Global Demographic Outlook 2020 – Demographic Perspectives from the Antall József Knowledge Centre R

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK 2020 – DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES FROM THE ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE RESEARCH TEAM

PÉTER DOBROWIECKI – DR PÉTER STEPPER – DALMA BODOLAY – BEÁTA TÓTH – BIANKA RESTÁS – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – ELINA HERÉDI –ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL – ÁGNES VASS – ZSOLT PÁLMAI – EMESE SCHWARCZ – VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP – DR BALÁZS HAMAR – ZSOLT CSEPREGI – TAMÁS KOZMA – ÁDÁM ÉVA

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

Contact: H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2 Phone: +36 20 310-87-76 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu Web: ajtk.hu/en

© Péter Dobrowiecki – Dr Péter Stepper – Dalma Bodolay – Beáta Tóth – Bianka Restás – Alessandro D’Onofrio – Elina Herédi – Zsombor Szabolcs Pál – Ágnes Vass – Zsolt Pálmai – Emese Schwarcz – Viktória Anna Papp – Dr Balázs Hamar – Zsolt Csepregi – Tamás Kozma – Ádám Éva, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK 2020 – DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES FROM THE ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE RESEARCH TEAM PÉTER DOBROWIECKI – DR PÉTER STEPPER – DALMA BODOLAY – BEÁTA TÓTH – BIANKA RESTÁS – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – ELINA HERÉDI –ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL – ÁGNES VASS – ZSOLT PÁLMAI – EMESE SCHWARCZ – VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP – DR BALÁZS HAMAR – ZSOLT CSEPREGI – TAMÁS KOZMA – ÁDÁM ÉVA

Global population witnessed an unprecedented growth in recent decades. From reaching 4 billion in 1974, 6 billion in 1999 and 7.8 billion people this year, the world’s population is set to reach the 8-billion mark in the very near future. This rapid growth will affect less developed nations the most; however, in strong contrast, economically advanced countries across the globe will witness a sharp drop in population, due to a set of mutually-aligned trends.

Fertility rates under the 2.0-2.1 threshold required for a stable reproduction rate, combined with an increasing life expectancy, mean that these states will not only have fewer citizens, but will also have to find a solution for the increasing pressure on their current pension system, as a declining number of workers will have to support a growing number of pensioners.

The effect of negative fertility trends will not only affect China, Japan, or the Republic of South Korea, but also many countries on the European continent, where countries might even lose close to a quarter of their population.1 On the other hand, countries like the nations of the MENA region will have to cope with the effects of an unusually fast population growth that resulted in the formation of a large youth bulge throughout the Middle East, putting unprecedented stress on countries that are not equipped to provide employment and social services for their young populations.

Europe, as the only continent, is projected to suffer a net loss of citizens by 2050. In addition, its countries will also have to come up with solutions for a variety of problems and challenges that are either nation-specific, regional, or continent-wide in nature.2 While the aging of our societies is a phenomenon that can be found all over Europe, unregulated immigration will continue to affect Western European states more, in contrast to the emigration and brain drain that have had a lasting impact on societies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. During the course of this paper the participating authors aimed to offer insight on specific demographic trends affecting selected countries and regions.

Whereas these trends might in certain cases only partially contribute to ongoing large-

World Population Prospects 2019. United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 12. <https:// population.un.org/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2019_Highlights.pdf> Accessed: 22 April 2020.

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World Population: 2020 Overview. Yale University. <https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/world-population2020-overview> Accessed: 22 April 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE scale demographic processes, they are still of significant importance, as they help highlight underlaying aspects that not only reveal the future trajectory of demographic development, but possible social, cultural, and political developments as well.

Péter Dobrowiecki

THE RELEVANCE OF AGEING IN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES DR PÉTER STEPPER

POPULATION CHANGE AND SOCIAL SYSTEM Fertility rate barely reaches the minimum reproduction rate of 2.0 in almost half of the countries around the globe. Considering this fact, there is a wide-spread argument that without an increase either in terms of fertility rates or the rate of net migration, the current level of economic development (GDP) is not sustainable. Looking at the demographic trends, as ageing is a progressive phenomenon, we can see that the age graph will not look like a pyramid anymore, but a square or an inverse pyramid in the long-term. Some argue that this situation is going to change even more, from bad to worse, especially in the case of Europe, which can be considered as a ticking demographic time bomb.3 The ever-smaller group of active employees will find it more difficult to finance the social system in general, and the pension system in particular.

However, not everyone in the developed countries agrees on this pessimistic future image and instead focuses on other important factors. Adais Turner, former CEO of the Confederation of British Industry and director of the pension committee in the United Kingdom, is one of the more prominent critical voices. He argues that the capital inheritance and wider welfare considerations of population density are not reflected in GDP, and a welfare optimizing model, which considers the years of healthy life and the rise of retirement age is more appropriate. If experts in the UK use the combined replacement ratios (CRR), including net migration, for their calculations then the end rate is higher than 2.0-2.1, which is the minimum level of maintaining the current level of population.4 The same high numbers of CRR can be seen in France, Germany, the Netherlands. Two major effects of social and economic changes within developed countries are reflected in their

3 Sue Hewitt: Defusing the demographic time-bomb. Human Resource Management International Digest, Vol. 16 No. 7, 2008. p. 3–5. <http://doi:10.1108/09670730810911305> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

Adair Turner: Population ageing: what should we worry about? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2009. p. 3009. <http://doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0185> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE respective demographic numbers. On the one hand, the length of healthy life is increasing, while the drop of fertility rates was a one-time phenomenon on the other. Although, we cannot know for sure how low fertility rates will eventually develop, however we can presume that a next radical drop (e.g. below the value of 1.0) should not to be expected. On the other hand, it is also quite unlikely to see more than 3-4 children in an average family similar to the late 19th century. It very likely that the number of elderly people (65+) will increase, whose pensions – regardless of funded pension system, PAYG (pay-as-you-go) or private investment fund – are to be financed by employees between the age of 20-65.

FUNDED OR PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM? In case of a funded system, most of the time employers pay the lion-share of finances reserved for pensions in the form of taxes. Besides, the employee also can pay a contribution to the pension funds in the form of PAYG system, or create a long-term (30-35 years) private portfolio investment in any bank. A pay-as-you-go system is one in which you pay for a service before you use it and you cannot use more than you have paid for in advance.

In Hungary, 1-2% of the salaries were paid in a form of PAYG, 6-8% as a private pension investment, while the state taxes decreased from 24% to 16% between 1998 and 2007.5 Demographic changes affected both types of pension systems. The decrease in the number of active workers is going to result in less state benefits form taxes, which eventually endangers the liquidity of social welfare system and pensions. In the same time, if a private system is expected to resolve the sustainability problem, there is a risk that future pensioners will collect a larger amount of savings in order to cover their pensioner years.6 This kind of capital collection on a large-scale can slow down the economy.

One consequence of the private pension fund system is that as people increase their savings in preparation for old age, the relative ratio of capital to labour increases, and the return on capital investment decreases. When an increasing group of elderly people wants to sell their pension bonds to a smaller group of young people, supply and demand changes will reduce the value of their investment. (Not to mention other economic externalities). Nobody will pay higher prices for a portfolio investment, so the value of the pensions will not reflect the value of their work of life, but the actual supply and demand ration, which will constitute a less then favourable condition.7 Funded pension system, however is dependent on the demographic trends of countries where investments connected to state bonds are conducted. The more countries a state invests in, the more complex demographic effects influence the situation, especially if we

Gábor Orbán – Dániel Palotai: The sustainability of the Hungarian pension system: a reassessment, MNB Occasional Papers, No. 40. 2005. <https://www.mnb.hu/en/publications/studies-publications-statistics/ occasional-papers/op-2005-40-gabor-orban-daniel-palotai-the-sustainability-of-the-hungarian-pensionsystem-a-reassessment> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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6 Adair Turner: Population ageing: what should we worry about? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2009. p. 3009. <http://doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0185> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

David Miles: Modeling the impact of demographic change on the economy. Economic Journal Vol. 109 No. 452, p. 1–36., 1999 <https://doi:10. 1111/1468-0297.00389> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE count the weight of the countries with the largest share of GDP. There is a presumption that a bias towards domestic markets exists, which is pretty understandable, not on an emotional basis, but considering the risks stemming from interest rate changes. In case of EU member-states the effect of this bias is limited at best. Considering the free movement of capital, it is highly unlikely that states, banks and companies responsible for the pension fund reserves, would not invest in other EU countries. Therefore, it is clear that pension systems are dependent not only on domestic but on EU markets as well.8 As mentioned in the introductory, some argue that EU is a ticking demographic time bomb.9 A lot of international and European research has been undertaken in order to analyse and evaluate the chance of sustainability in such circumstances. The general guideline of the World Bank was to increase benefits of private pension funds and to create incentives in order to shift towards a private system from the previous state funded one. Altiparmakov criticized this approach, because of the lack of thorough and transparent evaluations, in result of which the implementation would be a simple gamble in Central Eastern Europe without knowing if this would help solve or cause further damages to sustainability. Others criticized the governments of CEE countries, which used reprivatisation measures after the 2008 crises to create much required liquidity for the financial system, thereby prolonging the agony of pension system in a need of reform.10

HOW MANY YEARS DO WE LIVE AS A PENSIONER? There is a tendency of increasing life expectancy at birth in the developed countries, especially in Europe, which draws a more complex picture of the challenges facing our pension systems. The slow increase of retirement age and the discontinuation of the fertility rate decrease can prove to be enough alone. The fear of being healthy enough to work after being 65 years old is quite easy to understand, but it is worth to compare this situation with data, that we know already. Half a century ago, people older than 65 years were in much worse health condition, while in the next decades the working environments, income levels will be higher than in the last century.

Several studies have been made about this topic to highlight the fact that not necessarily the improvement of the healthcare system, but the development of general welfare conditions resulted in much healthier elderly people than in previous decades. Bourdelais argued that an average 77 years old Frenchwoman’s health can be considered to be equal to a woman around 62 from the early 1900s in the same area.11 Another important factor is the length of time what we live as pensioners. In the United Kingdom, the pensioner years took 20% of a male citizen’s life in 1950-1980, but this number increased up to 30% in 1990-

Adair Turner: Population ageing: what should we worry about? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2009. p. 3011. <http://doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0185> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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Hewitt 2008

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Anita M. Schwarz - Omar S. Arias (eds.): The inverting pyramid: Pension systems facing demographic challenges in Europe and Central Asia. World Bank, Washington D.C. 2014.

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Patrice Bourdelais: Demographic aging: a notion to revisit. The Histroy of the Family, Vol. 4, p. 31–50. <http:// DOI:10.1016/S1081-602X(99)80264-4> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE 2005.12 The main reason of this change is the fact that an average person worked until 67 years in the 1950 along with a life expectancy at birth of 77 years. In 2004, an average employee retired at 63.5, but the life expectancy at birth increased to 83 years.

In France, data related to length of retirement is quite similar, the average age limit has been around 60 years in the 1960s, while currently the life expectancy is at 83 years (see the paper of Beáta Tóth in this volume).

It is worth to compare this, with the situation of some developing countries in Central Eastern Europe. In Hungary, the life expectancy was 60 years in 1950 and it increased up to 75 years along with a rise in the age limit of retirement from 60 to 65 years. In Poland, fertility rate decreased below 1.5 from 3.0 between 1950 and 2018 (see the paper of Péter Dobrowiecki in this volume), while life expectancy increased to 77.

EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK From the perspective of CEE countries, it is easy to understand the government’s grooving fears from unsustainable pension systems. The main reason stems from the decreasing fertility rate, which is now around 1.3-15 and a significant growth is highly unlikely in the near future. However, economic factors and net migration is just as much important as fertility rate. These three factors have to be taken into consideration if we want to create a correct forecast, in order to evaluate the risk stemming from ageing precisely.13

Adair Turner: Population ageing: what should we worry about? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 2009. p. 3013. <http://doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0185> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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Beatriz Benítez-Aurioles: The implications of demographic and economic projections on public pension spending in the European Union, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy 14 December 2017. p. 5-6. <https:// DOI: 10.1080/21699763.2017.1411288> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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ANTALL Jร ZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE FERTILITY RATE

NET MIGRATION (FLOW) net migration changes in % of the total population

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cumulative net migration per share of population

2013

2060

2013

2060

2060

Austria

1.45

1.62

0.70

0.30

20.60

Belgium

1.81

1.87

0.50

0.30

20.70

Bulgaria

1.51

1.77

0.00

0.00

-0.40

Croatia

1.53

1.67

0.10

0.10

5.20

Cyprus

1.40

1.62

-0.10

0.70

19.00

Czechia

1.52

1.80

0.00

0.20

13.00

Denmark

1.74

1.86

0.40

0.20

11.50

Estonia

1.57

1.82

-0.20

0.00

-4.50

Finland

1.80

1.86

0.30

0.10

13.00

France

2.02

1.98

0.10

0.10

5.20

Germany

1.40

1.63

-1.40

0.10

9.90

Greece

1.34

1.58

-0.10

0.10

-3.00

Hungary

1.38

1.74

0.10

0.20

10.30

Ireland

2.01

1.98

-0.70

0.30

-4.00

Italy

1.43

1.61

1.90

0.30

23.40

Latvia

1.50

1.78

-0.50

0.00

-16.90

Lithuania

1.61

1.79

-0.60

0.00

-33.00

Luxembourg

1.59

1.78

-1.90

0.40

37.50

Malta

1.44

1.78

0.40

0.20

14.40

Netherlands

1.72

1.80

0.10

0.10

4.70

Poland

1.32

1.62

0.00

0.00

1.80

Portugal

1.27

1.52

-0.40

0.10

2.70

Romania

1.65

1.83

0.00

0.00

-0.20

Slovakia

1.28

1.53

0.00

0.10

3.50

Slovenia

1.59

1.75

0.00

0.20

11.00

Spain

1.32

1.55

-0.70

0.60

14.10

Sweden

1.93

1.92

0.70

0.20

17.40

United Kingdom

1.93

1.93

0.30

0.20

11.40

EU28

1.58

1.76

0.00

0.20

10.50

Antall Jรณzsef Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE EUROSTAT forecasted the increasing convergence in the fertility rate of EU member-states.

In the most fertile states (Ireland, France and Sweden) these rates are expected to decease a little bit, but in most of the countries it will grow slowly and steadily. An average growth of fertility in the EU is expected to reach 1.76 instead of the present value of 1.58., but this still remains under the 2.0-2.1 threshold which is the minimum level of bare reproduction. Hence, the natural balance of birth and death will not cause a population increase. Net migration can contribute to a plus 10% increase (c.a. 55 million people). The lesser developed counties of the Baltic and Balkan region (Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria) must increase their efforts to tackle outwards emigration and brain-drain, and the Mediterranean and Scandinavian memberstates (Italy, Malta, Spain, Sweden) have to deal with the security concerns of irregular migration. In the case of Hungary, there are no huge differences comparing to an EU average.

CONCLUSIONS Europe is ageing, and it is socially accepted in most of the member-states to have a small family with only one child instead of 2-3 children, as in past decades. In the meantime, the welfare conditions are increasing, GDP growth is relatively good, and as a result of the improved work conditions, people will not die around the age of 60-65, but they live until 80-85 years. Inversing the demographic pyramid is one tangible threat, especially, if the economy shall finance 20-25 years in retirement. Net migration (especially immigration of young workers) can bring some minor changes in this posture, but EUROSTAT data does not consider this as a game-changer. Fertility rate of 1.5-1.7 will be the main reason of population decrease, not the changes stemming from net migration. Furthermore, immigration influences Europe in a very differentiated way. Some countries have to bear the burden of immigration, but others are to tackle emigration and brain-drain. If the life expectancy in CEE countries follows Western European trends, age limits will probably grow slowly, and the process started in the 1950s will not cause any unmanageable problems socially and economically. A successful parental policy supporting the increase of fertility is a good first step into the right direction and hopefully it can reduce the effect of the constant decrease of the last years at least.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE GERMANY – CHALLENGES OF AN AGING SOCIETY: HOW GERMANY’S MORE DIVERSE SOCIETY COULD TACKLE WITH THE PROBLEM DALMA BODOLAY

Demographic developments are always determined by three factors, which overlap in their effects: the first factor is mortality, the second is fertility (birth rate) and the third is migration, both in the form of immigration and emigration, as well as regional migration movements.14 These three factors are also causing significant changes in the demographical tendencies of Germany. As a matter of fact, the declining number of people of younger age and the simultaneously increasing number of elder people are changing the demographic framework in the country in ways never seen before. Every second person in Germany is now older than 45 and every fifth person is older than 66 years.15 The number of people over 70 grew between 1990 and 2018 from 8 to 13 million. Considering that Germany has a population of 83.1 million, today around the 16% of it is over 70, placing the country among the oldest in the world.16 Even if differences between regions are still important in Germany, the country as a whole saw an incredible growth in the life expectancy since 1970. A German person born today might expect to live about 10 years longer than one born 50 years ago, mostly due the better healthcare system and the continuous medical developments.17 However, an ageing society is also strongly connected to the fall in birth rate. As it is known, Germany belongs to the group of those countries with the lowest fertility rate in Europe18.

Since 2012 this rate, though still very low, has been sustained mostly exclusively thanks to new migrants, who also account for a large part of the country’s youngest population. As a matter of fact, Germany has one of the highest percentage in Europe—around 12.2%— of people born in different countries abroad.19 The steadily growing level of immigration

14 Franka Kühn: Die demografische Entwicklung in Deutschland. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung. 29 August 2017. <https://www.bpb.de/politik/innenpolitik/demografischer-wandel/196911/fertilitaet-mortalitaet-migration> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

Statistisches Bundesamt: Mitten im demographischen Wandel. Statistisches Bundesamt. 2020. <https:// www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Querschnitt/Demografischer-Wandel/demografie-mitten-im-wandel. html;jsessionid=26EEBCFEB424A34DEBAED82DE95B109A.internet742> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

15

Statistisches Bundesamt, 2020.

16

Kühn, 2017.

17

The World Bank: Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - European Union. The World Bank.org 2019 <https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=EU> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

18

Statista: Anteil der ausländischen Bevölkerung an der Gesamtbevölkerung in Deutschland von 1991 bis 2018. Statista. April 2019. <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/14271/umfrage/deutschland-anteilauslaender-an-bevoelkerung/> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE towards Germany—in 2016 more than 1.8 Million, mostly young people arrived20—gave a boost to the extremely low fertility rate amongst young Germans, moving it from 1.4 child per woman to 1.57 in 2020.21 However, this rate is still relatively low, considering that in order for a population to grow, the average number of children should be around 2.1.22 Moreover, a low birth rate and a progressively ageing society is expected to have strong repercussions on the sustainability of the social and pension system which, in the next decades, will have to rely on fewer and fewer people. In 2018, the amount of people aged between 20 and 66 in Germany was 51.8 million people. The largest part of the current German active population was born between 1955 and 1969 and belong to the so-called Baby Boom Generation. This generation was born during the years of the post-war West German economic miracle when a totally destroyed country recovered (with the help of its allies) in just a few decades its place among the world’s leading economic powers.23 In the next two decades this “generation” will progressively abandon the labour market and will join the group of people in need of pension and more social care.24 According to the statistics, in the next fifteen years the number of active workers will shrink by up to 6 million, bringing the amount of them to about 46-47 million.25 Also, very much will depend on what kind of immigration policies the German government will decide to adopt in the future. In fact, for a developed western country such as Germany, a large amount of incoming people is vital to tackle its declining population.

In a “no-immigration” scenario the total amount of active workers in Germany would likely be reduced even further, until dropping to 40 million in the next 30 years.26 As a matter of fact, Germany has been much more successful than other European countries in attracting skilled migrants not only from other EU member states but also from other parts of the world. In 2015, during the “European Migration Crisis”, around 2,1 million people arrived to Germany and a large part of these new arrivals were asylum seekers escaping the civil war in Syria.27 At the same time, in the years following the economic crisis many EU citizens—mostly from Eastern Europe—decided to move to Germany, while looking for better job opportunities and living standards.28

Statista: Anzahl der Zuwanderer nach Deutschland von 1991 bis 2018. Statista. July 2019. <https://de.statista. com/statistik/daten/studie/28347/umfrage/zuwanderung-nach-deutschland/> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

20

Statistisches Bundesamt: Demographischer Wandel. 2020. <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/ Querschnitt/Demografischer-Wandel/_inhalt.html > Accessed: 25 March 2020.

21

22 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales: Bekommen wir heute weniger Kinder als früher? 27 Juni 2019. <https://www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Rente/Fakten-zur-Rente/Alternde-Gesellschaft/indikator-zusammengefasstegeburtenziffer.html> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

Lea Krause: Die Generation Y -: ihre Wünsche und Erwartungen an die Arbeitswelt. S.13.

23

Kühn, 2017.

24

Statistisches Bundesamt: Bevölkerung im Erwerbsalter sinkt bis 2035 voraussichtlich um 4 bis 6 Millionen.

Statistisches Bundesamt. 27 June 2019. <https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressekonferenzen/2019/ Bevoelkerung/pm-bevoelkerung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

25

Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019.

26

Statista 2020.

27

Kühn, 2017.

28

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE The German government put the integration of newly arrived people, as well as German families, at the helm of its social policies. Several ideas have been developed by the German administration in the last few years, especially in the fields of education, dual citizenship and successful access to the labour market—particularly for women.29 One of the main reforms was the new family policy that enabled, among others, the expansion of day-cares, the so called “Kitas”, the parental support and regulations of part-time jobs for mothers, which made it possible, also for people with a migration background to work and at the same time to take care of their children.30 Another important issue, addressed by the new strategy was the introduction of mandatory language courses, the possibility of dual citizenship and retirement at the age of 67, which are also measures for making the integration of newly immigrated people easier. With the Demographic Strategy of the Federal Government the goal of the German administration was to ensure the economic growth and prosperity in the long term so that also future generations can benefit from it. In addition, they wanted to support social relationships such as family and living and working conditions in all regions for all people living in Germany.31 Many experts agree that in the next years the population of Germany will become more diverse and the abovementioned demographic developments will affect with a different intensity all of Germany’s regions. For those regions in Germany where economy is stagnating, population is expected to shrink with even more intensity while big cities like Berlin, Stuttgart or Munich will see a rapid increase of the number of their citizens.32 More often than now, cities and municipalities will have to face the issue and the challenges connected to integration of people from different backgrounds.

GERMANY FACT SHEET: Population (2020) – 83,783,94233 Fertility rate children/woman (2020) – 1.5734 Annual population growth rate (2020) – 0.3%35 GDP per capita (2019) – 46,281.326 USD36 Life expectancy (2020) – 81.41 years37

Kühn, 2017.

29

Kühn, 2017.

30

Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend: Demografiestrategie der Bundesregierung und „Gleichwertige Lebensverhältnisse”. <https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/themen/engagement-und-gesellschaft/ demografischer-wandel-und-nachhaltigkeit/gleichwertige-lebensverhaeltnisse> Accessed: 31 March 2020.

31

Kühn, 2017.

32

Worldometer. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/germany-population/> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

33

Statistisches Bundesamt: Demographischer Wandel. 2020

34

Worldometer

35

36 Germany GDP per Capita. 1970 – 2019 <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/germany/gdp-per-capita> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

Germany Life Expectancy 1950-2020. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DEU/germany/lifeexpectancy> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN FRANCE BEÁTA TÓTH

The population of France was 67,063 million on 1 January 2020. In the previous year, the population was 66,978 million38 which means an increase approximately by 0,1%. The growth is mainly by cause of natural balance, namely the difference between the number of deaths and births. That results plus 140,000 people, however indicates a low amount compared to historical trends.

