Graeme Doull: New Zealand Defence needs a Pacific-centric reset
Chris Ogden: As the world order shifts, NZ should look to join BRICS
Nicholas Dynon: Harsher penalties for shoplifters likely to backfire
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Kia ora and welcome to the Spring 2025 edition – and 37th issue – of Line of Defence Magazine!
In this edition, we’re privileged to be joined by contributing writers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO, Assoc Prof Chris Ogden of the University of Auckland, Australian Strategic Policy Institute visiting fellow Dr Eric Frécon , former RNZN Officer Andrew Watts ONZM, former New Zealand Army officers Ben Morgan , J osh Wineer a, Derek Tunui , and Graeme Doull , Rob Mather , VP Aerospace & Defence at IFS and Dr Alberto Ardid of Canterbury University.
A big shout-out and thank you to this edition’s headline sponsors Babcock, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, and new sponsor Ventia. The support of these organisations is a critical enabler for the continued publication of Line of Defence Magazine
In Defence, this edition boasts a varied yet interconnected line-up of timely articles across which the themes of innovations in drone warfare, maritime platform modularity, and rightsizing for Pacific deployments predominate.
Graeme Doull, who debuted as a Line of Defence author last edition, returns with two articles this time around. In the first of these he argues that intentionally designing an NZDF focused on the Pacific necessitates tough decisions around force structure and capability platforms.
Ben Morgan writes that powers preparing for future conflict in the Pacific will need to develop two key capabilities in their future forces – the capability to capture islands, and to hold them. That means infantry.
In his second article, Graeme writes that New Zealand risks falling behind amid a drone-enabled transformation in warfare. We need a fundamental shift in both military strategy and our approach to innovation – and political leadership is needed.
Senior contributor Dr Wayne Mapp suggests that the government signalling that defence expenditure will be at 2% of GDP by the early 2030s can only signify an increased naval fleet, and a one-to-one replacement would not be seen as stepping up. Andrew Watts writes that modularity, flexibility, and the exploitation of autonomy should inform New Zealand’s maritime fleet renewal.
In International Security, Dr Eric Frécon writes that France’s National Strategic Review reveals that a focus on Europe and the Pacific is not mutually exclusive, and that France shares key shared interests with countries of the Blue Pacific. Identifying 2017 as the year that gave flight to the Indo-Pacific concept, my article suggests that an Indo-Pacific lens makes understanding China harder at just the time we need to be understanding Beijing’s activities in the region better.
And there’s plenty more in this 37th issue of Line of Defence Magazine.
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Assoc Prof Chris Ogden
Dr Alberto Ardid
Dr Eric Frécon
Andrew Watts ONZM Ben Morgan
Josh Wineera Derek Tunui
Graeme Doull
Rob Mather
Nicholas Dynon GA-ASI
Babcock
Nova Systems
GA-ASI
ASIS International
Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies
Ventia
Cover image courtesy NZDF. A SH-2G(I) Seasprite helicopter
UPCOMING ISSUE
SUMMER: December 2025
Main themes: Maritime Domain, Maritime Security, HADR, civil-military
Publication: 10 December 2025
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6 In Depth: New Zealand Defence needs a Pacificcentric reset
12 Teaming for success: Manned and unmanned teaming with autonomous aerial systems
14 The evolution of land forces in the Pacific: Part One – ‘Island Hopping’
17 EDGE Defence and SH Defence sign agreement to deliver modular mission systems
18 Persistent, Cost-Effective Vigilance: Deterring Counter- Narcotics Activity Using the MQ-9B SeaGuardian® UAS
22 Political leadership key to modernising Defence for drone warfare
24 New Zealand’s maritime fleet renewal and the Pacific-centric reset
28 How AI and other tech can help solve MRO skills shortage in aerospace and defence
31 NZDF competes in Military International Drone Racing Tournament
32 Wayne Mapp: Stepping Up for New Zealand’s Defence
34 NZDF throws weight into Cook Islands infrastructure work
35 NZDF delivers essential items to remote PNG areas
36 As the world order shifts, NZ should look at joining BRICS
38 2017: The year we decided we were living dangerously
40 French National Strategic Review: Seeing the Pacific wood for the Russian trees
44 An interview with Alberto Ardid: Harnessing AI for wildfire forecasting
48 Harsher penalties for shoplifters likely to backfire
51 Government funding for trans-Tasman space projects
Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www. defsec.net.nz
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New Zealand faces a choice. We can continue to tinker at the edges, replacing old assets with new ones, or we can intentionally design a Defence Force for the Pacific. That means tough decisions, writes former New Zealand Army Officer Graeme Doull.
The recently released 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) focuses largely on replacing existing assets but offers little genuine change. Rather than addressing New Zealand’s long-term defence requirements, it reads like a compromise between competing Services’ bids, mediated by bureaucrats, and assembled to meet the Government’s desire to increase military spending.
The Plan’s reliance on like-forlike replacement reflects decades of chronic underinvestment, but more worryingly, it suggests a lack of rigorous strategic analysis about the NZDF’s future roles and the capabilities we will most likely need.
As a once-in-a-generation opportunity, the DCP should be far more than a procurement list. It
demands robust analysis — about geography, the evolving security context, the nature of future conflict, and how New Zealand can best operate alongside partners. Anything less risks wasting billions while leaving our forces ill-prepared for the challenges ahead.
So how did we get here?
The DCP is the third in a series of documents, building on the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (DPSS) and the Future Force Design Principles 2023 (FFDP).
The DPSS laid out three interlinked pillars — Understand, Partner, Act — aimed at navigating our complex security environment, particularly in the Pacific, but also more broadly around the world. It was a solid starting point, but
arguably too high-level to provide real direction. It did not unpack in any real detail the implications of the geography of the Pacific, the nature of likely threats, or the detail of how we would operate alongside partners.
The FFDP added even less. Intended to be a bridge between policy and procurement, it delivered little more than vague concepts with sliding scales from low to high to illustrate the ‘desired policy setting’ — ‘flexibility’ set to ‘medium’, and ‘concurrency’ set to ‘medium high’, for example. Disappointingly, it failed to articulate meaningful principles with which to shape capability decisions – perhaps explaining the lack of clear intent in the DCP.
To fill the void left by the FFDP, I have proposed five alternative principles, along with their rationales. These could more meaningfully focus capability development, and a framework like this could help develop a more cohesive and aligned fit-for-purpose view of required capabilities for the NZDF:
The Pacific is rapidly emerging as a contested theatre. China’s military expansion, its growing influence among Pacific Island nations, and the United States’ and NATO’s pivot to the IndoPacific are transforming the region from quiet backwater to strategic flashpoint. Militarisation by Australia, the US, and China is accelerating, while fragile Pacific states are becoming prizes in this competition.
Hybrid tactics — cyber-attacks, political interference, economic coercion — amplify these dynamics. With the South China Sea heavily fortified, the less congested Pacific offers a more attractive arena for influence and power projection. Whoever secures footholds here will control vital logistics hubs and access valuable mineral and fisheries resources.
A future Pacific war will not resemble Afghanistan, Malaya, Vietnam, or Korea. It will be fought across kinetic, cyber, and information domains, with contested communications and disinformation campaigns as significant as artillery and ships.
Geography alone demands a rethink: small ports, grass runways, poor roads, and vast maritime distances. Sea control is paramount, and forces must be agile, logistically self-reliant, and designed for operations far from home. Maintaining current assets like the NZLAV makes little sense — they are too large for Bougainville’s or East Timor’s roads and cannot be deployed by Hercules in combat-ready form.
A Pacific-focused force would not preclude us from contributing further afield, but our priority must be our own neighbourhood.
2. Where we lack capability, we should rely on our natural partners
A credible defence strategy must prepare for a spectrum of conflict, from civil disorder to high-intensity war. Early stages will likely involve foreign-backed unrest and provocations. The NZDF must be able to support civil authorities, protect infrastructure, defend against cyber-attacks, and counter disinformation. As conflict escalates, roles would shift to targeted strikes, humanitarian assistance, and bolstering local forces.
In full-scale war, New Zealand would almost certainly fight alongside Australia and the US — or not at all. Australia has advanced aircraft, armour, and ships, and the US still dominates global power projection.
By contrast, New Zealand has no strike aircraft, and re-establishing that capability — say with F-35s — would exceed the DCP budget. Our independent naval combat capability is also limited with lone frigates highly vulnerable without allied support. Air superiority and naval dominance in the Pacific will depend on the US and Australia, not us — we simply lack the assets and expertise to do this ourselves.
3. Where we do build capability, we should lead for our partners - both larger and smaller Given our reliance on the US and Australia at sea and in the air, the question becomes: how best can New Zealand contribute?
Australian equipment is effective for defence on their mainland but is too large for Pacific deployment. Abrams tanks, ASLAV, Bushmasters, and Hawkeis are all bus sized vehicles that would struggle on narrow jungle roads and light bridges. Vehicles of this size would also damage existing
roads and, consequently, critical relationships with local populations.
US logistics are unmatched, but depend on deep ports and long runways, both scarce in the Pacific. These gaps highlight where New Zealand should invest: vehicles, ships, and capabilities specifically tailored to Pacific conditions.
Just as there are times when we will need to rely on larger partners for support, we should be building capabilities to support our smaller partners too. We should purposefully design our forces to act as a combat multiplier for our military partners by ensuring we can provide logistics, communications, engineering, and indirect fires for them — in addition to our forces.
4. Operational capabilities must have resilience and redundancy
Any deployable capability requires a cycle of preparation, deployment, and reconstitution. Sustained operations therefore demand three of any given asset — at a minimum. For example, to keep one frigate continuously at sea, we would need at least three. Our experience has proven that personnel-dependent capabilities, such as infantry forces or ship crews, require even greater depth. This is where Reserve Forces should play a key role — ideally mirroring the
regular force structure, one-for-one, to sustain operations and replace depleted units.
Too many of our current capabilities lack this resilience. We must invest intentionally to address the shortfall, and where true redundancy cannot be achieved, we should consider abandoning the capability altogether rather than creating unrealistic expectations.
5. Unless there is a compelling reason - we should procure the same equipment as our partners
New Zealand has an unfortunate history of pursuing bespoke solutions that create potential headaches in sustainment and interoperability. The recent decision to diverge from Australia in moving away from the IW Steyr, for example, potentially increases costs and complexity for future deployments.
Consistent with the DCP’s recommendations, wherever practical, we should procure the same platforms as our partners — simplifying logistics, deepening integration, and reducing costs. Exceptions should only be made where Pacific-specific needs demand it, or in circumstances where the Australian solution offers exceptionally poor value.
So, applying these principles, how might the DCP look different?
Logistics by sea is key to the Pacific
Fit-for-purpose logistics must be the foundation of any Pacific strategy. In this theatre, logistics means ships — ideally multi-role vessels like HMNZS Canterbury. While not built to full naval standards, and with lessons learnt that would certainly be incorporated in future builds, at around $170m each (inflation-adjusted) they are far cheaper than frigates (around $1b). They are versatile enough for shallow ports and landing operations, yet still large enough to provide meaningful support.
To ensure redundancy and resilience, we would need sufficient numbers — perhaps six vessels of this class — allowing ships to be in transit and loiter to support operations. Such a fleet would not only fill a gap for our larger partners but also meet critical needs for Pacific Island nations.
Ships like HMNZS Canterbury offer landing platforms for aerial drones, davits and ramps for launching sea drones, and sufficient space to accommodate drone operators to support these systems. Advances in modular missile
technology mean that, in future, such ships could also be fitted with a wider range of offensive and defensive weapon systems.
Warships are evolving. While sleek, heavily armed frigates and destroyers will remain the backbone of major navies for escorting fast task groups in high-threat environments, broader sea control is increasingly expected to fall to slower and more versatile vessels capable of operating a range of drones (such as the UK’s Multi-Role Strike Ship (MRSS) program). For New Zealand, the most valuable contribution to US–Australian sea operations may be to focus on building and deploying more of these adaptable multi-role workhorse warships.
NZDF transport assets (landing craft, helicopters, and genuinely light armoured vehicles) should, by design, be chosen to suit the Pacific’s geography (and whatever vessels we choose to deploy). Finding the right fit will be challenging, as even the relatively light, ubiquitous Humvee has too wide a wheelbase to be fit for purpose.
Operating in the Pacific, we should look for something that can handle tracks normally used only
by a Toyota Hilux. An armoured Landcruiser, similar to the twelve vehicles recently donated by the ADF to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force — essentially a lighter, less protected ‘light MRAP’ — could potentially fill this niche. Due to their huge size, nothing in the current Australian catalogue of armoured vehicles is suitable.
Ready-reaction forces should be deployable by Hercules, which should remain the mainstay of our tactical airlift capability. The Hercules’ cargo hold dimensions must be a key consideration when procuring vehicles — if they can’t operate directly off the ramp, they should be ruled out.
To match the short grass landing strips common in the Pacific, lighter fixed-wing aircraft, such as the C-27 Spartan, could also provide tactical airlift and logistics support. This would align with the ADF fleet and enhance Pacific focused capability.
Winning the information, cyberwar and remotely fought battlespace
Cultural, cyber, and information warfare capabilities are force multipliers. The NZDF, with its historical and demographic advantages in Pacific relationships,
must be able to influence the information environment through traditional and social media, backed by strong cyber tools. This should be underpinned by a near-constant peacetime presence in the Pacific — building infrastructure, providing aid, and cultivating trust.
Half of the multi-role fleet should be deployed at any time to ensure we are seen as a part of the community of Pacific Nations, not an outsider. These vessels should also host NZ land force units which, while training and acclimatising themselves, should be developing capability and building a depth of relationships with Pacific Island Country forces.
