Changes and Challenges for the EU in the Post-Brexit Scenario

CHANGES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU IN THE POST-BREXIT SCENARIO ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO JAROLIM ANTAL JULIE SMITH EOIN DREA

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Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

CHANGES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE EU IN THE POST-BREXIT SCENARIO

Publisher and copyright: © Alessandro D’Onofrio, Jarolim Antal, Julie Smith, Eoin Drea 2021 ©Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Antall József Knowledge Centre 2021 Managing editor: Zsolt Csepregi Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1027 Budapest, Királyfürdő street 4

This is a joint publication of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies and the Antall József Knowledge Centre. This publication receives funding from the European Parliament. The Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, the Antall József Knowledge Centre and the European Parliament assume no responsibility for facts or opinions expressed in this publication or any subsequent use of the information contained therein. Sole responsibility lies on the author of the publication.

The processing of the publication was concluded in 2021.

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Alessandro D’Onofrio

SUBGROUPS IN THE EU-27: HELPFUL OR HARMFUL?

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Jarolim Antal

EU–UK: COMMON FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND CHALLENGES DISCUSSION ON A JOINT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH 15

Professor Julie Smith

TOWARDS A STRONGER UNION: WITH OR WITHOUT TREATY CHANGE?

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Eoin Drea

CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHAT DID WE LEARN FROM BREXIT?

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SUBGROUPS IN THE EU-27: HELPFUL OR HARMFUL? ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

Even if the relations between the UK and the EU entered a new phase Brexit has shown that the economic, political and cultural ties between the two parts are very rooted and can hardly be wiped out by a unilateral pronouncement. Surely, some of them have already been altered, but most of these links will endure. The UK will recognise that, due to geography, any post-Brexit strategy should concentrate on cooperating with the EU and its member.

Contrarily to the common belief, in the long-term Brexit could make the British more aware of their European character and turn them into active (external) players in setting the European agenda.1 But in the immediate the UK is determined to strengthen bilateral ties with single EU countries on single issues, cutting out the EU. This aims at reducing intra-EU coordination between Member States and reducing UK’s isolation. However, because of Brexit EU Member States are more conscious of the value of their membership and of the importance of intra-EU cooperation. As, the British withdrawal changed the balance in the EU concentrating more power on larger Member States, some countries increased their efforts to cooperate with each other and form coalitions in order to bring forward political initiatives.

BALANCE SHIFTS IN THE EU Brexit, as an exceptional political and economic upheaval, shocked the EU and raised questions about the future of the European construction itself. Pro-European thinkers, federalists among them, after the initial pain of seeing departing the country where the federalist ideas spread, eventually agreed in seeing Brexit as an opportunity to reform the EU and make it stronger. This is true if we consider that the strengthening of the FrancoGerman axis, the creation of the revolutionary NGEU and the Commission’s ambitious plans are unlikely to have happened with the British still in the EU. On the other hand, many were actually convinced that the UK’s departure would have reinforced centrifugal forces and led to the EU’s disintegration. But, apart some cases, these forces never gained enough political power to bring forward Brexit-like initiatives and some of them even softened their anti-EU claims once they realised what a break-up entails.2 At the institutional level, Brexit excluded the UK from the EU decision-making process and left the Union without its third largest country and second largest economy. This led to a reorganisation of the European constitutional and financial set-up. On the one side, the EU had to cope with the loss of a crucial net contributor to the budget.

On the other, Brexit meant a notable change of the balance of power in the Council.

In fact, without the UK the voting weight of the larger remaining Member States,

especially Germany and France, notably increased. Currently, Germany, France, Italy and Spain together represent more than 57% of the EU population, and the

Georgina Wright–Alex Stojanovic–David Klemperer: Influencing the EU after Brexit. Institute for Government.

January 2020. <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/influencing-EUafter-brexit_2.pdf > Accessed: 29 July 2021.

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Ulrike Franke–Jana Puglierin: The big engine that might: How France and Germany can build a geopolitical Europe. European Council on Foreign Relations. 14 July 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_big_engine_that_ might_how_france_and_germany_can_build_a_geopolitical_e/ > Accessed: 30 July 2020.

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presence of one of them in a coalition can determine the outcome of any initiative.3 When in the EU the UK usually acted as a warrantor of the balance of power and of the status quo. British activities mostly concentrated on subjects related to budgetary matters, economic policy choices, digitalisation, the consolidation of the internal market, global free trade, and security. Smaller EU countries, and especially the northern countries, had in the UK an ally on many of these issues but now, without their powerful partner, are seeking new alliances in order to shape the decision-making process. According to them, larger states’ predominance in the Council can be detrimental to the interest of the medium and smaller ones and could hamper the role of the Commission as well as the Community method.4 In their eyes the ability of the EU executive to act as a balance between larger and smaller Member States and its autonomy in proposing own legislative initiatives will be reduced by a stronger Franco-German coordination. Some of this criticism might be well-founded, but it is also true that, historically, only big states’ activism stimulated the intra-EU debate and helped the Commission to adopt crucial initiatives which would have otherwise failed.5

THE COUNCIL’S VOTING SYSTEM In the last decades the EU decision-making process has changed several times, with the extension and modification of EU responsibilities and the policy areas where the EU is acting. This is mostly visible observing the Council and its voting system. The Council is one of the most important European institutions and takes part in the main decisionmaking procedures in the EU, it establishes the priorities of its policies, can propose changes to the Treaties, has a role in nominating and appointing the EU’s highest posts (the candidate for the President of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union among them), addresses the EU’S foreign policy and common security policy, etc.6 Lisbon notably changed the EU decision-process and redefined the role of the Council by extending the amount of decisions to be taken by a qualified majority. There is a qualified majority, when 55% of the Member States (15 out of 27), representing at least the 65% of the EU’s population vote favourably. A blocking minority, on the contrary, must include at least four members representing more than 35% of the EU’s population. Even if there is a tacit rule that decisions in the Council are to be taken by consensus, currently, about 80% of all EU legislation is adopted with qualified majority.7 However, the unanimity vote is still present

3 EU population in 2020: almost 448 million. Eurostat, Newsrelease 111/2020. 10 July 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/11081093/3-10072020-AP-EN.pdf/d2f799bf-4412-05cca357-7b49b93615f1 > Accessed: 30 July 2021.

The Community method is characterised by the Commission’s monopoly of legislative initiative and legislative co-decisional power of the Council and the European parliament on Commission’s proposals.

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Adriano Bosoni: How a Brexit Would Undermine Europe’s Balance of Power. Stratfor. 21 June 2016. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-brexit-would-undermine-europes-balance-power > Accessed: 15 July 2021.

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European Council. European Union. <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/ european-council > Accessed: 15 July 2021.

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Qualfied majority. European Council, Council of the European Union. Last updated on 23 March 2020 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/ > Accessed: 15 July 2021.

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and related to issues such as common foreign and security policy, EU finances (MFF), etc.

Essentially, the importance of the Council lies in the fact that it represents the main forum where Member States can bring forward their interests by creating coalitions supporting the same idea.8 Before Brexit, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain represented the countries shaping the EU’s political agenda. A cluster of smaller like-minded states, interested in preserving the status quo and having a less centralised EU, usually pooled around the British. Now things have changed and it will be more difficult for them to contrast the initiatives of the largest countries without the support of the UK. In order to be effective, a coalition of states aimed at blocking an initiative coming from Germany or France—accounting for the 33.2% of the EU’s population—needs, not just the participation of at least one of the remaining big states, but also additional 8-10 countries.9

COALITION-BUILDING AS THE MAIN GAME IN THE EU Coalition-building is the main tool Member States have to create consensus around issues that are central for them and strengthen their own position in negotiations. In a mostly intergovernmental EU, finding “allies” is a key aspect for a country since it is only by developing relations that it could act as driving force in the community. In a EU composed of twenty-seven countries, the need for informal consensus-building among governments has grown and following Brexit some readjustments were required. The EU Member States’ strong collective action as a reaction of Brexit is a good example of it and it reversed the main narrative of the last decades which saw fragmentation and conflict rather than cooperation.10 Moreover, being part of a coalition gives Member States more flexibility to vary their degree of integration by choosing partners sharing the same interest on determinate areas—considering that it would not be always possible to involve all the Member States to support an initiative. In fact, flexible models of cooperation allow European policies to evolve further, preventing that the veto of some states could detain the integration of others.11 Coalition-building is often referred in its negative aspect and perceived as essentially designed to block policies and divide countries.

However, this assumption takes into account only the competitive nature of sovereign states without considering that cooperation and compromise are processes inherent to any federal, confederal or multilevel system.12

Mikko Mattila: Voting and Coalitions in the Council after the Enlargement. In: Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Governments Play in Brussels, edited by Daniel Naurin–Helen Wallace. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008. 23–35.

