Dear Participants of the International Artillery Conference, When the idea to hold a conference on the subject of fire and combined arms in urban terrain was born - one which would assemble the best of those who deal with the use of combined arms under one roof - it seemed like a distant dream. Months passed, and the vision became a reality. Thanks to a huge response and the significant interest the conference has generated, leading figures in the field of artillery from all over the world were gathered, including senior officials from the IDF and the Israeli military industries. The conference was the fruit of cooperation between the Artillery Association Memorial Foundation, the ground forces and artillery corps of the IDF, and the Israeli air force and intelligence corps. This event offered a rare opportunity for mutual enrichment - on one hand, not only representatives of the IDF’s ground forces and its air and intelligence branches, but the leading experts in the field in Israel as well and, on the other hand, their colleagues from abroad. Friends, the wars in which the urban space constitutes an inseparable part of the battle theater are not “wars of the future” but, rather, of the present in every regard. Hundreds of thousands of civilians in Israel experienced severe attacks on the home front during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and during Operation “Cast Lead” in the Gaza Strip, in which the communities of southern Israel were attacked with rockets, in December 2008 and January 2009. Given that the attacks on the Israeli home front are launched from within population centers, the IDF has accumulated enormous expertise in using fire while making a supreme effort to avoid harm to innocent bystanders. This elegant booklet, which we are gladly handing out to you, is a summary of the excellent conference which we had. It gathers all the lectures and presentations presented during the conference - issues which are related to the use of fire in the modern military arena, from combat approach to force assembly, control systems, and goal-directed intelligence. As chairman of the Artillery Association Memorial Foundation and a former chief artillery officer, I am proud that the best of the lecturers and the senior people dealing with the use of fire have gathered for this unique conference. The association has made it a goal to strengthen awareness of the enormous changes now occurring in the way fire is used in different battle arenas, while also working to perpetuate and bequeath the heritage of the artillery fighters over the span of decades. In its framework, all of us, artillery people, continue to keep in contact and to form a single, extended family. We, the artillery veterans, could not have met the challenge of the first International Artillery Conference of its kind, without the full dedication of the chief artillery officer, Brig.-Gen. David Swisa, and many from the corps command, together with people from the ground forces, headed by Gen. Sami Turgeman. We also owe huge gratitude to the Israeli Air Force and to the Intelligence corps, which took part in the organizational effort and whose leaders are among the outstanding speakers of the conference. Special thanks go to all the members of the association and to the bodies that worked with it for the purpose of organizing the conference at the highest level.
Brig.-Gen. (ret.) Dany Kassif, Chairman of the Artillery Memorial Association, Former Chief Artillery Officer
Lieut.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi Chief of General Staff, IDF
Fire Challenges in Urban Terrain The challenges of opening fire in urban terrain cannot be discussed without understanding the changes which have occurred here. In a sense, it is difficult to illustrate the manner of combat in the last century to those who have not experienced it. I try to describe it to young commanders as an experience of the Yom Kippur War, in order to comprehend the depth of the change, which is additionally a conceptual change which poses quite a few challenges to us. For the Yom Kippur generation, the main challenge was to know to draft in time, obtain a warning, go to the battlefield, pick up the binoculars, look at where the divisions are located, adjust the war plans, and fight. In today’s reality, the new recruits come to the battle lines and look for the battlefield, lift the binoculars and look at the divisions that are not there. Not only is there not much of an enemy, the battle is behind you - all sorts of objects are flying above overhead towards the housewives of the State of Israel, and you ask yourself what do you do about it. I am not claiming that what is called the confrontation and “the symmetric enemy” have completely disappeared – rather it has faded and forgotten, but within the Israel’s strategic circumstances, there is no doubt that it faces a threat called “asymmetry”, and this did not transpire by accident.
The concept, initially led by Hezbollah and copied today by Hamas, and to some extent, not only by them, is essentially one of a low-signature enemy, which avoids meeting us in the traditional battlefields, and a cold, sober analysis of our capabilities shows us that he has no chance there. He heads towards the urban territory and underground interior and actually operates from within the urban territory to the Israeli territory, towards the Israeli populace. We are facing a different challenge, one which we must contend with. The enemy’s logic in the urban terrain stems from several causes: 1. He is unwilling to meet us in the open field. 2. He has understood that if he fights us from within the urban terrain, it will be difficult for us to fight within it. I think that during the second Lebanon War as well as operation “Cast Lead”, it was vital to demonstrate we know both how to produce fire within the constructed area and manipulate it as well. Eventually, at the basis of the concept, in the face of such enemies, we will have to operate both fire and maneuverability. There was an approach within the IDF that more can be cast on the fire than it seems it could do. This is very elegant, however I believe that fire cannot do everything. We have no choice, we must obtain a very clear and key result within a relatively short period of time, and we will have to perform some manner of combination between fire and maneuverability. This is one of the reasons we empha-
sized the importance of the ground maneuver and the fire elements within it in recent years in the IDF.
easier for us to operate the fire into this area, in addition to previous target recognition. However, this would require a dramatic increase in precision armaments.
I do not think there is no place for statistical fire anymore- it is important for types of arenas, maneuver capabilities and goals and we will continue to require it. For example, during operation “Cast Lead”, more than 80% of IDF armaments were precision armaments. The operational necessity for operating precision armaments, which are both lethal with smaller heads and have lesser collateral damage, will grow. Our problem will be to operate precision fire into crowded terrain.
We’ve defined something, which can perhaps be called the “reverse asymmetric approach”, which expresses the ability to fire, with all the restrictions of the urban area, with a joint maneuver with accurate intelligence and a strong and organized rear. I think that the IDF has progressed impressively within the field of fire, even compared to other armies. But I think that today’s type poses a challenge to fire and to the military planners and to the HQs, one which might not have been so clear in the past. As a result of the type of enemy, there is a dramatic increase in the importance of the battle between the systems in my opinion, especially in the field of intelligence. We cannot reach the war merely trained, ready and proficient with the programs, but will also have to reach it with such intelligence capabilities that we will be ready when the screen shall rise, after having exposed the centers of gravity, and in terms of targets with plans for our fire. If we wish to make a significant effect on such a low signature enemy, with short target lifespan within the urban terrain, we will have to come prepared in advance. It is the biggest challenge; otherwise we will shoot 170,000 shells as we fired in the second Lebanon War. It is no longer the previous war. We have the most impressive capabilities, for connecting between ‘sensor’ to ‘shooter’ - I believe we are at the forefront of this. However, this is not enough. We must continue to try and make an effort, practice the enemy’s capabilities and turn an asymmetric enemy into a symmetric one, before starting the battle. When we reach this war, we will not have to look for the divisions, in other words. This is an intelligence war prior to the war. During operation “Cast Lead”, for example, one of the flights we carried out at the onset was for more than 60% of Hamas’s launch pits. It did not occur because we found them in the morning, rather because of intelligence research effort. We have a very impressive quiver of arrows. The traditional bottleneck is usually the amount of targets. If we do not manufacture them within the urban terrain, we cannot effectively operate the fire towards a military target, whose destruction is of value. The intelligence capability becomes critical throughout the active fire operation. It is not enough to have capabilities - the intelligence capability to provide a very high rate of targets in advance is a critical condition for the sake of operating the fire and the precision armaments which we have. Yet this is not enough either. We should be able to have the connectivity ability with Jointness, which can pass on the targets with tactical context in real time. The IDF strives to reach the situation where we speak the language of coordinates, sea, air, ground- to simplify this process. The pinpointing-DAP systems (Digital Army Program) and the connectivity project serve this process – we are already walking towards this era. Upon entering the urban area, we should be able to locate the enemy in it. We take every measure to separate him and distance him from the innocents. There will be no refuge but to do so in the following wars as well. This will make it
Future Challenges Looking at the challenges of the future, the ground fire will have to support the maneuver and assist as the major effort within the maneuver. Those who look at the development, the battle progression, and this is equal in all arenas, see that the offence towards the goal will become more difficult. The IDF has an advantage in the recognition of the area - we are not a delivery army, we know where to fight. Yet whoever looks at this arena sees that the progress towards the goal will become increasingly challenging. Maneuvering land forces will be challenged more and more with their progress. Fire will be a very central element in assisting with their progression and with the performance of the primary mission, of course. I think that we must continue to strengthen the fire in order to continue with this maneuver. We will have to provide fire at all levels, including the brigade level. Even the mortars are very important: they allow for ranges of over 6 KM, precise, lethal and independent fire of the division and we may have to boost these capabilities later perhaps. I think we will also have to increase the ability of the division fire and in the IDF. We will not give up on the barrel weaponry, yet I think that as we look ahead, we will have to additionally define the division’s capability for precision fire capability as independent, autonomous fire of the division commander, with collection and assault capabilities. I think we are beginning to walk towards that direction. We will have to continue developing local weapons with small and lethal warheads with precise impact capability and with minimal collateral damage. I think that this approach will go and increase. We cannot ignore the tremendous improvement the IDF possesses in the rocket disposition in terms of accuracy, and we will have to go towards a slightly cheaper but more accurate rocket disposition. It will increase the independence of field commanders, to some extent and reduce the air-ground dependence to a degree. It can alleviate the Air Force and provide an advantage to the field commanders. An additional trend will be to increase the collection capability in the ground battle. We are already within this project, ranging from the tactical level to the strategic level. In fact, the IDF is among few armies that are already among these four layers.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles I think there is great significance that we give bestow the tactical echelon’s independent collection ability - the “Sky Rider” project (unmanned aircraft for the tactical echelon)
represents this. It has great significance in the echelon’s ability to maneuver, raise a picture, properly plan and identify targets and operate precision fire. We are doing the same thing at the division level with a UAV project on the ground layer and with our central UAV disposition, which is operational and has proven itself entirely, and we are going and strengthening with an additional layer beyond. I think that this field is generally a new dimension, and it has a crucial contribution to the ground capability, both in maneuvering and in operating fire - we highly believe in that. In my opinion, when combined with the DAP project, the force package that is providing as it is and will continue to improve is really more appropriate for today’s battlefield challenges posed before the IDF, with the combination of aerial access of course. One last thing, we will need to continue decentralizing the fire operation authorities. With this kind of warfare, with low-signature targets and with a very, very short target length or lifespan, it is not enough that locate the target. We will have to define rules that will allow the authorization of fire operation in real time and you realize that this entails the possibility of mistakes being made. However, there is no other way. We will have to decentralize authorization permits significantly based on rules, definitions, rules of engagement that are clear on what to shoot, what not to shoot, what to hit and what not to hit. Incidentally, this is important, not just for operating high trajectory fire, but also on the level of the
operational activity surrounding Gaza. If you go along the fence in Gaza will see that we have sensors attached firing weapons, and soldiers sitting not far away with rules to open fire upon recognition. At the bottom line, I think that there is great importance to fire. The IDF fire efforts continue to develop, and we will continue to strengthen it both as a maneuver facilitator as well as a very complex element in the ability to handle an asymmetric enemy. Furthermore, it should be remembered that we have not forgotten the other enemies as well. This thing must be accompanied by integration with an intelligence campaign and advanced technological capabilities to move information and speak the coordinate language and I think we are already within this world. Traditional ground was in the back, the Digital Army Program (DAP) is very much promoting it forward nicely, and this will increase the operational effectiveness. Anyone who sees what DAP does, including our connection with other systems, take the doubt off the table. All of this, including precision armaments with operational ability and authority to take advantage of opportunities before they occur, will ensure the fire operation, in my opinion. And in this sense, I am convinced, even based on my past experience and based on the second Lebanon War, and based on operation “Cast Lead”, that the fire will continue to be a key component but will do that with the maneuver and on the ground, in order to fulfill the task of the maneuver into such territory, with all its challenges, and the fire will continue to be a very major component and effort in order for commanders to be able to fulfill their mission.
Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Dan Harel
Former Deputy Chief of Staff, IDF
The Fire Delivery Concept in Operation “Cast Lead” Abstract
The presentation will focus on the strategic purpose of the state of Israel by going to operation “Cast Lead”. It will then describe the concept of fire support within urban terrain, and finally, the results of the operation, the primary conclusions and lessons.
Additional personnel- About 3000 terrorist activists (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Army of Islam, etc.) Armament- Small arms, antitank missiles, antiaircraft assets, IEDs, rockets, mortars, etc.
The Gaza Strip - General Data-Area - 365 km2; Population - about 1.5 million; Natural growth - 3.3% (50 %< 15); Resources – none.
The IDF will strike hard against the Hamas organization; significantly reduce the ballistic fire and terrorist activity from the Gaza Strip. This will improve deterrence, and will create conditions for improving the security situation in the south and prevent the confrontation from overflowing into other theaters.
Improving the Israeli deterrence:
We did not enter the Strip in order to conquer it, even though it was within our power – rather that is the definition of operation “Cast Lead” and its objective.
September 12, 2005 - completion of the Israeli withdrawal. 6/2007 - Hamas conducts a coup in the Gaza Strip. Prior to November 18, 2009 - intermittent firing punctuated by truces. The escalation process. November-December 2009 - increasing fire (about 400 rockets). December 27, 2009 - commencement of operation “Cast Lead”.
• 8000 activists in the terrorist attack apparatus • 6600 activists in the security apparatus and interventio force • 1500 in additional security apparatuses
1. Badly hurting the Hamas organization. 2. Significant reduction of steep trajectory fire. 3. Significant reduction of hostile terror activity from the Gaza Strip.
The Combat Rationale of the Hamas (Estimate) Because Hamas has capabilities that are inferior to those of the IDF in every selected parameter, it was estimated that the organization would operate in a mode of hiding and operating
from within a dense civilian area, using the population as a human shield and reducing the combat duration to the extent possible using: - Heavy, continuous ballistic fire towards population centers in Israel's home front for the purpose of demoralizing and exhausting it. - Extolling a price of heavy friction during warfare in the dense urban combat taking place at the front (maximizing military casualties). - Creating an image of a humanitarian disaster and multiple casualties among the civilian population in the Strip.
Southern Command - Mission - The southern command will defend its territory; take over launching areas in open terrain; stop trajectory fire on Israel; attack terror organizations in Gaza Strip with fire maneuvers in order to strengthen the threat towards the terror organizations and will additionally provide security to the citizens of the south. Operational achievements that will make the mission accomplishable• Stopping the trajectory fire. • Striking the Hamas and terrorists organizations • Strengthening the threat.
The Fire Delivery Concept
Maximizing the use of the relative edge of intelligence domination, precision fire and advanced command and control circles for the purpose of striking hard at the Hamas Organization (including its leadership and headquarters, operational infrastructures, production and storage units and its personnel), providing close, precision support to the maneuvering forces and suppression of ballistic fire at the Israeli home front - in order to break the adversary's logic (based on forcing the Israeli side to end the fighting by delegitimizing its action) and forcing our logic.
• Dealing with an enemy that hides and operates out of a dense civilian population (using it as a human shield) and against an (Israeli) civilian population in population centers in the south of the country. • Retaining the internal and external operation legitimacy by minimizing casualties among friendly troops, as well as both Israeli and Palestinian populations alike.
Fire Delivery Principles For planning the operation-
- Opening with a surprise volley of fire to induce a heavy physical and mental effect. - Suppression of ballistic fire by direct action against the physical and human infrastructures by striking at launching grounds and targeted preventative action against its perpetrators. - Achieving cumulative systemic damage to the Hamas organization in the preliminary fire phase. - Setting up the ground with fire in preparation for the maneuver phase. - Accompaniment of the maneuvering force with precision fire through its sector of operation, to a quantity and level that will prevent friction and heavy casualties (on both sides) during combat in the urban area. - Use of all dimensions for gathering intelligence and for fire delivery (sea, land and air), while maximizing the use of all existing platforms based on their relative advantages.
