The Chairman’s Address 2023 “Seaworthiness, Negligent Navigation and Safer Ships”
May I first express my deep thanks for the honour your Association bestowed upon me by asking me to become the Chairman of this historic and important Association. To have my name added to those very distinguished judges who have been Chairman of the Association is very special indeed. I am most grateful to Burkhard Fischer, the Vice Chairman last year and before that, for ensuring that my duties have not been onerous but I have enjoyed the last year immensely and I have met adjusters from more than a few countries. It may be a small profession but it is a most friendly profession.
There are some, believe it or not, to whom the name of your Association does not sound exciting. Perhaps they think “average” is an adjective rather than a noun. I remember the occasion of one annual dinner of your Association. There was a meeting in the Law Courts which I had to attend beforehand. I went in my black tie. The Lord Chief Justice was also attending a dinner that evening and was also wearing black tie at the meeting. He asked me where I was going. I told him, with a measure of pride, the annual dinner of the Association of Average Adjusters. I forget where he said he was going but he was underwhelmed by the mention of the name of your Association and suggested that he would have the more interesting evening. I then told him that my dinner was at the Savoy and he then agreed that I would probably have the better evening.
Such is the skill, learning and attention to detail of the members of your profession that few general average cases ever reach the courts. The Longchamp is, of course, the exception which proves the rule. However, from time to time a shipowner seeks to recover a general average contribution from cargo interests pursuant to an adjustment made by one of your members. Such claims do reach the courts. In my last years on the Bench, I had the immense pleasure of trying two such cases, one in the Commercial Court and the other in the Admiralty Court. My choice of topic for my Address this morning is prompted by the general average case which I tried in the Admiralty Court in 2019, The LIBRA. Of course, as I was reminded by one of your members, it is a contract of carriage case rather than a general average case. But it caused some debate, indeed concern, amongst shipowners and P&I Clubs and ultimately proceeded to the Supreme Court. The International Group of P&I Clubs was so concerned that they intervened in the proceedings to support the application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. You may recall that last year’s Chairman of this Association expressed his disagreement with the decision in his Address to you. So it is, I hope, appropriate that I should seek to explain the decision but also to discuss its possible consequences and its significance.
Although average adjustments are drawn up without regard to issues of fault, Rule D of the York Antwerp Rules allows such issues to be raised at the stage of enforcement of an obligation to contribute in GA. When a shipowner seeks to enforce cargo’s obligation to contribute in GA, the defence raised is usually the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel. There has been an implied warranty of seaworthiness since the days of sailing vessels and the duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship is at the heart of the allocation of risk between shipowners and cargo interests in the Hague Rules of 1924.
But negligent navigation is and has always been an exception from the Owner’s liability. To modern eyes, it seems curious that an employer can seek to avoid liability by proving that the cause of the damage was the negligence of his own employee. But the practice was, it is thought, once justified, or explained, by the circumstance that when the vessel was at sea the shipowner was no longer in control of the vessel and communication with the master was not possible.
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By the Hague Rules of 1924, the international shipping and trading community sought to agree a pragmatic compromise between the interests of those countries where shipowners were based and the interests of those countries who bought the goods carried on board ship. In place of the absolute duty to provide a seaworthy ship, the shipowner was obliged by Article III r.1 to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, to properly man, equip and supply the ship, and to make the holds fit and safe for the reception, carriage and preservation of the goods. The shipowner was also obliged by Article III r.2 to properly and carefully carry the goods but subject to Article IV. Article IV provided that the shipowner would not be responsible for damage resulting from certain listed causes, the first of which was negligence in the navigation or management of the ship. At the conference which produced the Hague Rules, Article III was described as the “cargo interests’ clause” and Article IV as the “shipowners’ clause”.
It might well have been thought that, since almost 100 years has passed since the Hague Rules were agreed, there was nothing new to learn about the shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy ship or the scope of the exception from the shipowner’s liability of negligent navigation. Both concepts were familiar to shipowners and cargo interests long before the Hague Rules of 1924 and both concepts were at the heart of the Hague Rules pragmatic compromise. There have also been attempts to introduce a new compromise by means of the Hamburg Rules of 1978 and the Rotterdam Rules of 2009, both of which have sought to end the exception of negligent navigation. But the Hague Rules, as amended by the Hague Visby Rules of 1968, remain predominant in the law of carriage by sea. However, the reality is that the scope of the seaworthiness duty is not fixed in stone but is capable of adapting to and encompassing changes in the practice of shipping. Thus, a vessel which in 1924 was regarded as a seaworthy ship may in fact and in law be regarded as unseaworthy in the 21st.century. In this way, the reach of the negligent navigation exception can be progressively reduced as changes in the practices of shipowners progressively increase the reach of the seaworthiness obligation.
The most recent example of this relates to the practice of passage planning.
The International Maritime Organisation published Guidelines for passage planning in 1999. The Guidelines expressly recognised the need for passage planning by all ships engaged on international voyages and emphasised that passage planning, as well as the close and continuous monitoring of the vessel’s progress, is of essential importance for safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation and the protection of the marine environment.
This publication gave rise to the following question. If a vessel suffers a casualty such as a grounding as a result of poor passage planning, is that negligent navigation so that the shipowner is not liable, or does it result in the vessel being unseaworthy so that the shipowner is liable for it? That was the issue which came before me in the case of the LIBRA.
Let me first tell you about the facts of the case.
On 17 May 2011 a laden vessel, the LIBRA, left the port of Xiamen in south east China. Xiamen is one of the largest ports in China. Vessels leaving the port do so by means of a buoyed fairway which had a least depth of 14 metres. Outside the fairway lie poorly charted shallows. The vessel’s draft was just over 15 metres but she left just after high water and so there would have been sufficient under keel clearance in the fairway. Unfortunately, in the course of her departure, the vessel left the fairway and grounded 4 cables to the west of the fairway in shallow water.
On the chart extract, the blue line shows the vessel’s intended track and the red line shows her actual track, taking her away from the fairway and into shallow waters where she grounded. A salvage operation was required which cost some US$9.5 million. When the general average was adjusted, the Cargo interests’ contribution in general average was some US$13 million.
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It would appear that the great majority of Cargo interests had a clear view of the law and accepted that the cause of the casualty was negligent navigation, an excepted peril under the contracts of carriage and the Hague Visby Rules, and they so paid their contribution to general average. But a very small minority, 8% of Cargo interests, refused to do so. Their contribution in general average was some US$800,000 and the Owners issued proceedings in the Admiralty Court to recover it.
The claim came before me in January and February 2019. The Cargo interests alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy because the master was incompetent or fatigued and that such unseaworthiness was the cause of the grounding. It was also alleged that the vessel had deviated from the normal and contractual route such that the contractual exceptions did not apply. These allegations failed.
A knowledgeable observer might therefore have expected the Cargo Interests’ case to have failed on the grounds that the casualty was a classic illustration of negligent navigation for which the Owners were exempted from liability. The master should have kept to the fairway and he failed to do so.
There was however a further argument, namely, that although there had indeed been negligent navigation, such navigation had been the consequence of a defective passage plan prepared by the second officer and the defective passage plan had rendered the vessel unseaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage. There was therefore, it was said, actionable fault and the Cargo interests had a defence to the claim to enforce their contribution in general average.
This argument was strongly resisted by the Owners. They said that the preparation of a passage plan was part of the navigation of the vessel. It was not a characteristic of the vessel, her equipment or crew which could render the vessel unseaworthy. It was simply negligent navigation. Further, the Owners had a sound Safety Management System pursuant to which the navigational practices of the crew were monitored and checked. Thus, it was said that the Owners had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage. The Owners said that the argument advanced by the Cargo interests would subvert the allocation of risk between shipowners and cargo interests agreed in the Hague and Hague Visby Rules. No previous case had suggested that a defective passage plan prepared by the navigating officer and approved by the master could render the vessel unseaworthy.
The case therefore raised an interesting and important issue as to the scope of the concept of seaworthiness in the context of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules.