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The Council of the European Union: Voting System: Voting Calculator. European Council. 2020. <https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/voting-calculator/ > Accessed: 16 July 2021.

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10 Frank M. Häge: Coalition Building and Consensus in the Council of the European Union. British Journal of Political Science. 2013/3. 481–504.

Mark A. Pollack: Theorizing the European Union: International Organization, Domestic Polity, or Experiment in New Governance? Annual Review of Political Science. 2005/8. 357–398.

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12 Maurice J. C. Vile: Federation and Confederation: The Experience of the United States and the British Commonwealth. In: Political Co-operation in Divided Societies. A Series of Papers Relevant to the Conflict in Northern Ireland, edited by Desmond Rea. Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1982. 216–228.

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Coalition-building practise usually follows historical patterns. Even before the 2008 financial crisis, the main intra-EU groups were born mostly along the North-South divide.

The accession of a large group of former communist countries opened up the way to new political and economic models which in turn resulted in new differing visions of European integration.13 Currently, new issues, such as environment, security, health, human rights, created new alignments and new partnerships outside the traditional ones.

Differently from larger Member States, the smaller ones represent a less homogenous group. In fact, smaller countries in the EU are geographically dispersed, in different regions, they have different political and economic traditions, and their interests are very diverse.14 Therefore, considering their characteristics, it is more complicate for smaller countries to band together. However, the size alone is not enough to obtain success in negotiations, as a country’s ambitions and willingness to engage are equally important to develop a strategy and to influence the others. Currently, the Franco-German tandem remains the most connected in the EU, but smaller countries like the Netherlands and Sweden are very effective and are among the most contacted by other Member States.15 Traditionally, the UK represented a strong partner for the more liberal and economically open Member States, that now find themselves at disadvantage in a more “centralistic” EU. The UK’s position was, in fact, crucial for the small but open economies of the Scandinavian and Baltic states, for Ireland or the Netherlands. The latter, is actively trying to replace the UK and set itself as the leader of the so-called “frugal” countries consisting also of Austria, Sweden and Finland, interested in a smaller but more modern budget. The Netherlands’ pivotal role was particularly evident during the 2021-2027 MFF negotiates where the Dutch government unsuccessfully opposed a budget’s increase and the NGEU’s introduction. In a context where QMV is required, a coalition of likeminded countries including the “frugals,” the rest of Benelux, the Nordic countries and Ireland, will fall way short of the minimum requirements to form a blocking minority.16 Brexit also brought about the prospect of a power shift in favour of Eurozone countries, potentially pushing the outsiders further to the side. Divergences between non-euro and euro countries are expected to emerge more frequently than before. In fact, when the UK was in the EU, the countries not belonging to the Eurozone represented more than 33% of the EU population. Now this group comprises just 23% of the EU population,17 which

13 Ivan Krastev–Mark Leonard: Europe’s pandemic politics: How the virus has changed the public’s worldview.

European Council on Foreign Relations. 24 June 2020. <https://ecfr.eu/publication/europes_pandemic_politics_ how_the_virus_has_changed_the_publics_worldview/ > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

Gunta Pastore: Small New Member States in the EU Foreign Policy: Toward ‘Small State Smart Strategy’?

Baltic Journal of Political Science. 2013/2. 64–87. <https://doi.org/10.15388/BJPS.2013.2.2818 > 14

15 Josef Janning–Almut Möller: Untapped potential: How new alliances can strengthen the EU. European Council on Foreign Relations. July 2019. <https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR_290_Untapped_potential_ How_new_alliances_can_strengthen_the_EU_-_double_pages.pdf > Accessed: 21 July 2021.

16 Claire Busse [et al.]: EU Coalition Explorer. European Council on Foreign Relations. 8 July 2020. <https://ecfr. eu/special/eucoalitionexplorer/ > Accessed: 23 July 2021.

This number is destined to reduce since Croatia will soon adopt euro as its currency while also Bulgaria and Romania took steps in this direction.

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increases the leverage of the Eurogroup for what concerns economic and financial matters.18

COALITIONS: THE VISEGRÁD FOUR EU Coalitions generally represents three main categories according to their degree of institutionalisation: lead groups, ad-hoc coalitions and alliances. A lead group is a fairly loose partnership resulting from an intergovernmental bargaining process aimed primarily at introducing some initiatives in the Council. Ad-hoc coalitions are more political in nature but focus just on a single issue. Differently, alliances emerge at the political level, are structural in nature and are usually targeting more subjects.19 While the first categories is usually asymmetric, with bigger states in a clear position of leadership, the latter two show a more balanced power relationship and more institutionalised coordination on a regional basis.

There are several interesting examples of alliances today in the EU, like the Benelux, the Nordic Cooperation, the Baltic group, and, in some way, the Visegrad Four.20 The Visegrad Four, or V4, received particular attention during the 2015 migration crisis.

This non-formalised alliance between four former communist countries which joined the EU in 2004, namely Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, is functioning today mostly as a “vetoing” minority in the Council. The V4, which represents about 14% of the EU population, has opposed some EU initiatives requiring unanimity, such as the Commission’s quota proposal to tackle the massive arrive of migrants to Europe or the introduction of a mechanism which would have linked the allocation of the NGEU to the respect of rule of law criteria.

The V4, created soon after the fall of the Iron Curtain, aimed at coordinating the efforts of its members in order to facilitate their integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, NATO and the EU. Despite a low level of institutionalisation (the International Visegrad Fund is the only institutional office in the V4) and with a yearly rotating presidency, cooperation among its members is very intense and mostly happens at an informal level.21 After achieving its primary goal, the V4 is now aiming at preserving the status quo in the EU, building of a looser Union and repatriating some of the EU competences to Member States. Brexit surely deprived the V4 of a strategic partner since the UK was an ally on many issues, including EU foreign and security policy, relations with the Eastern partnership, or policies related to the single market’s regulation and competition. 22 For this reason, the V4 is now mostly reacting to initiatives taken

Caroline de Gruyter: There Is Life for the EU After Brexit. European Council on Foreign Relations. 28 March 2018. <https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_there_is_life_for_the_eu_after_brexit/ > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

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Gavrilov Doina: Coalition of states for influence in the European Council. Brexit - a step towards decisional balance in the European Council? Open Political Science. 1/2018. 124–130. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ openps-2018-0009 > 19

20 Daniel F. Schulz–Thomas Henökl: New Alliances in Post-Brexit Europe: Does the New Hanseatic League.

Revive Nordic Political Cooperation? Politics and Governance. 2020/4. 78–88. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag. v8i4.3359 > Accessed: 21 July 2021.

About the Visegrad Four. Visegrad Group. <https://www.visegradgroup.eu/about > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

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Vít Beneš [et al.]: Brexit, Post-Brexit Europe and the V4. Potential Impacts, Interests, and Perceptions. Aston Centre for Europe. February 2018. <https://worldeconomy.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/V4_brexit_report.pdf > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

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by other Member States lacking the political power to bring forward any relevant initiative at the EU level. Moreover, the confrontational attitude of the group made the other EU members wary and, if we exclude some cooperation on single issues, the group is struggling to find strategic partners.23 One of the last intra-EU formats involving the V4 was “Friends of cohesion,” which also included Estonia, Croatia, Malta, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Italy, Portugal and Greece. During the MFF negotiations the group aimed to maintain a high-level of funding for the Cohesion Policy which, following Brexit, had to be reduced.24 The current economic status of the V4 countries makes them natural supporters of cohesion policy, of which they are the largest beneficiaries. Despite the potential of an alliance like the “Friends of Cohesion,” the divergences between its members and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, caused a change within the ranks of these states which focused on new issues (like the health crisis and the post-pandemic recovery). Eventually, differently from the group’s original purpose, the fight against the pandemic took the priority over the fight against regional disparities. The V4 countries, have been quite fortunate in terms of COVID-19 impact and therefore their share of NGEU funds was lower. However, V4 countries’ interests are not always aligned and they have often spoken with different voices on several EU matters.25 For instance, Hungary and Poland, are currently in open conflict with the EU institutions over concerns regarding the rule of law and are building a national model that hardly espouses the EU principles. On the contrary, Czech Republic and Slovakia are more pragmatic and are particularly keen in nurturing a strong and working relationship with Germany, their main trading partner. Currently, the fate of the V4 lies in the ability of its states in building new adhoc coalitions and strengthening cooperation with Germany or other larger countries. These will be not an easy task given Hungary and Poland growing isolation.26

WHAT TO EXPECT? Divergences between Member States usually forces the Commission to aim at the lowest common denominator when it comes to formulate its policies, especially in more sensitive areas. In addition, the expansion of the EU competences into new areas and the prospect of future enlargements changed substantially the EU and increased divergences between Member States. Some of them are resorting to their power of veto, which goes anyway against the spirit of the EU which aims at finding consensus. This also impedes the more willing Member States to deepen integration, endangering at the same time the EU’s capacity to pursue its goals.