For command and control
- Creating dedicated mechanisms for generating targets and closing real time circles at the regional command and the general staff level. - Institutionalization of fire centers at the brigade level (beyond the divisional one) to generate the ability to deliver precision fire at targets in general, and real time targets in particular, while combining inter-organizational, inter-branch and intercorps capabilities in continuous, durable manner. - Advanced finalization of the limits of responsibility and authority and boundaries throughout the chain of command (from the general staff to units in the field). - Reliance on a uniform situation report, based on command and control, at all levels and organizations.
Legality and legitimacy
- Keeping the civilian population away from the target areas in addition to existing and planned contact lines by communicating to it directly through the use of a wide range of measures and methods (radio/ television, leaflet bombing, direct telephone calls). - Determining precautions in delivering fire of all types and controlling of damage in the field, with the intent of reducing casualties among uninvolved parties due to the fighting. - Close legal accompaniment of all the planning and execution stages at the general staff, regional command and divisional level, in order to prevent disproportionate damage in the field.
Cast Lead- Development in Actual Execution
Opening strike- 27/12 11:30 a.m. Development of the Operation27/12-3/1/2009- Stage A- the fire strike 27/12/2008 - "Opening strike"-Attacking dozens of headquar-
ters in a few minutes. Ballistic fire suppression strikes dozens of launch regions within a few hours. 28/12-3/1/2009 - Attack of hundreds of static and opportune targets, by the general staff, regional command, divisional and brigade elements. Simultaneously: 29/12-5/1/2009 - Aerial strikes throughout the Gaza Strip (emphasis on closing real time circles). 3/1/2009- Maneuver preparation: striking at dozens of static targets and dozens of artillery targets. 3-17/1/2009- Stage B – maneuver 3-9/1/2009 - Attack, surrounding and severance of Gaza City. 9-17/1/2009 - Deepening of the maneuver and raids. 11-16/1/2009 - Attack of hundreds of static targets and opportune targets. 17-22/1/2009 - Re-evaluation 17-21/1/2009- Deployment in the security region, preparation of mechanized brigade teams for offensive. 21-23/1/2009- Cease fire Re-deployment. The operation started abruptly with an opening volley of dozens of targets, intended to create a physical effect on headquarters and more, in addition to causing an impact on the human factor. About 250 individuals, which were defined as part of the Hamas organization, were killed in the opening volley. This was a very severe blow – three minutes, dozens of targets, dozens of planes, operating in total coordination in a very small terrain. The maneuver stage arrived following the artillery, which was continuously accompanied by assault on hundreds of targets. Thousands of targets were attacked in total. Throughout the maneuver, Hamas asked that Hezbollah launch rockets in the north on two occasions, but Israel did not get dragged into it. Subsequently, a campaign in which we
stood in place arrived and in the end, our unilateral departure - absolute surprise for the Hamas. Just as the operation had begun by surprise, thus it ended with the absolute surprise of the Hamas, which had not assessed that this would be the situation.
the entire chase process until we thwarted the squad. This is a measure once used at the command level and is currently subordinated to the SO. This requires a change in the entire concept world and in the heat detailing - today, you already have to hit a window or the fourth floor, not just the house itself.
The ground operation, in its majority, was concentrated around northern part of the city of Gaza - 900,000 individuals over a cell area of 10 by 10 km. Into which five operating divisions entered in the south, a tilt effort basically, to keep the distribution of Hamas efforts unbalanced in the face of our efforts.
2. Coordinates as a common language foundation - coordinates serve as the anchor the IDF has decided to hold on to and this results in many capabilities that require precision.
The fire characteristics in the campaign were: very dense, problematic combat environment, the opening was a major flight surprise, followed by precision fire - an unprecedented move in Israeli warfare. Dozens of observation centers operating within such a small area, which we once thought was impossible. Dozens of observation centers and centers of attack by assault helicopter and other factors. Close assistance to the maneuvering force, with all the measures, including assault helicopters, cannons utilized for their relative advantage, intelligence research and real-time digital ground intelligence for quick closure of circles on all levels, assault through use of the totality of included circle closure - a link that provides the forces in the terrain the ability to function and respond very quickly.
Cast Lead- Results
Summary of the Operation – General
• The operation ended on January 18, 2009 at 2:00 a.m. with the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by Israel. • During the operation, about 730 rockets were fired at Israel, 165 of which landed in settlements. • Israeli casualties: • Friendly forces – 10 dead, 207 soldiers wounded and injured, 19 of whom severely injured. • Civilians – 3 civilians killed, 7 civilians severely injured . • Palestinian casualties: 1,166 Palestinians dead, among them: – 709 terrorists (about 600 Hamas and about 100 Palestinian Islamic Jihad) – 295 uninvolved. – 162 of unclear involvement. • Attack targets: Dozens of headquarters, hundreds of launch regions, hundreds of tunnels, hundreds of ordnance stores, 11 ordnance stores in mosques, dozens of outposts, dozens of ordnance production sites, and dozens of lathe workshops.
Main Insights and Conclusions in the Fire Field
From a combat doctrine perspective - 1. The entire world of fire operation concepts which we possess should be changed - in terms of the field of artillery; we are talking about cannons or rockets and a target area of 50 by 50. All these hold no meaning when the target is an individual or a launcher – the previous rules are irrelevant, as has been learned in the basic courses. Heat levels- we are providing combat aircraft for special operations (SOs) at this time. During the operation, I was in a reconnaissance aircraft whose visual range is many tens of kilometers, and we were allocated to a special operation (SO) at a "grass widower" (an array of soldiers within the enemy urban terrain), which was under attack, just as we arrived. We were about a kilometer or two over it, and it was attacked by terrorists and had injured individuals. We were integrated during
3. Battle organization - from our point of view, the division is a basic cornerstone in urban combat, and should therefore be given the maximum of independence in gathering of intelligence, fire capabilities and more. The transition from a single-corps or campaign organization, as we have been used to, to a lateral organization, which has representation for all the branches operating on the battlefield, is essential. In terms of weapons - we need to develop dedicated weapons for urban combat. A single-ton bomb, or the smallest bomb we have today, weighing at 250 kilos, is too large for the urban area. The IDF is set for there, at a very significant intensity. 4. Something which is an essential from my perspective - a unified command and control picture at the lowest level. If there is no unified command and control picture, it will not be possible to operate it all, it simply will not work. Another thing that I wish to mention, which may be a bit controversial but is my recognition - Hamas did not fight us during operation Cast Lead in the manner that they were expecting to fight us. Their fighting rationale broke entirely - they did not reach the conflict. Due to the intensity of the fire blow, its length and its effects, the maneuvering forces faced a problem locating the enemy and fighting him, because he simply dropped below the ground. We know that some of the Hamas leadership was underneath the hospital in Gaza, but this is also at the lowest levels - we know they were told to leave and fight, and they did not want to do it. I think that this is the fire operation ideal we can expect for during combat. It is not that the maneuvering forces did not do a good job, and it is not that they did not fight - saying so would be a sin towards them - they did so with great courage. Yet, the fire created the optimal conditions for them to fight. The second thing I wish to say, in summary, is that the events which occurred during operation Cast Lead are not those that will occur in the next operation. It worked once, and Hamas will have already prepared for it. If we are going to repeat Cast Lead for the second time, it will cost us very dearly. It needs to be understood that we have to bring something else. It is important to remember that fighting in the open is not recommended in an urban area, and the IDF’s advantage in such a fight is the ability to know where he is fighting. In the face of each arena, we must sew the appropriate suit and operation “Cast Lead” provided us with a glimpse into what to expect in the future. The clear result is that the people in southern Israel live today without fear - this is the outcome test. Have we solved the problem? Far from it, because as we said, the formula is not convergent.
Brig.-Gen. Itai Brun
Director of the "Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies"
The Revolution in Military Affairs The Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah Version Abstract BG Brun talks about "Modern Warfare" and "Revolution in Military Affairs", but not in the acceptable Western sense, rather through the perspective of Al-Qaeda, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria. "In the aftermath of the second Lebanon war and operation "Cast Lead", the other side is having his self examination", says Brun, "but he is far from abandoning his warfare perception".
The Presentation Hundreds of books and articles have been written about the revolution in military affairs, which has occurred during the last few decades. Almost all of them in the context of utilization of accurate weaponry, technological changes and the information revolution. Nevertheless, the dramatic change of the military
thinking of the Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas' leaders and of states such as Iran and Syria, is the focus of this presentation. It is very difficult to view warfare changing in real time, when things are occurring. The issue of the 'revolution in military affairs' is being dealt greatly around the world, though there is an argument whether or not such a revolution has actually happened. In general, we identify the modern war as something which has evolved around the era of Napoleonic warfare, at the end of the 18th century. The theory, which was later worded in the writings of the German military leader, Karl Von Clausewitz, held on without difficulties until the end of World War two, and probably much later. Since then, war was defined as total, and as being conducted for political purpose, with a certain political
logic. War is about territories and national resources. It is between states, and is very industrial and technological. The perception that war ends with a clear, unequivocal decision, such as the World Wars of the 20th century and the initial wars between Israel and the Arabs, was most important. When Churchill and Hitler fought each other in World War two, they had entirely different ideologies, yet there was an understanding between them regarding the question how a war should look like. For the sake of this discussion, it can be said that they played the same "game". Nowadays, many feel that we and our enemy are playing different games, myself among them, hence our attempt to profoundly understand the other side's perceptions, his learning modus operandi and his imagery of warfare. We date the beginning of the change in the Middle East to the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s. Until then, all parties essentially played the same "game" which matched the definitions of modern warfare, such as the Yom Kippur war between Israel, Egypt and Syria, which was the largest clash between states and was accompanied by vast armed division battles. Then, four major events occurred, which rocked the Middle East and created their warfare perception as we know it today:
One of the new founders was Ayman Al-Zawahiri- the future Osama Bin-Laden deputy within Al-Qaeda. The second was Osama Bin-Laden himself and the third was Abdalla Azam, who had arrived in Afghanistan, like the first two, in order to fight the Soviets. He was one of Al-Qaeda's founders and was killed in an explosion in 1989. In addition to these three, it is important to mention Imad Mughniyah, who started in the P.L.O in the 1970s and teamed up with Abas Musawi and Hasan Nasralla in 1982, who were in Baal-Bek, and founded the Hezbollah organization together. An interesting fact is that the three organizations, which currently lead the struggle against Israel and the U.S, were founded in the 1980s: Hezbollah in 1982, Hamas in 1987, and Al-Qaeda in 1988, towards the end of the war in Afghanistan. They appeared just when many states in the Middle East were in a middle of a crisis. These organizations took the central stage, however the states did not quit the battle in Israel, so much as just change its nature."
America and Israel Do Not Want to Fight" "
Back in the 80s these organizations did not have any systematic approach. Hezbollah, for instance, was hijacking airplanes, kidnaping Western hostages in Lebanon and implementing large suicide attacks.
1. The first significant event was the Islamist revolution in Iran, which inspired many elements, and made Iran into a center for spreading the change.
In the 90s, these organizations watched and observed major global confrontations, mainly through CNN, and what they saw was a row of conflicts in which the powerful side displayed significant technological superiority, yet also significant limitations at the same time.
2. The second event was the USSR invasion of Afghanistan, an invasion which created a phenomenon of Muslims traveling from all over the world to Afghanistan to fight the foreign conqueror- a move which would later birth the global Jihad movement and AlQaeda. The way the Soviets left Afghanistan created a narrative for the Mujahidin, which were the ones who brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union, no less.
They saw what happened after the first Gulf War, when Americans ineffectively attacked targets in the no-flight zones in Iraq, examined what happened in Kosovo and in the Israeli confrontation with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. They saw also the failure of the American operation in Somalia in 1993, and noted that in the aftermath of the attack on the American embassy in Tanzania, the U.S reacted with fire of long range cruise missiles.
3. The third significant event was the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, which was the source of many processes which influenced doctrine and weaponry.
To their perception, the U.S. did not want to fight, that the strong side mostly operates aerial power and does not really succeed in causing real damage from a distance, and has an obvious weak spot in that it is tremendously influenced by public opinion.
4. The fourth event from that period was what they refer to as “the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon”. It demonstrated to Syria that their military was inferior compared to Israel, and temporarily harmed the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. The vacuum created there enabled Iran to establish Hezbollah on grounds of demographic changes that had occurred within Lebanon in any case." In addition to these four significant events, an additional noteworthy event is the 1981 attack of the nuclear reactor in Iraq by the Israeli Air Force, which drastically changed how major targets appear in the Middle East since - they are much more camouflaged and protected. The interesting thing is that these developments rocked a certain group of individuals in the Middle East, and this is how the large change was created.
The attempt of the founder-warriors on the other side to understand our perceptions was not very profound. They understood the general idea, and their independent interpretation of reality was at times different from the way it was comprehended in Israel. They understood the information revolution, for instance, not merely in the context of the ability to connect between means of observation to an attack, but as a mean of increasing their ability to enlist warriors, or to influence the enemy’s public opinion. In the bottom line, they accepted the technological superiority of Israel and the West, but also that there are many weak points, which can be used to overpower the technological superiority.
Friction, Deterrence, Attrition
They compensated the Western technological superiority through three main components: 1. The first- a comprehensive effort to significantly increase absorption and survivability capabilities. The weak side understands the stronger side has lethal fire capability and knows how to attack in any weather and at all ranges. Therefore, it starts to operate within bunkers and civilian populaces, while using camouflage tactics and deception. The developing concept is that the essence of the survivability, under enemy attack, is an accomplishment in itself, a kind of triumph. 2. The second component is deterrence- the weaker side needs to demonstrate an image of deterrence, as it was important to Sadam Hussein that people will think he had non-conventional weapons, even if he did not have any. For this reason, Walid Mualem, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs, stated lately that if there is going to be war between Israel and Syria, he definitely does not want it, as it will result in mutual devastation on both sides. The concept which has evolved on the other side during the 1990s was that if they will have the appropriate deterrence tools, they will be able to take the war into their comfort zones, where they will be able to neutralize a significant part of the technological advantages of the stronger side. 3. The third component in their perception is attrition. Although the Israeli homefront was able to defend itself against the Palestinian terrorist attacks between 2000-2004, their assumption was that Israel and the West don't know how to handle long term wars with many casualties - and that in case of confrontation, they will blink first. The organizational derivative of the perception was a combination between states and organizations, IranSyria-Hezbollah-Hamas, in the framework of what we refer to as "the radical axis", which has developed in the Middle East, parallel to the terrorist attacks of AlQaeda and the Global Jihad.
The first years of the millennium were soulfully uplifting from the other side’s perspective. The 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon significantly expressed the success of their concept for them, as well as with the disengagement from the Gaza strip in 2005 and the results of the American warfare in Iraq. This is when the second Lebanon war and operation “Cast Lead” came. My argument is, and it is unusual, that when Hassan Nasralla said "I was wrong", right after the second Lebanon war, he did not mean that he was wrong about the two kidnapped reserve soldiers, which led to the war, but rather to a more profound mistake of reaching the battle field with a concept which did not fit. He understands that the triangle concept - friction, deterrence and attrition - has its limitations. Due to his wisdom and learning ability, Nassrallah already understood, in my opinion, that his organization is about to face many difficult years. And in fact, Hez-
bollah has been in a state of calm for four years, which has enabled it to become stronger, but has dramatically damaged its image as a fighting organization. Hamas has equally been searching for its path since operation “Cast Lead”. Hamas and Hezbollah were not founded as social or political organizations, but as fighting organizations first, and now they are undergoing self examination.
