AJRC_Analyses_2015A02 Zoltán Egeresi

TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY? TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS 2015 ZOLTÁN EGERESI

AJRC-Analyses 2015A02

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Ádám Éva Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6.

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© Zoltán Egeresi, 2015 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2015 ISSN 2416-1705

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TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY? TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS 2015

Zoltán Egeresi

On June 23, the 25th term of the Turkish Parliament was opened by the oath-taking ceremony of the newly elected deputies. Turkish political parties have 45 days to form a government in order to avoid possible snap elections. Three weeks after the general elections that made an end of the Justice and Development Party's (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) single-party government era, there is no coalition agreement about the prospective Turkish government. No Turkish coalition or minority government could finish it term. For some, it can be the sign of the return of the constant governmental crises that determined the country's domestic politics in the 1990's that led to deep economic crises and recession. The debates between the four parliamentary parties about the possible coalition predict rather an instable future. Due to the diverging political considerations, ideological cleavages in Turkish politics, it is very difficult to predict the results of the coalition negotiations.

The current situation also underlines the fact that the June 7 Turkish elections constitute a turning point in the country’s recent history. The government party, the Justice and Development Party has lost its majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TBMM) that brought an end to a 13 year-long period of single party government. This result also hindered Erdoğan’s aspiration – at least for a while – to implement an executive-style presidency. The elections also opened a new chapter for the Kurds: the proKurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi – HDP) positioning itself as a liberal-left-wing party could pass the 10 percent electoral threshold.

Seemingly, the elections have changed the political landscape of the country (see Map 1.). As Table 1. shows, the AKP's share of votes dropped from 49.8 to 40.9 percent that is a loss of approximately 2,4 millions of votes (compared to the overall votes in 2011). This 9 percent decline in votes resulted in even greater losses in the parliament: the number of deputies decreased by 69 from 327 to 258 (almost 12.5 percent),1 so the loss is rather proportional and reflects the ongoing conflict with the Gülen movement and other ruptures that hit the homogeneity of the faction.

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It is important to note that the number of AKP deputies was 311 prior the elections.

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Map 1. The 2015 elections results according to the main parties. Source: http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/t/turkey/turkey-legislative-election2015.html. Accessed: 28/06/2015.

2002 2007 2011 2015 Share of votes (%) AKP 34.3 46.6 49.8 40.9 CHP 19.4 20.9 26 25 MHP (8.3) 14.3 13 16.3 Kurds (6.2) 5.1 6.5 13.1 Independents entering the TBMM 1 0.1 Wasted votes 45.32 12.75 4.61 4.77 Turnout 79 84.2 83.1 86.6 Table 1. The share of votes (the MHP and the Kurdish party DEHAP could not enter the parliament in 2002), secim.haberler.com, http://www.haberturk.com/secim.

This seems to be a turning point in the AKP’s parliamentary majority, however, it can be also considered as a part of a long-standing decline. The party could reach the highest number of mandates in 2002 (363), at the very beginning of its rule following a surprise election victory.

Due to the change in Turkish electoral behaviour that resulted in the growing concentration of votes on four parties [including the Kurdish Democratic Society Party or Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP) and Peace and Democracy Party or BariČ™ ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP) whose candidates run as independents in 2007 and 2011] and consequently the drastic decrease in wasted votes (circa 45 percent in 2002 while below 5 percent in 2015).

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15% AKP

6% 0% 10% 4%

CHP MHP Kurds

13% 14% 32% 25%

20%

66%

62% 59%

47%

Independent

24%

Chart 1. The distribution of parliamentary seats during the last elections (from the centre to the outer circles: 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015 elections, respectively). Source: www.secim.aa.com.tr, www.haberturk.com/secim, www.secim-sonuclari.com.

This change has multiple causes. The AKP putting the introduction of the presidential system on the centre of its electoral agenda could not mobilize and preserve its voters. The agreement about the 'New Turkey Agreement' (Yeni Türkiye Sözleșmesi)2 that promised the establishment of a more democratic and prosperous country with a powerful president was not enough to prevent the loss of votes. The party followed the logic of the elections in 2014 (one local and one presidential) that focused on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was participating in the election campaign and addressing masses in Turkish cities and towns. By doing this, he was able to call its supporters to the urns last year. Nevertheless this time this tactic was not fruitful. According to post-election opinion polls conducted by IPSOS, approximately 65 percent of the voters perceived Erdogan's involvement in the election as a negative act 3 that overwrites the constitutional restrictions about the neutrality of the president of the republic. To cope with this message, all other parties declared their opposition to the presidential system. The elections have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s presidential system that had minor support in the See more about it at the AKP’s webpage: Yeni Türkiye Sözleşmesi / 2023: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/yeni-turkiye-sozlesmesi-2023/73285#1. Accessed: 28/06/2015.

