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Collision: The International Compendium for Crash Research

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JANUARY 2014

HYUNDAI AND KIA CRASH DATA THE INDISPENSABLE COMPENDIUM General Functionality of the Hyundai & Kia EDR Tool(s) A Review of Hyundai & Kia Crash Data from “Real World” Crashes

A Review of Crash Testing Involving Hyundai & Kia Vehicles Coverage Spoofing; Data From Unsupported Hyundai & Kia Vehicles

INCLUDES: “Hyundai & Kia Crash Data A Preliminary Overview” collisionmagazine.com

Special edition reprints from Collision Magazine Volume 8

Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, the Indispensable Compendium W. R. "Rusty" Haight

Shawn Gyorke

Collision Safety Institute

Crash Data Services, LLC

Sean Haight Collision Safety Institute

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he Event Data Recorder (EDR) data retrieval tool built by Global Information Technology (GIT) which provides access to data stored in Hyundai and Kia vehicles was first offered for sale in 2012 such that vehicles sold by those manufacturers in the United States after September 2012 would be in compliance with 49CFR563. 1 2 The basic history of the GIT system, 49CFR563 and the basics related to the Tool are found in “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview” from Collision Volume 8, Issue 1 included by reference here. 3

This Compendium is a follow up to the earlier published preliminary review and is the product of a review and examination of crash test data, “real world” crashes, hands-on experiments and analysis of retrieved data. It is separated into five sub-sections: 1. General Functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) 2. A Review of Crash Testing involving Hyundai and Kia Vehicles 3. A Review of Hyundai and Kia Crash Data from "Real World" Crashes 4. Coverage Spoofing; Data from Unsupported Hyundai and Kia Vehicles 5. Compendium Conclusions and Summary

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The first section, “General Functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s),” is an examination of the installation and operation of the EDR tool and a limited look at its application. Observations related to potential installation considerations (i.e.: folder or directory choices which might be made during the initial installation process) are addressed. The operation of the Tool as it relates to how connection is made and other aspects of the hands-on use of the Tool are examined as the basis for other activity discussed in later sections of the Compendium such as the “coverage spoofing” section.

This sub-section also offers a general look at the basic report layout for Hyundai and Kia EDR reports and what one might expect to find within the various sections of those reports including the section contents and layout of the hexadecimal data as presented.

In “Crash Testing involving Hyundai and Kia Vehicles,” the authors examine a set of crash tests conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) involving Hyundai and Kia vehicles and compare the data retrieved from the Airbag Control Units (ACUs) to observations and instrumentation from those tests. An associated review of some of that data is also found in the paper “Analysis of Event Data Recorder Delta-V Recording in the IIHS Small Overlap Crash Test” found in this issue of Collision and particularly that information related to Hyundai and Kia vehicles involved in those tests is included by reference here.

The sub-section “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data from ‘Real World’ Crashes” is a look at data retrieved from a small group of those vehicles accessible using the GIT/Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) involved in “real world” crashes and, particularly taken in light of the data retrieved and analyzed from the IIHS tests, it offers a look at some of the EDR data in a setting other than a crash test.

Referring, in part, back to the section on functionality, the authors examine the potential for retrieving data from unsupported Hyundai an Kia vehicles in the sub-section “Coverage Spoofing; Data from Unsupported Hyundai and Kia Vehicles.” The authors examine the potential process and variations on that process and illustrate the possible dangers of this approach to data retrieval.

In the previously published “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview,” the authors briefly discussed what is otherwise identified as “VIN spoofing” (using Bosch CDR Tool related terminology as a frame of reference) and suggested then that there had been some “success,” limited to the notion that “data has been retrieved,” not that it has been successfully translated accurately.

This section looks at that investigation and experimentation in more detail including some analysis of the issues arising from this otherwise ill-advised

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practice at least in part in an effort to be able to potentially identify when it is undertaken later with unanticipated results.

be made later in the functionality, operation and/or output in the GIT EDR Tool which may make part(s) of this compendium obsolete or at least “dated.”

The last section of the Compendium is the “Conclusions and Summary” in which the authors have made an effort to further connect the other sub-sections and associated observations. Without a doubt, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) is a developing and evolving system which will undergo changes in the coming months and years as a function of this and other research. As there have already been changes to, for example the Data Limitations text found in the reports for the Hyundai and Kia EDR reports since publication of the preliminary review, one might reasonably anticipate that other changes or modifications might

Again using a comparison to (and with a “tip of the hat” to) the Bosch CDR Tool, the end users of the information found in this Compendium are urged to use the latest production release of the GIT EDR Tool software appropriately as indicated in the instructions which come with the relevant system when retrieving data from Hyundai or Kia vehicles. The authors believe that this Compendium will further illustrate what is the best way to ensure that retrieved data has been translated using the most current information provided by these manufacturers.

Editors Note:

In Volume 8, Issue 1 of Collision, in “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview,” the authors of this Compendium provided a “first look” at crash data newly available from Event Data Recorder (EDR) systems found in Hyundai and Kia vehicles retrievable using what will be referred to here as the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s). The Compendium in this issue is the first-of-its-kind published in-depth review of several important aspects of EDR data available from Hyundai and Kia vehicles and a follow-up on that early, preliminary review. Some of the crash test data initially evaluated and discussed briefly in that earlier review is also discussed in more depth in “Analysis of Event Data Recorder Delta-V Recording in the IIHS Small Overlap Crash Test” in this issue of Collision.

We are often asked about “peer review” of Collision articles. While that topic has been addressed time and again in Collision, for this Compendium, each of the sub-sections has been written and reviewed by individuals who have actually used the Hyundai and/or Kia EDR Tool and who have reviewed and compared the retrieved data to other sources of crash data or information. The best information we have been able to develop is that less than 50 Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools have been sold commercially within North America which makes it far less likely that, for example, some later published paper would be able to assert that same claim in the context of finding an individual with experience with the system to review the text.

During the preparation and research for this article, the authors reached out to Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai), Kia Motors Corporation (Kia) and Global Information Technology (GIT, the manufacturer of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s)). Hyundai responded that they were interested in the EDR test set up “status”

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and were looking for information on what kind of test was performed and how the testing was done as well as data on the differences between the data extracted using EDR tool and the ACU internal data. Despite follow up calls and emails from the authors offering the available information, no further communication has been had between the authors and any of those entities nor did they participate in the preparation of this Compendium.

For readers who might be familiar with the operation and use of the Bosch CDR Tool, many of the HyundaiKia EDR Tool concepts discussed in the Compendium may be easily compared to those concepts or applications associated with the CDR Tool….whether “good” or “bad.” Bosch is the manufacturer of the longest standing EDR data retrieval tool, no one from Bosch was involved in the research for or preparation of this Compendium. The Bosch CDR Tool has been in existence as the Vetronix then later the Bosch CDR Tool for nearly 14 years at this writing and the experience gained by the authors in the use of that tool over that same period in a variety of settings has been applied during the development of the Compendium. Undeniably, many of the readers of Collision will have personal experience with the use and application of the Bosch CDR Tool and, for that reason, some references have been made to the Bosch tool not so much as a “comparison,” but rather to offer a frame of reference.

For a more detailed and comprehensive look at data from these “EDR Tools,” the authors will be presenting on this article and potential developments in the meantime at the CDR User’s Summit in Houston, TX in January, 2014 and that presentation might be later referenced for updates to this text as necessary.

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Section 1: Functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) Editor’s note: This section of the Compendium is offered to address the basic installation, operation and function of the Hyundai/Kia EDR Tool. For those who haven’t seen the EDR Tool and for those who might have the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) Tool, this section is offered as a frame of reference and as background for other sections of this Compendium.

be installed. There are two installation options(Fig. 1.2); one installs the EDR Tool software to the user’s “C” drive and the other splits the program and “files” folder across two drives identified as “C” and “D.” Without a dedicated “D” drive where an end user might have a portable drive on which they store data and that drive might have a drive letter assigned differently by Windows each time the portable drive is attached, the “split installation” choice may result in difficulty saving reports later and/or lost data. For most users, the installation of all the components to a C drive is preferable.

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oftware Installation The Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) are sold as individual products with separate software applications; however, the underlying components and the functionality of the software identified as being “for Hyundai” as opposed to “for Kia” are essentially identical. Therefore, for the purpose of this compendium, the authors will only distinguish between the two applications when necessary.

As of November, 2013, an annual software subscription to either the Hyundai or Kia EDR Tool software component costs $195 (no doubt subject to change, the price at publication is offered here for information only). Initial installation software is distributed via CD-ROM, similar in nature to how Vetronix then Bosch originally distributed their CDR Tool software. When sold to an individual, the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools are each assigned a unique user identification (ID) number and password (PW). The user's ID and password are required when installing the software application(s) (Fig. 1.1).

Figure 1.2: Installation screen In the context of typical Windows environment installation, the way the installation process completed was surprising if not disconcerting. When the software installation process completes and the user clicks on Finish, the installation executable file automatically restarts the user’s computer without at that step until the shutdown process actually begins. While there is a dialog box (Fig. 1.3) which appears briefly, the shutdown process is fast (less than 10 seconds), and if the user has other open applications, work could be lost. Therefore, the authors encourage users to shut down all other Windows applications before beginning the install process.

Figure 1.1: "LoginForm" dialog box where the user will enter a unique ID and Password The install processes for the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools are effectively identical. While relatively problem free and simplistic, the authors identified a few subtle challenges with regard to the installation of the software packages addressed here later. During the install process, the user is prompted to select the directory to which the software will www.collisionpublishing.com

Figure 1.3: Installation screen indicating pending reboot Collision Magazine - Volume 8 Issue 2 51

The authors successfully installed both the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool software in Windows XP (Professional 32bit), Widows Vista (Home Premium 64-bit), Windows 7 (Home Premium 64-bit), Windows 8 (Professional 64-bit) and Windows 8.1 (Professional 64-bit) operating systems.

The option for installing all the components to the “C” drive was selected for each. Apart from the surprising shutdown, the installation was generally problem-free across a wide variety of Windows operating systems; both 32-bit and 64-bit.

After successfully installing the software applications, the user is provided with two distinct shortcut icons (Fig. 1.4) on the Windows desktop. The desktop shortcuts are identified as “HMA EDR” and “KMA EDR;” associating each with the separate “Hyundai Motors America” and “Kia Motors America” software installations.

Figure 1.4: Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool Shortcuts

Figure 1.5: Power and PC Communication indicators on the VCI

Figure 1.6: Connection via the DLC Port

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he EDR Tool hardware Similar to the Bosch CDR Tool, the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) require communication at two locations in order to facilitate access of a Hyundai or Kia Airbag Control Unit (ACU). First, the user must initiate communication with the Vehicle Communication Interface (VCI) (Fig 1.5), analogous in some ways to the Bosch CDR Tool interface module. Second, the user must also ensure communication between the VCI and the ACU either through the Diagnostic Link Connector (DLC or OBD II port) or directly to an ACU (Fig. 1.6 and Fig. 1.7).

While similar in some ways, the VCI functions in a different fashion than what the Bosch CDR Tool users are familiar with. The VCI has an added power (On/Off) button. Also, the VCI cannot be powered directly (has no direct receptacle). By way of explanation, the VCI must be powered by drawing power (12v) from the vehicle through the power and ground pins at the DLC, or through an external 12 volt power source, facilitated through the ACU cable(s).

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Figure 1.7: Connection direct to ACU Another distinct difference is that, in order to open the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool Software(s), the end user must have the VCI powered up and connected to the PC. Obviously, this requirement presents a distinct use case problem inasmuch as the end user cannot check for vehicle coverage list found in the software absent connecting the VCI, powering it up and then being able to open the software. When a user attempts to open the Hyundai and Kia software(s), tthe program automatically searches for communication (Fig 1.8) with the VCI.

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Figure 1.8: "Checking USB connection between PC and VCI"

Figure 1.10: "This program only can be run after login. Program will be terminating"

Absent the VCI being powered and connected to the PC, the user will see an error message dialog box (Fig. 1.9) or, if the use fails to login before attempting connection (Fig 1.10), the software will close.

Therefore, the vehicle coverage list (as well as other aspects of the software) cannot be accessed absent assembling and powering of the hardware associated with the system. The Hyundai and Kia EDR User’s Manual(s) also fails to provide a vehicle coverage list, and the User Manual is not revised as a result of the update process described later in this section.

Instead of associating a direct-to-ACU cable by vehicle make or model, the Hyundai and Kia EDR User’s Manual(s) only identify the ACU cable(s) associated with specific Hyundai and Kia ACU Identifier Codes (Fig. 1.11). An Identifier Code is simply a two-letter value printed on the label of Hyundai and Kia ACUs. These Identifier Codes help identify what cable(s) may access the subject ACU.

Figure 1.9: "In order to run this program, VCI needs to be connected. Please check the connection between PC and VCI"

By way of example, the Hyundai and/or Kia ACUs bearing Identifier Code(s) ‘RB’ or ‘FS’ would generally be accessible via cable G1ZDDPA005. The end user wouldn’t be able to identify this until (a) the ACU is identified by direct observation within a given vehicle and (b) then after the VCI is connected and powered up and the EDR software started.

Figure 1.11: Adapter identifier table example from the User Manual

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As of November 7th, 2013, the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool coverage list as found in the current respective software versions is shown in Table 1.1: Hyundai Accent Azera Elantra Coupe Elantra GT Elantra Equus Genesis Genesis Coupe Santa Fe Santa Fe Sport Sonata Hybrid Sonata Tucson Veloster Kia Cadenza Forte Optima Optima Hybrid Rio Sedona Sorento Soul Sportage

2013 Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available Available 2013 Not Available Available Available Available Available Not Available Available Available Available

2014 Not Available Available Available Not Available Not Available Available Available Not Available Available Available Not Available Available Available Available 2014 Available Available Available Not Available Available Available Available Available Available

Figure 1.12: Landing screen with update tab highlighted

Figure 1.13: E-mail subject for update notice

Table 1.1: Vehicle coverage

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oftware Update and Software Version The Hyundai and Kia EDR Software(s), as well as the VCI, must be manually updated. The end user performs this function via the Update tab (Fig 1.12) within the software once it’s running.

In addition to having the VCI powered and connected, the end user must also have an active internet connection at their PC. All updates are accomplished via an online update protocol.

Figure 1.14: Software update process GIT America, Inc., maker of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s), as well as the supplier of software revisions, generally sends users an e-mail reminder (Fig 1.13) for software updates which are then reflected in the update process as

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seen in Fig. 1.14. The initial software version release for Hyundai was E-N-H-01-00-0000, and the initial software version for Kia was E-N-K-01-00-0000. As of this writing (November 2013), the most current version of the Hyundai and Kia software(s) was E-N-H-01-00-0004 and E-N-K-01-00-0002, respectively. Addressed later, the version number detail seen here is not reflected in the output report seen by the end user.

The e-mail reminder from GIT America, Inc. provides the update version, as well as a very brief summary (Fig 1.15) of the additional vehicles added to the official vehicle coverage list.

Dear EDR Users, An internet update for your Kia EDR unit is now available.

In order to update to version E-N-K-01-00-0002, your EDR unit requires an internet connection and the VCI to be connected to the PC as well as to an ACU or to a vehicle (Required to power up the VCI).

There is no software version history built into the software update process nor is there a “What’s New” section (Fig 1.16) of the Hyundai or Kia Software. Therefore, users do not know what has been “fixed” or “updated” as a result of the software update and the end product report does not reflect the actual software revision or version number.

By way of comparison, the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval System offers a “What’s New” section whenever a revision is provided. Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Tool end users are also offered a summary of changes and bug fixes, as well as a summary of those vehicle models(s) and year(s) added (or potentially deleted).

At times, the effect of a software update with the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Tool can be substantive, such that the revision can affect the nature in which data is displayed (such as graphing), as well as the actual content or inclusion or exclusion of one or more data parameters. By way of example, with Version 12.0 of the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Tool, a correction for Toyota/Lexus/Scion data was made, wherein graphing and precision reporting was affected. The end user was alerted to this change in the information accompanying the version release.

The EDR unit will search for internet updates automatically whenever the EDR program is started or the "Internet Update" button is pressed.

The EDR internet update will contain the following: • VCI Firmware update (Ver. 2.06) • 2014MY Optima(TF/QF) Diagnostic Program.

• 2014MY Rio(UB) Diagnostic Program.

• 2014MY Soul(PS) Diagnostic Program. (Note: An additional ACU adapter (Serial #: G1ZDDPA012) It is not included in the Basic kit and is sold seperately).

