AJRC_Analyses_2014A01 Julia Palik

THE YEMENI THEATER: EVALUATING YEMEN THROUGH THE PRISM OF ISIS

JULIA PALIK

AJRC-Analyses 2014A01

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Ádám Éva Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6.

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© Julia Palik, 2014 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2014 ISSN 2416-1705

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THE YEMENI THEATER: EVALUATING YEMEN THROUGH THE PRISM OF ISIS  Background: The regime change in Yemen and it’s domestic implications from 2012 until 2014  Actor mapping: Introduction of the conflicting interests of the Houthis, AQAP and the Southern Separatist Movement  External influence: The role of the international community, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran  Conclusion: Yemen’s role in the potential expansion of the ISIS 2014 was definitely the year of crisis all across the globe, especially in the Middle East. While western policy makers and media outlets were obsessed with the unprecedented brutality posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as ISIL or ISIS, another crisis hotspot received much less attention. The major drawback of this approach is that Yemen, as the most impoverished nation in the region, could rapidly evolve into a new safe haven for ISIS. Political turmoil and sectarian clashes are nothing new in Yemen. Unfortunately, the 2011 Arab Spring motivated unrests did not yet bring the desired democratization effects. Until 2012 President Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled for nearly 33 years. Countrywide demonstrations resulted in Saleh's resignation, in turn he was granted immunity from prosecution.

This concession however allowed him to hold central role in the Yemeni politics up until today through his extensive patronage system. Compared to other Arab popular movements, Yemen’s transition process was relatively peaceful, mainly because it was brokered under the aegis of the Gulf Co-operation Council.

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In accordance with the GCC deal Sana’a launched the National Dialogue Conference in order to find a much needed political modus vivendi between the opposing religious and tribal factions. The Sunni-Shiite division and complex inter-tribal confrontations still shape contemporary Yemen. In 2014 an agreement was reached, which envisaged Yemen’s future in a federal structure with increased political role of the provinces.

Presumably, this year’s mid-September marks a turning point in the road to transition. Recently, as part of broader economic reforms, the new Hadi-administration decided to lift fuel subsidies and as a consequence the price of oil nearly doubled. This move triggered the Shiite minority al-Houthi group to organize a mass protest in the capital. The originally peaceful protest soon escalated and they have seized strategically important government facilities and valuable military assets such as tanks and weaponry. The Houthis demanded the restoration of fuel prices and the resignation of the Hadi government.

The coup-attempt was ended with the UN-brokered Peace and National Partnership Agreement.

As a result of the compromise, Hadi agreed to cut fuel prices, to form a new cabinet and to appoint advisers nominated by the Houthis and also members of a separatist movement in the south. Simultaneously, the UN Security Council and the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Saleh and two Houthi leaders for threatening peace and security. The most relevant question today to ask is whether the fresh and yet fragile political cooperation can bring the long awaited stability in the country, or Yemen plunge into a deeper chaos.

In order to understand the political turmoil in Yemen, one has to identify the key domestic players. The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, or Partisans of God are a religious Zaidi Shiite movement. During the Saleh-era the group’s grievances remained unaddressed and since 2004, Saleh – ironically he is a Houthi as well – fought six wars against them. Despite longtime oppression, in September one thing became crystal clear: This is the very first time in the post-Saleh era, which provided a window of opportunity for the Houthis to be included in domestic politics. For today, the once loosely united Shiite movement enjoys the broad support both from Shiite and Sunni factions of the society. The Houthis constantly increased their political influence since the emergence of the political vacuum, which remained after Saleh.

The UN-Deal therefore can be seen as a logical consequence of their nearly three year long campaign. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that both Saleh and the Iranian leadership support the Houthis.

The other dominant actor, who contributes to Yemen’s instability is the al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is the most powerful and lethal regional affiliate of the al-Qaeda complex. The Sunni radical terrorist group was formed in 2009 and consists of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian al-Qaeda branches. AQAP announced its support for ISIS back in August 2014.

