Brexit: What's at Stake for US Security Interests

Atlantic Council BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE BRIEF

Brexit: What’s at Stake for US Security Interests?

JUNE 2016

WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

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n June 23, 2016, a referendum will decide whether Britain will leave the European Union (EU) or remain a member. Votes will be cast by British voters, but other nations—not just the members of the EU—have an interest in the outcome. In broad perspective, the ultimate issue is how Britons view their nation’s place in Europe and the world. Britain’s departure from the EU would affect the rest of the world, because it would have implications for a broad spectrum of international concerns—trade, economic and environmental regulations, response to climate change, law enforcement cooperation, movement of people, financial systems, the place of London in the world financial system—and very importantly on international security, in both the narrow military sense and more broadly. These potential impacts on security have special significance for the United States because of Britain’s prominent role in the international security context.

National security has been an issue, albeit a secondary one, in the internal British debate. The “Remain” campaign has argued that staying in the EU would better serve British national security, while “Leavers” argue that a Britain free of continental entanglements would be safer. The voters, however, seem likely to decide based less on national security issues than on such essentially domestic matters as immigration, subjection to EU regulation, and national sovereignty.

On June 23, British citizens will decide the fate of the United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union. Whether Britain remains or exits from the European Union also has enormous implications for US interests. “Bremain Vs. Brexit” is a campaign, led by the Atlantic Council’s Future Europe Initiative, to inform the debate in the run-up to the June 23 referendum.

For the United States, our interests would be affected more by the security consequences of a British departure from the EU than effects in other domains. While the United Kingdom (UK) is a significant factor in US trade and other economic relationships, it is, in relative terms, a secondary factor. By contrast, Britain is certainly among the most important, and arguably the most important partner for the United States across the full range of security concerns. To be sure, the “special relationship” is something of a nostalgic myth, and in any specific regional security context, other nations will usually figure prominently.

But for all Britain’s relative decline on the world stage, it is still, by any reasonable measure, the US ally with the broadest global perspective on international security and the greatest potential, in the European,

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Brexit: What’s at Stake for US Security Interests?

but also in a worldwide context, to work security issues with high quality capabilities in military, diplomatic, intelligence, and other domains. While the relationship has grown more distant over the decades, Britain and the United States share a wide range of security interests and values—in defense, diplomacy, norms of international conduct, and human rights. Our two nations have many bilateral connections in the security field but we also participate together—and are usually working in partnership—with many international institutions, including NATO and the United Nations.

And Britain has historically been a bridge—a “pragmatic mediator”—between the United States and the EU. A central question from the US perspective therefore is how Britain leaving the EU would affect US security interests, both directly and indirectly, from the secondary effects of the departure on other international relationships. Any predictions in this regard are necessarily uncertain—there is no solid precedent for so major a change in the international connections of a major US ally.

(Even De Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from the NATO military structure in 1966 was much more limited in scope.) However, some implications do seem clear—and consideration of them reveals that, as President Obama declared very directly during his recent visit to London, the United States has an interest in Britain remaining in the EU.

Such an economic slowdown has security implications.

Britain is a leader among European states in both defense spending and in development aid. Moreover, it has one of the most skilled and effective diplomatic operations in the world. Any slowdown in British economic recovery would result in less public revenue, and therefore less funding available for international and defense purposes.

More broadly, it seems likely that a Britain that turns away from Europe would be inclined to reduce its international role generally and to give priority to commercial interests, as it sought an alternate road to economic success. But even if Brexit changed not one single aspect of Britain’s policies and priorities on international affairs it would—assuming the consensus predictions are accurate—mean a reduction in its capacity to make resources available to advance those policies and priorities. The all-butcertain consequent need to reduce these contributions as part of the response to decreased growth in the economy and therefore in government revenues would reduce the scale and impact of Britain on the international stage.

For example, even if Britain were able to stick with its reversal of the earlier decision to let defense spending fall below 2 percent of GDP, the absolute amount of resources available would decline, and with it Britain’s already diminished capabilities to mount serious military operations and conduct other international activities.

