SocialScienceHistory (2023), 47,11–39
doi:10.1017/ssh.2022.30
PoliticalCentralization,Federalism,and Urbanization:EvidencefromAustralia
GeorgeWilkinsonIII1*,FionaHaslamMcKenzie2 ,JulianBolleter1 andPaulaHooper1
1TheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre,UniversityofWesternAustralia,Perth,WA,Australiaand 2CentreforRegionalDevelopment,UniversityofWesternAustralia,Perth,WA,Australia
*Correspondingauthor:Email: George.WilkinsonIII@research.uwa.edu.au
(Received4April2021;revised1December2021;accepted7February2022)
Abstract
Thedominanceofcapitalcities(urbanprimacy)isanenduringcharacteristicofAustralian states.Therehasbeenlimitedempiricalresearchexaminingthedriversofprimacyinstates despitesomebeingextremeexamplesofthephenomenon,bothinmagnitudeandscale.In lightofinstitutionaltheoriesofsettlementpatterns,wedevelopedaprofileofAustralian urbanizationusingacenturyoftime-seriesdata,descriptivestatistics,andanempirical modelofcitypopulations.InAustralianstateshighmeasuresofprimacyhaveendured withlittleevidenceofdisruptiondespitetheenormoussizeofthesestates,theirwealth, andpopulationgrowth – factorsassociatedwithdecliningandlowprimacy. Statistically,statecapitalcitystatushasasignificanteffectoncitypopulationsizevariation, withresultssuggestingprimacyinstatesisinpartaproductofAustralianfederalism.This contrastswithviewsthatsuggestAustralia’sscarcityoflargenon-capitalcitiesisdueto isolation,lowpopulation,andenvironmentaldeterminism.Thefindingsinthispaperhave majorimplicationsrelativetonationaland/orstatestrategiesthataimtodecentralizepopulationawayfromtheprimatecities.
Keywords: urbanprimacy;cities;urbanization;Australia;federalism
Introduction
Inthespringof2016, SocialScienceHistory featuredacomparativeanalysisof CanadianandAmericanurbanization(KimandLaw 2016)towhichwerespond withasimilarlydesignedstudyofAustralia.Groundedininstitutionaleconomics, KimandLaw’sstudyjoinedanemergentliteraturewhichposesthatinstitutions sculpteconomicgeographythroughtheircontrolofresourceallocation(Samuels 1995;Acemogluetal. 2001).Contrarytoneoclassicaleconomics,wheremarkets aresingulardriversoftheeconomy,institutionaleconomicsemphasize “therules ofthegame” (North 1990:3),thefoundational,formalandinformalconstraintson
©TheAuthor(s),2023.PublishedbyCambridgeUniversityPressonbehalfofSocialScienceHistoryAssociation.
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capitalaccumulationwhichconditionhoweconomicforcesinfluencedevelopment (Glaeseretal. 2004;Acemogluetal. 2005;Huggins 2016).
Relativetoeconomicgeography,institutionalperspectiveshavebeenintegralto developingtheoriesofsettlementpatterns.Urbanprimacy,asettlementpattern definedbyonedominantcityandanabsenceofsecondcities(Jefferson 1939),is associatedwiththecapitalsofcentralizedpolitieswheresubnationaland/orlocal governmentisweak,implyingcentralizeddevelopmentisconcomitantwithcentralizedpower(KimandLaw 2016:121).Innearlyallcasesofprimacytheprimatecity isapoliticalcapital(ShortandPinet-Peralta 2009),aconstantsuggestingpolitical institutionsreinforceprimacyregardlessofwhetherornotfurtheragglomerationin theprimatecityisoptimal(Henderson 2003;Anthony 2014).Conversely,decentralizedeconomicgeographyiscommonoffederationscomprisedofstrongsubnationalgovernments(AdesandGlaeser 1995;ArocaandAtienza 2016).
KimandLaw’s(2016)comparativeanalysisfollowedstudiesofurbanization whichlinkedthebalanceofpowerbetweenacountry’stiersofgovernmentwith variationsinprimacy(KimandLaw 2012).IntheAmericas,KimandLaw (2012)measurednationalcapitalcitypopulationmagnetismtobestrongestwhere sub-nationalgovernmentisweak,weakestwheresub-nationalgovernmentis strong.CanadaandtheUnitedStatesstoodapartfortheirstrongsubnationalpolitieswithinfederalsystems,decentralizednational1 settlementpatterns,andtheexistenceoflargenon-capital2 cities.KimandLaw(2012, 2016)attributedthesefeatures toBritishcolonizationandlocalisminthesamewaytheyandothershaveattributed centralizedSpanishcolonialinstitutionsandweaklocalismtourbanprimacy throughoutLatinAmerica(ArocaandAtienza 2016).BetweenCanadaandthe UnitedStates,KimandLaw(2016)measuredstrongercapitalcityeffectinprovinces,attributingthistoprovinces ’ widerrangeofownsourcerevenues(OSRs) whilstoverseeingrelativelyweakerlocalgovernments.Canadianlocalgovernments aremorereliantupon,andhavelittlebasistooppose,well-resourcedandhands-on provinceswhereasUSlocalgovernmentsareusuallyaffordedbroaderautonomy, rights,andrevenuechannels(KimandLaw 2016).Thus,stronglocalgovernments possesstheautonomytodevelopregardlessofhowtheirpotentialisperceivedinthe capital.Meanwhile,weaklocalgovernmentrendersdevelopmentbeholdentoand bottleneckedinhighertiers.KimandLaw(2016:123)describedtheirresultsas “highlysuggestiveofacausalrelationship ” betweenthepowerconferredbycapital citystatusandpopulationbecauseCanadianandAmericancapitalswereusually “chosenforpoliticalreasonspriorto industrialization. ”
Inthisstudy,weaskhowtheabovetheoreticalperspectiveandappliedmethods informanunderstandingofurbanizationinAustralia,asimilarlywealthy,large, decentralizedfederationalsoofBritishcolonialorigin.Thisapproachisparticularly salientinAustraliawherebeneatharemarkablyevennationalurbanhierarchy, statesexhibitprimacyintheircapitals(ShortandPinet-Peralta 2009).Therehas beenconjectureaboutthecausesofprimacyinAustralianstateswhichevoke
1Alsonumeroussubnationalcases(e.g.,Alberta,Saskatchewan,Texas,Florida,Pennsylvania,North Carolina,etc.)
2Neithernationalorsubnational(state/province)capitals(e.g.,LosAngeles,Chicago,Dallas,Houston, Miami,Montreal,Vancouver,Calgaryetc.)
theoriesofenvironmentaldeterminism(Rowland 1977)andfirst-moveradvantages (Neutze 1977)giventhepresentdaystatecapitalswereamongstthefewoasescited bythe18th and19th centurycolonistsandservedaslogicalhubsinachallenging wilderness(Statham 1990).Still,thecapitals’ disproportionatesuccessledBird (1965)andStatham(1990)toaskifthefoundershadremarkableforesight,choosing theonlypocketsofthecontinentcapableofholdingmillionsdespitehavinglittle experienceofAustralia.
IntheAmericas,empiricalmodelingenabledstudiestoquantifythepopulation magnetismoflocationspecificinstitutional,natural,andeconomicfactors,providingstatisticalinsightsaboutthedriversofcitypopulations.ToexamineAustralia, weemployanempiricalmodelofpopulationsimilarlycentereduponthe “rulesof thegame,” fundamentalconditionsthatmayimpartcompetitiveadvantageswhich varyinspaceandtimeacrossthecontinent.Thecentralresearchquestionguiding ourinquiryis, Whichlocation-specificpolitical,naturalandeconomicfactorsare associated – ifany – withpopulationsizeinAustralianmajorcenters?
ThisresearchisimportantandtimelybecausetheAustralianFederal Governmenthaslaunchedapolicy – encapsulatedinthereport “Planningfor Australia’sFuturePopulation,”– whichaimstodecentralizepopulationfromthe primatecapitalcities(AustralianGovernment 2019).ThereporthighlightsproblemsbesettingAustraliancapitalcitiessuchasunaffordablehousing,trafficcongestion, “overcrowdedpublictransport,” andalackof “sharedvaluesandideals” (AustralianGovernment 2019:5).Toalleviatecongestioncoststhegovernment aimstodecentralizepopulationfromlargecitiesintostrategicregionalcenters deemedtohavethe “potentialtosupporteconomicandpopulationgrowthin theregions” throughinvestmentsinimprovedinfrastructureconnectivity (AustralianGovernment 2019:26).However,inofferingasolutionthegovernment impliesaknownrootcauseofprimacy,whichwesuggesthaslimitedscientific grounding.