Adéla Denková [et al.]: Future EU: Does Visegrád have a plan? Euractiv. 16 February 2017. <https://www. euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/future-eu-does-visegrad-have-a-plan/ > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

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24 Friends of Cohesion. Joint Declaration on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027. República Portuguesa, XII Governo. 1 February 2020. <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro. aspx?v=%3D%3DBQAAAB%2BLCAAAAAAABAAzNDA2NwcAeMDfpAUAAAA%3D > Accessed: 27 July 2021.

Zuzana Stuchlíková: The Role and Status of the Visegrad Countries after Brexit: the Czech Republic. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, CENS 2017 Paper Series. November 2017. <http://archive.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/publications/ oct9stuchlikova.pdf > Accessed: 27 July 2021.

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Nikolett Garrai: Challenges faced by the Visegrad Group in the “European dimension” of cooperation.

International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. 2018/1–2. 24–42.

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To avoid legislative inertia, the EU treaties provide the possibility for a limited number of Member States (at least nine) to develop forms of enhanced cooperation. This approach allows Member States, to move at a greater pace towards integration in more fields and overcome the stalemate. More specifically, “coalitions of the willing” are legitimate if their aim is “to deepen their cooperation in chosen domains” while “the status of other Member States is preserved, and they retain the possibility to join those doing more over time.”27 However, smaller Member States usually oppose the idea of a multispeed Europe fearing that this would create an elite club and a periphery within the EU, increasing fragmentation and the bigger countries dominating integration.28 The EU today already incorporates flexible examples of cooperation. For example, the Eurozone, Schengen and even PESCO are some of the most visible forms of differentiation.

In fact, despite the smaller states’ concerns a multispeed EU should not be intended as exclusively negative. One of the main political implications of differentiated integration is the creation of new balances in the EU. Therefore, the use of enhanced cooperation could therefore be useful especially also for the latter that, by forming a coalition in support of a specific issue, would sustain policies the big states would not consider and influence them.29 Surely, it is also necessary to regulate within a legal framework any form of flexible cooperation to ensure equal opportunities to all Member States to participate. It is undeniable that differentiation in an enlarging EU will help to respond to immediate as well as long-term challenges, create a more resilient Union, and offer a functional answer to the dilemma between deepening and widening.30

White paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. European Commission, Brussels, 2017. <doi.org/10.2775/66626 > 27

Stefan Telle–Claudia Badulescu–Daniel Fernandes: Differentiated integration in the EU – What do the Member States ‘think’ about it? Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Research Paper No. RSC 2021/50.<https://poseidon01.ssrn.com > Accessed: 28 July 2021.

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29 Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade: Enhanced Cooperation: the Ultimate Challenge of Managing Diversity in Europe. New Perspectives on the European Integration Process. Intereconomics. 2005/4. 201–216.

Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade: Enhanced Cooperation: the Ultimate Challenge of Managing Diversity in Europe. New Perspectives on the European Integration Process. Intereconomics. 2005/4. 201–216.

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EU–UK: COMMON FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND CHALLENGES. DISCUSSION ON A JOINT FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH JAROLIM ANTAL CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, PRAGUE UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS

Foreign policy belongs to policies where the competence of the EU as whole remains limited.

Despite the number of reforms which strengthened the EU’s powers and capacity to speak with a single voice, Member States still play a prevailing role, directly influencing the EU foreign policy and maintaining certain exclusive powers. At the same time, the complex EU decision-making processes often slow down the ability to respond immediately, so, when it comes to issues that would need a fast reaction, the EU must seek a common position approved by all Member States.

Hence, as a result of Brexit, the UK may, through its regained “sovereignty,” move more independently, and eventually faster, with more room to manoeuvre in the global arena.

However, let us stay realistic. The complexity of international affairs and global issues requires partnerships and the ability to build coalitions that can help states to talk with a stronger voice and provide more concerted (re)actions. And, whether before Brexit or after, the partners of the UK and likeminded countries that defend and promote liberal values and democracy remain the same. The new era of relations between the EU27 and the UK has opened discussions on mutual future cooperation. This is also happening inevitably in the field of foreign policy, where the UK must search for a new position and re-establish a framework and ways of interactions with its partners.

This chapter describes the outcomes of Brexit and discusses the ways and the areas where the EU and the UK need to interact, given their status in the international arena.

It argues that the EU–UK cooperation in foreign policy can only work if the parties leave behind their sentiments on Brexit and re-establish mutual trust.

UK AND ITS INTERESTS IN WORKING WITH THE EU Looking back in the past, some relevant observations can be made about what the UK’s position was in relation to foreign policy when it was still a EU Member State. The UK was a respected voice within the EU, with one of the biggest military capacities, a military budget exceeding 2% of its GDP, and one of the biggest diplomatic and intelligence services. On the top of this, the UK actively contributed to the military operations promoted by the EU. Interestingly, just during the Brexit transition period, the UK contributed to 7 out of 16 EUled military operations.31 Furthermore, the UK also remains one of the five members of the UN Security Council, a member of various platforms such as G7 or G20, and a nuclear power within NATO. The UK is also active in giving development aids and, before Brexit, Britain’s budget for aid spending was 0.7% of its GNI, meeting the binding target set by the UN. At the same time, the UK was perceived in the EU as part of the so-called “liberal wing,” what was often reflected in its support for a more open trade policy or in ambitions toward the completion of the single market. In addition, it has been also a proponent of a strong transatlantic partnership.

During the Brexit negotiations, the UK officials often made clear that the UK wanted to further

31 Claire Mills–Ben Smith: End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation.

Briefing Paper. House of Commons Library. 19 January 2021. <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/ documents/CBP-9117/CBP-9117.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021

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cooperate with the EU on what were perceived as common interests and priorities.32 Former prime minister Theresa May portrayed Britain “as being a confident country that [was] in control of its own destiny once again.” Theresa May promoted Global Britain as an ambition of the British government even before Brexit. She stated that “we [would] build a new, bold, confident Global Britain and shape a new era of globalisation that genuinely works for all.”33 Nevertheless, this ambition lacked more concrete contents. Developments in 2019 showed that pledges from the above-mentioned political declaration were turned down, and UK’s foreign, security, and defence policy did not have any concrete structure.34 Hadfield and Wright argue that a U-turn in “any institutionalised relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) is arguably the most noteworthy feature of the post-Brexit dispensation.”35 Prime minister Boris Johnson explained the UK’s approach, emphasising that “while we [the UK] [would] always co-operate with its European friends in foreign and defence policy whenever our interests converge—as they often, if not always, [would]—this [would] not... necessarily require any new treaty or institutions.” He also added that this could not be a subject of a legal agreement due to the simple reason “that the UK [was] not a European power by treaty or by law but by irrevocable facts of history and geography and language and culture and instinct and sentiment.”36 Following Brexit, the UK became a “third country,” meaning that the CFSP and CSDP do not apply to the British. The preamble of the TCA refers to the “importance of the global cooperation to address issues of shared interest.” The international dimension of the common principles includes: • • • • •

the principles of democracy, the rule and law and respect for human rights the fight against climate change (commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change) countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction implementing obligations to counter the illicit trade in conventional weapons cooperation to combat acts of terrorism

32 Theresa May at Davos 2017: Her speech in full. 19 January 2017. <https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2017/01/theresa-may-at-davos-2017-her-speech-in-full/ > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

Idem.

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Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. HM Government. 19 October 2019. <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/840656/Political_Declaration_setting_out_the_framework_for_the_ future_relationship_between_the_European_Union_and_the_United_Kingdom.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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Amelia Hadfield–Nicholas Wright: Fog in the Channel? The impact of Brexit on EU and UK foreign affairs.

European Institute for Security Studies. 11 June 2021. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/fog-channelimpact-brexit-eu-and-uk-foreign-affairs > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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PM speech in Greenwich. Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s speech in Greenwich. GOV.UK. 3 February 2020. <https:// www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-in-greenwich-3-february-2020 > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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• global cooperation on issues of shared economic, environmental and social interest, including the two parties’ cooperation on global issues and coordination of positions in multilateral organisations (the UN, the G7, G20, OECD, IMF, World Bank, and the WTO)37 In March this year, the UK published the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. The review identifies opportunities and different platforms that should enable the UK to play a leading role in the global arena. The document also recognises crucial changes in the global environment, where challenges to the liberal world order have been rising. The stronger role of China or, at the time, Donald Trump’s administration have created pressure to defend liberal values and multilateralism more than ever before. For this reason, the Integrated Review sets what the priorities for the UK in this dynamic and unpredictable world are. The US is at the centre of the British relations with other countries as its “most important bilateral relationship, essential to key alliances and groups such as NATO and the Five Eyes [intelligence-sharing relationship between the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand], and our [UK’s] largest bilateral trading partner and inward investor.”38 The Indo-Pacific tilt also gains evident attention in the review. The ambition of the UK is to be “deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest, most integrated presence in support of mutually-beneficial trade, shared security and values.”