A central question from the US perspective therefore is how Britain leaving the EU would affect US security interests. . .

First, the economic consequences of leaving would very likely affect Britain’s public finances and therefore its resources for international activity. Those economic consequences are a matter of sharp debate between the Leave and Remain camps. Although the Leave campaign argues that Britain would prosper once freed from the yoke of Brussels, multiple independent economic analyses have concluded that Brexit would cause significant economic disruption and a slowdown in British economic growth. The scale of that effect is highly uncertain and depends very much on how successful Britain would be in negotiating a future relationship with the EU that would preserve most of the benefits of membership while shedding most of the burdens. Nonetheless, there is no real disagreement that the effect would be negative.

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The EU British withdrawal would, by definition, fundamentally change Britain’s relationship to the EU, and those changes would be adverse to US security interests, whatever impact they might have on economic and other non-security concerns. An EU without the UK would, in all likelihood, be less inclined to make its security and diplomatic efforts line up with US priorities—and less able to mount effective operations.

Britain has been unenthusiastic, to put it mildly, about these EU initiatives, but in practical terms, it has been both a major contributor of capability and a voice for strong links between any European diplomatic and military efforts and those of the United States and

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Brexit: What’s at Stake for US Security Interests?

British Prime Minister David Cameron and US President Barack Obama talk at the 2013 G8 Summit in Northern Ireland. Photo credit: White House/Wikimedia.

NATO. An EU freed of British objections and cautions would very likely press ahead more vigorously on the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the autonomous EU military capability, which might see defense purchases restricted to EU sources, regardless of reduced capability or costeffectiveness. Without Britain, the EU’s military capability would not only be less likely to be coordinated with NATO and the United States, but also less effective. Britain has one of the principal European armed forces; the UK accounts for over 20 percent of all EU defense budgets while having less than 14 percent of total Union GDP. An EU defense effort without that contribution would be significantly more limited in capability, and correspondingly less able to undertake missions that would—even from the US and NATO perspective—best be conducted under EU auspices, with support from the US and NATO. Moreover, Britain has insisted that any European defense policy, institutions, forces, and any European

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diplomatic program, must be consistent with NATO’s leading role in European security and give due weight to acting in partnership with the United States. That voice would be silenced in EU councils, and the Union would be more focused on commercial interests, more reluctant to take action that might offend Russia, less outward looking in its security policies, and less coordinated with US priorities and efforts.

Europe as a continent and the EU as an institution are facing a host of crises—not only immediate challenges on migration and finances, but on the very future of the institution. The United States has long fostered cooperation and integration of the nations of Europe along with openness to the outside world. Not only would the absence of the UK tend to shift the internal EU debate toward a more inward-looking set of policies, it is reasonable to expect that British withdrawal would exacerbate already-existing divisions within the EU, as other members considered withdrawal or insistence on special deals as the price of remaining, thereby further

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Brexit: What’s at Stake for US Security Interests?

fragmenting an EU decision-making mechanism that is already challenged to find common ground for timely action. Those effects would likely be particularly significant in the security and foreign affairs fields where Britain has usually advocated for EU positions that are more nearly in line with US interests, such as maintaining strong pressure on Iran to restrain its nuclear program, and recognizing that fundamental changes in Russian behavior force Europe to consider a realistic appraisal of the character of Putin’s policies and actions.

NATO A Britain outside the EU would, of course, still be inside NATO, and some Leave advocates argue that NATO membership is enough to ensure that Brexit will have essentially no impact on Britain’s own national security or its ability to cooperate with continental nations and the United States on military matters.

