The Nuclear Black Market: Unanswered Questions in a Dangerous Topic

A J R C A N A LY S E S

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE AJRC2021E28

John Kelly

THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN A DANGEROUS TOPIC

d i g i t a l i s t u d a s t a r. a j t k . h u

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THE NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN A DANGEROUS TOPIC JOHN KELLY

INTRODUCTION In popular culture, the nuclear bomb is the trump card: it is the game ender and the ultimate weapon to make an enemy capitulate. In the James Bond movie series, Bond regularly must defuse or stop nuclear bombs from destroying the world, and, in the popular video game Call of Duty, the nuclear bomb is the hardest item to obtain in the entire game; it is a weapon feared in both genres for its absolute power. Globally, nuclear weapons hold just as much cachet. The eight nuclear-weapon states, the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, regularly have the upper hand in defence and military negotiations, their opponents knowing that the ultimate weapon, an item a country spent untold dollars developing and testing, sits one order away. Nuclear weapons are admired for their power and their rarity in popular culture and actual global politics—but are they as hard to come by as the popular media makes it out to be? In theory, there is a limit to how many nuclear weapons and how much nuclear material exists which could be used for creating weapons because this is tracked.

During the height of the Cold War, the world saw the highest point of nuclear weapon production. In 1986, there were nearly 70,300 nuclear weapons across the globe.1 Since the Cold War, treaties and reduction efforts have dismantled large amounts of the global nuclear stockpile. At the beginning of 2019, there were “approximately 13,890 nuclear weapons” between the “United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea),” of which 9,330 are stockpiled and 3,600 on alert and ready for deployment.2

Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists. <https://bit.ly/3IL6A7Z > Accessed: 24 November 2021 1

Ibid

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Source: https://www.shutterstock.com The United States and Russia own most of the nuclear weapons in existence today at 93% (2019). The decrease from the 1986 high of 70,300 nuclear weapons to the 2019 number of 13,890 represents 56,410 decommissioned weapons, which creates a large opportunity for the loss, theft, and misplacement of weapons during decommissioning that could be resold or passed along into black markets. Further, the storage of these weapons while awaiting decommissioning makes them vulnerable to thieves and terrorists. Ten years after the 1986 peak in nuclear weapon proliferation, military leaders were already beginning to think about how to safely dispose of these weapons as reduction treaties called for smaller numbers, but these treaties did not outline “the disposition of warheads and fissile material.”3 In a United States Strategic Review book written in 1997, Major Joe Hogler writes that the success of non-proliferation treaties created the “immediate need for safe and secure storage of warheads far beyond that required during the Cold War” and created a real threat of nuclear proliferation. He even mentions that it would be safer to leave Russian nuclear weapons in their launchers than to break them up without adequate storage.4 Hogler continues stating that with these devices being “exceptionally difficult to detect” and non-state actors working to gain them there is “exceptional risk” to the United States for future crises.5 The threat here is not so much the weapon that could be stolen, but rather the fissile material inside of the weapon. Colonel Guy Roberts, quoted in the same paper, writes that “[w]ith modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is

3 Hogler, Joe L. "Threat Reduction: A Framework for the Future of Nuclear Arms Control." STRATEGIC REVIEW 25. United States Strategic Institute, Boston. 1997. 46-52.

Ibid

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Ibid

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so low that terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half.”6 Theft of devices awaiting dismantlement is not conjecture. There have twice been reports of fuel rods stolen from nuclear submarines in Russia, and multiple seizures of “plutonium and enriched uranium around Europe” by police, indicating a larger amount of diverted material.7 But there are risks with non-fissile materials, as well. Any radioactive isotope could be attached to a traditional explosive and exploded to create a radiological dispersal device. Radiological dispersal devices (RDD), or dirty bombs, are weapons comprised of radioactive elements, such as spent nuclear fuel or radioactive elements used in “hospitals, research facilities, industrial[,] and construction sites,” along with conventional explosives, like dynamite.8 RDD’s are not meant to cause huge amounts of destruction like a nuclear bomb would. Rather, RDD’s are meant to disrupt general life, sow fear of terrorism in a population, and deny access to a certain area due to possible radioactive contamination.9 RDD’s depend on a number of factors to be successful, including weather, wind, type of radioactive element used, dispersal technique, and local topography.10 After an RDD explosion, environmental factors such as wind direction and speed, rain, and building heights, would impact the efficacy of the dispersal of radioactive particles. RDD’s do not cover the same amount of area that a nuclear weapon might in an explosion. The explosion from the conventional explosives used to disperse the radiation would create most of the damage in an RDD attack, followed by the contaminated radiological dust from the blast, covering a few city blocks or square miles.11 The amount of injuries from radiation would depend on what types of radioactive material were used in the bomb and whether they released gamma, beta, or alpha radiation. Radioactive forms of elements used in professional settings are heavily licensed and regulated, and, while many are not dangerous enough to be used for an RDD, some elements could still be used for a terrorist organisation’s means. Examples of common professional applications of radioactive elements, called radionuclides, include Cobalt-60 and Cesium-137, which are both used in cancer treatment, food irradiation, and general radiography, along with well logging for Cesium-137. Iridium-192 is used for industrial radiography and some cancer treatments.