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Chart Extract CMA CGM Libra
Before explaining how that issue was resolved, I need to explain why the passage plan was defective and the effect it had on the navigation of the vessel by the master.
The passage plan, which was prepared by the second officer, was contained in two documents, the first being a document provided to the vessel by the Owners in which the plan was to be recorded and the second was the vessel’s working chart. A feature of a passage plan is the marking on the chart of “no go” areas, that is areas where it was not safe for the vessel to go. There was a particular need to do that in this case because a Notice to Mariners issued in December 2010, that is, five months before the casualty, warned that although there was a least depth of 14 metres in the fairway, there were numerous depths of water less than the charted depths in the approaches to Xiamen. There was thus a clear need to mark on the chart a warning that there were depths of water in the approaches to Xiamen which were less than the charted depths. Such a warning would alert the officer of the watch to that particular danger of navigating outside the fairway. No such warning was placed on the chart.
In the event, the absence of such warning on the chart and hence on the vessel’s passage plan was causative of the grounding. I held that it was more likely than not that, had the warning been placed on the chart, the master would have remained within the buoyed fairway. Indeed, when cross examined, the master accepted that that was the case.
Thus, the crucial question of law was whether the defective nature of the passage plan rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The Owners said that it did not. Their argument was summarised in this way by Lord Hamblen in the Supreme Court which heard the case in July 2021. He said that the Owners’ case was that there was a “clear distinction between the navigable state of the vessel and the navigation of the vessel by the master and crew.” The seaworthiness obligation was “concerned with whether the vessel is fit in herself for the purpose of safe navigation. It is concerned with the state of the vessel and defects which are intrinsic to the vessel, rather than extrinsic or ephemeral matters. To render the vessel unseaworthy the defect must be an attribute of the vessel.” In support of that submission, reliance was placed on the history of the obligation of seaworthiness, the origin, context and purpose of the Hague Rules and various English and US precedents. Reliance was also placed on the French text of the Hague Rules. The French text drew a distinction between the “navigable condition” of the vessel and defaults when “actually navigating the vessel.”
This argument was not accepted by the Supreme Court. Both I and the Court of Appeal had also rejected it. I had held that the defective passage plan rendered the vessel unseaworthy because no prudent owner would have allowed the vessel to proceed to sea with the defective passage plan had he known of it, that there had been a breach of Article III rule 1 and that in such circumstances the carrier was unable to rely upon the exception of negligent navigation. In the Supreme Court, Lord Hamblen explained that the Owners’ argument was contrary to two decisions of the House of Lords. It had been settled law since the decision in Maxine Footwear in 1959 that where loss or damage is caused by a breach of the obligation in Article III rule 1 to make the vessel seaworthy, the Article IV rule 2 exceptions cannot be relied upon, even where the excepted matter is the cause of the unseaworthiness. It is the fact of unseaworthiness that matters, not its cause. If the vessel is in fact unseaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage and there has been a failure to exercise due diligence in that regard, then the nautical fault exception cannot be relied upon. It had also been settled law since The Muncaster Castle in 1961 that the carrier is responsible for any failure to exercise due diligence by those to whom the owner has entrusted the task of making the vessel seaworthy. It followed that the crew’s failure to prepare a proper passage plan amounted to a failure by the carrier to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. It did not matter that the preparation of a defective passage plan amounted to negligent navigation.
What are the consequences of this decision?
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Before the Supreme Court, it was suggested that the decision of the courts below would lead to more cargo claims being made against carriers and their insurers and to more claims in general average being resisted by cargo interests. Indeed, since the decision I have been informed by the P&I Clubs that it is now routine to find allegations of poor passage planning in cargo claims. But in considering whether the decision will materially increase the share of the burden of maritime casualties borne by carriers, it is necessary to ask whether any defect in a passage plan will render a vessel unseaworthy.
In the LIBRA, I applied the usual or conventional test of unseaworthiness, namely, whether the prudent owner, had he known of the defect, would have required the defect to be remedied before the vessel set out to sea. Having regard to the importance of passage planning to safe navigation as recognised by IMO’s Guidelines, I had no difficulty in answering that question in the affirmative. It is difficult to see why that reasoning should not apply to any defect in a passage plan.
There may be cases at what Lord Hamblen called the boundaries of unseaworthiness, where the prudent owner test is not determinative of the question of unseaworthiness. But passage planning is not at the boundaries of unseaworthiness having regard to the importance of passage planning to safe navigation. Thus, it is difficult, I think, to contemplate a case where a defect in the passage plan does not render the vessel unseaworthy.
However, a note of caution should be sounded. Lord Hamblen, when considering this question, observed that in any future case it will be necessary to prove that the defect in the plan was “sufficiently serious” to render the vessel unseaworthy. The phrase “sufficiently serious” has caused some comment in discussions about the scope of the court’s decision. It raises the possibility that some defects in a passage plan may be so minor that they do not cross the threshold of unseaworthiness. What Lord Hamblen had in mind, I suggest, was that the defect in the passage plan must be one which endangered the safety of the vessel. That is the language he used in paragraph 124 of his judgment. Nevertheless, in circumstances where passage planning is essential to safe navigation, as recognised by the IMO Guidelines on the subject, it remains difficult to contemplate a defect in a passage plan which does not endanger the safety of the vessel.
Of course, care must be exercised before concluding that there is a defect in a passage plan. In this regard, attention will I think be paid to the observation of Sir David Steel in The Torepo in 1997 that passage planning is not a science and that there will inevitably be an element of judgment as to what notations need to be added to the chart. Thus, opinions as to what is proper passage planning may reasonably and legitimately differ. This will have to be borne in mind when deciding whether a sufficiently serious defect has been established.
But even if a sufficiently serious defect is established, it must then be shown to have been causative of the subsequent casualty. Lord Hamblen observed that in many cases it will be the failure properly and carefully to navigate the vessel during the voyage that is the cause of the loss rather than any prior defect in passage planning. Lord Hamblen noted that in the LIBRA the test of causation was satisfied because (i) the defect in the passage plan was found to have had a decisive influence on the master’s critical decision to leave the fairway and (ii) the danger was one which was not sufficiently visible or otherwise detectable to be avoided by the exercise of due navigational care. Thus, some defects in a passage plan may not have the decisive influence on the master’s navigation as the defects did in the LIBRA. Others may merely point to a danger which ought anyway to have been apparent to the master. It may be that Lord Hamblen’s phrase “decisive influence” will be regarded as an indication that the test of causation may be difficult to satisfy. For example, in the LIBRA, the Notice to Mariners pointed out that outside the fairway there were shallower depths of water than the soundings on the chart indicated. One might have a case where the soundings outside the fairway were reliable and indicated too little water for the vessel. In such a case, the passage plan would still have to indicate the area outside the fairway as a no go area but that it was a no go area ought to be apparent to the master in any event when navigating the vessel. In such a case, it might be said that the defect in the passage plan did not have a decisive influence on the master’s decision to leave the fairway. But I do foresee
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intricate arguments on causation in such a case. In such a case might there not be two causes of the casualty? One, the failure of the passage plan to mark the no go area had it been so marked, the master would not have gone there. Two, the failure of the master or navigating officer, when navigating the vessel, to observe the absence of sufficient water outside the fairway from the chart, which failure also caused the vessel to go where she ought not to have gone. In such a case, there would arguably be a causative breach of the seaworthiness obligation. But could the passage plan be said to have had the decisive influence which the passage plan had in the LIBRA? Perhaps not.
There are, therefore, reasons to doubt that the effect of the decision will be as damaging to the shipowner interests as some have suggested. Much will depend upon the question of causation. But where that test is satisfied the decision will, of course, have an effect on the carrier’s interests. Thus, in the LIBRA itself, had the significance of the passage planning defect been appreciated by the other 92% of the cargo interests, the carrier would not have received the general average contribution of $12 million paid by that 92%.
But such consequences are the result, I would suggest, not of any change to the allocation of risk agreed by ship and cargo interests in the Hague and Hague Visby Rules, but to the circumstance that what is seaworthy is not fixed in time.
