DIPLOMACIA
two from the Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño), two from Asia; and three countries from Africa. Nearly all reform proposals put forward include increasing the size of the Council to up to 25 Members by raising the number of NPM seats. Alongside this increase in size, ‘structural reforms’ to the composition and rules of the Council are proposed. The Weak Veto proposal is an example of such structural reforms. Among other such structural reforms we consider are: Creating a new membership category that gives permanent membership of the UNSC, but not the right of veto; Extending the right of veto to eleven UNSC Members – as proposed by the African Union; Re-shaping the existing regional groups – as proposed by Kofi Annan during his time as UN Secretary-General; Creating a new category of ‘long-term’ NPM seat with a four-year term;
30
Allowing immediate re-election as a NPM – presently NPMs at the end of their term must wait at least a year before seeking re-election; The EU member states voting as a single Permanent Member. The predicted effects of each proposal were explored in a computer simulation model that replicated the rules of the UNSC election process. To do this we used techniques in game theory and probability theory to develop a so-called ‘Council Voting Game’ to formally characterise democratic equity and efficiency. The findings suggest that most of these reforms do not decisively improve both democratic equity and efficiency. Indeed, the proposal of the African Union to expand the right of veto would only worsen deadlock in the Council.Only the Weak Veto proposal improves both democratic equity and efficiency. By allowing two of the P5 to vote down a motion before a veto was constituted it would improve efficiency by making it much easier for the Council to make affirmative decisions, and would improve equity by shifting power away from the P5 (whose citizens are over-represented) towards the rest of the world