Thispaperisstructuredintofivesections.First,inthebackgroundsectionwe describeacenturyofurbanprimacyinAustralianstatesandreviewvariousexplanations.Second,tosetthecontextwithinwhichourempiricalmodelexistswe recountAustralia’shistoryoffederalismfocusinguponthebalanceofintergovernmentalpower.Third,ourmethodsdescribesthequantitativeresearchstrategy, design,andanalyticaltechniquesusedinamodelofurbanizationdesignedtoassess whethercertainfactorsendowcitieswithcompetitiveadvantages.Fourth,wepresentourresults,derivedfromstatisticalanalysescontextualizingAustralianurbanization.Sixth,wediscussandinterpretourresults,answerquestionsabout limitations,andconsiderimplications.Fifth,wediscussourresults,answerquestionsaboutlimitationsandconclude.
Background
UrbanprimacyinAustralia
AccordingtotheAustralianBureauofStatistics(ABS, 2019a),Australiaisoneofthe mosturbanizednationsintheworld,withmorethan60%ofitspopulationlivingin thesixstatecapitalsofSydney,Melbourne,Brisbane,Perth,Adelaide,andHobart.
Australiaisalsoalarge,advanced,capitalist,democraticfederation;featuresconsistentwithdecentralizedurbanization(AdesandGlaeser 1995).Scholarscorrectly observeAustralia’sevennationalurbanhierarchy(Anthony 2014),however extremeurbanprimacyinstatesisapparentupon “closerexamination ” (Short andPinet-Peralta 2009:1262).
ThehighconcentrationofpeopleinAustralia’sstatecapitalshasbeenamatterof seriousconcernsincetheearlydaysofsettlementandlongpartofAustralia’spoliticallandscape(Archer 2015).Bythelate19thcentury,advocatesofdecentralization believedAustraliancitieswereunhealthybothtothebodyandtomorality,dueto themcontainingafesteringcocktailofovercrowding,decadence,andpoverty (Neutze 1974).FollowingFederation,continuedprimacyinstatesundermined widespreadoptimism,perhapsexpectations,thatAustraliawouldspreadoutto prosper,apervasivesentimentatthetime(Rowland 1977).Gradually,optimism wasreplacedwithresignationthattheenvironmentwouldtemperexpansionism. Theperceptionofalowlypopulated,inhospitableAustraliaismainstreaminthe 21stcentury,withclimatevolatilityreinforcingtheimpressionthatregionsof Australiaareover-populated(Lane 2017).Still,highgrowthincapitalcityregions continues.InrecentyearsthepopulationsofSydneyandMelbournehavegrownby over100,000annually(BirrellandHealy 2018),thoughthisrecentlydeclinedfollowingtheCOVID-19pandemic(ABS 2021).Rapidgrowthinthesecitieshas meantresidentsexperiencesignificantimpactsintermsofrisinghousingcosts, infrastructureprovision,androadcongestion(KellyandDonegan 2015; Seamer 2019).
TocontextualizeprimacyinAustralia,particularlyasrelatedtoKimandLaw’ s (2016)analysisofCanadaandtheUnitedStates,inFigure 1,wecomparemeasures ofprimacyinAustralianstatesandtheNorthernTerritorywithmeasuresforthe fivemostpopulousCanadianprovincesandAmericanstates.Primacyisexpressed asapercentage:equaltothelargestcity’spopulationasaproportionofthestate/ provincialtotalurbanpopulation(Henderson 2003).InFigure 1,fouroffive AmericanstatesexhibitthelowestprimacyinthesampleexceptforNewYork, where80%oftheurbanpopulationresidesinGreaterNewYorkCity. California’smeasureisalsomoderatelyhigh,where50%oftheurbanpopulation residesinGreaterLosAngeles.CanadianprovinceshavehighermeasuresofprimacythanAmericanstates,withanextremelyhighmeasureinManitoba,andhigh measuresinQuebec,BritishColumbia,andOntario.Bycomparison,Australian stateshavethehighestoverallmeasures,particularlyinSouthAustralia(88%), WesternAustralia(87%),Victoria(83%),andtheNorthernTerritory(82%),where urbanpopulationslivealmostentirelyincapitalcities.Thelowestmeasuresin Australia,Tasmania(59%)andQueensland(55%),arealsohighillustratingpervasiveprimacy3.
TofurthercontextualizetheexperienceofprimacyinAustraliaweplottedmeasuresofprimacyforeverydecadefrom1911to2016inFigure 2 (ABS 2014, 2019a). ThetrendlinesinFigure 2 featuresometimessteepandtemporarydeclinesinprimacy(e.g.,1950sand1960s).Asopposedtoreflectingtheascensionofnon-capital
3GreaterNewYorkCityspansacrossmultiplestates(e.g.NewYork,NewJersey,Connecticut).OurprimacycalculationfactoredonlytheurbanpopulationresidentinNewYorkstate.
MeasuresofurbanprimacyforAustralianstatescompared.
Sources: StatisticsCanada(2011);UnitedStatesCensusBureau(2018);ABS(2019a);Brinkhoff(2021).
cities,mostdeclinesresultedfromtheABSreclassifyingapreviouslyruralpopulationcenterintourban,therebyinflatingthedenominatorofthecalculationand mutingongoingandmoderateincreasesinprimacy.Whilstthequantityofurban centersincreased,theshapeofstateurbanhierarchieswasremarkablystablegiven thelongtimeframe.Ineveryperiodthecapitalsexperiencednominalpopulation growthfarinexcess(bymultiples)ofallotherurbancentersinthestate.One ‘true’ declineofprimacyoccurredinQueenslandfromthe1990swiththeemergenceof GoldCoastasamajorpopulationcenter,thoughGoldCoastisarguablypartof GreaterBrisbane(Brinkhoff, 2021).
ExplanationsofprimacyinAustralia
GivenAustralia’srenownedaridityandheatitseemslogicaltoconcludethatthe naturalenvironmentandprimacyarerelated.WhilsttheenvironmentmayconstraindevelopmenttoregionsofAustralia,whatevidenceistheretosuggestthis explainstheexclusivesuccessofstatecapitals?Bird(1965)andStatham(1990)both questionedthenaturalistnarrativethatthecapitalsarerelativeoasesgiventhe founders’ limitedexperienceofAustralia.OtheraccountsofAustralianprimacy emphasizeeconomics.Stilwell(1974)attributedmetropolitandominancetomarket forces – internationalcapitalismfavoringportcapitals,exportsfavoringthinrural populations,moderntechnology(e.g.,rail)allowingcapitalstoservevastgeographies,andurbanizationprecedingruraldevelopmentinAustralia.
Interestingly,neoclassicalperspectivesofprimacydonotrequirethestatecapital regionstobesingularnaturaloases.Theyposethatcolonialadministrativeseaports, establishedinaneraofmodernityandurbanization,centralizedeconomicactivity, therebyminimizingthequantityofurbancenters,thecapitalsprosperingon accountoftheirheadstart(Robinson 1962;BrennanandBrennan 1963;Neutze 1977).Thus,Australia’scolonialcapitalsbenefittedfromfirst-moveradvantages, enablingthemtoextendtheirdominance(Johnston 1977).Thispath-dependent explanationofprimacysuggestsinevitabilityduetoinstitutionalhabitandeconomiclegacy(MartinandSunley 2006:399).Acknowledgingtherigidityof path-dependence,North(1990:98–99)cautionedagainstconfoundingitwithpermanencebecause “ateverystepalongthewaythere[are]choices politicaland
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Sources: ABS(2014, 2019 a).
economic that[provide]realalternatives.” Furthermore,neoclassicalperspectives sometimesconfoundurbanprimacywithurbanizationinAustralia,demonstrated bytheuseoftheterms “metropolitanization” (Glynn 1975)and “metropolitandominance” (McCartyandSchedvin 1978)insteadofprimacy.Importantly,primacy denotesagglomerationin one city,notcitiesingeneral.
Intheurbanprimacyliterature,theoriesofprimacypartlyalignwithmarketdriveninterpretationssuchasEl-Shakhs(1972)whoposedthatinconcentrating scarceresourcesprimacysupportsearlyeconomicdevelopment.However,ElShakhs’sconceptionofprimacywasprocessual;inlargegeographiesprimacy maybeastageofeconomicmaturationwhereincreasingwealthandurbanization portenddecentralization(Williamson 1965;WheatonandShishido 1981).Where thisdoesnotoccur,particularlyinlarge,wealthypolitieswithurbanpopulations overtwomillion,urbaneconomistssuggestinstitutionsreinforcefurtheragglomerationintheprimatecitytothedetrimentofoveralleconomicgrowth (Henderson 2003).