There is a new king of the battlefield - the low-cost drone. In the Ukraine, drones now account for approximately 70 percent of casualties and yet the NZ Army does not currently operate First Person View (FPV) drones.
The NZDF is unprepared for the remotely fought battlespace. Drone warfare — both offensive and defensive — must become a core competency at all levels and domains, with systems ranging from cheap disposables to longendurance tactical platforms like the Bayraktar
If the frigates are retired, maintaining some form of strategic strike using a platform such as Anduril’s Ghost Shark maritime drone would be prudent. The Ghost Shark, while less versatile, offers comparable lethality and improved survivability versus a frigate, and, at around $25m each, are a fraction of the cost.
Kinetic warfare is still fundamental in the Pacific
Kinetic warfighting fundamentals still matter – seizing and holding ground, repelling attack, and delivering indirect fire. These capabilities must be adapted to Pacific geography and the littoral environment.
New Zealand’s soldiers should be confident in a marine environment — familiar with small boats, landing craft, and operating around water. Likewise, indirect fire support should be ready to operate on Pacific roads and tracks. This may mean a more mobile tube artillery system, like the Scorpion 120mm mortar, which can be deployed from a light vehicle and moved without digging out a base plate – may possibly be a better fit than the existing L119 light gun.
The New Zealand Army recently announced it is merging two of its three manoeuvre units because it does not have enough soldiers to sustain them, yet it can still justify having hundreds of senior officers. These manoeuvre units are the only way to deliver the fundamentals of kinetic warfighting and the reduction of the Army’s ability to do battle by a third represents the biggest drop in combat capability since the disbandment of the Air Force’s Strike Wing.
This merger seems ill timed given the Government’s public commitment to increase Defence spending. Even
without the increase in spending, surely, it would be wiser to release headcount from senior officers’ roles to reinvest in combat units.
Bringing this all together - a ‘Canterbury-class’ vessel (or perhaps an even more capable ship around her size) carrying an infantry company reinforced with what would normally amount to a battalion group’s worth of additional capabilities could be an exceptionally powerful and flexible force package. In addition to an infantry company, this type of force would ideally include:
• A headquarters company (command post, signals, military police, civil affairs, media/ communications, intelligence, and training/liaison functions);
• A reconnaissance squadron (with aerial drones, and wheeled, boatmounted, and dismounted recon);
• A combat support company (mortars, heavy weapons, engineers, and maritime operations); and
• A support company (transport, maintenance, quartermaster, and medical elements).
Such a task group could form the backbone of a Pacific Island Battalion, with additional infantry companies drawn from Pacific Island nations (alternatively, these could come from New Zealand or Australian regular/reserve units, or even from US, UK, Canadian, Irish, or other NATO partners). Three such task groups would provide the foundation for a brigade deployable anywhere across the Pacific.
Augmented with Ghost Shark maritime drones (alongside the expected helicopters and landing craft that a ship of this class would carry) the task group would constitute a highly versatile, lethal, and scalable combat formation — one intentionally designed for Pacific operations.
This concept points to a force structure with a different focus from the one that exists today. Within the land domain, it would place
greater emphasis on asset-rich and technically complex combat support and support trades — particularly those required for a modern headquarters company. Within the sea domain it would see a pivot to multiple multi-role vessels to provide resilience. Within the Air domain we would see the addition of Pacific focused airframes that operate on shorter runaways.
Increasing investment in Pacificfocused defence capabilities will inevitably require that some less critical areas be deprioritised. Applying the proposed principles, there are some obvious candidates where funding could be reduced in order to redirect resources toward more fit-for-purpose capabilities. For example, should New Zealand really be spending $300–600 million on space, or is this an area where we should rely more on partners with greater capacity?
There are also less obvious capabilities that may warrant reconsideration. The Javelin missile
system has proven its value many times over in Ukraine, but is it the best fit for the Pacific? Each Javelin command unit costs around $400,000, and every disposable missile is priced similarly. By contrast, the Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle costs roughly $35,000, with even its most expensive rounds costing only about $5,000 — delivering far greater firepower for the same investment.
In a theatre where vehicles are likely to be lightly armoured and engagements fought at shorter ranges, the Carl Gustaf may well provide more bang for buck.
There is certainly a lot more work to be done to consider the implications of the capabilities I have proposed, likewise the proposed principles are only an initial concept, but they hopefully demonstrate that getting the framework right will lead to a more cohesive and capable force.
New Zealand faces a choice. We can continue to tinker at the edges, replacing old assets with new ones, or we can intentionally design a Defence Force for the Pacific. That means tough decisions: trading frigates for multi-role ships, prioritising presence over prestige assets, and perhaps even considering a structural merger of the Services into a marine-oriented force optimised for littoral warfare.
New Zealand cannot afford incremental upgrades aimed at yesterday’s battles. It falls to the Minister of Defence to ask the right questions, set the right direction, and refocus the NZDF so we develop the capabilities New Zealand truly needs.
If the Minister fails to demand a decisive reset, our forces could be sent into harm’s way poorly equipped, under-prepared, and ill-matched to our likely partners’ capabilities — and the cost of that failure will be counted in lives.
With recent developments in manned and unmanned teaming (MUM-T) demonstrating its utility for defence and commercial aviators, there’s opportunity for New Zealand, write Josh Wineera and Derek Tunui.
Josh Wineera is a director of Latent and specialises in defence innovation, advanced technologies. He is a former New Zealand Army officer and forward air controller.
First there were manned aircraft. Less than two decades after the Wright Brothers flew, pilotless aircraft were being developed during World War 1 by both American and British designers. This included Archibald Low’s radio control system that guided a de Havilland’s monoplane in March 1917. Low has been referred to as the “Father of the remotely piloted vehicle”.
It should be no surprise then that 100 years later, combining the two, teaming them to achieve success, is a natural evolution in aviation.
As is commonly the way, military developments paired with advanced technologies, are leading in what has many descriptions – manned and unmanned teaming (MUM-T), collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), Loyal Wingman, and others.
What is clear is that the advancement in this field has drawn the attention and serious investment of some of the global defence industry heavyweights, with all eyes on who will be first to market with their sixth-generation fighter.
Earlier this year, Boeing’s successful bid sealed a US Government deal of $20Bn to develop the F-47, the successor to the F-22 Raptor. France, Germany and Spain are collaborating on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) through Dassault, Airbus, and Indra
Sistemas - the successor to the Rafale and Typhoon.
In June, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy accelerated their ‘Tempest’ design, with a formal commitment between BAE, Leonardo and Japan Industrial Enhancement Co to replace the Typhoon and F-2. South Korea’s KAI Aerospace is onboard, and India is exploring options, while China’s much publicised future combat aircraft programme remains a key motivator for Western sixthgeneration programmes.
But stealth technology, AI advancements and composite material aren’t cheap. When these fighters are fielded through the 2030s global sales are likely to be in the trillions.
A question lies beyond the hardware and software. How does the human factor of manned and unmanned teaming prepare?
Top-tier flight facilities in Europe, China and the US are developing sixth generation pilot training that will combine air space management, autonomous mission orders, threat avoidance and engagement systems operation over traditional pilot operations. AI will play a central role. The pilot may become more of a mission commander and systems integrator than a pure pilot.
In New Zealand, MannedUnmanned Teaming (MUM-T) ought to be an expected capability in the near future across the surveillance and strike functions. This is particularly relevant for the $2 billion maritime helicopter project , and long-range strike and surveillance acquisitions across multiple domains.
An article in the Autumn 2025 issue of Line of Defence titled Collaborative Combat Aircraft in the Royal New Zealand Air Force, concluded that “consideration could be given to the utility of a CCA capability flying independently and/or in conjunction with the RNZAF’s P-8 Poseidon or other similar aircraft.”
The applications of teaming extend well beyond air combat. Several industries and sectors, including Airbus are already exploring teaming. Airbus Helicopters’ CE, Bruno Even speaking on an EU-funded project (MUSHER) to develop a full-scale demonstration of a MUM-T system, pointed out that the aim of this was to harness Europe’s industrial know-
how, and demonstrate the benefit and practicality of MUM-T for military and civil applications.
Examples of a growing number of non-military sectors considering MUM-T to unlock safer, more precise and scalable methods of operation will include border control and maritime surveillance.
Agriculture is another, with precision farming operations experimenting with MUM-T concepts to combine piloted crop dusters with drone-based sensors and delivery systems for optimised spraying and monitoring, livestock management and infrastructure inspection.
Emergency services and disaster response will see piloted aircraft coordinate with drones to map fire perimeters, detect hotspots and guide suppression efforts. In search and rescue operations, manned aircraft scan wide areas, while drones access hard to reach zones using thermal imaging and GPS to locate survivors.
However, there is still a reliance on separation for safe integration
of ‘M’ with ‘UM’ – separation in horizontal or vertical axes and/ or by time. In sports parlance, opposing teams are kept on separate sides of the field with direction largely flowing from one side, and information from the other.
Today, the ‘T’ in MUM-T is the prize. Indeed, human aviators are no longer alone on defence or commercial missions. MUM-T is a Team space, with high degrees of integration over separation, twoway information and direction, and hierarchical layers of “M’ and ‘UM’ forming real MUM-T with a hard emphasis on the ‘T’.
As autonomous technologies and regulatory frameworks continue to evolve, MUM-T is showing its place for essential missions for defence and commercial aviators. Its fundamental logic is to bridge the human factor with unmanned intelligent support to deliver services in smarter and more sustainable ways.
Given this evolution, does New Zealand have the technical and intellectual curiosity to explore MUM-T?
Ben Morgan writes that powers preparing for future conflict in the Pacific will need to develop two key capabilities: to (i) capture islands, and to (ii) hold islands. Bring on the infantry!
‘Area-denial’ will be the defining tactical feature of any future conflict in the Pacific. Area-denial is a military term that means using accurate longrange missiles to deny areas of land, sea and air to enemy units.
Surveillance by ‘sensors’, like satellites, radar, drones, aircraft and human observers, combined with accurate long-range missile fire creates a ‘kill web,’ within which any movement by surface ships, aircraft, or large concentrations of ground forces can be immediately and effectively attacked.
The components of the kill web, either surveillance systems or the missiles they direct, need to be located somewhere. Given this, across the Pacific, from the South China Sea to Melanesia and Polynesia, there is a diplomatic contest underway to secure access to the small islands that would provide unsinkable bases from which areadenial missiles can operate.
This is shaping how Pacific land forces need to evolve because regardless of how accurate an areadenial missile system is, it is useless without ground to operate from.
This means that powers preparing for conflict need to develop two key capabilities in their future force structure:
• The capability to capture islands; and
• The capability to hold islands.
Chinese area-denial and amphibious capabilities are increasing and are often commentated on. China’s strategy is currently based on mass, or producing large numbers of missiles to swamp large areas of ocean to restrict US and allied movement.
For example, if China was to conduct an amphibious attack on Taiwan, or anywhere else, we would expect to see that island isolated using long-range missiles, with large US warships kept far away by a kill web of accurate anti-ship missiles. The US and its allies are unsurprisingly developing a new set of amphibious capabilities based on small unit infiltration.
In the essay Breaking Through the Modern Battlefield’s Defensive Kill Web, I discussed the need to develop ‘break in’ forces to defeat area-denial: … a swarm of light, combined arms teams (i.e. EW, ground and air drones, mortars, light artillery and airdefence) that are self-supporting and can operate independently for days, in digital silence using auftragstaktik. Moving self-sufficiently without resupply, or new orders, and operating under the enemy’s area-denial zone. A force able to move and fight in complex terrain like woods, urban areas and broken country. Its objective is to ‘break in’ by compromising the defensive kill web’s ‘sensors.’ Human observers, EW monitoring stations,
Ground Surveillance Radars, Remote Ground Sensors, and forward drone operating teams.
In recent years, ‘break in’ capabilities are developing in key Pacific militaries, using existing special forces units and light weight littoral infantry formations.
Special forces infiltration
In April 2019, Business Insider reported that “US and Philippine troops recently conducted a counterinvasion exercise focused on repelling an attempt by a foreign military to seize a small island and its airfield.” The small island was Lubang in the northern Philippines and the exercise involved US and Philippines special forces units landing by sea and air in a closely coordinated operation to seize an airfield and take control of the island.
On 24 August 2025, YouTube channel Cappy Army provided further insight into US planning, specifically the use of special forces units to assault small islands. The post discussed an exercise on Thitu Island (a Philippine administered island in the Spratly Islands) in which US special forces used High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) parachuting techniques to launch themselves from aircraft outside of anti-aircraft missile range, then glide close to the island before coming ashore to conduct an assault.
After capturing an airfield, the initial assault group was reinforced from the air, High Mobility Army Rocket Systems (HIMARS) being deployed immediately so their missiles could deny enemy ships access to waters around the island.
HALO infiltration is extremely complex and only the most technically proficient militaries have the capability, and even then only in small numbers. Another sophisticated method of infiltration involves landing special forces swimmers from submarines. China’s area-denial dominance means that the US and its allies will be developing and practising techniques like these to infiltrate forces through air defence networks.
This year during Exercise Talisman Sabre, Australia practiced rapidly deploying HIMARS rocket launchers by air to Christmas Island, 1500km north-west of Australia. It is likely that part of the activity involved securing the airfield, probably using special forces.
We should expect to see special forces units of the US and its allies honing and developing their infiltration and assault capabilities, with special forces providing an ideal option for the capture of small islands or key objectives within a larger operation.