Where are we going from here?
These organizations were considering three possibilities: the first is that they have nothing to change, because their conception was working overall. Another possibility was to stay with the triangle of friction, deterrence and attrition, while having a major improvement in capabilities. Another possibility is to abandon the concept altogether and have something entirely different. In my assessment, they’ve chosen the second possibility at this point- stay with the triangle, while tremendously improving their capabilities. To their understanding, their idea was correct but their ability to execute it did not fit, therefore, in order to have an effective deterrence, they require a longer and accurate weapon in order to reach Tel-Aviv, and not only Hadera or Ashkelon. It is possible that they may go towards a different third idea in the future, such as to pass the 'combat stick' against Israel from the semi-military organizations to a collection of undefined entities, operating in the context of the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" of the 'Marmara' ship, but this move cannot be pointed to at this stage. At any rate, after experiencing the first decade of the millennium, they are currently asking themselves whether an extended war really serves them. It is possible they have reached the conclusion that if a war lasts long enough, then eventually the stronger side utilizes his advantages and wins, or at least causes such a great damage, that it renders the confrontation against it a non-worthwhile adventure, according to the 'reverse symmetry' model, as it is called by the Israeli chief of staff. However, in the meantime, their deeds and declarations mainly indicate a will to improve their capabilities. As for the nuclear weaponry which Iran is aiming to obtain, it mainly enters through the deterrence component of the other side's perspective. A nuclear Iran may produce some sort of deterrence which will enable them, according to their perception, to absorb and to tire to better effect. As for the conflict between the will to destroy Israel by their fanatic leaders and the debate regarding their rationalism, there are only two options: they are rational, or they aren't, in which case nothing can be done. In my opinion, our discussion regarding the question of “rationalism” is, in fact, our way of saying that they are different from us and think differently, and therefore, I prefer to understand in what they are different and not deal with the question of whether they are rational or not.
Brig. - Gen. David Swisa
Chief of the IDF Artillery Corps
The Target: Precise, Relevant and Effective Armament When we speak about attack components, we talk about fire firstly. It is important to know that fire is not something in itself, and when fire is discussed around the world, what is talked about is fire capability. Fire itself has no existence right and bears no relevance without the connection to target intelligence, which we deal with greatly. In the absence of targets, fire will not be of relevance, even if it is the most sophisticated, the most accurate and the deadliest. The third relevant item is the C&C system (command and control), which simply makes us take the targets that we have on the field and mobilize them on the battlefield at the times we want, for the attacking element. This triangle is a necessary one. In the recent past, at least within the IDF, the fire dimension gained forward momentum, the target intelligence dimension and the C&C dimension were behind, and at this time I believe that weâ€™ve adapted to all three of these components, and today we have an impressive fire ability, even the ability to get the coordinates at the appropriate resolution, as well as the ability to move it from a collection element to an assault element in short periods of time. The challenge is to take this process forward. The fire purpose is to destroy and paralyze an enemy through a fire operation effort on the terrain line. Veterans remember that the purpose of the line of fire was to as-
sist the maneuvering forces in the past, and I would add to that purpose, to clarify it in depth, not only to assist in the ground combat but in any depth and along the width of the ground battlefield, and this is the depth challenge that awaits us.
The Fire Functions and Its place in the ground battlefield
In my humble opinion, the main role of the fire on the battlefield terrain is still to aid the maneuvering force, and only in a secondary role, with all the advanced capabilities we have, to paralyze and destroy enemy targets. When observing the fire, one must make a distinction that will place the types of fire on the battlefield for us: The initial type is the spatial fire. In recent years, we have moved towards this direction from a state of organic fire, when each field commander had artillery of his own â€œin the pocketâ€?. In studies we have done regarding the Yom Kippur war, we discovered that a small percentage of capabilities had been exhausted all the time. We moved towards spatial fire, meaning fire that exists in the expanse and that is assigned to anyone who requests it at the time and the force that he needs. Spatial fire is not organic, and provides an answer to the gap. We will always be missing fire, regardless of how many
precise armaments and launchers we may have; there will always be a shortage of fire. Therefore, the spatial perception is relevant in many cases on the battlefield. The second type is the systemic fire. We deal with fire coming from the land, fire coming from the air, and I think we have a lot to develop with regards to fire coming from the sea. However, in the end, the platform and the dimension are irrelevant, as what matters is that the armament reaches the relevant point, at the time we want. When dealing with systemic fire, we deal with the question of what it should achieve. Its bottom line rationale is to prevent the war rationale of the other side. The last fire that I wish to discuss about is the tactical fire, which essentially deals with close assistance of forces. It allows forces to fulfill their mission, accompanies them and prepares the area. We primarily operate guns of various ranges, even with statistical precision, but this is the tactical fire. Its characteristics are that it is a part of the tactical move, is structured within the tactical maneuver, is mostly planned, is partly reactive and has an immediate effect. It does not deal with the next battle or the next enemy. In fact, it is customized by the mission commander, and is an assisting component, in essence. When we observe the characteristics of the enemy on the battlefield, we see that it exerts its capabilities against our hinterland. The enemy is conducting a war with us that has no clear lines, no described areas, and the area which is occupied is not necessarily clean of hostile elements. The anti-tank threats and others exist there at every point in time. In other words, the rules of the game we were used to in the past are blurring and the depth front loses its logical order of warfare doctrine, defense - attack, as we were used to in the past. The enemy’s steep trajectory capability threat is significant and the entire state of Israel is covered under the threat of its steep trajectory. The enemy knows now how to improve the accuracy today, he knows how to bring mass and lethality and this is the central threat of the war that we have with him. The centers of gravity significantly challenge us when we talk about purpose. If so, what is the purpose and what is the center of gravity? The population is part of the “game”. This issue requires unique solutions as part of the operational plan. The target liveliness is short. We require greater processes of detection, handling and attack than ever. From the moment we have identified a launch until the moment we need to find an operational solution; we have few seconds, sometimes no more than minutes.
neuver? Will there be a maneuver with a lot of casualties to our troops? It depends on what the fire does. However, it will take place in any way and this requires us to provide fire capability, which is essentially an effective fire support for the maneuver.
Fire Efficiency, Precision and Mass
The question arises, what is effective fire? To me, it means that the warhead should be effective and tailored, that it should be accurate and should be within the ranges that we want them to be. A word on accuracy: 15-10 years ago, when we discussed effective accuracy, everyone would jump and say “nationwide” - the code name for the accuracy we would take from ortho-photo or from any other measurement tool. It took down 20 meters. An artillery corps officer, who reaches an accuracy of 20 meters, meaning “country”, would reach the utmost precision. Today, a distance of 20 meters for our fire capabilities represents an entirely inaccurate precision in the face of challenges. We are looking at precision from a completely different perspective - even in meters - when we talk about the target that we want to hit. When we want to hit an enemy tank, then sometimes you do not just want to hit the tank, but it is important where you hit it, and when you want to hit a structure, you do not only want to hit it but to know which window you are hitting in order to achieve the maximum effect. We need to fire accurately at all levels: Fire that can hurt people, terrorists, which constitute moving targets which we do not have much time to close circles on them. We need available fire, a matter of minutes and seconds. We talk about the fire continuity in two dimensions - fire must be continuous in the time dimension of time as well as the spatial dimension, that is, to cover the area at any time and point in time. The IDF’s main lesson from operation “Cast Lead” and from the Second Lebanon war is the necessity to significantly improve the range of armaments that we have for a variety of old and new targets on the battlefield. I think that we are not good at it, we should take the appropriate armament for the appropriate target and place it at the necessary strength, which is the challenge that I believe is facing us all. And here I want to get to an answer: if these are the challenges, what is the response that we need to deal with? The first response, and I think it is an ongoing revolution which will continue to accompany us in the coming years, is shortening the closing time of circle fire during assault. This is a significant challenge.
This challenge is found in all the urban combat battlefields. The last thing that the enemy places there, before us, when he is hiding in the underground center and in the sensitive sites, it weaponry. The targets are below the surface, and one of our challenges is to find them and destroy them. This constitutes a challenge for our fire capabilities and for our intelligence.
The second thing standing before us is the construction of a ground fire capability, I mean to say, autonomous, and I am not just saying it. During operation “Cast Lead”, the ground cooperation with the Air Force, at least in the research done afterwards, was rare, for me, with regards to the connection, cooperation, of the integration of interests and so on.
However, it is important to keep in mind that we cannot implement and complete the task only with fire. There will be a maneuver in any way. Will it be a deep and rapid ma-
The main lesson of operation “Cast Lead” is that because of this excellent cooperation between the ground and the air force in the ground combat, ground capability must
be built. This is a reverse lesson, in many ways, since you understand that without the air force’s capability to provide you the necessary assistance in the masses and strengths needed from the air, capability that you can only get from the air, you must develop the ground capability yourself, and I think that this thing is developed. Regarding mass – we have, and will still continue to have, targets on the battlefield, that we will not necessarily look for the precision and the specific impact of the element, the target, and the specific military component. We still require significant mass. Mass produces artillery, and you still will need 100, 200, and 300 rounds on target. Why? Because you will have to cover an area, lower people, you will want to avoid an effect on a 50 by 50 square area as an artillery target, and with regards to the fire aspect, we must preserve the ability to continue and operating in masses. We will never manage to get an accurate mass, we need to bring precision whose need is rising, but the need for mass must still be a tool in the hands of the field-level commander for operating artillery fire, and therefore, the significance of the statistical artillery which still covers a necessary, critical area in the battlefield, and which we have to preserve.
UAVs and the Barrel Disposition
The UAV (Unmanned Air Vehicle) disposition in the IDF is partly operated by the ground, by the artillery corps. The air force operates its UAV disposition for the aerial needs. The air force and the ground operate UAVs in close collaboration for the benefit of the ground. Regarding the UAVs, the field level commander, at the level of battalion commander, brigade commander, has known since the dawn of time to look at the battlefield from a horizontal angle. If he was a more talented and successful commander, he would go higher up the hill and overlook the battlefield. Has never had a complete picture, and will never have a comprehensive picture of the operational area he was going to operate in. Sometimes, he had to send different flanks, to land in-depth observations. Our history is filled with attempts to understand what is happening on the battlefield. Today, the UAV aerial ability opens a very significant capability to the ground corps to view the battlefield from different angles, from almost every angle, except the ground angle. This provides us with an intelligence picture, goals, enemy readiness, concentration of efforts, main effort, and etc., much more significant than we knew before. This is the contribution of UAVs to the ground. A UAV disposition was established in the IDF, which means that each level has unmanned aircrafts. Today at the battalion level, there are UAVs called “Sky Rider”, that know how to bring day-night intelligence at ranges of 10 km which the battalion operates, and know how to make fire elements in full form. The IDF will have the regimentlevel capability to operate a UAV which is regimental, belongs to the regiment, and this disposition exists today in the IDF within the existing aircraft at the division level and above. Within the fields of spotting and meteorology, the IDF currently has the capability, which, by the way, did not exist
during operation “Cast Lead” during the Second Lebanon war, to spot and mark the artillery situation picture of those firing at you in close to 85% of the launches. This allows us to better direct the fire, on the one hand, and to direct the maneuver to the necessary places on the other. Another capability deals with the field of meteorology: many things that fly through the air require accurate meteorology and there is no escape from switching to spatial meteorology, which actually gains meteorological data regarding wind speed and barometric pressure and more at any point in time. In the field of barrel weaponry, the challenge before us is to take the guns and make them more accurate. We are still preserving the mass, but there is no doubt that today, we require a higher rate of fire from the guns, deeper ranges – both 30 and 40 kilometers - and this continues to be the pillar of the ground fire.
Over the years and until today, we employ the IDF fire under a longitudinal approach, which means that each weapon system has an element which operates it. Take, for example, the division fire centers - there is a system that runs the guns, the mortars, and if there are any, then rockets as well, there are the precision armaments which are powered by a separate system, the air, EW (electronic warfare) and more. The main challenge before us is to operate the fire under the headquarters of all levels, integrated. Whether it is a commander at the brigade or division level and above, it has all the intelligence agencies streaming targets to it from everything out there, on the one hand - ground, air - and we have all the fire air and ground capabilities on the other hand, and all that remains is to connect the target to the relevant fire system and attack. This challenges us to build integrated command centers which operate laterally and not only longitudinally, and the IDF is vigorously engaged in this matter. In summary, when dealing with fire capabilities, there are five significant challenges for the coming years: 1. Autonomous fire for the ground in the ground battle against all updated targets which the battlefield produces for us. 2. Deep and accurate fire capability at all levels - no more precision fire at high levels, rather precision fire is required on the tactical/systemic level. 3. Creating capability for the ground in the IDF, for attacking buildings, attack underground dispositions and attacking fortifications. 4. Improving the ability command and control capability and the inter-branch and inter-corps connectivity. 5. Adopting a joint language between all of them, this is the coordinate language. In the end, if we succeed to produce a battlefield which creates a kind of network or canopy, which transports the targets and the available ground, air and at times sea measures at every period of time and at all the command levels, and if know to operate them and connect the armaments at the required time – then, I think, we will be able to operate precise, relevant and effective armament.
Maj. - Gen. Shmuel (Sami) Turgeman Chief of the IDF Ground Forces
Strike Capabilities and their Effect on the Maneuvering Elements in Urban Terrain Operations We will discuss global trends in everything that is related to demographics and to urban warfare, and then discuss the issue of enemy trends succinctly. What is the experience which we have in operating ground fire in urban areas? The army has rich experience in this field, both for better and in some cases for worse, and should learn each of these operations briefly in the end; we will try to focus the current challenge as we understand it. We are greatly dealing in this field, even within the framework of the Second Lebanon War, in operation â€œCast Leadâ€? and as part of the preparations. With regards to demographics, there are a few examples from around the world. There is no doubt that when looking at the area data over the span of years, we fully understand that the demographic expansion is very significant and taking over more and more areas. This is true for the entire world and this is especially true where we are. Looking at the scope of the areas around us, in Lebanon and the Golan Heights, in the Gaza Strip - if there is anywhere to build there - and elsewhere, we understand that the growth, the population growth rate and culture that exist in these places, bring us a generally very important demographic challenge. The first thing is
the gap that develops in these areas between the population growth rate and the ability of government - and sometimes, there is no government - to provide basic infrastructure for society and people, in order to avoid creating frustrated places, which burst and impact their neighbors at the end. The second is the operational challenge of more urban areas than open areas. Here in Israel, there is a major difference in everything to do with terms of demographic processes, especially with the culture around us and the data that is present here. Three percent is the growth rate per year within relatively few decades, found in population scopes, which are a significant challenge. What are the enemyâ€™s trends? I think the enemy has recognized the fire benefits of the Western armies. He has seen the process of building the force, and has also seen it in demonstrations that have happened over the years in terms of the massiveness of fire operation, in terms of accuracy, in terms of the result of such a significant operation, and he understood that everything related to a high-signature enemy - mechanized, armored units, and I would also say open and exposed infrastructure -is intended for destruction.