The UK, in this regard, should extend the cooperation from China, India, or Japan to South Korea, Vietnam, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines.

Regarding China, the document underlines both the benefits and the risks of closer relations between the UK and the Asian power. It suggests that UK will need “robust diplomatic framework” to manage its relations with China. At the same time, the UK wants China to follow existing agreements and, therefore, “will not hesitate and stand up for values and interests where they are threatened.”39 As for the future of the EU–UK relations, they lack more concrete steps and ways of engaging with the EU, as the UK only focusses on selected partnerships with single Member States. In particular, the review focuses on the bigger ones, calling for “growing foreign policy partnership with Germany or France” assuming the beginning of “deep and long-standing” security and defence cooperation. Hadfield and Wright describe missing forms of cooperation with the EU as “an EU-sized hole that now exists in British foreign policy thinking.”40

Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community. EUR-Lex. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?qid=1580206007232&uri=CELEX%3A12019W/TXT%2802%29 >. Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.

GOV.UK. 2 July 2021. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-theintegrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

38

Idem.

39

Hadfield–Wright.

40

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AFTER BREXIT: BAND TOGETHER OR FALL APART? According to the Integrated Review, from London’s perspective, there are only very marginal references to the relations with the EU. Nevertheless, despite the preferred flexibility for which the UK is calling when it comes to new relations with the EU, there must be interactions with the bloc in the field of foreign policy, given the geographical proximity and overlapping interest.

HOW? A reconfiguration of the relations with the EU is for naturally important the UK. Currently, the UK foreign policy seems to lean towards cooperation with single Member States and excluding Brussels. Recently, some formats gained attention and became a useful tool for common discussion and joint coordination. For example, the E3 format, where Germany, France, and the UK cooperated back in 2003 on the nuclear agreement with Iran, could be promising. The E3 gained a new momentum under Donald Trump’s administration and with other issues, such as the poisoning of agent Skripal, when the leaders of these countries met frequently.

Some experts argue that the E3 could provide diplomatic coordination and crisis response and expand its focus to address a new set of thematic, regional, or multilateral topics.41 The Quad is another platform where the UK is involved in foreign policy cooperation.

It includes Germany, France, and the US on a level of political directors, focussing on coordination and exchanging information. Under the new US administration, the formation met several times discussing the matters of Iran, Myanmar, and China.

Surely, small groupings and specific policy-oriented formats bring benefits and build trust between the countries. However, closed clubs are often criticised for their exclusivity, and, in regard to the EU, this may raise concerns about the possibility that these formats will undermine the EU’s unity. At the same time, looser forms of cooperation may contribute to better information exchange and building trust among single EU Member States and the UK. Flexibility, therefore, may enable the UK to explore new opportunities in its relations with EU Member States and eventually help foster cooperation in specific foreign policy areas.

WHAT AREAS? In foreign policy, the missing framework for cooperation between the EU and the UK affects various areas. It surely brings uncertainty, but, at the same time, some basic orientation and direction remains unchanged in some fields. Here, therefore, certain predictability is present.

As result of Brexit, the UK set its own sanctions framework, which gives the UK the power to actively implement the sanctions autonomously. Nevertheless, the UK and the EU are required to follow the international obligations based on UN resolutions. So it can be expected that the British position in this area will resemble that of the EU. However, there is currently no formal cooperation on dealing with policy challenges involving these sanctions. It should also be added that, in order to be effective, a sanctions policy should be coordinated with partners; 41 Alice Bilon Garrand–Richard G Whitman: E3 Cooperation Beyond Brexit: Challenging but Necessary. Expert Comment. Chatham House. 2 September 2020. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/09/e3-cooperationbeyond-brexit-challenging-necessary > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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so, for the UK, working together with the EU is an essential element to successfully implement sanctions and have a common stand on issues they both share the same views about, for instance, on Belarus or Russia. In the case of Belarus, Britain was the first European country introducing sanctions against the Lukashenko government in 2020; and it is only one of the most recent cases in a series of similar situations.

Coordination in climate policy also remains an open question in EU–UK relations, even if it is exactly regarding fighting climate change that the EU is mentioned as a possible partner in the Integrated Review. No doubt that both entities are committed to the very ambitious goal of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, but more efforts are needed. The COP26 in Glasgow is a unique opportunity to find a way to work with other countries and to agree on a common action with the EU, too. Here, the UK, together with the US and the EU, can play a vital role. Wachowiak points out that the EU should use its current momentum to set a triangular climate alliance with the US and not leave the UK out of their plans for establishing a High-Level Climate Action Group.42 Despite the binding nature of the Paris agreement, more action is needed at the national level to implement it and to contribute to achieving the states’ commitments.

World trade is now threatened by protectionist waves, and not only as a result of the pandemic. The need for a functioning multilateral body is, therefore, urgent. However, there has not been enough support to move further with the reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Here, again, coalitions are crucial and the core group is represented by likeminded countries in the West. The EU, together with the UK, could contribute to this reform and be among those promoting it to their partners. Other fields where collaboration is desirable are trade liberalisation and environmental sustainability.

The already-mentioned lack of structure for cooperation also affects the area of defence.

Here, the missing channels and platforms can become a real hurdle in the EU–UK cooperation, at least at this initial phase.43 The UK military personnel contributing to the CSDP missions will return to the UK, and this also applies to the military staff seconding EU institutions. It remains unclear what direction the UK will choose, as the decision about joining the CSDP operations with the EU needs to be approved by the parliament and has to be in line with the national interest.44 In addition, by leaving the EU, the UK also lost influence in shaping the EU defence initiatives. For instance, withdrawing from the European Defense Agency and, therefore, assuming a third-country status does not allow Britain to be part of the European Defence Fund and, consequently, to have an access to its projects. The UK will most

42 Jannike Wachowiak: EU–UK climate cooperation post-Brexit: A case for optimism? European Policy Centre, Policy Brief. 28 June 2021. <https://www.epc.eu/content/PDF/2021/EU-UK_Climate_cooperation_PB.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021

Paolo D’Alesio: EU-UK Defense Cooperation After Brexit. Finabel. June 2021. <https://finabel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/22.-EU-UK-Defence-Cooperation-After-Brexit.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

43

44 Claire Mills–Ben Smith: End of Brexit transition: implications for defence and foreign policy cooperation.

House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number 9117. 19 January 2021. <https://researchbriefings.files. parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9117/CBP-9117.pdf > Accessed: 10 September 2021

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probably focus on NATO and seek ways through its diplomacy to single Member States to gain information and influence in the activities of the EU’s CSDP.45 The recent step of the US government to withdraw from Afghanistan represents another challenge in the relations between the EU and the UK. This even proves that it is becoming harder for both of them to rely on the US to ensure their own defence. Neither the UK nor the EU managed to persuade the US to delay the withdrawal from Kabul airport in order to evacuate more people. For the EU, this may help catalysing the forces advocating the establishment of EU permanent military forces and, for the UK, rethink its approach to the US and seek ways for cooperation and alliances with other partners.46 The UK was also an active EU Member State in the field of cybersecurity. With its capacities and knowledge, it also contributed to the staff of ENISA and Europol. It also led actions investigating cybercrimes in the EU and called for closer cooperation among the Member States. Stevens points out that, because of Brexit, the UK has lost access to the information and is excluded from the EU’s cybersecurity decision making. This does not mean that the EU and the UK cannot cooperate, but the UK will eventually look at other platforms, such as NATO or the FVEY, and new bi- and multilateral relations for cybersecurity cooperation—more than at the EU, albeit the participants may often be EU states.47 Transatlantic relations are a key aspect of foreign policy strategy in both the UK and the EU. The result of the US elections and the new administration led by Joe Biden brought more predictability in the relations with the US’s traditional partners, but whether the “America First” approach is gone in American foreign policy remains still questionable.

A wave of optimism in the EU also followed Biden’s election. Brussels hopes that the Democratic administration is more willing to strengthen the EU–US relations and, eventually, it can have a strong advocate for trade liberalisation and regulatory cooperation on its side.

For example, the position of the new US administration on trade matters is already evidently different from that of the Trump administration. During the 2021 G7, the US has been nudging the UK government to accept the EU’s proposal for aligning UK products with the European rules, which would have helped avoid imposing controls at the Irish sea ports. The UK has denied the proposal, emphasising that flexibility in standards on foods could be beneficial for new trade agreements with countries with different standards, such as the US.48 In this sense, the UK is a new special actor that left the largest free market in the world, trying to set its own regulatory framework. To what extent it will diverge from the EU and how close it could eventually be to the EU in the future will only be visible in the long term. Nevertheless, the UK’s ambition to catalyse negotiations on a trade agreement with the US will not be

Mills–Smith. 2021

45

Daniel Boffey: US withdrawal from Afghanistan will lead to EU army, says top diplomat. The Guardian.