Strontium-90 is used in electrical generators in rural areas. Plutonium-238 is used for research, in space mission applications for radioisotope thermoelectric generators to power satellites, and for well logging. Americium-241 is used making industrial gauges and also for well logging.12 The IAEA categorises types of harmful radionuclides used in Ibid

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Ibid

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Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. <https://bit.ly/31TguDZ >. Accessed: 10 October 2021.

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Radiological Attack, Dirty Bombs and Other Devices. Department of Homeland Security. <https://bit. ly/3pQrvy2 >. Accessed: 10 October 2021.

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Backgrounder on Dirty Bombs.

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Radiological Attack, Dirty Bombs and Other Devices.

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Radiological Attack, Dirty Bombs and Other Devices.

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professional applications on a scale of 1-5 with 1 being the most dangerous and 5 being the least harmful. In 2006, Category 1 devices, which could cause damage to people with only a few minutes of exposure, numbered over 28,000 in the United States, while Category 2 devices, which can cause injury from anywhere between minutes to hours of exposure, numbered over 25,000.13 As of 2007, there were “approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources” of radiological material in the United States.14

BACKGROUND Nuclear warfare is a topic that many scholars, storytellers, and government officials have attempted to prepare for and mitigate for seventy-five years. The “nightmare scenario” of nuclear war is generally proposed as nations attacking other nations due to the complex nature of developing nuclear weapons and the skills and competencies needed to combine the collected pieces into a working weapon. Many studies have been done on how a terrorist organisation might create produce a nuclear bomb, concluding that it is certainly possible, but these studies are rooted in the era of their creation. The seminal study cited when referring to the possibility of foreign terrorist organisations creating nuclear weapons comes from an article titled “Making Nuclear Bombs the Quick, Dirty Way” from the journal Science News in 1977.15 A further oft-cited article comes from J. Robert Oppenheimer, known as the “father of the atomic bomb,” during his testimony to Congress in 1946 on the possibility of smugglers producing a nuclear bomb. Oppenheimer remarked to the senator that it was certainly possible and the only method of prevention would be a screwdriver to pry open boxes imported to the US in search of nuclear material.16 These articles, while still relevant, miss crucial developments in the years since 1977 and 1946, namely: the internet.

Since the launch of the internet to the public in 1991, the growth of the World Wide Web has been dramatically fast and compounded year after year. Nearly thirty years since the public internet became available, it is unlikely for a person to go a single day without being online, and consumers increasingly purchase items online instead of in stores. However, things purchased online are not only normal consumer goods. Apart from the public internet there are other levels of the web including the deep web and the Dark Web. The Dark Web is an anonymous internet with a robust level of black-market commerce which has facilitated the sale of drugs, prostitution, and other illicit items such as weapons. J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Science News Journal may have dealt in hypotheticals regarding the smuggling and creation of nuclear weapons, but neither prepared for the likelihood of an anonymous internet where a terrorist organisation could buy, sell, and trade nuclear materials and other components to make a nuclear weapon across the globe instantly. In 2005, Porter Goss, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before Congress saying that “[i]t may Radiation Source Use and Replacement: Abbreviated Version. National Research Council. Accessed: <https://bit.ly/3IL7uRX >. Accessed: 12 October 2021.

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14 Rosoff, H., von Winterfeldt, D. Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Risk Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 3,.2007. 533-546.

Making Nuclear Bombs the Quick, Dirty Way. Science News. 1977. 357.

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The First Line Against Terrorism. Washington Post. < https://wapo.st/3ILriET > Accessed: 15 November 2021.