3 IPSOS'tan CNN TÜRK'e seçim sonrası araştırması, CNN TÜRK. http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/ipsostancnn-turke-secim-sonrasi-arastirmasi?page=30. Accessed: 28/06/2015.

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society. In August 2014, he was able to persuade the majority of the voters about his competency among his two rivals – Selahettin Demirtaş and Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu –, in June 2015 the AKP propaganda could not convince the society about the necessity of the transformation. It was a too difficult task in light of the opinion polls: according to the A&G’s researches, 70 percent of the voters are against the presidential system.4 While other institutes, such Metropoll gives lower figures, in this case it is obvious that the AKP does not enjoy the support of the society.5 The corruption scandals that hit the government during the last two years, as well as the debate about the luxurious life of leaders, also led to disappointment with some elements of its electorate. Especially the case of Mehmet Görmez, the Diyanet’s chairman received much limelight, whose luxurious car's issue has become the target of opposition parties. This debate was frequently put on the agenda prior the elections.

Nevertheless, the AKP was able to preserve the very core of its electorate despite the scandals and the rise of internal cleavages. The previous elections have showed that the party's support peaked around 21-21.4 million of voters that was really difficult to increase or even preserve.

The Gezi events and the growing polarisation of the country in addition to the omnipresent debate about Erdogan authoritarian style hampered the party to reach new groups within the society. Nevertheless, the most important cause in the decrease of AKP's parliamentary seats was the emergence of the Kurdish HDP that managed to enter into the TBMM as a political party and not as a group of independent candidates that happened before in the case of DTP in 2007 and BDP in 2011.

So, the relative decline of the AKP encountered with the growing support of the HDP. The presidential elections on 8 August 2014 have already shown this tendency when Selahettin Demirtaş, the HDP’s candidate could receive close to 4 million votes, almost reaching the critical 10 percent. This change in the usual electoral performance – the previous Kurdish parties could only get 1.8-2.8 million (around 5-6.5 percent) votes – anticipated a possible success if the HDP enters in the campaign as a party. This result helped to pass the psychological barrier of the threshold and also pushed a great part of the electorate to vote for the HDP. It was obvious if the party cannot ascend to the parliament, most of its mandates (roughly 50-60 seats) would be transferred to the AKP paving the way towards a single-party government and granting the AKP more opportunity to introduce the presidential system.6

A&G Araştırma Şirketi’nin Başkanlık Sistemi Anketi. http://www.genelsecimler2015.com/ag-arastirmasirketinin-baskanlik-sistemi-anketi.

5 Başkanlık Sistemi Hakkında Halk Ne Düşünüyor? http://www.genelsecimler2015.com/baskanlik-sistemihakkinda-halk-ne-dusunuyor.

6 To have a simple majority in the Turkish parliament, one has to acquire at least 276 seats out of 550. To be able to amend the constitution with a referendum, 330 mandates are needed. Finally, to change the constitution without referendum, one has to possess two-third of the parliamentary seats, so at least 367 mandates.

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The most particular feature of these elections is that probably first time in the history, the overwhelming majority of Kurds voted for a Kurdish party in Turkey. According to the statistics, the HDP defeated the AKP in the Eastern, mostly Kurdish-inhabited districts of the country (see Table 2.)

Seats won in 2015 Party

AKP

HDP

CHP

MHP

AKP

Seats won in 2011 Independent CHP (BDP)

MHP

Adiyaman 4 1 5 Agri 4 3 1 Ardahan 1 1 1 1 Batman 1 3 2 2 Bingรถl 2 1 3 Bitlis 1 2 2 1 Diyarbakir 1 10 6 4 Elazig 3 1 4 1 Erzincan 1 1 1 1 Erzurum 4 1 1 5 1 Gaziantep 6 2 2 2 9 2 1 Hakkari 3 3 Igdir 2 1 1 Kars 1 2 2 1 Kilis 1 1 2 Malatya 5 1 5 1 Mardin 1 5 3 3 Mus 1 2 2 2 Sanliurfa 7 5 10 2 Sirnak 4 1 3 Siirt 1 2 2 1 Turnceli 2 2 Van 1 7 4 4 All 42 60 4 4 72 28 7 4 Table 2. The distribution of mandates in East and Southeast Turkey after the elections in 2011 and in 2015. Source: secim.haberler.com, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/secim2011/default.html.

As the table shows, compared to the 2011 elections, the AKP has lost approximately 30 mandates in East and Southeast Anatolia which usually went to the HDP. Even the already existing support of the Kurdish party could have been realized by the fact that HDP entered in the election campaign as a party and not as a conglomerate of independent candidates. In 2011, 7

due to the d'Hondt system, the AKP could have seized more mandates from Diyarbakir than the BDP even if more votes were cast for the party candidates on the whole in the districts.