• 2014MY Sportage(SL) Diagnostic Program.

For more information or to purchase the ACU adapters, please contact EQS at 1-888-542-1011 (Toll-Free).

For technical support, please contact GIT America at 1-888-5494977 (Toll-Free).

Figure 1.15: Example update e-mail

Figure 1.16: Example of version change information from Bosch CDR Tool Later within this Compendium, the authors address how the absence of a version history or “what’s new” section and lack of actual version numbering both with incremental updates, may adversely affect the results of an investigation involving the Hyundai and/or Kia EDR Tool(s).

As previously noted, the report generated by the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) do not display or one might suggest that they do not display adequately the specific or actual version number of the software the data was retrieved by and then translation with. The reports, to date, only provide users with a translation indicating the imaging was performed with “G-EDR Software Version 1.00” regardless of which actual version or release/update of the software(s) the actual retrieval and translation was performed with.

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Figure 1.18: Landing screen with vehicle shortcut tab highlighted

Figure 1.17: Two example reports showing the same G-EDR Software Version numbers regardless of which actual version or release/update of the software(s) the actual retrieval and translation was performed with.

Finding the end user’s actual version number is not intuitive or easily identified and it is not completely identified in a printed report (Fig. 1.17). The underlying version of the software the end user is applying when accessing an ACU and generating a report, can only be discerned by opening the software and selecting the “Update” tab.

When the user selects this tab, they can access, and download, a new version of the software, as well as “see” what version of the software is currently installed (see Fig 1.14).

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CU Access and Report Generation While connection to a Hyundai or Kia ACU is done via DLC or direct-to-ACU connection, the process within the software can be initiated in one of three ways, all originating from the Vehicle icon/tab (Fig. 1.18) within the EDR software interface.

The first method in which the user may initiate an imaging session is via the Auto VIN Search (Fig 1.19). The “Auto VIN Search” feature will only work when imaging is performed through the DLC, the vehicle status is set to Accessory or Run, and there is good (12 volt) in-car power. If all the previous requirements are met, the user may click the Auto VIN Search. The software will attempt to read the VIN from the vehicle. Since this feature is not available in the direct-to-ACU connection configuration, it follows that the software call for a VIN being “searched for” follows a generic OBD II call to collect the VIN from the vehicle’s powertrain/engine control module or ECU. The VCI being associated with the normal Hyundai or Kia diagnostic scan tool, it follows that the scan tool would retrieve the VIN from the powertrain ECU (akin to the same function within the Bosch CDR Tool).

Figure 1.19: Auto VIN Search button In a second use case, the end user may also begin an imaging session by manually entering a VIN. From the Vehicle tab, the user can manually type the VIN into the appropriate field seen in the upper left portion of the screen captures in Figure 1.20). Based on the VIN entered, the software will identify the Year/Model vehicle to be imaged.

The third available option for beginning a download is more generic. Users can forgo the use of a VIN, and simply select the model, year and engine (Fig 1.20) for the vehicle they are interested in imaging.

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model and year as selected by the end user (where no VIN is entered and the vehicle is selected based on that VIN).

As one who has used the Bosch CDR Tool or similar application may imagine, the nature in which the user may initiate an imaging session allows for potential access to data in and generation of a report from vehicle(s) outside the intended vehicle coverage list. For the purpose of this article, the authors will refer to this ill-advised and unsanctioned use of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) as “Coverage Spoofing,” as the scope of its application goes well beyond the VIN Spoofing sometimes possible (and similarly ill-advised) when using of the Bosch CDR Tool.

Coverage spoofing is addressed in greater detail later in this compendium.

Regardless of how the technician identifies the vehicle being imaged, the software allows the user to enter limited case detail (Fig 1.21). The user can enter their name, case number and crash date. None of the fields are mandatory to continue.

Figure 1.21: User can enter their name, case number and crash date Figure 1.20: Example of vehicle selection using model, year, and engine It becomes clear then that the potential access to data does not require a specific VIN and the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) does not require any specific reference to the subject vehicle by VIN to initiate the data retrieval process.

Even if the user chooses to enter a VIN manually, there is no requirement for the user to provide the correct VIN to the Hyundai or Kia EDR Tool(s). Moreover, there is no reference to a VIN in the report generated after data is retrieved. The only identification of the vehicle is by way of a line on the first page of the report indicating the make

After clicking “OK” to finish the end user input screen, one may click on the “retrieve” icon (Fig 1.22). The software suite will then initiate an imaging (Fig 1.23) of the subject vehicle/module (assuming there is a connection through the DLC or direct-to-ACU).

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Figure 1.22: Retrieve icon

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Data Retrieval Tool *.cdr or *.cdrx file. The lack of a raw, un-editable and re-translatable version of data from Hyundai and Kia ACUs creates, at least, an “evidentiary annoyance” not easily remedied. The authors have provided an example of this deficiency and its impact on the data application later in the Compendium.

Figure 1.23: Initiating the imaging of the subject vehicle/module

Figure 1.24: EDR data being translated to a report/PDF file Perhaps most disappointing to those familiar with the Bosch CDR Tool report particularly in the context of litigation is the format in which the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) produce the end report as well as the format in which the software saves the accessed data. If successful (Fig 1.24), the software will display a PDF version (Fig 1.25) of the translated data for the user in a report format on screen. Likewise, the user is provided an option to save the report as a PDF file.

Figure 1.25: The translated data as a PDF report There is; however, no option to save any “raw” data for later reanalysis within the software package. The software does not provide any sort of file similar to the Bosch Crash 58

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The Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool is, as stated within the Tool documentation, offered such that these manufacturers would be in compliance with 49CFR563. For example in the “Data Limitations” portion of a Hyundai or Kia report where one may find this entry: “The specifications for EDR are designed to be compatible with NHTSA 49 CFR Part 563 rule” (sic) as seen in the sample report found in this Compendium.) That regulation does not require a secure file which can later be re-translated with updated software nor are concerns about data integrity which might be addressed as a function of litigation anticipated in that regulation.

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eport Content Hyundai and Kia vehicles, officially covered by the EDR Tools, may record up to two events. Generally, the Data Limitations from these reports indicate that the events are “Deployments” and “Non-deployments” where the Deployments are locked and can’t be overwritten but Non-deployments unlocked and overwritten by later occurring events. This suggests that once two Deployments have been recorded or stored, the module would need to be replaced inasmuch as it can’t record additional data.

A recorded event is typically reported in four parts. By way of example, the Data Limitations portion of a given report may read “For the Event#1: Event#1-1 Event#1-2 Event#1-3 Real-Time Data.” Lacking other detail or explanation or comparable heading within the report body, this would seem to translate to: “Event 1, section 1,” “Event 1, section 2,” “Event 1, section 3,” and a section labeled “Real-Time Data.” Where there is a second event, the headers repeat (i.e.: “Event 2, section 1,” and so on). For a single recorded event, the report length varies between 10 and 30 pages including the four sections as translated as well as the hexadecimal data which is also displayed in the same section division layout.

“Event n, section 1,” includes tables and graphs of delta-V data, generally shown in km/h and milliseconds. “Event n, section 2,” includes event data, to include various precrash parameters, as well as deployment decision timing data (where appropriate). “Event n, section 3,” includes acceleration data (displayed in g’s) in both tabular and graphical form, apparently rounded for the purpose of re-

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porting to the nearest ½ g. And finally, the fourth part is identified as “Real-Time Data” which, at this writing, is limited to the data parameter "ignition cycle, download.

Pre-crash dynamic data, such as “speed” (in km/h) or “throttle application” (in %) are illustrated graphically, similar to the reports many may be familiar with as seen in the Bosch CDR Tool reports for the earliest GM vehicles which recorded pre-crash data. More specific examples of report parameters are provided later in this Compendium.

The Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) report includes a display of the data recovered in hexadecimal format and, loosely comparable to the Bosch CDR Tool “Engineering Translation report” for certain GM vehicles, the data is separated into blocks corresponding to the sections (i.e.: “Event n, section 1,”).

A sample report, offered as part of this Compendium is provided only as an example such that those not familiar with the report layout or design might better see what the output side of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool looks like and would provide a reference for later portions of this Compendium.

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eferences 1. "Read Me First." Introduction. Kia EDR User's Manual. Tustin, California: Global Information Technology, 2012. 4-5. Print.

2. "Event Data Recorders" 49 CFR 563. 2012.

3. Haight, Gyorke, Haight. “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview.” Collision: The International Compendium for Crash Research. Volume 8, Issue 1

Sample Report: The pages of this Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool report are offered as an example for use in better understanding parts of the Hyundai-Kia compendium found this issue of Collision. It may contain information which has been created for research or illustrative purposes and may not readily reflect data which would necessarily be found in an "actual" crash in the same way or as may be produced using a later available version of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool.

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Vehicle Information KM | SOUL(AM) | 2013 | ALL | AIRBAG SYSTEM Additional Information User : Collision Publishing CaseNumber : Volume 8 Issue 2 CrashDate : 4/14/13 Part No. : 95910 - 2L074 Save on : Sunday, October 28, 2013, at 10:13:39 G-EDR Software Version : 1.00

EDR Data Limitations

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Tools for downloading the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles have been developed only for vehicles produced after September 1, 2012. Currently, there is no tool for downloading accurate data from the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles produced prior to this.

The retrieval of his EDR data has authorized by the vehicle's owner, or other legal authority.

The airbag ECU can store up to two events. Deployment events cannot be overwritten or cleared from airbag ECU. Non-deployment events(which did not qualify as deployable events) can be overwritten by subsequent events.

The specifications for EDR are designed to be compatible with NHTSA 49 CFR Part 563 rule. The EDR data recording specifications of airbag ECU are divided into the following four categories.

- For the Event#1: Event#1-1 Event#1-2 Event#1-3 Real-Time Data.

- For the Event#2: Event#2-1 Event#2-2 Event#2-3 Real-Time Data.

The airbag ECU records data for all or some of the following crash(event) But, depending on the installed airbag ECU, data for side crash and/or rollover crash(event) may not be recored.

Ignition cycle counter(download) will increment by 1 every time when the power mode cycles is changed from OFF/Accessory to IGN/RUN or EDR data is downloaded by using the retrieval tool.

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Sample Report: The pages of this Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool report are offered as an example for use in better understanding parts of the Hyundai-Kia compendium found this issue of Collision. It may contain information which has been created for research or illustrative purposes and may not readily reflect data which would necessarily be found in an "actual" crash in the same way or as may be produced using a later available version of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool.

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Sample Report: The pages of this Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool report are offered as an example for use in better understanding parts of the Hyundai-Kia compendium found this issue of Collision. It may contain information which has been created for research or illustrative purposes and may not readily reflect data which would necessarily be found in an "actual" crash in the same way or as may be produced using a later available version of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool.

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Section 2: Crash Testing involving Hyundai and Kia Vehicles

C

rash Testing Overview Three different types of crash tests have been conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) using 2012-2014 Hyundai/Kia vehicles supported by the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool. The test protocols, reports and raw crash data can be used to shed some light on how well the EDR tool is reporting specific data parameters. All of these tests were performed at the IIHS Vehicle Research Center in Ruckersville, Virginia. They were conducted in a 22,000 square foot crash hall with a propulsion system that can accelerate a full size pickup truck up to 50 mph.1 IIHS implements state of the art measurement equipment including high fidelity accelerometers and fully instrumented crash dummies.

One of the many crash tests that the IIHS conducts, one is the Small Overlap Frontal Crashworthiness Evaluation.

This test is conducted at a speed of 40 mph (64.4 km/h) and the test vehicle is aligned so that a rigid barrier is 25% offset from the vehicle centerline.2 Figure 2.1 shows the vehicle orientation at the moment of impact.

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Figure 2.1: Diagram showing the small overlap crash test configuration Prior to the test, the gasoline is removed from the vehicle and the fuel lines are replaced with a Stoddard solvent.

The engine is then started to ensure that the Stoddard solvent has filled the fuel lines completely. To measure www.collisionpublishing.com

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vehicle accelerations, a steel plate is welded to the floor of the rear seating area along the centerline of the vehicle and then three Endevco accelerometers are mounted and oriented in the longitudinal, lateral and vertical directions.

To measure the moment of impact, two pressure-sensitive tape switches are applied to the front of the vehicle. The in-car data acquisition system relies on closure of the tape switch to set a time-zero for the crash pulse and other data elements.

Just before the test begins, a 50th percentile male Hybrid II dummy is placed in the driver seat and the driver seat belt is buckled. The vehicle is turned to the on position to power the vehicle electronics but the engine is not started (turning over). To begin the test, the vehicle is accelerated straight forward by the IIHS propulsion system at an average of 0.3 g until just before it reaches the vertical steel plate barrier such that it approached the barrier at a steady state speed at and just before impact.

The second type of crash test in this data set is the Moderate Overlap Frontal Crashworthiness Evaluation. While this crash test is very similar to the Small Overlap Crash Test it differs in two major aspects. While the impact speed and angle are the same, the percent overlap is increased from 25% to 40% 3 and instead of striking a rigid barrier, the moderate overlap test utilizes a rectangular deformable barrier. All other test preparations are similar to that of the small overlap crash test. Figure 2.2 is a diagram that shows the setup for a moderate overlap crash test at IIHS.

Figure 2.2: Diagram showing the moderate overlap crash test configuration The last type of crash test analyzed in this study is the Side Impact Crashworthiness Evaluation. This test is arranged so that a stationary test vehicle is struck on the driver side by a deformable barrier attached to a movable “crash cart” at a 90 degree angle.4 The speed of the barrier at impact is 31.1 mph (50 km/h) and the “crash cart” weighs about 3,300 lbs (1,500 kg). Figure 2.3 is a diagram of the set-up for an IIHS side impact test.

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Figure 2.3: Side impactcrash test configuration Like the other IIHS tests, the fluids are removed from the vehicle and replaced with Stoddard solvent and the fuel lines are cleared of gasoline. Unlike the previously described tests, only the lateral accelerations are measured near the A and B pillars on the non-struck side by the IIHS as a function of the focus of their research. Unlike the other IIHS crash tests, a 5th percentile SID-II dummy is belted and positioned in the driver seat while a second identical dummy is belted and positioned in the left rear seat. As is the case for all of the IIHS crash tests, video footage and still photography are captured and archived.

T

est Matrix Table 2.1 contains the year, make, model, test type and IIHS test number for each ACM that was downloaded using the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool. For each test, the ACM was removed from the vehicle by IIHS test technicians and downloaded using direct-to-module cables. In each test, except side impact test CES1306, both longitudinal and lateral accelerations were recorded and analyzed.

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nalysis of Crash Data As previously mentioned, all of the crash tests included in this paper were performed at IIHS according to IIHS test protocol. Moreover, all of the frontal crash tests were offset and caused the test vehicle to undergo significant rotation during the impact. Because the accelerometer was not colocated with the ACM, the accelerations and the calculated delta-V will have some significant differences. This difference is discussed in a separate paper in this issue of Collision.5 In short, the rotation of the vehicle in an offset crash coupled with a significant distance between measurement sensor and the ACM data reveals two different readings for acceleration and delta-V.

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Year 2012 2012 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013 2014

Make Hyundai Kia Hyundai Hyundai Hyundai Kia Kia Kia Kia

Model Accent Rio Accent Elantra Tucson Rio Rio Soul Forte

Test Type Moderate Overlap Frontal Moderate Overlap Frontal Small Overlap Frontal Small Overlap Frontal Small Overlap Frontal Small Overlap Frontal Side Impact Small Overlap Frontal Small Overlap Frontal

IIHS Test Number CEF1107 CEF1201 CEN1329 CEN1310 CEN1237 CEN1330 CES1306 CEN1317 CEN1318

Table 2.1: Selected IIHS crash tests Since this effect occurs in all of the frontal offset crash tests, only the side impact acceleration and delta-V data will be compared directly. For brevity, all other crash tests will be highlighted but only unusual or contextually interesting data parameters will be discussed in more detail.

2012 Hyundai Accent (CEF1107) Although the 2012 Hyundai Accent is not a supported vehicle in the Hyundai EDR tool, the authors decided it would be important to test the device on an older (unsupported) models to document and underscore the dangers of “coverage spoofing.” Because the Hyundai EDR software has no 2012 Hyundai Accent to choose from, the 2013 Hyundai Accent vehicle was selected for this download. This test follows the moderate overlap test procedure described above.

