stood in place arrived and in the end, our unilateral departure - absolute surprise for the Hamas. Just as the operation had begun by surprise, thus it ended with the absolute surprise of the Hamas, which had not assessed that this would be the situation.
the entire chase process until we thwarted the squad. This is a measure once used at the command level and is currently subordinated to the SO. This requires a change in the entire concept world and in the heat detailing - today, you already have to hit a window or the fourth floor, not just the house itself.
The ground operation, in its majority, was concentrated around northern part of the city of Gaza - 900,000 individuals over a cell area of 10 by 10 km. Into which five operating divisions entered in the south, a tilt effort basically, to keep the distribution of Hamas efforts unbalanced in the face of our efforts.
2. Coordinates as a common language foundation - coordinates serve as the anchor the IDF has decided to hold on to and this results in many capabilities that require precision.
The fire characteristics in the campaign were: very dense, problematic combat environment, the opening was a major flight surprise, followed by precision fire - an unprecedented move in Israeli warfare. Dozens of observation centers operating within such a small area, which we once thought was impossible. Dozens of observation centers and centers of attack by assault helicopter and other factors. Close assistance to the maneuvering force, with all the measures, including assault helicopters, cannons utilized for their relative advantage, intelligence research and real-time digital ground intelligence for quick closure of circles on all levels, assault through use of the totality of included circle closure - a link that provides the forces in the terrain the ability to function and respond very quickly.
Cast Lead- Results
Summary of the Operation – General
• The operation ended on January 18, 2009 at 2:00 a.m. with the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by Israel. • During the operation, about 730 rockets were fired at Israel, 165 of which landed in settlements. • Israeli casualties: • Friendly forces – 10 dead, 207 soldiers wounded and injured, 19 of whom severely injured. • Civilians – 3 civilians killed, 7 civilians severely injured . • Palestinian casualties: 1,166 Palestinians dead, among them: – 709 terrorists (about 600 Hamas and about 100 Palestinian Islamic Jihad) – 295 uninvolved. – 162 of unclear involvement. • Attack targets: Dozens of headquarters, hundreds of launch regions, hundreds of tunnels, hundreds of ordnance stores, 11 ordnance stores in mosques, dozens of outposts, dozens of ordnance production sites, and dozens of lathe workshops.
Main Insights and Conclusions in the Fire Field
From a combat doctrine perspective - 1. The entire world of fire operation concepts which we possess should be changed - in terms of the field of artillery; we are talking about cannons or rockets and a target area of 50 by 50. All these hold no meaning when the target is an individual or a launcher – the previous rules are irrelevant, as has been learned in the basic courses. Heat levels- we are providing combat aircraft for special operations (SOs) at this time. During the operation, I was in a reconnaissance aircraft whose visual range is many tens of kilometers, and we were allocated to a special operation (SO) at a "grass widower" (an array of soldiers within the enemy urban terrain), which was under attack, just as we arrived. We were about a kilometer or two over it, and it was attacked by terrorists and had injured individuals. We were integrated during
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3. Battle organization - from our point of view, the division is a basic cornerstone in urban combat, and should therefore be given the maximum of independence in gathering of intelligence, fire capabilities and more. The transition from a single-corps or campaign organization, as we have been used to, to a lateral organization, which has representation for all the branches operating on the battlefield, is essential. In terms of weapons - we need to develop dedicated weapons for urban combat. A single-ton bomb, or the smallest bomb we have today, weighing at 250 kilos, is too large for the urban area. The IDF is set for there, at a very significant intensity. 4. Something which is an essential from my perspective - a unified command and control picture at the lowest level. If there is no unified command and control picture, it will not be possible to operate it all, it simply will not work. Another thing that I wish to mention, which may be a bit controversial but is my recognition - Hamas did not fight us during operation Cast Lead in the manner that they were expecting to fight us. Their fighting rationale broke entirely - they did not reach the conflict. Due to the intensity of the fire blow, its length and its effects, the maneuvering forces faced a problem locating the enemy and fighting him, because he simply dropped below the ground. We know that some of the Hamas leadership was underneath the hospital in Gaza, but this is also at the lowest levels - we know they were told to leave and fight, and they did not want to do it. I think that this is the fire operation ideal we can expect for during combat. It is not that the maneuvering forces did not do a good job, and it is not that they did not fight - saying so would be a sin towards them - they did so with great courage. Yet, the fire created the optimal conditions for them to fight. The second thing I wish to say, in summary, is that the events which occurred during operation Cast Lead are not those that will occur in the next operation. It worked once, and Hamas will have already prepared for it. If we are going to repeat Cast Lead for the second time, it will cost us very dearly. It needs to be understood that we have to bring something else. It is important to remember that fighting in the open is not recommended in an urban area, and the IDF’s advantage in such a fight is the ability to know where he is fighting. In the face of each arena, we must sew the appropriate suit and operation “Cast Lead” provided us with a glimpse into what to expect in the future. The clear result is that the people in southern Israel live today without fear - this is the outcome test. Have we solved the problem? Far from it, because as we said, the formula is not convergent.