Special force units are highly capable, but small and easily depleted during operations. Line infantry units are also required to develop the skills needed to infiltrate and ‘break in’ to an area-denial kill web. We can already see such changes among the forces of regional powers:
• Australia’s 1st Brigade based in Darwin is developing as Australia’s lead unit for littoral operations. In 2023, US Navy News reported that “The 1st Brigade will be transformed into a light combat brigade, which will allow it to be “light, agile and quick to deploy in
the littoral environment” and “support land-based long-range fires.” Later, the 2024 National Defence Strategy reinforced the need to develop littoral capabilities. In simple terms, 1st Brigade’s role is to provide light infantry able secure areas for missile system, and this role means being able to infiltrate small groups into areas protected by missiles and drones.
• The US is well-advanced in the development of Marine Littoral Combat Regiments, specifically organised to infiltrate areas denied by missiles to seize ground. The aim being to break in and provide friendly forces with the safe areas from which to fire their own long-range missiles.
• Japan’s recently created Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade is another example of this trend. Establishment in 2018, this formation is a littoral operations focussed brigade,
specifically formed to rapidly respond to any threat to Japan’s offshore islands.
The key features of these units can be summarised as follows:
• Soldiers are expected to operate in small, widely dispersed groups.
• Interoperability is emphasised with direct support by landing craft and air transport.
• They exist to seize and hold ground for lodgement of a larger force or to provide firing platforms for area-denial missile systems.
• Unit tactical organisations often include organic air-defence and surface strike missiles.
The trend is likely to continue and to spread through smaller Pacific militaries, and within militaries planning to deploy to the region.
Sustainability, or being able to hold important ground
Being able to capture islands is one of the tactical capabilities required to fight in the Pacific. But a second capability is required: being able to hold ground that has been captured in order to sustain offensive operations and prevent raids or counter attacks.
Sustainability includes:
• Being able to rapidly reinforce an assault force that has successfully infiltrated and captured an island, or being able to exploit the break in.
• Defending ground that has been captured.
Both tasks require a larger infantry component than Pacific nations currently maintain, with success in a future conflict requiring two types of infantry:
• Immediate reinforcement forces . Well-trained and rapidly deployable infantry that can move by air or by sea to secure and hold ground captured by Break In forces. Special forces or littoral specialists are a limited
commodity and after the initial capture of island or key area they need to be reinforced immediately in case of a counter attack.
• Security forces . Large numbers of less mobile and responsive forces that can secure islands or areas of ground, preventing them from being used as either as part of a ‘sensor’ network or sites for missiles to be launched from.
[In the article Break out the infantry! I discuss in more detail the counter-intuitive reasons why a battlespace with more drones and missiles requires more infantry.]
The US and its allies are already looking at ways to increase the amount of infantry soldiers available to them, including by training local forces. A March 2024 Asia Times article, for example, reported that “US Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been permanently assigned to Taiwan’s frontline islands, preparing elite Taiwanese units for possible island defense and guerilla warfare operations against a Chinese invasion.”
Australia’s close relationship with Papua New Guinea, including exercising together and exchanges, provides a mechanism for increasing the number of soldiers available to a coalition force in the region. Given that soldiers from Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Fiji and Tonga regularly exercise with Australia, these nations can easily contribute to an Australian led coalition. Australia has also considered the option of recruiting soldiers directly from smaller Pacific neighbours into its armed forces.
Across the Pacific, military planners are appreciating the need for more soldiers, and it is likely the US, Australia, and their allies will continue training with and developing the skills of smaller armies in the region. In larger Pacific nations, we should also expect to see an increase in the size of reserve
forces, part-time soldiers that can be mobilised in times of conflict.
Island hopping
In summary, we can see that the US and its allies are evolving a new set of littoral infiltration tactics to beat area-denial. The ‘tip of the spear’ is small lightweight forces from the special forces community or from specialist littoral infantry units that can infiltrate into their opponent’s kill web of drones and missiles, removing ground sensors and capturing key terrain like airfields or landing areas through which reinforcements can deploy.
Air-defence and area-denial missiles will be an immediate element of these reinforcements. And alongside these weapons will be electronic warfare and surveillance assets. The objective being to exploit captured territory as quickly as possible to extend their own force’s area-denial bubble. Already, the movement of these systems quickly by air is being practised and these skills honed.
In a conflict, these tactical capabilities and skills would be used by the US and its allies to ‘hop’ from island to island within the area of operations, reducing their opponent’s ability to deny movement by capturing ground used for ‘sensors’ or for missile firing points. Slowly, compressing their opponent’s kill web, they would enable larger supporting units like amphibious ships and aircraft carriers to manoeuvre.
However, sustaining this type of campaign will require large numbers of infantry both to secure ground captured by more specialised units and to defend territory. US and allied combat capability depends on the ability to generate enough infantry, and we should expect to see more focus on this area in future years.
This article was originally published in Pacific Brief on Ben Morgan’s Substack on 31 August 2025.
EDGE Defence New Zealand signs Agency Agreement with Danish Global Company SH Defence to deliver Advanced Modular Mission Systems to the Region.
EDGE Defence Ltd has signed a formal agency agreement with SH Defence, part of SH Group A/S (Denmark), to represent and deliver SH Defence’s modular mission systems and associated services across New Zealand and the Pacific region.
Under the agreement, EDGE Defence will act as SH Defence’s appointed agent for New Zealand and the Pacific Island region. The partnership will provide regional defence, security, and emergency response agencies with direct access to the full SH Defence product and service portfolio, including The Cube, skidding and handling systems, launch and recovery systems (LARS), mission bay doors.
With EDGE Defence’s local support resources, the combined offering will include full through-life support and engineering integration services.
Supporting New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan 2025
According to the announcement, the collaboration between EDGE Defence and SH Defence is aligned with New Zealand’s Defence Capability Plan 2025 , which places strong emphasis on modularity, deployability, and multi-domain interoperability as it maximises the use of its assets in an ever-changing environment.
By integrating SH Defence’s The Cube mission module system into naval, coastguard, and civil defence platforms, states the announcement, New Zealand and its Pacific partners will benefit from:
• Rapid mission reconfiguration – enabling vessels to switch between ISR, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and combat roles within hours.
• Sovereign sustainment – EDGE Defence will provide local engineering and technician support, local manufacturing, training, and maintenance, ensuring reduced reliance on offshore servicing and much shorter lead times.
• Regional resilience – scalable systems that can be deployed across Pacific Island nations and forward
operating locations to strengthen collective maritime security and humanitarian response.
“This partnership represents a major step forward in bringing cutting-edge modular naval technology to New Zealand and the Pacific,” stated John Gell, General Manager of EDGE Defence NZ.
“Together with SH Defence, we are ready to support the Defence Force, Police, and Pacific partners with systems that are future-proof, interoperable and aligned with the Defence Capability Plan’s focus on agility and resilience.”
According to Peter Liisberg, Sales Director of SH Defence, the collaboration will ensure that SH Defence solutions are delivered with the highest level of local support and commitment.
“We are proud to join forces with EDGE Defence, who bring local marine engineering expertise, deep understanding of regional requirements, and strong relationships with government and defence clients,” said Peter Liisberg.
EDGE Defence and SH Defence confirmed that they are immediately positioned to support approaches to market, tender requests, and direct engagement with defence and security agencies across the region.
The interception of a narcosubmarine near the Solomon Islands in July 2025 was a wake-up call.
New Zealand and Australia have become very lucrative markets for organised crime groups spanning North and South America, China, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. These powerful criminal groups are using increasingly sophisticated means to evade detection—meaning more drugs are getting in.
The rise in drug trafficking begets related crimes, including money laundering, arms trafficking, and people smuggling.
Sophisticated, low-profile vessels—such as semi-submersibles, narcotics-carrying subs designed to evade detection—are becoming more common. Stopping the drugs
before they reach the shore is the best means of preventing and deterring these nefarious activities; that is why maritime domain awareness has never been more critical.
However, the vast Pacific Ocean makes detection and interdiction a challenge. Recognizing that issue, New Zealand’s 2025 Defence Capability Plan calls for the introduction of a Long Range Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), noting it as the most costeffective maritime surveillance option for countering narcotics smuggling.
The MQ-9B SeaGuardian®, built by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), aligns perfectly with this vision.
SeaGuardian offers proven unmatched endurance, range, and
sensor performance to monitor vast ocean spaces and disrupt illicit activities before they reach the shore.
MQ-9B SeaGuardian is a costeffective, persistent maritime surveillance platform, boasting a range of up to 5,000 nautical miles and endurance of up to 30 hours. It provides not only detection and tracking information, but also pattern-of-life intelligence against vessels of interest.
The aircraft’s design is highly ruggedised and includes anti-ice, de-ice, and lightning protection systems. It is capable of all-weather operations spanning the extent of New Zealand’s vast area of interest, including in the Southern Ocean.
MQ-9B SeaGuardian is the longest-endurance and most versatile uncrewed aircraft in its class.
MQ-9B is also equipped with GA-ASI’s proven Detect and Avoid System (DAAS), facilitating safe and seamless operations in all classes of airspace. In fact, the MQ-9B was recently certified by the United Kingdom to operate over dense urban populations, paving the way for similar certifications in many other countries.
MQ-9B’s world-leading sensor suite includes a multi-mode
maritime radar with detection, tracking, and imaging modes; an electro-optical/infrared (EO/ IR) system capable of long-range identification by day or night; an electronic surveillance system; and an automatic identification system (AIS). Together, these capabilities ensure SeaGuardian can conduct covert long-range stand-off detection and tracking against very small vessels.
SeaGuardian also features a resilient communications suite that’s fully compatible with systems used by the New Zealand Defence Force today, allowing it to cover vast areas while providing real-time communications to headquarters and tactical users operating in the vicinity.
The aircraft is designed for the rugged conditions in the Pacific theatre, capable of operating from runways as short as 4,000 feet, including remote airfields requiring only a handful of maintenance staff on-site. No aircrew is required at forward operating airfields due to SATCOM control of the air vehicle.
With its impressive range of capabilities, it’s a small wonder that SeaGuardian has rapidly established itself as the global gold standard for ISR missions worldwide.
Nations across Europe, Asia, and the Pacific—including the United Kingdom, Belgium, Japan, India,
Canada, and Poland—have embraced the MQ-9B for its unmatched endurance, multi-mission versatility, and proven operational pedigree.
Many of these countries are also leasing the system, demonstrating its flexibility and scalability for both immediate and long-term requirements.
This growing global fleet is reducing support costs and fostering closer military-to-military cooperation among allies. For example, the Indian Navy has
leveraged the SeaGuardian to extend its reach over the Indian Ocean, responding to real-time threats like piracy and armed boarding incidents. Similarly, the Japan Coast Guard uses the MQ-9B to sustain highquality, persistent maritime domain awareness around its home islands.
With millions of flight hours accumulated across the MQ-9 series, the SeaGuardian builds on the combat-proven legacy of the MQ-9A Reaper®. Its capabilities span land and maritime domains, making
In 2022, the Japan Coast Guard started operating a GA-ASI MQ-9B SeaGuardian under a Company-Owned, Contractor-Operated (COCO) agreement.
it a versatile solution for counternarcotics, border protection, resource monitoring, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response.
These roles are increasingly vital in regions across the South Pacific, where evolving threats such as illegal fishing, transnational crime, and strategic competition demand persistent ISR capabilities.
SeaGuardian is more than just an uncrewed platform—it’s a missionready solution that delivers costeffective, scalable ISR to safeguard national interests and promote regional stability.
As more nations continue to invest in this proven system, the SeaGuardian is poised to redefine ISR operations across the globe.
The narco-submarine found in the Solomon Islands is more than a curiosity—it signals the kinds of threats New Zealand can’t ignore, alongside existing threats posed by illegal fishing and strategic competition in the region. Prioritizing persistent ISR means New Zealand can remain ahead of evolving threats and reinforce its commitment to peace and security in the South Pacific and beyond.
MQ-9B SkyGuardian® / SeaGuardian® is the game-changing unmanned aircraft system that provides unmatched reach and real-time intelligence across restricted and unrestricted airspace without risking crews. Equipped with advanced sensors, it monitors everything from submarines to maritime traffic with precision across hundreds of miles at a time under any conditions. Whether for defense, emergency response, or environmental monitoring, MQ-9B is a one-of-a-kind solution that enables forces to act faster and more effectively — it’s proven and available now.
New Zealand risks falling behind amid a drone-enabled transformation in warfare. We need a fundamental shift in both military strategy and our approach to innovation – and political leadership is needed, writes Graeme Doull.
Cheap, mass-produced drones are transforming modern warfare as profoundly as the machine gun did in World War I, and tanks and combined arms tactics did in World War II. Despite this clear and ongoing revolution, the New Zealand Army appears dangerously slow to adapt. This isn’t just a funding issue; it’s a deep-seated problem of mindset and institutional culture.
The economics of warfare have fundamentally shifted, and New Zealand’s Defence establishment is failing to keep pace. For the cost of a single Javelin missile—approximately NZ$400,000—one could acquire a thousand off-the-shelf drones. While a Javelin might neutralise a single armoured vehicle, a swarm of drones could disable dozens, gather real-time intelligence, and coordinate strikes— all while being highly expendable.
There are several interlocking challenges: the Army lacks a procurement framework suited to rapid innovation; there is no established training doctrine for drones; and critically, no operational structure to integrate drone capabilities into existing units.
Our procurement process is a major bottleneck. A quick search on AliExpress reveals a drone with a 2.2 kg payload, a 30-minute flight time, and a 5 km range for just NZ$360. In an agile system, such a drone could just be bought and used almost immediately.
In the New Zealand Army, however, this would likely never pass through the rigid layers of bureaucracy, NATO standards, and vendor approvals. While these processes have their place, they inadvertently prevent the adoption of agile, low-cost solutions.
