Germany left-wing beliefs and therefore win the support of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils. However, neither Ebert nor Scheidemann wanted to see a communist revolution in Germany, so Ebert reached an agreement with the right-wing army on 10 November 1918. By the terms of this pact, General Wilhelm Groener agreed to suppress the remaining revolutionary activity in return for a promise that the government would allow the army and its existing officers to maintain their authority. Ebert has sometimes been accused of betraying his principles by signing a deal with the men who had ruled Germany under the Kaiser. However, the move reflected his determination to protect the new republic from illegal protests. Ebert and his colleagues believed in parliamentary democracy, not direct action and campaigns like those of the Spartacists. Ebert probably overestimated the threat posed by extreme left-wing violence, but he seems to have acted in good faith.
SOURCE 2.1 In the evening of 10th November, I telephoned the Reich Chancellery and told Ebert that the army put itself at the disposal of the government and that in return for this the Field Marshal, Hindenburg, and the officer corps expected the support of the government in the maintenance of order and discipline in the army. The officer corps expected the government to fight against bolshevism and was ready for the struggle. Ebert accepted my offer of an alliance. From then on we discussed the measures which were necessary every evening on a secret telephone line between the Reich Chancellery and the high command. The alliance proved successful. General Wilhelm Groener, recalling the pact between the German government and the army. Quoted in McKichan, F. 1992. Germany 1815–1939. Edinburgh, UK. Oliver and Boyd. p. 122.
QUESTION Consider the value and limitations of Source 2.1 for historians studying the Ebert-Groener pact.
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