Caught Between the Crossfire: the Grassroots Experiences of Violence during the Malayan Emergency of 1948-60 Jacey Quah As a strategic counter-insurgency paradigm, the Malayan Emergency was declared by the British in June 1948 to pre-empt the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)’s plans to launch armed conflict on a national scale. It derailed the political and social stability of Malaya, as the colonial administration enforced aggressive militant policies to fight the Chinese
communists
on
the
rural
frontier.
The
British
‘counter-terror’
strategy
emphasised population and spatial control, initiating ethnic-based violence, indirect violence through resettlement, and psychological warfare to consolidate power. As both a perpetrator of resistance and a victim of violence, the MCP’s retaliation can be interpreted as a byproduct of British colonialism, one cultivated under repression and desire for political representation. Under this violent political landscape, the Malayan people were inevitably caught between the crossfire of both sides.
MCP violence as resistance and a product of Malaya’s colonial context Prior to the Emergency, limitations were imposed on MCP’s activities as part of British repression of political opposition. With no hope in MCP’s constitutional endeavours, its radical faction proposed the resumption of armed rebellion as the inevitable solution. In April 1948, MCP strikes proliferated, as authorities were faced with a surge in violence and political murders.
Upon the official declaration of Emergency on 16 June 1948, the leader of the MCP, Chin Peng, admitted that the party was ‘forced at the outset onto the defensive,’ driven underground to quickly devise a plan of active resistance. The British had expected
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