This was observed by Lord Blackburn as long ago as 1863 and so it has been noted in the standard textbook Scrutton on Charterparties that “the standard of seaworthiness may rise with improved knowledge of shipbuilding”. Thus, seaworthiness is a concept which, as Lord Sumner noted in 1927, is “relative, among other things, to the state of knowledge and the standards prevailing at the material time”. Lord Hamblen therefore observed that the concept was “well suited to adapt to differing and changing standards”.
The concept of seaworthiness can also change with developments in the manner in which vessels are managed by their owners. In a series of cases in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the English Admiralty Court made clear that a shipowner’s duty was to have a proper system for monitoring the performance of its masters, officers and crew. As Lord Brandon observed in The Marion in 1984 there was a time when it was considered that shipowners or ship managers sufficiently discharged their responsibilities if they appointed a competent master and thereafter left all questions of safe navigation entirely to him, including the obtaining at their expense of all necessary charts and other nautical publications. Lord Brandon said that such an approach was out of date and he echoed the observation of Sir Gordon Willmer in The England in 1973 that such an approach would no longer pass muster. That change in approach, which was essentially developed by the Admiralty Court in limitation actions, was the forerunner of the requirement by the IMO in 1989 that all vessels should have a Safety Management System. No vessel without one could now be regarded as seaworthy. Yet until the latter half of the twentieth century, it would have been rare to find an owner who had provided for one on his ships.
It is instructive to note the facts of two of those cases. In The Lady Gwendolen in 1965, the master of a ship habitually navigated at full speed in fog mistakenly and negligently believing that because he had radar he could do so. Unsurprisingly, he collided with another vessel. It was held that the shipowner’s duty required the shipowner to have a proper and effective system by which the navigation of his vessels was monitored. The failure to have such a system was a fault of the owner and so he could not limit his liability. In The Marion in 1984, the master of a vessel dropped his anchor and fouled an oil pipeline. He used an out of date chart which did not show the pipeline. Had he used an up to date chart, he would have known of the pipeline and would not have dropped his anchor on it. It was held that the shipowner’s duty required the shipowner to have a proper and effective system for checking that his ships were equipped with up to date charts. In both of these cases there was negligent navigation. Had there been cargo damage, the vessels would have been held to have been unseaworthy for lack of a proper system for ensuring that the vessel was, in the one case, safely navigated and in the other case, properly equipped with up to date charts.
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Thus, from 1989, IMO has required vessels to have a Safety Management System and from 1999 IMO has required vessels to have a passage plan for the safety of life at sea. No vessel without a Safety Management System or a passage plan can now be regarded as seaworthy.
So developments in the building and equipping of ships, in the manner in which ships are managed and in the manner in which voyages are planned have necessarily led to an enlargement of the scope of the seaworthiness obligation; but an enlargement consistent with and reflective of the continually improving safety standards in modern day shipping. Seaworthiness as a concept can therefore give effect to the endeavours of IMO to improve the safety of shipping. If the decision in the LIBRA does lead to carriers bearing a greater burden of the losses caused by maritime casualties than they did in the past, that is because the notion of a seaworthy vessel keeps up with and reflects modern safety standards. That is not a cause for regret. Seaworthiness is the handmaiden of beneficial changes in ship management designed to promote safety at sea.
This can be illustrated by noting how an earlier stranding case was decided in the Commercial Court in 1926, long before the recognition of the need for passage planning. It was decided by Mr. Justice Roche, who, I am pleased to say, was Chairman of this Association in 1931.
The vessel Marjorie Seed left her berth on the Clyde at 11.30 am on Christmas Day 1924 bound for Spain with a cargo of coal and coke. A pilot was on board for the passage through the Clyde. It appears that the master and pilot and perhaps other officers had enjoyed a Christmas Day lunch of goose and plum pudding. The pilot left shortly after lunch. Before doing so, he advised the master that the course to be steered was SSW. The Judge found that the master did not study the chart and did not lay the course out on the chart. The master instructed the navigating officer to proceed on an SSE course. This led the vessel towards an area of water which was, according to counsel for the cargo owners, “studded with rocks”. There was evidence that in the afternoon the master was drowsy and was found, when not on duty, “asleep in the chart room”. But it must be noted that counsel for the cargo owners disclaimed any suggestion that the master was intoxicated or under the influence of drink. (Counsel in those days were obviously not as aggressive as some counsel today.). At 5.30 pm the vessel grounded on Troon Rock and became a total loss.
Cargo interests sued for the loss of their cargo. It was alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy by reason of the master being unable to navigate either through incompetence or illness. As it was put by counsel, “the course was so extraordinary that it was compatible only with utter incompetence or something wrong with his brain”. Alternatively, as in the LIBRA, deviation was relied upon. The course steered took the vessel 10 miles away from the normal course so that there had been a deviation and the shipowner was unable to rely upon the excepted peril of negligent navigation. None of these allegations succeeded.
So there was no unseaworthiness and no deviation. The cause of the casualty was negligent navigation. The cargo owner’s claim failed.
There was of course no passage plan at all. But there was also no suggestion that the vessel was unseaworthy because there was no passage plan. The recognition in 1999, 70 years after the decision in Marjorie Seed, that safe navigation is promoted by the preparation of a sound passage plan has led, inexorably, to the recognition that a sound passage plan is now required in order for a vessel to be seaworthy. That in turn has the consequence that carriers will be liable in an appropriate case when in previous years they would not have been. But that consequence assists in promoting safe navigation and is to be welcomed. It has been brought about, not by reason of any change to the allocation of risk agreed in the Hague Rules, but by the long established capacity of seaworthiness to reflect developments in the way in which vessels are built, equipped, managed and navigated.
What further developments may there be in this area of the law?
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At the time of the LIBRA, electronic charts were not compulsory. They are now. The adequacy of the passage planning in that case was assessed by reference to conventional paper charts and the practice of passage planning on such charts. Some have suggested that the decision in the LIBRA is now out of date and of no use in the world of electronic charts. I beg to differ. The advent of electronic charts has not eliminated the need for proper passage planning. To be seaworthy a vessel must still at the outset of her voyage have a proper passage plan. Such a plan remains of essential importance to safe navigation.
What the advent of electronic charts has done is to raise a number of important issues as to how to prepare a proper passage plan on an electronic chart. These issues have been considered by a study commissioned by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (the “MAIB”) and its Danish equivalent which have identified a number of difficulties. This is not the occasion for a detailed study of such intricate navigational matters but I will briefly comment on a few to illustrate the sorts of issues which may surface in future cases where the principles stated so clearly by Lord Hamblen in the LIBRA fall to be applied where a casualty has befallen a vessel being navigated by reference to electronic charts.
First, electronic charts contain the means by which the navigating officer who prepares the passage plan can place on the electronic chart warnings which indicate “no go” areas. This can be done by creating and displaying what are described as Mariner Overlays. Thus, a “No Go” area can be manually entered by drawing a Limiting Danger Line (an “LDL”) around hazardous areas or by automatically joining spot soundings, say to the port and starboard of the planned route. Similarly, shapes such as hatched boxes or circles can be created and displayed to draw attention to isolated dangers and/or “No Go” Areas. These can be “alarmed” such that an alert will be generated if the vessel crosses the LDL or hatched box.
However, the MAIB found that not all navigating officers are familiar with how Limiting Danger Lines are to be placed on an electronic chart. It was also found that care was needed by navigating officers not to rely solely on the data embedded in the computer-based system. It will still be essential for the officer preparing the passage plan to consult not only the Admiralty Sailing Directions and publications such as Ocean Passages for the World but also to ensure that all relevant information is considered in the same way as it would have been in the context of paper charts. The MAIB also found that there was no consistency in the speed with which the producers of electronic chart systems updated the electronic charts with notices to mariners. There was therefore a danger in navigational officers not checking the most recent Notice to Mariners. All of these points suggest that proper training of navigating officers in passage planning on electronic charts is essential. A lack of such training would suggest that the vessel was unseaworthy by reason of an incompetent crew.