Their main enemies are the Shiite Houthis, because AQAP claims that the Houthis are apostates and they are ultimately serving the interests of Tehran. Since mid-September AQAP declared 4

open war against them and called Sunnis to fight against the Shiite rebels. The most troublesome aspect of the increased tension between these two groups is that Yemen could easily descent into a full-scale sectarian war if AQAP continue its attacks against the Houthis. Furthermore, this may lead to more al-Qaeda cooperation with ISIS to fight the common Shiite enemy.

The already tense situation become further complex if one takes into account the so-called ‘southern-cause’. The Southern Movement, al-Herak in Arabic, is a fractious group, which was established in 2007 to oppose the Saleh administration The independence from the northern dominance have been a long and often violent struggle for the movement. It is interesting to note that current President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi is also coming from the once Marxist-led southern part of Yemen. Despite this fact, so far no tangible improvement happened regarding their vulnerable position in the county. The relevance of the southern part of Yemen lies in geostrategic reasons. Most of the economic activity takes place in Aden’s port and this is the home of oil production. Appropriately understanding the inability of the Southern Movement to influence politics requires closer understanding of the internal fractionalization of al-Herak.

The main obstacle in front of achieving political gains is that, contrary to the Houthis, the movement lacks a centralized leadership. Consequently, they cannot compete with the Houthis, but the recent deal might serve as a first step in the direction of political integration.

In order to arrive at a satisfactory investigation, one should not overlook the various international and regional interests, which are presented and constantly form Yemen’s political space. These often conflicting interests further complicate the Yemeni political Puzzle.

Generally speaking, the international community seeks to ensure that Yemen successfully complete the road to democracy. The main interest of the Western world is to destroy the capabilities and the core leadership of the AQAP in order to prevent attacks on Western soil.

Since 2002, as part of its global counter-terrorism efforts, the United States conducts covert drone strikes in Yemen. Since AQAP declared allegiance to the ISIS, the aim of U.S. drone strikes target became multifold. That means, unmanned aircrafts should simultaneously defeat AQAP and prevent the group from providing further strongholds for ISIS. The most prominent external actors in Yemen are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and it’s ancient enemy, Iran. Through the Saudi-Iranian lenses, Yemen is another battleground for hearts and minds and a proper arena for regional power projection. The current political turmoil enables the two powers to support, train and even arm their favorable groups. Saudi Arabia’s main interest in this respect is to halt the escalation of sectarian violence and to prevent AQAP from launching new attacks from the territory of its neighbor. The royal family supports the central Sunni leadership in order to defeat the increasing influence of the Shiite Houthi movement. In March, Saudi Arabia declared the Houthis a terrorist organization and explicitly put it in the same category with AQAP.

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On other side, Iran fully supports the Houthis with training and religious leadership. A member of the Iranian parliament, Ali Reza Zakani, said last month that Sanaa would become the new episode of the Iranian revolution.1 The Iranian leadership welcomed the recent political results by the Houthis and expressed its desire to further expand - beyond the borders of Yemen - the Shiite sphere of influence.

As discussed above, the newly established government had to face a myriad of internal and external pressures. The implications of the recent political events in Yemen will definitely not stay within the borders of the country. If the current unrest continues, Yemen might evolve to a new safe haven of such terrorist groups as the ISIS. What is needed is a strong and coercive central government, which is able to implement the transition process in the entire country. In the absence of a locally accepted Leviathan however other, external actors have to grant stability. Nevertheless, the strategic location of the country and the political vacuum together with the high level of dissatisfaction among the locals might serve as an impetus for ISIS to infiltrate inside Yemen and join their forces with the AQAP. An ISIS-AQAP alliance could result in an even more significant terror threat for the entire international community. Therefore, it is prudent to closely scrutinize every step in Yemen.

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Middle East Monitor (2014): Sanaa is the fourth Arab capital to join the Iranian revolution,

downloaded:

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14389-sanaa-is-the-

fourth-arab-capital-to-join-the-iranian-revolution, 14.November 2014

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