It is very clear in this test that coverage spoofing will provide “some data” and it is equally clear that at least some of the parameters do not make physical sense in the context of the test conducted. For example, Figure 2.4 shows the reported longitudinal acceleration for the moderate overlap crash test and Figure 2.5 shows the acceleration measured

by IIHS for the same test. Obviously, is a large discrepancy between the acceleration reported by the Hyundai EDR Tool and the IIHS accelerometers. It is important to note the -70 g and the +70 g values in the EDR report appear to be the confines of the range for the system. One could propose that there seems to be a data translation error in this case and the software may be reading the accelerations incorrectly. This issue appears to be associated with coverage spoofing the 2012 Hyundai Accent because the 2013 Hyundai Accent, discussed later, does not have similar acceleration values and reinforces that coverage spoofing should be avoided.

Figure 2.4: Reported longitudinal acceleration

Figure 2.5: Measured longitudinal acceleration Another significant observation would be that the delta-V for this test does not seem to be integrated directly from the acceleration provided in the report. If one were to integrate the data in Figure 2.4, the maximum delta-V would be closer to -355 km/h. The actual EDR Tool reported maximum longitudinal delta-V is -73 km/h. This latter value is a reasonable delta-V when one considers that the impact speed for this test is 64.4 km/h.

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While one cannot compare the delta-V calculated by the IIHS accelerometer directly because of the rotation and difference in sensor location, the reported IIHS delta-V is -68 km/h. Without measuring the acceleration at same location as the ACM, it is difficult to determine exactly if the reported delta-V data is accurate or not. This same argument can be made for the lateral delta-V which is reported as 6 km/h.

In this report, the vehicle roll angle is listed as a data table and graph, however each time entry is listed as “not supported” and the graph is blank. Vehicle speed, which is 63 km/h at time zero, is consistent with the test protocol. The engine throttle is listed as 8% even though the engine is not turning over during the crash test. The engine throttle percent data parameter is discussed in more in section 4 of this paper. As expected, the service brake is off during the entire test, the diver safety belt status is reported as “on” and the passenger safety belt status is reported as “off.” Also as expected, the engine RPM is reported as zero since the engine is off during the test. ABS activity is reported as OFF for all time points and the stability control is reported as “on” (as opposed to “active”). Item #15 of the Hyundai EDR report is the steering input, however, each sample is listed as “Not supported (or invalid data).” Also reported as “not supported” is lateral acceleration.

While some of the reported data vales do seem to be consistent with the test data, (i.e.: “vehicle speed,” RPM, seat belt use, etc.) there are some values, such as longitudinal acceleration, that are not reported correctly. These incorrectly reported values should again serve to discourage the reconstructionist from coverage spoofing non-supported vehicles with the Hyundai/Kia EDR Tool.

2012 Kia Rio (CEF1201) The 2012 Kia Rio moderate overlap crash test was also analyzed for any inconsistencies in the reported data parameters. Like the 2012 Hyundai Accent, the 2012 Kia Rio is not supported by the Kia EDR Tool and therefore the authors chose to engage in coverage spoofing with the EDR Tool for the purposes of this analysis as previously described. To accomplish this, the 2013 Kia Rio was selected as the test vehicle using the on-screen list.

The maximum longitudinal delta-V for the 2012 Kia Rio is -77 km/h, which is similar to that of the 2012 Hyundai Accent. The lateral delta-V was reported as 7 km/h. The vehicle roll angle was not supported for all time points and the roll angle graph was left blank. The vehicle speed for this test, which is 65 km/h at time zero, is consistent with the test protocol. Like the 2012 Hyundai Accent moderate overlap test, the throttle is listed as 8% and the service brake is off for all time points. Unlike the 2012 Hyundai Accent, all of the steering input values are reported as zero, which is consistent with a vehicle being pulled into a barrier on a straight track.

The longitudinal acceleration and delta-V values for this EDR report reasonably compare with the IIHS crash test data; however, again, it is not appropriate to compare the data correctly because the sensors were not mounted at the same location as the ACM. Like the other tests, the engine throttle is reported throughout the five seconds prior to impact, however the reported value is 14% to 15% compared to the 8% observed on the previous test example.

The engine speed, ABS activity, stability control and the driver safety belt status, passenger safety belt status are all recorded correctly for this test. Vehicle roll angle is listed as “not supported” for all data points and the corresponding graph is empty.

2013 Hyundai Accent (CEN1329) The 2013 Hyundai Accent was the first vehicle discussed in this data set that is currently supported by the Hyundai EDR Tool and the first small overlap crash test in the data set. The reported vehicle speed at the time of impact for this test is 63 km/h which is consistent with the actual speed of the vehicle at impact as reported.

Figure 2.6: Photo of the 2012 Kia Rio moderate overlap crash test (courtesy of the IIHS) 68

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Like the previously described tests, the vehicle accelerations and delta-V values cannot be directly compared to the IIHS crash test data, they do; however, seem reasonable given the impact speed of 64.4 km/h and the dynamics of a small overlap crash. The maximum longitudinal delta-V for this test was -47 km/h and the maximum lateral deltaV was 13 km/h. The reported longitudinal and lateral ac-

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celerations do seem to report the dynamics of ACM and there does not seem to be any inappropriate data points in either tables.

The vehicle roll angle is not supported, the vehicle speed is 63 km/h, the engine throttle is 14% to 15%, the service brake is off, the engine RPM is zero, the ABS activity is reported as off, and stability control is on. All of these available parameters are consistent with the test data. The driver safety belt is reported as “on” and the passenger safety belt is reported as “off,” which is consistent with the test protocol.

software. The table in this figure is truncated for space; all of the values 0.3 seconds are reported as “invalid data.” The Data Limitations found with the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool report offers no explanation for the “invalid data” indicator. Lacking insight into this indication, one is left to speculate that this may be a function of clipping, other internal or pre-set system limits or an internal failure of some sort.

Steering input, however, introduces some notable differences between two different 2013 Hyundai Accents. The vehicle in this crash test reports that all of the steering input values are “not supported (or invalid data)” while another download of the same vehicle model (2013 Hyundai Accent) from a real world collision does in report values for this parameter. This real world case is more thoroughly investigated and noted in section 3 of this Compendium in this issue of Collision.

2013 Hyundai Elantra (CEN1310) The 2013 Hyundai Elantra is the second small overlap crash test and the second Hyundai EDR tool supported vehicle in this paper. The maximum longitudinal delta-V is -64 km/h and the maximum lateral delta-V is 10 km/h which are reasonably consistent with the 64.4 km/h impact speed and crash dynamics of the small overlap test. The vehicle roll angle is “not supported” and the vehicle speed is 63 km/h at about time zero. The engine throttle for this test was 7% for all of the time points and the service brake was correctly listed as off. The safety belt status for the driver, the passenger belt status, the engine RPM, the ABS activity, and the stability control were all reported correctly as compared to the test design and as conducted. The steering input angle is zero degrees, which is also reported correctly considering that the vehicle was being pulled straight on a track. Both the longitudinal and lateral accelerations are reasonably consistent with a small overlap crash test pulses.

2013 Hyundai Tucson (CEN1237) The 2013 Hyundai Tucson was the third small overlap crash test and the first SUV to be analyzed in this review.

The most striking difference in this test report is the existence of roll angle data. Given all of the reports in this crash test matrix, this vehicle is the only one with a populated vehicle roll angle data table. Not only is the existence of this table singularly interesting, but the way it is reported is also unique. Figure 2.7 shows the table and graph for the vehicle roll angle as reported in the Hyundai EDR tool

Figure 2.7: Graph and table of the reported vehicle roll angle for the 2013 Hyundai Tucson crash test As expected, the vehicle roll angle is 0 degrees from -1.0 through time zero. After impact, the vehicle roll angle is reported as -10 degrees. This value stays constant for 300 ms. After 300 ms, all of the data points are reported as “invalid data.” It is not certain whether or not this data is actually “invalid” or if the module stops recording after the frontal event is complete as a function of the requirements found in Table III of 49CFR563. It is possible that for a longer event, like a rollover, the data collection may continue past 300 ms but inasmuch as Table III calls for 300ms of data (except for a rollover) it would seem the most likely explanation is compliance with that recording period rather than a suggestion that the data represents the event completely or that it would be for the same period in a rollover event.

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The maximum reported longitudinal delta-V is reported as -60 km/h and the maximum reported lateral delta-V is 7 km/h. These values are reasonably consistent with the small overlap crash test dynamics. Like other tests, the vehicle speed at impact is listed as 63 km/h in the EDR report which is very close to the actual impact speed. Engine throttle is reported at 4% and the service brake is off for all time points. The driver and passenger safety belt statuses are consistent with the test setup. The engine RPM, the ABS activity and the stability control are all consistent with the small overlap crash test. The steering input is reported as zero degrees for all time intervals which is accurate for this test. Lastly, both the longitudinal and lateral acceleration data seem reasonably appropriate for the small overlap crash configuration.

with the fact that this vehicle is being pulled straight down a track. The steering angle should reasonably be reported as 0 degrees as observed in all the previously mentioned tests.

The accuracy of steering input becomes more significant when one contemplates the requirements of 49CFR563 discussed in a later section of this Compendium.

2013 Kia Rio (CEN1330)

2013 Kia Rio (CES1306)

The 2013 Kia Rio is the fourth small overlap crash test in this data set. Perhaps the most interesting parameter observed in this report is the steering input data. Figure 2.8 shows the steering input graph and table from the 14th page of this EDR report.

The 2013 Kia Rio is the only side impact test of this data set. For this test, the lateral acceleration and delta-V can be directly compared because the barrier impacts the vehicle in the center, perpendicular to the longitudinal axis. This does not cause the same kind of rotation that is observed in the small and moderate overlap crash tests. Since only the lateral acceleration is measured during the test, it will be compared directly to the data provided in the Kia EDR Tool report. Figure 2.9 shows the lateral acceleration and delta-V from the 2013 Kia Rio report.

For this test, the maximum reported longitudinal and lateral delta-V values, as well as the corresponding accelerations, are consistent with the small overlap crash test.

The vehicle roll angle for crash test was reported as “not supported” for all time values. The vehicle speed, engine throttle, brake status, engine RPM, ABS activity, driver and passenger safety belt status and stability control are all consistent with the small overlap crash test.

Figure 2.10 shows the comparison between the Kia EDR Tool reported lateral acceleration and the IIHS instrumentation acceleration. Figure 2.11 shows the comparison between the Kia EDR Tool reported delta-V and the calculated delta-V provided by the IIHS accelerometers.

It is clear that the lateral delta-V reported by the EDR Tool in this side impact test reasonably compares to the deltaV calculated using the IIHS accelerometer. The maximum delta-V calculated from the IIHS accelerometer is about 26.7 km/h (16.6 mph) while the maximum reported deltaV reported by the EDR tool is 25 km/h (15.5 mph). The percent error between the two maximum delta-V values is about -6.4% if one assumes that the IIHS calculated deltaV is the true value. Figure 2.12 shows a ±10% error corridor for the IIHS calculated delta-V value.

Figure 2.8: Reported steering input for the 2013 Kia Rio crash test The steering input values for this Kia EDR Tool report range from +10 to +15 degrees throughout the 5 seconds of pre-crash data. The values in this table are not consistent 70

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Unlike the delta-V comparison, the acceleration data provided by the Kia EDR Tool does not compare favorably with the IIHS acceleration data, at least at first glance.

What is not clear to the user of the Kia EDR Tool data is the method for filtering or averaging that takes place when (or perhaps before) the acceleration values are recorded or reported. The data processing which clearly must be taking place could have a significant effect on the reported

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Figure 2.9: Reported lateral accerlation and delta-V from 2013 Kia Rio side impact test

Figure 2.10: Comparison between the reported and measured lateral acceleration

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Figure 2.12: Instrumentation lateral delta-V with a ±10% band acceleration and since it is not clear which method(s) is used, it is very difficult to compare directly with other raw (control) data.

For example, based on the acceleration recorded by IIHS, the maximum acceleration observed is about 22g (when filtered at SAE60). In comparison, the EDR Tool reported a maximum acceleration of 10.5g. This discrepancy is most likely due to the unknown (otherwise undescribed in any supporting literature) processing that is applied within the ACM or by the EDR Tool software. If one were to apply the same processing methods to the IIIHS accelerations, then the accelerations would most likely be better related.

It is important to note that if one mathematically integrates the acceleration reported by the Kia EDR Tool, it will not equal the delta-V from the same report. Figure 2.13 shows the delta-V that was integrated from the EDR reported acceleration. The integrated acceleration data does have a similar maximum delta-V, however, many of the time points to not match the reported delta-V or the IIHS delta-V. On inspection, it seems to be that the integrated EDR acceleration is time shifted by about 18ms.

If the time shift is analyzed, the integrated acceleration and the delta-V reported by the EDR tool match relatively well. The selection of the 18ms shift has been arbitrarily applied here for illustration alone and may not be applicable to other data sets. In other words, that selected shift reasonably aligns the data sets in this example but may not result in a comparable alignment in another data set.

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Not shown here graphically is the longitudinal acceleration and delta-V. Since this is a perpendicular side impact crash test, there is minimal longitudinal acceleration, and therefore minimal longitudinal delta-V. The acceleration found in the EDR report shows that all of the samples are effectively zero, ranging from -0.5g to 1.0g. Similarly, the longitudinal delta-V has a range from 0 to -1 km/h. This is expected for this type of crash test and seems to be correctly measured and reported.

In this report, the vehicle roll angle is “not supported” and the corresponding graph is empty. The vehicle speed, which is zero for all reported values, is correct because the vehicle is stationary prior to impact. The engine throttle is at 8% for all values prior to impact and the service brake is reported as off for all values. The safety belt status for the driver and passenger are recorded correctly as “on” and “off” respectively. Engine RPM is reported as zero for all values and the ABS activity are all listed as "off." The steering input is correctly reported as zero because the vehicle is lined up with the wheels “straight ahead” prior to the test.

2013 Kia Soul (CEN1317) The 2013 Kia Soul is the fifth small overlap test in this data set. Like the other small overlap tests, the delta-V and the accelerations cannot be directly compared due to the fact that there was significant rotation and the reference accelerometer was not colocated with the ACM. Generally, however, the delta-V and accelerations provided in the EDR report do seem to be consistent with a small overlap

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Figure 2.13: Instrumentation lateral delta-V with the integrated acceleration from the EDR report crash at 64.4 km/h. The maximum longitudinal delta-V was reported as -45 km/h and the maximum lateral deltaV was reported as 16 km/h.

In this test, the vehicle roll angle was listed as “not supported” for all values and the corresponding graph was left empty. The engine throttle was listed at 8% and the service brake was reported as off for all values. As expected, the steering input for this test was reported as zero degrees for all of the 11 data samples prior to impact. Finally, the safety belt status was reported correctly for the driver and passenger as “on” and “off” respectively.

The vehicle speed the perhaps the most notable parameter found in this report. The actual impact speed for this test, as reported by IIHS instrumentation, is 64.3 km/h. The vehicle speed, as reported by the Kia EDR Tool ranges from 55 km/h at -5.0 seconds to 61 km/h at time zero.

This discrepancy in vehicle speed represents an error of about 5.1%. This relatively small percent error is; however, the largest observed in all of the tests in the data set.

zero. This is slightly less than the measured impact speed of 64.4 km/h.

The engine throttle percentage for all pre-crash time samples was 1% and the service brake was reported as "off" for each sample prior to impact. The safety belt status for the driver and the passenger was reported as "on" and "off" respectively. The engine RPM was reported as zero for all pre-crash time samples and the ABS activity was reported as "off" for each sample. The steering input seems to be measured and recorded correctly as zero degrees for all precrash samples. Lastly, the acceleration (longitudinal and lateral) reports seem to be consistent with a small overlap crash test.