Nevertheless, the HDP had to convince the usually pro-AKP, conservative and religious parts of the Kurdish society to switch sides.

Obviously, the AKP's limited success to tackle the peace or solution process and growing scepticism over Erdoǧan’s intention about the Kurdish issue pushed its Kurdish electorate to revaluate its stance towards him and his party.7 Turkey’s support to anti-Assad forces and the battle in Kobani that has already implicated unrest in Eastern Turkey also decreased the AKP’s support.8 More importantly, HDP managed to convince a number of Kurdish tribes in Eastern Turkey to vote for the party with the support of local mullahs.9 Nevertheless, the HDP's success in the East would have not been enough to pass the 10 percent electoral threshold without receiving some 3 million votes from the Western and Southern part of Turkey. The Kurdish immigration during the last decades from Eastern Turkey to the big cities in Central Anatolia (especially Ankara) and the coastal areas like Istanbul and Izmir contributed to the establishment of the Kurdish communities far from the core areas. The decision of the HDP's leadership to run as a party with 543 candidates10 (compared to the BDP’s 64 independent candidates in 2011)11 made it possible to reach more Kurds dispersed in the country than previously. To surpass the 10 percent threshold, every vote was needed.

The HDP was not only successful at mobilizing the Kurdish electorate but it also managed to acquire the Turkish liberal and left-wing voters’ support. In contrast to previous Kurdish parties, the HDP defined itself as an explicitly nation-wide liberal-left-wing, ‘colourful’ party. By announcing its programme focusing on democracy, human rights, minority rights (including the representation of other ethnic and religious minority groups, sexual minorities) and women’s rights (half of the total candidates of the party was woman).12 The ‘Türkiyelileşme’ of the party with the liberal programme brought the votes of liberal and leftist ethnic Turks that enabled to size 13.12 percent of the total votes. By nominating Gezi park leaders on the party

Özpek, Burak Bilgehan: What are Erdoğan’s Real Intentions in the Kurdish “Solution Process?”. The Turkey Analyst: http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/378-what-areerdo%C4%9Fan%E2%80%99s-real-intentions-in-the-kurdish-%E2%80%9Csolutionprocess?%E2%80%9D.html. Accessed: 30/06/2015.

8 Tremblay, Pinar: Why is AKP losing the Kurds? http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/turkey-elections-akp-losing-kurdish-support.html .

Accessed: 28/06/2015.

9 Tașketin, Fehim: Kurds abandon AKP. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/05/turkey-piouskurds-abandon-akp-in-droves-hdp.html.. Accessed: 28/06/2015.

10 HDP listesinde kadın adaylar ve azınlıklar öne çıkıyor http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/04/150407_hdp_adaylar . Accessed: 28/06/2015.

11 Iște BDP’nin adayları. http://www.bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/129174-bdp-nin-destekleyecegi-bagimsizadaylar-aciklandi. . Accessed: 28/06/2015.

12 See more: HDP Party Programme: http://www.hdp.org.tr/parti/parti-programi/8. . Accessed: 28/06/2015.

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list, HDP could reach an important part of the Gezi youth that were not represented in the parliament or those who were upset with the ‘official’ left-wing CHP. The other party that benefited from the disappointment of the AKP’s voters was the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi –MHP) the ideological stance of which is closer to the AKP. Although this nationalist party is also not homogenous, it could easily become an optional protest vote collecting party. That is why it could increase its votes especially in central and northern Anatolia (see Map 2). Simultaneously, the minor Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi – SP) entering in election coalition with the Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi – BBP) also managed to increase its voters reaching nearly one million that may possibly be influenced by the internal war between the Gülen movement and the AKP that started in 2013.

Erdoğan kept attacking the ‘paralel devlet’ (parallel state) in his campaign speeches that also contributed to the eradication of the Islamist electorate.

Finally, the other relative loser of the general elections was the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) that was not able to increase significantly it votes13 and only a minor, around one percentage point in its share of total votes compared to the 2011. Despite Kiliçdaroğlu’s economy-focused campaign, which promised to double the minimum salary, he had to face a loss of votes in the East and in the West as well. Firstly, the Alevi Kurds favoured the HDP in the Kurdish inhabited regions. The most particular change took place in Tunceli, which previously was referred as a stronghold of the CHP.14 This time – similarly to the 2014 presidential elections – HDP candidates managed to attract more voters. Secondly, the HDP seemed to be a more plausible option for radical leftists and Liberals in the West. It was especially true for some part of the youth of Gezi whom the officially social-democrat CHP could not reach.

13

In 2011, the party got 11.155.972 votes while http://www.haberturk.com/secim. Accessed: 30/06/2015.

14 Even the party leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was born there.

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in

2015,

it

seized

11.518.70.