There are examples of those capabilities in recent years, and the ability - I’d say of all the Western armies - to attack with high capacity and a high level of accuracy, has brought him to the process of evaluation, and has developed abilities and directions that can actually bypass the systemic fire capability. The disappearance of the forces as well, which we see in Gaza, Lebanon - both disappearance and disregard, entry into the ground, even a purely civilian environment, where it is very difficult to discern between a military target and normal civil environment. We see it with Hamas, Hezbollah and in all built-up areas. We understand that the use of the civilian environment is part of his strategy, both as well as a shelter from fire, as well as manipulation. Obviously, when fighting in a continuous urban area, which has people and in which sometimes people have nowhere to be moved to, it has significance in terms of civilian casualties. This is part of the conception, launching from areas, which are sensitive and problematic, fire from mosques, near schools, launch by a hospital and put you in a dilemma with regards to damage, and to environmental damage that can develop from a legal military target, according to all international law, but one with additional costs. The refugee camp of Jebalia- one of the world’s most densely populated areas, which the only platform that knows how to work there is an infantry soldier. All the rest cannot enter the alleys and there’s no chance to maneuver there in this very crowded area, where a ground observation does not know to locate and mechanize. You need to find the sensitive spots and isolate them, locate the problematic places with safety ranges, find the places where the population is concentrated and which you do not want to hurt and in all that, attempt to locate the lone goal, which is sometimes a single person standing near the barrel of a mortar, or by a launch pad and knowing how to do it well, accurately and effectively represents a big challenge. Our challenge during the 1990’s, the IDF’s challenge, was called “Storm Perception.” We developed fire ability aimed at the war whose gravity center is the campaign environment and could cope with mechanized, armored divisions. This was spoken of greatly, as well as with highsignature units and an excellent intelligence gathering capability from our perspective, as well as their presence in maneuver areas, such as the Golan Heights and other places. This systemic fire and the impressive capabilities which have developed in Israel allowed for a friction reduction approach - to create an ideal situation for the maneuvering forces, by having the systematic fire wear out as many units as possible and leave a battered, often destroyed, unit in the end, with the maneuvering forces having to complete the work. This combination of demographics, as seen in the builtup area, where there is no area for maneuvering, and the enemy trends – training for entry into the area, the exploitation of the population, the sensitive spots, as cover in an area that it lives within, has actually changed the battlefield. I will not go on here into arguments of thinkers about what happened to the war. I will look in the end at the practicality of happened to maneuvering units at
the division, brigade and regiment level, what they had to face when I was a battalion commander in and a brigade commander, and with what today’s battalion and brigade commanders must deal with. I think that the environment is entirely different and the field has become a tactical battle, in essence, with a limited campaign fire capability. It’s not that it does not exist - it exists, it contributes and it assists, but the point of balance between what to do with fire and what can be done and what needs to be completed with maneuver - I think that this point has changed. It has gone down from the systemic level to a series of serious tactical high friction conflicts and complex areas where part of the capabilities cannot be expressed, both intelligence and fire capabilities as well as practice capabilities, which actually limit it all. And this of course requires a very, very significant and fundamental process from us, which we need to examine, determine its part that has happened, that is happening, even in scenarios of force operation and in matters of force construction. On issues of force preparation, all that was said here concerning intelligence preparation; I think must be obeyed to the letter, except for one reservation: intelligence preparation, however good it may be, is suitable for the initial two or three days. After that, bank of targets is reduced, sometimes zeroed, and now, all that was good was for the preparation of the first blow. This blow is important, in terms of results, effectiveness, people’s sensations, but it disappears after three days. In the Second Lebanon War, without going into classified details, it was even less than three days, since the enemy understands that you are gathering information about it with all the capabilities you have. While we are improving the collection, we will never know everything. And when you do not know everything, the battlefield has changed as I described earlier. It requires great effort, and preparation and then there are very good results. Prepare everything possible, but in the end, take into account that it does not stand by itself, and that it is probably impossible to achieve the perfect result only with it. These adjustments are necessary. They are needed by all the components, not just in the fire issue. Everything to do with command and control is much more complex in these areas. Anyone who enters with a battalion into a built-up area understands the complexity, no matter whether if infantry armored or mechanized. It is a different set of complexities, different levels of performance, and an entirely different observation, scouting, control and communication capability. Command and control and control capabilities are different content levels than what we knew. Today we are trying to make up for it with the Digital Ground Army (DGA) project. I think we are succeeding as well, but it must be taken into account that DGA is excellent, but it does not provide a total solution in the built-up area. Within the built-up area, command and control capabilities are different. The same applies on the issue of communication, the issue of HQs and the issue of the place of the commander. Every component you are examining derives adjustments and modifications. Everything con-
cerning operational processes is entirely different, as talked about by BG Harel with regards to determining the boundaries of the sector and determining the frame of the hierarchy, lets call it, between the General Staff and the command and the division and this is true for the brigade and the battalions as well and how processes are carried out there, from the collection, the assault, evaluation of achievements. These are things that are different from what we knew, including issues within the forces, closing the observation circles of the fire and collection units, issue of intelligence, I referred to preliminary intelligence, which is complemented by the fact that there is plenty of intelligence in the friction, there is plenty of intelligence in the maneuver. That is where the finalization of what you have prepared is made, when you reach the friction stage, there is usually a connection between the maneuver and fire. There is intelligence in the friction, and you need to know how to use it, both to exhaust the fire more and to operate.
the subject of integration, liaison officers. The connection disposition, which lives inside the unit represents the fire and affects the fire, is critical. What can we learn from our past experience? I took only the principal elements, not the entire operational experience, and I will go over this very briefly.
Everything concerning the aspect of precise coordinates is also true elsewhere. It is full many times more in the built-up area. There is also an issue of the training of commanders and of special forces - special with regards to their level of their competence - as well as the technological capacity that needs to be in the unites, and we are talking about widespread low-level units and from a low echelon up to the battalion level for sure and in some of the components, even under the battalion and that is a challenge in itself.
As far as I’m concerned, I think the perfect example, which can be seen even as a breakthrough in terms of maneuver and fire integration, is the 2004 operation in the Gaza Strip. I think that this is were there is the unusually good combination of heavy maneuver into the built-up area, with the operation of precision fire, close to the forces and the correct integration between maneuver capability, which assists the fire and between fire capability, which assists the maneuver.
The conventional statistical fire capabilities do not provide a solution in the built-up area, not with regards to their effectiveness, nor with their accuracy and not in accordance with what the supported element needs. This is where significant change is required, with the dosage between statistical and precise, and with the types of weapons, the ranges, ground the fire and the coordinated fire coming from the air. Of course, in the issue of the maneuver, there are significant components that require suitability, light, heavy maneuvering, maneuvering with tanks; all these issues have components, which must be suited to the field. The last point is the subject of ground and air coordinated activity. We in the army have worn out this ability for years, without any connection to whether the fight is in an urban area or in an open area, and now we are gradually returning to it. It is still not at the requested scope. It is still not at the appropriate pace, but the capability of the coordinated activity is consistent and is a key component in the fire response. In order to achieve this, we need a mutual operational understanding both in formulating the doctrine, as well as in joint training and the assignment of the people who arrived to plan and operate the fire together. You cannot drop people from the outside to be integrated within the DGA or combat team and will now go to work. People need to live together, learn together, plan and then get to the implementation stage. The air force also has limitations. We saw this during the second Lebanon war; these are banal things, coupled with fire measures, which are the artillery, helicopters, assault helicopters and the subject of drones, and the whole subject of air, of course. All these things have to be adjusted and completed, and I previously mentioned
In operations “accountability” and “Grapes of Wrath” we operated both the main types, I would say: both the statistical artillery and precise air armaments, and we discovered that it is effective within limits against an enemy who is organized in mobile, small and concealed squads, which are embedded in the field and launch small rockets towards the hinterland. There are examples, some positive, in terms of air superiority, but what is its meaning, when it is only superiority and only fire attack, against an example such as Afghanistan, of combination of both fire capability and the capability to maneuver especially in this environment?
These are things we saw in 2004, and I think after that we succeeded in materializing that during “Cast Lead”. Lebanon is a negative example only in the sense of fire. The systemic fire managed to unbalance the enemy around the qualitative targets, around the massive assault, but afterwards, without a maneuver taking advantage of this and without a maneuver which combines the fire, there is no resolution and no crushing result. The positive example was displayed here in detail, and I do not want to repeat it, but it needs to be said that, in “Cast Lead”, the systematic fire in this sense as well as the fire next to the maneuver, as well as the combination of maneuver and fire, brought a result which is a result that lasts to this very day. It is important to say, in response to a question asked here earlier, that “Cast Lead” was not the IDF’s challenge. The IDF’s challenge is primarily in the northern sector. Those who do not know the results of “Cast Lead” do not know to deal with the northern sector. In this sense, I think that positive example of the “Cast Lead” is the demonstration of capability, the sense of ability, which serves as a compass towards where the power needs to be built. In order to get there, there is a long way to go that we all need to do. On the ground, certainly, and other forces as well - the ICT Department, Military Intelligence as well and also with the Air Force, in order to reach the capability of operating it robustly in the northern sector as well, which is far more challenging, and far more significant to us, and we are not there yet. We have progressed, significantly I think, but there is still much work to be done in order to get there. Our experience, and there are excellent examples as stated before, is not really what we encountered in the past, of fire that aids a maneuver and stops there. I think there are plenty of scenarios where we have also seen
that there is a mutual opposite: that the maneuver aids the effectiveness of the fire, that when entering the area, you produce the friction, which forces the enemy to start to move and jump and make mistakes, and then effective, accurate fire both in assistance to the maneuvering force and as part of organized assault goals operating at an HQ level in each rank – from the brigade level to the division level and sometimes to the General Staff, this is the winning combination. Without the combination of these two things, both from the experience I presented earlier as well as from our understanding of the fire effectiveness aspect, I think that we will not bring about a good result. In the end, on one slide - all the experiences, you can see the division. This describes both the transformation of the enemy as well as our own transformation. In recent years, we operate much more over the red line, which is the precise armament, and less with what is below the red line, but since we have challenges that are both urban and otherwise, both low-signature enemy and frameworks, then we will need to establish the forces that there will be both a response for statistical and conventional fire, as well as precise fire, for both the conventional enemy and the other enemy. The summary of the meanings is that the lessons have taught us that fire does not decisive wars on its own – it is important, central and crucial - but it does not provide the answer. We need to understand that the fact that we have been pulled into the dense built-up area, presents a moral, professional, and command challenge of the first degree to know to obtain results, and the fire challenge is to deliver very good capabilities, which have developed over the years, in these areas to support the tactical combat in a complex and problematic environment. There pointer is on the changes from the 1990s to 2010, until as I stated, we need the capability of the 1990s as well as the capability of 2010. We have enough enemies to change our capabilities. How do we try to deal with the challenge? I will answer that shortly. For me, the operational need is to know to maneuver within the area, to avoid harming civilians, provide effective tactical assistance, which means accurate and on time. Accuracy is not enough on its own. Being on time is not enough on its own. The combination of these two things together is obligating, both for assault and for support to the maneuver capability, to exploit the enemy’s visibility, while fighting and reaching a situation where the availability to the tactical rank is high. The present difficulty is that the existing fire capability in the tactical units is not effective. It is not precise and its lethality, the ability of an artillery shell or something similar to it, does not provide a sufficient response in the urban area. The force which is appropriate for the mission is not available enough for the ground forces. The aerial power that is fitting for the task is not available for all the ground forces. I am now talking about the outline of Lebanon and additional sectors, no necessarily the “Cast Lead” scenario. At the bottom line, we need warhead strength with precision capability. We need high availability for the maneuver-
ing force, and need to provide authority to the commander down below to operate the fire while calculating the risks. This cannot be done from distant headquarters. It is impossible to do this from headquarters not in touch with what is happening in the maneuvering tactical capabilities. The combination of these things - suitable capability for precision and destruction, and the decentralization and availability of the decisions for commanders down below, this is what will provide the solution. There are, of course, dilemmas of force operation and establishment as well. Dilemmas of using force, air force of course, the ability to operate it well in a concentrated, controlled manner, with tasks and operating the entire strength. When taken down to the low tactical forces, it is exhaustion at a different scale, certainly in the operation. I think that both are needed; we need to have this ability and the ability down at the tactical level. In terms of power construction, I understand that we will need an independent, autonomous ground capacity for dealing with the challenges that are in the built-up area, together with an aerial capability. The autonomous ground capability will assist the Air Force and release it from some of the tasks, which will assist us in terms of availability and independence, and the direction we will go to is a fusion will include both the aerial ability and the ground ability for handling with these challenges. Until then, we need to do everything in order to obtain good intelligence, as many multidisciplinary assets of the organizations around us as we can and know to implement this plan in a short time and with surprise, as stated before. We will also have to learn everything about the built-up area, both before and during, including collecting about it and understand where there is a population and how can we keep them away - we have experience with that as well via communications, through phone calls, through the authorities present in some locations, to allow for the distinction between the combat forces and civilians. The definition of clear fire policy, selection of armaments to minimize the environmental damage, which is possible in some places, the combination of assault and maneuver, and documentation and photography where required and possible. We realized that the battle does not end at the conclusion of the campaign - there is also the campaign after it, and sometimes you also need to prove and present the operational environment in which forces operated in order to succeed to undermine some of the de-legitimization efforts carried out by these organizations. In summary, the army has experienced a variety of urban conflicts. The operation of fire in urban areas is a major challenge, even for us, and I think for all armies present here. The urban challenge is becoming the most central. I think that the response that needs to be reached it is clear to us. The application is not simple, both in the force construction and its operation. Either way, I see integration between fire and maneuver. I see an integration between of ground fire and coordinated activity to provide it with a response, both a precision fire attack and statistical fire assistance, which is possible in some of the locations, and the operation of proper fire will, of course, aid as well in preventing injury of uninvolved civilians as well as preserving the legitimacy - in internal and external - of the forces.
Maj. - Gen. David D. Halverson Commanding General of the United States Fires Center of Excellence and Fort- Sill
UP FRONT: Relevant & Adaptive Fires There are many among us here that have experience with fires. From the maneuver person who relies on the fire, or a combined arms person allowing a joint fire; Be it Air Force, Navy or Marines, it is the full spectrum of the integration of this thing called fires. It is possible to go all the way back to Sun Tzu and discuss how he applied fire. It is the same aspect of how this is currently applied in an extremely complex environment, and there are great insights which have been gained. However, you should listen to your chief of staff first on his applications that if you are not adapting, at this time, for how we must think and how we must apply the essential war-fighting function of fires, we would be remiss. Some of it will be a return to basics, which must be done in a combined arms maneuver, or returning to some very complex elements such as wide-area security, where your forces are spread out and you must still have the effect that your maneuver commander desires - at the theater, the core, the division, the brigade and all the way to the platoon level. Because one thing that we have learned in many lessons is that the platoon fight can be very strategic, if the wrong decisions are made, especially when it comes to fires.