During 2019, altogether 753,600 infants were born in France including Mayotte.39 In Metropolitan France the fertility rate totals up to 1,84 babies for each woman, nonetheless the rate has been slowly declining since 2015.40 Compared to the European Union, France remains the most fertile member state due to the latest data in 2018.41 In Metropolitan France in 2019, life expectancy at birth for men was 79.8 years42 while 85.7 years for woman.43 This noticeable difference between the sexes is not unique in Europe.44 Considering the mortality data, 613,300 people died in France in 2019.45 Population decline is a recent trend across the member states of the European Union. In this context, it is highly outstanding that the population in France has been growing constantly for decades46 and is standing currently at 67,063 million people. The annual expansion is driven mainly by a surplus of the number of births over deaths instead of migratory reasons.47 In Metropolitan France the estimated migration excess in 2019 was 60,000 individuals which

38 Demography - Population at the beginning of the month - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641607> Accessed: 23 March 2020 39 Demography - Number of live births - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641601> Accessed: 23 March 2020

Total period fertility rate - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. <https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001686825> Accessed: 23 March 2020 40

Total fertility rate. Eurostat.<https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00199/default/table?lang=en> Accessed: 23 March 2020 41

42 Life expectancy at birth - Men - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001686946> Accessed: 23 March 2020 43 Life expectancy at birth - Women - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/010536464> Accessed: 23 March 2020

Average life expectancy in Europe for those born in 2019, by gender and region. Statista.<https://www. statista.com/statistics/274514/life-expectancy-in-europe/> Accessed: 24 March 2020 44

45 Demography - Number of deaths - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641603#Tableau> Accessed: 24 March 2020 46 Demography - Average population of the year – France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641584> Accessed: 23 March 2020

Didier Breton – Magali Barbieri – Nicolas Belliot – Hippolyte d’Albis – Magali Mazuy: Recent Demographic Trends in France: A European Outlier?. CAIRN International Edition. 2019/4 Vol. 74. 381 47

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE number is identical with the data coming from the previous two years.48 386,911 individuals arrived in France in total in 2018 and this had been the greatest number since 2013. It consisted of 131,726 migrants coming from reporting countries, 78,560 people being EU citizens and 176,625 immigrants originating neither from EU nor reporting countries.49 The annual number of immigrants with EU citizenship stagnated between 2013 and 2018 while the number of people with non-EU citizenship background increased in the same period.50 Considering the distribution based on the statistical data mentioned above, the numbers show that 34% of the immigrants arrived in France from reporting countries, 20% from EU member states, while the biggest part namely 46% came neither from EU nor reporting countries. A further interesting indicator connected to the migration trends in France is the data on the EU cross-border worker flows.

In this context, France belonged to the top five countries of origin in 2018, in that year 46,000 French citizens worked in Belgium especially within the manufacturing sector, furthermore 88,000 French citizens worked in Luxembourg principally within the construction sector. The latter number was the second biggest amount across EU member states in 2018.51 Considering the trend in the previous years, the population of France grew by 3.2 million people in the period of 2006-2016, only a third of which were immigrants. In 2017, half of the immigrants arriving in France were born either in France or in another European country.52 The phenomenon is not a new one, France has been traditionally an immigration country since the nineteenth century including migrants from bordering states especially from the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany. In the twentieth century, the list of main regions of origin included Asia, South Europe, furthermore the Sub-Saharan and North Africa.53 Regarding the number of pending asylum applications in France, at the beginning of December 2017 there were 38,405 cases, while at the beginning of December 2019 there were nearly double as much, 74,385 cases.54 The annual number of registered live births in 2019 was approximately 753,000 individuals, which has been the lowest number since 1995, even though the downturn in birth numbers seems to be slowing.55 This relapse is partly due to the declining fertility rate which is currently 1.850 births per woman. In 2019, the fertility rate was 1.851 and this means a decline by 0.05%,

48 Demography - Estimated migration surplus - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001002693> Accessed: 24 March 2020

Immigration by age group, sex and citizenship. Eurostat.<http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/ submitViewTableAction.do> Accessed: 23 March 2020 49

Immigrants, total. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/outilinteractif/4268205/bloc-1b.html?lang=en> Accessed: 24 March 2020 50

51 EU cross-border workers flows. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www. insee.fr/en/outil-interactif/4268205/bloc-2c.html?lang=en> Accessed: 23 March 2020

Jérôme Lê: Half of the people arrived in France in 2017 were born in Europe. INSEE FOCUS 2019/145.

52

Gilles Pison: The number and proportion of immigrants in the population: International comparisons. Ined Population & Societies 2019/563. 2 53

54 Persons subject of asylum applications pending at the end of the month by citizenship, age and sex Monthly data. Eurostat.<https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do> Accessed: 25 March 2020

Demography - Live births - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641590> Accessed: 25 March 2020 55

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE the annual trend shows that there is a permanent decrease since 2014.56 The tendency in Metropolitan France is similar, the total fertility rate is 1.835 in 2019 which has been the lowest rate since 2000.57 A further reason for the falling number of live births is the ageing of the society since the number of females in reproductive age is also decreasing. The average age of mothers at delivery was 30.8 years in 2019 in Metropolitan France which is higher than ever in the French history.58 The rate of birth in France was 11.2 per thousand in 2019 which has been the lowest data for decades.59 By contrast, the mortality rate in France is 9.3 per thousand in the same year and this has been the highest proportion since 1992.60 As mentioned in the introduction, 613,300 people died in France including Mayotte in 2019.

Compared to the number of registered live births in the same year, the result is nearly plus 140,000 people in 2019. Due to natural balance and the 1.9 per thousand surplus of the rate of birth over the mortality rate in 2019, France is projected to experience a further population growth in 2020.61 The impact of migration on the population growth is complicated to define, however based on the numbers, it seems to be clear that the contribution of migration to the growth is slight, compared to the impact of natural balance.

FRANCE FACT SHEET: Population (2020) – 67,063,70362 Fertility rate children/woman (2019) – 1.8463 Annual population growth rate (2020) – 0.13%64 GDP per capita (2020) – 42,644 USD65 Life expectancy (2020) – 82.73 years66

France Fertility Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends.<https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/FRA/france/ fertility-rate> Accessed: 30 March 2020 56

57 Total period fertility rate - Metropolitan France. ). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001686825> Accessed: 25 March 2020 58 Average age of mothers at delivery - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001686826> Accessed: 25 March 2020

Rate of birth – France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/ statistiques/serie/001747868> Accessed: 31 March 2020 59

France Death Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends.<https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/FRA/france/ death-rate> Accessed: 25 March 2020 60

Please note that all projections of 2020 and beyond do not include any impacts of the COVID-19 virus.

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Demography - Population at the beginning of the month - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistiqueetdesétudeséconomiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641607>Accessed:31March2020 62

63 Total period fertility rate - Metropolitan France. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001686825> Accessed: 31 March 2020 64 Demography - Population at the beginning of the month - France (including Mayotte since 2014). Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques.<https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/serie/001641607> Accessed: 31 March 2020 65 France: Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in current prices from 1984 to 2024. Statista.<https://www. statista.com/statistics/263593/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-france/> Accessed: 31 March 2020

France Life Expectancy 1950-2020. Macrotrends.<https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/FRA/france/ life-expectancy> Accessed: 31 March 2020

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE ITALY – CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR AN AGING POPULATION BIANKA RESTÁS

According to the data published by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, the number of residents in Italy on 1 January 2020 amounted to 60,317 million, 116 thousand less compared to the previous year’s figures67. The country is the 3rd most populous state in the European Union (after France and Germany68), the 4th most populous in Europe (after France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), while ranks 23rd place in the list of countries by population worldwide.69 Despite a distinctive pattern with an industrial north and an agrarian south, a fairly even population distribution exists throughout most of the country, with coastal areas, the Po River Valley, and urban centres (particularly Milan, Rome, and Naples), attracting larger and denser populations. The total surface area of Italy comes to 301,340 square kilometres within the boundaries (with Sardinia and Sicily), including 294,140 square kilometres land area and 7,200 square kilometres of water.70 The population density in Italy stood at 206 people per square kilometres in 2019, calculated on a total land area of 294,140 square kilometres.71 Italy was one of the first countries in the world to reach “lowest-low” fertility levels, with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.19 births per woman in the mid-1990s. Since 2000, a slight recovery brought the Italian TFR close to 1.46 births per woman. However, the ensuing economic recession called a halt to this positive trend, and fertility has stalled at around 1.4 births per woman in recent years. The number of births is decreasing and is expected to decline even further in the future as there will be fewer women within the Italian population at a reproductive age. Historically, fertility was higher in southern Italy, which tends to be more traditional in terms of family values and gender roles, than in the north. Today, however, fertility is higher in the north, where the economy is more prosperous, childcare services are more developed, and external migration is more significant.72 According to the published data of ISTAT, in 2019, the life expectancy at birth was 85.3 years for women, and 81.0 years for men

67 Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): Infographic on demographic indicators – year 2019. 11 February 2020. <https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/demography> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

Europa.eu: EU in figures – Size and population. Last published: 10 February 2020. <https://europa.eu/ european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

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69 World Population Review: Italy Population 2020. Last updated: 17 February 2020. < https:// worldpopulationreview.com/countries/italy-population/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The World Factbook. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/it.html> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

70

Worldometers.info: Italy Demographics. <https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/italy-demographics/> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

71

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population Division: Low fertility, social rigidity and government policies in Italy. November 2-3, 2015. <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/events/pdf/expert/24/Policy_Briefs/PB_Italy.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE in the country. At the same time, the total fertility rate stood at 1.29, while the total number of live births amounted to 435,000. It is important to highlight that this is the lowest level in Italy since 1918.73 It’s worth noting too, that between 2010 and 2018, the number of births in Italy has decreased constantly. In 2010, 549,794 births were registered in the country, while in 2018 this figure dropped to roughly 440,780.74 The results of the Demographic outlook for the European Union, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service point out that in 2016 Italy and Spain had the lowest fertility rates in the EU-28 countries, while Eurostat projects that Italy will be the first country in the EU that will reach a median age of 50, in 2029, followed closely by Greece and Portugal, in 2031.75 To gain a better understanding regarding the importance of the low fertility rate in the case of Italy, it is essential to explain the definition of the natural replacement rate. This term refers to the number of live births needed per women to keep the population size constant in the long run, in the absence of migration. The limitations of the current analyses do not allow us to discuss the question of immigration and net migration (the difference between immigration into and emigration from a given area during the year76) in Italy, however we should not forget that analysing the impacts of these, and other relevant factors are indispensable to have a more accurate picture of the demographic situation in the country. According to Eurostat, “a total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per woman is considered to be the replacement level in developed countries”.77 In the case of Italy the fertility rate is by 0.81 less than this rate. The results of the Eurostat analyses on the demographic trends in Europe published in 2016 clearly demonstrate the gravity of the ongoing tendencies in Italy. Examining the proportion of children and young people in the population, statistics reveal that the shares of young people in the total populations of Italy and Spain fell to 15.1% (Italy was ranked 28th place in the list of the EU-28 countries).78 Analysing the demographic situation of Italy, it should also be emphasised that Italy has experienced a high unemployment rate in recent years (this figure was 9.22% in 201979), which – through the issue of financial instability – could have a potential impact on fertility, even

73 Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): Infographic on demographic indicators – year 2019. 11 February 2020. <https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/238460> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Statista Research Department: Number of births in Italy from 2010 to 2018. Release date: November 2019. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/781315/number-of-births-in-italy/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

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European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS): Demographic outlook for the European Union 2019.

May 2019. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/637955/EPRS_IDA(2019)637955_ EN.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

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European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/ networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/net-migration_en> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

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Eurostat: Births and fertility – Over 5 million babies born in the EU in 2015. 8 March 2017. <https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7898237/3-08032017-AP-EN.pdf/b17c1516-faad-4e65-b291187826a7ac88> Accessed: 23 March 2020.

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Eurostat: Being young in Europe today - demographic trends. December 2017. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php/Being_young_in_Europe_today_-_demographic_trends> Accessed: 21 April 2020.

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Statista Research Department: Italy: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2019. Release date: December 2019. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263699/unemployment-rate-in-italy/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE though the correlation between the two is not unequivocal. The problem of unemployment in Italy became critical in the first years of the financial crisis which started in 2008.80 Many analyses demonstrate that rising unemployment rates generate a feeling of uncertainty that can influence fertility behaviour, inducing a short-term reduction in fertility. Cazzola, Pasquini and Angeli examined the relationship between unemployment and fertility in Italy in their timeseries analysis in close connection with the economic crises in the country. The researchers intended to evaluate whether the changes in male and female unemployment in the examined period (1995–2012) are differently linked to fertility in separate geographic areas of Italy. The results of the analyses emphasised that both male and female unemployment rates are negatively associated with fertility in the northern and central regions of Italy. Unemployment rates seemed to be good predictors of fertility in these regions, although male unemployment appears to further reduce fertility beyond the reduction predicted by female unemployment.

It is important to note that while in northern and central Italy the rise in unemployment in the examined period was negatively correlated with the fertility rate, the economic downturn in the country seemed to be linked in a more ambiguous and weak way to the fertility rate in the southern area. However, with regards to the southern parts of the country, the authors also highlighted the fact that employment and unemployment rates in the southern regions do not always reflect the actual employment status due to the diffusion of black economic activity and undeclared work in the area.81 When we examine the nexus between unemployment and fertility rates, we should bear in mind that in the case of Italy the youth unemployment rate is significant too. Although the labour market crisis seriously affected the entire Italian working population, it impacted even stronger the youngest part of the work force. Between 2008 and 2014 alone, the share of unemployed individuals aged between 15 and 24 years has increased by more than 15%.

Despite a steady decline observed after 2014, youth unemployment still stood at almost 29% in 2019.82 As we have already underlined, many analyses highlight that unemployment rates generate a feeling of uncertainty that can influence fertility behaviour. Considering the above, the high youth unemployment rate in Italy is undoubtedly one of those factors that could have a potential impact on fertility behaviour. Last but not least, it is worth to note a widely discussed phenomenon in the case of Italy, namely the “difficult transition to adulthood”, and its potential consequences. According to a policy brief published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2015, more than 44% of Italians aged 25–35 still live with, and are supported by their parents. This pattern is partly connected to the lack of opportunities in the labour market, the limited rental housing opportunities, and the low level of public welfare available to young people. One major barrier to the transition to adulthood is the lack of certainty associated with the labour market. The same policy brief called

80 Statista Research Department: Annual youth unemployment rate in Italy from 2004 to 2019. Release date: January 2020. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/776931/youth-unemployment-rate-in-italy/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

81 Cazzola–Pasquini–Angeli: The relationship between unemployment and fertility in Italy: A time-series analysis. Demographic Research. 8 January 2016. <https://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/ vol34/1/34-1.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

Statista Research Department 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE the attention to the fact that among Italians aged 15–24, 43% work on temporary contract, which typically does not provide a minimum wage, no protection in case of job loss, and reduced health benefits and maternity leave. Apart from the uncertain job market, young adults tend to live with their parents due to the high cost of renting and having difficulties in obtaining a loan, which means a significant obstacle preventing adults from establishing a home of their own, and consequently having a child and creating a family.83 Italy is one of those countries in the European Union that is currently facing a demographic challenge considering its aging population and its low birth rates. These tendencies could have a serious impact on the country’s economic and labour market, family policies and pension system in the long run. In parallel with its continuous economic difficulties, huge public debt (in the third quarter of 2019, Italy’s national debt was the second highest in all of the European Union, amounting to 137.3% of Italy’s gross domestic product84), and high unemployment rates, the current and next governments should analyse the possible solutions in order to influence the negative trends and eventually tackle these challenges in the long run.

Furthermore, not only Italy, but many other countries in the European Union should evaluate how to modify their current regulations to create sustainable pension systems in the future, bearing in mind the significant changes in the young-age and the old-age-dependency ratios.85 ITALY FACT SHEET: Population: 60, 317 million (2020)86 Fertility rate children/woman: 1.29 (2019)87 Annual population growth rate: 0.11% (2020 est.)88 GDP per capita: 34,483.2 USD (2018)89

Life expectancy: 82.5 years (2020 est.)90

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population Division 2015.

83

Statista Research Department: National debt in EU countries in the 3rd quarter 2019 in relation to gross domestic product. January 2020. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/269684/national-debt-in-eu-countriesin-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/> Accessed: 21 April 2020.

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Eurostat: Statistics explained. < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Totalage_dependency_ratio> Accessed: 16 March 2020.

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86 Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): Infographic on demographic indicators – year 2019. 11 February 2020. <https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/demography> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

87 Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): Infographic on demographic indicators – year 2019. 11 February 2020. <https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/238460> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The World Factbook.

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World Bank: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. GDP per capita (current US$) – Italy <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=IT> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The World Factbook.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES: THE DIFFERENT CHALLENGES OF THE BRITISH AND THE IRISH SOCIETIES ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

When the focus is over politics, economics or some other cultural indicators the United Kingdom and Ireland are often grouped as similar countries. However, when the attention shifts on demographic changes both countries follow different patterns. In fact, the United Kingdom, as one of the most developed countries in Europe and in the world, is interestingly aligned with its European counterparts, such as Germany, France and Italy, in what is the trend of the most modern societies, e.g. an increasingly ageing population and a declining fertility rate among the younger families. Nevertheless, significant differences arise comparing the nations forming the United Kingdom. On the other side, in the last few decades the Republic of Ireland experienced an extraordinary economic boom which turned an almost-completely agricultural country in a highly advanced economy. Along with wealth, this rapid industrialization brought the emergence of some socio-cultural changes that are common all over the western world— such as increased urbanisation, greater use of the educational system, wider participation of women in the labour force, a decline in the popularity of marriage and in the number of births, steady ageing of the population and an increase in the number of foreign nationals—which came however as new in a growing country like Ireland.

Taking in account the United Kingdom and Ireland’s separate paths towards progress, it is right to assume the challenges both of the countries are expected to face in the close future will also be slightly different. In every country, population growth is a key driver of demand for housing, infrastructure, school places, health care and consumption—or in other words for progress—and so population projections are essential for the effective planning of these services. In the United Kingdom, the impact Brexit will have on the economy will be in part the result of a tighter immigration system which will have strong repercussions on the country’s demographic deficit and population decline.91 In fact, when in June 2016 the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, in a very peculiar attempt motivated in large part by a desire to “take back control” of immigration, not many of those who were in favour of Brexit realized that the British society, more than others, needs many incoming foreigners to tackle the workforce shortage caused by its shrinking population. As a matter of fact, the increase in population usually comes from two main sources. First the “natural increase” (the excess of births over deaths) and, second, the excess of immigration over emigration.

Migration has a potentially strong and long-lasting impact on population growth and composition through the interaction between the number of migrants, their relatively young

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts: Britain’s Demographic Challenge. The implications of the UK’s rapidly increasing population. CIVITAS. September 2017. < https://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/ britainsdemographicchallengeweb.pdf> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE age and their higher fertility. For an “old country” such as the United Kingdom, where fewer and fewer children are born, immigration accounts for 66.2% of the total population growth.92 The situation in Ireland is only partially different. The rapid expansion of the island’s economy during the famous Celtic Tiger period has been made possible by a strong probusiness regulatory system, which attracted substantial foreign direct investments. The wealth generated boosted the growth of population and forced many people to leave the countryside and settle in cities, while the life expectancy grew so fast on the island that in just a generation it managed to reach the level of other western European countries.

However, in order to keep a competitiveness advantage, the Irish government has been forced to destine very limited resources in the creation of a strong welfare state. The inadequacy of measures to sustain families, unemployment and the ageing of the population had been in part mitigated by one of the highest fertility rates in Europe and the constant influx of foreign workers. This mechanism came to a halt with the start of the 2008 global economic crisis which hit Ireland harder than any other western country. Understandably, the country’s birth rate has been falling ever since and many young people emigrated.

Between April 2011-2012, 35,800 people aged 15-24 left Ireland, while in the year up to April 2018, 12,500 people in the same age group did the same.93 Today, despite being the fastest growing economy in the Eurozone, still many young people decide to emigrate in the face of an uncertain future in the country, putting to a test the famous Irish model. On the other side the growing size of the elder population is putting a strain on public finances, social welfare and health systems, as well as economic competitiveness.

THE UK AND THE BREXIT DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE As mentioned before, Brexit is expected to impact heavily on the future of British immigration policy—and therefore on the size and composition of its population.

According to a report prepared by the House of Lords Select Committee on demographic change, the proportion of people aged 65 and over in the UK will rise by 51% by 2030.

More old people mean higher pension and health care costs, since the combination of longer life expectancy, higher incidences of chronic conditions, and low birth rates has become a burden for the UK economy—usually ageing societies are also characterized by lower economic growth.94 One way to assessing how old a population is, is to look at the number of people of working age for every person who is retired. This measure is called the “potential support ratio” and reveals the potential costs in pension, healthcare

Office for National Statistics: Overview of the UK population. ONS Report. 23 August 2019. <https:// www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/articles/ overviewoftheukpopulation/august2019> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

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Patrick Kelleher: Is Ireland still no country for young people? The Irish Times. 29 December 2018. <https:// www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/abroad/is-ireland-still-no-country-for-young-people-1.3738604> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

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Lords Select Committee: Ready for Ageing? House of Lords. 14 March 2013. <https://www.parliament.uk/business/ committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/public-services-committee/report-ready-for-ageing/> 19 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE and social care systems from population ageing.95 In 2016, before the referendum, the rate was about 5.5 working age people for every one person over retirement age.

In 2050 the population aged 65 or over would increase to 14,1 million (24,9%) from 11,9 million (17,5%) in 2019. As a result, in 2050 the potential support ratio would drop to 2.37, or even lower in the case of a “hard Brexit.” 96 In fact, one of the electoral promises of Boris Johnson was to introduce stricter immigration measures which, from 1 January 2021 may deter EU citizens from working in the UK. The new “points system” will keep low-skilled non-English speakers out of the country but with huge economic costs.