2 September 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/02/us-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-willlead-to-eu-army-says-top-diplomat > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

46

47 Tim Stevens: Brexit and Beyond: Cyber Security. King’s College London. 5 February 2021. <https://www.kcl. ac.uk/cyber-security-brexit-and-beyond > Accessed: 10 September 2021

George Parker: EU leaders to pressure Boris Johnson over Northern Ireland at G7. Financial Times. 11 June 2021. <https://on.ft.com/3twYaKe > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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easy, as the US president warned that, for now, the priorities for his administration are to increase competitiveness at home not through new trade deals with other countries.49

THE WAY TO GO: RENEWING TRUST IN THE EU–UK RELATIONS Despite the fact that the Brexit chapter is formally closed, uncertainty persists and directly affects the UK’s relations with the EU and mutual confidence between the country and its European partners. The trust between the UK and the EU was further harmed by several diplomatic incidents. Currently, the UK government is challenging the already agreed parameters of the Northern Ireland Protocol, forcing the EU to launch legal actions against the British government. Criticism towards the UK government came from the House of Lords, which deemed that Johnson’s attitude was damaging the UK’s international reputation, and, later, from the US. As a response, and still in regard of the Northern Ireland Protocol, the UK started accusing the EU of low flexibility in implementing the withdrawal agreement, as the new customs regime and the border controls could become an obstacle in delivering supplies from the UK to Northern Ireland. The issue escalated at the 2021 G7 summit, where prime minister Boris Johnson accused the French president Emmanuel Macron that the EU is preventing the sales of British chilled meat in Northern Ireland.50 In this climate, the UK government threatened to not give the EU ambassador to London full diplomatic status, a decision then withdrawn.51 However, Wachowiak points out the essential role of the levels in the EU–UK relations other than the official ones. The EU should focus more on the subnational level to support and promote relations between substate actors on both sides, such as devolved administrations, regions and cities, civil society, academia and think tanks.52 This could contribute to renewing trust and find grounds for mutual cooperation, also in foreign policy matters.

CONCLUSION Brexit opens a new chapter in EU–UK relations. With the introduction of the TCA, the process is formally concluded, but many questions still remain unanswered. As the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borell stated, “[w]ith Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make.”53 The EU and UK share

Patrick Wintour: Joe Biden warning dashes UK hopes of early US trade deal. The Guardian. 2 December 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/dec/02/uk-hopes-of-early-us-trade-deal-dashed-by-biden-warning > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

49

As a result of the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU and the UK agreed on a protocol providing border checks between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK 50

51 Jim Brunsden–Michael Peel: Brussels’ Brexit enforcer warns UK over diplomatic snub. Financial Times.

26 January 2021. <https://www.ft.com/content/bd9491fe-f9ae-4cfb-a966-8330bbe8643e > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

Wachowiak.

52

Josep Borell: After Brexit, how can the EU and UK best cooperate on foreign policy? EEAS. 29 January 2021. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/92345/after-brexit-how-can-eu-and-uk-bestcooperate-foreign-policy_en > Accessed: 10 September 2021.

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common values and interests and this is reflected in their foreign policy. But thelack mutual trust to work closer. For now, the UK does not perceive the EU as an essential partner with established channels for cooperation. The British are rather looking at different partners and, in some cases, establishing closer relations with single EU Member States. At least this is what it can be read from the UK government’s official positions. The flexibility in cooperation for which the UK government is calling is more an ambition than a recipe of success. When it comes to concrete issues, the UK needs to actively seek to build coalitions and partnerships that can increase the influence and the efficiency of its national positions.

In this respect, the EU represents the neighbour whose doorbell could be rung. There are several areas and opportunities where the EU’s and the UK’s interests will inevitably intersect. However, in this climate of uncooperativeness, it is hard to estimate when we will see more concrete steps. At the last G7 summit, it was still clear that Brexit is a topic that is stealing the show and unnecessarily overshadowed the summit’s agenda. Perhaps the COP26 conference can bring more achievements, and the EU and the UK’s common ambition on the issue as well as the necessity to implement the commitments in the Paris Agreement can open the way for a new rapprochement. This is made even more urgent by recent developments in Afghanistan that should help the two sides focus on stronger cooperation on not only trade issues but also defence and security matters.

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TOWARDS A STRONGER UNION: WITH OR WITHOUT TREATY CHANGE? JULIE SMITH PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

As it entered its eighth decade, the European Union (EU) faced a series of unprecedented challenges. One large country had just left and others sought to challenge the underlying principles that had shaped the integration process since its inception, namely democracy and the rule of law. Meanwhile, the Union was facing the challenge of the COVID pandemic, which raised questions of competence and effectiveness; health is not an EU competence, yet the consequences of COVID were not just about health—they were in part economic—and they clearly went beyond borders. Brexit, democratic backsliding and COVID all impacted the EU in different ways and all stand to have consequences for the Union as it looks to the next decade and beyond. Brexit was a turning point that offered the possibility of further integration and a stronger Union, or disintegration and a weaker entity; democratic backsliding provides an unambiguous and intentional challenge to the Union, making it weaker; reform of practice and perhaps the treaties is needed to strengthen the Union in the face of these attitudes; by contrast, the response to COVID provides some grounds for optimism that the European Union stands to integrate further.

Substantive reform to increase the formal powers (or “competences”) of the EU typically necessitates treaty change. Thirty years’ experience since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty have proved how difficult this can be to achieve, given the widely divergent interests and preferences of the EU’s Member States and, crucially, the fact that treaty reform can only be decided by unanimity among the Member States. These factors have ensured such reforms have remained off the agenda since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in November 2009.54 This contribution explores the competing pressures favouring more or less integration posed by backsliding and the COVID crisis, as well as the difficulty of securing treaty change even without the UK as the Union’s long-standing “awkward partner.”55 While Brexit highlighted the ability of the 27 to speak with one voice, quite at odds with some who feared or hoped that Brexit might lead to the collapse of the Union, the nature and difference of the 27 Member States constituting the European Union in the 2020s is such that further integration remains challenging and the prospect of securing treaty reform is quasi impossible, owing to the fact that revision of the treaties can only be ratified by unanimity.

The first of January 2021, almost 70 years after the founding Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community had originally been signed, marked the first day of a new era. The Europe of 28 had been reduced to 27, with the final departure of the United Kingdom marking the end of a protracted process of withdrawal, commonly dubbed “Brexit.”56 For the first time a fully-fledged Member State had left the postwar organisation that had been created with the vision of ensuring peace and security in Europe. The aims

Danish voters initially rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, while the Irish voted against the Nice and Lisbon Treaties. In all three cases, the results were overturned in second referendums and the treaties came into effect. By contrast, the Constitutional Treaty failed in 2005 when by French and Dutch citizens voted resoundingly against it.

54

This term was coined by Stephen George many years ago.

55

The UK formally left the EU on 31st January 2020 but was in a transitional phase outside the institutions but inside the single market and customs union until 31st December 2020.

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and ambitions of both founding states and latecomers were similar: to ensure stability and security for their citizens through what Karl Deutsch called a “security community.”57 By building mutual trust, alongside pooling resources, the sort of border disputes that had triggered centuries of conflict across Europe would cease. The initial results were positive and contributed to calls to expand, driven not by expansionist zeal among the existing members but from other states seeking the perceived benefits of membership. From an initial Community of six West European states, the Union would expand to the north-west, south, and east as a variety of domestic and international changes swept the continent.

Over the years a variety of factors underpinned the existing Member States’ decision to expand the Union. One factor in particular was to prove crucial both to decisions to expand and the evolving political landscape in Europe, namely the hope of consolidating democracy in fledgling democracies, initially those emerging from right-wing dictatorship— Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s. After the collapse of Communism in Europe, a significant group of Central and Eastern Europe states in transition followed a similar path towards liberal democracy and EU membership. For the existing Member States there was a clear interest in having stable neighbours that would not look east to Russia for their security or ideological guidance.58 For the elites leading the transition in southern and Central and Eastern Europe, there was an equal interest in securing membership of the “club,” in part for the economic benefits they anticipated, but also to embed their transition into the Western comity of nations, a widely articulated wish in Central and East European states that desired a “return to Europe.”

The apparently magnetic attraction of the Union was beneficial to newcomers and established members alike, as the latter demanded that would-be members commit themselves to a number of criteria, including respect for the rule of law and minority rights, and that they should be functioning democracies. Under these so-called Copenhagen criteria, the EU set the rules of engagement for states seeking membership to reflect the norms and values of the EU.59 Rhetorical commitment to these ideals alone was not sufficient: through the carefully elaborated enlargement process, the European Commission would rigorously review not just governments’ stated commitments to meeting the criteria but the actual practices in the country, seeking to ensure that newcomers genuinely met the requirements of membership rather than merely paying lip service. Failure to do so would ensure they remained as candidates sometimes, as the case of Turkey most visibly highlights.