I wish to highlight a few things I think are important when it comes to fires. Regarding the maneuverists, if you do not understand the maneuver, you canâ€™t apply fires. You have to be a student of everything - you have to be a student of the Air Force, with all its capabilities; you have to be a student of the Navy, so you can read their sensors and the capability that they bring. All of these things play into our ability to be able to be in warfare. We have a great dialog when we talk about what warfare is. However, what is true about warfare? Warfare is a tough business. Warfare is not good. Warfare is tough, yet as professionals, we must be prepared for it. We must be able to exercise ourselves so that then we can fight this thing in the best way - to meet the end state, meet the objectives that we have been given. And many times, we have to be given the best military advice, so that the necessary capability can then be provided, so that we can move forward. What you see here, in implications, is very grave. You cannot find the enemy. He adapts and he may be the same individuals which you have been talking to, as he may be in charge of the local governance that youâ€™ve been talking to. He may rise at the night. As such, our ability to discriminate who it is and have the appropriate lethality - either lethal or non-lethal
- on that enemy, at the right time or the right place, is still very important. And I think that is what is important, when we see ourselves and look at the implications that has for fires. I will discuss the implications I see from a fire perspective of where our energy must be focused. One of the things I have been trying to preach greatly is that, at times - because of the precision, the sensors, everything - we think it is a very easy thing to do, when actually, it has added to the complexity. This is because that same person you may have, a signature intelligence item, may not in fact be that person, as he has set up his friend for failure, and has caused you problems while performing your targeting process. I would like to focus on three small areas that we have been looking at in the United States. It is because of how we have seen ourselves in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and we are trying to create a mental ability so that we can handle the full spectrum. Unlike the Israeli army, we are not an expeditionary force, and do not know where we may be asked to go next. As such, a greater open-mindedness is needed with regards to how we must apply these things, as we look at the armed combat. However, from my foxhole, from the fires force, we must be balanced in our overall force. We must have a balanced structure for strategy, all the way down into the tactical capability. It is the same with field artillery. The right people must be at that higher level theatre, core and division capabilities and add the brigade capabilities in order to deliver that, shape the division commander he may want, to have the effect and application that he may do. What we have learned, as you will see in charts, is that we have greatly relied on precision. However, it is not a “win-all” solution, as you have a wide area of security or additional aspects. Within the urban environment, the presence of precision is critical. If you cannot provide, it is like undergoing an operation; you want to make sure they have a scalpel when they operate on your knee, rather than a hatchet. It is the same. Yet at times, you may have to take out a hatchet if it’s beyond that. As such, it is going to be a mix of precision, near-precision and the area fire. It is within the art of area fire that we are developing ways to ensure what is far cleaner than the area fire capabilities. Capable airspace management - I believe that this is very critical. Establishing a common operating picture of the airspace map is one of the more complex things that you do. You must have expeditionary capabilities to establish that, to be able to integrate your fires, so that they can be as responsive as possible. Therefore, you will see where we are trying to go with this fusion of sensors and networks; How it is applied, how to work with the air force on coordinating altitudes - all those things that provide flexibility in addition to maneuverability are now a restriction, and we must break the barriers within the restrictions to look at how we apply those integrated capabilities for an application of power. Therefore, we are looking at decentralized and distributed operations. One of the lessons that we’ve learned is that you cannot have a capability which is too centralized. In the absence of decentralized capability to be able to push forward, your command and control cannot accept many different things, from joint air effects, to mortars, to artillery, to rockets. Those stovepipes must be broken down, and so distributed ops are much more important. And that comes with
risk, in the aspect of “will they make the right choice at the right time”. We must empower the leader development and all those things for the application of fires, and what we have found out is that we were not teaching enough in our maneuver school on the application of fires. As such, we are dismissing some things, and we have gotten many more. With regards to precision, we have to be able to allow leaders to select and engage the targets as was said, ‘pulling out the scalpel’, and you have to ensure that you know you have had the effect towards minimizing that cloud damage. That tactical aspect of the cloud damage is that our enemy is one that brings his kids, his children, to the meeting place. And that becomes an issue then. We then have to defend it, as in today’s environment, it is very hard, because it is flashed in the news, and the news focuses on negativism. That flashes suddenly, and we and the maneuver commander have to be able to trust the confidence in the people which were behind them; that they know they made the right decision, so they can morally live with themselves with the pains of war, as all of us warriors have done. You then enable and bring the lethal and non-lethal approach to it, for understanding what you are after - that you stand for the better men more than anything. The way in which you build their trust and confidence, and the soldiers’ trust and confidence, will allow them to separate the good from the bad in urban ops, and turn the moderate into your friend. That requires broadening approaches, which means brining people who work with you, and build up their security forces to assist you. We have learned that a great deal from the inter-agency, coalition aspect of it in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where we have to make sure that we are building up their internal securities, so they can fight for their security, and can provide the security that their country demands of their forces. With the element of diffusion, I believe that discrimination of targets, allowing for diffusion, is important, as you cannot buy it all in today’s fiscal environment. So how do you leverage what capability you have? Regain the fidelity and the discrimination capabilities that you need, to be able to ensure that the right target is hit with the right munitions, at the right time? This is very important and it is why I say that discrimination of targets with greater fidelity is going to be very important for us. I could go back to 2001, when I was chief of plans at SENCOM, and had gone to the joint targeting and targeting provision boards. What you will see is that there is still huge demand on fires; There is this myth that we are not doing a thing, when what we have found from the maneuver commander is that fires are applied properly, it has an effect on the enemy, and one of the biggest things which occurred in Iraq - when the surge was brought in - was that they brought the effect of fires where they squelched a lot of places they thought were sanctuaries, like they were Sadr city. However as you will clearly see, one of the trends is with Excalibur - our 1.55 precision, which is very lethal, very precise, and is something that is growing everyday. The issue you always have, though, is that if you bring in new capability and are already engaged in combat, it is hard to build the air plan while in motion. As such, all those administrative things - the training, the maneuver commander, the latest of all - what we have seen is
that they continue to do it. Just as the Chief of General Staff said, it is a balance between your rockets and your artillery; You must have balance, since you want to be more flexible and agile, and so you think it is going to be one way. It is not, and what we are trying to do is work with our cannon artillery in getting precision guidance kits, to assist us with the fused elements, that make it much more affordable for us now to be able to move forward. The good thing with our guided multiple launcher system is that you can now reach 80 kilometers, and then go farther and expand in that precision capability, which as been a great benefactor for us. One issue which I wish to highlight from a fires perspective, when looking at Afghanistan and Iraq – while this is something that might be somewhat obvious, I believe it is important for the collective bodies present here to say what has remained the same, what has changed, and how do we advocate that to our junior leaders. For fires to be ready, you must be ready for the worst day. We have found that when we transitioned from Iraq into Afghanistan, they became very comfortable in their direct fire engagements with the maneuver. They forgot the skill-sets, which no one should be outside the hard weather fires. Maneuvers forces were saying that they had joint air via helicopters. The challenge was that when the weather went bad, you had limited access. What would happen is that our soldiers needed to plan for the worst day, and so you must plan for protective fires at your combat outpost. You must observe and register that the sound of the guns alone can have a deterrent effect, especially when looking in Afghanistan and at the Taliban. We have a saying, on account of our western heritage: ‘If you look just like a chuck wagon, you may get attacked; but if you look like a warrior, you will not get attacked’. And it is important - you had to present that, to show that all the combined members were out there, even if you were a simple company in a far-away place, such as in Afghanistan. Because if you are a company carrying out 24/7 ops, that mean you really have a platoon level-worth of firepower at any time, since someone has to sleep, someone has to be refitting, and that is what you have from a capability perspective. I believe that we must leave the targeting process, and what I say by targeting process is that we have become discriminative with regards to targeting, which means working with your intelligence, with your inter-agency individuals; you must be the integrator at the lowest level and at all things. As a fires person, I say that we are like Google: I do not have to own, but I have to bring the team together, to articulate all aspects: When is it right to engage? What is the best way to engage? Is it best with mortar? Is it best with precision? Is it best with aerial? Those are the fire skill-sets, and what has happened sometimes is we got so caught up in the intelligence of it, that we forgot about the offense. We cannot exploit, but it is good battlefield patience, which you have to apply at times - particularly when on the battlefield. Returning to basics has been very hard, as we are in a generation that as far as American forces are concerned, has lost a maneuver battalion in each and every one of the brigades, with regards to modularity. What happened was that artillery was so close to maneuvers, that the artillerists were plugged into maneuvers. We could do that; however we grew a generation, or two rotations in combat,
that were actually infantry or a mechanized force. We needed now to return to basics in order to know about certifications, about the discipline of fire. All the division commanders, the corps majors, the chief of staff and everyone from the senior leaders to the soldiers themselves, the brigade commanders – they all want their fires people to be experts in fires. It is essential for them to be able to do that. The interesting thing about fires is that, as you know, it knows neither friend nor foe. All the checks and balances that you carry out prior to pulling the lever or pushing the button to launch the rocket - all that work and checks and balances have to be done before, and so our ability and discipline to be able to acquire that properly, with all the checks, is very important in warfare, because you will lose a lot of trust and confidence if you do not. Urban operations in a civilian concentration are where we are truly going to focus on precision. You must do that when fighting in urban environments - you need that depth of breath, as what we found out in Iraq and Afghanistan was that our brigade combat teams were coming over 100 and more kilometers for a single brigade. As such, the application of that was very important as we worked with the local populace. Collateral damage can have strategic implications. It is very important and all it takes is a single question, and the next thing you know, you are delayed. We take a lot of precedence with everything, and have many discussions with our young soldiers, the good and the bad. Be it from what happened with General McChrystal, down to everything. We spin that into our schoolhouses very quickly so that we have a conversation on professional ethic, of saying “what did I do right, what did I do wrong”. Those are the open dialogs that we must have as we apply these lessons. As mentioned above, in decentralized operations, everyone has to be covered. I see it like an aircraft carrier: the aircraft carrier battle-group was designed so that you have subs doing some things, you have battleship cruisers, you have your air wings, but it is all to protect the aircraft carrier. It is the same thing with fires. You must have your mortars, your artillery, your rockets; you must have these rings of fire. It is what we are pushing for, as we know that there is always a manpower constraint in warfare. You are not going to be able to have all the tools you want. However, drawing these rings of fires - within our ability to determine how we can push it farther with greater precision and at better cost - is where we are pushing ourselves in the American Army. You must have the knowledge and be certified to conduct joint fires. You need to be just as much an expert as JTACs, and the JTACs have to know about fire support just as much as they have to know about the air. Our dialog and certification process has to be just as important. It is therefore very important that we provide all the fire support for our SAW forces. We work with all of them in our JTAC capability and will continue to do that, and we are leveraging our fires with our SAW forces very well. By way of stealth and lethality, we can maneuver quickly in the battlefield. From Bagram to Iraq, we can shift our fires force very quickly and ensure their success, with the ring of fire they need. One of the vignette discussed is the one in Afghanistan. A very intense firefight at a faraway, western area, and what they dis-
covered was that their ability to leverage all joint fires allowed them the capability to destroy the enemy, even though it was a greater mass. A company size COB, 300 warriors familiar with the terrain, understood that they could defeat the enemy because of the leveraging of fires. Even though it was catastrophic at the beginning, their agility and adjustability was due to the fires, some of which allowed them to redistribute ammo, and when it was just not enough, they had to bring in the artillery and the mortars. I could say the same thing with regards to Sadr City. At Sadr City, during the surge, what was the big issue for the enemy - he had sanctuary, right? “No one goes into Sadr City” - it is something that the local Iraqi populace could handle. However, when we found out that they had sanctuary, it was the application of precision and a combined arms approach - bringing in the strikers, the special ops, and the maneuverists all together and with setting the condition of fires - that allowed them to break their will. The precision allowed them to do that, in a very decisive manner. It is also the linkage of the sensor and the shooter – there are many discussions about this, but if you don’t have a quick linkage to be able to turn that quickly, then you will lose everyone’s confidence. That center fusion is huge and is not easy, though you may think it that it is. At the joint readiness training center in Fort Polk, we just jumped in the 3rd brigade and the 82nd, getting back to full spectrum operations. One of the lessons we’ve learned is that we used to be static. When we fell in Iraq or Afghanistan, we had a sort of static infrastructure; We had lost our ability to get our architecture and lost our ability to get our sensors up there. We obviously have air defense and field artillery at Fort Sill, yet it is still the same approach. It is still the eyes, the brains and the brawns, and with the munitions, we can do it - from space, all the way down to the ground. There is no difference, and what we are trying to do is leverage those capabilities and have those responsive fire processes. Our investments into the sensory development, where it is plug-and-play, are very big, which we then have a process in which there is the fusion that allows you to have high confidence in your ability to strike when you need to strike, which is very, very important. The other thing about sensors is that you can apply all the precision that you want, yet if you are off target location – you are imprecisely missing the target. You will miss that target. We call it mission command; a new term, it used to be ‘command and control’ but we are seeing it as mission command, which is an empowerment, as it also deals with the mental aspect of command. We have to be very quick to be able to fit in everyone’s architecture, be it air defense architecture or be it fitted in COB decentralized architecture, where anything can plug-and-play. It recognizes the IP more than the protocols and additional aspects of what we do. What we found out is that in decentralized operations, we had to man several systems, such as a mortar system or an artillery system, instead of just a single fires system. We are moving to consolidate a fires system so the capabilities of that system can then be determined. The biggest thing that we are looking at, on the organizational perspective, is whether or not we go composite at the infantry brigade combat team. This is as at the moment, our infantry brigade combat team does not act like infantry is designed to; rather it is much more motorized, much more protected as it moves forward.
The end of this is ‘in what direction are we going’, and this is the focus which I have and that our people are working on, over the next year to five years. I want to eliminate the target location area, because what we have found out was that with some of our software and algorithm developments, the radar target location could be reduced by over 50 percent just by consolidation and the collective aspect of carrying it out. We optimize the target location areas that we have and it allows us to get precision instead of just carrying it out, and we have to work in the most degraded mode as possible. The fusion of all sensors to gain that targeting dominance - that is what I want, dominance and our ability to target. It is not only just one indicator - you now have to confirm by two or three different indicators, such as pattern of life and others, because as I said – it is too important to botch. We must have confidence at lower levels, so that if they do decide to shoot, they have trust and confidence that they know they did the right thing. That is the balance being discussed. We are working very hard on scalable effects, which allows the commander to decide “I only need to take down the first floor” and bring it down using 25 pounds, for a scale of up to 200 pounds if there is need to take down the whole building. Those are the capabilities that young fire supporters need as they fight this next fight. Then they can call the mission command, as I said - this is at all echelons, joint and combined. It is important that we are able to have that capability. The stovepipes are not there, so if we have one, we can then bring in a Patriot or something else - it needs to be so that we can fit in that architecture, as that kill chain has to take place all the way through. Moreover, we must have adaptable, tailored organizations that foster that trust and confidence through everything. If a mission states that I need rockets, then I need everything from attackers which can shoot at over 200 kilometers; I need that tailorable capability - they know the certifications properly, and can accept them instead of having static organizations in which this is all you get. Expeditionary is going to be important to us, as will be the trust and confidence that they can train together and deliver what they decide. We then must have survivable platforms. In today’s environment, with the IED being the biggest killer in our battlefield, we must have a survivable system that can maneuver. We also have to be able to get off the roads, because the enemy has figured out that common roads are where we maneuver. We are not there yet - we have to maneuver like we used to, getting off the roads where it is easy for the enemy to engage us, and then ensure the common operating picture that we need, which responds to fires. There are many capabilities I have been told about which allow us that flexibility, which I believe were built into this A2C2 issue of responsive fires. The ability to see the enemy and to identify it is something for which you only have milliseconds, as all of you know here in Israel. Distance and time are an issue – you must be able to respond to distance and time, and it is going to be important to acquire it, with the capabilities and the speeds, in affordable manner. And I think that is where we are trying to go with artillery, from the lessons we are learning today in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how we see firepower in use. However, the bottom line is that fires as a war fighting function is a strong element; it will always be needed and respected.