A deeper issue lies in the Army’s institutional culture and training philosophy. While a few officers and soldiers have some exposure to a drone environment, no one in New Zealand has significant experience operating in a layered drone battlespace. Training in the NZ Army is an obsession, with formal courses being a prerequisite for both core competency and promotion. As instructors lack knowledge of drone warfare, they can’t teach it, making this omission systemic.
The Army is, by design, a disciplined, process-driven organisation—and rightly so. But when processes and doctrine become disconnected from the realities of the modern battlefield, they become liabilities rather than strengths. Furthermore, the NZ Army is already stretched thin, with existing personnel gaps. There is little sign of the structural expansion needed to build these new capabilities at every level, from individual sections to battalion groupings.
The solution requires a fundamental shift in both military
strategy and our approach to innovation. We must first look to Ukraine. In its fight for survival, Ukraine has demonstrated the extraordinary potential of drone warfare. Its innovation under fire has reshaped the battlefield and served as a crucial lesson for the rest of the world.
When Ukraine’s Ambassador to New Zealand, Vasyl Myroshnychenko, said , “You need us more than we need you,” it was not hubris—it was a challenge. A call to pay attention.
New Zealand must learn from Ukraine’s use of drones (and, just as importantly, from their counterdrone systems). We must embrace a culture of experimentation that
starts with enabling decentralised procurement. This would allow subunits and civilian partners to rapidly test and iterate drone solutions. The current centralised process is too slow, too risk-averse, and too bound by outdated assumptions.
We must accept risk, failure, and uncertainty—something our Defence institutions are often uncomfortable with. Innovation requires iteration. Repeated field exercises involving hundreds of drone operators and civilian tech specialists must become the norm. These drills should include offensive simulations—dropping inert munitions, jamming GPS, and disabling drones mid-flight—to build doctrine through real-world experimentation.
Defence procurement must move beyond replacing old equipment and begin fostering futurefocused development. This means empowering new entrants, embracing novel technologies, and funding platforms with growth potential— not just proven past performance.
Ultimately, bold political action is required to overcome the institutional paralysis in Defence. If left to its own devices, the Army will likely maintain the status quo, preserving existing capabilities while the world moves on.
A call to action, similar to the memo issued by Pete Hegseth on 10 July 2025, is needed. The memo delegated authority for procurement and operation, emphasising that the “major risk is risk-avoidance.” New Zealand needs to do likewise— direction must be set at the political level and followed up with sustained focus from the leadership of the NZ Army.
In the modern battlespace, there are either drones or targets. If we don’t have the right drones, the consequences will be lethal for our soldiers.
Modularity, flexibility, and the exploitation of autonomy should inform New Zealand’s maritime fleet renewal, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts ONZM.
Senior Contributor CAPT Andy Watts RNZN (Ret) is Maritime Defence Capability Consultant, AUSTAL. He was previously Deputy Executive Director, Australian Civil Military Centre, and an RNZN officer for over 30 years.
In an article that provides invaluable insight into the capability needed to implement a Pacific-centric defence strategy, Graeme Doull makes a number of points with which I completely agree, and some on which I have a different perspective. This article will hopefully continue the discussion and encourage more people to engage.
The first point on which I agree wholeheartedly with Graeme is the absolute need to avoid a “like for like” capability replacement focus. DCP25 talks about the replacement of the Anzac class frigates with “comparable, contemporary frigates”. Coupled with the intention to
consider Australian solutions for capability requirements first, this suggests a possible inclination to join the Australian SEA3000 general purpose frigate programme.
However, the Mogami class frigate selected for SEA3000, although extremely capable, is a traditional non-modular warship design in which the mission systems are tightly coupled to the platform. Although it can operate a range of autonomous systems and is effective over the entire naval mission arc, it is only efficient over the combat arc, and at some point in its lifespan, it will require a highly expensive and technically risky midlife upgrade.
The Australians will likely be able to afford this and may do it sooner rather than later to replace systems of Japanese origin with those in service in the rest of the RAN fleet. Our ability to follow suit may be problematic, leaving us with a range of sustainment challenges should our ships become orphans.
I’ve covered the generic ins and outs of modular as opposed to traditional naval capability many times in this and other journals , and I won’t repeat them here. Suffice to say that a modular combatant concept offers flexibility across the mission spectrum, including combat, and allows new technology to be inserted by replacing modules as opposed to taking an entire ship out of service for two and a half years.
Critically, modularity is the best way to exploit above water, surface, and under water autonomy. Autonomy is now mainstream, not pie in the sky. There are definite grounds for making the exploitation of autonomy a central plank of the maritime fleet renewal strategy.
The next point on which I agree strongly with Graeme relates to the centrality of the Pacific in our defence capability planning. As Graeme points out it is indeed an increasingly contested theatre, and our force structure must be capable of countering increasingly
sophisticated threats to Pacific security.
To state the blindingly obvious, the Pacific is an oceanic space. But to paraphrase Sir Julian Corbett , navalists like me sometimes need to be reminded that people live on the land, not on the sea. Enabling land forces to project soft and hard power in the type of contingency that is now much more likely to arise than in the halcyon days when Helen Clark declared our geostrategic environment to be “ incredibly benign” requires that naval and land capabilities be seamlessly integrated as a matter of course.
I very strongly support Graeme’s recommendations about the types of land capability that should be deployable and sustainable by sea, and I fully agree that this must have a bearing on capability choices for maritime fleet renewal. In that context it is disappointing that DCP 25 makes such scant reference to sealift and force projection.
In making the above points about the integration of land and naval capability, I don’t downplay for an instant the indispensable contribution made by air and space capabilities to a Pacific centric strategy.
Success in modern warfare requires the best possible information concerning the areas
in which our forces are operating to enable our people to make better decisions more quickly than their opponents – creating a condition known as decision advantage. Air, space, and the supporting intelligence and information networking capabilities are essential to this. Graeme’s points about airlift, including the need for airlift to access short and unimproved runways, are also highly germane.
Graeme offers the Royal Navy’s Multi Role Strike Ship (MRSS) as an exemplar for possible naval capability direction. I agree, up to a point. The MRSS is shaping up to be a highly sophisticated, and thus highly expensive, capability. If it were to be the centrepiece of our fleet, we would need at least three to ensure the availability of one at high readiness for operations. The cost might therefore crowd out the other capabilities that the fleet needs to be fully effective across the spectrum, including the “right sized” capabilities that we need for engagement with our Pacific partners (on which more below).
In addition, the relationship with Australia is a cornerstone of our defence policy, as governments of every political stripe have made clear in policy statements for many years. This requires capability that is credible to and valued by
the Australians, who place a high premium on capability that allows sea control in the regions to the north of Australia.
Australian doctrine requires “maritime manoeuvre” capability to project land forces in that region, partly to support sea control with land based maritime weapons. MRSS could provide useful support to that concept. But the overriding requirement is for naval and air combat power, and even if heavily armed relative to other amphibious capability, MRSS does not score highly on that point. Modular surface combatants able to field sophisticated anti-submarine sensors, ant-ship missiles, naval helicopters, and a range of autonomous capabilities would score more highly – as would the SEA3000 frigate.
If we were to adopt an MRSS-like concept, there might be options that allow a greater focus on autonomy, including the modified San Giusto design offered by Italian company Fincantieri. In this design the flight deck runs the length of the ship like an aircraft carrier, providing a more flexible crewed and autonomous
aviation platform. In addition, the modified San Giusto design incorporates frigate type combat capabilities, including a medium calibre gun, an area air defence missile system, and advanced active electronically scanned phased array radar. These capabilities are highly synergistic with the land capabilities that Graeme advocates for integration with naval sealift. The floodable well dock that it has in common with MRSS can deploy boats and landing craft and towed array sonar.
All these capabilities are expensive (although cost could be reduced by scaling back capability) but a platform that combined meaningful combat and sealift capability would obviate the requirement to acquire separate platforms for each function – but would only be viable if at least three were acquired.
There are some significant challenges with the San Giusto, however. The main one is that in its present form, it is too small for our needs. Its flight deck can accommodate NH90/SH60R sized aircraft, but its hangar cannot. It is
technically possible to enlarge any ship design, but the costs of doing so should not be underestimated. It can, however, embark a company group sized army unit and its supporting equipment, in continuation of one of Graeme’s themes.
Another significant challenge is that the San Giusto is based around European platform and mission systems not in service with our closer partners. However, if we could build a satisfactory relationship with the Italian Navy, this would not be insoluble. On official visits to the Italian Ministry of Defence and the Fincantieri shipyard in 2018, I formed the conclusion that these are people we can definitely work with.
In the past I have discussed the importance of what I have described as “right sized” capability for Pacific engagement. In recent times the RNZN has provided two excellent examples of this.
The Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV) HMNZ Ships Taupo and Hawea have made extended deployments to Fiji, and a team deployed the Ocius Bluebottle autonomous surface vessel to Fiji for maritime surveillance
Over the course of nearly 15 years’ service at sea in the frigates of the RNZN including many deployments to the Pacific, some in Command, I formed a view that the visit of a large combatant serves to emphasise the difference between ourselves and Pacific nations, not just in capability, but in worldview. This address by the Prime Minister of Fiji to the Fijian Parliament may be germane.
The IPV and Bluebottle deployments, on the other hand, have been highly successful, in part perhaps because they have been sustained over long periods allowing RNZN people to form close friendships and working relationships with their Fijian counterparts. More importantly perhaps, our Pacific partners can see the relevance of capabilities on this scale to their security needs and are thus likely to be comfortable working alongside (and often aboard) them.
The Bluebottle capability is a natural fit for Pacific partnerships, but interdiction capability is also required, which means finding eventual replacements for the IPV.
A modular platform in the same size range as the IPV (55m LOA) would be ideal. It would be able to perform all current IPV missions while also offering flexibility for hydrography, expeditionary reconnaissance, diving support, mine countermeasures and possibly even low intensity combat.
In the latter role they could provide essential force protection to an MRSS or LPD on passage and in the littorals, while the larger ship carried payload modules enabling the IPV replacement to be re-purposed while deployed.
A modular IPV replacement opens up a range of opportunities for New Zealand and Australian defence and marine industry.
I was employed as a consultant by Austal Ltd in 2023/24, and I had considerable exposure to the depth of naval architecture, systems integration, and shipbuilding skill and capability that Australian government investment in local capacity has created. Austal is a world leader in multi-hull design and construction, mainly in the fast commercial and military transport sectors, but there is no doubt that
this could be translated into a highly effective modular small combatant of the type outlined above.
Austal shipyard capacity in the Philippines and Vietnam could be used, while a commercial ecosystem featuring systems integrators and Australian and New Zealand suppliers could design, build, and sustain these ships in service.
Our Asian partner navies have long standing requirements for large numbers of small combatants to ensure adequate presence in their maritime areas of interest. A small modular combatant could attract interest from these partners, creating export opportunities for the concept and design, allowing fabrication and testing in-country.
The thinking outlined by Graeme Doull in his article dovetails neatly with my own, notwithstanding differences in detail. A force structure along the lines outlined above, consisting of three MRSS/Enhanced San Giusto LPDs and four to five small modular combatants, could address the naval aspects of the capability needs he identifies. It would be great to know what others think...
Rob Mather, VP Aerospace & Defence at IFS explains how MRO organisations can utilise AI, digital technologies, and innovative workforce strategies to combat workforce challenges.
Today’s commercial and defence Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) organisations are facing mounting challenges—the double whammy of an ageing workforce and an insufficient pipeline of new skilled talent.
At the same time, MRO teams must keep ageing aircraft missionready despite ongoing supply chain challenges—while also gearing up to support a new generation of advanced engine platforms. It’s a perfect storm of operational complexity that calls for smarter, faster, and more adaptive solutions.
The commercial MRO industry’s workforce is ageing at a staggering rate. Workers approaching retirement age, between 55 and 60, make up 35% of the workforce , while those between 18 and 30 represent only a single-digit percentage. Reports estimate the industry will need 690,000 new technicians over the next 20 years .
The defence sector is facing a similar struggle, with 48% of defence employers stating they have a shortage in engineering skills and a quarter reporting a shortage in manufacturing and mechanical expertise. These challenges have been exacerbated by the recruitment of new technicians failing to match the rising demand for MRO.
Look at the bigger picture— it’s more than inadequate recruitment
A major catalyst for the current labour shortage was the pandemic, a time when many MROs faced financial difficulties and opted to furlough employees or offer older technicians early retirement. Throughout the pandemic, demand for commercial and defence MROs dropped, leading to many pausing their recruitment—which is a major contribution to the workforce age gap we see today.
The answer is not as simple as replacing experienced technicians with junior technicians. Experienced technicians come with legacy knowledge, enabling them to efficiently identify, troubleshoot, and solve problems. In comparison, junior technicians often lack this hands-on knowledge, leaving them reliant on manuals or the guidance of more experienced colleagues to complete tasks.
This type of legacy knowledge cannot simply be passed on; it requires years of experience and is typically hard-won firsthand or shared in realtime by seasoned technicians.
To add to the MROs’ mounting challenges, aircraft fleets are getting older, but they’re not ageing out. In 2023, it was estimated that one-third of the 30,000 commercial aircraft
in operation were over 20 years old During the pandemic, new aircraft orders and fleet renewal programs were put on hold to cut costs—and many organisations are still playing catch-up.
As a result, more airlines are still operating older aircraft or reintroducing retired aircraft which require more maintenance to keep them in operation as components age, decay, and fail.