Second, electronic charts contain an ability to auto check the safety of a planned route by comparing a vessel’s safety depth with the charted depths along that route. Reliance on this function has its dangers. The MAIB perhaps underestimated this risk when saying that there was a risk that the “variability and poor fidelity of hydrographic data in many regions” will result in use of this auto checking system “working sub optimally.” Had auto checking been available and used in the case of the LIBRA, there would have been no sufficient indication of danger, because the very point of the Notice of the Mariners in that case was that the soundings in the entrance to the port were unreliable.
The need for proper training prompts me to recall one case of mine which concerned issues of seaworthiness. Counsel called a witness. He was a second engineer but he only had a third engineer’s certificate. Counsel thought that there must have been a good reason for employing him as a second engineer and, being anxious to show that the shipowner had exercised due diligence to appoint a competent crew, asked the engineer why he had been employed. The answer he received was “They must have been desperate”. It is a very good illustration of the maxim which all counsel should remember: never ask a question to which you do not know the answer.
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It is therefore possible that the introduction of electronic charts will give rise to more, not fewer, complaints of poor passage planning. In circumstances where the decision of the Supreme Court in the LIBRA has so clearly resolved the issues of law, the debate in the future is more likely to concern the adequacy of the plan as placed on the electronic chart and the causal significance of any defects and also the adequacy of the training of officers to use electronic charts properly and safely when passage planning.
When radar was introduced, mariners placed undue reliance on it and failed to keep a good visual lookout. Thus, it was said that the advent of radar gave rise to radar assisted collisions. In the same way there is a real risk that electronic charts will give rise to electronic chart assisted groundings.
Lastly, may I just touch on passage planning in the context of automated ships, that is, vessels which are controlled by operators ashore or by computers on board. Such ships are known as Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (“MASS”). They are not yet common but, with commendable foresight, MASS are being closely monitored by IMO. IMO wish to explore the extent to which the regulatory regimes, such as SOLAS and the Collision Regulations which apply to conventional ships can also apply to MASS. IMO’s plan is to have a non mandatory Code for MASS by 2024 with a mandatory Code in force by January 2028. I am not aware that this exercise includes consideration of the Passage Planning Guidelines of 1999. But there is no reason why MASS should not have a passage plan in order to be seaworthy at the commencement of their voyage. Such plans may in the future be produced by a computer. What if the reason that a passage plan is defective lies in a defect in the software purchased by the owner? Sir Richard Aikens, a distinguished judge and now author of a book on Bills of Lading, has suggested that in such a case the owner would be able to say that there was no breach of due diligence by him because the defect came about at a time when the ship was not under his control or, as it was put in one of the cases, “in his orbit”. That, if I may say so, appears to be correct. The principle was established in a case where there was negligence in the building of a ship. The need for the vessel to be in the orbit of the owner before the owner is subject to the due diligence obligation in the Hague Rules was recognised by Lord Hamblen in the LIBRA. Thus, the focus will be on the question whether the owner, once he was in possession of the software, should have appreciated, by careful and skilled monitoring of the software, that it was not in a fit condition for its purpose. If his monitoring were negligent, then there will have been a failure to exercise due diligence. I suspect that it will be difficult to establish negligence of this nature. What of negligent navigation? Where the master on board or operator ashore acts negligently when commanding the vessel that would amount to negligent navigation. But what if the error is committed by a computer? If such error is the result of a defect in the software, the automated vessel would presumably be regarded as unseaworthy. But again there would be no breach of due diligence by the owner unless the owner could and should have detected the error before the commencement of the voyage. But if the error is the result of an error by the artificial intelligence of the computer, then that might well be regarded as negligent navigation by the computer just as if it had been an error by the officer of the watch. Thus, one can envisage expert evidence from software engineers as to the nature of the defect and as to whether the defect could and should reasonably have been discovered by the owner or whether it was simply a mistake by the artificial intelligence of the computer. In the past and at present expert evidence in maritime cases is given by former masters and marine engineers. But in future, as and when MASS suffer a casualty, the important experts may well be software engineers. I would find that a depressing prospect; but more youthful minds may disagree.
On that note, I must finish. Thank you very much for listening. (Applause)
THE SECRETARY: Thank you very much, Sir Nigel. It was really interesting and raises a lot of issues for the future. Before I open up to the floor for questions and comments, could I have your permission to publish your address on our website and include it in the Annual Report?
THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.
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THE SECRETARY: Thank you. I am now going to open up for questions or comments from anyone. If you could state your name for the record so the stenographer can record it please?
MR RONALDO DREGE (Albatross Adjusters) I was the appointed average adjuster on the case of the LIBRA.
Mr Chairman, thank you very much for your illustrative address and a glimpse of what is still to come in terms of artificial intelligence. I and perhaps some of my colleagues in this room are very grateful to you for having mentioned that this case is more of a contract of carriage case rather than a general average case. We have seen and noticed a tendency, following the judgment, that issues of fault are being brought forward to the time of the collection of securities rather than the time of the collection of actual settlements, and this has obviously made the overall procedure a lengthy one. We believe that if it would be possible to clarify, that perhaps not all GA cases are the result of unseaworthiness and, even if they were, perhaps it would be a good opportunity to remind cargo interests that in general there is a duty to submit general average security upon arrival of cargo at destination and argue later. This, I think, would be a good win for the Association. Thank you very much. (Applause)
MS MELIS OTMAR (Associate of the AAA) Good morning. Actually, my question is in line with Ronaldo’s. First of all, Sir Nigel, thank you very much for explaining how the definition of unseaworthiness and the ship owner’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel are changing with the times and how these definitions are adaptable. Obviously, under no circumstances can I challenge your judgment. However, as Ronaldo has mentioned, I would like to have your advice on how, as claims practitioners, we may bring efficiency, even justice, to the position we are in now, whereby cargo interests are alleging unseaworthiness regardless of causation. The moment the GA adjustment is submitted, after taking weeks, they come with allegations of unseaworthiness and in most circumstances, or actually since the decision, all the claims I have dealt with have gone to the P&I Club, back and forth between the lawyers, and then a negotiated settlement is agreed upon which I find to be quite unjust to the ship owner who has to wait not only for that prolonged time to get their monies but also suffers from extra premium on the P&I side. The cases I have dealt with had no navigational matter. Actually, one was anchored and the other one had a fire on board because of a refrigerator. So it is not even with reference to your case but it has become the norm in our market that every GA adjustment is challenged as unseaworthiness. Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN: I am not sure that there is a question there that I can answer but I fully understand that what you describe is, indeed, happening, that challenges to the liability to contribute in GA are made perhaps more frequently now than they were in the past.
MR JOERN GRONINGER (Verein Deutscher Dispacheure) I am here as an average adjuster and also on behalf of the German Association of Average Adjusters. Maybe I can add two remarks to your two concepts here. First, Ronaldo, hopefully the use of the new forms that were mentioned earlier, the security forms, may take away a bit of the trouble in the first instance of our job because the new forms expressly include a remark pointing out the effects of Rule D. So it is a clarification for cargo people mentioning their rules to defend the claim in the aftermath. So it might be easier for them to accept that they have to submit security in the very beginning. That was one of our goals to make the tone easier to swallow for cargo interests when developing these forms.
Secondly, Melis, yes, we are also discussing these difficulties because I think all of us adjusters encounter very similar problems when trying to collect contributions in general average cases, and there are discussions going on on many different levels at the moment in this respect, including the CMI Standing Committee on General Average, which I am part of, and these discussions also include the AAA and will probably also be going on within the International Association of Average Adjusters, but I think everyone is very welcome to
Annual Report 2023 19
bring forward any suitable suggestions how to deal with these practical problems and, in fact, once cargo interests do mention unseaworthiness as a reason for that defence or as cause, that is already a step ahead because then ship owners can approach the P&I Club. In my experience, the worst thing is when they don’t say anything but they just say “No, I won’t pay” or “I want a discount” for whatever reason so this makes things even worse.