Indeed, candidates from Central and Eastern Europe were held to far higher standards than existing members, whose democratic or other credentials could not be monitored or censured.

The European Commission hailed enlargement as the Union’s best tool of foreign policy, enabling it to effect change in neighbouring states, thereby fostering a more stable region. Conditionality was explicit, the carrot of membership providing sufficient incentive 57 Karl W. Deutsch [et al.]: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton University Press, Princeton (NJ), 1957.

In the 1980s there was still concern about the threat of Communism even in Western Europe, particularly in Spain.

58

There were other criteria, including on administrative and judicial capacity and the having a functional market economy, but it is the first criterion relating to democracy that is most germane to the current piece.

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for most leaders to bring about change domestically. Such change was expected to be irreversible. There was an implicit assumption that after accession states would become ever more embedded into the process of integration, and that (liberal) democracy would become ever-more deeply embedded domestically, as had been the case in the erstwhile Mediterranean dictatorships, Spain, Portugal and Greece, whose membership could be counted a great success in terms of democratic consolidation. Little thought was given to the idea that states might in fact drift away from the European norms and values to which they had appeared so committed during their quest for membership, that leaders might only have been paying lip service to the Copenhagen criteria or that their successors would simply reject the aims and ambitions espoused by the proponents of joining Western institutions. There are few sanctions against those who do, legally or in practice. The introduction of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) initially in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which allows for members to be suspended if they breach the norms and values enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU, 60 does not provide the same sort of leverage for the Commission against Member States as it enjoys vis-à-vis candidate states, or indeed the sort of leverage it wields vis-à-vis withdrawing Member States.61 States can be suspended if they are found to be in breach of Article 7 but this has never happened, not least because of the unanimity requirement; there is no power to expel a Member State and, indeed, it could prove counter-productive to introduce such a provision even if it were likely to secure agreement. After all, one can only imagine the publicity that a leader such as Orbán would secure if Hungary were to be suspended, nevermind expelled from the Union. Equally, the European-level political parties have been reluctant to expel member parties deemed in breach of their norms, with Hungarian Fidesz Party for many years a member of the European People’s Party, despite its widely divergent ideology.

The upshot of the rapid enlargement at the start of the 21st Century is that, two decades on, the European Union is less integrated than proponents of enlargement had hoped, and the very values underpinning the process are contested, leading to fears of disintegration.

The criteria that were intended to ensure that newcomers could survive and thrive in the EU were also intended to protect the EU itself from a race to the bottom or any sort of implosion. The practice was rather different. In particular, two of the Union’s poster-children of the post-Communist transition, Poland and Hungary, have become the most vocal critics of European norms and values, with Poland in particular challenging the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its purported incursions into national sovereignty, putting it on a collision course with both the EU and Polish citizens, and leading to concerns

Article 2, Treaty on European Union states: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” Source EU-LEX.

60

It became clear during the four and a half tortuous years between the UK’s vote to leave the EU and its final departure that the EU-27 could set the agenda for withdrawal negotiations, just as they do for countries seeking to join. States seeking to join or leave the Union are equally seen as “demandeurs,” always on the back foot compared with the core membership.

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of Polexit—a Polish departure from the Union.62 While this prospect was swiftly dismissed in Poland, it was nonetheless indicative of a drift in opinion in many EU Member States regarding the relationship between EU and domestic law, representing a challenge to the long-standing CJEU ruling that the former has primacy over the latter, first argued in the landmark Costa v ENEL case of 1964. British Eurosceptics had long criticised the Court and even former EU Commissioner Michel Barnier targeted it for criticism in September 2021 in a pre-election speech in France that invoked the spectre of national sovereignty in the vein of Eurosceptics across the continent. Nonetheless, the sole backer of the Polish Court’s decision seemed to be Hungarian Prime Minister Viktór Orbán, whose own journey from a young liberal in the post-Communist period to authoritarian nationalist leader leaves him almost isolated in Europe, advocating as he does “illiberal democracy” in a clear and intentional snub to the rest of the Union. His strong showing in national elections ensures, however, that he can claim to be representing Hungarians and to have a democratic mandate, even if his preferences are a far cry from those he and others appeared to embody during transition.

Poland and Hungary’s apparent rejection of the norms and values of the EU are not identical, or even unique. There are concerns, for example, about possible backsliding in Romania, Bulgaria and Czechia, not to mention the language used by the rotating President of the EU, Slovenian PM Janez Janša, even if none of these cases seem directly to challenge the future of the European Union. What is unique about the Polish and Hungarian cases is the willingness of these two states to back each other in the face of criticism from other Member States, the EU institutions or even international condemnation, which highlights a major problem for the EU: under Article 7 (2), any decision that a state breaches Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union has to be made by unanimity among the rest of the European Council members; Poland and Hungary can simply block any such determination by the remaining 25 Member States. The unanimity rule presents a major problem for ensuring the integrity of European values, especially respect for the rule of law.

A similar issue prevails in the process of treaty reform, which also requires unanimity of all 27 Member States, thereby rendering reform hard to achieve, especially if the proposal were, for example, to entail provisions to sanction countries that deliberately defect from European norms. Any state, large or small, can effectively block reform, whether at the time of negotiation or through the ratification process. During negotiations it may be possible to persuade smaller and poorer Member States to concede on specific points in return for financial or other benefits. At the time of ratification when either a national parliament or the citizens directly in a referendum might reject the proposed treaty, such trade-offs are less feasible. In practice, no national parliament has succeeded in blocking treaty reform to date but the citizens have, most clearly in the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional

62 See in particular ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal on 7th October 2021, which put Poland on a collision course with the EU, notably the leaders of France and Germany, and led to mass protests across Poland, where citizens remain strongly favour of EU membership.

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Treaty in 2005.63 The unanimity rule can create major log-jams and the Catch-22 is that it can only be amended by unanimity. In the current, divided EU it seems inconceivable that such a change could be made. Without it, the ability to foster the values that for so long underpinned the process of European integration are under threat. These states are not the first to challenge aspects of European integration, particular vis-à-vis the role of the courts and loss of sovereignty, as was the case in the UK for years prior to its departure from the EU. For some, Brexit had set the unwelcome precedent, as it seemed to offer the potential for the demise of the integration process, certainly in the immediate aftermath of June 2016 when the United Kingdom voted to leave. Eurosceptics hoped and Europhiles feared that Brexit might inspire other states to follow suit. Yet the integration process has long been characterised by progress through crises of which Brexit was perhaps not even the most significant of the last decade. Indeed, the Eurozone crisis of 2010, the refugee crisis of 2015 and the COVID crisis of 2020 all potentially posed greater threats to the European Union, and the 27 seemed swiftly to unite around a shared position in negotiating the UK’s departure.

Any attempts to pick of states was rapidly rebuffed. Moreover, even long-standing critics of European integration such as Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy both toned down their rhetoric in the wake of the British referendum, as the benefits of departure began to look less compelling.

Europe will be forged in crises, argued Jean Monnet, one of the EU’s founders. At times his comments have appeared valid, for example when the Fiscal Compact was agreed in the wake of the Eurozone crisis of 2010, yet at other times crises have appeared to lead to stagnation and if not disintegration at least a stalling of the integration process. In some cases, the result has been treaty reform, the most formal and arguably effective way of strengthening the integration process. At other times, however, changes and reforms have taken place outside the formal treaty framework, owing to differences of opinion among Member States which meant that securing treaty reform would be impossible. Such was the case with the Fiscal Compact which was agreed as an international treaty not an EU treaty precisely because the British Prime Minister refused to support any EU treaty.

It is important to understand a little bit of the history of the integration process in Europe in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past. In particular, the 30 years since the end of the Cold War and the most notable reform of the foundational treaties, the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) of 1993 have been a period during which a divide between elites and people has become increasingly pronounced. The early years of the integration process were predicated on co-operation among the signatory Member States, which came together in order to secure peace, prosperity and security. Little attention was paid to the democratic underpinnings of the integration process but the success of integration in the early years ensured that citizens were broadly content with the process. They may not have enjoyed democratic engagement and there was no direct way to hold decision-makers accountable.

Nonetheless, opinion polls indicated that citizens were not dissatisfied.

The only treaty to be rejected by a national parliament was the European Defence Community treaty in 1954 on a procedural motion in the French Assemblée Nationale.