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be only a matter of time before Al Qaeda or another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons” to strike Americans.17 Porter was referring to Osama bin Laden, someone who, had the Dark Web existed then, may have used it for exactly the purposes of sourcing nuclear weapons. Scholarship has not kept pace with the growth of ecommerce, the Dark Web, the threat of nuclear weapon creation, and attack through these means.

PURPOSE STATEMENT AND STUDY HISTORY As the world continues to globalise and countries continue to develop weapons and power systems through multiple means, the likelihood that nuclear devices—be it weapons or devices for energy creation or medical—will become more ubiquitous. To date, scholars have researched the possibility that nuclear or radiation weapons could be smuggled into the United States or other countries, but none had conducted a thorough survey into the possibility of an enemy group actively pursuing a weapon and creating, developing, moving, and deploying it. Further, no research had been published on an enemy group using the Dark Web to pursue these means. The researcher of this study previously conducted the research outlined above as a master’s thesis titled: The Nightmare Scenario: Understanding The Plausibility Of Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Creation And Use By Black Market And Dark Web Means in an attempt to look at this issue as a whole and deliver a conclusion estimating the plausibility of these events, namely, the plausibility of weapon creation, avenue of acquisition, and use within the United States. The researcher’s study was conducted using only opensource, unclassified information, much as a terrorist group might operate. The question the researcher sought to answer was as follows: “How plausible is a ‘nightmare scenario’ in which a terrorist organisation uses Dark Web or black market means to obtain the pieces to develop, deliver, and deploy a nuclear or dirty bomb within the United States?” In brief summation, the researcher looked at each step and avenue as an individual case and rated whether or not the case was plausible using the following two hypotheses: · Hypothesis 1: It is plausible that, using the Dark Web or black market, a terrorist organisation could acquire, develop, deliver, and deploy the materials to construct a nuclear or dirty bomb. · Hypothesis 2: It is not plausible that, using the Dark Web or black market a terrorist organisation, could acquire, develop, deliver, and deploy a nuclear or dirty bomb.

The researcher found that, at every step: acquisition, development, delivery, and deployment, it was plausible that a terrorist organisation could successfully accomplish the step.

The researcher also found that the avenues of acquisition of nuclear material, the Dark Web or black market, were both also plausible avenues of acquisition. Every question of plausibility posed was found to be plausible.

The conclusion drawn during the original research of this study was that research suggested it was highly plausible a terrorist organisation which was well-funded, well-connected, and

Auerswald, D. P. Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks. Political Science Quarterly (Academy of Political Science), 121(4). (2006). 543–568.

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well-organised could source, develop, deliver, and deploy a nuclear weapon or radiation dispersal device within the United States. Further conclusions drawn during this research argued that a lack of coverage in nuclear material detection at some national levels, but broadly across municipal levels, existed.

This lack has brought upon the current study. Following the conclusion and presentation of the original work, the researcher sought funding to continue this research and attempt to grasp the procedures with which the globe is kept safe from this material and to try to create practical recommendations for the United States to follow to safeguard itself. As the previous study focussed on plausibility of a nuclear strike in the United States, the current study works to understand how the European Union, and Europe as a whole, works to safeguard nuclear material and track illicit nuclear material in order to block any terrorist organisation from accomplishing the acts posited in the original study material. The aim of this study is to interview experts, survey these procedures, document steps and applications, and return to the United States with an understanding or list of practical recommendations for future safeguards as nuclear material continues to grow globally.

CURRENT FINDINGS Beginning in October 2021, a renewed focus was given to this study. The researcher began networking with professionals in the industry with an aim to answer the specific question of how does the European Union track illicit nuclear material. This study would attempt to take practical methods and create recommendations for how the United States could do the same in the future. After three months of research, this study has come to multiple conclusions. As a note: “nuclear material” here will include nuclear and radioactive material for simplicity’s sake.

First, through conversations with experts, it has become apparent that the identified lack of controls and research into illicit materials in the public sphere does, in fact, exist. While there are many rigorous top-down controls for these materials in the realm of controlled government materials, and many efforts by non-proliferation groups to keep them safe, there is an absence of attention being paid to material already in existence and in the world, and its potential to be trafficked. What does exist is the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Incident Tracking Database (ITDB)? This list is compiled of nuclear incidents on a yearly basis which tracks “incidents involving illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials.”18 This list, however, is a proactively sourced list of incidents reported from member states to IAEA. This list would not contain an incident occurring in a non-member state, or which was not proactively reported to IAEA. As this study is only reaching its halfway point, it is possible new information will be uncovered regarding this conclusion. Any updates will be retroactively applied and notated.