Increasingly,contemporaryaccountsofprimacyinAustraliaacknowledgearole playedbyinstitutions.TheAustraliangeographerLangton(2010)pairedinstitutionsandprimacybyassociatingregionalinequalitywithstatecapitals,describing anextractiveeconomicdynamicbetweencapitalsandtheirregions.Bolleter(2018) suggestedaroleplayedbypoliticalhistorywhenheposedthattheoriginsof ‘metropolitandominance ’ inAustraliacanbetracedtocolonialadministration, AustraliabeingafederationofindependentcoloniestetheredtoLondon,not oneanother(Paris 1994,Potts 2003).SimilarlyEversoleandWalo(2020)contend thatcolonialcentralizationwasacatalystforAustralia’sdeepcity-countrydivide; theideathatnon-capitalregionsarenon-metropolitan,collectivelyreferredtoas regionalAustralia.Mostrecently,Wilkinsonetal.(2022)foundthatAustralia’ sconfigurationofintergovernmentalpower(e.g.strongfederalandstatetiersjuxtaposed withweaksubstategovernment)tobeconsistentwiththeinternationalexperience ofprimacy-primatecitiesarepoliticalcapitalsofcentralizedgovernmentswhich dominatetheirmemberspolitically,administratively,andfiscally.However,beyond fewqualitativereferences,whatexistsofAustralianprimacyresearchhaslimited engagementwithinstitutionaleconomicsandempiricaltechniques.
Afederationforacontinent
Aftercolonization(1788–1901)AustraliawasfederatedunderitsConstitutionin 1901.ColonialdevelopmentinAustraliawasremarkableforitsgovernmentcenteredness(Aitken 1959).Aharshnaturalenvironmentcompelledthestatetofill thevoidleftbyreluctantprivateenterprise(Coleman 2016).Furthermore,colonial governmentshadeasieraccesstoLondoncapitalmarketsthandidprivateenterprise andthereforeplayedadrivingroleineconomicdevelopment.InLondonthecolonieswere ‘partofthefamily’ andAustralianpublicloans,whilstspeculative,were regulatedandclosertohomethandistancewouldsuggest(ErgasandPincus 2015: 235).Inturn,settlerstoAustraliaexpectedservices,looking ‘upontheStateasavast publicutility’ forthegreatergood(Hancock 1930:72).Thesenascentproclivities colorAustralianfederalism.
Australia’sConstitutionrecognizestwotiersofgovernment,Commonwealthand States,andspecifiesonlyfederalpowers(intendingtolimitthem),withthose unspecifiedleftinthepreserveofstates(Fenna 2012).Evidentfrom Constitutionaldeliberations,thisapproachfollowedthenineteenthcentury Americantraditionoflimitedfederalgovernment(CommonwealthofAustralia 2011).However,itfailedtoprotectstaterightsbecausetheConstitutionprovides littleguidanceaboutwhatthosestaterightsare(James 1992).Fenna(2019:47) chroniclesfederalencroachmentintostatepolicyarenasandexplainsthat, ‘implicit powers[were]moreeasilyerodedthanenumeratedones.’
LocalismisnotabsentinAustralia,butafundamentalsphereofthepublicsector predating ‘states’ byfortyyears;eachcolonyhadlocalgovernmentbythe1860s (GrantandDrew 2017).Statesmanageindependentsystemsoflocalgovernment dispersedacrossover500LocalGovernmentAreas(LGAs)(RyanandLawrie 2020).Alocaltierofgovernmentisnotprovidedforinthenational Constitutiondespitetwofailedreferendatoincludeit(in1974and1988).LGAs wereestablishedbystatestodeliveranarrowrangeofservices(e.g.,parks,roads, garbage)andareinternationallydistinctiveinwhattheydonotcover,suchaspolice, schoolandhospitalserviceswhichareprovidedbystates(WildRiver 2003).Inthe lastfiftyyearslocalgovernmentresponsibilitiesandcapabilitieshavebroadened, howevertheyremaincreaturesofstates, ‘[not]well-springsofathrivingdemocratic polity’ (GrantandWoods 2016:247).
Theoretically,constitutionalrecognitioncouldboostlocalgovernments,however muchoftheirweaknessderivesfromstateadministrativechoices,notlaw.McNeil (1997:21)comparesAustralianmunicipalitieswithAmerican,notingbothlackfederalconstitutionalstatusandarethereforecreaturesofstates,howeverAmerican politicalculturefavors ‘localpoliticalactionandparticipation givingtolocal authoritiesagreaterdegreeofresponsibilityandautonomy. ’ Thatis,Australian statescanempowerlocalgovernmentswithrelativeease.Howeverwidespreadskepticismoflocalcapabilitiesandstatepaternalismresultinweaklocalgovernment, particularlyinlegislativeandfiscalterms(Wilkinsonetal. 2022).
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InitiallyStrongStates
Withfederation,sixindependentcolonialtaxsystemsbecamestates,surrendering theircustomsandexcisedutiestotheCommonwealth.Tocontextualizetheimpact federationhadonstates,in1897customsdutieswere76%ofcolonialincome (McLean 2004).Torecoverrevenues,statedelegatesinsertedaclauseintothe Constitutiontoempower/compeltheCommonwealthtofacilitatefederaltostate transfers.Theevolvingtermsandmethodsofthissystemremaincentraldebates ofAustralianfederalism(McLean 2004).
Theearlydecadesoffederationweremarkedbytensionbetweennationalistsand federalists.FederalistsrepresentedAustralianconservatism,advocacyforstates’ rights,andlimitedfederalgovernment.NationalistsrepresentedAustralianprogressivismandcollectivism,advocacyforcentralizationonthegroundsofnationbuilding.FederalistswerethedominantpoliticalforceinAustraliaattheturnofthe twentiethcentury.Craven(2005:2)describestheConstitutionasa ‘liberal-conservativeartifact,’ referringtoAustralia’sright-of-centerLiberalparty.Theserivalries retainrelevanceincontemporarypolitics,howevernationalismultimatelywon. Australia’strajectoryoffederalismischaracterizedbytheriseofbipartisancentralizationandoncepowerfulstatesbeingdominatedbyagrowingcentralgovernment (Fenna 2007,Galligan 2012,SaundersandFoster 2014).
Thefederalistpersuasionbeganwaningfiveyearsafterfederation.In1906 Australia’sHighCourtexpandedfromthreetofivejustices,theadditionaltwobeing morenationalistintheirsympathies,markingthebeginningofacentralizingtrend (ZimmermannandFinlay 2010).Centralizationacceleratedin1920followinggenerationalchangeintheHighCourt(MathewsandGrewal 1997)andanewcentrist direction,particularlyapparentintheEngineersCase(1921)whentheCourtruled thattheCommonwealthcouldgovernstateemployeewages,creatingthe ‘widest meaningpossible’ forCommonwealthpowers(MathewsandJay 1972:96).This rulingnullifiedandreplacedthereserverightsdoctrine(impliedstatepowersare broad)withaliteralinterpretationoftheConstitution(unwrittenpowersdon’t reallyexist).Thecaseisconsideredaturningpoint ‘whenanewnationalspirittook over,[with]amarkedcentralisttone,’ shiftingthefederal-staterelationship (Nethercote 2016:108-109).AustraliaturnedawayfromtheAmericanprecedent ofbroadlyinterpretedstates’ rightsandtowardadistinctlyBritishadministrative precedent(Latham 1937).
Priortothe1920sthestateshad ‘favorable’ viewsofFederation,particularlyduringWorldWarIwhen ‘theFederationmadegood [Australia]tookherstation amongthenationsoftheworld ::: [and]enteredalargernationallife’ (Piesse 1980: 199).Furthermore,throughstateincometaxessomestateshadrecoveredwhatthey lostincustomsduties.By1920somestates ‘werebecomingmorefinanciallyindependent’ leadinguptoWorldWarII(James 1992:11).Figure 3 atteststothisstate self-sufficiency,illustratingstates’ initiallystrongrevenueraisingpowers.Thefigure featuresfederal,state,andlocalgovernmentown-sourcerevenues(OSRs)asapercentageofgrossnationalproduct(GNP)fortheperiod1910to2018.OSRsrepresentatierofgovernment ’sindependentlygeneratedandcontrolledincome.Asa proportionofnationalproduct,OSRsindicateatier’sfiscalstrengthandeconomic weight.
Figure3. 1910–2018AustraliaOwn-sourcerevenues(OSR)aspercentofGrossNationalProduct(GNP).
Sources: ABS 1912 –2012, 1975–2018, 1994–2020
NotallAustralianstateswereself-sufficient.Theinterwarperiodprovedtotest andtransformthefederationasitgrappledwiththreechallenges(Prestand Mathews 1980).First,statesandCommonwealthwereborrowinginLondonindependentlyandsometimesincompetition.Tomanagethis,in1927the CommonwealthandstatessignedtheFinancialAgreementcreatingthe AustralianLoansCouncil,effectivelycentralizingpublicborrowing(Mathews andJay 1972:109)andsignalingfederalfinancialleadership(Burtonetal. 2002).