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Moreover, decision-making among six Member States was a relatively straightforward process. Politicians and officials could sit around a table, make eye contact and interact on a very personal basis. Over the years, repeated expansions of the European Union as it was to become rendered such interactions increasingly difficult and led some Member States to feel they had insufficient influence in the process and decision-making of integration. Even in the Europe of the Six, there were disagreements, most visibly seen in the so-called crisis of the empty chair precipitated in 1965 by French President Charles De Gaulle. Decisionmaking by unanimity, which at the time was the rule for all policies at the European level, proved to be extremely difficult. Various treaty reforms from the Single European Act of 1986, the Maastricht Treaty and most recently the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 altered the decision-making procedures substantially, ensuring that most decisions are now taken by qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers rather than requiring all Member States to agree by unanimity.64 By contrast, the process of treaty reform itself remains one that is driven by the need to secure unanimity among all Member States. Even the very smallest states, which may feel they have little influence in other areas, have the power to block treaty reform and some have indeed shown that potential to do so. Thus, any attempt to secure treaty reform in the European Union is overshadowed by the need for unanimity. Progress requiring treaty reform can always be held hostage by the views, desires and interests of a minority. A situation that was perhaps difficult in the context of the 1950s, when there were six Member States, potentially becomes intractable in Europe of 27 (and a fortiori of 28 when one of the members was the UK). This is a particular problem given the diversity of interests of the 27 and the fact that not all Member States appear to share the same values as those of what one might call core Europe. This has been particularly marked since some of the newer Member States from Central and Eastern Europe have drifted from the commitments to liberal democracy and the rule of law that are so integral to the integration process.

For many years, it was easy to assume that difficulties about deepening integration could be laid at the door of the United Kingdom, which was renowned for its Euroscepticism. With the withdrawal of the United Kingdom a variety of scenarios about the future of Europe emerged: the EU might collapse; some Member States might follow the British example and withdraw; some Member States would finally demonstrate their Eurosceptic credentials, once the UK was no longer there to do it for them; or, on a more positive note, Brexit might actually enable the 27 to integrate more deeply, freed from the small-c conservative and Eurosceptic UK’s influence.

It is very easy to assume that many of Europe's problems arose because of the United Kingdom, especially the English, given that Scotland and Northern Ireland had rather different views on EU membership. On that reading, Brexit therefore allowed some to assume that the time had come to remake Europe in a more Federalist direction. This certainly seemed to be the approach of French President Emmanuel Macron and perhaps of his choice for

In most cases the European Parliament has a right to “co-decide” with the Council of Ministers; a change from the early years when the EP’s role was extremely limited.

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Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. Initially at least it seemed that the 27 were united. As early as September 2016 they were speaking with one voice, whereas the United Kingdom was speaking with many voices. For those who had assumed and in some cases hoped that Brexit would be the beginning of the end of the European Union, this was a remarkable turn of events. Eurosceptics including Marine Le Pen in France and Salvini Italy distanced themselves from the previous views, seemingly recognising that Frexit, Italexit or any other sort of break from the integration process would not be politically popular. This temporarily at least, seemed to foreshadow a very positive scenario whereby the 27 would form a tighter, more integrated union, perhaps even leading in a federal direction.

However, the UK's departure from the European Union, which formally occurred on 31 January 2020 (a transitional period lasted until 31 December of that year), coincided with the start of a global pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus. As with the Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis before it, the COVID crisis had an asymmetric impact on the European Union, with Italy initially hit hardest and receiving little apparent support from the rest of the Union. In part, this was perhaps understandable. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out, health is not an EU competence. However, the effects of the health crisis went much further than just health or health care provision, given the huge financial consequences of tackling the virus, coupled with the need for each state to look to its own borders, in turn impacting the Schengen arrangements. The ramifications thus were in both the economic field and border control both of which were very clearly EU competences.

Moreover, the Commission President in particular pushed for closer cooperation in dealing with the crisis and for EU level procurement of a vaccine once it became available. This stage was now potentially set for closer cooperation, albeit at that stage not on the basis of treaty reform. If the presidents of the European Commission and of France were in favour of deepening integration, perhaps via an explicit transfer of competences necessitating treaty reform, they alone would not be enough to secure major changes. All 27 Member States would need to be on board and the nature of the integration process and of the 27 members since the Big Bang enlargement of 2004 is such that cooperation and agreement cannot be assumed. Treaty reforms tend to be package deals, allowing some proposals that suit each Member State, allowing them to compromise in other areas. They tend not to focus on just one issue, such as healthcare. Since one of the biggest challenges facing the Union in 21st Century relates to democratic backsliding, treaty reform would be the ideal time to introduce new measures to sanction back-sliders. However, as discussed, several Member States in Central and Eastern European had elected governments that were less wholeheartedly supportive of liberal democracy and the rule of law than the founding Member States. They would undoubtedly reject any moves to reform the treaties if they preferred approach to democracy and the rule of law were explicitly threatened. It is ironic that states which were only enabled to join the European Union after the collapse of Communism in Europe and which had been so wedded to the idea of joining as many Western institutions as possible in order to re-establish their European credentials should so swiftly backtrack on the norms and values expected of EU Member States. Their drift coupled with rules on unanimity render desirable treaty reform difficult to envisage in the coming years. By contrast, cooperation outside the treaty framework might be more feasible, allowing those states

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that wish to press ahead in certain policy areas to do so on the basis of international rather than European law. This is a far cry from the hopes and expectations of the founders, but a pragmatic response to the realities of European politics in the 2020s.

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CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHAT DID WE LEARN FROM BREXIT? EOIN DREA SENIOR RESEARCH OFFICER, WILFRED M ARTENS CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION The Conference on the Future of Europe (CFE) is a joint undertaking of the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament designed to identify the reforms required to optimise the longer term functioning of the European Union (EU). Formalised from an original Franco-German proposal published in November 2019, the CFE is organised on the principle of active citizen participation through events, European citizen panels and Conference plenaries. The plenary is composed of representatives from the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission, as well as representatives from all national Parliaments, on an equal footing with ordinary citizens. The concept of “European citizens, from all walks of life and corners of the Union, with young people playing a central role in shaping the future of the European project” is an active participation model similar to those previously undertaken in member states such as Ireland and France.65 Conclusions and recommendations from the CFE are expected by early 2022. This chapter sets out to address whether the CFE’s formalisation has been uniquely informed by the process of Britain leaving the European Union.

BREXIT. WHAT BREXIT? Remarkably, given the fundamental consequences of Brexit on the workings of the EU, neither the Political Guidelines for the European Commission proposed by (then Presidentelect) von der Leyen in 2019 or the subsequent Franco-German proposals offer any direct mention of Britain leaving the EU.66 The subsequent Joint Declaration of the EU institutions officially launching the CFE refers only to the “multiple challenges” facing the EU and to the COVID-19 pandemic.67 Similarly, in Strasbourg at the launch event of the CFE in May 2021, President Macron referred to “an unprecedented pandemic that has affected us for more than a year worldwide, but most particularly in Europe. With these huge crises forced upon us. And we've had many, many such occurrences in the past. There are always very deep seated doubts and national instincts that start to make themselves comfortable.”68 The absence of Britain from the founding rational of the CFE can, in part, be ascribed to the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in early 2020. It’s subsequent fallout—a level of socio-economic disruption not seen since the Second World War—has resulted in significant economic disruption across Europe and indeed globally. The fiscal supports required to combat the worst effects of the pandemic have significantly increased national debts. The Eurozone’s debt to-GDP ratio is forecast to exceed 100% in 2020/21 (up from 84% in 2019)

65 In Ireland, the Citizens’ Assembly on Gender Equality was established by parliamentary resolution in July 2019 to consider gender equality and make recommendations to the Irish Parliament.

Conference on the Future of Europe. Franco-German non-paper on key questions and guidelines. Politico.

November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Conference-on-the-Future-of-Europe.pdf >

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67 Joint Declaration on the Conference on the Future of Europe. Engaging with citizens and democracy – building a more resilient Europe. European Commission. 10 March 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/ default/files/en_-_joint_declaration_on_the_conference_on_the_future_of_europe.pdf >

Statement by President Macron, launch event of the Conference on the Future of Europe, Strasbourg, 9 May 2021.

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with debt levels already exceeding 130% of GDP in Greece, Italy and Portugal.69 The public response to the pandemic—unprecedented fiscal supports to match a very loose monetary policy—means that Europe now finds itself confronting an almost unprecedented set of economic circumstances. Low interest rates (a remnant of Europe’s sluggish recovery from the Great Recession) have now been paired with tapering fiscal supports, soaring consumer savings, booming assets prices (including housing), increasingly unequal labour markets and rapidly rising public and corporate debt.

In this context, it is clear that the ongoing pandemic has superseded Brexit as the key rationale underpinning the CFE. The scale and potential difficulties arising from the protracted Brexit negotiations since 2016, and the many disagreements between Britain and the EU which remain in 2021, pale in comparison to the fundamental challenges raised by the Coronavirus. For the EU, Brexit has now just become one challenge of many.