2014 Kia Forte (CEN1318) The 2014 Kia Forte was the last small overlap crash test that was included for analysis in this study. The maximum reported delta-V was reported as -56 km/h and 9 km/h in the longitudinal and lateral directions which is generally consistent with this type of crash test. Vehicle roll angle was reported as "not supported." The vehicle speed ranged from 59 km/h to 62 km/h for the 5 seconds prior to time

Figure 2.14: Photo of the 2014 Kia Forte from the small overlap crash test (courtesy of the IIHS)

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S

ummary In large part, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool reported data sets, compared to that collected by the IIHS in this series of crash tests, appears to be reasonably accurate; however, there are notable exceptions. These include:

• • • •

Potential anomalous data, in particular acceleration values, as a product of “coverage spoofing” (see 2012 Hyundai Accent test) Roll angle “missing/invalid data” (see 2013 Hyundai Tucson test) Steering inputs (see 2013 Kia Rio small overlap test) Acceleration data in general due to unknown raw data processing (see 2013 Kia Rio side impact test)

Arguably, some of these apparent discrepancies or differences might be addressed in a more thoroughly developed and detailed “Data Limitations” which would (should) accompany these types of reports. Lacking detailed information on the application, filtering process, anticipated accuracy, range, and resolution it is difficult to say whether or not the data, taken in total, may be used reliably to “… ensure that EDRs record, in a readily usable manner, data valuable for effective crash investigations and for analysis of safety equipment performance (e.g., advanced restraint systems). (where) These data will help provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which crashes and injuries occur and will lead to safer vehicle designs.”6

A

study. IIHS is an independent, nonprofit scientific and educational organization dedicated to reducing the losses — deaths, injuries and property damage — from crashes on the nation's roads.

R

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

eferences 1. "Inside IIHS." Vehicle Research Center. Web. 17 Oct. 2013. <http://www.iihs.org/iihs/ about-us/vrc>.

Small Overlap Frontal Crashworthiness Evaluation Crash Test Protocol. Rep. Version II. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2012. Print.

Moderate Overlap Frontal Crashworthiness Evaluation Crash Test Protocol. Rep. Version XIV. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2012.

Print.

Side Impact Crashworthiness Evaluation Crash Test Protocol. Rep. Version VI. Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2012. Print.

Haight S., Haight W. R., "Analysis of Event Data Recorder Delta-V Reporting in the IIHS Small Overlap Crash Test." Collision: The International Compendium for Crash Research. Volume 8, Issue 2.

74144 Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 240, Thursday, December 13, 2012, Proposed Rules; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 49 CFR Part 571, [Docket No. NHTSA–2012–0177], RIN 2127– AK86, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders

cknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, especially Becky Mueller and Raul Arbelaez, for their contributions to this

Section 3: Hyundai and Kia Crash Data from “Real World” Crashes

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n addition to comparison testing of data by way of a review of instrumented crash tests, the authors of this Compendium sought to evaluate real-world collisions wherein the data conveyed in the Hyundai and/or Kia EDR report(s) from the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools(s) might be examined against other forms of evidence and common accident investigation techniques.

Based on the fact that the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) are only intended for use on vehicles produced after September 1st, 2012 (presumptively model year 2013) or newer 1, consistent with compliance with 49CFR563 2, the authors sought only Model Year 2013 (or newer) vehicles for the comparisons.

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Case #1 - 2013 Kia Soul and a 2013 Cadillac XTS The crash occurred as the driver of the 2013 Kia Soul made a left turn in an attempt to leave a major thoroughfare and enter an adjacent shopping mall. The driver of the 2013 Cadillac XTS was traveling in the opposite direction of the Kia Soul and, as the Kia Soul completed its turn, the front of the 2013 Kia Soul struck the driver’s side of the Cadillac XTS. The crash resulted in the deployment of the side and headcurtain airbags as well as the driver seatbelt pre-tensioner in the 2013 Cadillac XTS. There were no deployments noted in the 2013 Kia Soul. Both vehicles were damaged sufficiently to have been towed from the scene.

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NOT TO SCALE, ILLUSTRATION ONLY

Figure 3.1: Case #1 - 2013 Kia Soul (red) and 2013 Cadillac XTS (black) The Event Data Recorders (EDRs) were both imaged; the 2013 Cadillac via the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval (CDR) Tool, and the 2013 Kia Soul via the Kia EDR Tool. Then, a comparison was made between the recorded delta-V from the 2013 Cadillac XTS and the 2013 Kia Soul.

Before the actual comparison could be made, vehicle specifications were sought for both the 2013 Cadillac XTS and 2013 Kia Soul. The published weights for said vehicles were approximately 4215 lbs 3 and 2778 lbs 4 respectively.

In order to account for the additional weights of cargo and occupants, 250 lbs was added to the weight of the 2013 Kia Soul, and 350 lbs was added to the weight of the Cadillac XTS 5. Therefore, the weights of the vehicles, when they collided, for this analysis, were assumed to be about 4565 lbs for the 2013 Cadillac XTS and 3028 lbs for 2013 Kia Soul.

In examining the recorded Longitudinal and Lateral deltaV from the 2013 Cadillac XTS, the authors found that the

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Figure 3.2: Photographs of the 2013 Kia Soul

Figure 3.3: Photographs of the 2013 Cadillac XTS vehicle experienced a Maximum Longitudinal delta-V of about -4 MPH, as well as a Maximum Lateral delta-V of about 5 MPH, both occurring around 150ms after time zero.

Based on the availability of both Longitudinal and Lateral delta-V data for the 2013 Cadillac XTS, the authors calculated the resultant delta-V that the vehicle experienced :

Equation 3.1: Resultant delta-V for the 2013 Cadillac XTS Therefore, the resultant delta-V for the Cadillac, based on its internally recorded delta-V, was about 6.4 mph.

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Based on the fact that extensive research has been performed with regard to the accuracy and reliability of General Motors EDR data 6, 7, 8, 9 and the data “made sense” given the crash case facts, the authors set the 2013 Cadillac XTS as the benchmark by which the subsequent comparison was made with the 2013 Kia Soul data. In short, the 2013 Cadillac XTS resultant delta-V was assumed to be reasonably reliable for the purpose of the subsequent comparison.

In examining the recorded Longitudinal and Lateral deltaV from the 2013 Kia Soul, the authors selected a Longitudinal delta-V of -16 km/h (-9.9 mph) and a Lateral delta-V of -1 km/h (0.6 mph), both occurring at 150ms within their respective delta-V sets. These specific samples were selected by the authors because they represented the same approximate time(s) as observed for the 2013 Cadillac XTS Maximum delta-V data points (both Longitudinal and Lateral).

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Figure 3.4: Maximum recorded longitudinal and lateral delta-V from 2013 Cadillac XTS (excerpt, Bosch CDR Tool report)

Figure 3.5: Longitudinal and lateral delta-V reported by the Kia EDR Tool for the 2013 Kia Rio Given the availability of both Longitudinal and Lateral delta-V data for the 2013 Kia Soul, we can calculate the resultant delta-V that the vehicle experienced as:

Adopting the assumption that the force acting on the Kia would be equal opposite to that acting on the Cadillac,10 and given the mass (weight) of the 2013 Kia Soul, as well as that of the 2013 Cadillac XTS, we can utilize the previously calculated resultant delta-V of 2013 Cadillac XTS in order to calculate the anticipated resultant delta-V of the 2013 Kia Soul, absent the use of the 2013 Kia Soul’s EDR report.

Equation 3.2: Resultant delta-V for the 2013 Kia Rio

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Equation 3.3: Calculated Delta-V for the Kia Rio When the resultant delta-V of the 2013 Kia Soul is calculated via the reported Longitudinal delta-V and a Lateral delta-V from its EDR report, the resultant delta-V is about 9.96 MPH. When the resultant delta-V is calculated via comparison with the 2013 Cadillac XTS weight, 2013 Kia Soul weight and 2013 Cadillac XTS resultant delta-V, the calculated value is 9.64 MPH. Clearly then, the delta-V data as reported by the 2013 Kia Soul compares well with delta-V data as retrieved from the 2013 Cadillac XTS (9.96 mph vs. 9.64 mph).

While the extent of the data collected during the aforementioned real-world comparison was encouraging, the authors also experienced reports, generated by the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) that exhibited debatable data translations in some real-world cases.

Case #2 - 2013 Hyundai Accent The subject real world crash occurred as the driver of the 2013 Hyundai Accent approached a stoplight, with traffic slowing and stopped ahead. In all, there were four (4) vehicles involved in the collision; a 2005 Infinity G35X, a 1999 Infinity Q45, a 2010 Jeep Wrangler and the 2013 Hyundai Accent.

All but the 2013 Hyundai Accent stopped for the aforementioned traffic signal. For an unknown reason, the driver of the 2013 Hyundai Accent failed to reduce her speed before striking, and under-riding, the rear of the 2010 Jeep Wrangler. The 2010 Jeep Wrangler was subsequently pushed into the rear of the 1999 Infinity Q45, which was then pushed into the rear of the 2005 Infinity GX35.

The crash did not involve the deployment of any airbags or seatbelt pre-tensioners in the 2013 Hyundai Accent.

However, due to substantial damage, the 2013 Hyundai Accent was towed from the scene.

The Airbag Control Unit (ACU) from the 2013 Hyundai Accent was accessed, and a report generated, via the Hyundai EDR Tool. Then, an examination of the EDR

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Figure 3.6: Photographs of the 2013 Hyundai Accent

NOT TO SCALE, ILLUSTRATION ONLY

Figure 3.7: Illustration of the 2013 Hyundai Accent crash

report was compared against the known circumstances of the collision.

While an independent validation of the data sets was not possible (due to a lack of instrumented testing), the majority of recorded parameters displayed in the 2013 Hyundai Accent report seemed to fit with the circumstances of the collision. In this case, although the Jeep may have had

data which might have been retrieved using the Bosch CDR Tool, such data was unavailable for this analysis but, by way of example, the Maximum Longitudinal delta-V of about -22 KPH, as well as the Time to Max delta-V of about 215ms for the Hyundai generally fit with the shape and duration of significant under-ride type collisions.

Likewise, the majority of the pre-crash data parameters seemed to fit with driver and/or witness statements, to in-

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Figure 3.9: Reported vehicle speed from the Hyundai EDR Tool for the 2013 Hyundai Accent

Figure 3.8: Longitudinal delta-V reported from the Hyundai EDR Tool for the 2013 Hyundai Accent

clude self-approximated speeds, as well as reactionary measures (i.e.: braking just before impact). For this example; however, there remained data which was inconsistent with observations and logic.

Specifically, the report generated by the Hyundai EDR Tool suggested the driver of the 2013 Hyundai Accent was engaged in what would appear to be at least 250 degrees of counter-clockwise steering prior to the collision (-250° assuming SAE J211 polarity).

In contradiction to this observation, the roadway wherein this collision occurred was straight, at least two independent witnesses observed the 2013 Hyundai Accent traveling generally straight prior to the crash and the damage to the front of the Hyundai suggests that it was aligned directly behind the Jeep at impact. Based on the fact that 80

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Figure 3.10: Reported brake status from the Hyundai EDR Tool for the 2013 Hyundai Accent the Steering Input data was reported at a constant and apparently maximum value, the authors theorize the error was a product of an improper data translation or a failure of the program to indicate the data element(s) a “clipped value” or “invalid” data element.

This theory was further supported through empirical testing with an identical 2013 Hyundai Accent. By way of example, the IIHS tested a 2013 Hyundai Accent as part of the Small Overlap Crash Test Program (discussed elsewhere in this Compendium). When a comparison of the report generated from the IIHS 2013 Hyundai Accent was made with the report generated from the real-world 2013 Hyundai Accent, the authors noted the Steering Input from the IIHS 2013 Hyundai Accent was translated as “Not Supported (or invalid data).”

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Figure 3.11 Reported steering input angle from the for the 2013 Hyundai Accent in Case #2

Figure 3.12: Reported steering input angle from a 2013 Hyundai Accent small overlap crash test

One could theorize, the impossible translations as contained in the report generated by the Hyundai EDR Tool in April of 2013 were or may have been, at some point, remedied via a software update, as an identical vehicle, when accessed in August of 2013, with the same Hyundai EDR Tool, produced a report wherein Steering Input was more reasonably translated as “Not Supported (or invalid data).”

In this case example, the real-world 2013 Hyundai Accent data retrieval took place on April 12th, 2013. Unfortunately, just ten (10) days later, on April 23rd, 2013, GIT America released version “E-N-H-01-00-0003.”

This version of the software, having replaced “E-NH-01-00-0002,” remained current until the time of the accessing and generating a report for the IIHS 2013 Hyundai Accent on August 26th, 2013.

One may conclude that the error in the version of software available in April was remedied in this respect by August 2013; however, on the face of the report for each, the identified software version was 1.0. Unfortunately, the authors were unable to return to the real-world 2013 Hyundai Accent in attempt to re-access the vehicle and generate a report with the most current version of the software, as the vehicle was already salvaged by its insurer. While the available evidence could certainly lead one to hypoth-

Figure 3.13: Report header from case #2

Figure 3.14: Report header IIHS crash test

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esize on the root of the real-world 2013 Hyundai Accent quandary (mistranslation remedied by a software update), only the producers of the software could confirm such a postulation. In any event, parties in a claim or litigated case would be potentially faced with two reports ostensibly prepared using the same version of the software (1.0) but with different results for at least that particular parameter.

The authors specifically exploit this real-world example as an illustration of some of their concerns predicated on functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s). As previously explained within the confines of this compendium, the Software Version, as displayed in the PDF document report header, does not actually provide the specific software version being utilized to generate a report. Moreover, the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) lack a means of preserving a raw data file that could simply be re-translated in the most current version of the software.

“

As this case example illustrates, end users of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) are faced with a dilemma wherein the retention of a vehicle or vehicle ACU might play a pivotal role in the same end user's ability to provide a report generated in the most current version of the accompanying software. The Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools produce a report in a Portable Document Format (PDF), and, while these files have a wide viewing capability on virtually any operating system or platform, the PDF files produced by the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools do not employ any of the security features or document protection capabilities offered through popular PDF commercial software applications, such as the Adobe Acrobat family. 11 The authors have no reason to question method in which data is collected within Hyundai and Kia ACUs. Nevertheless, the authors maintain their concern as to the potential challenges that may arise based on the functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools as discussed later in the Conclusions section of this Compendium.

... the PDF files R produced by the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools do not employ any of the security features or document protection capabilities ...

eferences 1. "Read Me First." Introduction. Kia EDR User's Manual. Tustin, California: Global Information Technology, 2012. 4-5. Print.

2. "Event Data Recorders" 49 CFR 563. 2012.

3. "New 2013 Cadillac XTS Premium Sedan Exterior Specs." 2013 Cadillac XTS Premium Sedan. MotorTrend Magazine, Source Interlink Media, n.d.

Web. 18 Oct. 2013. <http://www.motortrend.com/ cars/2013/cadillac/xts/premium_sedan/1175/specifications/exterior.html>.

4. "The 2013 Soul." Kia Cars, SUVs, Crossovers, Minivans, & Future Vehicles. KIA Motors America, n.d.

Web. 18 Oct. 2013. <http://www.kia.com/us/>.

5. Each driver weighed approximate 180lbs (Driver’s License Data), but the 2013 Cadillac was carrying an additional 100lbs of cargo in its trunk.

6. Chidester, Augustus, et al. "Recording automotive crash event data."Transportation Recording: 2000 and Beyond. International Symposium on Transportation Recorders. 1999.

7. Comeau, Jean-Louis, Alan German, and Donald Floyd. "Comparison of Crash Pulse Data from Motor Vehicle Event Data Recorders and Laboratory Instrumentation." Proc. CMRSC-XIV (2004): 27-30.

8. McClafferty, KJ, et al. "A preliminary comparison of real world frontal impacts and staged crash tests."

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Proceedings of the Canadian Multidisciplinary Road Safety Conference XVI.

10. Newton, Isaac. Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. A. Strahan, 1802.

9. Niehoff, Peter, et al. "Evaluation of event data recorders in full systems crash tests." Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles. 2005.

11. "About Adobe PDF." Adobe Portable Document Format. Adobe Systems Incorporated, n.d. Web. 07 Nov. 2013.

Editor’s note: For readers familiar with the operation and use of the Bosch CDR Tool, many of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool concepts discussed in the Compendium may be easily compared to those associated with that tool….whether “good” or “bad.” In this section, the authors address the notion of attempting to retrieve data from Hyundai and Kia vehicles which are not supported by the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool.

In the context of the Bosch CDR Tool, this would be identified as the practice of “VIN spoofing” or attempting to use a VIN for one vehicle to retrieve data from another vehicle (often one not supported), in effect, trying to “fool” the CDR Tool software into retrieving data not currently supported by the Tool. In a research/testing scenario this is often done but then only with sufficient information and the cooperation of the vehicle or module manufacturer or supplier. In the field, this is often done to otherwise improperly circumvent restrictions put in place by an auto manufacturer on a vehicle or module (i.e.: an ACM with EDR potential) for a number of reasons. In the latter application, the net effect is often that data retrieved may be mistranslated by the Tool software and the “results” while appearing to be “meaningful” are otherwise unreliable and essentially useless.