Second,duetotheFinancialAgreementtransferstostateschangedfrompercapitapaymentstoannualinterestpaymentsonstatedebt.Thisprovedproblematicin theWestandina1933referendum66%ofWesternAustraliansvotedtoabandon thefederalexperimenttoavoidbeingimpoverishedbyit(McLean 2004).Though unsuccessful,theCommonwealthwasmovedtoaddresstransferinequitiesbycreatingtheCommonwealthGrantsCommission(CGC),anindependentstatutory bodytaskedwithensuringfederaltransferequity,withclaimantstatesreceiving grants ‘sufficienttobring[their]budgetarypositionintolinewiththatofthestandardnon-claimantstates’ (MathewsandJay 1972:5).
Third,toservicedebtsincurredduringthefirstWorldWar(1914–1918),the Commonwealthbeganto ‘invade’ directtaxationbycreatingformsofincome tax(Smith 1993:46).AsperFigure 3,by1920federalOSRsrivaledstates. EffectivelytheCommonwealthwascompetingwithstateincome,complicating Australia’staxsystem(Burtonetal. 2002;PrestandMathews 1980).WorldWar IIcreatedanemergentneedtosimplifythingsinthenameofnationalmobilization viafederaluniformincometax.Challengedbyfourstates,thelegislationsurvivedin theHighCourt,notonthegroundsofwartimeprovisionsbutonConstitutional interpretation,fortifyingfederalincometaxindefinitely.Stateslegallycanlevy incometaxesbutitisimpracticalgivenlittletaxroomandthefactthatincreases tostaterevenuesdiminishfederaltransfers(McLean 2004;NewSouthWales Government 2011).
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Mid-centuryfederalomnipotence
ThebalanceofpowerinAustralia’sfederationshifteddramaticallyasaresultof WorldWarII.Theproportionofstaterevenuefromfederaltransfersincreased from14%in1939,to46%by1947(CGC 2019).FederalOSRsascendedtoover 26%ofGNPin1945whilststateOSRsdeclinedtoFederation-eralows(5%)by 1951(Figure 3).TheCommonwealthwasfurtheradvantagedin1949whenthe HighCourtclassifiedretailsalestaxasexciseduties,effectivelyassigningsales taxtotheCommonwealthanddenyingstates(andlocalgovernmentsbydefault) acriticalsourceofelasticrevenue. ‘Defyingalllogic ::: theHighCourtcontinued todecreethattaxesonconsumptionweretaxesonproductionandweretherefore excisetaxes’ (MathewsandGrewal 1997:18).By1950theCommonwealthcollected 88%ofalltaxationinAustralia(8%bystates,4%bylocalgovernments)whilststates retainedresponsibilityfortheimplementationofeducation,healthcare,lawenforcement,utilities,transportationandothermajorinfrastructureas ‘agentsofthe Commonwealth’ (MathewsandJay 1972:190).
Thepostwarrealitywasoneofentrenchedverticalfiscalimbalance(VFI),awell examinedandoftregrettedcharacteristicofAustralianfederalismwherebyfederal revenueexceedsfederalspendingobligations(Burtonetal. 2002).VFIisnormalof federations,howeverinAustraliaitiscontroversialduetoitsextremityrelativeto ‘allothereconomicallyadvancedcountries’ (MathewsandGrewal 1997:767; McNeill 1997).CritiquesofVFIfocusonblurredaccountabilitiesinherenttotransferdependence theCommonwealthdelegatesresponsibilitytostateswhichin turncanclaimtheyareunder-resourced.StillVFIpersists,mitigatedbyhorizontal fiscalequalization(HFE),afederaltransfersystemnoteworthyforitsefficacyto redressfederaldominance,flatteninterstatedifferences,andcontinuouslyimprove thefairnessoftransfers(McLean 2004).
RisingVFIwasnotpassivelyaccepted.UndertheconservativeMenzies Government(1949–1966)federalismwasweaklyrevived,nowtermed ‘weakcentralism,’ aperiodwherecentralizationplateaued(HollanderandPatapan 2007). AsperFigure 3,duringthistimefederalOSRsdeflatedfromtheirwartimepeak toalowof21%ofGNPin1960,thoughthiswouldprovetemporary.Federal OSRsexpandedinthe1960sastheCommonwealth’sfiscalsupremacyenabled itsgraduallegislativeexpansionintohealth,welfare,andeducation(Fenna 2019).Meanwhilestates,persistentlyemasculatedbytheHighCourt,appeared resignedtosourcegrantsfromtheCommonwealthratherthantestnewrevenue streamssuchasconsumption/servicetaxes(MathewsandJay 1972).Forexample, James(1992)arguedthatstatesweresluggishtorespondwhentheCommonwealth abandonedLandTaxin1952andthatthislethargyprecipitatedfederalencroachmentinthe1970s.
NewFederalism
ByReinhardtandSteel’s(2006)account,thehistoryoffederaltaxationcanbe dividedintotwoperiods.ThefirstcoversFederationtothe1970swhen Commonwealthandstatesjostledtoestablishroles,responsibilities,anddefendrevenues.Afterthe1970sfocusshiftedtoharmonization(intheguiseofcentralization
toattainadministrativeefficiency,costcutting,etc.)andequity-basedimprovementstothetransfersystem.The1970swerepivotallargelybecauseofthe WhitlamGovernment(1972–1975),whichinitiatedthe ‘mostambitiousexpansion oftheCommonwealth ’sroleinthehistoryofAustralianfederalism’ (Fenna 2019:46).
TheWhitlamGovernmentsawtheCommonwealth’sroleasoverseerofstate deliverables.It ‘tookstatestotaskbecauseoftheirneglectofthelocalsphere’ throughthecreationof ‘inter-jurisdictionalmoderatinginstitutions,’ signifyingfederalentryintostatedomains(Chapman 1997:46).Whitlam’sreformsespoused statepower,localpower,regionalpowerwiththein-practicecaveatbeingcentralizedorchestrationofthesepowers(Burtonetal. 2002).Tocontrolstatesthe Commonwealthincreasinglyconditionedtransfers.Theusageof ‘tied’ grantsacceleratedfrom13%ofstateincomein1970to23%in1980(over50%bythe2010s) (Fenna 2019).However,Whitlam’stransformativeapproachwithstatesbackfired. StrongpoliticaloppositionandimpassespromptedtheGovernorGeneraltodismiss theWhitlamgovernmentin1975.
OneofWhitlam’slastingimpactswasbringingintergovernmentalrelationstothe fore.Thefollowing(Fraser)governmentintroducedtheterm ‘NewFederalism’ to restartrelationsandachieve ‘partnershipandnotdomination’ (Mathewsand Grewal 1997:14).Fraser’sgovernmentintroducedtaxsharingarrangementswithstates andsetuptheAustralianCouncilofIntergovernmentalRelations.ThismorecooperativefederalismgainedmomentumundertheHawkeGovernment(1983–1991),which oversawSpecialPremiersConferences,later formalizedintotheCouncilofAustralian Governments,todayacentralintergovernmentalarena(Burtonetal. 2002).
UndernewfederalismtheCommonwealthemphasizedstateself-relianceandfiscalrestraintbydecreasingtransfers.Withthiscamesomefiscaldevolution.In1994 thetermsofpublicborrowingweredevolvedwhentheFinancialAgreementwas amended.Publicborrowingbecame, ‘deregulated ::: withthestatesnowactive playersindomesticandglobalfinancialmarkets’ (CommonwealthofAustralia 2008).ExpendituredevolutionalsooccurredwhentheCommonwealthintroduced theGoodsandServicesTax(GST)in2000,effectivelyafederalsalestax.GSTrevenuesarecollectedbytheCommonwealthandreturnedinfull(subjecttohorizontal fiscalequalizationcalculations)tostatesasuntiedfunds,nowconstitutingthe majorityoffederaltransfersandawindfallforstateincomes(Commonwealthof Australia 2008:52).
Despitenewfederalism,Australianstatesremainfiscallydwarfedbythe Commonwealth.ThedeclineinCommonwealthOSRsinthe2000s(Figure 3)does notsignifyalastingchangebutreflectsAustralia’sminingboomandtheglobal financialcrisis,whichraisednationalproductivityanddecreasedfederalrevenues respectively.Mostmajortaxes(e.g.,personalandcorporateincometax,salestaxes) arethedomainoftheCommonwealth.StateOSRs,whilstkeepingpacewitheconomicexpansion,arelimitedtopayrolltax,stampduties,landtaxes,gambling taxes,varioustransactionandservicefees/taxes,andmineralextractionroyalties (CGC 2019).Theyarefurtherlimitedbythefactthatimprovedfiscalcapacity decreasesfederaltransfers,asexperiencedbyWesternAustraliawhichin2016 receivedonly30%oftheaverageGSTpaymentduetoitshighminingroyaltiesrevenue(CommonwealthGrantsCommission 2016).Overall,fiscalcentralizationhas
leftstates ‘morebereftofrevenuesourcesthananyothersuchtierintheworld’ (Coleman 2016:2).Furthermore,subnationalfiscalweaknesscompoundsatthe substatelevel,withlocalOSRsbeingthesmallestineveryperiodrepresentedin Figure 3,increasingonlymarginallyfrom1%in1910to2%in2018whereas CanadianandAmericanlocalgovernmentOSRsweresignificantlylarger(approximately5%and7%in2000respectively)(KimandLaw 2016).