A comprehensive study by the British government’s independent Migration Advisory Committee found that EU migrants—mostly from Eastern Europe—are particularly large contributors to public services such as health and social care, both financially and as workers.97 As a matter of fact, in order to blink the eye to the most anti-immigration part of the population—which represents the bulk of Conservative voters—the UK is actually turning away the most industrious and enterprising individuals who in the past fuelled its economy and provided basic needs for its elderly population. Even if it is early to assess whether Johnson’s immigration policy will have the effect of reducing immigration or if, as many observe, it will only contribute to reducing the number of EU migrants but making the system less restrictive for migrants from outside the EU, the impact on the size of population might not be unimportant. The issue of immigration is especially important for Scotland, as it is ageing population is predicted to have more deaths than births for the next 25 years.98 The Office for National Statistics (ONS), observed that the reduction in the number of immigrants is the largest single driver of the lower level of population growth since the Brexit referendum.99 Today, the UK’s population is about 67,8 million but the growth rate has steadily slowed down and in 2019 was only 0,53%, the smallest since 2004.100 As many believe, Boris Johnson’s failure in reaching an agreement with the EU, will put an end to freedom of movement, and will give a hard blow to the population growth in the country. In fact, in 2061 78,1 million people are

95 Sarah Harper: Brexit and the Role of Migration for an Ageing UK. The Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. Blog. 13 July 2016. <https://www.ageing.ox.ac.uk/blog/2016-Brexit-and-migration-ageing-BLOG> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

Nik Lomax, Paul Norman, Philip Rees and Pia Wohland: What the UK population will look like by 2061 under hard, soft or no Brexit scenarios. The Conversation. 30 May 2019. <https://theconversation.com/what-the-ukpopulation-will-look-like-by-2061-under-hard-soft-or-no-brexit-scenarios-117475> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

96

Migration Advisory Committee: EEA migration in the UK: Final report. MAC. September 2018. <https:// assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/741926/Final_ EEA_report.PDF> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

97

National Records of Scotland: Scotland’s population projected to increase but at a slower rate. NRScotland Report. 21 October 2019. <https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/news/2019/scotlands-population-projected-toincrease-but-at-a-slower-rate> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

98

Office for National Statistics: Population estimates for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland: mid-2018. ONS Report. 26 June 2019. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/ populationandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/annualmidyearpopulationestimates/mid2018> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

99

Worldometer: U.K. Population (Live). Worldometer. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukpopulation/> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

100

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE expected to live in the UK, something like 8,8 million people less compared to if, for example, the UK did not leave the EU.101

UNITED KINGDOM FACT SHEET: Population (2020) – 67,790,596102 Fertility rate children/woman (2020) – 1.75103 Annual population growth rate (2019) – 0.53%104 GDP per capita (2018) – 42.579,82 USD105 Life expectancy (2020) – 81.4 years106

IRELAND: A FAST CHANGING POPULATION From the mid-1990 until the early 2000, Ireland has turned from one of the poorest countries in Western Europe to one of the wealthiest. From 1961, the population in Ireland has increased by 70% cent, to almost 5 million.107 This increase reflects the rapid expansion during the Celtic Tiger era, which filled the cities with many young people from the rural countryside, making Dublin one of the most developed cities in Europe, and turned Ireland in one of the most appealing destinations for migrants, mostly from Eastern Europe. As a matter of fact, the transformation of Ireland from a country of emigration in a country of immigration, helped to maintain a steadily growing population rate and a high replacement fertility rate. Actually, the very high fertility rates made Ireland for years a demographic exception within Europe. But then the economic crisis came and many young qualified and skilled workers all over Ireland decided to leave, while the austerity crisis that followed had permanent effects on the country’s demographic profile to this day. In fact, even if now Ireland has the third highest fertility rate in the EU after France and Sweden, its value fell from 2.1 of 2011 to 1.77 in 2018, similar to rates in England and Northern Ireland.108

Nik Lomax, Paul Norman, Philip Rees and Pia Wohland: The impacts of international migration on the UK’s ethnic populations. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 6 March 2019. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ full/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1577726> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

101

Worldometer: U.K. Population (Live). Worldometer. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ukpopulation/> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

102

Macrotrends: U.K. Fertility Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/GBR/ united-kingdom/fertility-rate > Accessed: 24 March 2020.

103

Macrotrends: U.K. Population Growth Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/ countries/GBR/united-kingdom/population-growth-rate> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

104

Statista: Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the United Kingdom (UK) in current prices from 1984 to 2024. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263600/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-inthe-united-kingdom/> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

105

Macrotrends: U.K Life Expectancy 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ GBR/united-kingdom/life-expectancy> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

106

Central Statistics Office: Population change and historical perspective. CSO Report. September 2017. <https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/population/2017/Chapter_1_ Population_change_and_historical_perspective.pdf> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

107

Eurostat: Fertility Statistics. Eurostat. March 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ index.php/Fertility_statistics> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

108

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE Even if Ireland seems to have recovered from the crisis, the number of young people who are deciding to leave the country is still very high while lower salaries, high taxes and precarious employment, high costs of rent and unaffordable housing are all disincentives for them to return. These young people represent the most active part of the society and the most productive labour force whose presence in the country is supposed to maintain a social care state for an ageing population.109 The National Risk Assessment 2019 published by the Department of the Taoiseach listed all the risks and challenges for Ireland in the coming years and put the ageing population as one of the major problems. Over the past five years living conditions have improved faster in Ireland than anywhere else in the world, and life expectancy at birth is today 82 years, two years higher than the OECD average of 80 years.110 Even if a longer life expectancy is a positive fact, the risk is that the growth of the part of population aged over 65 will put an unbearable stress on public finances, social welfare and health systems. By 2026 the population aged 65 or above would increase from 617.400 (13,5%) in 2016 to 851.100 (16,6%). This will obviously result in a marked decline in the share of the population which is in the working age groups. The resulting change in the potential support ratio (the number of people dependent on public services compared to the number of workers) will have serious consequences for education, health and social welfare budgets and, most of all, economic competitiveness. The loss of a whole generation of young people will cause very acute labour shortages in key sectors (for example, healthcare and IT). Today Ireland is still one of the most competitive economies in the world, and its ability in attracting FDI—mostly due to its skilled labour, lower wages and little interference of the state in the business—is still greater than the EU average. However, as a small open economy, Ireland is particularly exposed to the actions of other countries.

Other than being dependent on factors outside its control (Brexit, US trade and taxation policy, Chinese economic performance, COVID-19), the Irish model of growth could lose most of its competitiveness advantages in attracting foreign companies and investments when the government will decide to increase the fiscal pressure to fund social services.

The area most directly affected will be the State pension budget with the Social Insurance Fund forecast to accumulate a deficit of €335 billion over the next 50 years. Spending on health, which is already above the OECD average, is expected to grow at around 1% of GDP between now and 2070, a rate faster than the EU average.111 The demand for public hospital services will increase as well in the next years by up to 37% for inpatient bed days and demand for GP visits will increase by up to 27%, an example of the increased demand due to

Central Statistics Office: Population and Migration Estimates 2019. CSO Report. April 2019. <https://www.cso. ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2019/populationandmigrationestimates2019/?utm_source=twitter&utm_ medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Population%20Estimates%202019> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

109

110 OECD Better Life Index: Ireland. OECD. 2015. <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/ireland/> Accessed: 18 March 2020.

Central Statistics Office: System of Health Accounts. CSO Report. 20 June 2019. <https://www.cso.ie/en/ releasesandpublications/er/sha/systemofhealthaccounts2017/> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

111

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE an ageing population.112 Being able to tackle the problems of these demographic changes in the population and redirect resources and services where it is needed the most is an extremely difficult task, and the uncertainties associated with Brexit will only accentuate this problem for the small Irish state.

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND FACT SHEET: Population (2020) – 4,922,928113 Fertility rate children/woman (2020) – 1.82114 Annual population growth rate (2020) – 1.13%115 GDP per capita (2018) – 78.764,60 USD116 Life expectancy (2019) – 82.35 years117

Government of Ireland Department of the Taoiseach: National Risk Assessment 2019. Overview of Strategic Risks. Government of Ireland. July 2019. <https://assets.gov.ie/24144/fff14682a27943fbbdce8922124b5e05. pdf> Accessed: 20 March 2020.

112

Worldometer: Ireland Population (Live). Worldometer. <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/ ireland-population/ > Accessed: 20 March 2020.

113

Macrotrends: Ireland Fertility Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ IRL/ireland/fertility-rate> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

114

Macrotrends: Ireland Population Growth Rate 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/ countries/IRL/ireland/population-growth-rate> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

115

Trading Economics: Ireland GDP per capita1970-2018. Trading Economics. <https://tradingeconomics. com/ireland/gdp-per-capita> Accessed: 23 March 2020.

116

Macrotrends: Ireland Life Expectancy 1950-2020. Macrotrends. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ IRL/ireland/life-expectancy> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

117

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE BELGIUM – THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A MELTING POT ELINA HERÉDI

Belgium is a federal constitutional monarchy – and nothing expresses this better than the saying ’There is only one real Belgian - that is the King’, a saying that describes the fragmentation of the Belgian society quite fittingly. Belgium’s population can be divided in various ways for the purpose of analysis – by regions that have very different social and economic statuses (Flanders, Wallonia, Brussels – Capital Region), by language (Dutch, French and German) or by communities (Dutch speaking Flemish, French speaking Walloons, German speaking Walloons, bilingual Brussels). While political lines are seemingly not split anymore solely along the interests of the different communities, Belgian administration is still confusing with its six parliaments and separate jurisdictions, with education, healthcare, economic and trade policy staying within regional competences. Therefore, it would be a mistake to only study Belgium’s population as a homogeneous body. According to 2019 data, the country’s population is split between the regions in the following manner:118 Population

Share of total

Flanders

6 589 069

57.64%

Wallonia

3 633 795

31.79%

Brussels-Capital

1 208 542

10.57%

Total

11 431 406

100%

A STEADY POPULATION GROWTH DRIVEN BY IMMIGRATION Belgium counted 11 431 406 inhabitants in 2019 and it is one of Europe’s most developed and urbanised countries with a fairly high population density. In contrast with Eastern Europe, Belgium’s population has steadily been growing for the past 20 years. Between 2001 and 2019, the country’s population grew by 11.5%, an average annual growth rate of about 0.5%. The population growth rate increased slightly in 2011, with the beginning of the war in Syria.119 A slight natural growth is present but it is insignificant as 90% of growth is explained

Population – Annual change. Brussels Institute for Statistics and Analysis. <http://ibsa.brussels/themes/ population/population#.XpVA5oj7RPY> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

118

Olivier Rozencwajg: Arrivées, départs, origines: Myria dévoile de nouveaux chiffres de la migration en Belgique. RTBF. 10 July 2019. <https://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/detail_arrivees-departs-origines-la-realitedes-chiffres-de-la-migration-en-belgique?id=10267493> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

119

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE by immigration120. There is an aging trend within the population, similar to most European countries. In 2019, the fertility rate stood at 1.66 child per woman and although there is a positive outlook with projections of a slow increase, it is still not expected to reach the level necessary for natural replacement. There is a positive natural balance but it contributes to the country’s steady population growth only just.

Migration, and therefore population growth is unevenly distributed amongst the country’s regions. Over the past ten years, the Walloon population saw an increase of 4.5%, similar to that of Flanders’ 6.1%, but less than the average Belgian growth of 6.3% over the same period.

The national average is biased by the 13.1% growth recorded in the Brussels-Capital Region.121 The popularity of a capital is obvious, and besides the external immigration, the difference between the Walloon and Flemish indicators can be explained by the presence of a domestic migration towards the richer part of the country.

A CHANGING PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS Belgium is home to about 2 million people that had a different nationality at birth, meaning, that one-fifth of the country’s population was born outside of the borders, and about half of this immigration is accounted for by mobility within the European Union.122 The meaning of European mobility was fundamentally transformed with the Treaty of Rome. While immigration used to mean permanent settling before, with the new freedoms, Belgium was one of the first European countries to experience temporary mobility of posted workers, many of them now holding Belgian citizenship.123 There has been a phenomenon of an exceptionally high emigration rate from this high-income economy – the Belgian paradox, that can be explained with the ease of mobility of European posted workers.124 Brussels is the de facto capital of the European Union and there are about 50 000 European civil servants and thousands more lobbyists with their families working in the city, resulting in a very high inward and outward flow of people to the capital each year. Besides being the centre of European decisionmaking, on one hand, there is the physical proximity of many of Europe’s biggest capitals. On the other hand, this multi-language country is entoured by countries that speak the same languages, also contributing to the mobility of workers. Language and the proximity between home and second country are considerable pull-factors

Mouvement de la population. STATBEL. <https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/mouvement-de-lapopulation#panel-11> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

120

121 Marc Debuisson: Taux d’accroissement de la population. L’Institut wallon de l’évaluation. 1 March 2019. <https://www.iweps.be/indicateur-statistique/taux-daccroissement-de-la-population> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

Statistiques sur la migration et la population migrante. Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics/fr#Acquisitions_de_nationalit.

C3.A9:_les_.C3.89tats_membres_de_l.E2.80.99Union_ont_accord.C3.A9_la_nationalit.C3.A9_.C3.A0_825.

C2.A0000.C2.A0personnes_en.C2.A02017> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

122

123 Immigré, étranger, Belge d’origine étrangère: de qui parle-t-on? Myria. December/2015. <https://www.myria.be/files/Myriatics2__layout.pdf > Accessed: 25 March 2020.

La migration en chiffres et en droits. Myria. 2019. <https://www.myria.be/files/Myria_RAMIG-FR_2019-ASgecomprimeerd.pdf> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

124

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE in the mobility of European citizens. Immigration from European sending countries is still on top of the list in all three regions of Belgium, even though there have been changes in the profile of immigrants in the past 20 years. The Netherlands still leads immigration to Flanders and France took over the lead from Italy, looking at the whole of Belgium. At the same time, the number and share of immigrants coming from the new Member States (especially from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) grew significantly since the 2004 and 2007 enlargement of the European Union.125 There has also been a surge in citizenship applications from British nationals, and their numbers multiplied by tenfold since Brexit referendum took place in 2016.126 There have also been changes in the composition of international immigration coming from third countries, accounting for about half of the total numbers. While, for decades, immigration from third countries was determined by Belgium’s colonial past, indicators have changed in the past 10 years. The domination of French-speaking immigrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo and from Morocco has been reshaped by the influx of Afghans and Syrians. This change in the composition of third country immigrants is firstly due to the outbreak of the migration crisis, and secondly to the implementation of the new Belgian Nationality Law in 2013. The new law connected obtaining naturalisation to certain conditions of national integration, this way making it significantly more difficult to become a Belgian citizen and thus somewhat lessening the country’s attractivity to migratory groups from particular countries.127 Although Belgium seems like the very European symbol of harmonious living together with a prosperously growing population, there are a few significant challenges facing the country in the forthcoming decades. Belgian regions seem to be more intertwined with their neighbours than unified in their diversity. The Flemish and Walloon populations are divided not only in the language they use but also very much on the political level. For the past decade, Flemish have had a political preference for conservative and populist extreme right parties at the regional elections, while socialist and progressive parties are oftentimes winning in Wallonia. It is a division driven by economic considerations but it also reflects differing views towards immigration within the federal country. In the future, Belgium will have to find a response to the problem of the ageing of its population without further fragmenting its society.

Population - Movement of the population. Brussels Institute for Statistics and Analysis. <http://statistics. brussels/themes/population?set_language=en#.XpVRMIj7RPY> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

125

Changements de nationalité. STATBEL. <https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/changements-denationalite#figures> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

126

New Belgian Nationality Law approved. European Migration Network. 25 October 2012. < https://emnbelgium. be/news/new-belgian-nationality-law-approved> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

127

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE BELGIUM FACT SHEET Population (2019) – 11,431,406128 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.61129 Annual population growth rate (2019) – 0.49%130 GDP per capita (2019) – 53,675 USD131 Life expectancy (2019) – 81.5 years132

IBERIA: TURNED GREY BUT WITH GATES WIDE OPEN ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL

As many rich—or, as they are often called in a growingly misleading way, developed— countries, Spain and Portugal also face challenges stemming from an increasingly ageing population, and this problem will leave a mark on their societal development in the forthcoming decades. Since their woes are not isolated and happen in a global context sharing similar traits, having a look at their tight spots, and also their consequences and solutions, can be instructive and worth examining.

By most measures, Portugal and Spain fare badly in many aspects of demography.

According to Eurostat, both countries are among the European countries having the lowest fertility rates. In Spain, this number was 1.25 in 2018, and, in Portugal, 1.41.133 Their rank is not better in a global comparison either: according to World Bank statistics, birth rate per 1,000 people in Portugal was eight in 2016, putting the country in the same league among OECD members as Italy and Japan, two countries famous for struggling with flat birth rates. Spain is only one category better, having nine babies per 1,000 people.134 According to some projections, this figure will slightly rise towards the end

Perspectives de la population. STATBEL. <https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/perspectives-dela-population#panel-12> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

128

Naissances et fécondité. STATBEL. < https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/naissances-etfecondite#figures> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

129

Mouvement de la population. STATBEL. <https://statbel.fgov.be/fr/themes/population/mouvement-de-lapopulation> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

130

Selected indicators for Belgium. OECD. <https://data.oecd.org/belgium.htm> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

131

BetterlifeindexBelgium.OECD.< http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/belgium/>Accessed:25March2020.

132

Fertility rates by age. Eurostat. Last updated: 24 February 2020. <https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ nui/submitViewTableAction.do> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

133

Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) – OECD members. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN?end=2016&locations=OE&most_recent_value_desc=false&start=1970&year_ high_desc=true> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

134

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE of the century but will remain lower than the sub-replacement fertility, as it will stand around 1.88 in Spain and 1.59 in Portugal.135 Low fertility rates may partly be due to the effects of the Great Recession that started in 2007–2008. The younger generation, and especially young women, saw the deterioration of their socioeconomic situation and chose to delay childbearing in its wake.136 The problem also involves a high unemployment rate among the younger generation: in 2011, for example, unemployment in the age class from 15 to 39 years was a record-high 25% in Spain, and it was around 15% in Portugal—and this rate could not decrease below 17% and 9%, respectively, even in 2019.137 However, not unrelated to the above, precarious work138 and choices to postpone leaving the nest are also part of the problem.139 Low birth rates are also connected to the labour market integration of women, who, in the meantime, are expected to perform their “traditional” female duties at home alone.140 High education and increasing career choices also lead to delayed childbearing in their case.141 This is clear in statistics: in both countries, the mean age of women having their first baby is above the EU average of 28.7, as it is 29.6 in Portugal and 30.9 in Spain.142 It is not just the fertility rates, however, that put the two countries in a dire situation.

In parallel with fewer births, the two Iberian states also have an ageing society. There are 2.1 million elderly people in a Portugal of around ten million today, which is projected

The 2018 Ageing Report. Underlying Assumptions & Projection Methodologies. European Commission, Institutional paper 065. 2017/November. 192, 205.

135

Yolanda González-Rábago–Unai Martín–Amalia Bacigalupe: Crisis y fecundidad en España: ¿Cómo afectan la situación socioeconómica y las políticas de apoyo a la familia? OPIK-Working papers/Lan koadernoak.

2017/2.; Susana Atalia–Vanessa Cunha: O impacto da crise nos nascimentos em Portugal: uma perspetiva terriotorial. In: Portugal Social em Mudança—Retratos municipais, edited by João Ferrão–Ana Delicado.

Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Lisbon, 2017. 33–41.

136

137 Unemployment rates by sex, age and educational attainment level (%). Eurostat. Last updated: 24 March 2020. <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

Demógrafo sobre los datos del INE: “La gente tiene hijos si su empleo no es precario, no por la macroeconomía.” Europa Press. 19 June 2019. <https://www.europapress.es/sociedad/noticia-demografodatos-ine-gente-tiene-hijos-si-empleo-no-precario-no-macroeconomia-20190619194003.html> Accessed: 24 March 2020.; Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes–Pau Mari-Klose: The Mediterranean Welfare Regime and the Economic Crisis. Routledge, London–New York, 2016. Kindle e-book.

138

In Spain, the young leave their parental home at an average age of 29, while, in Portugal, at 28.9 according to Eurostat data. When they are ready to leave the nest? Eurostat. 3 May 2017. <https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20170503-1?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=%2Feurostat%2F> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

139

Manuel Villaverde Cabral: A bomba demográfica. Observador. 18 January 2020. <https://observador.pt/ opiniao/a-bomba-demografica/> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

140

Nuria Legazpe: Mujer, trabajo y familia en España. El trimestre económico. 2015/October–December. 873–896.

141

Women are having their first child at an older age. Eurostat. 18 March 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20190318-1> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

142

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE to grow to 2.8 million until 2080.143 In Spain, the proportions are somewhat similar, as, today, around 17% of the population is over 65, and, by 2050, this proportion is supposed to reach 30%.144 This pace of growth is above the European average145—and Spain is also the only European country that will stay among the ten countries of the world with the highest projected increase in the share of elderly persons by 2050.146 The fast pace of ageing is also the effect of a positive phenomenon, namely, the increasingly high life expectancy in these societies. As per a 2019 United Nations report, with 83.4 years, Spain has the fifth-highest life expectancy from all the states globally and the secondhighest in the EU, whereas Portugal, with 81.9 years, ranks 21th worldwide and 10 th in the EU.147 Also, a study by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation says that, by 2040, Spain will be the first on the globe with an average lifespan of 85.8 years, while Portugal will place fifth with 84.5 years.148 The other phenomenon that contributes to a decrease in population, and, particularly, to a drop in the working-age, fertile part of the society in the two countries in question, is emigration. The outflow of the younger generations is also related to economic turbulences at the beginning of the second decade of this century. Portugal has always had a long tradition of emigration, and, although this tradition had appeared to cease after the 1974 revolution, as a matter of fact, it continued in the background and saw a new surge in the 21th century, especially since 2010.149 This new wave of emigration reached its highest level between 2010 and 2013, and, from 2014 on, annual departures every year reached a level that equals to 1% of the country’s whole population.150 As a consequence, Portugal has been experiencing a negative net migration since 2004.151 This tendency makes it the European Union country with the highest number of emigrants in proportion to resident population.152 Spain, also a country with a long history of emigration, could become a recipient of immigration more than a source of

Mantém-se o agravamento do envelhecimento demográfico, em Portugal, que só tendrá a estabilizar daqui a cerca de 40 anos. Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Destaque. Informação à comunicação social. 26 March 2017. <https://www.ine.pt/ngt_server/attachfileu.jsp?look_parentBoui=289240867&att_display=n&att_download=y> Accessed: 24 March 2020.

143

José Luis Fernández–Clara Parapar–Miriam Ruíz: El envejecimiento de la población. Lychnos. 2010/ September. 6.

144

Fernández–Parapar–Ruíz, 7.

145

World Population Ageing 2019. Highlights. United Nations, New York, 2019. 7.

146

Pedro Conceição [et al.]: Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21th century. United Nations Development Programme, New York, 2019. 300–303.

147

How healthy will be in 2040? Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. 16 October 2018. <http://www. healthdata.org/news-release/how-healthy-will-we-be-2040> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

148

Rui Pena Pires: Portuguese Emigration Today. In: New and Old Routes of Portuguese Emigration. Uncertain Futures at the Periphery of Europe, edited by Cláudia Pereira–Joana Azevedo. Springer, Cham, 2019. 29–48.

149

Pires, 34.

150

Inês Vidigal–Carlota Moura Veiga: Portuguese Emigration Factbook 2019. Observatório da Emigração, CIES, ISCTE–Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, Lisbon, 2020. 9.

151

Vidigal–Veiga, 9.

152

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE emigration in the first decade of the current century—for the first time after its transition to democracy.153 However, after the economic crisis, emigration from there also hit its peak in 2013, with almost 270.000 people leaving the country. Since then, emigration decreased, and the country’s net migration turned into the positive after 2015.154 One of the most direct consequences of the above is that there is, and there will be, a decline in working-age population in both countries. Forecasts show that Portugal will have a population of 7.9 million by 2070 (down from 10.2 million today), and its workingage population will shrink to 37%, while, as mentioned, its population over 65 will increase to 36% from 22%.155 This means a very high dependency ratio, supposedly leading to chronic budget deficits from 2027 on.156 In Spain, predictions indicate that, by 2064, with the aforementioned proportion of elderly population, the dependency ratio will reach 95.6%, up from the current 59.2%.157 Until 2048, pensions will take a 13.4% share from the country’s GDP.158 This situation is going to have a damaging effect on the potential economic growth in both countries, while it will put a tremendous strain on their respective social and pension systems, especially as both nations have a replacement rate which is well over the OECD average159 and, for now, a fully public pension system.

Another corollary of the accelerated ageing in these societies is the depopulation of certain regions in their countries. In Spain, the north-western quadrant is threatened the most: municipalities there are projected to lose 10-16% of their population, which is particularly problematic, as, 15-21% of their GDP directly or indirectly comes from pensions today.160 Portugal faces similar challenges, since population in its interior is on the decline.161 Apart from short-term and transitional remedies, such as increasing the retirement age, the most obvious solution to both countries’ demographic quagmire is helping immigration and encouraging the return of former emigrants. This is what the ruling Socialist Party aims to achieve in Portugal, and this is also what business leaders are

María Almena: Diez años de emigración española. Política Exterior. 2019/January–February.

153

Población en España hoy: inmigrantes, emigrantes y otros datos sobre los habitantes de España.

