MIguEL ÁNgEL COLLADO YuRRITA
JOAN EgEA FERNÁNDEz
ISAbEL FERNÁNDEz TORRES
JOSé IgNACIO gARCíA NINET
JAvIER LOpéz gARCíA DE LA SERRANA
bELéN NOguERA DE LA MuELA
LuIS pRIETO SANChíS
FRANCISCO RAMOS MéNDEz
RICARDO RObLES pLANAS
SIxTO SÁNChEz LORENzO
JESúS-MARíA SILvA SÁNChEz
JOAN MANuEL TRAYTER JIMéNEz
JuAN JOSé TRIgÁS RODRíguEz
Director de publicaciones
Prof. Dr. Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris
Prof. Dr. Carmen Estevan de Quesada
Directors
Miquel Aznar Company
Marco Botta
Niklas Brueggemann
Jens-Uwe Franck
Niccolò Galli
Carlos Gómez Asensio
María Gómez Santos
Contributors
Carmen Herrero Suárez
Ji ř í Kindl
Eugenio Olmedo Peralta
Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris
Julia Suderow Rodríguez
Richard Whish
Directora:
Isabel Fernández Torres
Profesora titular de Derecho mercantil
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Research Project: «Concentration, Harm, Abuse and Cooperation in Digital Markets». PID2021-128111OB-I00
Research Project: «Competition Power Control».
CIAICO/2021/202
Reservados todos los derechos. De conformidad con lo dispuesto en los arts. 270, 271 y 272 del Código Penal vigente, podrá ser castigado con pena de multa y privación de libertad quien reprodujere, plagiare, distribuyere o comunicare públicamente, en todo o en parte, una obra literaria, artística o científica, fijada en cualquier tipo de soporte, sin la autorización de los titulares de los correspondientes derechos de propiedad intelectual o de sus cesionarios.
Este libro ha sido sometido a un riguroso proceso de revisión por pares.
© 2025 Los autores
© 2025 Atelier
Santa Dorotea 8, 08004 Barcelona e-mail: editorial@atelierlibros.es www.atelierlibrosjuridicos.com Tel.: 93 295 45 60
ISBN: 979-13-87867-92-8
Depósito legal: B 21828-2025
Diseño y composición: Addenda, Pau Claris 92, 08010 Barcelona www.addenda.es
Impresión: WINIHARD
k eys for effeC tive private enforCement of Competition law in Digital markets in the european union 13
Prof. Dr. Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris
t he role of private litigation in the enforCement of the Digital m arkets aC t ......................................
Prof. Dr. Richard Whish
37
f un Damental prinCiples of private Dma enforCement 63
Dr. Niklas Brueggeman
Damages aC tions against Digital gatekeepers for breaChes of e U antitrust law an D the Dma: a german perspeC tive .......... 79
Prof. Dr. Jens-Uwe Franck
Damages aC tions in the Digital seC tor - CzeCh experienCes with the eu level impaC t 117
JUDr. Jiří Kindl, M.Jur., Ph.D.
big teCh an D private antitrust litigation in italy ............. 129
Dr. Niccolò Galli / Prof. Dr. Marco Botta
t he problem of aCCess to justiCe in Digital markets: ColleC tive reDress solutions 155
Prof. Dr. Carmen Herrero Suárez
p rivate enforCement an D Compensation for the Damages C auseD by app stores in violation of the Dma 175 Prof. Dr. Eugenio Olmedo Peralta
unlawful state aiDs to startups in Digital an D teChnologiC al markets ................................................. 211
Prof. Dr. Carlos Gómez Asensio
p rivate antitrust enforCement for Consumers an D Digital platforms. where is the Compensation? ....................... 233 Dr. Julia Suderow
t he appliC ation of the DireC tive (eu ) 2020/1828 on representative aC tions in the Context of the Digital m arkets aC t ............................................. 253
Prof. Dr. María Gómez Santos
Competition risks an D Damage aC tions in streaming platforms: nfl sun Day tiCket lawsuit an D more 275 Miquel Aznar Company
In recent years, multiple class actions have been filed in the United Kingdom to protect the interests of consumers and professionals against large digital platforms such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, and Meta (GAMAM) for billions of pounds.
In the European Union, follow-on actions are beginning to be brought, particularly by entrepreneurs, as a result of the various Booking decisions adopted by the German, French, and Spanish competition authorities, or as a consequence of the Google Play and Google Search decisions.
The issue of actions derived from the DMA is also opening up.
The transposition of the directive on collective or representative actions in the various member states allows for the exercise of collective actions to protect consumers.
Many member states have gone further in their legislation.
This book brings together most of the papers presented at the IV Valencia International Meeting on Competition Law dedicated to private enforcement in digital markets.
Juan Ignacio Ruiz Peris writes about the fact that the relevance of private enforcement of competition law in the European Union is growing fast due to the current moderation of public enforcement by the European Commission, both in the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and Articles 5, 6, and 7 of the Digital Markets Act.
His paper explores several ways to improve public and private deterrence in digital markets in relation to collective redress, the financing of claims, and public-private cooperation in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the DMA.
Richard Whish considers the availability of damages to firms that suffer as a result of infringements of the Digital Markets Act by ‘designated gatekeepers’. He considers the development of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the availability of damages for infringement of the competition rules of the TFEU and the impact of the Damages Directive of 2014.
The direct effect of the provisions of the Digital Markets Act is considered and the ‘pros and cons’ of litigation under competition law and/or the Digital Markets Act are considered.
He concludes that it can be expected that private litigation under the Digital Markets Act will develop rapidly.