This section of the Compendium addresses, in the context of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool, the idea that one may attempt to retrieve data from otherwise unsupported vehicles and then a review of some of the ramifications of that effort observed to date.

Section 4: Coverage Spoofing - Data from Unsupported Hyundai and Kia Vehicles.

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overage Spoofing Based on the nature in which the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) function (previously discussed in this Compendium), an exploration of the ability to retrieve data and generate a report from vehicles outside the intended coverage list was explored. Tests were performed via both DLC connection as well as direct to ACU (directto-module imaging). In summary, the tests returned a myriad of outcomes, ranging from apparent proper translation to manifest errors in significant aspects of the dynamic data being reported.

As discussed in the “Functionality” section of the Compendium, Hyundai-Kia EDR Tools do not require a specific VIN to identifying which specific vehicle one is attempting to retrieve data from. Instead, the end user may attempt retrieval by way of simply selecting the vehicle model, year (at this writing, 2013-2014) and engine. In that section of the Compendium, one may find that, even when no VIN is entered and a vehicle is selected from the “supported list,” the Tool will still retrieve data; at least from supported vehicles. For this portion of the research for the Compendium, the authors chose to attempt to re-

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trieve data from Hyundai and Kia vehicles made during the years prior to the supported years (2013-14) by first selecting their supported equivalent model and then attempting retrieval from other models and the “opposite” manufacturer. Where users of the Bosch CDR Tool would recognize this as the equivalent of “VIN Spoofing,” in this context, since no VIN is required, the authors have elected to refer to this as “coverage spoofing.”

In the context of the Bosch CDR Tool, the end user of that system must first identify a vehicle manufacturer (OE) from a screen showing those OEs supported by that Tool and then either read from that vehicle by way of a generic OBD II process or manually enter a specific VIN to initiate data retrieval. In short, a specific VIN is required by the Bosch CDR Tool. The CDR Tool communicates with the selected module (here, as a corollary, the airbag control module) and, as part of a “hand shake” process identifies the module by a specific software or ROM ID. Assuming that the vehicle identified first by VIN is supported by the Tool and then the specific module is supported and not excluded by virtue of the module’s software ID, data is retrieved. Afterward, in the report generation process, the user entered VIN, software ID or both as well as other information available to the Tool may be used as part of the data translation and report generation process.

Where the user is in control of the VIN entered and that VIN is “spoofed” (specifically, not the actual VIN associated with the ACM being imaged) the results may be demonstrably unreliable. In testing conducted by the Collision Safety Institute 1, results have included, for example, the transposition of the data from the longitudinal and lateral axes or a reversal of polarity for one or more axes. Some manufacturers supported by the CDR Tool have instructed Bosch to include a check of the VIN recorded within the ACM against the user entered VIN and, where those don’t match, no translation is completed and no “plain language” report generated.

sion Safety Institute CDR Technician and Data Analyst courses. 1 Nonetheless, VIN spoofing has been the subject of some debate within the community. For example, some purported experts have promoted the practice where there is some suggested level of "exigency," where none truly exists, to “justify” the practice or where it is simply misrepresented as being conducted “for research” even though the data later finds its way into litigation. There is no doubt that, historically, some data retrieved as a function of VIN spoofing may be reliable as has been demonstrated as a function of testing and comparison to control instrumentation and observations; however, given the objectively demonstrated 1 potential for erroneous translation and reporting, the practice should be avoided.

In this section of the Compendium, the authors have selected examples of field work and crash test data to illustrate examples of what will be referred to in the context of the Hyundai-Kia EDT Tool(s) as “coverage spoofing.” In initial versions of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool, there was no reference to the practice one way or the other. In versions of the software released nearer November 2013, a single sentence was added to the apparently generic Data Limitations for the reports from both OEs (see the previously included sample report) indicating the system is not designed for models and model years not listed and a dialog box (Fig. 4.1) appears explaining coverage limits and requiring the user acknowledgement of that restriction to continue.

The Bosch CDR Tool addresses VIN spoofing specifically within the software Help file with, for example (the specific warning including the reference to “VIN spoofing”), that: “…Attempts made to retrieve data from vehicles built for markets the CDR Tool does not support by entering a VIN from a market it is built for (VIN spoofing) may result in inaccurate CDR report data translations and possibly incorrect or erroneous retrieval of data from the ECU.” 2

Figure 4.1: The [EDR Disclosure] confirmation dialog box requiring user confirmation of the limits of vehicle coverage.

Other references to this practice generally may be found in the Help file and within course notes from the Colli84

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In this research, the authors address coverage spoofing in four ways:

suggest “spoofing” might be at least “productive” particularly toward an understanding of its potential.)

1. Selecting a supported make and model but an unsupported year (i.e.: an unsupported 2012 vehicle accessed by selecting that vehicle for model year 2013) 2. Selecting the wrong model without respect to year (i.e.: selecting a vehicle, whether or not for a year supported, other than the one the Tool is actually connected to) 3. Selecting a vehicle from the “other” manufacturer’s list (i.e.: attempting to download data from a Kia using the Hyundai software and selecting a Hyundai model vehicle whether or not from a supported year) 4. Attempting to retrieve data from an unsupported module by the direct-to-module method using the “wrong” cable

The original investigating police officers were met with an account of this incident such that, when they spoke to the driver of the Elantra, she indicated she was gradually slowing her vehicle while preparing to park in a painted parking spot. She reported that, as she reached her intended parking spot, she applied the brake but the engine revved uncontrollably, causing the vehicle to lurch forward, projecting it over the adjacent sidewalk and into the nearby storefront.

The examples that follow are offered to illustrate the process and, where appropriate, the pitfalls of coverage spoofing rather than endorse the practice.

Coverage Spoofing example: Selecting a supported make and model but an unsupported year - 2011 Hyundai Elantra In August 2013, a 78 year old driver crashed through the front widows of a storefront, depositing her 2011 Hyundai Elantra inside the store (Fig 4.2). Despite the otherwise dramatic nature of the collision, no one was hurt in the incident. (As background to this portion of the research, the authors identified that, for example, there were nominal changes made to the Hyundai Elantra’s basic platform between model years 2011 through 2013 3 which would

Based on the nature in which the event was reported, as well as the allegation of a sudden acceleration incident (SAI)4, the investigating agency sought consent from the vehicle owner to access the ACU data via the Hyundai EDR Tool knowing at the time that the 2011 model wasn’t specifically supported and with the understanding that the resulting report/data might be meaningless – if access were successful and if a report were to be generated. At that time, there was no prohibition, in the literature accompanying the Tool that the 2011 model was “excluded,” although all parties involved were aware it wasn’t specifically supported. In this example, the attempt at “coverage spoofing” was simple; the vehicle was accessed by imaging it as though it were a 2013 Hyundai Elantra. In short, the Tool was “fooled” into believing that it was communicating with a 2013 Elantra.

The report suggested, in the pre-crash data section, that the engine throttle was at 100% for the pre-crash -1.0 and -0.5 data samples; again keeping in mind that the driver’s account was that she was attempting to park her vehicle.

Likewise, there was a lack of any brake switch “on” (activa-

Figure 4.2: Photographs of 2011 Hyundai Elantra Crash

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tion). At least in the initial evaluation of the report, the data retrieved apparently refuted the claim of a SAI. Examination of the remainder of the report yielded no outstanding or obvious discrepancies with the remaining data elements; such as Lateral Acceleration graph or Normal Acceleration graph anomalies. On its face then, the data appeared to be useful in the underlying crash evaluation and analysis; however, the investigating officers knew that there was no way to fully support relying on data retrieved through coverage spoofing.

With this example in mind, the authors undertook additional research into the potential for coverage spoofing with other vehicles not supported by the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s), and were similarly successful in retrieving data often producing reports in which, at least on first examination, no clear discrepancies with the data elements appeared 3. However, despite the apparent “success” with coverage spoofing on some unsupported vehicles, additional attempts provided demonstrably defective translations or, in some cases, failed to retrieve data altogether.

Figure 4.3: Photograph of 2011 Hyundai Sonata Crash

Coverage Spoofing example: Selecting a supported make and model but an unsupported year - 2011 Hyundai Sonata As part of research conducted here, the authors found that, similar to the 2011-13 Elantra example, there were few changes made to the Hyundai Sonata’s platform between model years 2011 through 20136; however, when coverage spoofing was attempted on a 2011 Hyundai Sonata, the results of the imaging session displayed distinctly different results as compared to the otherwise seemingly promising Elantra data set previously discussed.

In this particular example, a 2011 Sonata vehicle was involved in a frontal collision, wherein the driver airbag, as well as driver seatbelt pre-tensioner deployed. In the review of the data successfully retrieved by the Tool from the unsupported 2011 Sonata where it was “spoofed” as a 2013 Sonata, there were clear discrepancies related to some data elements, specifically the Longitudinal Acceleration data, Lateral Acceleration data and the Normal Acceleration data. (The authors would note, at this point, that apparent anomalies in the display of acceleration data, regardless of axis, are a common theme among reports for vehicles accessed by way of coverage spoofing attempts7 and are consistent with similar observations made as associated with “VIN spoofing” in the context of the Bosch CDR Tool.)

In the report for the 2011 (as a 2013) Sonata, the Lateral Acceleration data, reported in g’s every 10 milliseconds,

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Figure 4.4: Excerpts from the 2011 Hyundai Sonata EDR Report

appears to alternate between what would seem to be a maximum values of 25g’s and 0g’s for the 250 milliseconds illustrated in the graph and accompanying data table. In light of past experience with “VIN Spoofing” (in the context of the Bosch CDR Tool), one reasonable conclusion would be that the otherwise unrealistic appearance of the data displayed in the Lateral Acceleration chart (Fig 4.4) is a product of a translation error as a direct result of coverage spoofing.

Moreover, the Normal Acceleration data contained in the report generated by the Tool, also reported in g’s every 10 milliseconds, appears to alternate between values of up to 59g’s and 0g’s for the 250 milliseconds illustrated in the graph (Fig 4.4). Here, one might presume that the 59g’s represent a limit to the range of the system.

However, contrary to the data displayed in the Lateral Acceleration graph (Fig 4.4), the Normal Acceleration data points do not alternate between Maximum Values and Zero. Instead, the graph appears to report unclipped data points. One is left to assume the unreasonable appearance of the data displayed in the Normal and Lateral Acceleration charts are a product of a translation error, brought about by the effects of model year coverage spoofing.

Lastly, the Longitudinal Acceleration does not seem to represent the crash dynamics in this case. By inspection, one would notice that the Longitudinal Acceleration graph shows that there are many consecutive samples larger than -20g's. In fact, when the reported acceleration (Fig 4.4) is

Figure 4.5: Data elements of the 2013 Hyundai Accent imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Accent

integrated to calculate the total delta-V for the event, the result would be larger than -350 km/h. This is simply not realistic given the other facts of this case and the condition of the Sonata (Figure 4.3).

Coverage Spoofing example: Selecting an unsupported model without respect to year – 2013 Hyundai Accent Coverage spoofing can also be facilitated through the application of the GIT Tool, where the user initiates retrieval and generates a report through the application of the wrong model, while still selecting the appropriate year. By way of example, the Hyundai GIT Tool provides official coverage for 2013 Hyundai Accent. However, a user of the Hyundai GIT Tool is also able to produce a report as if the vehicle were imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Azera. This type of coverage spoofing also frequently produces what might be described as anomalous results.

Coverage spoofing the model alone produced abnormal acceleration graphs, both Longitudinal and Lateral, similar to a consolidation of those issues previously identified in the data associated with the coverage spoofing of the 2011 Hyundai Sonata (Figure 4.2). When the 2013 Accent is imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Azera, the longitudinal and lateral graphs yielded what appear to be at-or-near-maximum values, minimum values and values reported as “exceed the maximum sensor range” (clipping).

Figure 4.6: Data elements of the 2013 Hyundai Accent imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Azera

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Coverage spoofing by use of the incorrect model also produced what would appear to be errors in a number of the translations pertaining to SRS deployment timing. If one assumes that the correct translation of data from a 2013 Accent is reflected in the report for that data where the 2013 Accent is the model selected, the translation of the 2013 Hyundai Accent spoofed as a 2013 Hyundai Azera produced mistranslations of the “Time to Deploy – Side Airbag Driver (No Deployment),” “Time to Deploy – Side Airbag Passenger (63 ms),” “Time to Deploy – Curtain Airbag Driver (No Deployment),” and “Time to Fire – Pretensioner Driver (No Deployment)” data parameters.

Coverage Spoofing example: Selecting a vehicle from the "other" manufacturer's list – 2013 Hyundai Accent Coverage spoofing can be facilitated through the application of an improper make, meaning the user completes retrieval and generates a report through the application of the Tool for the “other” manufacturer. By way of explanation, in this regard, coverage spoofing can be done by use of the Hyundai EDR Tool on a Kia vehicle, as well as vice versa.

Through the use of the Kia EDR Tool, the 2013 Hyundai Accent referenced in the previous spoofing example was imaged as a 2013 Kia Optima. A translation of the 2013 Hyundai Accent produced inappropriate translations of the acceleration graphs and deployment data, similar in fashion to the errors associated with coverage spoofing by use of the 2013 Hyundai Azera translation of the data from the 2013 Hyundai Accent (as seen in the previous example).

In testing, data was also imaged from the 2013 Hyundai Accent and translated as other Kia vehicles including the

2013 Kia Soul, the likes of which produced additional, yet different, erroneous translations of the data in the subsequent reports. Specifically, the translation of the data from the 2013 Hyundai Accent as a 2013 Kia Soul failed to populate the acceleration data sections of the report, suggesting such data was potentially “Not supported…” in the Kia. The translation of the data from the 2013 Hyundai Accent as a 2013 Kia Soul also failed to populate the Real-time Data section, specifically the Ignition Cycle at Download, suggesting the data parameter was also “Not supported…” as seen in Figure 4.7.

In all, the 2013 Hyundai Accent was successfully spoofed and data – whether or not properly translated – was recovered where the Accent was spoofed as a: • • • • • • • •

2013 Accent 2013 Azera 2013 Equus 2013 Genesis Coupe 2013 Genesis Sedan 2013 Sonata Hybrid 2013 Sonata Sedan 2013 Tucson

Notably, there were also attempts at coverage spoofing which were met with negative results; the selected vehicle failed to retrieve data from the Accent module and returned an error message indicating a failure to communicate. Where coverage spoofing was attempted but failed, an error dialog box (Fig 4.8) appeared on screen indicating the selected vehicle was not supported/data retrieval failed.

In all, the authors were unable to access the data and produce a report when the 2013 Accent was spoofed as a: 2013 Elantra Coupe 2013 Elantra Sedan 2014 Equus 2013 I30

Figure 4.7: Top: Ignition cycle data when the 2013 Hyundai Accent is imaged properly.

Bottom: Ignition cycle data when the 2013 Accent is imaged as a 2013 Kia Optima.

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2013 Veloster 2013 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Optima Hy 2013 Kia Optima 2013 Kia Sorento 2013 Kia Soul 2013 Kia Sportage

Each of the successful coverage spoofing attempts performed on the 2013 Accent via either the use of the inappropriate make and/or model, produced incorrect translations absent the 2013 Hyundai Tucson and 2013 Hyundai Veloster. In those attempts, the retrieved data translated to a report identical to the report generated by way of imaging of vehicle as a 2013 Hyundai Accent.

• • • •

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• • • • • • •

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• • •

2013 SantaFe Sport 2013 SantaFe 2013 Kia Rio

the Hyundai EDR Tool). However, where the direct-tomodule cable would be connected to the module (the port or opening typically referred to as the “ECU header” or “ECU Connector”) was pinned in a fashion that appeared to allow for the user to connect “Cable 9” (part G1ZDDPA009); a cable which is a standard component in both the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools.

Figure 4.8: Error dialog box when coverage spoofing fails Coverage Spoofing example: Attempting to retrieve data from an unsupported module by the direct-tomodule method using the “wrong” cable – multiple vehicle examples Coverage spoofing experiments were also performed on Hyundai and Kia vehicles where a combination of the improper year and model or ACU cable was utilized to accessing and retrieve data. In researching vehicle information in anticipation of this Compendium, the authors learned that there were substantive changes made to the Hyundai Santa Fe platform between model years 2012 and 2013.8 Therefore, the authors expected similar substantive changes to the supplemental restraint system, to include the ACM/ACU. An ACU was salvaged from a 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe, involved in a real world collision. This particular module was identified by both Delphi and Bosch part numbers but appears to have been assembled by Bosch in Mexico and bears the Hyundai/Kia identifier "CM" and "FL" (identifiers which are found on both Hyundai and Kia modules) as seen in Figure 4.9.