EpData. Last updated: 8 January 2020. <https://www.epdata.es/datos/poblacion-espana-hoy-inmigrantesemigrantes-otros-datos-habitantes-espana/1/espana/106> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

154

Amílcar Moreira (ed.): Sustentabilidade do sistema de pensões português. Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, Lisbon, 2019. 53.

155

Moreira, 105–107.

156

Proyección de la Población de España 2014–2064. Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Notas de Prensa. 28 October 2018. <https://www.ine.es/prensa/np870.pdf> 8.

157

Opinión sobre la sostenibilidad del sistema de seguridad social. Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal, Opinión 1/19. <https://www.airef.es/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/opinion-pensiones/190109_Opinion_ SS.pdf> Accessed: 27 March 2020. 6.

158

159

Pensions at a Glance. OECD and G20 Indicators. OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019. 31.

Javier G. Jorrín [et. al]: El noroeste de España se enfrenta a su condena final: la tercera gran despoblación.

El Confidencial. 16 December 2019. <https://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2019-12-15/terceradespoblacion-noroeste-espana-condena-definitiva-774_2377340/> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

160

Onde e como se vive em Portugal. Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Destaque. Informação à comunicação social. 25 June 2013. <https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_destaques&DESTAQUESdest_ boui=157042886&DESTAQUESmodo=2&xlang=pt> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

161

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE asking there from the government,162 while even the right-wing Social Democratic Party agrees that the country needs some kind of controlled immigration.163 Migration is not a particularly polarising topic in Spain either—only the right-wing Vox has a somewhat stricter attitude towards it, but most of the parties acknowledge that Spanish economy needs a legal and controlled influx of manpower.164 Even nowadays, major demographic hiccups can only be avoided thanks to immigration into both of these countries; what is more, the “foreign population” is younger, more qualified, and more active than that of Portugal,165 and, albeit not that qualified, makes up a massive proportion of working-age population in Spain166 and is expected to contribute significantly to the sustainability of its social security system.167 Although most of the immigrants come from the European Union and states that have a cultural link to the two countries in question (especially, from Latin America168), the present Portuguese government, for instance, also has a welcoming attitude towards Middle Eastern asylum seekers and makes efforts to help their integration into its labour market.169 It makes good sense to throw gates wide open in both countries: otherwise, their society and economy will most probably collapse, since exclusively encouraging more births among the native population is not an option anymore in either of these nations.

Filipe Santos Costa–Tiago Miranda: Costa defende mais imigração e mais estrangeiros a trabalhar em Portugal. Expresso. 25 September 2019.

162

Rio quer “estratégia para a imigração” mas recusa “portas escancaradas.” Sábado. 25 September 2019. <https://www.sabado.pt/portugal/politica/detalhe/rio-quer-estrategia-para-a-imigracao-mas-recusaportas-escancaradas > Accessed: 26 March 2019.

163

Adrián Francisco Varela: Qué medidas proponen exactamente sobre inmigración PSOE, PP, Ciudadanos, Podemos, Vox y Más País. Business Insider. 18 April 2019. <https://www.businessinsider.es/inmigracionproponen-pp-psoe-podemos-ciudadanos-vox-404701 > Accessed: 27 March 2020.; ¿Son tan distintos PSOE y Vox con la inmigración? La respuesta es no. ESdiario. 26 May 2019. <https://www.esdiario.com/371175303/Sontan-distintos-PSOE-y-Vox-con-la-inmigracion-La-respuesta-es-no.html > Accessed: 27 March 2020.; Escrivá cree que España necesita “a millones y millones de inmigrantes” para evitar la “japonización” de su economía. 20 minutos. 16 January 2020. <https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/4119198/0/escriva-cree-que-espana-necesitaa-millones-y-millones-de-inmigrantes-para-evitar-la-japonizacion-de-su-economia/> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

164

Boletim Económico, Outubro 2019. Banco de Portugal, Lisbon, 2019. 50–53.

165

Carmen González Enríquez: Inmigración en España: una nueva fase de llegadas. Real Instituto Elcano ARI 28/2019. 5 March 2019. 2, 6–7.

166

Opinión sobre la sostenibilidad del sistema de seguridad social, 33–34.

167

Boletim Económico, 50., Cifras de Población (CP) a 1 de julio de 2019. Estadística de Migraciones (EM).

Primer semestre de 2019. Instituto Nacional de Estadíctica, Notas de Prensa. 8 January 2020. <https://www. ine.es/prensa/cp_j2019_p.pdf > 3.

168

Quase metade dos sírios em Portugal com emprego ou em formação profissional. Público. 6 December 2017. <https://www.publico.pt/2017/12/06/sociedade/noticia/quase-metade-dos-sirios-em-portugal-com-empregoou-em-formacao-profissional-1795174 > Accessed: 27 March 2020.

169

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE PORTUGAL FACT SHEET Population (2018) – 10,281,762170 Fertility rate children/woman (2017) – 1.4171 Annual population growth rate (2019) – −0.2%172 GDP per capita (2018) – 23,407.9173 Life expectancy (2017) – 81 years174

SPAIN FACT SHEET Population (2018) – 46,723,750175 Fertility rate children/woman (2017) – 1.3176 Annual population growth rate (2018) – −0.3%177 GDP per capita (2018) – 30,370.9 USD178 Life expectancy (2017) – 83 years179

170 Population, total – Portugal. The World Bank. < https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=PT > Accessed: 27 March 2020.

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Portugal. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=PT> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

171

Population growth (annual %) – Portugal. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. GROW?locations=PT> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

172

GDP per capita (current US$) – Portugal. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=PT> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

173

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Portugal. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=PT> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

174

175 Population, total – Spain. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ES> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Spain. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=ES> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

176

Population growth (annual %) – Spain. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. GROW?locations=ES> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

177

GDP per capita (current US$) – Spain. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=ES> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

178

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – Spain. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=ES> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

179

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN HUNGARY DR PÉTER STEPPER

POPULATION DATA The population of Hungary is 9,772,756 on 1 January 2019. In the previous year, the population was 9,797,561 which means a decrease by approximately 0,01%.180 The decrease is mainly due to the natural balance, namely the difference between the number of deaths and births.

During 2018, altogether 89,807 children were born in Hungary, a little bit more than in 2013, but by a small margin less that in 2015-2017. In Hungary the fertility rate totals up to 1,49, nonetheless the rate has been slowly increasing since 2013.181 Compared to the European Union, Hungary remains a member state below the EU average in terms of fertility due to the latest data in 2018.

On EU level, the fertility rate is 1,57 (the lowest is 1,26 in Malta, the highest is 1,9 in France).182 In Hungary in 2018, life expectancy at birth for men is 72,56 years and for women is 79,19 years. The noticeable difference between the sexes is not unique in Europe. Considering the mortality data, 131,045 people died in Hungary in 2018. Population decline is a recent trend across the member states of the European Union. In this context, it is not so surprising to see Hungarian trends, but the relatively slow decrease looks promising, if we compare minus 20,000 people in the last 3 years with the former decrease of almost 100,000 between 2013 and 2016.183

MIGRATION The annual decrease is driven mainly by a deficit of the number of deaths over births instead of migratory reasons. However, net migration data is also an important factor due to the relatively high number of Hungarian labour workers in the UK, Germany, the Netherland, parallel with the restrictive immigration and asylum policy of the government.

Concerning the data related to foreign nationals, the Central Office of Statistics (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal: KSH) counted approximately 180,000 people living in in Hungary, 100,000 of which coming from Europe, 50,000 from Asia and the others from the rest of the world.184 The annual number of immigrants with EU citizenship stagnated between 2013 and 2018 while the number of people with non-EU citizenship background increased in the same period.

A further interesting indicator connected to the migration trends in Hungary is the data on the EU

Népesség, népmozgalom 1941 -. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2019). <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/ xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnt001c.html> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

180

ibid.

181

Fertility statistics, Eurostat. < https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_ statistics> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

182

Népesség, népmozgalom 1941 -. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2019). xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnt001c.html>

183

<https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/

ibid.

184

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE cross-border workers flows. In this context, Hungary belonged to the top issuing countries in 2017, in that year 339,000 Hungarian citizens185 worked in another EU country. However, it is also worth to mention that 18,500 Hungarian nationals186 returned home in the same year.

The Hungarian government aimed to prevent further decrease of population, thus it was constantly searching for successful policies in order to increase birth rate, decrease emigration (especially among youth), and also found a way to materialize certain profit from issuing residence permits. One good example for this was the naturalization program for non-EU citizens between 2013-2017. Those, who wanted to acquire residence permit in Hungary, the government issues so-called settlement bonds for 250,000-300,000 euros.

81% of the applicants originate from China187, who desired Hungarian citizenship most probably for the free movement rights within the European Union.

However, immigration is not to be understood as a good opportunity to tackle population decrease in general, and refugee mass influx is to be considered as a security threat in particular. Therefore, Hungary launched a diplomatic offensive in the region, and the European Union, in order to put asylum policy on the top of the security policy agenda.188 The number of those whom were born in Hungary and moved abroad has been 400,000 in 1990, a number which increased up to 600,000 until 2017.189 The “Come back, youth” (Gyere haza fiatal) program was one of the first experiment to fight against brain-drain. Almost 400 people registered and applied for the program, which offered more than 2000 job positions for those interested in returning to Hungary. A little bit more than 100 young employees returned in 2016. Probably this low turnout rate resulted in the closure of the program one year later.190 Another concept was to support financial assets for young families in need of any place of living, the family homebuilding discount (CSOK) program in the framework of which the state provided 10 million HUF non-repayable loans for families willing to take care of at least 3 children in the future, and plus 10 million HUF loan provided by private banks on zero interest rate.​ At the beginning of the program, 20 million HUF were more than enough to buy a normal property, but the mere existence of the program resulted in the massive increase of real estate prices all across Hungary.

Hungarians working abroad above EU average, Budapest Business Journal, 29 May 2018. <https://bbj.hu/ analysis/hungarians-working-abroad-above-eu-average-_149883> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

185

Gyermekvállalás, Infojegyzet. Országgyűlés Hivatala. 2018. évi 12. szám. <https://www.parlament. hu/documents/10181/1479843/Infojegyzet_2018_12_gyermekvallalas.pdf/8ecc1529-515b-cabe-a7697f46b7e20c5e)> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

186

187 Wiedemann Tamás: 59 országból jött Magyarországra a húszezer letelepedési kötvényes. G7. 16 January 2019. <https://g7.hu/kozelet/20190116/59-orszagbol-jott-magyarorszagra-a-huszezer-letelepedesi-kotvenyes/> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

Stepper Péter: The Visegrad Group and the EU agenda on migration: A coalition of the unwilling? Corvinus Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 1. No. 1. (2016) p. 62-82. <http://unipub. lib.uni-corvinus.hu/3295/1/COJOURN_Vol1_No1_Stepper_Peter.pdf> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

188

Versenyképességi program 330 pontban. Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 2019. <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/ versenykepessegi-program.pdf> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

189

Leállítják a Gyere haza, fiatal! programot. Origo. 13 June 2016. <https://www.origo.hu/gazdasag/20160613nem-hiv-haza-tobb-fiatalt-a-kormany.html> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

190

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE Some research has been made so far to evaluate the demographic aspects of CSOK after 2016.

It seems that certain fears beyond parental decisions to give birth to a child are connected to bad housing conditions, so the program could contribute indeed in the increase of population, but there are other factors in the decision as well. The effects of CSOK would not be on those, who already planned to have a family but postponed the start, but on those, who want to have children sometime in the far future, but find it important to have a decent place for a living, or those who already have two children, but were somehow reluctant to have a third one.191

SUMMARY Considering the trend in the previous years, the population of Hungary decreased by 136,042 people in the period of 2013-2019. The annual number of registered live births in 2018 are 89,807 individuals, which has been the lowest number since 2014. In 2019, the fertility rate was 1.49 and this means an increase by 0.01%, the annual trend shows that there is a permanent increase since 2013, when this rate barely exceeded 1,3.192 The average age of mothers at delivery is around 30 years in 2019 which is higher than ever in the Hungarian history. This rate was below 26 years in 1990.193 The rate of birth in Hungary is 9.2 per thousand in 2018 which has been the lowest data for the past four years. By contrast, the mortality rate is 13.4 per thousand in the same year and this has been the highest proportion since the 2000s.

As mentioned in the introduction, 131,045 people died in 2018. Compared to the number of registered live births in the same year (89,807), the result is nearly minus 41,238 people in 2018. Due to natural balance and the -4,2 per thousand deficit of the rate of birth over the mortality rate in 2018, Hungary is projected to experience a further population decrease in 2020. The impact of migration on the population growth is complicated to define, however based on the numbers, it seems to be clear that the contribution of migration to population growth is slight, compared to the impact of natural balance.

HUNGARY FACT SHEET:194 Population (2020): 9,770,000 Fertility rate children/woman (2019): 1.49 Annual population growth rate (2019): –0.4 % GDP per capita (2018): 16,148 USD Life expectancy (2019): 75.94 years

Kapitány Balázs: Lakáshelyzet és gyermekvállalás: fontos, de nem a legfontosabb. Korfa – Népesedési hírlevél. 2016. február, XVI. évfolyam 1 szám. <https://www.demografia.hu/kiadvanyokonline/index.php/ korfa/article/download/2652/2507/)> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

191

Népesség, népmozgalom 1941 -. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2019). <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/ xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnt001c.html> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

192

Kapitány Balázs- Spéder Zsolt (2015) Gyermekvállalás. IN: Monostori Judit - Őri Péter - Spéder Zsolt (2015) (szerk.): Demográfiai portré 2015. KSH NKI, Budapest: 41–56. <http://www.demografia.hu/kiadvanyokonline/ index.php/demografiaiportre/article/download/2466/2472> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

193

Népesség, népmozgalom 1941 -. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (2019). <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/ xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnt001c.html> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

194

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE POLAND – THE CASE OF POLISH WORKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM PÉTER DOBROWIECKI

Similarly, to many European states, Poland faces a growing demographic crisis that could lead to a dramatic reduction of the country’s population. With an all-time high mortality rate, low birth level and rapidly ageing population, Poland might lose more than one-third of its citizens by the end of the century.195 Mortality rate in Poland reached record heights in 2018 with 414,200 deaths as members of the country’s post World War II baby boom generations passed away.196 In contrast, Poland has one of the lowest births per woman in Europe. While the level of the total fertility rate (TFR) has increased in recent years (from 1.403 births per woman in 2016 to a predicted 1.439 births per woman in 2020), it is still one of the lowest in Europe, being nowhere near the estimated 2.1-2.15 TFR required for generation replacement. These trends will have a direct effect on the average age of Polish society, which – from the current, relatively young level of 41 years – will increase by more than 10 years by 2040.197 In the upcoming decades, this will result in Polish society becoming one of oldest societies on the globe, putting an enormous strain on the pension system, as the number of active workers (financing the pensions of the older generations) will decrease – inevitably leading to a raise in retirement age.

TFR 1950

3.705

1960

2.980

1970

2.200

1980

2.276

1990

1.991

2000

1.652

2010

1.505

2015

1.350

2018

1.452

Total fertility rate in Poland198

World Population Prospects. United Nations. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/POL/poland/ population-growth-rate > Accessed: 25 March 2020.

195

Rocznik Demograficzny 2019 [Demography Yearbook 2019]. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych. Warsaw. 2019. 26. <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznikistatystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny-2019,3,13.html> Accessed: 21 March 2020.

196

Filip Lamański: Sytuacja demograficzna Polski jest coraz gorsza [The demographic situation of Poland is getting worse]. Obserwator Gospodarczy. 23 October 2019. <https://obserwatorgospodarczy.pl/komentarzei-analizy/922-sytuacja-demograficzna-polski-jest-coraz-gorsza> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

197

Rocznik Demograficzny 2019. 50-53.

198

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE With these grim demographic predictions, which might also have a serious impact on the domestic economy, it comes as no surprise that Polish governments in recent years aimed to facilitate the return of some of the estimated 2.5 million Poles working and living abroad – the distinctive majority of them, 2.15 million people, residing in European states.199 After the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004, hundreds of thousands of young Poles left the country in search of job opportunities; with their eventual settling in the United Kingdom, they were gradually becoming the largest group of foreign citizens living on the isles – since 2007, Polish has become the most common non-British nationality in the UK, with Poland being the second most common non-UK country of birth.200 Number of people (thousand) 2002

461

2004

770

2007

1925

2010

1685

2014

2013

2015

2098

2016

2214

2017

2241

2018

2155

Number of Poles working abroad in Europe201

At the moment of Poland’s entry into the EU, the UK was home to 69 thousand Polish workers, while in just the first three years, more than half a million people made the decision to emigrate (already in the first year of Poland’s EU membership, 190 thousand people travelled to the UK in search of better job opportunities). The global financial crisis of 2007-08 temporary halted and even significantly decreased the number of Polish citizens working in the UK (580 thousand in 2010 down from 690 thousand in 2007). However, their number soon reached pre-crisis levels (685 thousand in 2014).202 In the following years, the upward-pointing trend of continuous,

Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2018 [Information regarding the proportion and destination of temporary emigration from Poland in the years 2004-2018]. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/migracje-zagraniczne-ludnosci/informacja-o-rozmiarach-ikierunkach-czasowej-emigracji-z-polski-w-latach-2004-2018,2,12.html> Accessed: 21 March 2020.

199

200 Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality: July 2018 to June 2019. Office for National Statistics. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/ bulletins/ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/july2018tojune2019> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

201 GUS methodology: before 2006, for a period of more than two months and, after 2006, for a period of more than three months. Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2018.

Iza Chmielewska-Adam Panuciak- Paweł Strzelecki: Polacy pracujący za granicą w 2018 r. [Polish people working abroad in 2018]. Narodowy Bank Polski. Departament Statystyki. Warsaw. 2019. 7.

202

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE increased immigration into the UK was steady even during the heated campaign and debate surrounding the Brexit referendum. Following the pro-Brexit vote, a growing uncertainty emerged among Poles living in the UK that in terms of immigration figures materialised slowly (following the June 2016 Brexit vote, the number of Poles staying in the UK even increased minimally in 2017).203 Nevertheless, the Polish government – facing the challenges mentioned above – saw an opportunity to present an alternative to its citizens residing in Britain. Citing the rapid economic development of Poland (between 2002 and 2018, Polish GDP growth surpassed surpassed British GDP growth in all but one year)204 and the improved living conditions, the Polish government urged its citizens either to apply for settled status in the UK or consider returning home.205 In spite of the government’s efforts, its seems that, until now, only a portion of the former emigrants decided to opt for the return, while a part of the Polish citizens leaving the UK eventually preferred to settle in another Western European country (Germany overtook in 2018 the UK in terms of the number of Polish workers for the first time since 2010206). While statistics indicate that the number of Poles temporarily remaining in the UK decreased by 98 thousand people in 2018, with 695 thousand remaining, the trend did not continue in the first half of 2019.207 Moreover, researchers suggest that most of the Poles living and working in the UK intend to stay in the country well past Brexit – in the last years, over 456 thousand Poles applied for settled status in the UK with more than 25 thousand already gained British citizenship as well.

POLAND FACT SHEET: Population (November 2019) – 38,395,000208 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.452209 Annual population growth rate (2018) – 0.01%210 GDP per capita (2020) – 15,990 USD211 Life expectancy (2018) – 77.76 years212

Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach czasowej emigracji z Polski w latach 2004-2018.

203

World Bank: GDP growth (annual %) – Poland, United Kingdom <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=PL-GB> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

204

Brexit: Poles in UK should ‚consider’ returning, Polish ambassador says. BBC. 18 September 2019. <https:// www.bbc.com/news/uk-49741175> Accessed: 27 March 2020 205

206 Jo Harper: in terms of the number of Polish workers. DW. 25 November 2019. < https://www.dw.com/en/ germany-bound-poles-kiss-uk-goodbye/a-51391225> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

Population of the UK by country of birth and nationality: July 2018 to June 2019.

207

Biuletyn statystyczny [Statistical Biuletin] 2019/12. Główny Urząd Statystyczny. Zakład Wydawnictw Statystycznych. Warsaw. 2019. 10.

208

Rocznik Demograficzny 2019. 270.

209

World Bank: Population Growth (annual %) – Poland <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. GROW?locations=PL&display=graph> Accessed: 23 March 2020.

210

211 International Monetary Fund – GDP per capita, current prices <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/ NGDPDPC@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/POL> Accessed: 27 March 2020.

Rocznik Demograficzny 2019. 382.

212

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE SLOVAKIA – CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOUR OF THE POPULATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ÁGNES VASS

Slovakia is a relatively small landlocked country, with a population of 5,457,873 people in 2019.213 This is the highest number of inhabitants in the history of the country so far. The last time the population of Slovakia decreased was during the Second World War, as the population has been increasing since 1946 (decrease was monitored only in 2011).214 This trend, however, will stop and the population will start decreasing around 2030 the latest, as the result of the transformation processes in the demographic behaviour of the population.215 Table 1 summarizes the growing number of inhabitants of Slovakia and the population growth in percentage from 2005 until 2019.

Number of inhabitants

Population growth (%)

2005

5 389 180

0,08

2006

5 393 637

0,08

2007

5 400 998

0,14

2008

5 412 254

0,21

2009

5 424 925

0,23

2010

5 435 273

0,19

2011

5 404 322

-0,57

2012

5 410 836

0,12

2013

5 415 949

0,09

2014

5 421 349

0,10

2015

5426242

0,09

2016

5435343

0,17

2017

5443120

0,14

2018

5450421

0,13

2019

5457873

0,14

Table 1: Total number of inhabitants and population growth of Slovakia216

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. March 2020. <https://slovak. statistics.sk/wps/wcm/connect/f1a037e8-37bd-4645-a76d-d185838e3610/MY_v_cislach_Pohyb_obyvatelstva_2019. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-f1a037e8-37bd-4645-a76d-d185838e3610-n5oX5zo> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

213

Pohyb obyvateľstva v Slovenskej republike v roku 2018 (Pramenné dielo). Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 10 June 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/y8aagxhx> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

214

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019.

215

Based on the data available in “Pohyb obyvateľstva v Slovenskej republike v roku 2018 (Pramenné dielo)”.

216

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE In case of the Slovak population, the changes in demographic behaviour are visible most significantly in three interrelated areas: • Reproductive behaviour of the population • Family behaviour of the population • Ageing of the population These changes in the demographic behaviour appeared in Slovakia at the end 1990s and the beginning of 2000s and since then, are exceptionally intensive.217 Similar changes have already arisen in Western and Northern Europe a little bit earlier than in Slovakia, and with certain differences, are already apparent in other Central European countries. The new model of reproductive behaviour is characterised by the decline of the natural population growth and the decrease of the reproduction rates to levels that no longer support the selfreproduction of the population. Another important factor is, that according to the statistics, the intensity of fertility is also declining rapidly. At the same time, the average age of women at childbirth is rising, which can be understood as the effect of deferment of childbirth for an older age. The development of the total fertility rate shows a slightly upward trend: in 1993, the total fertility rate was 1,93, in 2002, this number was 1,19 (the lowest since 1993) and since then, it has been slowly increasing.218 The total fertility rate in 2019 reached 1,52.219 During the last few years, the average age of mothers at live births also has started to increase: while in 1994 the average age of women at live birth was 25,15 years, since then it increased by almost four years as in 2019 the average age of mothers was 29,7 years.