Second, we must conclude an assumption. While we conclude that there is no specific regulatory body working to actively track illicit nuclear material, we must assume that this

Incident Tracking Database Fact Sheet 2020. International Atomic Energy Agency. 2020. <https://bit. ly/3ETu74n > Accessed: 1 December 2021.

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tracking and coordination of defence against illicit nuclear material is happening at national intelligence levels across the world. We know as fact that numerous times criminals have been caught in the act of transacting nuclear material. We know that somehow law-enforcement agencies are warned to be aware of these events. However, without a coordinating body, we must assume that this tracking and coordination happens at the national intelligence level, spread across numerous countries and intelligence agencies, in a classified manner that is not available for public observation. As the intention for this study is to survey open-source methods and public organisations, researching classified activities would not benefit the findings.

Third, a distinction needs to be made about these materials between “nuclear” materials, which includes fissile materials such as uranium and plutonium, and “radioactive” materials, such as americium, caesium, etc. As mentioned earlier, the IAEA keeps a list which has become titled the RSG1.9 and categorises the danger of these materials.19 Items that fall into Category 1, and generally Category 2, tend to be heavily regulated from creation as they are nuclear materials. Items in Categories 3, 4, 5 tend to have less oversight after creation.

The RSG1.9, while a very useful source for categorisation of radioactive material, is also somewhat scenario based. The dangers of these materials being used in fashions such as a radioactive dispersal device or simply as threats. The RSG1.9 provides a useful framework for beginning to define techniques for oversight of nuclear material, but more research is needed to understand how this could be implemented and who could implement it.

Conclusions about the ability to utilise the Dark Web as an avenue for sales of illicit material remain plausible. This answer remains the same as the original research: Is it plausible that a terrorist organisation could buy or sell illicit nuclear material on the Dark Web? The answer is yes. This answer remains to be somewhat “shallow,” in that the natural operation of the Dark Web enables this to happen. At the time of this writing, the only parts of the Dark Web which remain to be indexable, or viewable, are those websites which have been found and saved or indexed. As the Dark Web is quite fluid, this is somewhat an exercise in futility as the websites can change addresses overnight. However, we must once again assume that at a national intelligence level there is a function to index unknown websites on the Dark Web which is not public. Finally, as the nature of the Dark Web is an internet of person-to-person connections via proxy connections, it cannot be ruled out that a terrorist organisation could possibly create their own closed internet. Again, there is an assumption that this has been thought about at a classified level, but the conclusion is valid enough to be included here.

The researcher must conclude also that black markets for nuclear material do exist. This conclusion is best summarized by IAEA’s 2020 Incident Tracking Database: The number of incidents reported to the ITDB related to trafficking or malicious use has declined slightly over recent years. In the period between 1993 and 2019, confirmed incidents in this group included high enriched uranium (12), plutonium (2), and plutonium beryllium neutron sources (5). A small number of these incidents involved seizures of kilogram

Incident Tracking Database Fact Sheet 2020.

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quantities of potentially weapons usable nuclear material, but the majority involved gram quantities. In some of these cases, there were indications that the seized materials were samples from larger unsecured stockpiles. Some of these incidents involved attempts to sell or traffic these materials across international borders. Incidents involving attempts to sell nuclear or other radioactive material indicate that there is a perceived demand for such material. The number of successful transactions is not known and therefore it is difficult to accurately characterize an ‘illicit nuclear market’. Where information on motives is available, it indicates financial gain to be the principal incentive behind the majority of events.

Many trafficking incidents could be characterized as ‘amateur’ or opportunistic in nature, as demonstrated by ad-hoc planning and a lack of resources and technical proficiency.

However, there are a few significant cases that appear more organized, better resourced and that involved perpetrators with a track record in trafficking nuclear/radioactive material.20

CONCLUSION This current project, a Fulbright Schuman grant, runs from October 2020 to April 2021. This first three months of research was conducted with the aid of the Antall József Knowledge Centre Brussels Office. This paper presents the first three months of research into this subject. A further three months of research will be done to solidify these findings and report new findings. Updates to these findings will be made accordingly, and a consolidated report will exist at the end of this grant period. With questions about the findings please contact the analyst: Jack Kelly at jkelly58@lakers.mercyhurst.edu.

Incident Tracking Database Fact Sheet 2020.

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