Methods – AnempiricalmodelofAustraliancitypopulations
Havingestablishedaqualitativeunderstanding/historyofAustralianfederalism,we introduceatime-seriesquantitativemodelofpopulationguidedbyKimandLaw’ s (2016)comparativeanalysisofCanadaandtheUnitedStates,whichfollowed GalianiandKim’s(2011)modelofpoliticalcentralizationandgeographicdevelopment.Politicalcentralization/decentralizationreferstoresourcecontrol(e.g.,taxation),whetheracentralizedgovernmenttaxesthentransfers,oradecentralized governmentdevolvesfiscalpowersthroughoutthehinterland.
“Inthedecentralizedscenario ::: locationsareallowedtoindependentlyset taxesandlocalpublicgoods[so]thegeographicdistributionofpopulation betweenthecapitalcityandhinterlandwillbedeterminedbydifferencesin economicproductivity.Inthepoliticallycentralizedscenario population distributionbetweencapitalcityandhinterlanddependsontherelativeweight thecentralgovernmentplacesonthewelfareofcapitalcityversushinterland residents” (KimandLaw 2016:134).
Toexaminethisrelationship,weutilizedadeductive-correlationalmodeling strategythatregressedcitypopulationswithlocationspecificfactorsthatmight endowacitywithcompetitiveadvantages(e.g.,capitalcitystatus,naturalendowment,infrastructure).Themodelenabledustostratifyfactorsanddeterminetheir respectiveexplanatorypower.
Correlationisaresearchstrategythatusesstatisticalmodelstoinvestigaterelationships.Specifically,itseekstoidentifyarelationshipbetweentwoormorevariablesinadataset(SwaffieldandDeming 2010:90).Linearregressionisusedto exploreprobabilityandin-detaildependencyamongtwoobservedvariables,includingthedirectionandsignificanceofdependency(Bryman 2008;Sharifietal. 2016: 1840).Toachievethis,researchdesignsoftenincorporatethetechniquecalledmultipleregression.Thisallowsinvestigationofaseriesofindependentvariablesand onedependentvariabletoidentifywhichvariablesexhibitthestrongestcorrelation withothers.Thismayormaynotsuggestdirectionalcauseoreffect,butitnarrows downthepossibilitiesforinvestigation(SwaffieldandDeming 2010:43).Using multiplelinearregressions,wedeterminedhowcitypopulationsrelatedtopolitical, economic,andnaturalfactors.
Studysites
OurmodelutilizedcitypopulationdatafromAustralia’squinquennialcensus,featuredas “majorcenters” inhistoricpopulationstatistics(ABS 2014;Australian 22GeorgeWilkinson etal.
MapofAustralianmajorcentersoverlaiduponamapofpopulationdensity.
Sources: ABS(2019a).
BureauofStatistics 2019a)atermcombiningtwoAustralianStatisticalGeography Standardclassifications:(i)GreaterCapitalCityStatisticalAreas,thepopulationof eachcapitalcityurbanareaand(ii)SignificantUrbanAreas,urbancenterswith populationsover10,000asofthe1991census.WedidnotutilizeAustralianmunicipalunits(LGAs)duetotheirfracturedconfigurationinmajorcities(e.g.,Sydney, Melbourne,Perth),wherethereislittlealignmentbetweenmunicipalitiesandurban populations.WeexpandedtheABSdatasettoincludemajorcenterswithpopulationsover10,000inanycensusperiod,sourcedfromAustraliancensusrecords (ABS 1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, 1966, 1976, 1986)andBrinkoff(2021) – atotal of94majorcentersnationallyby2016,illustratedinFigure 4.
Regressionfactors
Table 1 outlinesninevariablesidentifiedfromtheliteratureutilizedinourmodelof populationandhowtheyweremeasured.Theselectionoffactorslargelyfollows thoseutilizedbyGalianiandKim(2011)andKimandLaw(2012, 2016),aselection ofregressionvariablesfocuseduponlocationspecificattributesthatframethe “rules
Table1. IndependentvariablesutilizedinmodelofAustralianmajorcenterpopulations
FactorTypeDescription
Statecapital status
PoliticalStatecapitollocatedincityYes(1);No (0)
Federalcapitalstatus PoliticalFederalcapitollocatedin city Yes(1);No (0)
LatitudeNaturalNorth-southgeographic coordinate
LongitudeNaturalEast-westgeographiccoordinate
Navigable waterway
NaturalBodyofwaterincludingrivers,canals,lakes,bays, estuaries,etc.thatare deep,wide,andslow enoughformaritimenavigation.
Retrievedfrompublicrecord
Retrievedfrompublicrecord
DecimalRetrievedfromAustralian BureauofMeteorology (BoM, 2021)
DecimalRetrievedfromAustralian BureauofMeteorology (BoM, 2021)
Yes(1);No (0)
Presenceoffeatureidentifiedusingsatelliteimagery,maps,andlocal publicrecord
RainfallNaturalAverageannualrainfallMillimetersRetrievedclimatestatistic (30yearmeanannual rainfall)pertainingto respectiveregression period(BoM,2021)
TemperatureNaturalAverageannualhightemperature Degrees Celsius Retrievedclimatestatistic (30yearmeanannual maximumtemperature) pertainingtorespective regressionperiod(BoM, 2021)
MajorportEconomicAnindustrialharborYes(1);No (0)
Major airport EconomicAirportwithgreaterthan1 millionpassengermovementsannually
Yes(1);No (0)
From1911to1976: “Major” asidentifiedinAustralian Yearbook(ABS 1912–2012).1986onwards: “Major” signifiesgreater than500,000tonneshandledannuallyaspertrade statistics(Commonwealth ofAustralia, 2014;Ports Australia, 2019).Data alignedtorespective regressionperiod
From1911to1976:Major airportidentifiedandpassengervolumesascertainedfromAustralian Yearbook(1912–2012); 1986onwards:Passenger volumesretrievedfrom Commonwealthof Australia(2021).Data alignedtorespective regressionperiod
ofthegame” andconditiondevelopment.Theyaregroupedintothreecategories: Political,natural,andeconomic.UnlikeKimandLaw,wedidnotincludecitysize (km2)givenourcitypopulationmeasuresaredemographicconstructs,notsalient politicalunits.
Politicalfactors
Wemeasuredtwopoliticalfactors;statecapitalcitystatusandfederalcapitalcity status.Therearenumerousreasonstoanticipatethatcapitalcitystatuswillresultin higherpopulations.Whetherthecapitalmakesthecity,orthecitymakesthecapital, empiricalevidencesuggestscapitalcitystatusitselfconstitutesacompetitiveadvantage(Anthony 2014).Thisisexplainedbytheabilityofcapitalstoagglomerategovernmentjobs,lobbying4,andbusiness,therebysustainingsteadygrowth(Adesand Glaeser 1995).
Naturalfactors
Atheory/hypothesisofenvironmentaldeterminism(thebeliefthattheenvironment,mostnotablyitsphysicalfactorssuchaslandformsandclimate,determines thepatternsofhumanculture,settlement,andsocietaldevelopment)informedthe selectionofnaturalfactors.KimandLaw(2016)examinedthepresenceofmajor riversinCanadaandtheUSA,representingameansofaquaticnavigationandtrade. DuetoAustraliahavingfewmajorrivers,wetookabroadertackandmeasuredthe presenceofanavigablewaterway,includingrivers,canals,bays,estuaries,etc., whichareprotectedfromseaswellsandaccessibletointernationalwaters.This includednaturallynavigablewaterwaysandthosemadenavigablebytechnology (e.g.,dredging).Weexaminedpositionalfactors,latitudeandlongitude,tocontrol forunmeasurednaturalandhistoriccircumstancesthatmighthavecausedpopulationtoconcentrateregionally.Shouldeitherpositionalfactorcorrelatewithpopulationthiswouldsuggestthelocationoflargermajorcentersinaparticularregionof thecontinent.Relativetoclimate,weincludedhightemperatureandrainfallgiven Australia’srenownedheatandaridity.Wehypothesizedcitypopulationswillnegativelycorrelatewithtemperature,andpositivelycorrelatewithrainfall.
Economicfactors
Weregressedtwoeconomicfactorsfocusedupontransportationandtradeinfrastructure,thepresenceofamajorseaportandairport.Majorportsareincluded onaccountoftheirpivotaleconomicfunctioninAustraliathroughoutthecentury (Statham 1990).Intermsofothereconomicdata,city-specific,industry-levelproductivitydatawereunavailablefortheperiodofanalysis(e.g.,manufacturing,agriculture,andservices).Still,themodelholdscentralasthedependentvariable,one sucheconomicproductivitymeasure,majorcenterpopulation.Thatis,individuals arevaluableeconomicactorsandtheirconcentrationsspeakvolumesaboutproductivity(Zsolnai 2018).Furthermore,thequalificationofportsas “major” considers economicproductivity.