However, "Cable 9" could not be connected to the ACU until keyways (small plastic tabs within the opening of the ECU header) in the ECU header of the ACU were shaved, thereby allowing for the ACU adapter to properly align with the pins. Once the keyways in the ECU header of the ACU were shaved, the ACU adapter cable (“Cable 9”) aligned properly.

Figure 4.10: Figure 4.10: ECU Connector/Header and "Cable 9"

Figure 4.11: ECU Connector/header before and after the keyway was shaved.

Figure 4.9: ACU from a 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe None of the ACU direct-to-module cables from the Hyundai or Kia user’s manual(s) are suggested for access to ACUs with either of the identifier codes CM or FL (and, of course, the 2012 Santa Fe is not listed as supported by

Figure 4.12: The cable now fits in the keyway

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After this modification of the ECU header, in all, the authors were able to establish communication by way of previously described model and make coverage spoofing, retrieve data and generate a report from the 2012 Santa Fe as a: • • • • • • • • •

2013 Accent 2013 Azera 2013 Equus 2013 Genesis Coupe 2013 Genesis Sedan 2013 Sonata Hybrid 2013 Sonata Sedan 2013 Tucson 2013 Veloster

• • • • • • • •

2014 Kia Cadenza 2013 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Optima Hy 2013 Kia Optima 2014 Kia Sedona 2013 Kia Sorento 2013 Kia Soul 2013 Kia Sportage

As in previous examples, there were also coverage spoofing attempts which were met with negative results. In all, the authors were unable to retrieve data from the 2012 Santa Fe module when it was spoofed as a: • • • • •

2013 Elantra Coupe 2013 Elantra Sedan 2014 Equus 2013 I30 2013 SantaFe Sport

• • • •

2013 SantaFe 2014 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Rio 2014 Kia Sorento

Of particular note here, the authors were unable to establish communication by way of coverage spoofing and retrieve data from the 2012 Santa Fe when spoofed as a 2013 Santa Fe, effectively confirming a substantive change in the SRS between 2012 and 2013, or given the Data Limitations text for these systems, that there was a change in the Santa Fe ACU on or after Sept 2012.

Each of the successful coverage spoofing attempts performed on the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe’s ACU produced numerous incorrect translations. For example, the data from the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe ACU as a 2013 Hyundai Accent, generated what may be described as impossible translations (where compared to what was known about the 2012 Santa Fe involved in the underlying crash) including such elements as “Safety Belt Status Driver – Not Supported” and “Time To Deploy Frontal Airbags – 1st Stage Driver – 1ms.” (Fig. 41.3).

Similarly, coverage spoofing of the 2012 Santa Fe as a 2013 Hyundai Accent, produced clear discrepancies with the reporting of Longitudinal Acceleration data, similar to the previously described coverage spoofing of the 2011 Hyundai Sonata. The acceleration data, reported in g’s every 10 milliseconds, appears to alternate between maximum and minimum values for the 250 milliseconds illustrated in the graph (Fig 4.14).

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Figure 4.13: Data elements from 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Accent Perhaps even more concerning, was the nature in which the “pre-crash” parameters were translated when coverage spoofing was applied to the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe. “Precrash data,” such as “Engine RPM,” “ABS activity” (Fig 4.15) “Stability Control” and “Steering Input,” all exhibited some of the reported translations as “Not Supported” or “Invalid Data,” almost randomly across the various models selected again calling into question the translation of the pre-crash fields.

Figure 4.14: Reported Longitudinal Acceleration when the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe was imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Accent

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ment, anticipated there may be similar substantive changes to the supplemental restraint system, to include the ACU. An ACU was salvaged from a 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe, involved in a real world collision. Also similar to the Santa Fe module, this module was identified by both Delphi and Bosch part numbers but appears to have been assembled by Bosch in China and bears the Hyundai/Kia identifier "BK."

Figure 4.15: Reported ABS Activity when the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe was imaged as a 2013 Hyundai Accent

Figure 4.16: Reported Stability Control

Figure 4.17: Reported Steering Input The Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool Owner’s Manuals, would find that module “BK” would be directly accessible using ACU direct-to-module (Adapter) "Cable 9" (G1ZDDPA009). Likewise, if the user were to open the Hyundai software, they would observe that the 2013 Genesis Coupe purports to contain an ACU with the same "BK" (Fig 4.18). This might lead a casual reader to believe that the data contained in the subject ACU may be translated appropriately if the module identifier were to be an indication that the module type was otherwise supported.

Figure 4.16: Reported Engine RPM In an effort to ensure the test results associated with the coverage spoofing of the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe were not another event anomaly or product of a power interruption, a second experimental test vehicle was sought out.

The authors identified that there were substantive changes made to the Hyundai Genesis’ platform between model years 2012 and 20139 and, based on the Santa Fe experi-

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Figure 4.18: Adapter information found in Owner's Manual Collision Magazine - Volume 8 Issue 2 91

However, again the direct-to-module cable couldn’t be used in the ACU as was the case with the previously discussed 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe. Using the same approach as applied to the Santa Fe ACU above, the keyways in the ECU header on the subject ACU were shaved down allowing for ACU direct-to-module "Cable 9" to properly align with the pins.

49CFR563, deployment was selected by the OE as “Time zero (T0)” which is inconsistent with the apparent description or selection of “time zero” as seen in the remaining Hyundai and Kia reports; spoofed or otherwise.

Despite the potential for access to ACUs bearing the "BK" identifier code, the results of the coverage spoofing attempts on the 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe ACU were comparable to that of the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe.10 For example, the translation of the data retrieved from the 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe spoofed as a 2013 Hyundai Genesis Coupe, generated what might be, at best, described as “impossible translations,” for example, “Time To Deploy Frontal Airbags – 1st Stage Driver – 0ms” and “Time To Deploy Frontal Airbags – 1st Stage Passenger – 0ms.” Obviously, a deployment in conjunction with “Time Zero” is impossible unless, in the context of

Coverage spoofing applied to the 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe as a 2013 Hyundai Genesis Coupe produced again what might be described as anomalies in the data with respect to the Longitudinal and Lateral delta-V data elements. In that report, the Longitudinal delta-V data

Figure 4.20: Reported Longitudinal Delta-V from the Hyundai Genesis

Figure 4.21: Reported Lateral Delta-V from the Hyundai Genesis

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Figure 4.19: Deployment data elements from Hyundai Genesis

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points (reported in kph every 10 milliseconds) appear to trend as might be anticipated for such data element until the about the 190ms point; however, at the 200ms data point, the delta-V magnitude abruptly changes returns to -1 km/h and continues on at that magnitude until the end of the graph (at 250ms). This apparent anomaly is observed in the Lateral delta-V trace as well, with a drop off from 10km/h after 130ms to 9km/h from time mark 140 to 210ms and then at 210ms an abrupt drop-off from 9 km/h to 1 km/h to the 250ms point. The “return” to 1km/h in both cases may be with a function of coverage spoofing and the resultant incorrect translation of data or as a function of an offset applied where the data “should” be 0 (zero) but is reported as 1km/h (again potentially as a function of the spoofing and associated translation).

As was the case in the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe example, the “pre-crash” parameters as translated when coverage spoofing was utilized to access the data from the 2010 Hyundai Genesis yielded some apparently anomalous results.

“Pre-crash” data, such as ABS activity, Stability Control and Steering Input, all exhibited some of the reported translations as “Not Supported,” “Invalid Data" (Figs. 22 and 4.23) or apparent minimum and/or maximum values, many not reasonably plausible, once again calling into question the translation of the pre-crash parameters when spoofing.

Figure 4.23: Steering Input as reported for Hyundai Genesis The authors discovered during the coverage spoofing attempts with the 2010 Hyundai Genesis, that some of the previously mentioned anomalies appeared to be “remedied” by use of an alternate translation. Another way of saying it is that, by trial-and-error other spoofing efforts resulted in more “reasonable” appearing data. For example, retrieval of data from the 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe was also possible via the 2013 Hyundai Accent. In that attempt, the Longitudinal Delta-V trace from the coverage spoofing based data translation/report (Fig. 4.24) produced a more reasonable appearing Longitudinal delta-V trace absent the previously described “drop outs.” However, this alternate coverage spoofing 2010 Hyundai Genesis as a 2013 Accent produced translation errors of the same pre-crash data and resulted in additional apparent discrepancies in other event data fields.

Figure 4.22: ABS and Stability Control data as found in the Hyundai Genesis report

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Figure 4.25 Deployment data from Hyundai Genesis when imaged as a Hyundai Accent In all, the authors were able establish communication through coverage spoofing and generate a report from the 2010 Hyundai Genesis Coupe (each with various apparent erroneous or anomalous data elements) as a: • • • • • • • • •

Figure 4.24: Longitudinal Delta-V for Hyundai Genesis when imaged as a Hyundai Accent For example, nearly all the data fields pertaining to the deployment of the supplemental restraint system devices were apparently affected when data was recovered from the 2010 Hyundai Genesis module when spoofed as the 2013 Hyundai Accent. And while not all errors in translation are covered within the confines of this article, some of the most prominent examples when the 2010 Hyundai Genesis was spoofed as a 2013 Hyundai Accent include: “Time To Deploy Side Airbags – Driver – 6,528ms,” “Time To Deploy Side Airbags – Passenger – 19,584ms,” “Time To Deploy Curtain Airbags – Driver – 47,105ms” and “Time To Fire Pretensioner – Driver – 1,793ms” (Fig. 4.25).” It seems most unlikely (at best) that an ACM/ACU would wait to deploy driver head curtain airbags for over 47 seconds into a side event appropriately severe enough to call for that protective measure.

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2013 Accent 2013 Azera 2013 Equus 2013 Genesis Coupe 2013 Genesis Sedan 2013 Sonata Hybrid 2013 Sonata Sedan 2013 Tucson 2013 Veloster

• • • • • • • •

2014 Kia Cadenza 2013 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Optima Hy 2013 Kia Optima 2014 Kia Sedona 2013 Kia Sorento 2013 Kia Soul 2013 Kia Sportage

As in previous examples, there were also coverage spoofing attempts which were met with negative results. In all, the authors were unable to access the data and produce a report from the Genesis module when spoofed as a: • • • • •

2013 Elantra Coupe 2013 Elantra Sedan 2014 Equus 2013 I30 2013 SantaFe Sport

• • • •

2013 SantaFe 2014 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Rio 2014 Kia Sorento

The reader will likely have noticed that the list of vehicles through which access was and was not possible by way of coverage spoofing attempts with the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe and with the 2010 Hyundai Genesis are identical.

During a preliminary examination of coverage spoofing attempts, the authors identified something of a pattern or groupings of vehicles which allowed for common access and retrieval and report generation. As with other OEs, Hyundai and Kia are demonstrably using ACMs/ACUs from multiple first tier suppliers with several commonalities (as well as, of course, differences).

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In another series of tests, the authors also undertook coverage spoofing on a 2014 Kia Forte. In all, the authors were able establish communication through coverage spoofing and generate a report from the 2014 Kia Forte as a: • • • • •

2013 Elantra Coupe 2013 Elantra Sedan 2014 Equus 2013 I30 2013 SantaFe Sport

• • • •

2013 SantaFe 2014 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Rio 2014 Kia Sorento

However, the authors were unable to access the ACU and produce a report from the 2014 Kia Forte when spoofed as a: • • • • • • • • •

2013 Accent 2013 Azera 2013 Equus 2013 Genesis Coupe 2013 Genesis Sedan 2013 Sonata Hybrid 2013 Sonata Sedan 2013 Tucson 2013 Veloster

• • • • • • • •

2014 Kia Cadenza 2013 Kia Forte 2013 Kia Optima Hy 2013 Kia Optima 2014 Kia Sedona 2013 Kia Sorento 2013 Kia Soul 2013 Kia Sportage

The list of vehicles for which access was/was not possible by way of coverage spoofing attempts with the 2014 Kia was opposite that list for the 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe and 2010 Hyundai Genesis. In the final analysis, the authors discovered that coverage spoofing, regardless of the year, make and model of the subject vehicle, were generally possible via one of the two aforementioned groupings without respect to the “reliability” of the resultant data/report.

O

ther Data Parameters As illustrated in this section, a data parameter may appear in a “spoof ” generated report and may, at least initially, appear to contain reasonable data (apart from the otherwise “odd” appearance, for example, of some of the acceleration data). Other data parameters observed in spoofed and non-spoofed reports alike should then be addressed in this context.

device at the time when the data was downloaded since the first use of the EDR.”11 In the output report generated by the EDR Tool(s), this parameter is found in the “Real Time Data” section (at page 27 of the example report in this Compendium). In that same example report, at page 1 in the report “Data Limitations” section we find this: “… Ignition cycle counter(download) will increment by 1 every time when the power mode cycles is changed from OFF/Accessory to IGN/RUN or EDR data is downloaded by using the retrieval tool.” (sic) (emphasis added) The first part of the definition is clearly consistent with that found in sub-part 563.5; however, the second part “... or EDR data is downloaded by using the retrieval tool.” is not only objectively inaccurate but would also not seem to be in keeping with the specified definition (563.5 noted above)11 not to mention potentially raise other issues again related to the research and litigation application of this data (while those areas are admittedly not contemplated within the scope of 49CFR563 as later discussed in the Conclusions section of this Compendium).

During testing, for more than one vehicle and module, the authors applied power (either by way of the ignition in the car during a “DLC” download or by way of direct-tomodule connection) and then initiated a download having properly identified the supported vehicle or as a function of “coverage spoofing.” Once that download was complete and the PDF report document saved, the process was initiated again without cycling the ignition or removing and reapplying power to the ACU. Without cycling power and even without retrieving data to generate a PDF report (where there was an error encountered during spoofing indicating the vehicle wasn’t supported), the ignition cycle counter “at download” still incremented.

Such that the process is clear, as part of testing this function, the authors:

First, within the Functionality section of this Compendium, one finds a discussion of the process of retrieving data from a given vehicle; the connection of components leading to retrieval. Within that section and then as part of the resultant output report, one finds a data parameter called for in sub-part 563.7 (“Data elements.” at Table I): “Ignition cycle, download.” It is specifically defined at “563.5 Definitions.” as:

1. Connected the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool to a car’s DLC and the laptop, 2. Brought up the EDR Tool software and selected a vehicle (spoofed or supported), 3. “Clicked” on the “retrieve button” (Fig 1.22), then 4. After the retrieval and report process completed, saved the PDF report

“… Ignition cycle download means the number (count) of power cycles applied to the recording

5. (a) Power was not cycled (the key position wasn’t changed on the car for an in-car download and the

The variations in testing after “step 4” were:

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cables weren’t disconnected where the connection was direct-to-module) (b) The “retrieve button” was “clicked” again (after the previous report was saved) (c) Data was either retrieved and a PDF report generated and saved or an error message was observed indicating a failure to collect/retrieve data (Fig. 4.8) 6. Step 5 (a) and the process was repeated In one specific example, a 2012 Hyundai Sonata was connected for imaging through the DLC. Steps 1 through 4 above completed, the Sonata’s ignition was turned to “IGN/RUN” and the data recovered by spoofing the car as a 2013 Sonata. Then, without changing the car’s ignition setting, the Hyundai hardware was left in place, the Kia software opened and the Sonata downloaded subsequently and ignition cycles observed as seen in Table 4.1.

Spoofed as 2013 Sonata 2013 Elantra 2014 Cadenza

Ignition cycle, download 1832 <failed> 1834

2013 Optima 1835 2014 Sedona 1836 2013 Sorrento 1837 2014 Soul “(parameter) not supported” 2013 Sportage 1839 Vehicle ignition cycled to “off” then cycled back to “on,” Hyundai software initiated, Kia hardware attached 2013 Elantra <failed> Ignition cycled to “off” then back “on” 2013 Accent 1842 2013 Tucson 1843 2013 Genesis 1844 Hyundai software closed, Kia software opened (Kia hardware still attached) 2014 Sportage 1845

Table 4.1: Ignition cycles observed Notably, in the process, for the vehicles selected from the Kia and Hyundai list, one attempt resulted in a failure to communicate/retrieve data (the 2013 Elantra) and one (2014 Soul) returned a report; however, instead of an ignition cycle number, the parameter displayed the words “Not Supported…” This might be compared to the spoofing experiment conducted with the 20120 Hyundai Genesis discussed earlier. When downloaded as a 2013 Accent, for example, the parameter displayed the translated result: 96

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“Invalid data.” In another example, a 2011 Sportage was spoofed as a 2013 Sportage. The ignition cycles at the event (“Ignition cycles, crash”) were reported as 818 and, at download, reported as 4387.