Anyway, as I have the microphone and, as I said, I am here on behalf of the German Association, I will take the opportunity and say thank you for being invited here. I was invited yesterday already to a very nice evening with good food and good company and that was joyful. I am looking forward to the dinner tonight and, secondly or lastly, I would say thank you for giving these explanations because, as you have noted yourself, there is probably, there was and there is, a good amount of scepticism even amongst knowledgeable people, as you have said, and so it was certainly helpful to have some explanations in respect of this judgment. Thank you. (Applause)
MS BARBARA HOLLAND (President of the Maritime Law Association of the United States) I thank you very much for the invitation to attend. I very much enjoyed your address this morning, Mr Chairman, and I thank you for the insight you provided into some of the very difficult issues that you faced in the cases before you like that of the LIBRA. So it was very interesting and I thank you for that.
I as well want to thank you for a very enjoyable evening last night. Thank you and I do look forward to this evening as well. Thank you. (Applause)
MR JOSEPH GRASSO (Chairman of the Association of the United States and Canada)
Sir Nigel, I congratulate you on your tenure and a really fascinating talk. I think obviously it is generating a lot of conversation, perhaps controversy, but it was very informative, a lot of food for thought there, and it is a topic we are roundly debating in the US as well. It does show the perils of leaving a fairway, by the way, which is something I found out about when I played golf on Monday.
Speaking of food for thought, I would also like to thank you for a delightful dinner last night. I was happily seated next to your lovely wife. It was really an enjoyable time and I look forward to the dinner tonight as well. To Burkhard, congratulations and good luck on the coming year. (Applause)
MR ESTEBAN VIVANCO (President Association Mondiales de Dispacheurs) I want to thank you for a very nice dinner we enjoyed yesterday, a lovely piece of meat upon the table, delicious red wine from Mendoza, so it made me feel quite close to my country. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for the subject you touched upon, a very interesting point of view. Thank you. (Applause)
MR STEFANO CAVALLO (Chairman of the Italian Association of Average Adjusters) I wish to thank you for your very interesting and stimulating address on this topic and I also thank you for the very enjoyable dinner yesterday. It was great company, great food and great wine. It is my last mandate here as the Chairman of the Association. We had a meeting last week and I was expressly required to wish to you all greetings from the Italian adjusters. Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. (Applause)
MS VIBEKE KOFOED (Nordic Association) I would like to thank you for the very interesting address. It does make me a bit nervous for the future but I do hope we all survive as average adjusters.
Thank you also for a very lovely dinner last night, good food, lovely wine, and very good company. I also look forward to seeing you all tonight. Thank you. (Applause)
Annual Report 2023 20
THE SECRETARY: Are there any other comments or questions?
MR BURKHARD FISCHER: Mr Chairman, I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for chairing our Association for the past term and until midnight tonight. As already mentioned by Sir Nigel himself, his name is the latest one on an illustrious list of past Chairmen that came from the judiciary. We as an Association value the strong ties that we enjoy with the legal profession. Sir Nigel will be remembered not only for his involvement in two specific judgments that created some, let’s say, additional challenges for ship owners and adjusters, but for his enthusiasm, his charming way of putting up with whole assemblies of adamant average adjusters, and when he encountered other species, lawyers, for instance, he never got tired of explaining to them the importance of the average adjuster’s work.
Sir Nigel, on behalf of all members, thank you very much. It was a real pleasure working with you. Thank you. (Applause)
Any other Business
THE SECRETARY: Is there any other business at all? If not, could I ask those that received their certificates to stay behind for a little photo opportunity at the end, please?
THE CHAIRMAN: I think I only need to thank Lloyd’s for this venue for the meeting and invite everybody to lunch at Balls Brothers immediately after this event and also that I look forward to seeing you all this evening at the Savoy. Thank you very much indeed. I think that means the meeting is now closed. Thank you. (Applause)
Annual Report 2023 21
Fellows 2023
Bramwell - Ian J (1997) London International A.A. Co., Peterborough, UK
Tel: +44 1733 551 003 Email: liaa@btopenworld.com
Cao - Jie Matthew (2015) Gard P&I (Bermuda) Ltd, Singapore
Tel: +65 69785482 Email: livingcao@hotmail.com
Chen - Hung Yi (Jimmy) (2023) Richards Hogg Lindley, Taipei, Taiwan
Tel: +886 922675809 Email: jimmy.chen@charlestayloradj.com
Clancey - David C (1978) Marine Adjusting Solutions, Herts, UK
Tel: +44 7785 312 443 Email: david.clancey@fairseas-mas.com
Duncan - J Miles (1977) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool, UK
Tel: 44 7767 861615 Email: miles.duncan@rhl-ct.com
Ewing - Gerald J (1987) Regis Mutual Management Pty Ltd, NSW, Australia
Tel: +61 2 9252 1599 Email: gerald.ewing@rmml.com
Fei – Peter Xiao Ming (2019) Richards Hogg Lindley, Hong Kong
Tel: +852 94255917 Email: peter.fei@charlestaylor.com
Fischer - Burkhard P (2011) Albatross Adjusters Ltd, Limassol, Cyprus
Tel: +357 2558 8988 Email: b.fischer@alba.com.cy
Freuling - Christian Jona (2023) Richards Hogg Lindley (Hellas) Ltd, Piraeus, Greece.
Tel: +30 6952 380 682 Email: christian.freuling@rhl-ct.com
Hao - Rui (2020)
Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool, UK
Tel: +44 151 227 2175 Email: rui.hao@ctplc.com
Hara - Nanami (2020) RELA, London, UK
Tel: +44 20 3968 7847 Email: nhara@relaltd.com
Harvey - Michael D (1978) Harvey Ashby Ltd, Suffolk, UK
Tel: +44 1206 689 500 Email: mharvey@harvey-ashby.co.uk
Jones - Keith (1984)
Aon Risk Solutions, London, UK
Tel: +44 207 086 4219 Email: keith.jones@aon.co.uk
Kallini – Angeliki (2019) Richards Hogg Lindley (Hellas) Ltd, Piraeus, Greece
Tel: +30 210 429 1870 Email: angeliki.kallini@rhl-ct.com
Kilbee - Chris C (1987)
Lai – William (2019)
Macdonald - John A (1972)
Madge - Tim J W (1979)
Magkanaris - Stelios (2017)
Marine Claims Office of Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore
Tel: +65 6438 4016 Email: chris@marineclaimsoffice.com
Charles Taylor Adjusting, Hong Kong
Tel: +852 5803 4569 Email: william.lai@rhl-ct.com
Macdonald Hebditch & Co. Ltd, Surrey, UK
Tel: +44 1428 715 533 Email: jmacdo5604@aol.com
Mediterranean Average Adjusting Co, London, UK
Tel: +44 1483 222407 Email: timmadge@medav.co.uk
Marine Adjusters & Consultants Inc, Piraeus, Greece
Tel: +30 6945 584423 Email: sm@maradco.com
Annual Report 2023 22
Fellows 2023 (continued)
Margaritopoulos – George (2019) Richards Hogg Lindley (Hellas) Ltd, Piraeus, Greece
Tel: +30 6944 443075 Email: georgios.margaritopoulos@rhl-ct.com
Martin - Keith J (1990) KJM Claims Consulting, Pierrevert, France
Tel: +44 7985 416 748 Email: keith.martin@hotmail.com
McCabe - Phillip (2022) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool UK
Tel: +44 151 235 5581 Email: phillip.mccabe@ctplc.com
Miller - Tristan E L (2014) Willis Towers Watson, London, UK
Tel: +44 7766 205225 Email: tristanelm@gmail.com
Mody - Leena (2002) Leena Mody & Associates, Mumbai, India
Tel: +91 98204 34528 Email: leena@leenamody.com
O’Neill – Amy (2013) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool, UK
Tel: +44 151 227 2175 Email: amy.oneill@rhl-ct.com
Paton - Andrew M (1987) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool, UK
Tel: +44 7798 775075 Email: andrew.paton@rhl-ct.com