Niklas Brueggeman argues that obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6 and 7 as well as in Article 13(4), (5) and (6) DMA are sufficiently precise and, following adoption of the respective designation decision, also unconditional. They therefore meet the first prong of the legal test for private enforcement as they can, in principle, give rise to unconditional and sufficiently precise direct rights between individuals. This leads us to the second prong of the legal test for private enforcement.
Jens-Uwe Franck examines actions for damages against digital gatekeepers for breach of EU antitrust law or the Digital Markets Act (DMA) from a German perspective. His paper provides insights into private antitrust litigation against digital gatekeepers before German courts. While the pending damages actions are still at an early stage, a number of injunction actions have been decided, providing some insight into the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement against digital gatekeepers.
The paper deals also with the role of damages actions as an instrument of corrective justice and of enforcement in the context of DMA infringements is discussed. The conceptual choice to include DMA infringements in the German antitrust damages law is considered in the light of the EU principles of effectiveness and equivalence.
Jiří Kindl examines the evolving landscape of private competition litigation in the Czech Republic, with a particular focus on damages actions in the digital sector and their broader implications for the EU.
Despite the limited prevalence of private enforcement in Czechia, where public enforcement by the Office for Protection of Competition dominates, some notable cases such as the Heureka Group v. Google and Seznam.cz v. Google show a potential for EU-level impact.
The paper delves in particular into the Heureka case, where a preliminary reference to the CJEU clarified previously unaddressed issues surrounding limitation periods, reinforcing the principle of effectiveness in EU competition law.
It concludes by assessing the potential future trajectory of these cases and their broader significance for private damages claims within the EU.
Niccolò Galli and Marco Botta examine private enforcement in Italy, where the competition authority (ICA) has been an active public enforcer, but private litigation against BigTech remains limited.
The analysis focuses on three cases before the Milan Court, which illustrate both the potential and challenges of private enforcement. The private actions did not yield the desired remedies for the three small plaintiffs—two lost on the merits, while the successful one entered liquidation before the litigation concluded. Nevertheless, the Italian cases provide valuable insights for future private litigation, not only under Article 102 TFEU but also in the context of the emerging EU digital regulations.
Carmen Herrero Suárez examines the collective or representative action, the assignment of credits or claims to a litigation vehicle, assessing their admissibility and implementation in practice in the European framework and the role they are playing or may play in the future to solve the problems of access to justice for victims of anti-competitive practices or other illegalities in digital markets.
Eugenio Olmedo Peralta’s paper examines the competitive constraints inherent in the current configuration of digital mobile ecosystems, with a focus on practices that restrict developers from directly distributing their applications.
It explores how dominant app distribution platforms -Apple’s App Store and Alphabet’s Google Play- have established gatekeeping positions that enable them to control developer access to end-users.
These practices are assessed through the lens of competition law enforcement, highlighting the limitations of traditional antitrust tools in addressing structural and behavioural barriers within these markets. In response to these regulatory shortcomings, the European Union has adopted a proactive ex ante framework through the Digital Markets Act (DMA), which imposes binding obligations on designated gatekeepers. The conduct of Apple and Alphabet, particularly in relation to app distribution and user access, has informed the inclusion of targeted prohibitions within this new regulatory regime. Despite the formal entry into force of the DMA and the submission of initial compliance reports, both firms continue to engage in strategic behaviours central to the entrenchment of their market power.
He concludes that the effectiveness of the DMA will ultimately depend on the availability of robust enforcement mechanisms. In this regard, the development of efficient private enforcement pathways is essential to ensure compliance and to enable effective redress for affected market participants. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to safeguard the right of developers to directly distribute their apps, free from gatekeepers’ undue restrictions.
Julia Suderow examines the evolving landscape of private enforcement in abuse of dominance cases within digital markets, focusing on the challenges faced by consumers and businesses in seeking redress from dominant digital platforms. Her paper explores how the rise of Big Tech has intensified bargaining asymmetries and introduced new competition risks, prompting regulatory responses such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act and Digital Services Act.
Through an initial analysis of two cases, including Idealo v. Google in Germany and collective actions against Apple in the UK, the article highlights the procedural and evidentiary hurdles in quantifying harm, particularly for consumers.
The paper discusses the limitations of current legal and economic methodologies, such as the lack of methods for the lack of choice for consumers in Europe. Despite a consensus on the need for effective private enforcement, significant barriers remain—particularly for consumers—due to the fragmentation of collective redress mechanisms and the complexity of proving harm in digital markets. This asymmetry undermines both consumer welfare and the effectiveness of EU competition law, underscoring the urgent need for more accessible and robust enforcement tools.
María Gómez Santos explores the connections and applications of Directive 2020/1828 within the context of the Digital Markets Act (DMA), particularly emphasizing their weaknesses. Two main conclusions are reached. First, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) fall outside the scope of Directive 2020/1828. Consequently, these operators are unable to pursue representative actions in cases of potential violations of the DMA. However, they still have the option to engage in individual litigation or combine their actions, though this approach carries certain disadvantages for the plaintiffs. The second conclusion addresses the potential issues that may arise from using third-party funds to finance representative actions, particularly concerning public enforcement. Lastly, the paper reviews the status of the transposition of Directive 2020/1828 into the Spanish legal system and identifies some areas for improvement.
Miquel Aznar Company, analyses streaming platforms that have become a reality that has transformed the way audiovisual content is consumed. These platforms, through the application of Over-The-Top technology, offer the user different functionalities to access audiovisual content with just an internet connection. Due to their digital nature, they present a series of competition risks typical of this sector, such as vertical integration or tying. In his paper, these risks will be analysed, as well as different judicial procedures that are being developed in the United States on the subject, which offer us an insight into the private enforcement of competition law to this type of platforms.
We hope you enjoy the lecture.
Carmen Estevan de Quesada