Since 2014, the highest number of children was born to women aged 30-34. While in 1993, the highest number of children was born to women with high secondary education, from 2014 the most children were born to mothers with tertiary education and almost 19% of children were born to mothers with only primary education.220 This phenomenon is in close relation with another change in family behaviour, namely, that there is a significant transition from the model of early marriages to the model of late marriages which trend has started in 1989. While in 1994, the average age at marriage for men was 26,08 and for women 23,33. Ten years later, the average age at marriage for men was 29,57 years and for women 26,67 years. In 2014, the average age for men at marriage was 33,2 and for women it exceeded 30 years for the first time (30,25 years). In 2018, the average age at marriage for men was 34,19 and for women 31,29 years. It is also

Štatistika v súvislostiach. Rodinné správanie populácie Slovenska. September 2018. <https://tinyurl.com/ y8l5j5q9 > Accessed: 11 April 2020.

217

218 Štatistika v súvislostiach. Hlavné trendy populačného vývoja v SR v roku 2017. Demogafia a sociálna štatistika 2018. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. May 2018. <https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/wcm/ connect/0af9ef47-685a-4ded-8853-5e5a9aed5c01/STATISTIK A _V_SUVISLOSTIACH_Hlavne_trendy_ populacneho_vyvoja_v_SR_v_roku_2017.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-0af9ef47685a-4ded-8853-5e5a9aed5c01-mkTnD-t> Accessed: 10 April 2020.

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019.

219

Štatistika v súvislostiach. Hlavné trendy populačného vývoja v SR v roku 2017. Demogafia a sociálna štatistika 2018.

220

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE important in this regard, that the number of marriages also decreased: in 1994, the number of marriages decreased under 30 000/year and until now, this ratio was exceeded only twice: in 2017 with 31309 marriages and in 2018 with 31177 number of marriages.221 The ageing of societies has become a widespread phenomenon, especially in the more developed regions of the world. The aging of the Slovak population appears not only in short term (last ten years), but in long term as well. The above-mentioned decline in fertility is causing the so-called ageing from bottom phenomenon. Taking UN classification into consideration (three main categories are differentiated, based on the ratio of the population over 65 years in the population of the respective country: young population (less than 4%); mature population (4-7%); old population (7%), population in Slovakia belongs to the old population as the value of the ratio of the population over 65 years is higher than 7%. The share of those aged 65 and over represented almost 14% of the population in 2014 – this is a 20% increase, compared with 2005.222 The age pyramid of the Slovak population shows, that in 2010s the post-World War baby boom cohorts are reaching retirement age, emphasizing the population aging more significantly. The aging from the bottom of age pyramid is also manifested by the fact, that there are no significant Millennial cohorts in the Slovak population.

This means, that for instance in 2014, the half of the population was aged 39 years or older. For the first time in the history of Slovakia, the average age of the population was 40 years, in 2019, this number is 41,06 years. On the other hand, life expectancy is increasing: in 2014 the life expectancy reached 73 years for men and 80 years for women. In 2019, the life expectancy for men is 74,31 years, while for women is 80,84 years.223 From the migration point of view, Slovakia is a country profiting from migration since 1993.

Until recently, Slovakia was almost exclusively a country of origin for migration. In this regard, the accession to the EU and later to the Schengen Area brought some significant changes.

Since 2004, illegal and asylum migration has decreased, while legal migration has increased more than four times.224 Between 2004 and 2008, the increase of foreign population in Slovakia was the second highest within the EU, the representation of foreigners in population is relatively low: compared with all EU member states, Slovakia has the 6th lowest proportion of foreigners (only Romania (0,57%), Poland (0,63%), Lithuania (0,97%), Bulgaria (1,27%) and Croatia (1,27%) have lower number of foreigners in their total population).225

221 Štatistika v súvislostiach. Hlavné trendy vývoja sobášnosti v SR v roku 2018. Demogafia a sociálna štatistika október 2019. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. October 2019. <file:///C:/Users/%C3%81gi/Downloads/ Statistika_v_suvislosiach_%20Hlavne_trendy_vyvoja_sobasnosti_v_SR_roku_2018.pdf> Accessed: 10 April 2020.

222 Štatistika v súvislostiach. Hlavné trendy populačného vývoja v regiónoch SR v roku 2014. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. October 2018. <https://tinyurl.com/y8f4a4pr> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019.

223

Statistical Overview of Legal and Illegal Migration in the Slovak Republic. Presidium of the Police Force Bureau of Border and Alien Police. 2016. <https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/hranicna_a_ cudzinecka_policia/rocenky/rok_2016/2016-statistical-overview-UHCP-EN.pdf> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

224

225 Population by citizenship and residence – Foreigners. Eurostat. 1 January 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001&plugin=1> Accessed: 14 March 2020. See also: Population without the citizenship of the reporting country. Eurostat. 1 January 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00157&plugin=1> Accessed: 22 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE In 2018, there were 16 813 more foreigners in Slovakia than one year earlier (16% increase).226 Since 2004, the number of foreigners legally living in Slovakia has increased more than six times.227 The most significant reasons for legal migration to Slovakia are currently migration for work, business purpose, studying, family reunification, marriage to Slovak citizens or other social reasons. The most numerous groups of foreigners in Slovakia are formed by the citizens of neighbouring countries and other EU member states. More than 40% of foreigners living in Slovakia are from Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Ukraine,228 around 90% of the total number of immigrants of Slovakia were from other EU member states. On the other side, European countries are the main target countries for the emigrants from Slovakia: the largest number of Slovak citizens emigrated to the Czech Republic, Austria, the United Kingdom and Germany.229 Immigrants

Emigrants

Net migration

2005

5276

1873

3403

2006

5589

1735

3857

2007

8624

1831

6793

2008

8765

1705

7060

2009

6346

1979

4367

2010

5272

1889

3383

2011

4829

1863

2966

2012

5419

2003

3416

2013

5149

2770

2379

2014

5357

3644

1713

2015

6997

3870

3127

2016

7686

3801

3885

2017

7188

3466

3722

2018

7253

3298

3955

Table 2: Number of Immigrants and Emigrants of Slovakia since 2005.

226 Statistical Overview of Legal and Illegal Migration in the Slovak Republic in 2017 and 2018. Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the Presidium of the Police Force <http://www.minv.sk/?rocenky> Accessed: 22 March 2020.

227 Foreign-born population. Eurostat. 1 January 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table. do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00178&plugin=1> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

Statistical Overview of Legal and Illegal Migration in the Slovak Republic – 2018. Bureau of Border and Alien Police of the Presidium of the Police Force. <http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/hranicna_a_ cudzinecka_policia/rocenky/rok_2018/2018-rocenka-UHCP-EN.pdf> Accessed: 23 March 2020.

228

MY V ČÍSLACH Zahraničné sťahovanie 2018. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. May 2019. <https:// tinyurl.com/ybpeajew> Accessed: 22 March 2020.

229

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE In 2011, when the last census was conducted in Slovakia, the share of inhabitants with Slovak nationality decreased from 85% to 81%. The other 19% of the population of Slovakia belongs to different ethnic minority groups. The biggest minority community living on the territory of Slovakia is the Hungarian community. The proportion of the Hungarian nationality within Slovak society has had a downward trend in the last 15 years. The second biggest minority group is the Roma community. The following table shows the proportion of minorities living in Slovakia in the last 15 years:

Slovak

Hungarian

Romany

Czech, Moravian, Silesian

Ruthenian

Ukrainian

German

Polish

Other/ Unknown

2005

85,6

9,6

1,8

0,9

0,5

0,2

0,1

0,1

1,3

2006

85,5

9,5

1,9

0,9

0,5

0,2

0,1

0,1

1,3

2007

85,4

9,5

1,9

0,9

0,5

0,2

0,1

0,1

1,4

2008

85,3

9,5

1,9

0,9

0,4

0,2

0,1

0,1

1,5

2009

85,2

9,5

1,9

1,0

0,4

0,2

0,1

0,1

1,5

2010

85,2

9,4

2,0

1,0

0,4

0,1

0,1

0,1

1,5

2011

80,6

8,5

2,0

0,6

0,6

0,1

0,1

0,1

7,4

2012

80,6

8,5

2,0

0,6

0,6

0,1

0,1

0,1

7,4

2013

81,0

8,5

2,0

0,7

0,6

0,2

0,1

0,1

6,8

2014

81,1

8,4

2,0

0,7

0,6

0,2

0,1

0,1

6,7

2015

81,25

8,40

2,02

0,71

0,58

0,17

0,13

0,11

6,63

2016

81,35

8,37

2,03

0,72

0,57

0,18

0,13

0,12

6,53

2017

81,45

8,33

2,04

0,73

0,56

0,18

0,14

0,12

6,44

2018

81,55

8,29

2,05

0,74

0,55

0,19

0,14

0,12

6,36

2019

81,64

8,25

2,06

0,74

0,54

0,2

0,14

0,13

6,29

Table 3: Proportion of different ethnic groups in the population of Slovakia in %.230

Traditionally, almost 99% of the inhabitants of Slovakia hold Slovak citizenship: in 2016 and 2017 98,7% of inhabitants, while in 2018 and 2019 98,6% of inhabitants has had Slovak citizenship. The biggest group of inhabitants holding citizenship other than Slovak are people with Czech (12 500), Hungarian (9200), Romanian (5800) and Polish (5500) citizenship. In 2016 96,6%, in 2017 96,5%, in 2018 and 2019 96,4% of inhabitants of Slovakia were born on the territory of the country.231

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019.

230

MY V ČÍSLACH Zahraničné sťahovanie 2018.

231

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE SLOVAKIA FACT SHEET: Population (2019) – 5,457,873232 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.54233 Annual population growth rate (2019) – 0.14%234 GDP per capita (2019) – 19,344 USD235 Life expectancy (2018) – 77 years236

232 My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. March 2020. <https://slovak. statistics.sk/wps/portal/a3e2fc1a-108d-4085-8ac7-c11f1dd7dbcb/!ut/p/z1/rVTLctowFP2WLFgKXck2kpc2B EMgNMaYhzYdP4Pq2BBwofx9BUPTJjMIL6qFx7LPOdI994EFXmJRRQf5GtVyU0Vvar8Sne8-G3LXJQ4As3ow fAp7vhfYBEzAiwugH7xQxza9bm_6rQ_DWZfyYNyhAAQLzW-vc-V3PWdgsjEAH3sWDJ1BOLV9wwDHuPA_zu funMKQTaZk5Pve6MW68uHGcqAZX3NBHZ-YV74GIPT-zbHAIqnqbb3Gq028j9ZoX6Dtz7gF6vEmiyiRWQsO6wuTv9-iYyM5gmJEAGeIhO4hXiUMJQQkpM0ZWmcxGftbSJTvGqE_hILuGNDXXYUTAbdPvVC6xKL4_t-MJ 7PwZtTZZVBPJiEIUCfXfkagNCXit7LkDXLpcZsoS-VxdmvO9V4T0PcC1JoozgHea9lhDYP7j3A7B5AJSrYF3 il3GQ3q4GodB9kdsRhtdmValIEf4sNqEVJwhiK7chEZmYayGaMImaxOMk7eco5wQPAT1jIuGwfk7INbcYZG Ixxk5p2xzKM8-ihu-fu86uSjeo1klW-wctG2ooqf7y_C0e11qaqs181Xn70ltJBUVG34Cyorl7LQ5Wh_XYXHU5_ Gq0Fjc75atHnghvR2xY16sdP_hDKWcekxOQ2NdT7DX8aCWv9-V-zZ1uG51Vy4ySlRMX0cfqY99wJ8ha85sdZX i743nl4-A18mphi/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/ 233 Total Fertility Rate – Number of Children Per Woman. Eurostat. 19 February 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00199/default/table?lang=en> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

My v číslach. Pohyb obyvateľstva 2019. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

234

Hrubý domáci produkt vo 4. štvrťroku 2019. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. 6 March 2020. <https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/portal/ext/products/informationmessages/inf_sprava_detail/f3955779a07a-41f5-aa17-42b2e0a9f561/!ut/p/z1/tVJNU4MwFPwtHjiGPAg04C3taD9snamd2pKLEzB82EIoRLD_3tTx4 ozVejCXl8zb3bfJBnO8xbwSXZEJXahK7M054oOnJZ0Gw6HDAIZzAtPZ3ep-Mrp1x2sfP2KOeVLpWuc4UnErc tTuUFGlSOy0BWajmtKodZVEbd2I7mhB10q9MzUloe9TGiIBVCDPSX0khEOR58auBBGm_sA5yddJ8Yyji9Cb3_ xy04Yzi4Hh8w_IaMwmHp0DBPOxD1M2WT-ES0KAkU_ADxqR8UDPenAo3nSF7PG6Or3MHq_-eMUJ4Bnm RVzafVLaYNOAAqE08FwvHPiEnDJzm8VokRlZofNTGApvL9I21OLlcODMZKoqLd803v5HqGYOq2ISGIuNTGU jG_u1Mb8t17pury2woO97O1Mq20s7UaUF31Fy1Rp_X5G4LsuAHNEuXdwQj8dHsu_mjF1dvQNKmO19/dz/d5/ L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/> Accessed: 4 April 2020.

235

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) - Slovak Republic. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=SK> Acessed: 4 April 2020.

236

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE CZECHIA – IMMIGRATION TARGET COUNTRY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ÁGNES VASS

The total number of inhabitants of the Czech Republic was 10 693 939 at 31 December 2019.237 This means, that the population number rose by 44 139 in one year, which was the highest rise over the past 10 years in the country.238 In this regard, it is important to add, that due to the fact that the mortality was slightly higher than that of the births, the increase can be considered as the result of foreign migration to Czechia.

YEAR

Number of Inhabitants

2005

10234092

2006

10266646

2007

10322689

2008

10429692

2009

10491492

2010

10517247

2011

10496672

2012

10509286

2013

10510719

2014

10524783

2015

10542942

2016

10565284

2017

10589526

2018

10626430

2019

10693939

Table 1: Total number of Inhabitants of Czechia from 2005 until 2019.239

237 Statistiky – Obyvatelstvo. Czech Statistical Office. 5 February 2020. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/ obyvatelstvo_lide> Accessed: 5 April 2020.

Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

238

Česká republika od roku 1989 v číslech. Czech Statistical Office. 12 December 2019. <https://www.czso.cz/ csu/czso/ceska-republika-od-roku-1989-v-cislech-2018> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

239

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Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE Since the mid-1990s, there is an ongoing debate between demographers, whether the second demographic transition of the Czech society has been taking place in these years or not. This chapter is not aiming to decide this question, but it highlights, that the changes in demographic behaviour of the population of Czechia are most visible in the dataset of reproductive behaviour: analysing statistics we can witness the decline of the natural population growth and the decline of reproduction, too, as it does not stipulate the self-reproduction of the population.240 The demographic change in the 1990s manifested itself in a break with the previous trends in the family and fertility behaviour. The most significant change was visible in the rapidly declining fertility rate: in the ‘90s the total fertility rate plummeted from 1.89 to 1,13 children per woman, which is one of the lowest rates not only in Europe, but worldwide as well.241 The increase in this indicator was recorded only after 2005, and in 2019 it stands at 1,66 children per woman. While in 2005 the total fertility rate was 1,28 children per women, in 2010 this was 1,49 and in 2018, 1,71.242

Chart 1.: Total fertility rate between 1950 and 2018243

240 Vybrané demografické údaje v České republice. Česká republika od roku 1989 v číslech. Czech Statistical Office. 12 December 2019. <https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/91917748/32018119_0101. pdf/0644d54b-c584-4a0f-8257-487066abfac1?version=1.0> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

241 Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

242 Česká republika od roku 1989 v číslech. Czech Statistical Office. 12 December 2019. <https://www.czso.cz/ csu/czso/ceska-republika-od-roku-1989-v-cislech-2018> Accessed: 26 March 2020.

Total fertility rate, 1950 – 2018. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/total-fertilityrate-1950-2018> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

243

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE This phenomenon is accompanied by the postponement of childbearing and the rising of the mean age of mothers at first birth. While in 2014 the mean age of women at first childbirth was 29,9 years, in 2018 this increased up to 30,1 years.244 The ageing of the society is another phenomenon, showing the changing trends in the Czech society. Between 2000 and 2006 the number of people of post-productive age rose significantly, due to the fact, that people born in the 1940s reached their retirement age.245 In the last few years a relatively favourable development in the mortality rate and an increase of life expectancy has been also contributed to this trend. While the average age of the population of Czechia was 41,7 years in 2014, four years later this indicator was 42,3 years.246 Life expectancy has been also increasing in the last period: in 2014 this indicator for males was 75,7 years and for females 81,7 years, while in 2018 this was 76,1 years for men and 81,9 years for women.247 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

0-14

14,8

15,0

15,2

15,4

15,6

15,7

15,9

15-64

68,4

67,6

67,0

66,3

65,6

65

64,5

65+

16,8

17,4

17,8

18,3

18,8

19,2

19,6

Table 2.: Distribution of the population by age group in %.

As it was mentioned above, the increase of population can be considered as the result of immigration to the Czech Republic. In the last period, Czechia has become one of the most important immigration target countries in the region, what puts Czech demographic developments into a new perspective, as the country has traditionally been a country of emigration. While at the beginning of 1990s, the Czech Republic was mainly a transit country from the migration point of view, since the mid-1990s, the number of immigrants in Czechia has been gradually growing.248 Regarding the statistics, it is important to highlight, that in the 1990s, the Czech statistics registered only those who changed their permanent residence – due to this, the number of migrants annually was about 100 000 (as in 1970s).

After introducing a new system of migration registration after 2001, a significant increase

244 Mean age of women at birth of first child, 1950-2018. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/ czso/mean-age-of-women-at-birth-of-first-child-1950-2018> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2006. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/ czso/statistical-yearbook-of-the-czech-republic-2006-yakczvx0p9> Accessed: 30 March 2020.

245

Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

246

Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

247

Česká republika od roku 1989 v číslech. Cizinci trvale a dlouhodobě žijící v České republice (bez azylantů).

Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/91917748/32018119_0102.pdf/bde63d216fc5-4b9c-a3c5-4658736e2fa7?version=1.0> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

248

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE can be witnessed in the number of immigrants. As an example, while in 2001 the number of migrants was 13 000, in 2007 it raised to 104 000.249 The largest group of immigrants in the Czech Republic were Slovak citizens, but only until 1999. It is interesting to add, that in 1993 for instance, there were 12 900 immigrants registered in total, from which 7276 were from Slovakia. In the 2000s, the migration flow in the country was dominated mainly by those migrating from the territory of Ukraine. Other large migration groups are from Vietnam, Russia, Poland, Germany and Austria, but in the recent years the number of migrants from Moldova, Romania and Mongolia is also rising. As it is visible from the table below, approx.

40% of foreign migration to Czechia constitutes migrants from Ukraine.250 2015

2016

2017

2018

Total

464670

493441

524142

564345

From the EU 28

195499

208166

219708

232493

Slovakia

101589

107251

111804

116817

Poland

19840

20305

20669

21279

Germany

20464

21216

21261

21267

269171

285275

304434

331852

Ukraine

105614

109850

117061

131302

Vietnam

56900

58025

59761

61097

From non-EU countries

Despite other countries in the region, the Czech Republic has not become a significant emigration country after the regime change. Emigration has been replaced by the phenomenon of the temporary labour migration to the Western European countries, mainly to Germany and Austria. This phenomenon was the most significant in 1990s, when almost 1% of the domestic labour force found commuting jobs or seasonal work in Germany or in Austria. This trend, however, has changed significantly, as according to the OECD statistics, current Czech emigration into other EU member states appears to be one of the lowest within other Central and Eastern European states.251

Česká republika od roku 1989 v číslech. Cizinci trvale a dlouhodobě žijící v České republice (bez azylantů).

Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/91917748/32018119_0102.pdf/bde63d216fc5-4b9c-a3c5-4658736e2fa7?version=1.0> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

249

Markéta Seidlová: Czechia. Ukrainian migration in Czechia: Facts and Figures. In: Dusan Drbohlav, Marta Jaroszewicz, Markéta Seidlová, Dita Cermáková (eds.): Monitoring of Migration Data and Policy Changes Conducted in Ukraine, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia. Charles University, Faculty of Science. 2016. p. 72-96.

250

Country Notes: Czech Republic. OECD. <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/ international-migration-outlook-2014/czech-republic_migr_outlook-2014-13-en#page1> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE CZECHIA FACT SHEET: Population (2019) – 10,693,939 252 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.71253 Annual population growth rate (2019) – 0.22%254 GDP per capita (2019) – 23,113 USD255 Life expectancy (2018) – 79.1 years256

THE UNITED STATES – THE POLITICS OF VISIBILITY ZSOLT PÁLMAI

2020 marks an especially important year for civic life in the United States for two reasons: in November citizens will vote on who they want to be President, and between March and July the government will conduct the next decennial census. These two undertakings are closely interlinked, with political decisionmakers having sway over how residents are counted and the collected data directly influencing the makeup of Congress and the allocation of government resources. The below piece will look at a similarly interlinked set of recent developments that have become the subject of much attention due to the abovementioned factors: undocumented residents, the US Hispanic population, and the Trump administration’s most notable response to the situation vis-á-vis the census.

While it may seem counterintuitive at first, it makes sense to touch upon these in reverse order. In March 2018 the US Census Bureau, under pressure from the Department of Commerce, announced that it was planning to add the following question to the 2020 census: “Is this person a citizen of the United States?” The official overseeing the Bureau argued that the move would be a step toward combating voter discrimination, as required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. We will return to the matter later, but what is important

Statistiky – Obyvatelstvo. Czech Statistical Office. 5 February 2020. <https://www.czso.cz/csu/czso/ obyvatelstvo_lide> Accessed: 5 April 2020.

252

253 Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

254 Czech Republic (Czechia). < https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/czech-republic-population/> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

GDP improves in Czech Republic. <https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/czech-republic> Accessed: 23 March 2020

255

Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic – 2019. Czech Statistical Office. <https://www.czso.cz/ documents/10180/92010906/32019819.pdf/6bf03523-f75f-4335-97db-755c1c466337?version=1.6> Accesssed: 23 March 2020.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE to know at this point is that, in the wake of a series of criticisms and legal challenges, the question was ultimately kept off the census, as the Supreme Court ruled five to four that its proponents had failed to demonstrate that they were indeed motivated by a desire to uphold the law. What, then, could have been the real reason for the Trump administration’s desire to include the question?