Richards - Willum (1992) Willum Richards Consulting Ltd, Central Otago, New Zealand
Tel: +64 21 132 1863 Email: willum.richards@wrconsulting.co.nz
Robinson - Heather (2017) Richards Hogg Lindley, Dubai, UAE
Tel: +971 43 583 963 Email: heather.robinson@rhl-ct.com
Rogers - Nigel J C (1985) Rogers Wilkin Ahern LLP, London, UK
Tel: +44 207 220 0920 Email: nigel@rogerswilkinahern.com
Rowland - Paul O (1996) Richards Hogg Lindley, London, UK
Tel: +44 207 015 2045 Email: paul.rowland@rhl-ct.com
Shead - Joseph (2019) Aon Risk Solutions, London, UK
Tel: +44 7450 171194 Email: josephshead@hotmail.co.uk
Shimura - Ryoko (2021) Charles Taylor (Japan) Ltd
Tel: +81 335189601 Email: Ryoko.Shimura@ctplc.com
Silver - Paul (1986) Richards Hogg Lindley, London, UK
Tel: +44 7785 948832 Email: paul.silver@rhl-ct.com
Slade - Andrew (2017) Richards Hogg Lindley, London, UK
Tel: +44 20 7398 5354 Email: andrew.slade@ctplc.com
Tang - Christopher Y C (1982) Asia Maritime Adjusting Pte Ltd, Singapore
Tel: +65 9789 3938 Email: chris.tang@amadjusting.com
John Thompson (2022) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool UK
Tel: +44 78800 95792 Email: john.thompson@rhl-ct.com
Tomlinson - Robert M P (2017) Gard (UK) Ltd, London, UK
Tel: +44 7895 675715 Email: robert.tomlinson@gard.no
Tucker - R Ian (1992) Maritime Adjusting Services, London, UK
Tel: +44 20 8720 6788 Email: ian.tucker@maritimeadjusters.com
Annual Report 2023 23
Fellows 2023 (continued)
Willan - James (2021) Richards Hogg Lindley, Liverpool, UK
Tel: +44 151 2355579 Email: james.willan@ctplc.com
Wong - Raymond T C (1980) Asia Maritime Adjusting, Hong Kong
Tel: +852 9265 9199 Email: raymond.wong@averageadj.com
Wood - Richard W (1986) Charles Taylor Management Services, Connecticut, USA Email: richard.w.wood01@gmail.com
Xu - Yibing (2008) Richards Hogg Lindley, Hong Kong
Tel: +852 5803 4576 Email: yibing.xu@rhl-ct.com
Honorary Life Fellows
Mr Richard Cornah
Mr Charles Hebditch
Mr David Pannell
Mr Roger Street
Mr John Wilson
Non-Practising Fellows
Martin - John (2000) Starmans - Michiel (2001)
Honorary Fellows
The Rt. Hon. Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hamblen of Kersey
The Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick
The Rt. Hon. Lord Mance
The Rt. Hon. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
The Rt. Hon. Lord Saville of Newdigate
The Rt. Hon. Sir David Steel
The Rt. Hon. Sir Julian Flaux
The Rt. Hon. Sir Stephen Tomlinson
Sir Bernard Rix
Sir Nigel Teare
Mr David Taylor
Mr Jonathan Gilman KC
Mr Julian Cooke
24
Annual Report 2023
Only members that have consented to appear within this report are listed
Senior Associates as at May 2023
Bibaj Albana Siat SPA
Cavallo Giorgio Studio Dott. Giorgio Cavallo
Ellis Jack Willis Towers Watson
Gibbs Benjamin INDECS Consulting Ltd
Muthu Jagannath NAU Pte Ltd
Italy
Italy
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Singapore
Poojary Rathna Jani, Clancey & Richards India
Rappal Varrier Manoj BP Singapore Pte Ltd
Singapore
Roncallo Tomaso Siat SPA Italy
Roumanou Julia Independent Average Adjusters Ltd
Rowe Nicholas Standard Club
Sakurai Konosuke TM Claims Service Asia Pte Ltd
Sasegbon Deji CJC Law
Warr Charlotte Sarnia Training Ltd
Associates as at May 2023
Greece
United Kingdom
Singapore
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Abdelnaby Maged MECON /Alexandria University Egypt Egypt
Adhikari David Richards Hogg Lindley
Anastasiadis Eva Richards Hogg Lindley
Avdimiotis Athanasios Hellenic Marine Adjusters S.A.
Bailas Panagiotis Marine Adjusting Solutions
Balaouras John GARD Greece
Best Neil SteegeXP Pte Ltd
Blane Nicholas AXA XL
Cardy Jonathan Lloyd Stichling Hahn Hilbrich GmbH
Chan Yin Ting (Amy) Yin Ting Chan
Charalampous Constantinos Albatross Adjusters Limited
Chiampas Vasiliki Seascope Hellas S.A.
Singapore
Greece
Greece
Greece
Greece
Singapore
United Kingdom
Germany
Canada
Cyprus
Greece
Choi Cheuk Shuen (Vincci) Bernhard Schulte Ship Management Hong Kong SAR China
Chomata Angeliki Margetis Maritime Consulting
Chow Yuk Yi (Cory) Richards Hogg Lindley
Christodoulou Kyriacos Albatross Adjusters Ltd
Chrysomalli Athina Margetis Maritime Consulting
Chu Wing Yin Asia Maritime Pacific (Hong Kong) Ltd
Comitardi Alberto Cambiaso Risso Marine
Contreras Isabel Matthews Daniel
Coop Derek The Claims Cooperative
Dallaway Amy Lancashire Group
Drakatou Pippi Oceana Marine Claims & Adjusting
Drege Ronaldo Albatross Adjusters Ltd
Duncan Alice Richards Hogg Ltd
Exadaktylos Dimitrios Marine Adjusting Solutions
Fahrizal Fahrizal PT. MCO Prima Indonesia
Gautama Mukesh Wilson Surveyors and Adjusters Pvt Ltd
Georgakopoulos Vassilis Enterprises Shipping & Trading S.A.
Georgiadi Rea Marine Adjusting Solutions Inc
Georgiou Konstantinos RSA
Greece
Hong Kong SAR China
Cyprus
Greece
China
Italy
United Arab Emirates
South Africa
United Kingdom
Greece
Cyprus
United Kingdom
Greece
Indonesia
India
Greece
Greece
United Kingdom
Annual Report 2023 25
Annual Report 2023
Associates as at May 2023 (continued)
Gibbins Daniel Blue Seas Adjusters
Gilchrist Iain NEPIA
Greene Alexander Seascope Insurance Services
Haake Sean Richards Hogg Lindley
Hales Jenna Hiscox
Hoh Lai Fun(Evelyn) Aon Singapore (Broking Centre) Pte Ltd
Hubbuck Jeremy Willis Towers Watson
Irani Zarir Constellation Marine Services LLC
Jackson Thaminah Richards Hogg Lindley
Jani Amit Jani, Clancey & Richards
Jani Nitika Jani, Clancey & Richards
Johannessen Alf Inge Gard AS
Kafka Ioanna The Swedish Club
Karaloizou Costas Albatross Adjusters Ltd
Keaney Donal Ince Gordon Dadds LLP
Kemp Alex Holman Fenwick Willan LLP
Kilbee James Marine Claims Office of Asia Pte Ltd
Krivovs Daniils OnlyYacht
Kumar Harshvardhan Charles Taylor Marine Technical Services
Laws Kate Richards Hogg Lindley
Lee Chia Yun Charles Taylor
Levantis Alexandros Marine Adjusting Solutions
Lim Siew Ping AXA XL
Lim Yonghwan Lockton Korea
Liu Yi Charles Taylor Adjusting
Lynskey Mark Mediterranean Average Adjusting Company
Mackenzie Andrew Atrium Underwriting Ltd
Manohara Bernadette PT. MCO Prima Indonesia
Margetis George Margetis Maritime Consulting
Marsden Susanna Travelers
Martinez Gonzalez Alejandro Charles Taylor Adjusting
McCaughey Thomas Charles Taylor Adjusting
McDonach Tony Ince Gordon Dadds LLP
Michalakopoulos Nikolaos Latus Mare Marine Consultants
Mitchell Matthew QBE Marine & Energy Syndicate 1036
Mondal Swapnodeep Anglo Eastern Ship Management Ltd
More Anuradha Anuradha More and Associates
Musolino Pino North Central Thyrrenian Sea Port Authority
Naqvi Asif Amaan Syndicate
Naveed Sameen QBE Insurance Australia Limited
Nizham Khairul W K Webster
North Andrew Thomas Miller Claims Management
Osborne Debbie AXA XL
Otmar Melis BMS Harris & Dixon Marine
Patel Nishi Skuld
Pathak Abhishek
Pell Louise Munich Re
Pinheiro Joel Quest Marine LLC
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Singapore
Norway
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
India
India
Norway
Greece
Cyprus
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Singapore
Monaco
Australia
United Kingdom
Taiwan
Greece
Singapore
South Korea
China
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Indonesia
Greece
United Kingdom
Mexico
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Greece
United Kingdom
Hong Kong SAR China
India
Italy
Pakistan
Australia
Singapore
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
India
United Kingdom
United Arab Emirates
26
Associates as at May 2023 (continued)
Poh Ann Nah TM Claims Service Asia Pte Ltd
Portuondo Cristina
RSA
Ramadhan Ghulaam PT MCO Prima Indonesia
Ramadhillah Raihan PT MCO Prima Indonesia
Regtien Iris Braskem Netherlands BV
Revis Mark LIAA
Rizioti Stella The Guardian (Maritime) Ltd
Robinson Matthew Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd
Rocca Laura Studio Tecnico Lonoce
Rolland Adam Independent Average Adjusters Ltd
Rowe Steven Richards Hogg Lindley
Singapore
Spain
Indonesia
Indonesia
Netherlands
China
Greece
United Kingdom
Italy
Greece
United Kingdom
Russwurm Jørgen Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) Norway
Sakai Yuno Charles Taylor (Japan) Ltd.