It’s not as simple as out with the old and in with the new for MRO organisations
The commercial aviation industry is driven by efficiency and managing tight margins, but continuing to operate with older aircraft is having a serious impact. Consequently, many commercial airlines are seeking newer, more efficient aircraft. However, major aircraft manufacturers’ failures to meet demand have slowed or prevented this fleet renewal.
Boeing has faced a host of challenges from supply chain disruptions, testing phase failures, in-flight issues, and workforce strikes. In January 2024, the FAA temporarily grounded all 737-9 MAX aircraft and forced Boeing to halt production of the 737 MAX, after a blowout of a 737-9 MAX door plug during a flight .
As a result, many airlines pivoted to the Airbus A320 family aircraft, but they have had their own supply chain issues for aircraft components This left a significant gap in new aircraft supply, and with demand rising, airlines had to keep operating older aircraft.
Bringing aircraft out of retirement and storage increases demand for MRO technicians while awaiting the new, less maintenanceintensive aircraft deliveries. Older aircraft also heighten safety risk as technicians are under pressure to deal with the associated increased workloads as new protocols put strain on existing systems.
The commercial aviation and defence sectors are both experiencing a shift in engine types, with the 737-MAX and the A320neo rising in popularity for commercial aircraft and the F-35 rising in deployment by military forces, including Poland and Canada . Although new engine platforms are more efficient and being new, they shouldn’t be more maintenanceintensive from the jump.
However, MRO organisations have encountered challenges with the new engine types, such as the 737-MAX engine’s load-reduction mechanism fault , causing harmful
smoke to enter the aircraft, or the issues with counterfeit titanium being used in both Boeing and Airbus aircraft. As a result, MROs have had to carry out maintenance on the new engine right away to solve these issues.
New airframes and engines come with new training practices and certifications for technicians. MRO organisations need to proactively manage the training of their workforce for the new platforms and balance this with matching their demand to carry out work on legacy platforms. While building new capabilities isn’t anything new for these organisations, the sheer amount of change at once and the capacity required, piled on top of the other pressures, makes it a genuine challenge.
put its house in order
To combat the labour shortage and relieve pressure on their current workforce, MROs need to make being a maintenance technician cool to the younger generation, for many of whom, the current state of MRO makes for an undesirable career path.
The generation entering the workforce has grown up in the digital world we live in today— Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) are nothing unusual, and they have access to personal AI assistants right on their phones. They are looking for more than just old-school monetary incentives.
Whether it be improving working conditions, utilising modern technological tools and systems, increasing job awareness at much earlier ages, or making the working environment more favourable for more diverse employees—the industry can do more to increase the recruitment or retention rates of the emergent generation.
New digital tools for a new generation of MRO—the technologies are ready now
While MRO organisations need to be patient with recruiting the next generation of technicians, in the meantime, they must find ways to increase their maintenance capacity with fewer resources. The answer lies in implementing new technology to automate monotonous tasks, making technicians’ lives easier and reducing the chances of mistakes. This will also help make the job more appealing to a younger workforce with native digital skills and new or different priorities.
Ultimately, there are two different groups of digital technology solutions MROs can employ. AIbased solutions can help with monotonous tasks such as procedure research and data entry with the support of an AI Copilot, but also provide optimised task scheduling, planning, and assignment.
Meanwhile, non-AI technologies can improve other processes by increasing the use of mobile devices, improving engineer support with AR-supported video calling, enhancing precision and speed with embedded measurement tools, and making supply chains more efficient with e-paper labelling.
There are five main areas these digital solutions will help MROs reduce technician workloads, and safety risks, and meet increasing demands:
1. Increase technicians’ handson metal time with aviationspecific mobile devices: Traditionally, in the MRO industry, job cards and manuals are on paper, but arming technicians with mobile devices with aviation-specific language models can allow technicians to access these references digitally, request materials from the warehouse, and get solution
suggestions. The results are that the technicians never have to leave the aircraft—and the life of a maintenance technician starts to look a lot cooler.
2. Context-switching gives technicians the freedom to be more efficient : By having digital job cards on a mobile device, technicians can pause work and start new tasks proactively, while waiting for parts or materials, keeping them fully productive.
3. Embedded tech equals big efficiency wins: Whether it’s an experienced technician needing to take a live measurement with lidar or an inexperienced technician initiating an augmented reality call with a supporting senior technician— mobile devices enable it all.
4. AI-optimised maintenance: AI tools can analyse data in two different areas of MRO operations. Task sequence optimisation can analyse data to ensure tasks within a given work package are scheduled optimally, while task assignment optimisation uses AI-driven optimisation engines to optimise the assignment of tasks across all available technicians based on
skillset, experience, availability, and even physical location.
5. Answering questions, locating procedures, and troubleshooting : AI can do it all, and more: Early use cases of AI Copilot ensure technicians aren’t wasting time painstakingly searching through manuals and documentation. In more advanced cases of AI Agents, the agent can use Natural Language Processing (NLP) to match previously recorded faults or troubleshooting manuals and make proactive suggestions to the technician.
The labour challenges facing commercial and defence MROs are mounting, but the industry can turn the tide by employing new digital tools and processes. These new tools, optimised and driven by AI, will tackle these challenges head-on. These tools in the hands of today’s technicians will ease the pressure of their job, attract the recruitment of new workers, while ensuring the aircraft they work on spend less time in the hangar and more time in the air.
A tri-service NZDF team of drone pilots recently competed in the UK alongside 13 other militaries at the Military International Drone Racing Tournament (MIDRT).
The tournament, which got underway on 16 September at the Royal Military Academy in Sandhurst, is the premier first-person view (FPV) drone racing activity for militaries around the world. This year is the fifth and largest iteration of the event.
“Drone racing has existed for at least the last decade, but over the last three years in particular those skills have transferred directly to the battlefield,” said Major Richard Adams, the New Zealand Army’s lead on uncrewed systems.
During MIDRT UK 25, Teams compete in standard drone racing events involving laps around a course, with additional events focusing on aspects more directly relevant to the modern battlefield. These include a ‘find and strike’ challenge, with teams working in tandem to locate and strike a target on the ground with a drone, as well as a simulated bomb drop challenge, with pilots dropping an item from a drone onto a target.
Sergeant Reuben Ellett, a Reserve Force soldier with the NZ Army’s Signals Corps, captained the five-person NZ Army-sponsored team, and has participated in drone racing since 2019.
“Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 we’ve seen FPV UAS become a significant combat capability, and a key technology in both offence and defence,” said Sergeant Ellett.
“Competing in military drone competitions offers huge value in testing our skills against military partners. It’s a bit like a shooting competition, where marksmanship and weapon-handling skills can be tested, and then those skills are directly transferrable to improving your combat effectiveness. In trying to operate a drone faster, more accurately and with more skill, we are building the fundamental skills required to operate weapon systems of the future.”
FPV drones and other unmanned technology have developed rapidly in recent years, and the NZDF continues to evolve and advance its unmanned capabilities in line with our ally and key partner militaries.
The NZ Army is also working alongside New Zealand-based companies to advance its organic UAS capabilities, most recently with an FPV drone course hosted at Burnham Military Camp, where personnel learned how to rapidly build and operate small drones.
“We’re seeing FPV drones contribute a vital effect within combat systems the world over – not only do they increase possible strike options on the battlefield, but they enhance soldier survivability and lethality,” said Major Adams.
The NZDF continues to explore various drones and is working alongside the Ministry of Defence to strengthen its UAS capability in terms of scale and types of system.
“It’s also worth recognising that drones are not the answer to modern conflict in and of itself – there is still a strong requirement for modern and traditional capabilities to operate as an integrated combat system, and that’s where we see the huge value and potential in where this technology is going,” said Major Adams.
The government has been signaling that by the early 2030s, defence expenditure will be at 2% of GDP. This can only signify an increased naval fleet, writes senior contributor Dr Wayne Mapp.
Senior Contributor Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
The Minister of Defence, Judith Collins has spent much of early September on an official trip to Europe. The trip included a special visit to Ukraine. Minister Collins, with her extensive social media coverage, has been very clear in the importance that she places on bolstering New Zealand’s defence and intelligence relationships. Her meetings included the Ministerial meeting in London of the Five Eyes partners. The Five Eyes relationship is becoming increasingly important, with much greater focus on the Ministerial meetings, which have become more prominent in recent years. Five Eyes has graduated from being a relationship almost exclusively between intelligence agencies to a much broader security relationship with active high level political direction.
The five nations do not coordinate their political responses on all major issues. In fact, they are often quite divergent, as illustrated by their different responses to the crisis in Gaza. But there is an underlying sense that the Five Eyes are a steadfast bloc with shared values and purpose. That on fundamental issues, they will act in unity.
This has been most recently shown by their joint approach by the anti-piracy and freedom of navigation mission against the Houthis in Yemen. This follows on from the numerous joint actions by the Five Eyes nations ever since the events of September 11, 2001.
The Minister also signed a Joint Statement on enhanced defence cooperation with UK Secretary of Defence John Healey. This will reinforce traditional links and arguably also buttresses the AUKUS partnership.
The Minister’s visit has served to reinforce New Zealand’s commitment to the wider Western alliance, and especially the importance of the Five Eyes relationship. This relationship has become increasingly central in New Zealand’s overall defence and security relationships.
This focus on the importance of key defence and security relationships was recently illustrated by the recent announcement of the purchase of five Sikorsky Seahawk SH – 60R helicopters and two Airbus A321XLR aircraft for $2.7 billion. This was the first of many upcoming major capital equipment purchases.
Over the next five years the government will spend an extra $12 billion on the New Zealand Defence Force. The great bulk of this will be for major capital equipment.
The announcement of the Seahawk helicopters had been anticipated for quite some time. They are to replace the ex-Australian Kaman Seasprite helicopters. The Seasprite helicopters were always intended to be a stop gap measure.
As Minister of Defence, I initiated the purchase of the 11 Seasprite helicopters. The existing
five Seaprite helicopters were technologically outclassed, even though they had new airframes.
The Australian Seasprites had a far more advanced avionic set up. However, the Australians had rejected them because of concerns over their performance at the extreme edge of the flight envelope. The New Zealand review team considered these concerns were not warranted.
The deal being offered by Kaman was less than 10% of the price of new helicopters, including a comprehensive spares package. With 11 airframes, it would be possible to have five operational machines for many years into the future. Back in 2021, we thought that might be ten years.
As it has turned out, the exAustralian Seasprite helicopters will be in service for 15 years. They have ensured that New Zealand has combat capable helicopters that are an essential part of the operational capabilities of the ANZAC frigates.
The new Seahawk helicopters are the precursor to replacing the existing ANZAC frigates with new frigates. A lesser type of naval vessel, such as a patrol vessel, would not have such sophisticated helicopters. The government has sent a clear signal, to the NZDF, to the wider New Zealand public, and to our defence partners, that New Zealand
will have combat capable naval ships well into the future.
It is a decision that must have been made after close consultation with Australia, who already operate the Seahawk on their ANZAC frigates and air warfare destroyers. Their helicopters will be carried over onto the new Japanese designed frigates that Australia has chosen.
There has been some questioning of the price of $2 billion for five helicopters. Not all details of the purchase have been released. However, it is clear that New Zealand is buying much more than five airframes. There is a whole spares, maintenance, and training package, including simulators. There is also a complete weapons package. The details of these packages, including their timeframe, is not yet public.
There is also a question as to whether five machines will be enough. This entirely depends on the future naval fleet replacement programme. More ships, especially combat ships, means more helicopters. It will be relatively easy to add extra machines if that is required. In that case the additional cost would largely be the airframe cost.
In previous articles, I have highlighted how the test of New Zealand’ s commitment to upgrading the NZDF will largely rest on whether New Zealand buys
more than two frigates to replace the ANZAC ships. A one-to-one replacement would not be seen as stepping up. Not when the current Australian naval programme will double the number of combat capable ships compared to the existing fleet.
The Government has been progressively signaling, including with statements by Prime Minister Luxon, that they intend to make that step. That by the early 2030s, defence expenditure will be at 2% of GDP. That can only signify an increased naval fleet.
It is unlikely any decisions that would confirm this commitment will be made prior to the 2026 election. The leading party of the Opposition, the Labour Party, has indicated that the NZDF needs to be modernised but has not expressed any commitment to a 2% goal. Their likely coalition partners, the Green Party and Te Pati Maori, are actively opposed to such an increase.
Defence is unlikely to be a central issue in the next election. However, the existing spending commitments, much less any increase, will bear upon the nature of the political promises that the parties on each side of politics can make.
The Government parties will be effectively bound by the forecasts arising from the 2026 Budget. These will also affect the Opposition, at least to the extent that they involve binding purchase contracts. Beyond that, the Opposition has more freedom. The Labour Party, would be expected to release a budgetary programme for the next three years that is capable of implementation. That will inevitably have to say something about the direction of defence spending.
Thus, while defence will not be to the fore in the election campaign, it will have some significance. Money spent on defence is money that can’t be spent elsewhere. At least to this extent, defence expenditure will play a role in next year’s election.
A team of New Zealand Army engineers and support staff has arrived on the small island of Ma’uke in the Cook Islands to conduct crucial infrastructure upgrades.
A Royal New Zealand Air Force C-130J Hercules delivered the main body of personnel from 25 Engineer Support Squadron, 2 Engineer Regiment (2ER) on Monday, 22 September.
Exercise Tropic Twilight is a longrunning annual exercise in various South West Pacific countries. It is funded by New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and delivered by the New Zealand Defence Force.
This year, more than 30 personnel will carry out maintenance and improvements on Ma’uke’s solar farm, water infrastructure, school and halls.
Serving tradespeople from Australia, Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu will contribute to the work, and they will be backed up by medical and logistics teams.