4CommitteeforPerth,CommitteeforSydney(GrantandDrew 2017).
Statisticalanalysis
Univariateanalyseswererunforeachyear,regressingeachfactorindividuallywith majorcenterpopulation.Multivariatemodelswerethenrunforeachyear,withall factorswetestedenteredintothemodel.Ourmultivariatestatisticalmodel regressedthelogofmajorcenterpopulationswiththeallfactorsoutlinedin Table 1 enteredintothemodelforeachdecade(n = 11;19115,1921,1933,1947, 1954,1966,1976,1986,1996,2006,2016)withthepopulationandfactordata correspondingtothatyear.Weestimatedthefollowingregressionequationwhere log(pop)i isthenaturallogarithmofcity i population;
SCCi and FCCi correspondwithstate/federalcapitals; SEAi and AIRi indicatethe presenceofamajorseaportorairport,and Ni representstheremainingexogenous naturalfactors.
Results
Table 2 presentsstatisticsdescribingoursampleofAustralianmajorcenters.The numberofcentersmultipliedinthe20thcentury,from19in1911to94in2016. Meanwhiletheconcentrationofnationalpopulationincapitalcitiesincreasedfrom 38%in1911to67%in2016.Thepercentofurbanpopulationincapitalcities increasedfrom66%in1911to75%in2016(ABS 2019a).Asexpected,thesemeasuresindicatethatthecapitals,namelySydney,Melbourne,Brisbane,Perth,and Adelaideenjoyedadisproportionateshareofgrowth.Theresultingsizediscrepancy betweencapitalcitiesandmajorcentersingeneralisillustratedbythedifference betweenthemedianandmaximumpopulations.In2016Australia’slargestcity (Sydneyinallperiods)hadapopulationof5,024,923,whilethemedianpopulation inthesamplewas28,238,illustratingtheanomalouslargescaleofthecapitalsrelativetoothercenters,arealitythatnecessitatedtheuseofthenaturallogofpopulationinourstatisticalmodel,ameansofmanagingskewnesstowardlargervalues.
Table 3 presentstheresultsofelevenmultivariatelinearregressionsforeachyear from1911to2016.Itisimportanttonotethatthemodelcompared/weightedfactorstoexplainpopulationvariation within thesample.Somefactorsthatappear insignificant(navigablewaterway)orintermittentlysignificant(seaport,airport) werestrongly,positivelycorrelatedwithpopulationinunivariateanalysesinall periodsforwhichtherewasdata(resultsnotshown).Themultifactormodeldoes notindicatethatthesefactorsareunimportantbutidentifiesthestrongestrelationships.Thecorrelationcoefficientispresentedforeachfactorabovethestandard errorandsignificancecode,orp-value.Tocontextualizethis,if x isthecoefficient, itsimpactoncitypopulationequalsexp(x) – 1.Forexample,statecapitalstatuswas theonlyfactorexplainingsizevariationamongcitiesinoursampleforallperiods andin2016itscorrelationcoefficientwas0.977withapvaluelessthan.001,the strongestmeasurablestatisticalrelationship.Thus,in2016,theimpactofstatecapitalcitystatusonpopulationequalledexp(0.977) – 1 = 1.65,orthecoefficientis
Table2. Australianmajorcenterswithpopulationsover10,000
Totalmajorcenters1922323645566676889294
Averagepopulation105,102124,231115,543127,451131,785148,602164,874170,786174,664190,388225,131
Minimumpopulation10,02310,30610,41310,74910,03610,10310,27210,05510,17410,09010,464
Maximumpopulation629,503899,0591,235,2671,484,0041,863,2172,446,3453,021,9823,471,5673,856,6464,256,1615,024,923
Medianpopulation30,97225,32121,69319,43719,30720,93421,90923,43326,55626,83728,238
Nationalpopulation4,455,0055,436,7946,630,6007,580,8208,986,87311,550,46213,548,47216,018,35018,310,71420,450,96624,190,907
Nationalurbanpopulation2,560,7663,370,3164,232,4705,208,5527,073,0499,612,51011,650,62413,725,42415,788,56018,040,62121,727,854
Totalcapitalcitypopulations1,694,3292,338,0793,128,7583,864,1484,852,5706,747,9258,714,11910,247,46511,811,99113,379,37716,258,288
Sources: ABS(1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, 1966, 1976, 1986, 2014, 2019;Brinkoff 2021). *Nationalorsubnationalcapital.
Table3. Logofmajorcenterpopulationregressedonpolitical,natural,andeconomicfactors
StateCapitalCity Status
FederalCapital CityStatus
MajorSeaport0.001(0.386)0.727(0.240)**0.230(0.216)0.327(0.221)0.433(0.166)*0.348(0.119)**0.330(0.130)*0.273(0.113)*0.317(0.106)**0.235(0.111)*0.172(0.112)
MajorAirportNANANANANA0.679(0.244)**0.474(0.287)0.551(0.175)**0.710(0.198)***
Longitude0.002(0.011)0.006(0.008)0.005(0.008)0.003(0.008)0.008(0.006)0.004(0.004)0.010(0.005).0.010(0.004)*0.007(0.004).0.006(0.004)0.003(0.004)
Notes: Eachcolumnrepresentsaseparateregression.Standarderrorsaredisplayedinparentheses.Includesonlymajorcenterswithpopulationsof10,000 orabove.
associatedwitha165%increaseinpopulation,alargeimpactapparentinall periods.
From1966to1986,andalsoin2006,federalcapitalstatusdemonstratedasignificantpositiverelationshipwithpopulation;however,thisrelationshipweakensin laterperiods.Note,inunivariateanalyses,federalcapitalcitystatuscontinuedto correlatewithpopulationafter1986.Thepresenceofaseaporthadamoderately strong,significant,positiveeffectonpopulationinmostperiods,particularly between1954and2006,thoughtheimpactdeclinedfroma54%increasetopopulation(0.433.p < .05)in1954to27%in2006(0.235,p < .05).Majorairportswere strongly,positivelycorrelatedwithcitypopulationsformostmeasuredperiods, associatedwitha103%increaseinpopulation(0.710,p < .001)in2016.
Relativetonaturalfactors,fewrelationshipswereidentified.Navigablewaterway, latitude,andtemperaturewereinsignificantinallperiods(sameforunivariateanalysesoflatitudeandtemperature).From1976to1996,longitudemoderately,positivelycorrelatedwithpopulation(0.007, <0.1),indicatingcitieseastofthesample’ s centertendedtobeslightlylarger,likelyreflectingpopulationgrowthinnon-capital majorcentersonAustralia’sPacificcoast,particularlyinQueensland.Rainfall showedaweak(0.000,p < .1)relationshipwithpopulationin2006,indicatingdisproportionatepopulationgrowthinwettercenters.
Discussion
Consistentwithstudiesofprimacyinternationally,weidentifiedastrongstatistical relationshipbetweencapitalcitystatusandAustralianmajorcenterpopulations bothinunivariateanalysesandinamultivariatemodelthatconsideredsevenadditionaleconomicandnaturalfactors.Takentogetherwithveryhigh,relativelystable measuresofprimacy,wesuggestAustralia’slargestmajorcentersbenefitfromcapitalcitystatus,anobservablemagnetofpopulation.Whilstourresultsimplycapital citystatusisacoredriverofpopulationvariationamongAustralianmajorcenters, werecognizethenaturalandeconomicprerequisitesofstatecapitalcitystatusin Australia.Eachcapitalwasanearly,ifnotinitialpointofsettlementinitscolony, chosenforitsassessedeconomicsuperiorityin18thand19thcenturycontexts (Statham 1990).Acknowledgingthis,Stathamdemonstratedhowlatercolonial experiencerevealedadditionalandnumerousfavorablelocationsandstillprimacy persisted.Wesuggestwhatevernaturaladvantagesthecapitalshavetheyarenot exclusivetoverylargecitiesnoraretheyenoughtoexplaintheextremeandpersistentconditionofprimacy.
ItmayappearcounterintuitivethatAustralia’scapitalcitiesdonotoccupynatural “ oases ” comparedtoothermajorcenters,givenAustralia’slargestcitieshave navigablewaterwaysnearthecoast.Furthermore,inunivariateandmultivariate analysescontainingonlythenaturalfactorswefoundnavigablewaterwayshada strong,positiverelationshipwithpopulation.However,whenallfactorswereadded tothemodelnaturalfactorsbecamelargelyinsignificant.Thisindicatesthatwhile largermajorcentersinthesampleusuallyhavenavigablewaterways,politicaland economicfactorswerebetterabletoexplainwhatdifferentiatesthelargestmajor centersinthesample.Ourresultsdonotrefutetheimportanceofnaturalfactors
30GeorgeWilkinson etal.
butsuggestthatthereareother,smallermajorcentersinAustraliawithcomparable naturalendowments.Alsoworthnotingrelativetonaturalfactorsisthesample’ s inherentsurvivor’sbias.Thatis,theregressionsspeaktovariation among major centerswithpopulationsover10,000,arelativelysmallsample(<100),ascompared withCanadawhichin2000had145citieswithpopulationsover25,000(Kimand Law 2016).TheAustraliansampleitself,aswellasourmodificationofthe “major river” variable,speakstonaturallimitationsandwesuggestthenaturalenvironment posesobservable,longrecognizedlimitationstourbanization,particularlyinthe aridinterior.However,thepresumptionthattheselimitationsareuniversaland/ orexplainprimacywasnotsupported.