Japan
Saputro Bagus Charles Taylor Adjusting (PT Radita Hutama Internusa) Indonesia
Saraswati Rininta Charles Taylor Adjusting
Sarll Richard 7 King’s Bench Walk
Sengendo Elizabeth Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty
Setyorini Maurene Ayu PT Global Internusa Adjusting
Shao Jie Charles Taylor Adjusting
Shaw Alexander Richard Hoggs Lindley
Shurville Daniel Zodiac Maritime Limited
Sidik Mufli Agfaransyah Charles Taylor Adjusting
Simiakaki Georgia VC Marine Claims Adjusters & Consultants
Singhal Rahul Gard (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Sitompul Andrea Nathaly Richards Hogg Lindley
Indonesia
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Indonesia
Hong Kong SAR China
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
Indonesia
Greece
Singapore
Indonesia
Siu Rocky, L.K. Asia Maritime Adjusting (Hong Kong) Hong Kong SAR China
Smoili Evangelia TMS Bulkers LTD
Stavriani Christea Roxana Shipping S.A.
Stevens Daniel Gallagher
Symes Matthew Bermuda Monetary Authority
Tan Robert Asia Maritime Adjusting Pte Ltd
Tan Si Hua (Stan) Richards Hogg Lindley
Tang Joseph Kuok Group
Tasios Petros Seascope Hellas S.A.
Truszczynska Marlena Norwegian Hull Club
Tsekos Dimitrios V C Marine Claims Adjusters and Consultants Ltd
van der Houven van Oordt Haco AKD
van Hal Arnold Van Traa Advocaten N.V.
Wee Ya Lun (Aaron) W K Webster & Co
Wells Matthew Chubb Global Markets
Wheatley Alex Richards Hogg Lindley
Whittle Adam Brookes Bell
Wilkie Graham Sunderland Marine Mutual Insurance
Wright James Costero Brokers Ltd
Youn Seonggwan HMM Company Limited
Young Elle Kennedys Law
Zaarour Petro Lloyd’s Register
Greece
Greece
United Kingdom
Bermuda
Singapore
Singapore
Singapore
Greece
Norway
Greece
Netherlands
Netherlands
Singapore
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
South Korea
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Zareifis Alexandros Margetis Maritime Consulting Greece
Annual Report 2023 27
Annual Report 2023
Associates as at May 2023 (continued)
Zhou Weiyan Gard (UK) Ltd
United Kingdom
Zhu Zizhen Skuld Hong Kong SAR China
Zulfiandri Zulfiandri PT Radita Hutama Internusa (Charles Taylor Adjusting) Indonesia
Representative Members
AXA XL, UK
C Solutions Ltd, UK
Marint (Offshore Services) Ltd, UK
Resolve Salvage & Fire (Europe) Ltd, UK
Smit Salvage BV, UK
The Britannia Steamship Insurance Association, UK
W K Webster & Co, UK
Affiliate Members
British Maritime Law Association, UK
International Salvage Union, UK
UK Chamber of Shipping, UK
Subscribers as at May 2023
Aggersbury Robin UK
Ahmed Alavi Burhan Pakistan
Alverandy Ariowibowo Johanes Indonesia
Alvisi Alberto Italy
Anagnostopoulos John UK
Anum Cassandra UK
Asaka Kiichi Japan
Asbury
Michael UK
Austin Kevin UK
Bartlett
James USA
Berridge Anthony UK
Bhardwaj
Mukesh India
Bird Caroline Australia
Black
W L Rivers USA
Bolden Andrew UK
Borg Barthet Maria UK
Bose Sanjib UAE
Brain Anthony Canada
Brogan Patrick USA
Bruce Jonathan UK
Burdass Tom UK
Burke Ina USA
Byrne Matthew Gibraltar
Carbone Alessandro Italy
Carpenter Nigel Singapore
Carr Jeanne USA
Cavallo Stefano Italy
Chalaris Marios Greece
Chartokollis Michail UK
Chiossone Marzia Italy
Chitla Sudheer UAE
Coleman Nicholas Norway
Cooper Nigel UK
Corray Laurence Singapore
Costourou Christiana Greece
Crane Anita UK
Dallalana Renata UK
D’Andrea Franco UK
de Jongh
Camiel Netherlands
de Lange Judith Netherlands
den Haan Pieter Netherlands
Dower Keith Patrick Greece
28
Subscribers as at May 2023 (continued)
Dragoumerli Maria Greece
Evans Jonathan UK
Exadactylos Anthony Greece
Fairweather Karen UK
Farmer
Chris UK
Fellin Eileen USA
Fitz-Hugh Clark USA
Flori Gianluca Italy
Fokas-Kavalierakis Stavros Cyprus
Foss Patrick UK
Fraser Ian Canada
Galvan Angel Spain
Gatti
Paola Italy
Gibson Bill UK
Gigney
Michael UK
Glover Peter Singapore
Golding
Goodacre
Gozdzik
Graham
Maureen UK
Stephen UK
Dariusz UK
Ted UK
Gran Philip USA
Grasso
Gray
Gray
Joseph USA
Andrew UK
Martin Greece
Greene James Ireland
Groninger
Joern Germany
Groninger Philip Germany
Gunn Richard UK
Gupta Abhinav India
Hahn
Juergen Germany
Hall Martin UK
Hatcher Jack UK
Hawkins Neil UK
Hesson Jake Australia
Hicks
John UK
Hirase Shigeto Japan
Hogendorp Jacob Singapore
Holland Barbara USA
Hong
Edmund South Korea
Howell Peter Greece
Hudson
Hutchings
Iguera
John UK
Oliver UK
Martina Italy
Jackson Graham UK
Jackson
Simon UK
Janssen Dirk Germany
Jeon
Sora UK
Johannsson Isak UK
Johnston Alistair UK
Jordan Frank USA
Justers Walter Belgium
Karagianni Petroula Monaco
Kardiakopoulos Neoklis Gibraltar
Karia Chirag UK
Kastanas George Greece
Kauffeld Tilmann Sweden
Kay Alexander Germany
Keyes David UK
Kim Hoon Gi South Korea
Koelzer James USA
Kruit Jolien Netherlands
Kuchipudi Kishor Varma Singapore
Lavelle Jennifer UK
Lawrence Stewart UK
Lech Anne Norway
Legat Paola Italy
Leontsini Margarita Greece
Lim Henson Philippines
Lin Sandy China
Lonoce Lorenzo Monaco
Lucking Michelle UK
Lux Jonathan UK