Troop Commander Lieutenant Jarrod Wilson said the key tasks were
repairs and upgrades to the island’s solar-powered water bores, the solar farm and work on Apii Ma’uke - the only school on the island.
“The water and power improvements will be quite farreaching but even the smaller tasks, such as at the school, will mean things like the students won’t have to walk in the rain to go between classes,” Lieutenant Wilson said.
Tropic Twilight is a good opportunity to get offshore and for the military tradespeople to practice their craft in an expeditionary environment, he said.
“2ER has a long history of this sort of work. Already this year our personnel have deployed around the Pacific, to places such as Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga.
“We are confident that we can get everything done, we’ve got some pretty skilled people here,” he said.
Mau’ke Mayor Joanne Rongoape Stephens said she was delighted Tropic Twilight was able to help maintain the island’s assets. Ma’uke’s water supply, which is sourced from an aquifer and reticulated to users, is very important to the island.
“Our water is pure and we want to maintain that to make sure it keeps going for the next generation,” she said.
She was also thrilled to have so many more people on the island and said it brought back memories.
“The last time I saw the Hercules was in 1985. Seeing it again is amazing. This is a joyful time.”
The solar plant, which started in 2019, will have air conditioning units installed in the battery room to help stop inverters from overheating, allowing its batteries to operate efficiently.
A New Zealand Defence Force C-130J Hercules and two NH90 helicopters have delivered equipment, medical gear and clothing to remote areas of Papua New Guinea.
The flights took place over two weeks, while the nation was celebrating its 50th anniversary of independence.
Among No. 40 Squadron’s C-130J deliveries were first aid equipment, clothing and books.
The squadron’s liaison officer for the C-130J, Flight Lieutenant Mick Wansink, said the PNG deployment wasn’t one they had the opportunity to do very often.
“It’s great being able to fly around these islands for the crew. The flying has provided plenty of challenges manoeuvring into smaller airfields that are not used as often by aircraft of this size.
“Operating in new environments adds elements that we don’t typically have to deal with back in New Zealand,” Flight Lieutenant Wansink said.
The NH90s travelled to small remote areas throughout the country where fixed-wing aircraft are unable to land.
They delivered about 2,000kg of mosquito nets to the rural population. Scholastica Rim, from Rotarians Against Malaria, joined one of the flights to a remote village in the country’s highlands.
“Being able to deliver the mosquito nets is going to reduce malaria and protect the local populations,” she said.
“The regions are so remote that the only means to bring the nets in is by aircraft, so that’s what we are doing. That’s awesome.”
The NH90s also moved an 800kg mini-excavator to workers in
remote farmland in the Kiru village to Keapara in Rigo District Central. The equipment needed to be moved 4km and across a lagoon if the NH90 had not been available.
No. 3 Squadron Flight
Commander, Flight Lieutenant Paul Robinson, said it was rewarding to be able to help communities that wouldn’t be able to achieve the tasks without their support and capability.
The heat, reaching around 30°C each day was a challenge for the air and ground crews, he said.
“The heat affects both the aircraft and the personnel – we need to make sure the helicopters have the power required to do what’s needed, as well as the crews looking after themselves.
“During the deployment the ground crews have been putting in
long hours in the hot temperatures and it’s hats off to what they have been able to put out for us,” Flight Lieutenant Robinson said.
An RNZAF Boeing 757 also flew military bands from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu to PNG to take part in a military tattoo as part of independence celebrations.
Air Component Commander
Air Commodore Andy Scott said supporting New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours was an important role for the RNZAF.
“It’s an honour to be here to help celebrate PNG’s important milestone and to be able to successfully deliver the support out to the provinces is a credit to the whole deployed team,” Air Commodore Scott said.
Joining BRICS would be a pragmatic way for Wellington to prepare for a future in which Asia and the Indo-Pacific will only become more powerful, writes Chris Ogden, Associate Professor in Global Studies, University of Auckland.
With the old global order in a heightened state of flux, driven by US President Donald Trump’s attacks on free trade, international organisations and human rights , small states like New Zealand are having to adjust their foreign policies and hedge their bets.
As long-term economic and diplomatic power shifts towards Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific , alternative multilateral groups are now growing in importance.
Foremost among these is the grouping known as BRICS , a maturing – and potentially dominant – centre of global economic power. Whether New Zealand would consider joining is still moot, but the forum already includes major nations vital to this country’s future.
Formed in September 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China (the original BRIC), it had its first annual summit in June 2009, with South Africa joining in December 2010 (thus becoming BRICS).
The core strategic logic of BRICS is based on consensus and solidarity, not coercion, and to gain member benefits via collective strength. As then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh put it in 2009, “We share the vision of inclusive growth and prosperity in the world [… and] we stand for a rule-based, stable and predictable global order.”
Having substantial economies, populations, landmasses and ambitions underpinned this shared goal of a multipolar world – which now seems to be emerging by a different route due to Trump’s isolationist “America first” policies.
Strength in numbers
In 2012, motivated by mutual concerns over food and energy security, terrorism and climate change, BRICS members signed the Delhi Declaration , stating, “We envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress [… and] strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance.”
In 2013, BRICS launched the New Development Bank , designed to progressively reform the world’s financial architecture after the global financial crisis of 2008.
Seeking to fund sustainable development and infrastructure projects in developing states, the bank now rivals older Western-based institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The rising significance of BRICS has been accelerated by its recent expansion. In 2024, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates all became members, as did Indonesia in 2025.
Argentina had also agreed to join in 2024 but then pulled out due to the election of its US-orientated populist president Javier Milei.
The expansion saw BRICS’ share of global GDP rise to 39% in 2023. Member states now account for 48.5% of the planet’s population and 36% of total global territory.
BRICS also accounts for around 72% of the world’s reserves of rare earth minerals, 43.6% of global oil production, 36% of natural gas production and 78.2% of coal production.
By such measures, BRICS is an economic and diplomatic powerhouse. In economic terms, it has been out-ranking the G7 countries (US, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada) since around 2019
An alternative, not a choice Diplomatically, BRICS members pledge to better synchronise their national policies by meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, IMF, World Bank and G20 summits.
Joining such a body provides an attractive way for countries to
enhance their trade and diplomatic bandwidth, as well as hedge against US-inspired instability.
Joining BRICS also comes with potential risks, of course. Any perception of traditional Western alliance systems being undercut could see aid and investment reduce . So far, however, Trump’s threat to impose an extra 10% trade tariff on any countries aligned with BRICS is yet to materialise.
But as economist Stephen Onyeiwu has written , with the exception of Russia and Iran, “Most of the countries and partners in BRICS are either allies of western countries or neutral on global issues. They are unlikely to support decisions or actions that are grossly inimical to western interests.”
Given the current geopolitical situation, New Zealand may well baulk at closer ties with Russia and Iran. But being inside the forum would also allow diplomatic opportunities to press other member states over their actions or policies.
In fact, New Zealand – along with many US allies – joined the Beijing-inspired Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank and signed a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2008. It didn’t suffer any adverse consequences.
New BRICS members can be invited or make a formal request to apply, which is then considered at the next BRICS annual summit. Or they can apply to be a partner country, which is akin to “observer” status.
This allows them to take part in special summits and foreign minister meetings, as well as contribute to official documents and policy statements. But they can’t host meetings or select new members and partners.
Most importantly, joining BRICS would not mean New Zealand needs to leave other multilateral institutions.
Rather, it would be a pragmatic way for Wellington to spread its diplomatic wings and prepare for a future in which Asia and the IndoPacific – already the world’s largest economic and military region – will only become more powerful.
This article was originally published in The Conversation on 11 September 2025.
We once knew it as the ‘Asia Pacific’ region, but since 2017 it’s become the ‘Indo-Pacific’ – a small name change with far-reaching implications, writes Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
New Zealand’s Defence Whitepaper 2016 characterised China as “an important strategic partner for New Zealand”. By the time Defence Assessment 2021 was released under Defence Minister Ron Mark, China was no longer a strategic partner but a ‘strategic competitor’.
The Defence Assessment noted a deteriorating strategic environment marked by increasing security threats and the key challenge of strategic competition, which it saw as “playing out globally, including in New Zealand’s immediate neighbourhood, with direct implications for New Zealand’s security and wellbeing.”
The document also marked the first adoption in a New Zealand defence assessment or policy statement of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’.
Previously, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 had mentioned Indo-Pacific in relation to the use of the term in Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Policy, and the promotion of ‘Indo-Pacific concepts’ by Japan, Australia, and the US, but it had not adopted it, preferring the conventional term ‘Asia-Pacific’.
Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific concept had been rapidly adopted by the Trump Administration and US partner political leaders following a state visit to the US by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June 2017. A Trump-Modi joint statement described their countries as “responsible stewards in the IndoPacific region”.
Since then, the term has featured prominently in US, Australian –and more recently New Zealand – defence and national security documents, It appeared 31 times in the 2021 Defence Assessment, including in this explanatory note:
The “Indo-Pacific”, which broadly encompasses the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is increasingly used in security contexts in preference to other concepts and terms, such as the “Asia Pacific”. Accordingly, we have used Indo-Pacific in this Assessment.
With that, the Asia Pacific region has been relegated to history.
The US 2017 National Security Strategy marks the moment in which the Asia Pacific region’s benign characterisation was replaced with the impending dread of a new IndoPacific reality.
“For decades, US policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China,” states the Strategy. Yet, it continues, “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour”.
The belief in China’s eventual liberalisation and the US’ policy of engagement towards China up until that point was famously referred to by John Mearsheimer as the “worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history”.
The 2017 identification of China by the first Trump administration as a threat and the formal adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept to US security policy changed the policy calculus.
An Indo-Pacific state of mind
Nicholas Ross Smith and Paul Bacon write that the Indo-Pacific should be thought of not as a region but rather as an attempt at multi-country ‘macrosecuritisation’ to frame China’s rise as an existential threat to the rules-based international order.
Securitisation is the idea that an issue can be reframed and presented by political leaders as an existential threat requiring the use of extraordinary means to deal with it. In the case of ‘Indo-Pacific’, they write, the concept “is firstly intended to frame China as a challenge, rival or enemy, and secondly to encourage like-minded states to feel that they need to join together to address this threat.”
According to Smith and Bacon, the decision by the US to adopt the Indo-Pacific concept and identify China as a strategic competitor had immediate real-world implications, not least the resurrection of the Quad, the formation of AUKUS in 2021, and the launch of the IndoPacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in 2022.
Unsurprisingly, it’s a term that Beijing views negatively and that many Chinese policy makers perceive as a US-led foreign policy instrument of neo-containment designed to
shape the security environment around China in its favour.
Politics trumps scholarship
Smith and Bacon note an observation made by V.N. Sahin that the creation of the Indo-Pacific is “a triumph of elite-level discourse over the factors that scholars have argued tend to shape regionalization”. A case of political motivations winning out over scholarly objectivity.
But it’s increasingly evident that the Indo-Pacific concept hasn’t just won out; it’s now taking over the scholarly landscape. In very quick time, it’s become entrenched in the nomenclature of academia and academic institutions.
A Google search for “IndoPacific Studies” returns an impressive array of results: Indo-Pacific institutes, research centres, and studies centres, a Palgrave series in Indo-Pacific Studies, a Handbook of Indo-Pacific Studies, a Journal of Indo-Pacific Studies, and degree programmes in Indo-Pacific Studies. Indo-Pacific Studies has fast become a growth industry.
At the same time, scholarship and analysis on China has become politicised, securitised. The loyalties of commentators not feverishly critical of Beijing are now questioned, while ‘hawkish’ think tanks curry favour with governments and funders.
The rise in Indo-Pacific Studies is being matched by a marked decline in China scholarship, with the number of students in US, Australian and New Zealand
universities pursuing Chinese studies plummeting.
“A recent study of the Australian Academy of the Humanities found only 17 people have graduated with Honours in Chinese studies between 2017 and 2021—including just one in 2021,” notes Elizabeth Buchanan
“It is doubtful that these dismal numbers are due to a lack of interest in the field, particularly given the broad range of career pathways such training offers—from private sector to government,” she writes. “More likely, this reflects the toxicity our national China debate portrays. If you aren’t critical (enough) of Beijing’s foreign policy, you are tarred ‘pro-China’. If you venture deeper to understand the drivers of Chinese strategy or consider the merits of it, you risk being branded an agent of the Chinese Communist Party.”
The number of students learning Mandarin at universities across New Zealand was just 255 in 2020, a 57 percent drop from 10 years previously. As of May 2024, at least one university, the Auckland University of Technology (AUT), had closed its Asian Studies and Chinese Studies programmes, with other universities also scaling back their programmes.
Domestic concerns in Australia and New Zealand over Chinese influence operations, the infiltration of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) United Front agents onto campuses, and the public shaming of university-hosted Confucius Institutes, have damaged the prestige of Chinese Studies Departments and undermined the position of sinologytrained scholars in national debate.
We’re losing the ability to understand China at a time when that ability is perhaps needed more than ever… and we’re replacing that ability with an Indo-Pacific inability to view China as anything other than a threat.
That’s the choice the US made in 2017, and it’s a choice we’ve joined them in making.
France’s National Strategic Review reveals that a focus on Europe and the Pacific is not mutually exclusive, writes Dr Eric Frécon, a visiting fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
According to the latest French National Strategic Review (NSR), high-intensity conflicts may be returning to Europe, hybrid warfare is increasing domestically, and countering new threats requires whole-of-nation approaches.