But first, some relevant context. The United State Census Bureau estimates that the United States’ population is at 329,412,198 as of the writing of this article, amounting to a roughly 8% increase from the 2010 numbers.257 Over 60 million (18.3% by a recent estimate) of them are of Hispanic or Latino origin, making them the second largest ethnic group in the nation after non-Hispanic whites (60.4%), and ahead of African Americans (13.4%).258 These changes are no longer driven primarily by immigration, but birth rates among the resident population (the total fertility rate among Hispanic women is 2.0, putting them 0.2 and 0.3 ahead of African American and white women, respectively), as a result of which the share of non-Hispanic whites among those aged 18 or younger is down to 50%, while among those aged 65 or older it is 76%.259 One oft-cited consequence is that 2020 will mark the first election where Hispanic voters will constitute the largest non-white voting bloc, providing an estimated 13% of eligible voters, or some 32 million people (with 30 million African Americans representing the second largest group, and 11 million Asians the third).260 Moving on to illegal immigration, it is important to begin by noting that Hispanics and undocumented immigrants are by no means interchangeable groups—but the overlap is nevertheless considerable. It was only recently, in 2017, that experts put the share of people of Mexican origin below 50% of the total number of illegal immigrants, or 4.9 million out of a total of around 10.5 million (down from a peak of roughly 12.2 million in 2007), while another 1.9 were estimated to have arrived from Central America (mainly El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala).261 Together that is nearly two-thirds of all undocumented residents. 57%of them live in just six states, led by California and Texas (with around 2 and 1.6 million undocumented residents respectively), and followed by Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois—a detail that will prove crucial in understanding the administration’s motivation behind the aforementioned census question.262

U.S. and World Population Clock. United States Census Bureau. <https://www.census.gov/popclock/> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

257

258 QuickFacts. United States Census RHI725218> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Bureau.

< https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/

259 What the 2020 US Census Will Tell Us about a Changing America. PRB. 12 June 2019. <https://www.prb. org/what-the-2020-u-s-census-will-tell-us-about-a-changing-america/> Accessed: 12 March 2020

Anthony Cilluffo—Richard Fry: An early look at the 2020 electorate. Pew Research Center. 30 January 2019. <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/an-early-look-at-the-2020-electorate/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

260

Jeffrey S. Passel—D’Vera Cohn: Mexicans decline to less than half the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population for the first time. Pew Research Center. 12 June 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorized-immigrant-population-2017/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

261

Unauthorized immigrant population trends for states, birth countries and regions. Pew Research Center. 12 June 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/12/us-unauthorized-immigrantpopulation-2017/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

262

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

Undocumented Immigrants in the United States by size and localization Source: Statista/Pew Research Center

Two-thirds of illegals are estimated to have lived in the country for at least 10 years—which should already begin to undermine anti-immigration rhetoric focused on border security—and another important yet often overlooked fact is that in the last 10 years the nature of illegal immigration has largely been the result not of border-crossings but visa overstays, the latter outnumbering the former almost two to one.263 They make up a non-negligible part of the US workforce, accounting for 4.6% of it (7.6 million people, a decline since a peak of 8.2 in 2007)264, and pay payroll and sales tax, while relying on government benefits far less than their legal

Robert Warren: US Undocumented Population Continued to Fall from 2016 to 2017, and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive Year. Center for Migration Studies. <https:// cmsny.org/publications/essay-2017-undocumented-and-overstays/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

263

Jeffrey S. Passel—D’Vera Cohn. Unauthorized immigrant workforce is smaller, but with more women. Pew Research Center. 27 November 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2018/11/27/unauthorizedimmigrant-workforce-is-smaller-but-with-more-women/> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

264

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE counterparts, complicating the debate over the costs and benefits of their presence. One controversy that previously arose regarding the existing undocumented population under the Trump presidency concerned the people protected from potential deportation by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). There are currently 690,000 individuals in DACA, with no further applications accepted.265 So why was a census question purportedly aimed at giving us more accurate data about undocumented US residents problematic? The answer lies in the aforementioned relationship between the census and the allocation of Congressional seats and government resources: in short, visibility matters a great deal.

The question was in fact included in an earlier American Community Survey (ACS), which is also conducted by the Census Bureau and allows for smaller-scale updates to the decennial census by gathering similar information on a minor level, from 3.5 million households every year.

When the citizenship question was made a part of the 2017 ACS, 1 in 12 Hispanic respondents refused to answer (a rate much higher than in the case of whites), which, according to a study, could have translated to an undercount of 6 million Hispanic residents in this year’s census.266 Fears regarding the census in undocumented Hispanic communities already materialized in 2010, when estimated 400 thousand Hispanic children failed to be counted, and modern polling reveals that such underlying fears linger even in the wake of the administration’s abandoning of the citizenship question, with about three-quarters of Hispanic US residents reportedly worried that their census information could be used against them.267 Where a substantial undercount would likely have occurred illuminates the political calculation behind the push to include the question: 28% of all unanswered ACS questions were in California, which is both the most populous US state and a stronghold for the Democratic Party. Since states are assigned congressional seats based on their populations, an undercount of similar proportions could result in California losing two of its 53 seats in the House of Representatives, giving the state—and others with high undocumented populations, most of which also lean Democrat—less overall weight in elections and the federal legislature. It would have also prevented underenumerated sections of society from having access to census-based government assistance that their size would normally warrant, and would have kept them at least partially invisible to decisionmakers (be they in government or business) whose job involves considering the needs of various communities.268 Moreover, it would have also laid the groundwork for changing

Warren

265

Matthew A. Baum et al.: Estimating the Effect of Asking About Citizenship on the US Census. Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy. 21 March 2019. <https://web.archive. org/web/20200117195132/https://shorensteincenter.org/estimating-effect-asking-citizenship-u-s-census/> Accessed: 17 March 2020.

266

Arturo Vargas—Lizette Escobedo: Countdown to Census 2020: New Data on Latino Perceptions. NALEO Educational Fund. 10 February 2020. <https://naleo.org/COMMS/PRA/NEF%20Census%202020%20_2_10_ FINAL.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

267

William H. Frey: America wins as Trump abandons the citizenship question from the 2020 census. The Brookings Institution. < https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/07/12/america-wins-trumpabandons-the-citizenship-question-from-2020-census/> Accessed: 10 March 2020.

268

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE existing redistricting rules to consider only citizens as opposed to the total population, which, combined with the previously mentioned consequences, would have been “advantageous to Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites”, according to a Republican operative whose work directly influenced the Commerce Department’s move to include the question.269 The highest possible degree of accuracy is clearly desirable in a census and, in light of the above, the omission of the citizenship question from the upcoming US survey appears to be conducive to this aim. Indeed, the Census Bureau’s long-standing position has been that cross-referencing records would provide more accurate data on citizenship than a direct question. Politics aside, this development should be seen as positive by all observers of the–ever-increasingly diverse—United States.

USA FACT SHEET: Population (2020) – 329,412,198270 Fertility rate children/woman (2017) – 1.766271 Annual population growth rate (2018) – 0.6%272 GDP per capita (2018) – 62,794 USD273 Life expectancy (2019) – 78.5 years274

Andrew Prokop: Trump’s census citizenship question fiasco, explained. Vox. 11 July 2019. <https://www.vox. com/2019/7/11/20689015/census-citizenship-question-trump-executive-order> Accessed: 10 March 2020.

269

US Census Bureau

270

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) - United States. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=US> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

271

272 Population growth (annual %). World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.pop.grow> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

273 GDP per capita (current US$) - United States. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=US> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) - United States. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=US> Accessed: 25 March 2020.

274

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN JAPAN EMESE SCHWARCZ

The Japanese “demographic time bomb” has been talked about ever since the turn of the century, if not earlier. Ageing population, low fertility rate, depopulation, economic struggles and many other demography-related dangers are threatening the island country, most of which are heritages of the last century. This short analysis will try to take account of the current challenges that the Japanese will have to address – the sooner the better.

We should start with the ageing-problem. It is not a secret, that East Asian countries, especially Japan, South Korea, and China have been severely affected by rapidly ageing societies, with other Southeast Asian countries following them in the same fashion. If we take a look at the numbers in Japan, the picture is grim. The population growth rate is at -0.2%, while life expectancy at birth is as high as 81.1 years for men and 87.3 for women.275 The health care sector is of exceptionally high quality in Japan, and due to traditional dietary customs and lifestyle, people are living longer – so long actually, that the government had to decrease the amount of money given by the state as congratulation to those turning 100 years old. In the same manner, commemorative silver sake cups given to these supposedly special individuals are also containing less and less silver – indicating the increasing number of centennials.276 Right now we are stepping into the period, where the second generation of post-war baby boomers are reaching the age of retirement. Things are getting real problematic, now that the economically active mass of people is insufficient in size to provide enough tax revenue for the government to keep the pension and health care system up and running for the two generations of post-war baby boomers. Especially considering that the current fertility rate is 1.43 – not exactly a number pointing to a third baby boom.

Caring for this many people – with 27,58% of the population being above 65 years old in 2018 – is also becoming a problem.277 With not enough people populating the medical care sector, the government is aiming at securing foreign medical professionals by setting up trainee programmes. An unsuccessful attempt was already launched in 2008, partnering up with the Philippines and Indonesia, whereby approximately 1000 nurses and caregivers were invited to Japan to work for 2-5 years. Of course, the applicants had to go through rigorous exams, both regarding their medical knowledge and Japanese language. These exams, mainly the language part, proved to be disproportionately hard, while some of the employers that took the qualified applicants in Japan, did not let them engage in tasks they were examined and trained for. Many of the applicants were not even able to secure

Japan. OECD. <https://bit.ly/344p8MP> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

275

Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s. Wiley-Blackwell, second edition. 2012.

276

Japan: Age distribution from 2008 to 2018. Statista. <https://bit.ly/3bOglBk> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

277

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE contracts due to the rampant economic crisis that birthed a shortage in jobs in the first place. While the initial programme was not as successful, the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement ensures further opportunities for filippino health care professionals to work in Japan. The problem continues to be – as in many other instances – the language requirements and the trust between the hosts and the foreign professionals.278 Language-related problems are not limited to foreign caregivers. Several attempts were made during the 1990s and 2000s to attract foreign workers to Japan, one of which was constructed to make them stay as well. This programme was targeting the Japanese minority in Brazil, offering them a preferential working visa system, and encouraging them to settle in Japan with their families. The idea was that these Japanese descendant Brazilians will be compatible with the Japanese locals due to their ancestry, and therefore they can assimilate easier. What the concept owners were not aware of is that these workers were brought up in, and were socially adapted to Brazil, with a culture widely different from that of the island country, which made assimilation nearly impossible. Language was once again a major obstacle, and the Japanese government made no attempts to establish schools for the arriving children, let alone language schools for the foreign workers. This programme, however, may have inspired the current administration to step up its preferential visa-game.

In April 2019, Japan implemented a new visa system that allows blue-collar workers from 14 different sectors to work in Japan for 5-10 years.279 Naturally, health care professionals are included: the government is prepared to welcome approximately 60,000 people in the medical field.280 A big step towards alleviating the burden on the Japanese workforce – but as to judge how sustainable the system will be, time has to pass.

However, Japan should not be fast to turn its eyes abroad, as a surplus workforce is available at home, but left unused. According to OECD data, for men, 84.3% of the economically active population was employed in 2019, while for women, the number is 71%.281 Not necessarily a bad rate, but it is important to note, that the OECD estimates do not consider different kinds of employment schemes, which are crucial for understanding Japan’s workforce illness. The general understanding is that a major chunk of economically active women is working in non-regular employments schemes. In December 2019, more than 49% of female workers were employed in non-regular jobs.282 Non-regular employment is a collective term for part-time, temporary and contract jobs. Usually these types of employments only allow employees to work a maximum of 35 hours per week, usually in industries such as a.) accommodation and food; b.) retail; c.) service industry; d.) medical

278 Ronron Calunsod: Japan’s health care sector still a magnet for Filipinos. The Japan Times. 17 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/3dY0stI> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

Emese Schwarcz: Making Sense of Japan’s New Immigration Policy. The Diplomat. 30 November 2018. <https://bit.ly/2UL3km7> Accessed: 6 April 2020 279

Keizo Yamawaki: Is Japan becoming a country of immigration? The Japan Times. 26 June 2019. <https:// bit.ly/3e1duqj> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

280

Employment rate - Japan. OECD. < https://bit.ly/3emIq4G> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

281

Labour Force Survey December 2019. Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

2020. <https://bit.ly/3dYQFnf> Accessed: 7 April 2020.

282

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE field.283 These employees are provided with lower wages, and the jobs come without social security or benefits. So why would women choose to work part-time? It is not always a choice for them really.

The reasons are intertwined with the reasons for the low fertility rate. Women in Japan tend to gravitate towards either single life, or childless life, because it is very hard for a woman to get her job back or to re-enter the job market after giving birth. Even if a mother can keep her job, most workplaces do not support flexible work hours or family-friendly measures. Childcare facilities are very scarce in metropolitan areas (Tōkyō has the lowest fertility rate in the country), and they usually have long waiting lists and very rigorous rules: mothers who are employed with stable incomes are preferred, but mothers usually cannot get employed until they find a day-care spot for their children.284 We can see that this oxymoron might be the strongest force that both lowers fertility rate and pushes mothers to turn to non-regular employment, which offers flexible and limited work hours. Although Prime Minister Abe Shinzō tried to boost female employment rate with his ‘Womenomics’ policy, the result – as we can see from the 2019 data – is not yet completely convincing.

Lot more day-care facilities are needed with flexible rules, and more companies must apply family-friendly policies, so that fathers can take part in the child rearing as well.

Unfortunately, as much work has to be done with female employment, and with the labour force in general, Japan’s demographic time bomb is a little bit more complicated than this. The low fertility rate and the changing demographic tree has already started to transform social norms and values in Japanese society: younger people have less and less inclination not only to bear children, but to marry or date altogether. The demanding work conditions, such as extremelong working hours and involuntary after-work activities (compulsory company parties and drinking events) make it nearly impossible to live a social life, which sets a worrying tendency.

According to 2015 government data, 47% of the male population aged between 15-49, and 42% of the female population was never married.285 This trend is bound to change family patterns and social cohesion, which might be even harder to cure in the long term.

Part of this phenomenon involves increasing depopulation as well. While the bombings and airstrikes during World War II pushed the population to the suburbs and less populated areas, the urbanizational trend strengthened considerably in the latter half of the Shōwa Era (1926–1989). Finding jobs and elevating the existential level – which is easier to do in metropolitan areas – is a main priority currently as well. The problem with domestic migration is not only that these metropolitan areas are now suffering of extreme population density, but also the fact that rural areas are being depopulated, leaving behind only the substantial amount of elderly people. This causes problems with many sectors that Japan relies upon heavily: fishery, agriculture, domestic tourism are all under pressure to keep themselves

Yutaka Asao: Overview of Non-regular Employment in Japan. The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. 2011. <https://bit.ly/2Xh1wTC> Accessed: 7 April 2020.

283

Kingston, 2012.

284

Japan Statistical Yearbook 2019. Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. <https://bit.ly/2UTxJPa> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

285

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE afloat. Natural disasters, such as the 2011 Tōhoku Triple Disaster or the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquakes are also contributing to this factor, let alone the economic burden Japan has to deal with after these unfortunate events. Even though the Fukushima Dai Ichi reactor and its vicinity is still dangerous, and many people are still in dire situations due to the disaster, the government is trying to revitalize the depopulated and neglected Tōhoku region (Japan’s Northeast) by channeling funds into tourism. According to the Reconstruction Agency of Japan, most of the infrastructure has been recovered, and efforts are made to revitalize businesses, and to rebuild homes.286 However, the question is always money. The shrinking labour force, declining fertility, depopulation, and national disasters will most likely prompt the government to raise taxes, to make up for the missing revenue. In the past couple of years, cabinet talks have been ongoing about raising the age of retirement to the age of 70.287 In October 2019, the consumption tax was raised from 8% to 10%, which inversely pushed down the rate of consumption, and the currently raging COVID-19 pandemic will surely make it even harder for the Abe administration to deal with the menacing demographic time bomb of Japan.

JAPAN FACT SHEET: Population (2019) – 126,167,000288 Fertility rate children/woman (2017) – 1.43289 Annual population growth rate (2018) – -0.203%290 GDP per capita (2019) – 40,313 USD291 Life expectancy (2019) – 84.5 years292

Efforts for Reconstruction of Tohoku. Reconstruction Agency. 2019. < https://bit.ly/2XiFwb9 > Accessed: 8 April 2020.

286

Japan to amend laws to help elderly work until 70. The Japan Times. 4 February 2020. <https://bit. ly/2XfyzHT> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

287

Jinkō suikei – 2020 nen (Reiwa ninen) sangatsuhō – Sōmushō tōkeikyoku hōmu pēji. 2020. <https://bit. ly/2Jr9IZw > Accessed: 1 April 2020.

288

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Japan. World Bank. <https://bit.ly/2wSI70C> Accessed: 1 April 2020.

289

Population growth (annual %) – Japan. World Bank. <https://bit.ly/2WZ6G6M> Accessed: 1 April 2020.

290

Japan GDP per Capita. CEIC Data. <https://bit.ly/3dLw7i4> Accessed: 1 April 2020.

291

Japan Life Expectancy 1950-2020. Macrotrends. < https://bit.ly/3bEAkCg > Accessed: 1 April 2020.

292

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 2020 – CHINA VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP

As of today, the People’s Republic of China is still the most populous country in the world with roughly 1.4 billion citizens which represents about 18.5% of the global population.

However, China’s population is expected to peak at 1.46 billion and will be taken over by India probably by the end of this decade.293 There is an open debate about when it will reach its peak but most experts agree that China’s population will start shrinking gradually in the near future between 2020 and 2030—if it hasn’t already.294 In the past forty years huge changes have taken place in China’s demographic scene as the country’s fertility rate shifted from high to low. China’s fertility rate has dropped below replacement level in the early 1990s and the population growth rate has reached only about 0.5% over the past decades mainly as a consequence of the government’s birth control measures and other important socioeconomic changes.295 In the seventies, when China first started to introduce family planning policies, the birth rate was about 36 per thousand,296 but in 2019 it fell to 10.48 per thousand which was the lowest in 70 years.297 Concerned by the excessive growth of the population the Chinese government decided to introduce population policies in the past four decades, including limitation on the number of children couples could have. The “Later, Longer, Fewer” campaign298 was launched in the early seventies. Then, the family planning program, that is often referred to as the “one-child policy,” was officially introduced in 1979 and had a huge impact on the Chinese population in terms of size and gender balance in addition to the country’s socioeconomic development. Limiting the population growth rate was necessary in order to ease the pressure on natural resources and on the environment, facilitate faster economic development as well as complement the reform and opening-up policy.299 Families following the birth control policies were rewarded through financial or other means, but

David E. Bloom: Population 2020: Demographic can be a potent driver of the pace and process of economic development. Finance and Development. March 2020. < https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/03/ pdf/changing-demographics-and-economic-growth-bloom.pdf> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

293

Euan McKirdy: China faces ‚unstoppable’ population decline by mid-century. CNN. Study. 8 January 2019. <https:// edition.cnn.com/2019/01/07/asia/china-population-decline-study-intl/index.html> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

294

295 Population growth in China from 2000 to 2017. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/270129/ population-growth-in-china/> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

China—Crude birth rate. Knoema. <https://knoema.com/atlas/China/Birth-rate> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

296

BBC: Chinese birth rate falls to lowest in seven decades. BBC. 17 January 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-china-51145251> Accessed: 2 April 2020.

297

298 The campaign encouraged later marriage, longer intervals between children, and fewer children, using a variety of birth control means.

The reform and opening-up policy of China started in 1978 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.

299

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE those couples who couldn’t conform these rules faced different punishments, ranging from fines or being expelled from the Chinese Communist Party, even to forced sterilization or abortion.300 The national birth control policy was relaxed in 2016 and families generally were allowed—and even encouraged—to have two children, however the “two-child policy” did not achieve the desired outcome as there has only been a slight increase in the number of births in 2016 and 2017.301 As a result, the Chinese government now seems to be open to relax the policy even further—indicated by the recently reformed Civil Code—but it is yet to abolish it completely.302 As a result of the declining fertility rate, the extending lifespan and the decrease in the number of children per family China is experiencing a major challenge: the rapid ageing of its society, which the country has already reached the threshold of in 2000.303 The number of people aged 60 or older has increased four times faster than all the other age groups combined and it will continue to grow reaching more than 30% of Chinese population by 2030.304 Consequently, the shrinking number of people in the labour force and the imbalanced proportion of active-inactive workers are putting a serious pressure on the country’s economic development which has benefited from China’s fortunate demographic structure.

The strict birth control measures adopted by the government along with Chinese families’ traditional preference for sons over daughters have also caused a distorted ratio of males to females in the population, which was first recorded in the eighties and still persists today. In 2018 the sex ratio ranged at about 114 males to 100 females in the youngest (0-4) age group.305 This also means that there are not enough women to sustain the country’s population level— in spite of the relaxed family planning policy—as Chinese women born during “the one-child policy” are currently reaching or have already passed the peak of their fertility.

Recent demographic changes in China, including the ageing of its society, do not just boil down to the central government’s family planning policies as the underlying reasons are more complex. In the past few decades the country’s economic development has brought about rapid modernisation, urbanisation and improvement in living standards that left a mark on the fabric of society. A few generations have already grown up under the birth control policy, for whom nuclear families have become a norm. Fewer couples want to have more than one child and more than half of the families with one child do not wish to have

300 China’s two-child policy is having unintended consequences. The Diplomat. 26 July 2018. <https:// www.economist.com/china/2018/07/26/chinas-two-child-policy-is-having-unintended-consequences> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

301 Number of births in China from 2009 to 2019. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/250650/ number-of-births-in-china/> Accessed: 6 April 2020.

South China Morning Post: China sends further signal on end to family size limits with revised civil code. South China Morning Post. 28 August 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/ article/2161662/china-sends-further-signal-end-family-size-limits> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

302

Dr Wei Zhang: Ageing China: Changes and Challenges. BBC. 20 September 2012. <https://www.bbc.com/ news/world-asia-china-19572056> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

303

China country assessment report on ageing and health. World Health Organization. 2015. 1.

304

Female/male sex ratio in China 1953-2018. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/251102/sexratio-in-china/> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

305

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE a second, which they tend to justify with financial considerations—the younger generation channels its energies into building their careers and achieving a better standard of living.306 Even though, there is still room for economic growth—in which China’s demographic structure plays an important part—the rapid ageing of its population is expected to create social and economic tensions and could cause an even greater burden on the country’s shrinking labour force.307 As the number of workers declines, the government could struggle to provide public goods for a population that is living longer and growing older.

A decrease in the working-age population could also slow consumption and thus have a negative impact on the economy in China and beyond. It will become of uttermost importance for the government to improve its social care, public health care and the pension system for the growing inactive population. These tasks will have to be tackled in a challenging economic environment, when the Chinese leadership is trying to shift the economy’s structure while trying to avoid the loss of its competitiveness or let the GDP growth slow down too much.

CHINA FACT SHEET: Population (2019) – 1400,05 million308 Fertility rate children/woman (2017) – 1.683309 Annual population growth rate (2018) – 0.456310 GDP per capita (2018) – 9770,847 USD311 Life expectancy (2017) – 76.47312

306 Su Yun: China’s falling birth rate threatens economic growth. Financial Times. 19 January 2020. https:// www.ft.com/content/a245eef4-3a5e-11ea-a01a-bae547046735> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

307 Jeff Desjardins: This animation shows China and India’s population are ageing at different rates. World Economic Forum. 30 January 2020. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/demographics-china-indiadiverging/> Accessed: 3 April 2020.

308 Total population of China. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263765/total-population-ofchina/ > Accessed: 2 April 2020.

Fertility rate, total (births per women) – China. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=CN> Accessed: 2 April 2020.

309

310 Population growth (annual %) – China. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP. GROW?locations=CN> Accessed: 2 April 2020.

311 GDP per capita (current US$) – China. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD?locations=CN> Accessed: 2 April 2020.

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) – China. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=CN> Accessed: 2 April 2020.

312

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE SOUTH KOREA – THE COUNTRY WITH THE LOWEST FERTILITY RATE IN THE WORLD DR BALÁZS HAMAR

South Korea or with its official name The Republic of Korea is the fourth largest economy in Asia and the 15th largest in the world.313 It is one of the few countries that has successfully transformed itself from a low-income to a high-income economy. Yet, Korea is struggling since years with a demographic problem which is not unique to this country in the region.