Machum Eric Canada
Macinnes Alex UK
Makestad Sveinung Norway
Martinoli Federico Italy
McCarthy Stephen UK
McGinty Tom UK
Mellett Peter UK
Metcalf Frank Canada
Meyers John USA
Mokua Kevin Kenya
Moore Jade UK
Morelli Francesco Italy
Mukherjee Supriyo Falkland Islands
Munkeby Oyvind Norway
Mustapa Nadiah Izzaty Singapore
Nagase Yasuhiko Japan
Nakada Eiichi Japan
Owen John UK
Panggabean Sahat Indonesia
Papadiamantis George Greece
Park Beomsu South Korea
Park Jae Hong Panama
Patil Ranjitsinh UAE
Patiño Felix Spain
Annual Report 2023 29
Annual Report 2023
Subscribers as at May 2023 (continued)
Petterson Leif Norway
Pourpoutidis Nikolaos UK
Priano Gian Piero Italy
Prichard Rob USA
Purse-Napier Lee-Anne South Africa
Putra Ranahumaira Savira Indonesia
Quek Xinghui Singapore
Rathod Kalpesh India
Rekantzis Nikos Greece
Rible Stephen USA
Richardson Joseph Ireland
Roderick Michael UK
Rodríguez Díaz Aladar Panama
Rokstad Vilde Norway
Roy Rudrajit India
Ryan Peter Singapore
Rydén Linda Singapore
Ryder Seamus Canada
Ryles Howard UK
Saito Chihiro Japan
Sandbakken Einar Norway
Sanden Roar Norway
Sato Shigeki Japan
Sato Tomoaki Japan
Saxena Nikhil UAE
Schwampe Dieter Germany
Shahid A K M Reaz Australia
Shaukat Imran USA
Shen Tai-Chung (Thomas) Hong Kong SAR China
Shipley Nigel UK
Siemens Jan-Andresen Germany
Slaatten Bjorn Norway
Smith Christopher UK
Spencer Jonathan USA
Past Chairmen
May/Nov 1869
Mr T L Davison
Nov 1869/May 1870 Mr W Harrison
May/Nov 1870 Mr L R Baily
Nov 1870/May 1871 Mr W Richards
May/Nov 1871 Mr R Lowndes
Nov 1871/May 1872 Mr R Lowndes
1873 Mr R Lowndes
1874 Mr J H Powell
1875 Mr M Hopkins
1876 Mr T L Davison
Sporle David UK
Staib William USA
Steemers Michael Cyprus
Sukumaran Nair Gayathri UAE
Sweetman Edmund Spain
Sydenham Chris UK
Tantrum David J USA
Tatham Simon UK
Terrell Martin Singapore
Thakkar Yogesh India
Tsakiris Ilias Greece
Umeno Koji Japan
Valenti Alessandro Greece
van der Valk Taco Netherlands
van Hemmen Hendrik USA
Vassenden Bjørn Norway
Vega Alejandro Argentina
Virvilis Isabella UK
Vivanco Esteban Argentina
Waite Ann UK
Walker John USA
Warrender KC Nichola UK
Watson Harold USA
Wattel Markwin Netherlands
Whyte Gordon UK
Wiersma Taco Netherlands
Wolf Martina Germany
Woods John USA
Wright Mike UK
Zampichelli Giovanni Italy
Zeuner Robert USA
Zhang Guang China
Zolezzi Francesco UK
30
Mr W Richards
Mr G Coyte 1879 Mr R Lindley
Mr L R Baily 1881 Mr W H Jones 1882 Mr E Hogg
Mr C McArthur 1884 Mr H Davison 1885 Mr S Smith 1886 Mr P H Rathbone
1877
1878
1880
1883
Past Chairmen (continued)
1887 Mr S Cross 1888 Mr K W Elmslie 1889 Mr H C Jepps 1890 Mr I W Court 1891 Mr G Lidgett 1892 Sir F C Danson
Mr T G Carver 1894 Mr T S Cookes 1895 Mr J S Allen 1896 Mr W E Towers 1897 Mr W Lowndes
1898 Sir D Owen, K.B.E.
1899 Mr A Lindley
1900 Mr A H May
1901 Mr W Richards, C.B.E. 1902 The Hon Mr Justice G Barnes 1903 Mr M G Towers 1904 Mr E R Lindley 1905 Mr F C Dale 1906 The Hon Mr Justice Kennedy 1907 Mr M A Rudell, C.B.E. 1908 Mr J B Wallace 1909 Mr T R Miller 1910 Mr J S Hogg 1911 Mr F T Loftus 1912 Mr J H Scrutton 1913 Mr M Dale
1914 Mr C W Henzell
1915 The Right Hon Viscount Mersey
1916 Mr B T Harland
1917 Mr G S Lloyd Davies
1918 Mr A W Dauglish 1919 Mr A D MacKinnon 1920 Sir T J Storey, K.B.E.
Mr H B Hurd
H T Lindley
F E Vaughan
1931 The Hon Mr Justice Roche
1932 Mr H E May
1933 Mr H W Lindley
1934 Mr C E Fox
1935 The Hon Mr Justice MacKinnon
1936 Mr E R Lindley
1937 Mr E E Moore
1938 Mr G O Henzell, M.C.
1939 The Right Hon Lord Wright
1940 Mr G F Elmslie
1941 Mr C T Ellis, M.C.
1942 Mr E W Reading, M.C.
1943 Mr P R Bennett, B.L.
1944 The Right Hon Lord Porter
1945 Mr C B Cooper
1946 Mr J R Danson, M.A., M.C.
1947 Mr W Richards, C.B.E.
1948 Mr W D Wattleworth
1949 Mr J T Walker, M.C.
1950 The Hon Mr Justice Pilcher, M.C.
1951 Mr F G Hogg T.D.
1952 Mr G J B Edge
1953 Mr D R Miller
1954 Mr G E Towers
1955 Mr D D B Johnson, O.B.E., B.Com.
1956 Mr D V Moore
1957 Mr W T Wood
1958 The Right Hon Lord Justice Sellers, M.C.
1959 Mr M H Downes
1960 Mr S G Chubb
1961 Mr J H Lloyd Davies
1962 Mr A J Finlason, M.C.
1963 Mr R H Arnold
1964 Mr C T Greenacre
1965 Mr R C Clancey, LL.B.
1966 Mr N M Gordon
1967 The Right Hon Lord Devlin, P.C.
1968 Mr G R Heselton
1969 Mr J S Crump
1970 Mr D L Towers
1971 Mr R A H Arnold
1972 The Rt Hon Sir G Willmer, O.B.E., T.D.
1973 Mr N G Hudson
1974 Mr G H May
1975 Mr D G Milburn
1976 Mr A B Dann M.A., J.P.
1977 Mr C R D Towers
1978 The Right Hon Lord Justice Roskill
1979 Mr D C Cooper
1980 Mr W P F Bennett, M.A.
1981 Mr J P Duke
1982 The Right Hon Lord Justice Donaldson
1983 Mr W Richards
1984 Mr R A Stacey
1985 Mr G S Hughes
1986 Mr K V Wood
1987 The Hon Mr Justice Sheen
1988 Mr D J Wilson
1989 Mr A J Birch
1990 Mr C S Hebditch, M.A.
1893
1921
1922 Mr
1923 The Right Hon Viscount Sumner, G.C.E. 1924 Mr G R Rudolf 1925 Mr J D Barker 1926 Mr A H Watts 1927 The Right Hon Lord Merrivale 1928 Mr A C Smith 1929 Lt-Col D Cookes, D.S.O. 1930 Mr
Annual Report 2023 31