Brig. - Gen. Ariel Karro Chief Intelligence Officer
Intelligence Challenges for Attacking Abstract
The Yom Kippur War increased the need for effective use of fire in achieving the battle plan. In the IDF and other Western armies in recent decades, an approach has developed for attacking targets deep in the ground battlefield. This approach reflects the development of capabilities of fire and information gathering, which make possible a large supply of targets. The approach is influenced by the transformation in the nature of war, which has changed from interstate conflict to conflict between a state and organizations. These conflicts are usually conducted in a communication-rich urban environment and pose a complex challenge for those involved with intelligence and fire. Those responsible for information gathering must provide answers for dealing with new families of targets: small ground forces, command and control centers, senior individuals, stationary and mobile launchers, and so on. These targets are characterized by a low signature and a short lifespan.
The Presentation Background
• The ‘Yom Kippur’ war enhanced the need of affective strikes and attacks in order to improve the battlefield. • In the last decades, IDF developed and promoted its attack approach like other armies. • The targeting approach was enhanced according to the improvements of intelligence gathering, field intelligence abilities and precise attack platforms (air and land) and
the ability for mass targeting. • Another Influence to the advancement in targeting approach in the last decades was the development of terror organizations and the dimension of the classical battlefields. • Most of the conflicts take place in an urban environment, populated with mass media and communication against a hybrid enemy - those turn out to be a complicated task to intelligence and attack forces. • This modern battlefield required the needs to classify targeting groups such as: small groups of infantry, central communication entities, rocket launchers (mobile and still) and wanted persons. • The switch was forced by the need to attack core centers in enemy systems, with the characterization of this being: Small intelligence signature, Short life cycle.
Target – a place, structure or enemy force, which is marked for striking. Upon operational needs the target can be broken down to components. • Mobile Target – a target that is mobile in various or constant speed. The target may change its position often, a fact that requires a periodical check up and requires consideration of the motion during a strike. • Standing Target – a target with some mobile capability, with longer periods of fixed position (e.g Artillery positions, fortified forces, HQ’s, etc.) • Detection – initial intelligence recognition focused on in
Prime Threat Vectors
• Hybrid threats – a combination of military and semi-military characteristics. • The process of trying to diminish the capabilities of modern western armies in an emphasis of Intelligence targeting and attacking capabilities: visual, technical or electronic deception, disruption, underground tunnels and bunkers. • The use of artillery and High trajectory rockets as an offset of aired capabilities, home front attacks and strategic infrastructure attacks (fire attack vs. strategic attack maneuvers). • Inland artillery and rocket attacks direct to populated areas. • Activities from urban environments. • Wide spread of launching capabilities that are hard to detect. • High redundancy of launch capabilities that allow flexibility in the attacks. • Cheap weapons that require expensive countermeasure. • Usage of deposable launchers. The Challenge - the decentralization, redundancy, mass targeting that complicates detection.
The Use of Human Shields
• High usage of civilian facilities: schools, International humanitarian organizations, mosques, and healthcare. • The use of civilian houses as a shield for hostile activities: weapon storage, command posts.
The Use of Tunnels
• In order to prevent the IDF from the use of its advanced aerial strike and intelligence gathering • Explosive tunnel digging In intent to detonate • Smuggling tunnels for ammunition and weapons. • Underground tunnels used to bridge and relocate forces between positions
Intelligence Challenges for Target Delivery
• Small intelligence signature • Short life cycle • The lack of enemy core centers • Information congestion • A wide range on collecting abilities that require professionals in operating them.
• Aerial superiority • Surface to surface rocket and missile attacks • Infrastructure and logistic array attacks. • HQ and Communication centers attacks • Interdictions • Attacks supporting ground maneuvers
• Development of intelligence sensors that allow real time detection and connection to IT and combat systems (C4). • Ongoing intelligence collection on targets and structures. • Improvement in intelligence availability – and integration of the information in operation planning and combat systems (C4). • Formation of methodology of target handling. • Target situation awareness influences the attack and the fluency of the information to the attacking force.
• Improved weaponry development in order to cope with the updated threats.
Intelligence Target Handling
• The Collection and Targeting process break down to two main phases: – Battle procedures – Conduct of operation
Target Handling During Battle Procedures
• Researching the enemy’s environment • Operating Intelligence sensors in a formed collection plan. • Development of research and analyzing methods pointing to detection and target acquiring. • Building a target research databank. • Developing a common protocol between Combat systems (C4), Intelligence systems and attacking forces. • Pre-defined and categorized target classification upon groups in order to support the fire circle upon attack need. • The Division of target groups allows the decision maker to provide an operational grasp of quality targets according to the intelligence missions.
Target Handling During Operation Conduct
• Attacking predefined, preset targets according to logic and prioritization in order to fulfill the mission. • Managing the intelligence collections to provide BDA in order to update the target awareness situation and enemy assessment. • Analyzing the enemy operability in order to recognize the core center and concentrate fire power to provide maximum fire effectiveness.
• Defining the entire enemy array system components: HQ’s and Strongholds, Active terrorist houses, Weapon and ammunition storages, Logistical centers. • Marking sensitive targets: Healthcare, School, and Religious.
Battle Damage Assessment
• BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) – the process of damage review prior to an attack. • This process is done by intelligence interpreters and targeting officers who assess the damage to the target from the attack and its ability continue to operate. • The BDA is included in the enemy assessment in order to decide for re-attacking.
• After target attacks Intelligence complete an enemy assessment in order to assess the enemy unit’s qualifications to operate. • Basic enemy assessment – define the ability of the unit to operate. • Mission assessment – The ability of units to fulfill their mission as trained to, based on mental, physical and organization • Enemy assessment principles: Quantitative data (amount of ammunition, troops' logistical support); Qualitative data (moral support, professionalism, command and control, weather and terrain).
Intelligence and the media
• In this age of mass media the process is followed with a publicity method • The intelligence requires providing the legitimacy in order to extend the attacks for long periods of time. • This capability requires the intelligence to cope with local and international media and to provide those with an immediate product to be published. • The process is followed by the need to protect intelligence sources and targeting capabilities.
• In the last decades, changes within the battlefield challenge the intelligence and fire capabilities with new and
sophisticated challenges. • Enemy components turn to become hybrid instead of classical military characteristics, thus combining military and semi-military as well as guerilla that carry a minimal intelligence signature along with a short life cycle. • The intelligence for targets require to cope with those challenges either by developing collection means and sensors along with updated research methodologies to cope with new challenges. • The target building process is started at the battle procedures and executed in the conduct of operation to fulfill the commanders' orders.
Brig. -Gen. David Barki
Head of Helicopters Division, Israel Air Force
Air Power in Asymmetric and Urban Warfare The Presentation Background
The threat: home-made, improvised and tactical weapons can strike almost any point in Israel. The reasons: long borders, lack of strategic depth, short distances from sources of threat.
IAF – Special characteristics
• The IAF is the only aviation in Israel - Air Force, Army, Navy, Medical-Evacuation, Special Operations Forces, UAVs • Force build-up and force operation- the only operational air command • Defensive and offensive abilities and missions - includes all air defense and BMD units
raeli citizens. • 40 Km Range from Gaza. Covers almost 1,000,000 Israeli citizens. Between the years 2001-2008, more than 8000 rockets and mortar shells were fired to Israeli territories. Since 2005, when the disengagement occurred, and until 2008, there was a rise of more than 500 percent in the fire of rockets and mortar shells from the Gaza strip and Lebanon.
HAMAS – The exploitation of civilians as human shields
ric, conventional weapons in the middle range, to WMD which is not asymmetric.
• Firing mortars from residential buildings back yards • Storage of rockets and weapons inside private apartments • IEDs and booby traps inside schools and public facilities • Launchers are positioned in close proximity to schools • Munitions are stored inside mosques • Terror activity and deployment inside populated areas
• 250 Km Range from Lebanon. Covers almost 7,000,000 Israeli citizens. • 70 Km Range from Gaza. Covers almost 3,000,000 Is-
During the 2006 Second Lebanon war there was great activity of Hezbollah terrorists next to U.N. bases, including the launch of rockets. Hezbollah systematically
The Asymmetric Challenge
The range is between: terror guerilla which is asymmetThe rocket threat: Gaza and Lebanon-
Using U.N. bases as shields
uses civilian vehicles for years for transferring weapons as well as for the launch of rockets. Ambulances, or vehicles which accompanied humanitarian aid convoys, were also used by the terrorists.
Airpower in Asymmetric and Urban Warfare
Rocket launches during “Cast Lead”
Varied “Tool Box” – both weapons and platforms
• All platforms and weapons available 24/7. • Versatility against a wide spectrum of targets: - Different bombs, warheads and fuses in all types of platforms and in all missions - Demands a variety of weapons and multiple carriage
• High PGM percentage:
- 100 percent in the first three days - 90 percent in the first ten days - 81 percent in total - Precision munitions are essential - Collateral damage, small targets
• Intensive support to ground forces • Intimate coordination – pre-planning, JTAC\FAC • “Paving” the maneuver • Joint training 120 launchers and launch sites, and 54 launch squads400 targets in total. Minimizing collateral damage – an example: manufacturing and storage facilities inside private houses; Residents were asked to leave prior to a strike; 165,000 personal warnings sent (text messages and phone calls).
• The strategic perspective -Israel’s unique challenges • The Asymmetric challenge -Tactical problems have strategic influence • Airpower as an effective tool -Jointness as a force multiplayer
Dr. David Johnson
Senior Researcher, the RAND Corporation, U.S.A
The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power across the Range of Military Operations Abstract
The presentation will examine the evolving roles of the ground power and air power in major combat operations in the post-cold war era through Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. It then will discuss how adversaries have adapted to U.S. and Israeli conventional dominance and what the implications are for future warfare in various levels of conflict and in complex terrain. The lessons are relevant to understanding the capabilities a joint force will require in the future.
The Presentation The evolving roles of ground power and air power—and adversaries
What can be learned from cases like the 1991 Iraq war,
Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq war? • Fixed-winged air power, enabled by C4ISR, largely operates with impunity, setting the conditions for: Air dominance of a theater; Strategic attack; Effective attack of the enemy fielded forces. • Ground power, enabled by air dominance is: Central
to the fight at the tactical/operational levels; Forces enemy action; Critical in dealing with dispersed enemy and complex terrain (urban, jungle, mountains); Key in achieving national strategic political objectives after major combat operations. Service centric air and ground doctrines do not exploit these realities; Israel has similar issues.
An integrated air-ground approach to future challenges Role of Air Power
• Overhead ISR and SIGINT crucial because the enemy does not mass for finding and killing HVTs. • Air mobility is key for supply and evacuation. • Mostly ground-directed CAS with tight ROE; key for force protection in extremis. • Air superiority contested below 3,000 feet; above 3,000 feet air largely invulnerable.
Role of Ground Power
• Focused on establishing security, HUMINT, training indigenous forces.
• Maneuver focused on clearing, holding, building. • Dispersed operations increase the difficulty of force protection. • Tight ROE demands rigorous target ID.
Level of Air-Ground Integration
• Ground-centric, air-dependent operations. • C2ISR and JTACs best integrated at lower echelons for direct support.
Insights from Lebanon/Gaza
• Hybrid irregular opponents, like Hezbollah and Hamas, create a qualitative challenge, despite their smaller scale, because of their: - Training, discipline, organization, and C2 - Effective stand-off weapons (such as rockets, mortars, ATGMs, MANPADS, RPGs, etc.). - Use of complex terrain (“nature reserves,” urban) and fighting among the people. - Precision, stand-off fires are critical, but not sufficient to defeat hybrid adversaries. - Ground operations are an essential component of military operations against hybrid opponents. - Joint combined arms fire and maneuver key against these opponents. - Ground maneuver produces operational pressure on the enemy—makes him react. - Reaction immediately increases the enemy’s operational signature and generates new targets for air and other fires. - Air, ISR, and ground—including indirect fires—must be tightly integrated and highly responsive to be effective against these relatively small, fleeting targets.
Air and Ground: Non-State Hybrid Warfare • Role of air power
- Overhead ISR and SIGINT tightly linked with precision strike. - Key to attacking enemy deep strike assets and HVTs. - Tight ROE for centralized strikes and CAS. - Suppression of enemy standoff systems to allow ground maneuver. - Denies enemy massing and reinforcement. - Air superiority contested below 15,000 feet.
• Role of Ground Power
- Key to forcing enemy reaction and uncovering hidden assets. - Combined arms operations fundamental to success. - Closes with enemy defenses. - Dispersed and decentralized operations. - High intensity MCO-like operations possible at brigade and below. - Vulnerable LOCs.
• Level of Air-Ground Integration
- Balanced operation requires tighter coordination, extensive training and rehearsals. - Centralized control of air with high responsiveness to ground units.
Air and Ground: Deterrence and MCO Role of Air Power
- Key to deterrence via global reach/strike capabilities. - Air and space superiority contested at all levels. - Centralized control critical.
- Precludes enemy large scale ground maneuver. - Bases contested. - Operations may be in NBC environment.
Role of Ground Power
- Troop deployment a key signal. - Combined arms operations key to success. - Ground maneuver forces enemy operational reaction. - Engages ground units that avoid air and indirect fire attacks; pursues those that do not. - Key for exploitation. - Deals with hybrid or irregular threats. - Key to establishing post-MCO security and stability. - Basing and staging contested. - Operations may be in NBC environment.
Level of Air-Ground Integration
- Highly centralized air. - Air superiority key to ground maneuver. - Integrated SEAD key. - Supported-supporting relationships could be air or ground led depending on operation - could shift.
Trust can be an Obstacle to Effectiveness
• The Army does not believe the Air Force will adequately attack the targets it believes critical to the ground war— or that it will always be there when needed. • The Air Force does not trust the Army to employ (much less control) air power appropriately—Army demands for air will never be satisfied. • These trust issues have their origins in different institutional views about how to fight and win wars. • This is common among states with strong armies and air forces. • Barriers to effectiveness are overcome through constant association, common purpose, and joint doctrine that is understood across the force. Operation “Cast Lead” showed the benefits of integrated Air-Ground-ISR operations—and trust: “our pilots, air crews and UAV operators worked directly with ground commanders from the very early planning stages—each one in his own sector, to the point that they knew one another. They recognized each other’s voices over the network and could smell each other’s sweat… Full partnership with the ground forces—from a moral and physical perspective—which required well-planned, well-rehearsed, truly joint operations. “ Major General Ido Nehushtan, on air-ground integration in Operation “Cast Lead”.
The challenge of urban warfare among the people Urban Combat: “Taking” and/or “Clearing” Cities
• In wars between states, cities, especially capitols, are often a center of gravity. • Mega-cities are central to the future security environment; often have inadequate internal law enforcement. • The enemy has a decided advantage once you enter the city. • Mounted maneuver channelized and vehicles are vulnerable—similar to mountainous/channelized terrain. • It is lmost always costly for your soldiers and remaining civilians—who may number in the millions. • “Destroying the city to save it” is often inevitable—and then you own it and the population. Is there a better way in future warfare?
Another Way: Joint Air-Ground-ISR Operations: Sadr City and Gaza
• The focus is enemy fighters and their capabilities • Ground maneuver is key: Forces the enemy from prepared positions; separates from the population; Heavy forces - based on tanks and IFVs - are key elements of maneuver in complex terrain (survivable, lethal, intimidating); Snipers and special operations forces are important enablers.