A sober assessment of France’s strategic environment, it follows the tone set in other recent pronouncements, including President Macron’s opening speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the 6th Pacific-France Summit, and the just updated France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Experts agree that this new edition, released two and a half years after the previous one, is more detailed, less ambiguous, and better organised with a clearer hierarchy of threats. Twice as large as the 2022 version, it reflects the goal of preparing for both a military attack in Europe and hybrid threats within France’s borders by 2030.
But this weightier document raises two sets of questions. Firstly, is this goal too ambitious? Is it realistic and aligned with current capabilities and future defence budgets? In a speech delivered on the eve of Bastille Day, President Macron confirmed an exceptional spending increase of €3.5 billion in 2026 and €3 billion in 2027 on top of the sum already allocated in the Military Programming Law 2024-2030 . Will
it ultimately materialise in the face of mounting social pressures? And will it be sufficient?
Secondly, beyond the “how much” and “when” questions, exactly “where” should it direct its focus? Does this NSR focus too heavily on Europe? Is there a risk of desensitisation or “mithridatisation” to the Russian threat? From a Pacific perspective, might this Eurocentricity be to the region’s possible detriment—especially in terms of lost diplomatic engagement and the provision of military assistance and equipment?
Having struggled with public finance during my law studies, I prefer to explore the second question, and particularly in relation to its implications for the Pacific side of the Indo-Pacific supra-region.
First, let’s reassure France’s potential partners that the NSR has been very clear on the convergence of security interlinkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, and that France’s concerns about Russia are indeed linked to Pacific challenges.
As Michael Field observes, shipping connections between the Cook Islands and pro-Russian fleets raise questions about the security of undersea cables, including those in Europe. The Cook Islands-flagged tanker Eagle S is suspected of having damaged the Estlink 2 electricity
subsea cable between Finland and Estonia last December. Additionally, many ships registered under Pacific Island Country (PIC) flags have stopped in Russia and could be involved in Russia’s oil trade despite sanctions. It is also possible that the passport business in countries like Vanuatu might be facilitating Russian movements.
In addition to Moscow, Azerbaijan is also active in the Blue Pacific, including in the spreading of disinformation in French territories, as detailed in the 2024 VIGINUM report.
More broadly, Russia and other revisionist powers appear to be testing European sovereignty and resilience, setting a precedent for similar actions in the Blue Pacific. This warrants vigilance.
This latest NSR should be read alongside the recently released French Indo-Pacific Strategy, which emphasises France’s strong interest in the region. France’s identity as a Pacific nation is evident through its three territories and Exclusive Economic Zones (about 6.9 million square kilometres, compared to Japan’s 4.47 million), its Pacific citizenry, and its two military bases, which host roughly 3,200 personnel. Within this region, Paris has stationed one two-star admiral in French Polynesia, a two-star army general in New Caledonia,
and, recently, a two-star air force general in Hawaii within the US INDOPACOM.
In relation to China, President Macron repeatedly states that “there is no confrontation”, and on this the NSR remains realistic rather than paranoid. It notes China’s “tougher stance”, stating that in “the region and beyond, China’s economic investment strategy has been accompanied by a desire to extend its political influence.”
The document also highlights the “increased use of hybrid strategies,” notably by China, across cyberspace, outer space, the deep seabed, and high seas. These pose potential threats to PIC security, as noted in PNG’s 2024-2029 Revised National Security Policy and Fiji’s 2025-2029 National Security Strategy
In short, while there is no confrontation, neither is there complacency. Freedom of navigation remains critical, as evidenced by frequent French patrols through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. And illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by Chinese fleets poses a threat to the Pacific Ocean.
In relation to criminal activities at sea, drug trafficking has become a major concern, with Pacific islands potentially serving as hubs en route to Australia and New Zealand. The former chief of the French armed
forces in New Caledonia (FANC) admitted that upon his appointment in Nouméa he saw drug trafficking as the main threat to the territory. Unsurprisingly, ‘organised crime’ is mentioned 16 times in the NSR.
In addition to China and transnational crime, climate change is another shared issue identified in the NSR, along with pandemic and food crisis risks, and other concerns like nuclear proliferation. As early as 2022, the French Ministry for the Armed Forces had already adopted a Climate & Defence Strategy “to engage the armed forces in adapting to climate change.” These indicate just how closely aligned security concerns are between Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) members and France.
Given apparent alignment between France and the PICs on security concerns and their shared disdain towards a return of spheres of influence, what next? Given the lack of immediate funding available, what opportunities does the review open up?
In answer to these questions, hope rests on the NSR’s Strategic Objective 7 (France as a reliable sovereignty partner and credible provider of security) and its appeal for “strengthening the operational implementation of our Indo-Pacific approach”.
This objective reflects President Macron’s call at the Shangri-La
Dialogue “for action for Europe and Asia to work together on a coalition of independents… a coalition of countries that will navigate the rough seas of trade and protect the global commons of nature and climate.” It also reflects the Indo-Pacific Strategy’s idea that France’s actions in the region are “built on large partnerships that it has developed with like-minded countries in the region… based on a shared vision of the issues and the solutions that need to be provided.”
There now exists a unique opportunity to take on these types of initiatives. The Europeans do not know where they stand in relation to transatlantic solidarity and the solidity of alliances with the US.
The Washingtonian ecosystem is divided into opposing communities of thought on US foreign policy, including those against China. Even areas of traditional US focus in the Indo-Pacific in general and in the region in particular, such as its commitments to the island states of the northern Pacific, are up for debate within the Trump decisionmaking system.
Meanwhile, and despite some past differences, France, New Zealand, the PICs, and Australia appear to share a range of similar interests.
Paris, for example, is certainly interested in how Wellington manages its relations with its nearby associated States (with the Cook Islands a potential model for New Caledonia – or possibly a counter-model depending on how its relationship with China evolves).
In Australia, the French defence industry, through such companies as Safran and Thales, remains active despite the abrupt termination of the Naval Group contract in 2021, and –unlike the USA and the United Kingdom – Australia is a signatory to the Paris AI (Artificial Intelligence) Action Summit statement.
In Fiji , it is little known that France is expanding its cooperation
to include capacity-building of defence personnel, donating surveillance drones , and appointing for the first time a Fijian officer to the French War College.
In Papua New Guinea , the Chief of the FANC met the Minister for Defence Billy Joseph in 2024 a year after Macron’s visit, and, in 2025, the French President discussed security issues with Prime Minister Marape on the sidelines of both the One Forest Summit and the UN Ocean Conference.
These interactions uncover a largely underestimated and fertile ground for promoting so-called ‘sovereignty partnerships’, as outlined in the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Pragmatism is key. France has much to learn from its Pacific partners.
“Supporting French and European sovereignty through academic, scientific and technological excellence” is a new strategic goal added to the 2022 NSR, which in several places discusses the threat posed by foreign influence. In relation to the challenges posed by influence operations, French political scientists could benefit from focusing on the region and its particularities.
Similarly, as France aims to “contribute to the moral rearmament of the nation to face crises” via a whole-of-nation approach, there
is considerable potential value in learning from the resilience strategies of PICs.
Paris could enhance these sovereignty partnerships by providing assistance or equipment in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and enabling autonomous data collection and sharing.
It could also extend logistical support to enable longer deployments, given the proximity of its Pacific territories to Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu.
In accordance with its 2022 Seabed Warfare Strategy, the French Navy could provide expertise in the deep sea, particularly in relation to the security of natural resources and undersea cables. Ultimately, France could present as a new option in the diplomatic spectrums of its partners.
In summary, focusing on Europe and the Pacific is not a mutually exclusive endeavour. The question is not if France will remain a major security provider in the Blue Pacific, but rather how. The upcoming update of the 2024-2030 Military Programming Law, especially in relation to the navy and, potentially, Pacific naval bases, will be instructive.
In that regard, the forthcoming discussions at the French National Assembly will be a decisive end-ofyear test.
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Dr Alberto Ardid talks to Nicholas Dynon about his research using AI and real-time data to predict wildfire potential, his journey from geophysics to fire prediction modelling, and the power of interdisciplinary approaches to emergency response.
Dr Alberto Ardid is a Lecturer in Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Canterbury.
Dr Alberto Ardid, a Lecturer in Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Canterbury (UC), is a geophysicist and environmental data scientist specialising in real-time, AI-driven forecasting models for natural hazards.
With a background in engineering science and geophysics, his research focuses on machine learning for early warning systems covering wildfires, floods, and volcanic eruptions.
Alberto has led award-winning work in wildfire forecasting, including developing sub-hourly models that integrate weather and human mobility data to support timely interventions. His contributions have been recognised with the New Zealand Geophysics Prize and the Allianz Climate Risk Award.
Alberto collaborates across academia, industry, and government to develop operational forecasting tools and promote resilient infrastructure. Alberto also leads Wildfire Intelligence Ltd., a company translating this research into practical systems for fire agencies.
ND : I understand that you’re presenting at the FireNZ Conference in Auckland in October. What will you be speaking on?
AA : The talk a will be about the future of technology in emergency response. It won’t just be about the research that I’m doing at the UC, but also a broad overview of where I believe technology for the emergency response sector is moving, and particularly for the fire sector.
I highlight how emergency technologies, like AI, remote sensing, and real time data streams, are transforming the way that we predict, prepare for, and respond to emergencies. I’ll also provide an idea of the broad trends in terms of how this technology might help to build more resilience emergency response systems in general.
ND : Artificial intelligence, or AI, is a buzzword. We hear about it a lot, and it means different things in different applications. Could give us an example of how AI driven technologies might be deployed in fire?
AA : Imagine a system that updates every 15 minutes, showing the likelihood of ignition and dangerous fire behaviour in a specific district. Crews could pre-position resources, shift patrols, or issue warnings hours earlier than with traditional daily indices.
That’s what I have been working on – developing a short-term wildfire forecasting system. Based on trials conducted in Australia using historical data recreating real conditions, these machine learning forecasts have been shown to outperform standard fire and danger metrics by up to 30-50% in their ability to anticipate wildfires. We have established that these kinds of models deliver clear benefits in terms of cost savings and reducing risk.
ND : What type of data points would such system be utilising?
AA : These models assimilate weather data that update every 30 minutes. They have been trained on historical data, but they are designed to update with changes that occur during the day (as opposed to daily), which is key, because fires react to weather transitions at various points during the day. These tools need to be
responsive to the changes that take place during the day and not just daily or weekly.
ND : How would that compare with what fire services currently have in terms of their ability to forecast?
AA : The tool that the fire agencies typically use is the fire danger index. They are typically updated daily and cover big regions.
What we are developing is something that reacts faster, such as hourly, and is also more localised. This enables personnel to make decisions, such as how to deploy their resources, based on locality-specific data. Beyond emergency response, this locality-specific data can also be valuable for other sectors, for instance, the forestry or agricultural industry looking to protect their assets from potential fires.
ND : That sounds like a real game changer.
AA: Hopefully. We are still developing the tools, but they’re showing some promising results in Australia. We are also working here in NZ with Scion and FENZ on how to narrow this research into the future and how to identify the big challenges in adopting these technologies. One of the things that I hope to do at the Fire NZ conference is to get ideas and talk with people that have more experience than me, and to understand which direction we should be pointing this research in.
ND : What led you to a to what you are doing now careerwise?
AA : In high school, I was interested in science generally. I was not strong at English and always better at physics. Later I studied geophysicist in Chile. Geophysics in Chile is mostly about earthquakes in Chile, because earthquakes are the big thing over there – massive earthquakes every couple of years.
I then moved to New Zealand to work on the geothermal industry as a PhD student, developing geophysics tools relating to geothermal energy. But four years ago, I moved to Canterbury to start a project developing forecasting models for volcano eruptions using machine learning and time series analysis. We developed forecasting models for volcano eruptions here in New Zealand, in the US, in Chile, and other places.
Around two years ago, I started developing AI driven tools for fire prediction, leveraging what I learned from volcanoes.
The two similarities that these natural hazards share are that all of them are infrequent events and are monitored through some kind of sensor that records some physical property as a time series over time. For example, with volcanoes, you typically place a seismic station near a volcano that records how the Earth’s surface vibrates close to volcano. This provides data that can help to explain what is happening inside the volcano.
In the case of fires, instead of seismic data, we have weather stations that monitor temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, and so on, and we have those records over long periods of time where we know that previous fires have occurred in the past. We train these statistical models to learn what the data typically looks like before these events, and then to look for those statistics in real time and convert that into a metric of likelihood for the near future.
ND : In terms of your professional journey, where did AI come into it? What led you down that track?
AA : As mentioned, I come from Geophysics. Geophysics is a lot about time series and developing mathematical models to analyse the time series of different sensors
that record earth data. I was always curious about how we might identify and use the data that we can’t intuitively see in the signals.
For example, as humans when we see a signal like a cardiogram or a seismogram or any type of signal that is being recorded over time, we can typically identify some trends, such as the mean, the standard deviation, maybe some idea of the spread, and maybe some linear tendencies, but that’s about it. But when we observe these kinds of really complex measurements, it’s obvious that there are things going on in the background that we are not capturing because we aren’t able to.
This is where machine learning and AI comes in – it helps us to identify patterns in all of the complexity and apparent randomness that we see in the signals.
Physics is really good at capturing trends – big picture, linear behaviours – while for non-linear behaviours, this is where AI and machine learning shine. In terms of forecasting, in the prelude to an event these dynamic, complex natural systems are just giving you big flows of complex information that looks a bit random, but with AIbased tools, you have the potential of extracting something from this apparent randomness that is useful. That’s why I got into machine learning.