Interestingly,thetime-seriesresultsreflecttrendsineconomicgeography.Three suchexamplesincludethesignificanceofprecipitationin2006,thefadingimportanceofseaports,andtheriseandfalloffederalcapitalcitystatusinthe1960sto 1980s,arguablyazenithofcentralizationinfiscalfederalism.First,thepositive, albeitweak,relationshipwithrainfallcoincideswithAustralia’schangingeconomic geography,alate20thcenturyandongoingmigrationintotropicalQueensland (andWesternAustralia)sometimesreferredtoasasunbeltmigration (O’Connoretal. 2001).Second,thefadingimportanceofseaportsintheregression reflectsincreasingtradevolumesintheseaports,bothnewandold,ofrelatively smallnon-capitalcitiessuchasKarratha,WesternAustralia;Devonport, Tasmania;andPortland,Victoria.Bythe21stcentury,bothlargeandsmallcentres hadhighvolumeseaports,resultinginthefactorbeingincapableofexplainingor predictingvariationinmajorcenterpopulations.Third,despitethefederalcapital, Canberra,beingfoundedin1913,thevariabledoesnotbecomestatisticallysignificantuntilthe1960sandonlytemporarily.Theinitialriseinsignificancecorrespondswiththe1957NationalCapitalDevelopmentCommission,whichjumpstartedCanberra’sdevelopmentfollowingwar-timedelays,heraldingdecadesof growth(Sansom 2009a).Interestingly,theimportanceoffederalcapitalcitystatus increasedandplateauredinthe1970s-1980s,aperiodcommencingwithmarked federalexpansionandconcludingwithsomemoderationoffederalomnipotence. WhilsttheCommonwealthremainsthemostpowerfultierinfiscalterms,relative totheurbanhierarchytherewasashiftawayfromfederalaggrandizement.Thatis, relativetootherfactorsCanberra’sstatusascapitalconferrednopopulationadvantagefromthe1990s.ThisfollowedtheSunbeltphenomenonandthe Commonwealthabandoningthe ‘traditionaladministrativemodelofdirectcontrol...[nowpreferring]toworkthroughotherproviders’ suchasstates,regional andlocalgovernment(Head 2007:161)
CompetingAgendas
Thefederalcapitalvariableisalsonoteworthyforitsweaknessandwhatitdoesnot correspondwith,suchastheascensionoffederalrevenues(e.g.,Figure 3).InKim andLaw(2012, 2016)themechanismfosteringagglomerationincapitalcitieswas eachtierofgovernment ’srelativeOSRs.Forexample,capitalcityeffectislargerin CanadianprovincesthanAmericanstatesbecauseprovinceshavehigherOSRs, whereasAmericanlocalgovernmentshaveaccesstomorerevenuesourcesthan Canadian.DifferentcapitalcityeffectsareapparentinAustralia;thefederalcapital
gainslittleagglomerationbenefitdespiteitsfiscalomnipotencewhilststable/ increasingmeasuresofprimacysuggestlittlediscerniblerelationshipbetweenstate OSRsandprimacy.Forexample,despiteperiodsofsignificantstateOSRdecline (e.g.,1940s)orincline(e.g.,early2000sminingbooms),primacylargelyheldsteady.
RatherthancounteringKimandLaw’smechanism,wesuggesttheAustralian datarefineit.Thatis,thecentralizationofOSRsisnotamechanismforprimacy bydefault,butamechanismforonetiertoenactanagendaoverothers,toexpress the ‘relativeweightthecentralgovernmentplacesonthe[capital]’ (KimandLaw 2016:134).Putanotherway,primacymaycoincidewithcentralizedgovernance,but centralizedgovernmentsdonotalwaysselectforprimacy.ThisisapparentinChina, whereastrongcentralgovernmentimplementsafederalideologyofevenness, soughtthroughmigrationcontrols,resultinginarelativelyflaturbanhierarchy (AuandHenderson 2006).Demonstratedbyitsequalizationsystem,Australia’sfederalgovernmentissimilarlyconcernedaboutandequippedtoimplementanevennessagenda. ‘ThecrucialpointoffederalisminAustraliaisthepervasivenessof doctrinesofequalityandequalization ::: [which]inpracticetakestheformofstandardization,homogenization,andevenuniformity’ (Nethercote 2016:115). Rationallythen,anagendaofpercapitafairnesshassteeredfederaltransfersto existingpopulationcenterssincefederation.
Thus,Australia’sproblemisnotoneoftransferlogic,butoneoffewsubnational revenuestreams.Outsideoftransferstherearefewelastic(e.g.,localpoint-of-sale tax)orspeculative/innovativesourcesofcapitalinAustralianpublicfinance.Thisis particularlyacuteinthelocalgovernmentsector.Outsideofgrants,LGAfunding optionsformajorinfrastructurearerestrictive(AustralianProductivity Commission 2008).Somerecommendincreasedusageofdebt(Comrie 2014; Grimsey 2013)suchasmunicipalbonds(Dolleryetal. 2012;GrantandWoods 2016;Byrnesetal. 2008),debtsissuedbysubnationalandsubstategovernments oncapitalmarkets.Forexample,intheUnitedStatespubliclytraded ‘muni-bonds’ financeovertwo-thirdsofpublicinfrastructureandareissuedbylocal,regional,and stategovernments,constitutingadecentralizedfiscalarenathatenablesnumerous locationstofinanceinfrastructuresimultaneously(MunicipalSecurities RulemakingBoard 2020).Comparablefiscalpowers/tools/arenasdonotexistin Australiasubnationally.Instead,fiscalpowersarecentralizedintotransferswhich aresubjecttoanegalitarianprioritizationofexistingsettlements,resultinginthe crystallizationoftheurbansystem.Thatis,despiteafewinstancesofhierarchical dynamism(e.g.,emergenceofCanberra,GoldCoast,SunshineCoast;Perth’ sascensionoverAdelaideinthe1980s), ‘itisdifficulttoescapetheconclusionthatthe federalsystemhaseffectivelylocked-intheexistingbroadcontoursofAustralia’ s spatialstructure’ (StilwellandTroy 2000:928),theoutcomebeingascarcityoflarge non-capitalcities.
Wehavearguedthatdespitethefederalgovernment ’shighOSRsanegalitarian agendamoderatesCanberra’saggrandizement,weakeningtheimportanceofthe federalcapitalcitycoefficient.Conversely,withorwithoutlargeOSRs,statecapitals retainedtheircentrality.Thestatecapitalcitycoefficientwasstrongineveryperiod suggestingmyopicstateagendasbycomparison.Importantly,statescontrolledlarge scaleexpenditureresponsibilitieswhich,duetotheir ‘entrenchedlegalpowersand constitutionalsafeguards,’ theywieldwithabsolutecontroloverlocalgovernments
32GeorgeWilkinson etal.
(Burtonetal. 2002:41),atop-downdynamicwithalonghistory,moreextremethan thefederal-stateimbalance(Wilkinsonetal. 2022).Localweaknessisillustratedby theproclivityofstatestointervene,abolish,redrawandreorganizelocalgovernments,aheavy-handedpowerAustralianstatesexercisefrequently,resultingin ‘balkanized’ capitalcityregions,urbanareascomprisedofmanysmalllocal governments,andstates’ monopolisticmetropolitancontrol(Sansom 2009b). Thus,whatlittlepowerlocalgovernmentshavetopushanagendaisusuallyconcentratedincapitalcityregions.
CanprimacybediscussedofAustralianstates,atopictypicallydiscussedof countries?
Weprovidetwojustifications.First,Australianstatesaregeographicallylargeandof comparablesizewithmanycountries.Tasmania,thesmalleststate,isapproximately thesizeofIreland,whileWesternAustraliaislargerthanMexico.Second,primacy describeseconomicgeographywithinapolity.Nationalscaleisnotaprerequisiteof thephenomenonthoughcountrieshavehistoricallybeentheunitofanalysis.More recentworkshaveextendedanalysestosub-nationalandregionalscales,theresults ofwhichhavecomplementedunderstandingsofprimacy(ShortandPinet-Peralta 2009;KimandLaw 2012;Garza 2016;KimandLaw 2016).Ourworkisinthesame vein,understandingthataninterpretationofsub-nationalterritorieswillbeshaped bymultiplelayersofpoliticalfactors.