Source:

Map 2. Change in the four main party’s votes (2011-2015). Source: http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/t/turkey/turkey-legislative-election2015.html. Accessed: 28/06/2015.

The new legislature faces the problem to form a new government. The AKP has 258 seats; the CHP has 132, while MHP and HDP possess 80 deputies each. Due to the cleavages in the party system it is very difficult to predict the outcome of the coalition negotiations. There are four main scenarios for the future.

Firstly, following 45 days of unsuccessful negotiations, the president of the republic can call for new elections. Although this option is not ruled out by any party as consultations could not achieve any plausible results, its probability is unlikely. According to the newest opinion polls, no major change has occurred in the electorate: the AKP’s support still stands at 41 percent and the HDP would get more than 10 percent of the votes. Right now, seemingly, a new election would not bring out the country from the political impasse, so the parties should find an arrangement. Furthermore, the incapability to form a government would also be a sign of weakness and a menacing message for the markets.

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Secondly, smaller parties could form a coalition – CHP, HDP and MHP have altogether 292 seats that may ensure the single majority. Nevertheless, it is the most unlikely option due to the ideological ruptures between the three parties. The diverging stance towards the Kurdish peace process and the PKK makes the cooperation absurd betwixt the HDP and MHP. Finally, parties’ chairmen have already ruled out the option of a shared government.

Thirdly, AKP can form government with one or two parties (this second option the most unlikely). a) According to the electorate’s preferences and the opinion polls, the MHP can be the most convincing partner. With 338 seats at the parliament and 57 percent of the votes, this alliance would hold a comfortable support of the society. No AKP government in the past had such a great support. Nevertheless, it is questionable that Devlet Bahçeli would like to enter into a coalition where the AKP can try to attract its religious electorate that could lead to a huge loss of votes, shrinking the party’s support under 10 percent. b) The greatest parliamentary majority would be ensured by a coalition between the AKP and CHP. This would-be government having 390 seats in the TBMM would be able to amend the constitution easily. However, in this case the constant debates between the major opposition party CHP and the AKP during the last legislatures would continue in line with the ideological ruptures, making the cooperation fragile. c) The HDP was the loudest party in opposing any coalition with the AKP. Although the party leadership has moderated its opinion, a common government is not very likely.

Fourthly, the AKP can make an attempt to form a government without an official coalition partner. It can enter into an alliance without direct coalition agreement with one of the abovementioned parties that may support in a number of issues. According to the opinion polls, almost half of the voters would support this kind of alliance between the MHP and AKP.15 However, these kind of governments are even weaker with limited room for manoeuvre than formal coalitions.

Concerning the outcome of the ongoing coalition talks, the election of the parliament speaker on 2 July provided us with more information. The process ended with the victory of the AKP’s candidate, İsmet Yılmaz who had been elected by the unanimous support of his party faction (258 votes). His adversary, former chairman of the CHP, Deniz Baykal got altogether 182 votes from the CHP and HDP (the latter one casted 50 votes). The MHP decided not to vote for Baykal giving indirect support for the AKP.16 Although Davutoǧlu declared that it may not IPSOS'tan CNN TÜRK'e seçim sonrası araştırması, CNN TÜRK. http://www.cnnturk.com/turkiye/ipsostan-cnn-turke-secim-sonrasi-arastirmasi?page=30 .

Accessed: 30/06/2015.

16 AKP candidate elected as Turkey's parliament speaker.

Hurriyetdailynews. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/akp-candidate-elected-as-turkeys-parliamentspeaker.aspx?pageID=238&nID=84820&NewsCatID=338 Accessed: 02/06/2015.

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change the coalition talks, it is plausible to think that a MHP-AKP government has a reality.17 In this case, Turkish foreign policy may put more emphasis on relations with Turkic people in Central Asia, Caucasus and may increase Ankara’s concerns over Tatar (Crimea) and Turkmen (Syria, Iraq) minority groups. The Kurdish peace process will also be altered as the MPH opposes to any talks with the PKK. This will trigger the anger of nationalist elements of Kurdish electorate that may lead to growing unrest in the Eastern part of the country.

Although it is still difficult to predict how the coalition talks will be ended in Turkey, the new government will not be as stable as the single-AKP rule was. The history of previous coalitions predicts that the new one will not remain at power until 2019. However, the decline of the AKP’s influence and a more plural parliament will result in the decreasing polarisation of the country that has featured the last years, especially after the Gezi events, 2013. The most important message of the elections is that the possibility of presidential system á la Turca seems to be over.

Turkish PM: Speaker election won’t change composition of CHP, MHP coalition talks. Hurriyetdailynews. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-speaker-election-wont-change-composition-of-chp-mhpcoalition-talks.aspx?pageID=238&nID=84860&NewsCatID=338. Accessed: 02/06/2015.

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