In the latter example, from a car involved in a “real world” crash, it is difficult to draw too many conclusions from the huge difference in ignition cycles (which could potentially have been from actual vehicle use) but an obvious potential culprit remains it is a function of spoofing.

While, in the particular experiment with the Sonata, other (supported but spoofed) vehicles could have been selected during the process, but the point would seem to be clear from the sequence completed: when the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool communicates with a module – whether or not data is retrieved (as suggested by the Data Limitations) – the current “ignition cycle counter” is incremented by one. When power is actually cycled at the ignition, the current counter is also, of course, incremented by one.

Connecting and disconnecting hardware or opening and closing software doesn’t appear to be associated with the cycle incrementing. It would seem to be clear then that the current counter is actually incremented (1) when vehicle power (at the ignition) is applied and (2) when the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool communicates with a module in some fashion not limited to actually retrieving data. Similar experiments were conducted with other vehicles and with direct-to-module connection downloads with similar results (not all were conducted switching the hardware or software packages).

A second data parameter which caught the attention of the authors was the parameter “Engine Throttle” (percent).

Inasmuch as there is no objective frame of reference for readily evaluating the parameter in “real world” crashes, the authors looked to IIHS crashes (some of which are also discussed in the IIHS Crash Test Data section of this Compendium). Across the selected group of IIHS crash tests, the observed throttle percentages observed in the EDR reports (some for spoofed vehicles other were not spoofed) are shown in Table 4.2.

Where the car in these tests would not have a driver and no acceleration would be applied through the accelerator to the throttle of the vehicle (under the hood), one would, initially presume that the parameter should reflect “0” (zero) or at least be relatively consistent across a group of vehicles not to mention one vehicle in a single test. As can be seen in Table 4.2, the results varied from a low of 1% throttle for the entire “pre-crash period” to a variable of 13 to 14% and 14 to 15% in two of the tests. Initially, one might suspect this variance is a function of spoofing (which was done on the 2012 Accent and 2012 Rio; how-

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ever, those were at least “both 8%” whereas two tests with the two 2013 Rios had very different results.

Vehicle 2012 Accent 2012 Rio 2013 Accent 2013 Elantra 2013 Tucson 2013 Rio 2013 Rio 2013 Soul 2014 Forte

Throttle Percentage 8% 8% 14% and 15% 7% 4% 13% and 14% 8% 8% 1%

3. "Hyundai Elantra Model History." NADAguides.

NADA Services Corporation, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/2013/hyundai/elantra/Model-history>.

4. SAl is defined as unintended, unexpected, high-power accelerations from a stationary position or a very low initial speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking effectiveness. - Pollard, John, and E. Donald Sussman. An examination of sudden acceleration. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1989.

Table 4.2: Throttle Percentage found in the reports from the IIHS crash tests Since the throttle on a late model vehicle is open (to some degree depending on a variety of factors and OE specifications) as soon as the ignition is “on,”for there to be "some" percent throttle recorded (as a function of the voltage being observed at/from the throttle position sensor) is not abnormal and should not be confused by one examining the data as being a function of spoofing.

S

ummary The authors believe it is important here to remindthe reader that coverage spoofing is not generally recommended. While it is by way of this sort of comparison that “implausible” or “impossible” data may be identified, a single report obtained by way of spoofing might, on its face, appear to yield reasonable data; however, end users would normally have no way of knowing whether or not the translation was actually done properly for the unsupported module (vehicle) and should not generally rely on data retrieved by way of this practice.

Based on the uncertain nature of coverage spoofing, the authors recommend against its application as, more often than not, coverage spoofing has been shown to produce nominal to dramatic errors in the resultant data translation producing errors or anomalies which might not be readily apparent.

R

2. "Help (file)," (from the) Crash Data Retrieval Tool (software), Robert Bosch, LLC. Version 12.x series released October 2013

eferences 1. Collision Safety Institute, CDR Data Analyst Course curriculum notes, 2001-2013. www. collisionsafety.net

5. The vehicles included a 2012 Hyundai Tucson and a 2012 Kia Rio. 6. "Hyundai Sonata Model History." NADAguides.

NADA Services Corporation, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/2012/hyundai/ sonata/Model-history>.

7. Nearly identical anomalies were found in reports generated through model year Coverage Spoofing on both real-world and instrumented tests, to include a 2012 Hyundai Accent and 2011 Kia Sportage.

8. "Hyundai Santa Fe Model History." NADAguides.

NADA Services Corporation, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <https://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/2002/Hyundai/ Santa-Fe/Model-History>.

9. "Hyundai Genesis Model History." NADAguides.

NADA Services Corporation, n.d. Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <http://www.nadaguides.com/Cars/2013/hyundai/ genesis/Model-history>.

10. A third Coverage Spoofing attempt utilizing an ACU from a 2012 Kia Forte (Mobis ACU / Identifier Code ‘TD’), produced nearly identical results as that of the 2010 Genesis Coupe and 2012 Hyundai Santa Fe, despite nominal changes in the vehicle platform between 2012 and 2013 – “Kia Forte Model History."

NADAguides. NADA Services Corporation, n.d.

Web. 19 Oct. 2013. <https://www.nadaguides.com/ Cars/2013/Kia/Forte/Model-history>.

11. "Event Data Recorders" 49 CFR 563. 2012.

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Section 5: Compendium Conclusions and Summary

C

onclusions and Summary This Compendium has been assembled based on the most current data available to and latest research conducted by the authors. As this technology and, more specifically, as the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) may evolve, opinions offered here may become dated if not obsolete. For this section of the Compendium, the authors have attempted to group their observations, opinions, conclusions and recommendations by topic following the assembly of the Compendium by section. Some of the content of this section may be repeated in or summarized in one form or another in the foregoing sections. For example, observations about the report formatting would be associated with the “Functionality” section of the Compendium and would be grouped under that heading within this summary.

What might be made as something of a blanket observation at this point (and as was discussed in more detail in the previously published “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview”)1 is that it would be reasonable to conclude, based on the information found in the GIT EDR Tool user’s guide and the “Data Limitations” portion of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool reports (a sample is found earlier in this Compendium) which, but for the provisions of 49CFR563 (specifically sub-parts 563.3, 563.6 and 563.12)2, there would be no tool, publically available, which might be used to retrieve crash data from Hyundai and/or Kia EDR components of their ACUs. Parenthetically, the same might be said to one degree or another as this relates to other auto manufacturers. At this point, in light of the provisions, definitions, and requirements found in 49CFR563, in a basic sense, it is the opinion of the authors that the GIT Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool appears to largely address the minimum requirements of “the rule.”

F

unctionality With 49CFR563 as something of a guide, we might look to sub-part 563.12 which reads:

“… Data retrieval tools. Each manufacturer of a motor vehicle equipped with an EDR shall ensure by licensing agreement or other means that a tool(s) is commercially available that is capable of accessing and retrieving the data stored in the EDR that are required by this part. The tool(s) shall be commercially available not later than 90 days after the first sale of the motor vehicle for purposes other than resale.”

As discussed previously , this sub-part2 does not specifically call for a report to be generated nor does it call for a digital 98

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file to be stored or recorded by the retrieval tool which may be available to the researcher, regulator or reconstructionist to retranslate or re-report in a later revision (read: updated or perhaps “corrected” version) of the retrieval and translation software. Taken literally, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool accesses the module where EDR data would be recorded in a vehicle and retrieves that data. Beyond those functions, it generates a report such as the sample report found previously in this Compendium and which is typically laid out as discussed in “Section 1, Functionality.”

From the perspective of an effort designed solely to meet that minimum published standard, this would likely seem sufficient; however, other potential perspectives, or perhaps applications, might be considered. Suppose, for example, that 49CFR563 were to become FMVSS405 (as has been proposed)3 and one were to be tasked with reviewing a collection of EDR data from a group of, solely for the sake of example here, Kia Rios and were interested in whether or not a particular data element found across those reports met the accuracy, range and/or resolution requirements of sub-part 563.8 (Table III).

As the situation currently exists, if one were to be working from PDF files made, potentially, over the span of several months and correspondingly by way of potentially several versions and/or revisions of the Kia EDR Tool software, it would be, at best, difficult to affirmatively identify a trend for a given data element or elements. Moreover, since the software or tool version number (as displayed in the report) doesn’t change (undeniably, there are demonstrably changes and updates to the program periodically), it would be nearly impossible – from the PDF reports alone – to evaluate in which report (if any) a given parameter’s translation was correct (or incorrect) or whether or not that (or which) translation was “current” particularly where there might be differences observed across other reports in the set under study.

We might assume that the chronologically “most recently saved (printed)” report was the most current and might then be adopted as the most reliable; however that presumes - at a minimum - that (1) there had been an update or fix to a select data element (if, for example, one has been identified and some change required) before that report date and (2) it was included in a software update distributed prior to that date, that (3) the operator had updated the software prior to the download and report generation, and that (4) one would be aware of when (by date) updates to the program had been made such that report generation date might be used as a marker in place of incrementally

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increasing software revision numbers during a comparative analysis or review.

As it exists now, a report generated in, for example, July 2013 and one generated in November 2013 from a pair of 2013 Kia Rios may have differences, between the two reports, for a given data element. We might assume that the November 2013 report is the most current translation of the data; however, we have no way of knowing at that point – if we were to go back to the Rio ACU which was downloaded in July – whether or not we would get the same report as we find in the November download of the second Rio. Unless we were to have maintained custody of the first Rio or, at a minimum, the ACU from that vehicle (a luxury not available to all researchers or reconstructionists and which poses other issues addressed later), based on a review of just those two reports, what changes may or may not have been made. Some differences between the reports, lacking the ability to return to one vehicle/module or the other for some sort of comparative “second” download, could be a function of options or a lack of a system on one vehicle compared to another.

If, on the other hand, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool were (1) to clearly indicate the actual version number of the software in the report and were to (2) save a set of raw data (preferably in a security enhanced digital file (by way of comparison as found in the Bosch CDR Tool and its “.CDRx” file structure) which could be reopened in later released versions of the software and the “new” translation of the data would result in an updated report, this potential issue might be effectively resolved: the original retrieved data could be reexamined again later as (potential) revisions to the program are made.

Overall, by comparison, like the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s), the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Tool similarly produces an original printout, but the Bosch Tool also provides a secure digital copy of the underlying data which can be retested by newer versions of the Bosch Tool software. The secure digital file is, by comparison, a “photo negative” or a “blood sample” that would serve to support that the output report is an actual duplicate of the original (here, the original data).

Editor’s note: This Compendium is the first-of-its-kind published in-depth review of several important aspects of EDR data available from Hyundai and Kia vehicles and a follow-up to the authors’ article “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview” found in Collision Volume 8, Issue 1. The conclusions offered in this section reflect observations made by the authors through early November 2013 as this issue of Collision goes to press. Given that event/ crash data technology is subject to frequent changes, updates and evolution, some of the conclusions may not later reflect the state of the system(s) being referenced as a function of subsequent changes, updates or other modifications to the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool.

As mentioned elsewhere in the Compendium, during the preparation and research for this article, the authors reached out to Hyundai Motor America (Hyundai), Kia Motors Corporation (Kia) and Global Information Technology (GIT, the manufacturer of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s)). They were also provided with a copy of “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview.” A representative of Hyundai responded only that he was interested in the EDR test set up “status” and was looking to review the author’s information associated with what kind of test was performed and how the testing was done as well as data on the differences between the data extracted using EDR tool and the “ACU internal data.” Despite follow up calls and emails from the authors offering to review the available information, no further communication has been had between the authors and any of those entities nor did they participate in the preparation of this Compendium.

Going forward then, the opinions and conclusions found in this section of the Compendium are offered to the end user of the GIT EDR Tool or those reviewing data retrieved by those EDR Tool(s) mainly as a guideline and discussion of some of the things to be aware of; perhaps “food for thought.” The reader should keep in mind there is the probability that there might well be changes to the systems made after publication of this issue of Collision which might reverse some of the comments made in this section.

While the authors do not profess to offer regulatory or legal advice or conclusions, some observations and opinions found in this section may well be useful to the researcher or practicing reconstructionist attempting to use and apply Hyundai and Kia EDR data, particularly in litigation, whether civil or criminal. Here, the authors have drawn on more than 50 years combined experience as law enforcement officers, academics and expert witnesses in criminal and civil litigation in the preparation of portions of this section. www.collisionpublishing.com

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The authors full well recognize and reiterate that concerns associated with litigation go beyond the scope of 49CFR563. Nonetheless, the reality is that this technology reaches beyond regulation and research; it undeniably has application in both civil and criminal litigation. Ample examples of this can be found from early litigation5 associated with the technology to more recent cases6, among many others. To that end, an inescapable component of this Compendium would be to extend the analysis to contemplate the effect of the observations made here on litigation.

In the context of litigation then, where two experts might be working with two reports – both from the same, for example, 2013 Hyundai Sonata case vehicle – it is conceivable that Expert #1 would have a report which shows one or more data elements one way and Expert #2 would have a report that displays the same data element(s) another way. As it currently exists, both would have reports generated by what appears to be “Version 1.00” of the program (displayed with the suggested precision found in the report to the second decimal place…) even though they may have different dates for the data access and retrieval (indicated by the “Save on” (sic) date found in the report header).

That there might then be differences in the data parameters but where the apparent (reported) software version number remains unchanged may raise another possible issue associated with the application of this data; data integrity not to mention individual integrity.

The Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool generates a report as a PDF document. The report, in that format, is not a secure digital file and can be easily edited; altered. While that observation is not, of course, a suggested path one might take and surely not one recommended or endorsed by the authors, it is mentioned here as an obvious but unfortunate extension of the application. Where the foregoing example were to come to life, it is a virtual certainty that, someone will suggest that one or the other of these experts (1) “must have altered the PDF” or (2) that one is actually working from a download from a different vehicle since, after all, there is no VIN associated with either report and no objective way to associate the report with a specific vehicle or module (coverage spoofing aside for the moment).

Inasmuch as there is no secure, original digital file to return to for comparison, this allegation will almost assuredly cast a shadow on both of these reports (whether actually “edited” or not) and raises the potential that Crash Data Retrieval Technology in general might well be painted by an ignorant broad brush in a legal decision down the road as in an example such as the convoluted and ill-informed decision found in “LaBorde.”7

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From the perspective of a tool designed to meet the minimum requirements of 49CFR563, an original, secure digital file which might be useful in research or litigation isn’t a priority consideration so the approach taken here by GIT with the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) is “understandable;” however, the authors believe it’s short sighted and ultimately might be more detrimental; not only to users of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) but with the potential for a broader impact on other similar tools or applications whether in regulation, research or litigation. So as to be clear on this point, the authors have no reason to question the method in which data is collected within Hyundai and/or Kia ACU EDR components. Nevertheless, the authors maintain their concern as to the potential challenges that may arise based on the functionality of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools in a litigation scenario and potentially similar challenges as may be related to research and even regulation.

As discussed in the preliminary review1, there are those who may suggest that “documenting” the module and getting past the potential issues discussed herein will be overcome by taking some photos and/or video of a data retrieval process or of a module against the background of a damaged car. Still others may suggest the simple preservation of an ACU (ACM) will provide sufficient basis and background to associate the data retrieved and reported with a specific vehicle. This is nothing less than a grossly oversimplified approach, allowing for arguments of credibility, as well as corresponding analogies to the bloody glove that was famously photographed, videotaped and “preserved."

Object or evidence collection and preservation, when done properly, can be a complex practice. Investigators - whether in the civil or criminal arena - must concern themselves with the potential for, and ramifications of, “destructive testing” as well as the potential for a claim of spoliation of evidence.7 Part of a proper evidentiary practice requires pre-planning, multipart photographic and/or video documentation, minimally invasive collection or retrieval, as well as validation and authentication procedures to include the maintenance of a chain of custody of a given object where appropriate. While largely similar in a gross sense, each of the phases or components of an object or thing’s preservation may be applied differently in criminal as opposed to civil investigations.