The current population of the Republic of Korea is 51.63 million.314 The land size of the Korean Peninsula comes to about 221.000km2 , while that of South Korea bordered by the military demarcation line comes to 100.300km2 , accounting for 45.4% of the entire peninsula. The size of South Korea is similar to that of Hungary, Portugal or Iceland, accounting for 0.07% of global land mass.315 The total fertility rate recorded in 2018 was 0.98, which hit a new record low after the first-time production of birth statistics in 1970.316 At 1.05 in 2017, it was already the lowest among members of the OECD, far below Japan’s 1.43, France’s 1.86, and Israel’s 3.11.317 The most recent official statistics for 2019 is not out yet, but the number of babies born per month were declining every month. In December it was -7.2% on a year-onyear basis.318 The country’s fertility rate fell to 0.88 between July and September which is the lowest quarterly reading on record in South Korea.319 Therefore, we can expect that South Korea will set again a new record as having an even lower fertility rate

The World Bank in Republic of Korea. World Bank. 19 April 2018. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/korea/ overview> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

313

314 2018 Population and Housing Census. Statistics Korea. 29 August 2019. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/ pressReleases/1/index.board?bmode=read&aSeq=378503> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

315 Explore Korea through Statistics 2018. Statistics Korea. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/news/3/index.board?bmode=download&bSeq=&aSeq=372131&ord=2> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

Final Results of Birth Statistics in 2018. Statistics Korea. 28 August 2019. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/1/index.board?bmode=read&bSeq=&aSeq=378026&pageNo=2&rowNum=10&navCount=10&currPg=&searchInfo=&sTarget=title&sTxt> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

316

Jiyeun Lee: Korea Baby Bust Pushes World’s Lowest Birth Rate Even Lower. Bloomberg. 28 August 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-28/korea-baby-bust-pushes-world-s-lowest-birth-rate-even-lower> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

317

Vital Statistics in December 2019. Statistics Korea. 26 February 2020. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/1/index.board?bmode=read&bSeq=&aSeq=381022&pageNo=1&rowNum=10&navCount=10&currPg=&searchInfo=&sTarget=title&sTxt=> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

318

Sam Kim: South Korea Set to Break Own Record on World’s Lowest Birth Rate. Bloomberg. 27 November 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-27/south-korea-set-to-break-own-record-onworld-s-lowest-birth-rate> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

319

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE than in the previous year. On top of this in November 2019 South Korea was reporting the first-ever natural population decline, as death outpaced births and was set on path to register first annual reduction last year.320 BUT WHY IS SOUTH KOREA’S BIRTH RATE SO LOW? After the Korean War (1950-1953), the population remained predominantly rural and agricultural. The fertility rate exceeded six children per woman. In 1962, the government began its national family planning campaign to reduce women’s unwanted births through a program of information, basic maternal and child health services, and the provision of family planning supplies and services. The program was seen as essential if the goals of economic growth and modernization were to be achieved. Overall, the public responded well to the idea of a “small and prosperous family.” By 1970, the fertility rate had fallen to 4.5 against a background of rapid industrialization and the waning of the country’s largely agrarian character. 321 The titles of the propaganda posters to disseminate this idea, put on the streets and public places were: “Sons or daughters, let’s have two children and raise them well”; “Even two children per family are too many for our crowded country”; “One family, full of love. One child, full of health”; ”Korea’s population has already exceeded 40 million”; “Overpopulation is everyone’s responsibility” 322 323. As a result of this policy and the socioeconomic changes the fertility rate was down to 1.74 by 1984.

It wasn’t until the beginning of the 2000’s that the government started to worry about the low fertility rates. In 2002, the National Pension Institute reported that the pension fund would soon be wiped out because of a decline in the working age population visà-vis the number of retirees. The government also realized that the number of women of childbearing age was declining and that the trend would only accelerate. In 2005, an advisory committee to South Korea’s president was formed and a law passed to provide the basic legal framework for a new pro-natalist policy. The Saero-Maji (“new beginning”) Plan for the 2006-2010 period included provisions to provide a more favourable environment for childbearing. The plan contained the following measures: tax incentives, priority for the purchase of a new apartment, support for child care including a 30% increase in facilities, childcare facilities at work, support for education, and assistance to infertile couples. In June 2006, the government announced the Vision 2020 Plan to raise fertility and prepare for a society with extreme aging. 324 In 2019 South Korea was one of the world’s fastest-aging nations. Between 2006 and 2018, the government spent $198.22 billion on benefits for families and subsidies for new-

320 Yang Yeon-ho-Cho Jeehyun: S. Korea’s death tally outnumbers birth in Nov, set to record first thinning this year.

Pulse News. 30 January 2020. <https://pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2020&no=97238> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

321 C. Haub: Did South Korea’s Population Policy Work Too Well? PRB. 27 March 2010. <https://www.prb. org/koreafertility/> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

Learning From Korean Family Planning Advertisements of the 1960s-1980s. The Grand Narrative. 16 February 2012. <https://thegrandnarrative.com/2012/02/16/korean-family-planning/> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

322

<https://blog.naver.com/hyouncho/50042586124> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

323

C. Haub

324

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE born children325 to reverse the falling trend, but so far they had little success, which survey after survey blames on rising home prices326 and shrinking job stability among other factors.327 In 2018, a majority of South Koreans aged 20 to 44 were single, according to the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHSA). Among those who were not dating, 51% of men and 64% of women said they were choosing to remain single.328 The reasons answered by the ever-married women for wanting no children of their own were “no hope for future society”, “burden for education of child”, “incompatibility between work and life”, etc.

In Korea the role of the women in a traditional family is very hard. A girl after the marriage will be part of her husband’s family. Although this tradition is diminishing, it is still there. The government understood this problem, and at the end of 2018, South Korea announced plans to remove some of the disincentives for employing women, allowing both parents to take parental leave at the same time and extending paid paternal leave. Employers also get incentives to allow either of the parents to work fewer hours. 329 These are efforts on gender equality, which were missing very much until now.

The latest articles present the opinion, that the problem of the birth dearth in South Korea is deeper than the one caused by the coronavirus.330 South Korea, has a deeper concern: Its culture no longer supports the formation of families and the virtue of having children. Many women choose not to marry and not to have children. They have their own movement called #NoMarriage with their own YouTube channels.331 Already a 2014 study commissioned by the national legislature concluded that South Koreans could face natural extinction by 2750 if the birth rate was maintained at 1.19 children per woman – assuming no reunification with North Korea or significant inflow of migrants will happen.332 There is another side of the coin. Just remember, South Korea has almost the same size of territory as Hungary, but its population is five times more(!). As we described in this

Joori Roh: Not a baby factory: South Korea tries to fix demographic crisis with more gender equality.

Reuters. 4 January 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-economy-birthrate-analysis/nota-baby-factory-south-korea-tries-to-fix-demographic-crisis-with-more-gender-equality-idUSKCN1OY023> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

325

Byoun, Soo-Jung: The Relationship between Young Koreans’ Marriage Intention and Housing Characteristics. Kihasa – Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 31 July 2019. <https://www.kihasa.re.kr/english/ publications/eng_research/view.do?pageIndex=3&keyField=&key=&menuId=68&tid=34&bid=30&division=&ano=1119> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

326

Sam Kim

327

Lee, So-Young: The 2018 National Survey on Fertility and Family Health and Welfare. Kihasa – Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 17 April 2019. <https://www.kihasa.re.kr/english/publications/eng_research/view. do?pageIndex=4&keyField=&key=&menuId=68&tid=34&bid=30&division=&ano=1104> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

328

Roh

329

Darrow Miller: The birth dearth. World. March 2028 2020. <https://world.wng.org/content/the_birth_ dearth> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

330

Yasmin Jeffery: #NoMarriage movement sees South Korean women reject Government pressures to marry and have kids. ABC Australia. August 1 2019. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-01/nomarriage-movement-south-korea-women-reject-marriage-kids/11367488> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

331

Elena Holodny: South Korean’s could be ’extinct’ by 2750. Business Insider. June 19 2015. <https://amp. businessinsider.com/south-koreans-could-be-extinct-by-2750-2015-6?fbclid=IwAR3W4-pwNt528lWulk_ iT1X0vRbk1cPxYepk21eBNPjliHCtIxwL8XbrRNg> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

332

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE article, in the 1960s and 70s, South Korea experienced one of the fastest fertility declines in the world, halving the number of children born per woman from over 6 to less than 3 in just 18 years. In large part, this was due to early government recognition that fertility reduction is a component of development, a strategy that generated rapid economic and social development. Jenna Dodson, associate researcher in the Biological and Environmental Sciences Department at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden has the opinion, that with the right policies, South Korea can take advantage of below replacement fertility as a springboard for social change, biodiversity conservation, and living in balance with nature.333

SOUTH KOREA FACT SHEET: Population (2018) – 51.63 million.334 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 0.98335 Annual population growth rate (2018) – 0.3%336 GDP per capita (2018) – 31,362.8 USD337 Life expectancy (2018) – 82.7 years338

333 Jenna Dodson: Low fertility in South Korea: a springboard for social change and conservation. The Overpopulation Project. May 2 2019. <https://overpopulation-project.com/low-fertility-in-south-korea-a-springboard-for-social-change-and-conservation/> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

2018 Population and Housing Census.

334

Final Results of Birth Statistics in 2018.

335

336 Population growth (annual %). World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=KR&display=graph> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

GDP per capita (current US$). World Bank. <https://data.worldba.nk.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. CD?end=1960&locations=KR-GH-JP&start=1960&view=bar> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

337

Life Tables for Korea, 2018. Statistics Korea. 4 December 2019. <http://kostat.go.kr/portal/eng/pressReleases/8/1/index.board?bmode=read&bSeq=&aSeq=380555&pageNo=1&rowNum=10&navCount=10&currPg=&searchInfo=&sTarget=title&sTxt=> Accessed: 8 April 2020.

338

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE ISRAELI DEMOGRAPHY – A CASE STUDY OF A HIGH FERTILITY RATE IN A DEVELOPED SOCIETY ZSOLT CSEPREGI

Israel is a country that due to national, religious and security reasons has been obsessed with its demographic structure since its birth in 1948. The exact number, make up and distribution of its population is an existential issue for the Jewish state while it also presents an important case study for sustainable demography, as it is the only OECD country possessing a fertility rate higher than 3 children per woman. It is important to highlight the unique structure of the Israeli nation, diaspora dynamics and fertility rates as co-dependent factors, jointly contributing to a sustainable demographic structure of a developed state which may hold important lessons for Western societies. On the other hand, relevant data has to be explained while keeping in mind the unique factors shaping Israel that might limit the effect of ideas and ready-made solutions for other countries that might try to mimic Israeli success in demography.

Country/year

1990

2005

2017

Israel

3.020

2.840

3.110

Saudi Arabia

5.760

3.420

2.490

Turkey

3.070

2.120

2.070

Hungary

1.840

1.320

1.490

OECD average

1.900

1.600

1.700

Fertility rate (children/woman) trends in OECD member states.339 Rate beyond/below replacement level of 2.100

Israel is a small country, spanning a mere 22.000 km2 (including the Golan Heights) and further 3000 km2 administered by its armed forces in the West Bank. The state holds a strategic location at the crossroads of the Eurasian and African continents, in the easternmost edge of the Mediterranean Sea. Israel has a densely populated north, supported by its relatively moderate Mediterranean climate and a sparsely inhabited, mostly inhospitable south, which is the Negev desert. Before the establishment of the State of Israel, British officers argued against using the land as a haven for Jewish refugees, as they claimed that the land cannot support the livelihood of more than a few hundred thousand people.340 These fears were

OECD Data: Fertility rates. <https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

339

Ilan Troen: Calculating the Economic Absorptive Capacity of Palestine: A Study of the Political Uses of Scientific Research. Contemporary Jewry Vol 10. No 2. 1989. pp 19-38.

340

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE wrong as Israel surpassed 9.1 million citizens in 2019, more than 11 times the 800.000 at its inception in 1948. A further 3 million Palestinians live in the West Bank a territory under dispute with Israel. Three fourth of Israeli citizens are Jews, 21% Arabs (Muslim, Christian and Druze) and another 4.8% is ‘other’ which includes Armenians, East Asian non-Jewish immigrants and immigrants from the former Soviet Union who have Jewish ancestry or family members, but are not considered currently as Jews.341 Israeli Jews themselves belong to three distinctive groupings, the secular (irreligious or traditional), the nationalreligious and the ultraorthodox groups, the first being the large majority.

Israeli population growth is first and foremost supported by a healthy natural reproduction of 3.09 in 2019342 and incoming Jewish migration (a phenomenon called Aliya or literally ‘going up’ in Hebrew). Israel welcomes on average 30.000 immigrants each year (34.000 in 2018)343, thanks to its “Law of Return” (1950) which stipulates that any person having at least one Jewish grandparent can immediately get an Israeli citizenship and benefit from a resettling package including financial incentives. Also, those people, who undergo religious conversion process to Judaism become ethnic Jews in the eyes of the Israeli state and may receive Israeli citizenship automatically, a unique phenomenon stemming from the ethnoreligious nature of Jews. Currently only half of the global Jewry lives in Israel (6.7 million), significant diaspora groups exist in the USA (5.7 million), and sizable (more than a hundred thousand strong) communities in Russia, France, the UK, Canada and Argentina.344 The size of the global Jewish population cannot be determined without answering the millennia long question of ‘who is a Jew’ to which there is no common answer. It is more useful to think about Jews as a group built up from concentric circles, the core population being at around 14 million and the extended one around 20+ million globally. The yearly makeup of the Jewish immigrants is determined by socioeconomic factors, such as Russian and Ukrainian Jews attracted

by Israel’s high living standards, or anti-Semitic persecution trends, such was the wave of Islamist terrorism and anti-Semitic attacks in France.345 High natural reproduction is the most important variable that we must strive to understand in the case of Israel. The Jewish state dropped to a still intensive but sustainable 3 children/ women rate in the 1980s which represented at that time the median of OECD countries’ rates. As other countries started experiencing significant drops in fertility, moving under the replacement rate of 2.1, Israel stayed around 3. In 2010, Israel became the OECD country with the highest fertility rate, as Saudi Arabia went under 3 children per woman,

Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of Israel: Population of Israel on the Eve of 2019, <https://www.cbs. gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2018/394/11_18_394e.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

341

342 Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of Israel: Israel in Figures 2019. 2020.01.30. p. 6. <https://www.cbs. gov.il/he/publications/DocLib/isr_in_n/isr_in_n19e.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

343 The Jewish Agency: The Jewish Agency Summarizes a Decade of Aliyah. 22 December 2019. <http:// archive.jewishagency.org/news/jewish-agency-summarizes-decade-aliyah> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel: Israel and the Jewish World. 2018. p 11. <https://mfa.gov. il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Documents/Israel%20Jewish%20World%202018.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

344

David Roe: Many French Jews living in fear as a result of anti-Semitic attacks – research. Radio France Internationale. 23 January 2020. http://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20200121-many-french-jews-living-fear-resultanti-semitic-attacks-research> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

345

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE and remained in front with a margin of 0.6 over the second highest ranking member state (Saudi Arabia) with fertility rates twice higher than in European countries. The superficial reasoning to the overall high reproduction rate is (even oftentimes in Israel) that the Arabs/ Muslims and ultraorthodox Jews drive up the average fertility rate.346 However, the first part of the argument is objectively false, as fertility rate among Arab Israelis, while it was significantly higher than their Jewish counterparts’ in the first decades of the establishment of the state, has steadily correlated to the national level as their socioeconomic stature and level of education went up. The second part of the explanation, stating that ultraorthodox Jews drive up the national average is accurate, as deeply religious Jews do correlate with higher birth rates, nonetheless this does not explain why the majority of the Israeli population, the secular and the traditional, highly educated Jews still have a fertility rate well beyond 2.2 children per woman.347 The latter is the question we must focus on and analyse if we aim to come up with a lesson for our societies from the Israeli case. Two possible answers can emerge. On the one hand this high fertility rate might derive from the unique nature of Jewish society, while on the other it might stem from the fact that the policies of the Israeli state aids families and especially educated, emancipated woman to bear more children than anywhere else, as more than half of Israeli women have a tertiary degree, the prime factor in reduced childbearing in a society, second highest rate in the world (see in Israel country fact sheet). These policy methods include an earned income tax credit and other financial methods, but they are not at any rate higher in Israel than in other OECD member state, therefore it cannot explain high reproduction rate by itself.348 The Israeli state did however develop a system to aid families and women in balancing their career and family, especially when it comes to part-time work, prevalent among Israeli mothers, enabling Israel to support a simultaneously “work-oriented” and “family-oriented” society often thought as opposites.349 Also the overall socioeconomic levels are high with a GDP per capita in 2018 surpassing 41.715 USD350, therefor families feel secure in taking responsibility for more children. It is important to note that woman may benefit from the relaxed Israeli approach to part-time employment among women in addition to state and private-run child caring services from an early age. Regarding the cultural aspects of the reproduction issue, Jews are not special by themselves, as their diaspora communities do not show any outstanding

346 Lee Cahaner: Society. Israeli Democracy Institute (in Hebrew). 1 October 2016. <https://www.idi.org.il/ haredi/2016/?chapter=3268> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

347 Alex Weinreb, Dov Chernichovsky and Aviv Brill: Israel’s Exceptional Fertility. Taub Center. 23 December <http://taubcenter.org.il/israels-exceptional-fertility-eng/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

Adi Brender, Michel Strawczynksi: Government support for young families in Israel. Israel Economic Review Vol 12. No 2. 2015. pp 28-33. <https://www.boi.org.il/en/Research/Periodicals/Documents/adimichel1. pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

348

Olivia Ekert-Jaffe, Haya Stier: Normative or economic behavior? Fertility and women’s employment in Israel.

Social Science Research 38 (2009). pp 646-647. <https://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/hayas/files/2011/02/ ekert-stier-2009.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

349

World Bank: GDP per capita (current US$) – Israel. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP. CD?locations=IL> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

350

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE trends in fertility, only in Israel. Cultural factors include a religious duty to create new lives by having children. Religious Jews believe that the birth of each child brings the coming of the Messiah one step closer and even their secular kin shares a deep belief that children are a blessing and exert strong societal pressure on young people to wed (called shidduch351 where colleagues, friends, family and even strangers try to introduce single people to each other, on a level and directness incomprehensible to Western people). The state effectively counts the number of Jews and Israelis each year on Yom Ha’atzmaut (Independence Day), as it follows immediately Yom Ha’zikaron (Memorial Day), the Memorial Day of the fallen martyrs of Israel. The leaders of the Jewish state use the narrative repeatedly in their speeches of a nation rising from the ashes which must secure its future for generations to come.352 As a testament of pride in the growing nation, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics releases every year on Independence Day the up to date population figures, which is picked up by all major Israeli media outlets as a leading news for the day.353 In the end neither these cultural, symbolic nor the previous, objective socioeconomic factors of course do not give a solid scientific answer, why do secular and traditional Jews have so many children in Israel, effectively being the only society in the World that is not affected by the drop in fertility rates as a country reaches the upper echelons of economic development. For now, one must point to the mixture of different but interconnected factors encouraging childbearing in Israel, even if further research is needed to find the right methods for each people.

Israel naturally has its own set of demographic challenges, even if fertility rates and aging population are not a problem for the country. For one, the population is growing by almost two hundred thousand people each year and will soon surpass 10 million citizens, possibly reaching 17.6 million in 2050.354 This trend puts an ever-larger pressure on the country to use its available territory better and settle the southern Negev desert using various forms of advanced technologies in order to cope with the lack of water, unfertile soil in addition to providing energy to the new developmental communities. This trend also drives Israel to further push into the West Bank and develop settlements in the area. Israel, standing by its raison d’etre as the homeland of all the Jews, also has to be ready for another mass influx of Jews. While the yearly 30.000 people making Aliyah is at a comfortable rate for absorption, a new wave of mass immigration cannot be excluded. The Jewish state also has to make large reforms in the conversion process to Judaism, such as foregoing the strict scrutiny of new converts under ultraorthodox guidelines, and open and strengthen more liberal paths, such as reform, modern-orthodox and conservative and the special military

351 Shalonda Kelly: Diversity in Couple and Family Therapy: Ethnicities, Sexualities, and Socioeconomics. ABCCLIO. Santa Barbara. 2016. pp 238-241.

President Rivlin addresses Yom Hazikaron ceremony at the Western Wall. The President’s Office of the State of Israel. 11 April 2015. <http://archive.president.gov.il/English/ThePresident/Speeches/Pages/ news_210415_04.aspx> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

352

Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of Israel: Israel’s Independence Day 2019. 6 May 2019. <https:// www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2019/134/11_19_134e.pdf> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

353

Sue Surkes: With its population set to double in 30 years, how will Israel cope? Times of Israel. 26 June 2019. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-its-population-set-to-double-in-30-years-how-will-israel-cope/> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

354

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE conversions in the Israel Defense Forces.355 By this, it would effectively open the gates into the ethnoreligious group for citizens from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia and noncitizens wanting to become full members of the Jewish and after making aliya, the Israeli nation. On the other side of the religious spectrum Israel has to handle the boom in the number of ultra-orthodox Jewry (who have an average of 7 children per family) and further integrate their male members into the state’s military and economy. Israel, thanks to its advantageous demographic condition, financial and technological wealth has moved upwards into the top tier in the power rank of countries, in its region and beyond.356 However it cannot take this situation for granted. Also, it will have to take into consideration the unique challenges that the growing population number will present.

ISRAEL FACT SHEET (data from the Central Bureau of Statistics): Population (Jan 2020) – 9,152,000 Fertility rate children/woman (2019) – 3.09 Population growth (2019) – 1.9%357 GDP per capita – 41,715 USD Life expectancy (in 2017) – 82.6 years358

355 Yifat Erlich: The trouble with Jewish conversions in Israel. Yediot Ahronot. 2 September 2019. <https://www. ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5458400,00.html> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

356 U.S. News Staff: Best Countries for Power 2020. U.S. News. <https://www.usnews.com/news/bestcountries/power-rankings?fbclid=IwAR0H93OHs3QgPEZ0erqvd8-MOwFIBPwkUB6h53GYYiw6FYJo3aupuvz OY7U> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

357 Central Bureau of Statistics of the State of Israel: Population of Israel on the Eve of 2020. 31 December 2019. <https://www.cbs.gov.il/en/mediarelease/Pages/2019/Population-of-Israel-on-the-Eve-of-2020.aspx> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

World Bank: Country data – Israel. <https://data.worldbank.org/country/israel> Accessed: 12 March 2020.

358

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY: FROM DEMOGRAPHY TO FOREIGN POLICY TAMÁS KOZMA

GENERAL OVERVIEW Turkey is without a doubt an important country, also from a demographic point of view, where not only population growth, but also interrelated political, economic, and social trends draw attention. In line with the aforementioned, this chapter aims to offer insight into the most relevant figures concerning Turkey’s demographic situation, and to shed light on an issue of key importance: the situation of the Syrian population residing in Turkey, in the light of the latest relevant foreign policy developments.

No analysis should disregard the fact that Turkey can be considered as a European country, as an Asian country, and also as a combination of both of them. Therefore, when it comes to ranking it, both contexts should be referenced. In Europe, Russia takes the lead with its population of 146.745 million, 359 while Germany ranks second, and Turkey ranks third, both having a population of slightly more than 83 million. According to the latest datasets of their respective statistical authorities, Germany as the most populous EU member state had a population of 83.2 million at the end of 2019, 360 while Turkey’s population reached 83,154,997 by the end of December 2019.361 If we look at Turkey’s ranking in Asian context, based on the 2018 dataset of the World Bank, it is the tenth most populated country on the continent, with a population comparable to that of Vietnam, Iran, and Thailand.362 Population 1960

27,754,820

1970

35,605,176

1980

44,736,957

1990

56,047,035

2000

67,803,927

359 Naselenie Rossii sokratilos vtoroy god podryad (Population of Russia decreased for the second consecutive year).

RBK Ekonomika. 24 January 2020. < https://www.rbc.ru/economics/24/01/2020/5e2ac0d29a794776cb833825> Accessed: 11 March 2020.

360 Population growth in 2019 expected to be lowest since 2012. Press Release. DESTATIS – Statistisches Bundesamt.

17 January 2020.<https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2020/01/ PD20_022_12411.html> Accessed: 11 March 2020.

361 The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019. Press Release. No: 33705. Turkish Statistical Institute. 4 February 2020. <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=33705> Accessed: 11 March 2020.

Population, total. The World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?most_recent_value_ desc=true> Accessed: 11 March 2020.