To some considerable degree this is true: Britain would continue to be a major player in NATO councils and a leading contributor to its military potential. But Brexit would not be without its effects within NATO. In the alliance, even more than inside the EU, Britain has been an advocate—in its own interest—of policies and actions that are broadly consistent with US views. The UK brings to NATO councils a serious military capability, a more global outlook, and a realism about the international scene (including in relation to Russia). In addition, Britain enjoys a geographical situation such that—to a degree exceeded only by the United States and Canada—attacks on allies that are the immediate victims of aggression are matters of solidarity and long-term interest because of a realization that attacks on relatively remote allies also threaten its own security, even though they are not direct threats to territory. This is the fundamental principle of the alliance, and one with both profound political effects and practical military consequences, such as forward deployments in peacetime and preparations for rapid reinforcement if deterrence is failing.

EU as well—is unlikely to be completely immune to the divisions between Britain and its continental neighbors that would flow from leaving the EU—over both the broad shape of the UK’s relation to the rest of Europe and the difficult specifics of negotiating its future relationships with the Union. It is not plausible that a Britain that had just repudiated association with its EU partners would be as effective inside NATO as before.

A relatively minor example of the tensions that would follow within NATO if Britain left the EU is presented by Gibraltar. Spain (itself something of an outsider vis-àvis both the Union and the alliance) might well tighten or even cut off access from Gibraltar to Spain, if the Rock were no longer within the EU freedom of movement regime. Still more worrying would be the effect on the border between Ulster and the Republic of Ireland; any change to the border regime might make all the more difficult full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement to which the United States has devoted so much effort. Additionally, Britain has been a significant player in seeking to moderate and contain tensions between Greece and Turkey, and this would be more challenging to manage without Britain in the EU— in which Greece (and Cyprus), but not Turkey, are members.

NATO as an institution . . . is unlikely to be completely immune to the divisions between Britain and its continental neighbors that would flow from leaving the EU. . .

Much of this would remain true after Brexit, but NATO as an institution—most of whose members are in the

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It is quite likely that referendum victory for Britain leaving the EU would lead, in short order, to a victory in a second Scottish referendum for Scotland leaving the UK. It seems likely that an independent Scotland would become a NATO ally, but unless the Scottish National Party (SNP) were to drastically change its policies, independence would mean British nuclear missiles and submarines would have to leave their Scottish base. It is by no means certain that this shrunken UK would choose to find the resources (and the political will) to create a replacement base south of the River Tweed. The United States—and NATO as an institution—have long regarded the British deterrent force and US-UK cooperation on nuclear issues as both a contribution to deterrence and a pillar of our defense relationship.

The Leave campaign cannot be held responsible for outsiders who choose to support its cause. But it is

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Brexit: What’s at Stake for US Security Interests?

significant to note that Putin has made no secret of his preference for the UK to leave the EU—a position unlikely to be driven by deep sympathy with British concerns about immigration, Brussels bureaucrats, or the sovereignty of parliament, much less confidence that Britain can leave the EU without reducing the effectiveness of NATO. Rather, Putin surely expects that the strains among European states and within NATO and the EU would open opportunities for Russian exploitation. Britain has, for example, been a strong supporter of continued meaningful sanctions on Russia to impose a cost on Russian actions against Ukraine.

Bilateral relations The very close cooperation between the United States and the UK in defense and intelligence would certainly continue, but—as with NATO—it would be hard to insulate it from the effects of Britain leaving the EU, if only because there is likely to be some spillover from what would likely be contentious negotiations of a separate agreement on trade and other economic and

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regulatory issues. (To be sure, increased nationalism in the United States would also contribute to these tensions, probably more than anything specifically linked to Brexit.) *** The links between the United States and the UK in military and security matters are deep and longestablished. If the British people choose to leave the EU, the United States, the EU, NATO, and the UK would no doubt all do their best to minimize the impact of British withdrawal on security cooperation because that cooperation serves all parties’ basic interests and rests on shared values. But maintaining that cooperation would face new challenges. One may reasonably debate the scale of the effect of Brexit on that cooperation, but it is pretty clear that the sign of the effect would be negative.

Walter B. Slocombe is Secretary, Director, and Member of the Executive Committee of the Atlantic Council and a Senior Counsel at Caplin & Drysdale law firm.