• Persistent ISR and responsive precision fire capabilities are fundamental and must be integrated: It is im-
portant to show proportionality and deliberateness; This is key to attacking targets “among the people”; Lessens exposure of your soldiers to risks of urban combat; Only air can efficiently destroy many large targets (buildings, tunnels). • Irregular/hybrid opponents become more visible when they take over (Gaza) or when they act (moving, firing rockets/mortars, massing—Gaza and Sadr City). • The enemy is fleeting: decentralized decision-making and integration capabilities at lower levels (brigade and
Case Iraq 1991
below) are important. • Highly integrated air-ground-ISR is a prerequisite for success.
• Potential adversaries know their vulnerabilities and are adapting. • Hybrid state-sponsored adversaries (like Hezbollah) can create qualitative challenges, despite smaller scale – these are major combat operations at brigade levels and below. • An adversary can move quickly from irregular to hybrid with state sponsorship. • Heavy forces (tanks and IFVs) reduce operational risks and minimize friendly casualties . • The degree of centralization/decentralization of air and ground depends on the enemy.
Joint combined arms fire and maneuver are needed for successful operations across the range of military operations.
Cases from “Learning Large Lessons”
Ground campaign decisive after air softened Iraqi forces.
Air power set the conditions for overwhelming success—all but won the war.
Air campaign significantly weakened an incompetent opponent who was defeated by ground power.
Croat-Muslim ground offensive principally responsible for Serb concessions.
Decisive and precise air power forced Serb concessions.
Combination of ground threat and air attack and low stakes for Serbs resulted in concessions; rapidity yields false expectations about Serb will to resist.
Threat of a ground invasion caused Milosevic to yield; center of gravity Serb Forces in Kosovo; a minor view held that KLA influenced decision.
Air power forced Milosevic to yield after stepping up modest initial campaign; center of gravity “downtown”—what Milosevic valued; attacking forces in Kosovo a waste of bombs.
Air attack against infrastructure targets changed the political dynamic. This use of air power, coupled with diplomatic isolation (Russians) and NATO unity caused Milosevic to yield. Ground threat a future consideration and may have influenced to a lesser degree.
Afghan ground forces, enabled by air power, overcame Taliban and al Qaeda. CAS not responsive during Operation Anaconda, when US ground forces necessary to root out remnants.
Air power decisive in giving Afghans the edge. Also key in Operation Anaconda in protecting U.S. ground forces.
Air power decisive in giving Afghans the edge, but US ground forces needed to do the searches and rooting out that surrogate Afghan forces did not want to do. Air power critical in Operation Anaconda.
“Shock and awe” did not obviate the need for ground combat; “boots on the ground” were needed to destroy Saddam’s regime and occupy Iraq. Nevertheless, air power was a a key enabler in achieving these objectives.
Air power set the conditions for rapid success on the ground, despite being in a supporting role. However, control of the FSCL by ground commanders limited air power’s contribution in the “deep battle” (as defined by the Army and Marine Corps).
Air power precluded effective positioning and employment of Iraqi ground forces even in bad weather or darkness, often shattering units before they could close with Coalition ground forces. This not only reduced the costs, risks, and duration of the Coalition campaign to remove Saddam’s regime, but largely left Coalition ground units to mop up the remnants of shattered enemy formations in close battle where friction persisted unabated.
Current State Containment/ sanctions for 10+ years; OIF Stability Ops
Brig. - Gen. Tamir Haiman Formation Commander
C4I in the Division
Command and control systems in the modern battlefield must rest on the basic foundations and principles of command and control. These systems entail calculated risks of lack of contact between the different echelons, the “disappearance of the commander,” information surplus, and the loss of the chain of command. The basic formation in the IDF is composed of five integrative elements: the Operations branch, intelligence, logistics, teleprocessing, and fire, all of which must achieve the tactical mission with full and ongoing coordination. Command and control makes a decisive contribution to the maximal achievement of the main tasks of the division and in general. Command and control in a built-up area entails opportunities as well as risks with which the forces in the field must cope.
Principles of Command & Control in the c4I- environment
• Human factors and the reality in the field are what restrict the full effectiveness of the C4I. • Unity of command and the threat of “Cyber Command”. • Unity of command and control in response to the developing arena. • Identity of the operation planner.
Command and Control within the Ground Forces
• Between command and control- the uniqueness of the C4I system is for being a command system that is more
than just a control system.
• Leadership in the command and control era- threat to interpersonal and informal communication. • Command and control with regards to the weapon system and to the headquarters- significant differences and what it means.
- No extended communication between the commanding levels out of a sense that everything is clear. - Lack of control upfront. - Overload of Information. • An overload of information can cause people to gloss over crucial information. • An overload of targets makes it difficult to manage fire in a smart and efficient way. - Canceling and bypassing the command levels. • Reference to the assessment of the situation in communicating with two levels down while talking with subordinate levels. • Performing staff work by the commander (for example: assessment of the enemy’s situation, fire and reconnaissance).
Division in the IDF- General and Fundamental
• The purpose of the division as a basic formation. • The main output of the commander. • The integrative arrangement and their contribution in achieving goals.
• Basic Formation: independence, all the components
of the forces, all operations and for an unlimited amount of time. • Tactically: “the conquering or defending of land in time and with power”, the battalion as a main component, the brigade as a tactical body with a number of operational actions. • Continuousness Operating: reconnaissance, logistics, backup forces, headquarters. • Achieving a task with an operative context: tactical warfare in an operative context and the unique complexity of the division in this subject.
The Main Output of the Headquarters
• Orders - the complete command and control cycle: (Planning-Order-Control-Order Update) • Target attack - the headquarters as a planning and executing body simultaneously - “the anomaly” of the fire center in the division. • Sustaining the force - the logistics organic response, spatial coordination and influencing the operational effort.
Command & Control in Urban Warfare
• Chances and Opportunities:
- Preventing friendly fire. - Navigation and orientation force control. - Transferring targets quickly to assault factors.
• Risks and Challenges:
- Navigation based on G.P.S in urban terrains might increase a situation where the commander and his forces are not in-control. - Land complexity makes the understanding the reality of the situation difficult without knowing the forces position. - Lack of a full assessment of the situation, and a local gap in the exact information can cause a lack of weapon usage.
Fire Command & Control in Urban Warfare
• Target production and being able to distinguish between those who are involved and those who are uninvolved in the conflict continues to be the main difficulty in maximizing the potential of fire forces. • The decrease in the usage and operating of statistic weapons at the battalion level ensures operating unique and complex weapons at the lower levels (battalion-brigade). • The importance of the common language and assistance. An ability to shoot and destroy a single.
Command and Control: Contribution to the Main Processes in the Division
Lieut.- Gen. (ret.) Gary Speer Former Acting Commander and Deputy Commander, US Army Europe, former Deputy Commander
Evolution of C4I Capabilities in the US Army Transition to a Digitized Army Abstract
After the Vietnam War, the United States Army transformed from a totally analog approach to command and control to a fully integrated digital means. The Army and other services are increased the lethality of the total force package by developing automated command and control systems evolving into the Army Battle Command System evolved through the 1990s enabling a digital battlefield. ABCS continued to evolve through the experiences in the Iraq and Afghanistan incorporating additional combat systems, data sharing, and collaboration. The current initiative in establishing the Afghanistan Mission Network aims to bridge the challenge of C4I interoperability in order to share information essential to C2 among the coalition. Looking towards the future, the US Army seeks to establish a backbone for Battle Command in one global network.
The presentation The case for change
• Problem: US fights on SIPRNet and NATO fights on NATO Secret – both communicating, not fighting, on the Coalition Network. 34
• The dynamics have shifted from a U.S. battle space to a true Coalition battle space - E.g., in Marjah, Helmand Province: • NATO Corps • British Division • Marine Brigade • UK Brigade • US Brigade … all in same fight! Fundamentally shifts the way we approach sharing of information - must move from “need-to-know” culture to a “need-to-share” operational mindset.
Coalition Network Requirements • Build CJOA Coalition Network
- Enable Network Points of Presence with CX - Migrate Battle command and ISR systems to CX • Extend Network Capacity to other regions (Support training)—Point of presence • Enable deploying units to train and configure on CX prior to deployment • Extend CX-I to garrison network for deployers - Enables SA after equipment ships • Creation, test and evaluation of capacity for CX
AFATDS - Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AMDWS - Air and Missile Defense Workstation AMN – Afghanistan Mission Network ASAS - All-Source Analysis System AWE – ADVANCED War fighting Experiment BC – Battle Command BCCS - Battlefield Command and Control System BCS3 - Battle Command Sustainment and Support System BFA – Battlefield Functional Area BFT – Blue Force Tracking C2 – Command and Control C2OTM - C2 on the Move C2PC – Command and Control Personal Computer C4 – Command and Control, Communications and Computers C4I - Command and Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C5 – Command and Control, Communications, Computers, and Combat Systems C5ISR - Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance CENTRIXS - Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System CJOA-A - Coalition Joint Area of Operations – Afghanistan COP – Common Operational Picture COTS – Commercial Off-the-shelf CPOF – Command Post of the Future CSSCS - Combat Service Support Control System CX – CENTRIXS DCGS-A - Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DDS – Defense Dissemination System DTSS - Digital Topographic Support System FAAD C2 - Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control FBCB2 - Force XXI Battle Command – Brigade and Below GCCS-A - Global Command and Control System-Army GOTS – Government Off-the-Shelf HS – Home Station HTTB – High Technology Test Bed; 9ID and Fort Lewis IA – Information Assurance IM – Information Management IMETS - Integrated Meteorological System ISAF – International Security Assistance Force ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance JADOCS - Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System JCFAWE – JOINT Contingency Force Advanced War fighting Experiment LTP – Leaders Training Program MCS - Maneuver Control System MRX – Mission Rehearsal Exercise NIPR - Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network OEF – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM PASS – Publish and Subscribe System POR – Program of Record SA – Situational Awareness SINCGARS - Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SIPR – Secret Internet Protocol Router Network TACSAT- Tactical Satellite Radio TAIS - Tactical Airspace Integration System UAS – Unmanned Aerial Systems VOIP – Voice over Internet Protocol
Col. Dariusz Karwinski
Polsocom J2 Director- Special Forces
Utilizing Intelligence for Fire Engagement Abstract
The presentation will deal with TTPS for fire engagement in Afghanistan. It will focus on the main methods of conducting operations in Afghanistan and intelligence and fire support. It will deal with main means of reconnaissance and TTPS. The difficulties and challenges in gathering intelligence in an urban terrain are: isolation, close combat, focused information operations and aggressive ISR operations, understanding the human dimension, separating non-combatants from combatants, avoiding the attrition approach, controlling the essential, minimization of collateral damage, conducting close combat, transition control, restoration of essential services, preservation of critical infrastructure. The tactical challenges are: contiguous and non-contiguous operations, asymmetrical threats, collateral damage and non-combatant casualties, transition from stability operations to combat operations, enemy threat, and enemy tactics.
In this presentation will be presented:
1. Presentation of POL SF. 2. Description of intelligence interfaces for the fire targets following experience in Afghanistan. 3. How to keep a relevant intelligence for attacks, in continuous manner. 4. Transfer of intelligence, for attacks, between the NATO Armies. 5. Difficulties and challenges in gathering intelligence in an urban terrain.
POLAND / USA - Strategic partnership NATO • To be a leader in NATO • To be the leader in Middle-East Europe • Strategic partner for Croatian SF • Military training for Croatian SF FRANCE • Cooperation • NRF – XIII rotation • Liaison office • Cooperation in the framework of maritime security
Areas of Responsibilities Combating Terrorism Ops • Land Special Ops • Maritime Special Ops
Intelligence Interfaces for Fire Targets
• Task Force White Eagle (TF WE - Polish Brigade Combat Team) Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) assets - medium range • TFs ISR - short range • TF WE artillery assets. • Counter fire • Call for fire
Keeping Relevant Intelligence for Attacks Personnel on the Ground:
• JTAC or FSO. • HUMINT, PSYOPS, CIMIC or conventional forces ele-
Equipment on the Ground:
• UAV or manned platforms with FMV capabilities or FP IMINT systems. • Target Acquisition Radar or FP systems. • Remotely monitored sensors. • SIGINT. • Vehicles with their own forces tracking system. • Implied procedures
Intelligence Gathering in an Urban Terrain • Control the essential • Collateral damage and noncombatant casualties
• Information Operations and ISR operations • Preserve critical infrastructure
• Comprehensive and in-depth understanding of all levels of the battle space • The ability to rapidly generate up-to-date geographical products • Timely gathering and distribution of information • The ability to locate and identify enemy forces • The ability to discern enemy movement patterns • The increased requirements for precision targeting • Challenges for ISR platforms • The ability to do battle damage assessment (BDA)
Intelligence Interfaces for Fire Targets
Maj. - Gen. (ret.) Udi Shani Shinuter CEO of the Ministry of Defense
The Consequences of C4I and the Implementation of Electronic Warfare in the Ground Battle Abstract
The presentation will focus on advanced command and control systems and their influence on fire during urban warfare. It will include the command and control vision of the IDF, from the ordinary lookout to the intelligence official to offensive weaponry. During the lecture the different forms of liaison between the different branches will also be presented. The presentation will deal with the command-and-control vision on the ground, with emphasis on the digital ground army.
The Presentation NCW – Network Centric Warfare
Closing circuits of fire
• Network based systems • Any user “cleared” • To know- everyone • To understand- together • To develop... • To overcome time-constants • To overcome the limitations of location • Everything is available • Everything is survivable • To match plans to demands • To decide together
• Availability and clarity • See together • Making use of the relative advantage • Minimizing time in information and operation • Common language • Dispersion • Cutting down on manpower • Advantage in budget management
Strategic level- Centralized Process, Low dynamic, Predefined Process, Large amount of Information. Tactical level – Decentralized, Highly Dynamic, Short time reaction. The Disadvantages
• Development of the “worship” of technology • Harming of creativity • A developing dependency • The breaking of hierarchy • Security and survivability • Maneuver is forgotten
Quality = Technology Building of force = Acquisition of projects
How Do We Bridge the Gaps?
• In-depth understanding. • Adapting the organization to change. • Awareness and assimilation of the culture.
• Training HR. • Institutionalization of processes. • Budget. • Whole and non-partial solution. • Investment in promise. • Length of training. • Length of assignment.
Dr. Shaul Attar
Director, Precision Tactical Weapon systems, Rafael
Modern Fire Directions of Development and Capability SPIKE Multi-Purpose Missile System Abstract
A common "language" in the battlefield between all the players, along with decentralized fast reaction weapons, will provide the combat force with high utilization of the new weapons in the theater, while saving lives and costs.
The Presentation The factors underlying the development of weapon systems • Change in threats as insights from wars in the last decade: buildings, light vehicles, artillery rocket launchers, infantry, targets of short viability, sensitivity to collateral damage, pinpoint accuracy, and closure of rapid attack circles. • Development of advanced technologies
What do we have today?
Any target can be destroyed at any range with pinpoint accuracy. Is this enough? No.
Directions of development and capabilities
• Common language: Understanding of the combat space by "all" of the participants concerning "the essence of the target"..