362

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE 2010

73,722,988

2019

83,154,997

1. Turkey’s population from 1960 to 2019363

In order to contextualise Turkey’s present demographic processes, it is necessary to shed light on the growth path that the country’s population has been undergoing in the past decades. In 1960, Turkey’s population was 27,754,820, by 1990 it has reached 56,047,035,364 while by the end of 2019 it has reached 83,154,997.365 Despite the continuous population growth, it should be underlined that Turkey’s annual population growth rate has been showing a decreasing tendency. While this indicator was 28.5‰ in 1960, by 1990 it has decreased to 21.7‰, and by the end of 2019 it was as low as 13.9‰.366 According to the year-end data of 2019, median age in Turkey was 32.4 years, which is a significant growth compared to the figures from slightly more than a decade earlier. In 2007, median age reached only 28.3 years. In addition to that, one can observe some key trends concerning the age structure of the population. Comparing the latest figures from the year-end of 2019 to the ones from 2007, one can see that the share of child population (aged 0-14 years) decreased to 23.1% from 26.4%, the portion of working age population (aged 15-64 years) rose to 67.8% from 66.5%, while the share of the elderly population (over 65 years) increased to 9.1% from 7.1%.

In addition to that, by the end of 2019, population density in Turkey reached 108 person/ km² in average, with significant differences in geographical distribution. While the most densely populated province was Istanbul with 2,987 person/km², the one with the sparsest population was the Eastern Anatolian Tunceli, with only 11 person/km². In the end of 2019, the share of the population living in province and district centres reached 92.8%, while the share of those living in towns and villages reached accordingly 7.2%.367

SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY – THROUGH THE LENS OF FIGURES The protracted Syrian conflict resulted in an unprecedented flow of refugees to neighbouring countries, including Turkey. This series of events has an unquestionable effect on Turkey’s demographic situation, therefore, it is essential to highlight some key facts and figures characterising the Syrian population of Turkey.

Data compiled from: Cahit Gelsekçi: 1960 Sonrasi Dönemde Türkiye’de Nüfus Yapisi ve Bazi Temel Özellikleri Üzerine Tespitler (Evaluations on Population Structure and its Main Features in Turkey in the Post-1960 Era). Sosyoloji Konferansları. No: 52. (2015/2). 590; and The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019.

363

Cahit Gelekçi: 1960 Sonrasi Dönemde Türkiye’de Nüfus Yapisi ve Bazi Temel Özellikleri Üzerine Tespitler.

364

The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019.

365

Cahit Gelekçi: 1960 Sonrasi Dönemde Türkiye’de Nüfus Yapisi ve Bazi Temel Özellikleri Üzerine Tespitler.

366

The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019.

367

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Population

2011

0

2012

14,237

2013

224,655

2014

1,519,286

2015

2,503,549

2016

2,834,441

2017

3,412,368

27 February 2020

3,587,266

2. Number of Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey 368

According to the figures released on 27 February 2020, a total number of 3,587,266 Syrian nationals (holding temporary protection status) reside in Turkey, which means that Syrian nationals make up approximately 4.3% of Turkey’s total population.369 Following the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, Turkey has applied the ‘open-door-policy’ for Syrian refugees for years, which resulted in a significant influx of refugees to the country. The number of Syrians being under temporary protection in Turkey was only 224,655 in the beginning of 2013, with their number increasing to 1,519,284 by the beginning of 2014, gradually exceeding 3.5 million by 2020.370 Among Syrians in Turkey, children between the ages of 5-9 are represented in the highest number. At present, 518,590 children belong to this age group, while it should also be noted that the youngest age group – aged between 0-4 years – is also very populous: based on the latest figures, 490,590 infants and small children belong to this group. The median age of Syrian population in Turkey is 21.66 years, which is significantly lower than Turkey’s median age (32.4 years).371 The geographic distribution of the Syrian refugee population in Turkey shows a great degree of diversity: Istanbul as the largest city and economic powerhouse of Turkey hosts 492,013 Syrians. Major cities located close to the Syrian border such as Gaziantep (452,278), Hatay (440,569), and Şanlıurfa (424,635) also play a significant role in hosting Syrian refugee population. At the same time, it is interesting to see the proportion of Syrian refugees compared to Turkish nationals residing in certain provinces. For instance, in Kilis, a city located adjacent to the Syrian border, the proportion of Syrian refugees makes up 80.77% of the total population, while this proportion is the lowest with 0.02% in Artvin, a city in the Eastern part of the Black Sea region. It should be added that as of 27 February 2020, a total number of 64,048 Syrian refugees

Data compiled from: Syrians in Turkey – A Special Report. The Ombudsman Institution. 2018. 27. <https:// www.ombudsman.gov.tr/syrians/special_report.pdf> Accessed: 11 March 2020; and Türkiyedeki Suriyeli Sayısı Şubat 2020 (The Number of Syrians in Turkey in February 2020). Mülteciler Derneği. 4 March 2020. <https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi/> Accessed: 11 March 2020 368

Türkiyedeki Suriyeli Sayısı Şubat 2020.

369

Syrians in Turkey – A Special Report.

370

Türkiyedeki Suriyeli Sayısı Şubat 2020.

371

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE lived in refugee camps, which means a significant decrease compared to previous years: in January 2018 this figure was as high as 228,251.372 According to the data published by Mülteciler Derneği (Refugees Association), by December 2019, a total number of 369,690 Syrian refugees left Turkey for their homeland, and approximately 110,000 persons were granted Turkish citizenship. It is also worthwhile to highlight the fact that

by October 2019, an estimated number of 450,000 Syrian children were born in Turkey.373

SYRIAN REFUGEES – A FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH Obviously, Syrian refugees are not only relevant due to their vast number, but also for their politicised role in Turkey’s foreign relations. In this regard, one might refer to the migration crisis and its implications for Turkey-EU relations. The migration crisis had come to the forefront of security agendas in 2015, when massive flows of primarily Syrian refugees crossed Turkey and headed to Europe in order to flee from their war-torn homeland. These events were followed by the signing of an EU-Turkey agreement aimed at stopping the irregular migration flows crossing Turkey to Europe in March 2016. Despite the agreement, over the past couple of years, Turkey has repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with the EU’s approach towards the implementation of the deal. Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Hami Aksoy stated in an interview that “We have been calling for a more equitable burden and responsibility-sharing for a long time,” adding that „all our efforts contributed significantly to the security of Europe. However, our calls were ignored by the EU and member states.”374 Nearly four years after the adoption of this agreement, in late February/early March 2020, the question of approximately 4 million refugees – of which 3.6 million are Syrians – living in Turkey reappeared on the headlines. Concerns in EU member states culminated again following Turkey’s decision to open up the country’s western borders for the refugees (not exclusively Syrians), so that they could leave Turkey and enter the EU.375 This step resulted in crowds trying to leave Turkey for neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria first, which replied with strict, reinforced border protection in order to stop the new wave of irregular migration flow. These events led to the escalation of tensions not only in the border zones, but also at the highest levels of decision-making between Brussels and Ankara. Turkey’s decision to open up the borders can be interpreted as a demonstration of the country’s inevitable role in successfully holding back the flow of migration, which Turkey uses as a foreign policy tool to put pressure on its European counterparts.

At the same time, another important foreign policy dimension should be highlighted in relation to the latest events. Besides the clear intention to send a wakeup call to the EU, in order to urge on an increased cooperation, Turkey’s border opening manoeuvre has had important external drivers, too. Turkey’s intensified military involvement in the last rebel stronghold of Syria, Idlib Province,

Ibid.

372

Ibid.

373

374 Umut Uras: Turkey, EU and the imperilled refugee deal. Al Jazeera. 3 March 2020. <https://www.aljazeera. com/news/2020/03/turkey-eu-imperilled-refugee-deal-200302085719576.html > Accessed: 11 March 2020.

Syria war: Turkey says thousands of migrants have crossed to EU. BBC News. 29 February 2020. <https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51687160 > Accessed: 11 March 2020.

375

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE its recent military losses, as well as the growing pressure on the closed Turkish-Syrian border – approximately 1 million Syrians closed up near Turkey’s borders in recent months376 – created a complex set of challenges for Turkey. Such increased stress on Turkey’s southern borders can further strengthen the narrative about Turkey’s gatekeeper role, which can be suggested/ communicated during negotiations with the EU and NATO, as it happened during President Erdoğan’s visit to Brussels on 9 March 2020.377 At the same time, it is obvious that another wave of refugees on top of the already 4 million refugees living in Turkey would put a tremendous burden on the country, which is not acceptable for Ankara. Instead, Turkey’s interest would be to resettle Syrian refugees in their homeland. It is worth adding that throughout the years, approximately 370,000 Syrian refugees left Turkey already, and returned to their homes in Syria.378 Nevertheless, Turkey has to take into consideration that the majority of Syrian refugees will most probably stay in Turkey, which will have obvious political, economic, and social implications.379 Consequently, Turkey finds itself in a considerably complex situation currently. On the one hand, we can see that Ankara aims to maximise its security, and seeks to promote its regional power position by playing an active role in the Syrian events. Moreover, Turkey would certainly not like to miss its chance for shaping a new status quo in the region, where Iran, and Russia also see a chance for strengthening their roles. On the other hand, Ankara has to cope with its tense EU relations. Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, as well as the entire migration crisis are not only key subjects of their conflict, but also bargaining chips that Turkey can use whilst seeking for more help from the EU for handling the situation of refugees, or when it comes to discussions surrounding the review of the 2016 agreement.

At the same time, Turkey-NATO relations further complicate matters: Turkey hopes that the recent tensions stemming from the opening of its western borders can give further momentum to enhance negotiations between Turkey and NATO. As President Erdoğan stated in a press conference subsequent to his talks with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, he requested NATO to showcase support for Turkey in Syria, implying that the security situation on NATO’s southern frontier is a common security interest for both NATO and Turkey.380 At the same meeting Secretary General Stoltenberg made it clear that the alliance will continue its support with a range of measures to help defend Turkey from

376 Ayla Jean Yackley: Idlib operation splits Turks more than other Syria interventions. Al-Monitor. 3 March 2020. <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/03/turkey-syria-russia-idlib-operation-splits-turkish-public. html > Accessed: 11 March 2020.

377 Erdogan demands ‚concrete support’ from EU, NATO over Syria. Al Jazeera. 9 March 2020. <https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/erdogan-demands-concrete-support-eu-nato-syria-200309183710499.html > Accessed: 11 March 2020.

Türkiyedeki Suriyeli Sayısı Şubat 2020.

378

Egeresi Zoltán: Idlibtől Edirnéig: kettős válság a török határoknál (From Idlib to Edirne: Double Crisis at the Turkish Borders). Elemzések 2020/5. Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóintézet. 5 March 2020. 9.

379

EU and Turkey agree to review 2016 migration deal. Euronews. 10 March 2020. <https://www.euronews. com/2020/03/09/erdogan-to-meet-eu-officials-in-brussels-amid-migration-crisis-at-greek-border> Accessed: 11 March 2020 380

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE the threats it encounters relating to the security situation in Syria.381 It remains to be seen, however, to what extent these measures can meet the expectations of Turkey.

TURKEY FACT SHEET: Population (2019) – 83,154,997382 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.99383 Annual population growth rate (2019) – 13.9‰384 GDP per capita (2019) – 9,127 USD385 Life expectancy (2019) – 78.3 years386

THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ÁDÁM ÉVA

INTRODUCTION All demographic indicators have improved in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)387 region from the wealthiest to the poorest countries within the past few decades. This is the result of the modernization and development of the economies, infrastructure, health and education in these countries. However, states are struggling with a steadily growing population and how to create jobs for the large educated youth bulge. Population growth in the MENA is one of the main stress factors that combined with the lack of environmental resources and environmental degradation triggers human migratory movements from the areas of scarce resources and limited opportunities to more resourceful areas where countries are struggling with the lack of workforce. However, this “natural” flow of people does not lead to the restoration of an equilibrium. On the contrary, (cross-continental and

NATO Secretary General discusses situation in Syria with President Erdoğan. NATO. 9 March 2020. <https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174281.htm> Accessed: 11 March 2020.

381

The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019.

382

Fertility rate continues to decrease in Turkey, drops to 1.99 in 2018. Daily Sabah. 18 May 2019. <https://www. dailysabah.com/turkey/2019/05/18/fertility-rate-continues-to-decrease-in-turkey-drops-to-199-in-2018> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

383

The Results of Address Based Population Registration System, 2019.

384

2019 GSYH verileri açıklandı: Kişi başına gelir 2007’nin gerisinde (2019 GDP data announced: Per capita income is behind 2007). BirGün. 29 February 2020. <https://www.birgun.net/haber/2019-gsyh-verileriaciklandi-kisi-basina-gelir-2007-nin-gerisinde-289888> Accessed: 19 March 2020.

385

386 Life expectancy rises to 78.3 years. Hürriyet Daily News. 24 September 2019. < https://www.hurriyetdailynews. com/life-expectancy-rises-to-78-3-years-146842 > Accessed: 19 March 2020.

This analysis is basically concerned with the demographics of the Arab countries of the Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf sub-regions with occasional reference to Turkey and Iran as they are not Arab but Muslim countries.

387

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE cross-cultural) human migration causes complex political, economic, social and cultural problems mainly for the destination countries. Human migration is many times the result of political unrest or wars that lead to a rapid migratory movement of people who end up at the easiest accessible places as refugees. As a result, these people are stuck between the desire to return to their home countries and their inability and unwillingness to integrate in the destination countries as it was a necessity not a desire for them to end up where they are. Thus, population growth in the source countries and aging population in the destination countries do not lead to a natural viable equilibrium due to many culture-based barriers.

Beside the movement of workforce from the francophone ex-colonies to France, which has been systematized by the French, the rest of the population movement within and from the MENA region might be described as undesired or forced relocation. This understanding led to the securitization of the migration of the Middle Eastern people to the West and eventually made the demographics of the MENA a security issue for Europe. The purpose of this analysis is to shed light on the main demographic trends in the MENA region that have led both to the political turmoil in the region and to the refugee crisis in its neighbourhood.

THE MAIN FACTORS OF DEMOGRAPHICS In spite of the many political, economic and social difficulties and the lack of environmental resources and environmental degradation, the MENA region have had the world’s fastest growing population during the 20th and 21st centuries. The introduction of modern medical services and public health interventions, such as antibiotics, immunization, and sanitation, caused death rates to drop rapidly in the developing world after 1950, while the decline in birth rates lagged behind, resulting in high rates of natural increase.388 Between 1955 and today, the initial population of 145 million people has surpassed 700 million.389 Despite the generally declining rates of fertility, absolute population numbers are expected to further double to over 1 billion inhabitants by 2100. This means that by the end of the century, there will be more people in the MENA region than in Europe.390 Countries such as Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Syria and Yemen have a rate of natural increase (RNI) of more than 2, which translates to doubling their population almost every thirty to fifty years.391 The MENA region has countries with large territory and large population, such as Egypt (~104 million) and Iran (~85 million); countries with large territory but small population, such as Libya (~6.9 million) and most of the countries have small territory and small population, such as

388 Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi: Population Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa.

Population Reference Bureau. MENA Policy Brief. 1 December 2001. <https://www.prb.org/ populationtrendsandchallengesinthemiddleeastandnorthafrica/> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

389 Tamás Dezső: Demográfia és migráció: A muszlim világ népességrobbanásának okai és következményei.

(Migráció Kutató Intézet. 11 December 2018. 5.< https://www.migraciokutato.hu/hu/2018/12/11/a-muszlimvilag-nepessegrobbanasanak-okai-es-kovetkezmenyei/> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

390 Musa McKee et al.: Demographic and Economic Material Factors in the MENA Region. Menara Working Papers.

No. 3. October 2017. 5. < http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_3.pdf> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

Elhum Haghighat: Demography and Democracy: Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018. 57.

391

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE Lebanon (~5.5 million), Palestine (~4.8 million), Kuwait (~3 million) or Qatar (~2.4 million).392 The MENA is the most arid region in the world while it is home to the world’s largest refugee population. Despite that, its population is growing faster than the world average, exacerbating its fragility.393 Experts agree that human systems with poor human ecologies are less resilient to shocks, more prone to collapse and conflicts. Human ecology includes population, population growth and density, diseases, resource availability and consumption and ecosystem services. Traditional interpretations of geopolitical events largely overlooked the physical/biological/ecological dimensions of peace and conflict and instead focus predominantly on politics, nationalism, ethnicities. This is why it is very important in the case of MENA to put more attention to demographics. There are many ways how we can measure the nexus between the above-mentioned indicators.

With regards to economic output, the most useful connection is found between natural resources and labour force abundance. While most of the MENA countries are resourcepoor and labour-abundant, the wealthiest oil states of the region lack labour force.394 Again, however, a natural equilibrium between the MENA sub-regions is never to be reached due to multiple reasons.

This great disparity of natural resources and population density led to an intraregional income disparity which in turn is the source of the constant flow of people between the poorer and richer Arab countries. However, in spite of the apparent linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the people of the MENA region, the religious and political cleavages between the countries and regions have also built barriers between the Arab people that are used many times by the political regimes as leverages in the domestic and foreign policies of the state, resulting in sectarian enmities. As in general, the coexistence of two different religious communities in the MENA region is not regulated and sanctioned by the authorities based on universal values, the Arab people of the region find it many times easier to take refuge in the Western democratic societies than in another Arab country.

Similarly, for the Arab Gulf states it is morally and economically more logical to import cheap labour force from Asia than to employ less-skilled or highly skilled Arab workforce for reasonable salaries. This complexity of the region necessitates the independent analysis of the Arab states and renders the terms of Arab people and Arab demographics invalid. This is all the more true as there is little or no regional integration or policy coordination on joint demographic and economic policies in the MENA in comparison with many other regions.395 In the MENA region, the rate of natural population increase is higher than the world average, because the MENA’s population is younger, its fertility is higher, and its mortality

Country population data is based on information retrieved from the CIA factbook.

392

Farzaneh Roudi: After the EU Global Strategy: Building Resilience. In: After the EU Global Strategy: Building Resilience, edited by Florence Gaub – Nicu Popescu. European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2017, 51. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/After_EU_Global_Strategy._Resilience.pdf> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

393

McKee et al., 21.

394

Ibidem, 2.

395

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE lower than in most other regions.396 In 2016, the world population grew by 1.2%—a rate half of that of Egypt’s, the most populous country in the region. The highest rates of natural increase are seen in Iraq and Palestine (2.8%), Yemen (2.6%), and Egypt (2.5%). In absolute numbers, however, because of its large population (~104 million in 2020), Egypt is adding more people to its population than any other country in the region. However, the countries experiencing the fastest rates of population growth in the region are the least equipped to meet the basic needs of their citizens. The highest rates of fertility are seen in Iraq and Yemen, where maternal and infant mortality rates are also the highest. Palestine’s and Jordan’s population are among the youngest in the region, with 40% and 37% of their population under age 15, respectively. On the other hand, in Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey, where fertility has dropped to below or close to the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman, 25% of the population is below age 15.397 In terms of GDP, the picture in the MENA region is diverse. On one hand, this is mostly due to the large hydrocarbon resources in some countries and the lack of them in others.398 On the other hand, it is the result of effective governance as some countries with large resources are struggling (Algeria or Libya) while other resource-poor countries are economic powers (Turkey or Israel). The region has some of the richest countries on a GDP per capita basis in the world. These countries are mostly located in the Persian Gulf region. Qatar has the highest GDP per capita in the world but Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait are very close. Turkey, Lebanon, Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Libya are considered upper middle-income countries. However, some of them have limited capabilities to utilize their resources due to governance problems or external factors, such as economic sanctions.

The MENA’s lower middle-income countries are Syria, Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Yemen, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Jordan. Some of the poorest lower middle-income countries are also in the MENA region, such as Yemen, Mauritania and Sudan.399 The 7.5 times bigger population by 2050 will dispose of a particle of the exact amount of natural resources the population had enjoyed a hundred years ago. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the states of the region are becoming less and less resilient and more and more dependent on external help. This is mostly connected to the structural weaknesses of the states which are deliberately sustained by the ruling elites who understand that human development and social resilience could be threatening their regimes. The rule of the elites had been challenged by the desire of the people to rule for themselves during the Arab spring movements which anyway could not achieve the desired level of democratic system. The latter could only be avoided by the elites by marginalizing and excluding large swathes of the societies. Conversely, the military coups and the political restoration in many states have led to the renewed fears of mass mobilization of the disenchanted young people for either protesting against the regimes or leaving the MENA region for Europe

Roudi-Fahimi

396

Ibidem

397

McKee et al., 23.

398

Ibidem

399

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE for good. The first scenario leads to permanent insecurity in the European neighbourhood while the second one creates a permanent political state of emergency due to the migratory pressure. The nexus of politics and demographics is the basis of the framework of the global strategy for the foreign and security policy of the European Union. However, the integration of the EU with its Southern Mediterranean partners does not lead to tangible results without integration or at least cooperation between the MENA subregions.

The apparent strength of the MENA societies, the large youth bulge, is also the basis of their weaknesses as the governments are unable to providing jobs for their freshly graduated young people. The youth population (15-24 years old) grew substantially from 1980 to 2010 in all countries of the MENA region without any exception. This pattern will slow down, and in some countries, will eventually be reversed over the next few decades (2010–2040).

Some countries will even experience a negative growth in their youth population during the next few decades.400 The youth cohort is a substantial percentage of the working age in the entire MENA region, which ranges from 17% in Qatar to 42% in Yemen. Youth unemployment rate on the other hand ranges from 1% in Qatar to 49% in Libya. Many young people are waiting in vain to enter the labour force, establish their own households and start their own families. The youth bulge, combined with the absence of jobs, leads to a very frustrated society. Many studies have proved that a disproportionately large population of youth with higher unemployment leads to a greater propensity for violence, civil unrest and an increasing sense of alienation. Further, it has been proved that achieving and sustaining a democratic order is much more difficult with a young age structure than with a balanced one.401 Clearly, a youthful age structure puts unprecedented stress on a country that is not equipped to provide employment and social services for its young population.

Demographics in the MENA region is as diverse as its political and social systems or its religious composition. In the last 50-70 years we have seen an unusually fast population growth the result of which is the large youth bulge in general throughout the Middle East.

Due to the huge disparity between the natural resources and the amount of labour force, the social and economic development of the countries is very diverse. Mauritania or Yemen remain to be the least developed countries of the world, while Qatar and the Arab Gulf countries are global economic powers. Seemingly, some countries have reason to celebrate while others are on the brink of collapse. The reality is that all countries without exception face the same consequences of the general demographic trends of the last decades. While young people are plentiful, the job creation and political development is very slow. This puts an unprecedented stress on countries that are not equipped to provide employment and social services for their young population. The youth bulge, coincident with a lack of jobs, increases the likelihood of conflict and civil unrest as we have witnessed this during the Arab spring.

Haghighat, 74-75.

400

Ibidem, 87.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE MENA FACT SHEET: Population (2018) – 715,000,000402 Fertility rate children/woman (2018) – 1.72 (Iran) – 4.69 (Sudan)403 Annual population growth rate (2018) – 1.05 (Iran) – 2.82 (Syria)404 GDP per capita (2018) – 895.34 USD (Yemen) – 70379.49 USD (Qatar)405 Life expectancy (2017) – 66 (Yemen) – 80 (Qatar)406

Dezső, 5.

402

Ibidem

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Ibidem

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Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in current prices in 2018. Statista. <https://www.statista.com/ statistics/804765/gross-domestic-product-gdp-per-capita-in-the-mena-countries/> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

405

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) - Middle East & North Africa. World Bank. <https://data.worldbank. org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=ZQ&most_recent_value_desc=false> Accessed: 17 April 2020.

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