CanAustraliabecomparedwithlargercountrieslikeUnitedStatesandCanada?
WhilstCanada’spopulation(37m)ismarginallyhigherthanAustralia’s(25m),the UnitedStates’smuchlargerpopulation(>300million)mightappeartodisqualify thecomparisonbetweenAmericanandAustralianurbanization.However,theinstitutionalperspectiveemphasizesfoundationsandorigins – thesuggestionthatthe currentstate(e.g.,population)isinpartaproductoftheinstitutionsunderreview.It isthisfoundationalviewthatledustodeterminethethreecountries’ comparable originsinnewlysettledlands,nowhostingdivergenturbansystems,makesthe additionofAustraliatothedebateparticularlyinteresting.
Insummary,theresultsofourstudycontributetoabetterunderstandingofthe driversofurbanprimacyinAustraliaandofferpolicyimplicationsrelativeto “PlanningforAustralia’sFuturePopulation,” theCommonwealth’spurported decentralizationplan(AustralianGovernment 2019).Specifically,ouranalysissuggestseffectivedecentralizationinAustralianeedstoaddressthepoliticaldriversof primacy,suchasfiscalcentralizationandweaklocalism,andwilllikelyentailreform tosomedegree;aconsiderationabsentfromcurrentplans.Presumingthetrendswe identifiedcontinue,manyofthesecenters,particularlythosenotadjacenttocapital cities,areunlikelytoexperiencethedisproportionatepopulationgrowththeyneed inordertoalleviatecongestioninthecapitalsand/oractascomplementarysecond cities.
Conclusion
MeasuresofurbanprimacyinAustralianstatesareprofound,boththeirmagnitude andthescaleuponwhichprimatecitiescasttheirshadows.Ourresultsidentify extremeexamplesofprimacy,particularlyinNewSouthWales,Victoria, Queensland,andWesternAustralia.Aretheseexamplesofthepoliticallyderived excessive primacytypicalofpost-colonialcountriesinLatinAmerica,Asia,and Africa?Australia’shistoryoffiscalfederalism,ourstatisticalresults,andconsideration ofthepopulation,geographicsize,andwealthofthesestatessupportaninstitutional explanationconsistentwithotherlarge-scalecases.Ourpopulationmodelstatistically linkedAustralianmajorcenterpopulationswithpoliticalfactors,indicatingthatfrom 1911to2016statecapitalcitystatusstrongly,positivelycorrelatedwithpopulation whilenaturalfactorswerelargelyinsignificantdriversofvariation.Australianeconomicgeographyappearstobeconfinedbypoliticalforces.
HowcanprimacyinAustraliabeexcessiveamidstthecountry’saffluence?Livable primatecitiesmakeitdifficulttoroundlycriticizeprimacy.However,theABShas projectedsignificantpopulationgtowthinth21stcentury(ABS 2013, 2017). Shouldpopulationgrowthcontinuetoconcentrateincapitalcitiesthiswilllikely erodelivabilityastheprimatecitiessurpass10millionpeopleandexpandinto mega-cities(WellerandBolleter 2013).Furthermore,tojudgeprimacybythequality oflifeintheprimatecityoverlooksthephenomenon’sterritorialscaleandunderestimatesthepotentialofsecondcities.WhilstHenderson(2005)foundurbanhierarchiestobestable,andAnthony(2014)suggestedprimacyprogressivelygrows inflexible,neitheraccountedforrareexamplesofhierarchicaldisruption,ashas occurredinBrazil6 twice,forexample.Thus,theoreticalrecognitionofuntappedeconomicpotentialinthenon-capitalcitiesofvast,wealthycasesofexcessiveprimacy (e.g.,someAustralianstates)isnecessary.Theseexamplesrepresent bydefinition the suppressionoflargenon-capitalcities,arguablyfutureworldcities(asperTaylor 2020).Theexistenceofthispotentialanswersprimacy’ s “so-what” question – primacy matterspartlybecauseofwhatisconcealedinitsshadow.
ArchivalSources
AustralianBureauofStatistics (1911)2112.0 – CensusoftheCommonwealthofAustralia,1911.Canberra. (1912–2012)1301.0YearBookAustralia.Canberra. (1921)2111.0 – CensusoftheCommonwealthofAustralia,1921.Canberra. (1933)2110.0 – CensusoftheCommonwealthofAustralia,1933.Canberra. (1947)2109.0 – CensusoftheCommonwealthofAustralia,1947.Canberra. (1954)2108.0 – CensusoftheCommonwealthofAustralia,1954.Canberra. (1966)2106.0 – CensusofPopulationandHousing,1966.Canberra.
6Fortwocenturieseach,Salvador(1534–1763)andRiodeJaneiro(1763–1960)werelargest,capitalcities ofwhatisnowBrazil.Inthe19thcentury,RioeclipsedSalvador,exhibitingahighmeasureofurbanprimacy throughthelatterhalfofthe19thcentury(BoyerandDavies 1973).Inthewakeofa20thcenturyeconomic boominSaoPaulostate,constitutionalreformstodisruptthepoliticalestablishmentinRioandanational desiretodevelopthecountry’sinterior,RiowassurpassedinpopulationbySaoPauloin1954andstripped ofcapitalcitystatusin1960withtheestablishmentofBrasilia(JamesandFaissol 1956).Thisexampledemonstratesbothhierarchicaldisruptionandalsothatthemovementofacapitalisnotaprerequisitetoprimacydisruption,thoughitmaybesupportive.
etal.
(1975–2018)5206.0AustralianNationalAccounts:NationalIncome,ExpenditureandProduct. Canberra:GovernmentofAustralia.
(1976)2104.0 – CensusofPopulationandHousing,1976.Canberra. (1986)2102.0 – CensusofPopulationandHousing,1986.Canberra. (1994–2020)5512.0GovernmentFinanceStatistics,Australia.Canberra:GovernmentofAustralia. (2013)3222.0PopulationProjectionsAustralia,2012(Base)to2101.Canberra:Governmentof Australia.
(2014)3105.0.65.001AustralianHistoricalPopulationStatistics.Canberra. (2017)3222.0 – PopulationProjections,Australia,2017(base) – 2066.Canberra. (2019a)3105.0.65.001AustralianHistoricalPopulationStatistics.Canberra. (2019b)3218.0 – RegionalPopulationGrowth,Australia,2017–2018.Canberra. (2021)PopulationGrowsbyOverseasMigrationDecreases.Canberra.
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GeorgeWilkinson isaPhDcandidateintheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCenterandCentrefor RegionalDevelopmentattheUniversityofWesternAustralia.Heisalsoamanagementconsultantwith expertiseinstrategy,rootcauseanalysis,andchangemanagement.George’sPhD,titled Ascarcityoflarge non-capitalcities:anationalanalysisofthedriversofurbanprimacyinAustralianstates,examinesprimacy fromtheperspectiveofeconomicgeographyandinstitutionaleconomics.
FionalHaslam-McKenzie isprofessorofgeographyandco-directoroftheCentreforRegional DevelopmentattheUniversityofWesternAustralia.Fionahasextensiveexperienceinpopulationand socioeconomicchange,housing,regionaleconomicdevelopmentandanalysisofremote,andregional andurbansocioeconomicindicators.Sheiscurrentlyresearchingthesocioeconomicimpactofdifferent workforcearrangementsfortheminingindustryanduneveneconomicdevelopmentinWestern Australia,focusingonthekeyissuesofcompetitiveness,resilience,andspatialintegration.
JulianBolleter isaresearcherandteacherattheUniversityofWesternAustraliaSchoolofDesignandcodirectoroftheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentrewherehedeliverscommissionedresearchforstate governmentplanningdepartments,writingurbandesign/city-relatedbooks,conductingurbandesignprojects,andteachinganurbandesigncourse.Herecentlypublished TheGhostCitiesofAustralia,exploringthe failedvisionsfornewcitiesinAustraliasinceFederationin1901tounderstandwhatpragmaticandpsychologicalbarriersexisttomakingnewcities.
PaulaHooper isaHealthwayresearchfellowattheUniversityofWesternAustraliaSchoolofDesignand co-directoroftheAustralianUrbanDesignResearchCentre.Hermultidisciplinaryresearchworkhasstudiedtheimpactofthebuiltenvironmentandurbandesignonhealthandwell-beingandhashadastrong focusonpolicyrelevanceandresearchtranslation,forwhichshehaswonnumerousplanningindustrybasedawards.Paulaishighlyskilledinspatialanalyticsandtheuseofgeographicinformation’ssystems andthedevelopmentofmeasurementmethodsofurbandesign.
Citethisarticle: Wilkinson,George,III,FionaHaslamMcKenzie,JulianBolleter,andPaulaHooper(2023) “PoliticalCentralization,Federalism,andUrbanization:EvidencefromAustralia,” SocialScienceHistory 47: 11–39.doi:10.1017/ssh.2022.30