THE PANDEMIC AS A DRIVER OF FURTHER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION The Coronavirus has also fundamentally changed the political landscape in Brussels. The nature of the pandemic—a public health crisis impacting across all member states and social strata—has strengthened the rationale of those seeking a bigger, more confident EU with wider competencies enabling it to undertake more European wide policy initiatives.

This is addressed in the Joint Declaration on the CFE which specifically sets out that: “To address geopolitical challenges in a post COVID-19 environment, Europe needs to be more assertive, taking a leading global role in promoting its values and standards in a world increasingly in turmoil.”70 To this end, it appears that the CFE has been primed to become the vehicle for delivering a post-COVID vision of the EU. A vision that is based on a more assertive, powerful EU. A more coherent EU, better able to respond to challenges, both political and economic, arising from Afghanistan, China, the US and beyond.

However, the strategy of attempting to use the CFE as an umbrella response for multiple challenges—in the Joint Declaration this includes everything from social justice to combatting climate change—is problematic. The challenges are so big that the final recommendations risk becoming generalised statements of approach, rather than discernible policy actions. Also, the entire CFE will be compromised if its final recommendations are seen to just broadly mimic the existing priorities of the European institutions. Given the prominence allowed to specific issues highlighted in the Joint Declaration this latter possibility should not be discounted.

In this context, the entire Brexit process—including the lessons learnt for the EU—has been subsumed into the much broader questions to be tackled by the CFE. This makes it

Eurostatistics. Data for Short-term Economc Analysis. 01/2021. Publications Office of the Eurpean Union, Luxembourg, 2021.

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Joint Declaration, 1.

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very difficult for the CFE to specifically address how Brexit has (and will continue to) alter the operation of the EU in the years ahead. This approach also carries the risk that the EU, in seeking to increase its relevance in the post-COVID environment, will simply regard the aftermath of Brexit as just another challenge in the post-COVID world, rather than giving this issue the detailed analysis it requires. Because trying to understand the voluntary detachment of one of EU’s largest economies after nearly forty years of membership must be one of key priorities for Brussels in the years ahead. Unfortunately, this is not now the case with the current structure of the CFE. “Moving past Brexit” in Brussels risks becoming synonymous with failing to heed its important lessons.

WHAT EXACTLY WERE THE DRIVERS OF BREXIT? As noted, if the CFE is serious about strengthening the EU in the years ahead, it must take account of the multitude of factors which underpinned the Brexit vote in the UK. It must also then apply those lessons to the future development of the EU. Unfortunately, the broad scope of the CFE, the onset of the pandemic and the fact that the UK is no longer an EU member (and thus its citizens cannot directly involve themselves in the CFE process) all indicate that the motivations of Brexit will not feature prominently as a learning tool for the EU. The multi-faceted nature of the Brexit vote is often, erroneously and simplistically, ascribed to British “exceptionalism.”71 This is a convenient narrative which allows Brussels to “move past Brexit” without confronting the underlying causes of the British exit. It also, whether implicitly or explicitly, gives credence to the analysis that the “awkward Brits” were holding back the process of European integration. However, the widespread acceptance of these conclusions will do little to strengthen the EU in the years ahead. Rather, attributing Brexit to British related factors only, risks minimising its true impact.

The reality is much more complex. However, on a macro level, it is clear that Brexit can be seen as a triumph for a misrepresented and selective view of British imperial history and an unbending belief in the primacy of the nation state. This narrative was combined (quite quickly and unpredictably) with a rise in economic nationalism and populism stimulated by the global economic crisis that commenced in 2007. This combination, in turn, challenged long-established political norms such as Britain’s membership of the EU.72 Yet, no one factor in isolation drove the Brexit process, but rather a combination of political, economic and socially related issues. It is true that many of the hard Brexiteers policy lines were totally contradictory. The “taking back control” debate for instance witnessed “right wing populists claiming they are avid free traders and simultaneously saying that one of the purposes of taking back control is to be able to rig domestic markets/competitions in favour of British suppliers/producers.”73

71 Andrew J. Crozier: British exceptionalism: pride and prejudice and Brexit. International Economics and Economic Policy. 2020/3. 635–658.

Eoin Drea: The Empire Strikes Back: Brexit, History and the Decline of Global Britain. European View. 2019/1. 118–119.

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Ivan Rogers: 9 Lessons in Brexit. Short Books, London, 2019. 56.

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But, it is not enough to just ascribe Brexit to British uniqueness and reckless politicians. It is clear also that decades of rising insecurity played an important role in allowing economic grievance to express itself as cultural or values driven behaviour.74 The illiberal sentiments often expressed as a type of hyper-nationalism during the Brexit process are not unique to Britain. The United States and Brazil are just some of the many states experiencing variations of this process in recent years. Values, or the perceived alienation of the main political parties from the beliefs of many people, fed directly into the result of the Brexit referendum.75 Although the purpose of this chapter is not to provide a review of the reasons Britain chose to leave the EU, it is important to highlight that Brexit was the result of decades long forces operating in Britain, Europe and globally. To borrow Professor Kevin O’Rourke’s conclusion Brexit really is complicated.76 But, what is certain is that the consideration of the impact of EU membership on Britain’s voters cannot be ignored.

From the reunification of Germany to the enlargement of the EU, European political decision-making played an important role in the evolution of British domestic debate. No serious consideration of the future workings of the EU can take place without an analysis of how these major European developments drove policy formulation in the main British political parties. For example, debate surrounding the free movement of labour from Central and Eastern European member states was an important element in the Brexit referendum campaign. The underestimation of these inflows—initial estimates forecast up to 13,000 arrivals annually, while by 2014 over 1.5m workers from these countries actually lived in the UK—played a major role in shifting British sentiment on inward migration.77

WHY BREXIT MATTERS FOR EUROPE For the EU, Brexit should have been a clear wakeup call in terms of informing the future development path of the entire European integration process. Unfortunately, and as noted in this chapter, this has not proved to be the case. A combination of the ongoing pandemic and a desire to “move past Brexit” has facilitated the EU’s more expansive approach to discussing its future. The principal mechanism for this is through the CFE. The EU has not, however, facilitated any detailed consideration of the EU’s role (either direct or indirect) in Britain’s gradual disengagement from Brussels over the past decades.

The CFE will likely offer no examination of the lessons of Brexit for the future of the EU. Brexit, it seems, was an entirely British problem. A narrative made easier to digest owing to the chaotic and (borderline dishonest approach) adopted at various stages by successive British governments since 2016.

But the EU’s approach is fraught with danger, both in the context of its own development and in the context of future relations with Westminster. In terms of its own future, the EU,

74 Martin Sandbu: The Economics of Belonging. A radical plan to win back the left behind and achieve prosperity for all. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2020. 48–49.

Geoffrey Evans–Anand Menon: Brexit and British Politics. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2017. 73.

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Kevin O’Rourke: A Short History of Brexit: from Brentry to Backstop. Pelican Book, London, 2018. 180.

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Evans–Menon, 15.

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in framing itself as the primary solution to the big meta-topics of our time—such as climate change—risks detaching itself further from public support at a local level. It is not that the vast majority of Europeans don’t want to take real action in combatting global warming— they obviously do—but in adopting a clear top/down approach with binding numerical targets, Brussels will likely become the lightning rod for public anger in the years ahead. An anger that will manifest as the public becomes more aware of the fundamental economic changes required in many traditional industries to fulfil these targets in the future. This will reinforce the narratives among more populist parties who paint the EU has increasingly out of touch with ordinary voters.

This issue is relevant when considering Brexit because this sense of “being on your own” was a key factor in the Brexit referendum campaign. By painting the main political parties— Conservatives, Labour and Liberals—as “out of touch” and uninterested in the real problems of working voters, Brexit campaigners (primarily through the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), were able to harness longer term worries over economic insecurity and the erosion of traditional values. This was a strategy also made possible to the lack of coherent pro-European message on the Remainer side. Threats of economic doomsday in the event of Brexit proved a poor riposte.

The ultimate conclusion to the Brexit campaign in Westminster was the adoption of a hard Brexiter position by the ruling Conservative Party and the effective neutralisation of pro-EU sentiment within the opposition Labour Party. This was a dénouement thought impossible in 2016.

The EU is already susceptible to criticism from across the political spectrum about its ivory towers. And the EU’s current approach—in subsuming the consideration of Brexit into broader post-pandemic challenges—risks making all the same mistakes that elements of the British political establishment undertook before, during and after the Brexit referendum campaign.

By attempting to “go big” the EU risks losing sight of the daily issues—affordable housing, access to education, accessible jobs, local facilities—that determine a significant portion of voters’ satisfaction. And, as Brexit showed, once narratives are established that link political leadership/institutions with economic insecurity, social anxiety and societal decay, they can be almost impossible to rewrite. In this context, the CFE shows that Europe has not learned the lessons of Brexit.

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