• Solution for: Target viability time, priority, location and type of target (surface / underground. ( • Closure of attack circles in the aspect of: SENSOR TO SHOOTER. • High sensitivity to collateral damage-communication and/or control until impact. • The trooper as a "trigger-sensor” for operating ordnance delivered from a range of platforms: land, air and sea. • Decentralization of ordnance: for achieving flexibility and availability in the operation and control of ordnance resources in the theater • Price of destruction: bringing the cheapest available ordnance in the theater to execute the mission • Ordnance of type: Multi Mission-Multi Platform
Precision tactical weapon- system directorate A range of systems of 0-25,000 meters range
Combat Proven-SPIKE-Family Spike-LR - 4 km/13kg, Fiber Optics Spike-ER - 8 km/34kg, Fiber Optics Spike-NLOS - 25 km/75kg, RF Future products Mini Spike - 1.5 km/4kg, RF
Iron Flame - XX km/XXkg The Spike Family Spike-MR/LR - 200-2500m, 200-4000m Spike-ER - 400-8000m Spike-NLOS - 500-25,000m - The system is especially designed for urban and high intensity warfare, for ground support, special missions with maximum effectiveness. • Long Range NLOS • C4I • Mid-course guidance • Multi Launchers • Multi Mission Warhead
• Pin Point accuracy • Man-in-the-Loop • RF data link
Fire & Forget…Plus
• Real time surveillance • Hidden/alternate target attack capability • Pinpoint “surgical” operation • Minimum collateral damage • Urban Warfare Precision • Damage assessment • Abort a mission after launch
Dr. Danny Peretz
IMI Corporate VP for R&D and Business Development
Current and Evolving Strike Capabilities The Technological Aspects Abstract
The presentation will deal with the technological advancement in rockets and rocket systems. This technological advancement changed the characteristic of rocket systems and thus revolutionizing rocket artillery participation in modern urban warfare.
plementation of GNC systems and data links in small caliber rockets and launchers. Technological advances such as these allow great changes in Artillery Rockets.
Technological Trends in Artillery Rockets
• Very effective in carrying large warheads. • Very short time from decision to effect. • Long range. • All weather. • Simplicity of maintenance and operation. • High reliability and availability. • Very cost effective system.
Russian SS-21 (Tochka): Range - 70km, WH Weight -480kg American ATACAMS: Range – 165/300 km, Cep – 10m American GMLRS: CEP - 10m Russian ISKANDAR (SS-28): Range – 280km, CEP – 30m Israeli Lora: Range – 280km, CEP - 10m Israeli Extra: Range - 150 km, WH Weight 100 kg, CEP - 10 m Israeli Magic Spear: CEP - 10 m
Technological Advances in Artillery Rockets
Technological Advances in Artillery Systems
The presentation Why Artillery Rockets?
• The availability of GPS systems enables precision in hitting the target thus eliminating the need for a large warhead, and reducing the number of rockets required to destroy a specific target. • Miniaturization of electronic components enables im-
• Advances in communication and internet technology enables efficient system performance for small deployable units. • Advances in UAV technology and size enables targeting and BDA for small units.
• Advances in light-weight data links enable the designation of targets from different sources from a long distance, thus allowing for pinpoint accuracy. These technological advances provide for great changes in Artillery Systems.
Autonomous Multi-Purpose Rocket Launching System • Modern C4I System. • Advanced Fire Control Computer. • Advanced I.N.S.
• Advanced mechanical/hydraulic system. • Fully autonomous launcher. • Launches all rockets (122mm to 300mm). • Pod reloads time – less than 10 min.
The technological capabilities enable a total concept change. Not only massed artillery fire from a rocket launcher, but accurate, precise engagement at various ranges from common autonomous launchers, with warheads tailored to the target.
Mr. Bezhalel Machlis EVP & General Manager Elbit Land & C4I Division
Future C4ISR & Fire Support in Urban Environment Abstract
Future C4I systems leverage evolving technological capabilities and adapt them to the operational challenges of the complex, modern battlefield. The improvements relate primarily to the areas of reconnaissance and targeting, by improving the decision making process and enabling faster and more accurate response.
The Presentation The Operational Environment-Targets
Multiple, dynamic, low-signature, high-resolution combat field, friend or foe difficulty.
Short range acquisition, large number of sensors (“eyes”), high acquisition precision required.
Single launcher mission, Accurate, Efficient, Responsive, Deadly, Costly but Cost Effective. SPM 7Km- 120mm self-propelled mortar, equipped with an autonomous FCS & self-positioning laying system, enables the battalion mortar platoon to provide responsive and efficient close-fire support for various types of missions.
The Operational Challenge • Multiple opportunities • Fast decision required • High cost of failure
Future C4I System Requirements
Real-time C4I Based Imagery • 2D/ Panoramic Still Images • RT Sight Views • RT UAV/SAT Images • C4I Data • 3D Modeling from DTED • GIS database-terrain & population, ref. models 3D visualization of the battlefield based on C4I, GIS and real-time imagery from multiple sources, available on the battlefield. Solved and docked sources connected to a unified geographic database allow the soldier and his commanders real-time, tangible and enhanced situational awareness.
Real-time C4I Based Imagery
• 2D/ Panoramic Still Images • RT Sight Views • RT UAV/SAT Images • C4I Data • 3D Modeling from DTED • GIS database-terrain & population, ref. models 3D visualization of the battlefield based on C4I, GIS and real-time imagery from multiple sources, available on the battlefield. Solved and docked sources connected to a unified geographic database allow the soldier and his commanders real-time, tangible and enhanced situational awareness.
Brig. - Gen. (ret.) Shmuel Yachin Israel Aerospace Industries
“Seeing is Striking” Fire Support for Tactical Maneuvering Abstract
This presentation will focus on the operational gap of the modern battlefield that has been identified over many years between intelligence gathering and target acquisition from within the maneuvering tactical force and various sources of fire available to it in a relevant, effective and timely manner.
- On target - On time - Required Precision - Effect-driven munitions - Exploitation of fire resources
The Presentation Traditional Fire Support for Tactical Units
Limited capability to close strike loops by tactical maneuvering forces
• Mostly artillery • Limited effect (has, however, caused most of the casualties) • Pre-planned immobile target engagement • Accompanies the maneuver with no significant target destruction
The battlefield has changed - More complicated - More lethal - High uncertainty
The Operational Gap
- Common target language - Available and suitable munitions - Information transfer - Operational complexity
“Seeing is Striking”
The Goal: to exploit tactical ISR capabilities, target creation and closing of strike loops for destruction The idea: quick and flexible fire loop closure, with adequate and effect-oriented munitions.
Brig. - Gen. (ret.) Amnon Sofrin Israel Aerospace Industries
Intelligence Integration with Fire Support Abstract
The operational requirement an Intelligence system is to support the firing effort by supplying relevant, accurate information for target acquisition and attack. This presentation will focus on current capabilities and system at both the operational and tactical level, and future solution intended to improve the Intelligence process, with an emphasis on a system for automatic data fusion.
The Presentation The Operational Need
To generate a variety of targets for the firing groups: • Qualitative targets of high valence • Accurate location • "Living” target
How to Generate Targets?
Mobile targets / targets of “short life endurance”:
• Vehicles / armored vehicle convoys (reserve units) • SS Missile units- preparations for launching from concealed sites
• Real Time detection • Transferring information directly to the Firing Group (Air Force, Artillery) • Maintaining ongoing intelligence coverage of target until the attack is accomplished + BDA
Gathering Capabilities and Methods IMINT Information -
• Air photo pictures • UAV pictures • Aerial coverage by unique tools: SAR, GMTI
Processing – RICENT-
Basic ongoing Intelligence process: • Gathering relevant information from various sources • “Targeting bank” build-up • Basic research of targets • Prioritizing the targets (valency) • Focused research of targets
• Real Time information - for operational needs • Referencing advanced research capabilities • Merging information from various sources on unified GIS layer
Generation of Targets – GHQ Level
Processing – Real Time Tactical SIGINT Center-
Strategic / Static Targets:
• Research of prioritized, static, strategic targets • Preparedness of basic terrain aids • Preparations at the attacking groups (Air Force, mainly)
SIGINT Information• Textual information • Accurate spotting
• Real Time information – for operational needs • Precise spotting capability - directing firing group/directing information inspecting capability
Targets Generating – Tactical Level The Operational Need-
• Generating targets of relevance and affectivity on the Division’s fighting arena
• Mobile targets of “short living” endurance • The need for a “short cycle” (Sensor to Shooter)
Main Capabilities & Limitations Autonomous Gathering Capabilities• Division’s reconnaissance unit • Tactical autonomous UAV • Real Time information from RICENT
Autonomous Firing Capabilities• Divisional Artillery Regiment • Air assault capability • Accurate weapon systems
Tactical Surveillance Radars
• Detection ranges: walking persons - 1300 m, vehicles – 2000m • Detection ranges: walking persons - 300 m • Detection ranges: walking persons - 2500 m, vehicles – 5000 m
Evolving Capabilities in IAI
• Evolving advanced capabilities: - In-house SIGINT capability for tactical needs - Unattended sensors - Tactical UAV - Payload of wide area scanning capability - Automatic fusion and processing system
COMINT Spotting for Tactical Level
• Detecting & spotting of transmitting entity- with emphasis to urban area. • Affective on providing Early Warning Indications on people’s presence in arena • Based on spotting – carrying out other gathering activity • SIGINT independent gathering capability for the tactical level • Deployment of various sensors (airborne/ mounted on vehicles) in the arena • Target spotting in the battlefield
Autonomous Processing System The Vision-
• Automatic system - automatic processing & targets generating • Location - Division’s / brigade HQ • Transferring the information to subordinated units close to real time
A combined effort is essential in order to generate a large quantity of targets: • Autonomous gathering capabilities • Advanced fusion & processing system • Real Time transferring of information to Firing Units • Autonomous advanced systems enables the Fighting Units to generate the relevant targets • Hitting these targets damages enemy’s fighting capabilities and assists the maneuvering effort
Mr. Yair Ramati
VP Marketing, Israel Aerospace Industries
Missile Developments throughout the World (and in the Middle East)-Trends in Tactical Missiles Abstract
• Russia: SMERCH, SS21, ISKANDER • China: various systems (see below) • Turkey: WS-1B, YILDRIM, ATACMS • South Korea: ATAMS, self-developed surface-to-surface missile with a 300 Km range • North Korea: various systems • Iran: Fajr 3,5, Zelzal family, Fatah 110 family, CSS-8 • Syria: M302, Frog 7, M600, guided M600, SS-21 • Egypt: Frog 7 • Yemen: Frog 7, SS21, 7 • Bahrain: ATACMS Terrorist organizations • Hamas: reports of 70-Km-range rockets • Hezbollah: M302, Fajr 5, M600, additional missiles These represent a classic means for land offensives – in addition to air power (Power Projection). Note: “heavy rockets”: have a range in excess of 50-60 Km
The Presentation Heavy rockets and tactical missiles throughout the world
Rockets and missiles technological trends
Precisions–guided munitions are becoming a central future of modern artillery. The ability to achieve high accuracy through relatively simple means began some twenty years ago in the USA, from where it spread gradually to other developed countries and is expected to also reach the Middle East. The main features in a world of precision-guided munitions: • The blurring of the division between heavy rocket and missiles. • A dramatic improvement in range. • A willingness to deploy rockets and missiles in a local conflict, for example: the launching of “ISKANDAR” missiles in the Georgian conflict, and the use “ATACAMS” in Afghanistan and Iraq. A critical examination both worldwide and regionally, allows us to formulate a number of relevant insights for the Israeli conflict.
Countries • USA: GMLRS, ATACMS
• Diversity: range, precision, warhead, cruise and ballistic. • Precision: from hundreds of meters to a few meters (precision is derived from navigation such as Glonass/
GPS). • Fuzziness of the traditional division between missiles and rockets: - SMLRS – MLRS. - Zelzal 3 – Fatah 110 - M600 – guided M600 - 122mm – Strikes • Dramatic increase in rocket range (WS-2 - up to 400 Km). • Appearance of cruise missiles and target drones as offensive weapons: Iran’s Krar, and perhaps also the DR3 in Syria and Lebanon.
Operational and project-related trends
• Increase in supply, and increase in the number of countries mastering the technology • Price of precision – declining • Threshold of deployment – declining. - Russia used Iskander (and SS21/Tochka) in Georgia - To date the USA has launched over 450 ATACMS in Iraq and Afghanistan • Steep rise in proliferation - Rocket and missile batteries are increasingly intended for use against advanced air forces (Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and Iran) - The use of both light and heavy rockets to attack urban concentrations has become a strategic aim - MTCR ‘constraints’ are seen to be too weak vis-à-vis North Korea, China, and the Middle East
Significant future directions
Advanced RV’s, and WMD warheads• Maneuvering RV. • Chemical warheads. • Nuclear warheads.
• “Very high” – tens of meters. • “High” – 200-300 meters.
• Increase in the number of missiles. • Hundreds of modern missiles. • Thousands of heavy rockets able to strike central Israel.
A real challenge to the Home Front and Israeli industry
Fin based rocket steering
• There are two technical implications of steering rockets by means of fins: - Accuracy to several meters (instead of 100’s) - Increase in range (hopping over the atmosphere) • In addition, there are a number of technical-tactical issues: - Using existing systems - A simple launcher in needed, the load is transferred to the rocket - Accurate leveling is not required, and neither is northfinding - New targets- Single launch site, Roofs of houses in urban surroundings
The PGM revolution has moved from air to ground
Mr. A. Ash
Electro-Optical Systems Directorate at Rafael
Future Trends and Development in Intelligence and Target Acquisition, Net Warfare and Intelligence Administration Abstract
The presentation will deal with the following topics: The main milestones in the development of warfare; development of the threat; development of the operational requirements; development of the support systems; and existing applications and those under development at Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd.
The Presentation NCW Methodology
The Network Centric Warfare is a methodology to enhance mission effectiveness, by: • Networking sensors, shooters and decision-makers • Generating and sharing common operational picture • Sophisticated allocation of shooters vs. targets
Main Mile Stones in the evolution of combat intelligence Gulf War 1991-
• Sensor to shooter time – days 80% - Statistic munition
Kosovo War – 1998-
• Sensor to shooter time – hours
Afghanistan War – 2001-
• Initiation of Time Critical Target requirement
War in Iraq – 2003 -
• Real time Sensor to shooter. 80% Precise guided munition
Second Lebanon war/Operation “Casted lead” 2006/2008-
• Real time STS via NCW. : 90% Precise guided munition, UAVs
• High mobility • Time-critical targets • Camouflage and deceit • Usage of urban areas • Digging-in and remote activation • Ware of missiles and rockets on home-front • Personal anti-tank weapons with improved destruction capabilities • Absolute air-superiority! Is it stable? The Operational Challenge • Time Critical Targets • Low Signature
• Camouflage • IED • Urban Warfare • Mortar • Multiple Targets • Uninvolved
Operational Requirement Evolution Target Destruction Effectiveness-
• TCT, shorten STS time • RT continuous target intelligence • Efficient collection, analysis, manage and dissemination of intelligence picture • Integrated C2 systems • RT ordnance to target allocation via NCW • NLOS, roaming, self homing guided munitions • Formation and platforms self protection: fire sources detection and destruction • Identification and marking of friendly forces via NCW
The evolution of counter threats means
• RT continuous target intelligence • Rafael’s applications for the future threats
Rafael’s applications for the future threats
Some of Rafael's applications will be presented here-
Intelligence Collection, analysis, manage and dissemination
• Multi-Source Imagery Exploitation System- IMILITE System Main Operational Capabilities: - Multi-source data integration - Geo-spatial data access - Unified exploitation workflow - Automated processes - Relevant data to the relevant customer, in relevant time
• Integrative C2 Systems - Ground Forces Communication
Wide-band, military cellular link for data, voice and video
Main operational capabilities:
- Wide-band communication for dissemination of video and data to tactical and mobile levels - Quick deployment of network over large areas