While not addressed in any expanded fashion within this Compendium, the authors have on reason expect the standard of care associated with the collection and preservation of a vehicle and/or Hyundai or Kia ACUs to be any different than the standard by which any other item(s), likely to be involved in criminal or civil litigation, would be held. The authors recognize the existence of a number

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of reasonable and informative resources from which the reader may seek guidance when attempting to produce an effective methodology for collection and/or preservation of articles or objects collected by an investigator. Some “standards” have been proposed, putting style over substance, becoming so overly restrictive as to be impractical. While these “standards” ultimately fail in terms of being effective, some others serve as excellent guidelines leaving room for experience and practicality to those individuals who would observe them.

For example, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) has developed a number of recommended practices with regard to object and/or evidence collection and preservation including “Collection and Preservation of Information and Physical Items by a Technical Investigator”8, “Examining and Preparing Items That Are or May Become Involved in Criminal or Civil Litigation”8, and “Collection of Non-Volatile Memory Data in Evidentiary Vehicle Electronic Control Units”10. The guides – especially the latter in this context – speak specifically to proper evidence memorialization as well as the issues surrounding the collection of electronic evidence from event data recorders, the likes of which cannot be summarized by simply collecting a few photographs or putting an “evidence” sticker on a module or object. In short labeling or calling something “evidence” doesn’t make it so.

While the authors cannot provide a strict or comprehensive guideline to which all investigators in every jurisdiction must adhere, these ASTM standards have been previously cited and a lack of observance of these standards was noted by the court in a successful Daubert11 challenge of an expert witness’ qualifications. 12 Prior to the release of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s), the only widely available system for retrieving “EDR/crash” data was, of course, the Bosch CDR Tool. In his article and oral presentation at the CDR User’s Summit, Melkonian 13 pointed out that the airbag control module is an object, it may well be an “exhibit” at trial, but that module and even the Bosch CDR Tool report are ultimately, cautiously considered “exhibits” as opposed to “evidence.” By definition, “evidence” is what is considered by the terrier of fact (whether judge or jury); a decision in a case is supposed to be based on an evaluation of the admitted evidence. At the end of the day, what the trier of fact will consider with respect to this technology is what a qualified expert testifies to not the presence of an object with a label on it or in some sort of sealed bag.

Where an electronic control unit (typically the ACM) has been downloaded using the Bosch CDR Tool, the module isn’t, of course, going to “testify” in front of the jury; at

best it will effectively become a “paper weight” in the jury room. In some jurisdictions, even the output “CDR report” may not be allowed to go before the jury (although a less likely occurrence). What the trier of fact will consider is the expert’s opinion.

But what if the expert’s opinion is based on something that can’t be demonstrated as a product of the best test conducted on an object? Even if the best test is applied, what if the history of or source of the object is open to or subject to question?

The undeniable reality remains that (1) the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) output is not a secure digital file, (2) neither the Huyndai-Kia EDR Tool(s) report nor does the ACU (preserved as an exhibit or as “evidence”) contain reference to a specific VIN identifying a specific vehicle as the source of the data, (3) as demonstrated in the “Coverage Spoofing” section, a specific VIN is not even required to retrieve data (and “spoofing” can have its own unanticipated results), and (4) the report does not realistically or clearly represent the current software version number making it nearly impossible to determine if the translation and resulting report are conducted as a function of the best test (the latest translation of the data as distributed by the manufacturer(s)).

Another consideration in this respect is that, like the crash data reports available from other manufacturer’s vehicles accessible using the Bosch CDR Tool, there is no date/ time stamp on the data indicating the date/time of the underlying crash14. Instead, the researcher often relies on comparisons to the results of a situationally complete reconstruction or other characteristics of the data and an investigation to associate data with a specific crash. One of those other characteristics is an ignition cycle counter.

Over time, ignition cycle counts have played a role in litigation 15 as well as research and are important enough on the regulatory side to have been included as a required element in 49CFR563 (Table I).

As illustrated in the “Functionality” and “Coverage Spoofing” sections of this Compendium, the reliability of the ignition cycle count in Hyundai and Kia vehicles between an event and the time of the download which might be used to assist the researcher as well as the litigation expert in evaluating the “age” of the recorded data relative to the time of the retrieval (a comparison of the parameters “ignition cycle, crash” and “ignition cycle, download”) is questionable if not simply unreliable (coverage spoofing aside for the moment).

Another issue to be contemplated not only by testifying experts but by researchers and regulators as well would be the depth and quality of the “Data Limitations.” A com-

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parison can be made here to the Bosch CDR Tool in which one finds the first reference to and first use of the term “Data Limitations” in the context of “EDR technology” or crash data reports. In the CDR Tool, the “Data Limitations” have been, since the product was first released, a common report element used to inform the end user about limits or restrictions associated with the data retrieved and translated, specific nuances and identified potential anomalies associated with a module (or vehicle) type and other considerations (i.e.: the more recently added polarity tables). In some cases, manufacturers have elected to include information as detailed as the potential range for a given data element or parameter.

reasonably accurate; however, there are notable exceptions.

These include:

The Data Limitations found in the report generated by the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) include elements found in the Data Limitations text found in the Bosch CDR Tool generated reports but are not nearly as well developed nor, demonstrably, informative. Perhaps another way of saying this is that it is the authors’ considered opinion that the Data Limitations found in a Hyundai or Kia crash data report (refer to the sample report included with this Compendium, for example) is virtually useless as it might offer any real, meaningful understanding of the data presented.

Arguably, some of these apparent discrepancies or differences are a function of spoofing and others might be addressed in a more thoroughly developed and detailed "Data Limitations" which would (should) accompany these types of reports (as previously noted).

The authors recognize that there is no requirement for an explanation of or inclusion of some sort of “data limitations” reference document or similar information within the provisions 49CFR563; after all, one can argue there isn’t even a requirement for a report. In general, the functionality and application of the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) may well be considered to address the minimum requirements of 49CFR563 but the end product – the report – should be carefully considered in light of the considerations addressed in this Compendium separate and apart from issues associated with “spoofing.”

In summary, the authors support a cautious approach to the preservation of exhibits and/or “evidence” from Hyundai and Kia vehicles and cannot specifically recommend a definitive approach to navigating the potentially complex legal issues related to evidence collection and/or retention or admissibility in every possible jurisdiction. However, the reader needs little imagination to visualize how the discussed shortcomings of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools could apply to the operational demands of Law Enforcement, insurance claims administration, and expert witnesses alike.

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eview of Crash Test Data In large part, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) reported data, compared to that collected by the IIHS in the assembled series of crash tests, appears to be

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• • • •

Potential anomalous data, in particular acceleration values, as a product of "coverage spoofing" (i.e.: 2012 Hyundai Accent test) Roll angle data shorter than anticipated as "missing/ invalid data" (i.e.: 2013 Hyundai Tucson test) Steering input inconsistencies (i.e.: 2013 Kia Rio small overlap test) Acceleration data reliability (and usefulness) generally as a function of unknown raw data processing (i.e.: 2013 Kia Rio side impact test)

For example, lacking detailed information on the application, filtering process, anticipated accuracy, range, and resolution it is difficult to say whether or not the data, taken in total, may be used reliably to "… ensure that EDRs record, in a readily usable manner, data valuable for effective crash investigations and for analysis of safety equipment performance (e.g., advanced restraint systems). (where) These data will help provide a better understanding of the circumstances in which crashes and injuries occur and will lead to safer vehicle designs."2 Where the reported acceleration data is offered without other explanation or information, it is difficult to discern its ultimate usefulness.

The small amount of roll angle data observed may be tied to the minimum 300ms requirement for other dynamic data as called for in 49CFR563 and, for that reason, it may be “missing” rather than “invalid;” again a recording limitation which should reasonably be addressed in a fully developed “Data Limitations.”

Of course, comparing instrumentation based data from a crash test naturally provides an objective standard by which to evaluate the reliability of the data in the context of 49CFR56 Table III with respect to range, accuracy and resolution to that recorded in the ACU of Hyundai and Kia vehicles.

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eal World Crashes The “real world” examples serve to illustrate that, in a gross sense, the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s) reported data is generally reliable, within limits, as discussed within that section of the Compendium. Each of the selected cases highlights a different concept or approach to evaluating or using the data in a crash analysis.

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One underlying theme; however, is that, as the last case example in that section illustrates, end users of the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) may find themselves in a situation where the retention of a case vehicle or at least the ACU might play a pivotal role in the end user's ability to provide a report generated in the most current version of the corresponding appropriate software. As also discussed earlier in this Conclusions section of the Compendium, an ACU – by itself – is almost impossible to objectively associate with a specific vehicle absent significant effort on the part of the investigator.

Another issue raised in previous sections of this Compendium which bear repeating here are the potential ramifications of “coverage spoofing.”

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overage Spoofing The authors believe it is important here to remind the reader that coverage spoofing is not recommend.

A single report obtained by way of spoofing might, on its face, appear to yield reasonable data; however, end users would normally have no way of knowing whether or not the translation was actually done properly for the unsupported module (vehicle) and should not rely on data retrieved by way of this practice.

Based on the uncertain nature of coverage spoofing, the authors recommend against its application as, more often than not, coverage spoofing has been shown to produce nominal to dramatic errors if not “inconsistencies” in the resultant data translation and even producing errors or anomalies which might not be readily apparent without other comparisons being possible.

The general objection of the authors to coverage spoofing is not a condemnation of the data contained within Hyundai and Kia vehicle ACUs prior to model year 2013, but rather a warning against a process wherein the potential for improper translation is considerable and reinforces the recently added warning against the practice as found in the Data Limitations for Hyundai and Kia vehicle EDR reports.

The previously published “Hyundai and Kia Crash Data, a Preliminary Overview”1 includes a discussion of what was then identified as “VIN spoofing” or “coverage spoofing” as described in this Compendium where the authors wrote that “…That ‘success’ is, at this writing, limited to the notion that ‘data has been retrieved’ not that it has been successfully translated accurately…” and “… it is clear that at least some of the crash pulse data, for example, is either (1) being translated incorrectly or (2) not supported in the format anticipated by the Hyundai are Kia software for model year 2013 and, therefore, the output is of questionable accuracy and/or reliability.

In that regard, it will be useful later to identify characteristics of “VIN spoofing” (or its equivalent as it’s related to Hyundai and Kia vehicles) as a function of either testing the reliability of the systems or in an effort to identify where an individual may have used “spoofing” to access data not intended for retrieval or translation by the Hyundai or Kia EDR Tools. Lacking a clear VIN-to-module-todata/report association, this may be an important attribute or benefit of such ongoing research by the authors not to mention its potential application in litigation. …” As of this writing, efforts by the authors are ongoing in an effort to be able to identify where a report is a product of what we have come to call, in this narrative, “coverage spoofing.”

As noted earlier in this Compendium, coverage spoofing generally falls into 4 general categories as it relates to the Hyundai-Kia EDR Tool(s). These are: 1. Selecting a supported make and model but an unsupported year (i.e.: an unsupported 2012 vehicle accessed by selecting that vehicle for model year 2013) 2. Selecting the wrong model without respect to year (i.e.: selecting a vehicle, whether or not for a year supported, other than the one the Tool is actually connected to) 3. Selecting a vehicle from the "other" manufacturer's list (i.e.: attempting to download data from a Kia using the Hyundai software and selecting a Hyundai model vehicle whether or not from a supported year) 4. Attempting to retrieve data from an unsupported module by the direct-to-module method using a cable and making certain modifications The initial coverage spoofing experiments reported in Volume 8, Issue 1 of Collision went to press in May 2013.

In October 2013, Hyundai released software version “EN-H-01-00-0004.” With the release of that later software version, the tool supplier (GIT America) added an “EDR Disclosure,” wherein the user is warned against the utilization of the Hyundai EDR Tool to access vehicles produced prior to September 1st, 2012. The Hyundai EDR software goes on to warn that: “…there is no tool for downloading accurate data from the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles produced prior to this date….”

With the release of version “E-N-H-01-00-0004,” an identical warning was added to the Hyundai EDR Data Limitations: “… Tools for downloading the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles have been developed only for vehicles produced after September 1, 2012. Currently, there is no tool for downloading accurate data

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from the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles produced prior to this.”

On October 31st, 2013, Kia released software version “EN-K-01-00-0002.” With this release, Kia also added an EDR Disclosure, equivalent to the warnings contained in the Hyundai Software.

While the authors largely agree with the spirit and intent of the “EDR Disclosure” (essentially, it says: do not utilize the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tools for vehicles prior to model year 2013), a strict literal interpretation cannot be reasonably possible. The authors do not dispute that the Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) were developed for use only with vehicles produced after September 1st, 2012, and, the authors will agree that the application of the Hyundai and Kia EDR tools on vehicles prior to model year 2013 may produce errors in translation.

However, the suggestion that “no tool” exists for the interpretation of “accurate data” is doubtful in a literal sense.

As the authors previously explained, there is no evidence that there was no data contained within Hyundai and Kia ACUs prior to model year 2013 or that, if translated properly, it would be inaccurate. In fact, the opposite is far more likely to be true. The authors can only confirm the likelihood of inaccurate translations when the current release Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) are used to retrieve data from vehicles prior to model year 2013. Furthermore, one might speculate, given, for example cases such as Padilla v Toyota5, that OEs maintain some form of tool for the proper translation of the data contained within their ACUs prior to model year 2013.

A more appropriate warning, true in its literal sense, might be along the lines of: “… Tools for downloading the EDRs in Hyundai vehicles have been developed specifically for vehicles produced after September 1, 2012. The use of this commercially available tool for retrieving data from vehicles manufactured prior to September 1, 2012 may result in inaccurate data translations.”

Again using a comparison to the Bosch CDR Tool, the end users of the information found in this Compendium are urged to use the latest production release of the GIT EDR Tool software appropriately as indicated in the instructions which come with the relevant system when retrieving data from Hyundai or Kia vehicles. As of this writing and publication of this volume of Collision, as it relates to “coverage spoofing,” the official Hyundai and Kia Tool coverage was available for the vehicles found in Table 1.1.

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ummary This Compendium, as a first-of-its-kind look at the recently available Hyundai and Kia EDR Tool(s) should be taken together with the information contained in the “Preliminary Review ” as current at the time of publication and as the basis for ongoing future research into this sort of crash data and retrieved data reporting.

Without a doubt there will be changes in the various system(s) over time which may affect some of the opinions and conclusions offered here; however, as noted with respect to the inability to “retest” retrieved data, some issues may never be resolved. The authors suggest that HyundaiKia EDR Tool(s) report data be contemplated with appropriate caution in litigation and, to some extent in research into collision safety.

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eferences 1.

Collision: The International Compendium for Crash Research, Volume 8, Issue 1 2. "Event Data Recorders" 49 CFR 563. 2012.

3. 74144 Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 240, Thursday, December 13, 2012, Proposed Rules; National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 49 CFR Part 571, [Docket No. NHTSA–2012–0177], RIN 2127–AK86, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders 4. Tucker, Robert L. "The Flexible Doctrine of Spoliation of Evidence; Cause of Action, Defense, Evidentiary Presumption and Discovery Sanction." University of Toledo Law Review 27 (1995): 67-68.

5. Bachman v GM, NO. 4-01-0237, Appellate Court, Illinois 4th District 6. Padilla v Toyota, U.S.D.C. District of New Jersey, Law Division, civil Action No 04-cv-3422 7. LaBorde, et al, v. Shelter Mutual Insurance, et al, (2011) Third Circuit Court of Appeal, CW11-00956 8. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM): Standard Practice for Collection and Preservation of Information and Physical Items by a Technical Investigator (E 1188 – 05) 9. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM): Standard Practice for Examining and Preparing Items That Are or May Become Involved In Criminal or Civil Litigation (E 860 – 07) 10. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM): Standard Practice for Collection of Non-Volatile Memory Data in Evidentiary Vehicle Electronic Control Units (E2493 – 07) 11. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 12. Coffey v. Dowling Mfg., Inc., 187 F. Supp.2d 958 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), aff’d, 89 Fed. Appx. 927 (6th Cir. 2003).

13. William J. Melkonian. "CDR Evidence Frequently Asked Questions" Collision: The International Compendium for Crash Research. Volume 4. Issue 1.

14. Although some recent model Chrysler line vehicles, for example, include an odometer reading captured at the time of the event and other systems may capture the equivalent of “engine hours” as lifetime or current ignition cycle operating times.

15. in AZ v O'Brien, Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, CR 2003-016197-001 DT. (2004)

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