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Atlantic Council Board of Directors CHAIRMAN *Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Brent Scowcroft PRESIDENT AND CEO *Frederick Kempe EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS *Adrienne Arsht *Stephen J. Hadley VICE CHAIRS *Robert J. Abernethy *Richard Edelman *C. Boyden Gray *George Lund *Virginia A. Mulberger *W. DeVier Pierson *John Studzinski TREASURER *Brian C. McK. Henderson SECRETARY *Walter B. Slocombe DIRECTORS Stéphane Abrial Odeh Aburdene Peter Ackerman Timothy D. Adams Bertrand-Marc Allen John R. Allen Michael Andersson Michael S. Ansari Richard L. Armitage David D. Aufhauser Elizabeth F. Bagley Peter Bass *Rafic A. Bizri Dennis C. Blair *Thomas L. Blair Myron Brilliant Esther Brimmer *R. Nicholas Burns William J. Burns

*Richard R. Burt Michael Calvey James E. Cartwright John E. Chapoton Ahmed Charai Sandra Charles Melanie Chen George Chopivsky Wesley K. Clark David W. Craig *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Nelson W. Cunningham Ivo H. Daalder *Paula J. Dobriansky Christopher J. Dodd Conrado Dornier Thomas J. Egan, Jr. *Stuart E. Eizenstat Thomas R. Eldridge Julie Finley Lawrence P. Fisher, II Alan H. Fleischmann *Ronald M. Freeman Laurie S. Fulton Courtney Geduldig *Robert S. Gelbard Thomas H. Glocer *Sherri W. Goodman Mikael Hagström Ian Hague Amir A. Handjani John D. Harris, II Frank Haun Michael V. Hayden Annette Heuser *Karl V. Hopkins Robert D. Hormats Miroslav Hornak *Mary L. Howell Wolfgang F. Ischinger Reuben Jeffery, III *James L. Jones, Jr. George A. Joulwan Lawrence S. Kanarek Stephen R. Kappes Maria Pica Karp

Sean Kevelighan Zalmay M. Khalilzad Robert M. Kimmitt Henry A. Kissinger Franklin D. Kramer Philip Lader *Richard L. Lawson *Jan M. Lodal Jane Holl Lute William J. Lynn Izzat Majeed Wendy W. Makins Mian M. Mansha Gerardo Mato William E. Mayer T. Allan McArtor John M. McHugh Eric D.K. Melby Franklin C. Miller James N. Miller *Judith A. Miller *Alexander V. Mirtchev Karl Moor Michael J. Morell Georgette Mosbacher Steve C. Nicandros Thomas R. Nides Franco Nuschese Joseph S. Nye Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Sean C. O’Keefe Ahmet M. Oren *Ana I. Palacio Carlos Pascual Alan Pellegrini David H. Petraeus Thomas R. Pickering Daniel B. Poneman Daniel M. Price Arnold L. Punaro Robert Rangel Thomas J. Ridge Charles O. Rossotti Robert O. Rowland Harry Sachinis

John P. Schmitz Brent Scowcroft Rajiv Shah Alan J. Spence James G. Stavridis Richard J.A. Steele *Paula Stern Robert J. Stevens John S. Tanner *Ellen O. Tauscher Frances M. Townsend Karen Tramontano Clyde C. Tuggle Paul Twomey Melanne Verveer Enzo Viscusi Charles F. Wald Jay S. Walker Michael F. Walsh Mark R. Warner Maciej Witucki Neal S. Wolin Mary C. Yates Dov S. Zakheim HONORARY DIRECTORS David C. Acheson Madeleine K. Albright James A. Baker, III Harold Brown Frank C. Carlucci, III Robert M. Gates Michael G. Mullen Leon E. Panetta William J. Perry Colin L. Powell Condoleezza Rice Edward L. Rowny George P. Shultz John W. Warner William H. Webster *Executive Committee Members List as of May 18, 2016

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