Around two years ago, while working a post-doctorate in volcano eruption forecasting, I was watching a documentary with my wife about the about the Black Summer 2019-20 bushfires in Australia and she asked me, “is this something that you can apply your volcano stuff to?”. She was right, as always… At that second, I
realised that the kind of tools that we were developing for volcano erosion forecasting could also be used for this.
So, I started talking with some people at the university who put me in touch with some people in Australia. I got some data tested, and it proved to work better than the fire danger index. That’s how I got to wildfires, because my wife made the link.
One thing that I’m testing now is human mobility as a predictor of fires. Most of the work that I have developed so far is about using weather data as a predictor of wildfires. But actually, the human part is quite significant, because the ignition is typically caused, at least here in New Zealand, by people. We are now looking to collect traffic data and using human mobility as a proxy for how many people may
be out there hiking or doing other stuff in the wilderness and see if that can help to inform the forecasting models.
For example, let’s imagine that we have a bunch of weather stations around a national park that typically provide weather-related statistics that we can use for fire prediction purposes. What if we could also track, for example, how many people are accessing the park during the day? If we place a traffic sensor near the park that collects data that can be used as a proxy for how many people may be in the park, that may provide an additional layer of context.
All hazards share a key challenge: making sense of complex, fastchanging data to support rapid decisions. Volcanoes taught me about precursors and early warning, floods about physical constraints like mass
conservation, and wildfires about weather and human behaviour as a driver. Bringing these insights together has allowed me to design generalised forecasting frameworks that can transfer across hazards, and that’s exactly the kind of flexibility emergency services need.
ND : What are the key challenges with adopting these technologies?
AA : With this kind of technology, you need to build trust first, and for that the tools need to be transparent. They need to be explainable, so responders know why a forecast says what it does. You need to be able to understand how the model is making its decisions, so you can make your decisions.
There are also big challenges faced in getting access to data. Many regions don’t have dense networks of weather or hazard sensors, which limits performance. Additionally, a lot of entities own data for their own use. But ultimately, if we were able to combine the data it will just improve things for everyone.
Another big challenge is that of integrating these tools with operations. These new tools need to be able to fit into existing workflows and not create additional complexity. They need to be able to simplify things. And that’s a big challenge. These technologies are, in essence, pretty complex, but the outputs need to be interpretable and simple enough so as to avoid creating an extra layer of complexity for the people who are going to use it.
I’m hoping from the conference is to explore the challenges that I have observed in terms of the adoption of these kinds of technologies. So far I have seen excellent attitudes from the fire community in terms of adopting new tools. And with the right partnerships and collaboration, I believe we can overcome these barriers and make these tools truly operational.
Stronger penalties for low-level retail theft are being lauded as a positive step in the fight against crime, but this contradicts established evidence that harsher sentencing increases repeat offending, writes Nicholas Dynon.
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
“Public confidence in our justice system is undermined if people can steal with apparent impunity. It’s disheartening, and our government will not sit by while shoplifters rob businesses of their livelihoods,” said Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith in a 01 July announcement . “Currently, the administrative burden can deter retailers from making official complaints, and lower-level offending often goes unreported or unpunished,” he said. “Our government is restoring real consequences for crime, and shoplifting is no exception.”
The ‘real consequences’ have been wrapped up in a bundle of proposed changes that include:
• Introducing an infringement regime for shoplifting in retail premises. For stolen goods valued
up to $500, infringement fees will be up to $500. For goods valued over $500, fees will be up to $1,000.
• Strengthening the penalties for theft. The maximum penalties will be one year imprisonment (if the value is approximately $2,000 or less), or seven years imprisonment (if value is approximately more than $2,000).
• Creating a new aggravated theft offence for when the value of the goods is under $2,000 and the theft is carried out in a manner that is offensive, threatening, insulting, or disorderly.
“Harsher penalties could mean up to twice as long behind bars for aggravated theft, and criminals will be forced to think twice before
destroying more lives,” said Courts Minister Nicole McKee.
“Our government is focused on restoring law and order, reducing violent crime, and putting victims first in our justice system,” she said, thanking the Ministerial Advisory Group for Victims of Retail Crime and its Chair Sunny Kaushal for their shaping of the proposed changes.
According to peak retailer body Retail NZ, the new penalties are a positive step in the fight against retail crime.
“It’s great to see new measures being introduced that will broaden opportunities for shoplifting to have significant repercussions,” said Retail NZ Chief Executive Carolyn Young, who is also a member of the Ministerial Advisory Group on retail crime.
“Retailers are crying out for proactive solutions that prevent crime and enhance the safety of their staff and customers,” she said.
“Our members continue to face high rates of violence and crime, putting both their employees and the public at risk, as well as threatening the financial sustainability of retail businesses.”
According to the retailers’ group, retail crime is a significant issue, impacting more than 99% of New Zealand retailers and costing well over $2.6 billion a year.
Retail NZ’s COMS Retail Crime Report 2024 found that 73% of retailers experienced shoplifting during the year and 58% experienced threatening behaviour.
“Shoplifting is at epidemic levels and recidivist offenders are a big issue,” Ms Young said.
Established academic research suggests that harsher penalties are not a silver bullet. In fact, studies have roundly debunked the fallacy that harsher penalties dissuade people from committing crimes.
Research confirms that while
punitive approaches may address electoral pressures on governments to be seen to be tough on crime, they tend ironically to fuel recidivism.
Being ‘tough on crime’ contradicts evidence that prisons are a training ground for harder criminals, wrote University of Auckland masters graduate Bex Silver in an article in the lead-up to the 2023 national election.
“This long-standing punitive approach to crime withstands the plethora of evidence and research that disproves its effectiveness for reducing re-offending,” she wrote.
“On the contrary, criminal justice experts and statisticians have consistently said harsher sentencing increases recidivism.”
The ‘we need to get tough on crime’ narrative that dominated the agendas of political parties ahead of the 2023 election, she wrote, promised “victims a false sense of safety which contradicts the comprehensive and compelling evidence that prisons are a training ground for harder criminals.”
According to Silver, it’s a narrative that’s “driven by opportunistic politicians wanting an easy vote; politicians who claim to know better than the experts in this field.”
It’s a point with which University of New South Wales Emeritus Professor of Law David Brown concurs.
“Deterrence is very largely an article of faith,” he wrote in a 2020 article . “I call it sentencing’s dirty secret because it’s just assumed that there is deterrence … but what the research shows is that the system has little to no deterrent effect.”
Deterrence theories in criminology are based on the idea that attempts to deter crime rely on an increase in either the severity of penalties or the certainty of their imposition”.
According to Professor Brown, harsher punishments, such as longer prison sentences, not only do not prevent crime but may actually have the opposite effect.
“What research is increasingly showing is that imprisonment itself and punishment more generally is actually criminogenic – it makes it more likely that people are going to re-offend,” he said.
“The severity of punishment, known as marginal deterrence, has no real deterrent effect, or the effect of reducing recidivism.”
Even the US Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice has published public guidance explaining that increasing the severity of punishment does little to deter crime .
“Some policymakers and practitioners believe that increasing the severity of the prison experience enhances the “chastening” effect, thereby making individuals convicted of an offense less likely to commit crimes in the future,” states the National Institute of Justice. “In fact, scientists have found no evidence for the chastening effect.”
“Research has found evidence that prison can exacerbate, not reduce, recidivism.”
Risk is typically calculated as a function of likelihood and consequence (Risk = Likelihood x Consequence), where likelihood is the probability of an event occuring and consequence is the impact of the occurrence.
In the context of an individual perpetrating a theft, we can think of the risk borne by the individual as the likelihood of failure (e.g. walking away with nothing, or walking away in handcuffs) multiplied by the potential consequences of failure (e.g. penalties such as a criminal record or custodial sentence).
So, if tougher penalties (increased consequences) don’t provide a disincentive to offend, what about increased likelihood of failure?
As it turns out, an increased likelihood of apprehension is indeed something that thieves factor into their decision making. According to UNSW’s Professor Brown, “if people think they’re more likely to be caught, that will certainly operate to some extent as a deterrent.”
US National Institute of Justice research agrees that “the chance of being caught is a vastly more effective deterrent than even draconian punishment.”
Informing the USNIJ’s research is a study by criminology professor Daniel Nagin that found that the inefficacy of legal consequence as a deterrent “has important policy implications among which are that lengthy prison sentences and mandatory minimum sentencing cannot be justified on deterrence.”
In a study of shoplifters , US academics Frances Weaver and John Carroll found that seasoned shoplifters are deterred less by potential consequences such as arrest, trial, fines, and jail, and more
by ‘strategy-specific problems’ such as “item size, security devices, and the chance of being observed.”
Additionally, they found that seasoned thieves tend to perceive a relatively low risk of failure due to their confidence in being able to thwart the security measures put in place by store owners.
According to Weaver and Carrol, expert shoplifters perceive the risks of being detected and caught as under their own control because they can rely on their expertise to avoid detection, ie. their expertise enables them to shoplift with a high degree of confidence of success.
Indeed, apart from the perpetrator’s skill and experience in the planning and execution of an act, the two key factors influencing their likelihood of failure (in no particular order) are (i) police response; and (ii) the efficacy of any security measures put in place by the store owner.
If a perpetrator considers the likelihood of failure in relation to a potential job to be high (due to strong and visible security measures, fast police response times, etc) then they might scratch it and consider an alternative plan. If the likelihood of failure is low, then it may be game on – even if the potential consequences are significant.
In short, strong in-store security measures and certainty of timely law enforcement response are more likely than severity of punishment to dissuade an individual from perpetrating theft at a store.
Reducing the incidence of theft in society more generally is a broader question and one that involves a range of economic and social factors. Addressing these factors – rather than adding to them by increasing the country’s prison population – is where government policy has the potential to make a positive impact on retail crime.
But that’s difficult policy, and it doesn’t make headlines.
Three innovative trans-Tasman space projects designed to enhance maritime awareness, improve agricultural planning and secure satellite communications have secured up to $5.3 million in funding.
“I am delighted to announce secondstage funding for three innovative, collaborative projects, all of which demonstrated clear plans for realworld impact in earlier feasibility studies,” Space Minister Judith Collins announced on 28 September.
“By building advanced space capabilities, creating new commercial opportunities and strengthening international competitiveness, these projects will boost our economies, bring New Zealand and Australia closer together and advance the Space and Advanced Aviation Strategy goal of accelerating aerospace innovation,” she said.
According to Science, Innovation and Technology Minister Dr Shane Reti, the projects showcase the collaborative drive and commercial focus the Government is fostering through major reforms to New Zealand’s science and innovation system.
“These projects exemplify the spirit of collaboration and innovation that drives our science sector forward. By pooling expertise and resources with our Australian partners, we’re not only tackling shared challenges but also opening new opportunities for growth and technological advancement,” he said.
Funded through the Catalyst Fund, which fosters international science and innovation partnerships for New Zealand’s benefit, the three projects focus on maritime monitoring, smart farming, and high-speed satellite communications,
and are designed to build local capability, support economic development, and protect national interests.
The projects are:
• Monitoring the Southern IndoPacific from Space – The Takehē Mission: Led by Restore Lab Ltd (NZ) and SmartSat CRC (Australia), this satellite mission will deliver advanced maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific.
• Satellite Sensing in Agricultural Practices: Led by the University of Canterbury (NZ) and the University of Newcastle (Australia), this global satellitebased soil moisture monitoring system aims to boost water efficiency and drought resilience for farmers.
• Governance and Management of a Network of Free-Space Optical Communication Nodes: Led by the University of Auckland (NZ) and the University of South
Australia (Australia), this project seeks to establish a trans-Tasman optical communications network for high-speed satellite data transfer.
“These projects harness the strengths of our researchers to build capability, support our economy and protect our national interests. Congratulations to all three teams, I look forward to watching your progress,” Ms Collins said.
The trans-Tasman projects are the result of a January 2024 agreement between the New Zealand Space Agency and Australia’s SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre (SmartSat CRC) to collaborate on research projects that advance space science, leading to real world benefits.
New Zealand’s investment is matched by support from Australia.
In 2024, New Zealand’s space sector supported 17,000 jobs and generated an estimated $2.68 billion in revenue. This partnership aims to grow that impact even further.
The qualification develops and advances critical research, critical thinking and writing, analytical best practice as well as exploring relevant twentieth and twenty-first century intelligence operations. It is aimed at those wishing to develop advanced critical skills in relation to their existing or prospective intelligence sector careers in New Zealand.
Graduates of this year long programme will possess an advanced knowledge of intelligence analysis processes, be grounded in relevant previous operational intelligence experiences and have a critical understanding of the ethical and professional issues involved.
The programme of study consists of two 30-credit courses:
Semester ONE, 294741: Intelligence in the International Security Environment
A critical examination of intelligence theory and practice, focusing on key concepts and methodologies of intelligence collection and analysis, analytical tools, frameworks and concepts applied to investigations and operations in the contemporary international security environment.
Course Controller:
Dr Rhys Ball, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Auckland)
A comprehensive grounding in the operational intelligence environment in the second half of the 20th century, into the 21st century. Participants will consider the development of intelligence practices both in New Zealand and around the world, from the evolution of intelligence contributions from the end of World War Two, to the intelligence challenges of the 2020s. Intelligence operations are critically reviewed, including intelligence success and failure, espionage against friends and allies, and policing and private intelligence formats.
Course Controller:
Dr John Battersby, Senior Fellow, Centre for Defence and Security Studies (Wellington)
To enroll in this qualification, students must have been awarded or qualified for a relevant Bachelor's degree, or be able to demonstrate scholarly work in conjunction with extensive relevant professional experience for Admission with Equivalent Status.
For further information, please contact John: j.m.battersby@massey.ac.nz, or Rhys: r.ball@massey.ac.nz.
