More Discord than Accord? AUKUS, The EU, and the Indo-Pacific Regional Security Architectures

A J R C A N A LY S E S

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE AJRC2021E23

Rahul Mishra – Peter Brian M. Wang

MORE DISCORD THAN ACCORD? AUKUS, THE EU, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES

d i g i t a l i s t u d a s t a r. a j t k . h u

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MORE DISCORD THAN ACCORD? AUKUS, THE EU, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES RAHUL MISHRA – PETER BRIAN M. WANG

The emergent Indo-Pacific order is anything but static. Fast-surfacing permutation and combination of major stakeholders and their individual and collective strategies to shape the Indo-Pacific order are unfolding with each passing day. In mid-September itself, two new Indo-Pacific strategies were formally launched. The European Commission and the EU High Representative presented a Joint Communication on the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy.

Just a day earlier, the US, the UK, and Australia established a new trilateral security pact with the unimaginative acronym, AUKUS. Both invited very different responses, but that may have been the intention, and while the region is busy making sense of these two strategic initiatives, Japan, India, Australia, and the US - four leading proponents of the Indo-Pacific- held their first-ever in-person Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) Summit in New York on September 24.1 The EU’s strategy calls for increased engagement in the Indo-Pacific through strengthened partnerships with Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and India. In maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, the EU plans to step up cooperation with partners covering a vast array of areas: Digital governance and partnerships; Connectivity; Green transition; Ocean governance; Sustainable and inclusive prosperity; Security and defence; and Human security. In short, the strategy aims to foster a rules-based international order, tackling climate change and promoting transcontinental connectivity between Asia and Europe.

AUKUS, on the other hand, is unquestionably a security pact involving the US, the UK, and Australia. Its objective is to promote deeper information and technology sharing and interoperability, particularly in industrial and security areas. It began with the announcement that Australia would be procuring nuclear-powered submarines from the US, perhaps an indication of where the priorities of AUKUS will be.2 Intriguing by its timing and controversial since its birth, AUKUS has naturally attracted more attention. This is not surprising for while both initiatives have been designed with China in mind, the European initiative is unmistakably premised on cooperation and rather sedate, while AUKUS seems to be unashamedly confrontational. Reactions among key players have been mixed. Unsurprisingly, China has described AUKUS as an

Launched in 2007, the Quad is a security-centric minilateral group involving Japan, India, Australia, and the US. It aims to boost strategic, defence, and diplomatic cooperation among these four countries.

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The authors acknowledge the support of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence Project (Project Number: 586907- EPP-1-2017-1- MY-EPPJMO-CoE).

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initiative that is “extremely irresponsible” and “seriously undermines regional peace and stability and intensifies the arms race” (Aukus 2021). Indonesia and Malaysia (Malaysia 2021) have stated their concerns, worried that it would lead to an arms race that could destabilise the region.

Japan and Singapore (Yeo 2021), the US allies in the region, have been more measured with their responses, with both welcoming any effort that would constructively contribute to ensuring a free and open, peaceful, and stable Indo-Pacific. India’s response has been rather muted although experts believe it will benefit India (Mohan 2021). The most negative reaction has come from France, a major EU and Indo-Pacific power and one of the founding members of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) – the decadesold military pact considered the cornerstone of post-World War Transatlantic relations.

The US-Australia submarine pact came alongside the cancellation of the France-Australia defence deal, making France AUKUS’s first victim; even prompting the French Foreign Minister to describe it as “a stab in the back” (Vock 2021). The question now is what the impact AUKUS will have in the region, especially on the existing and new security architecture being developed.

AUKUS AND REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURES It is still unclear what the goal of establishing AUKUS is. Minilateral arrangements are normally established to push a bigger agenda. If the goal of AUKUS is to protect the liberal rules-based Indo-Pacific order, and drawing support for it, this has dented that effort based on the responses from France, Germany, the EU, Malaysia, and Indonesia so far. AUKUS was advanced in such secrecy that even their long-time allies and friends knew little about it.

The French for sure were caught by surprise. Did Canada and New Zealand know anything?

Were India and Japan aware? Perhaps, we have to wait for years to know the complete story.

And what of its impact on the balance of power in the region, and China specifically? If this was meant to hurt China through strengthening alliances with like-minded countries, it has probably already turned counterproductive. China, despite its strong comments, has possibly come off better and this further confirms that there is a conscious effort to militarily deal with China. This is bound to have repercussions as it will raise alarm bells with countries that do not wish to see the existing economic interlinkages in the region affected by the great power rivalry. AUKUS is likely to hurt Australia more. Just eight submarines are not going to help Australia deter one of the world’s strongest militaries; it needs to pour in billions of dollars to stand up to China militarily. For all practical purposes, the US is and likely to remain the net security provider to Australia in the coming years.

Worse still, AUKUS will potentially put relations between the three and their other partners to the test. For sure there is the question of trust. Did the US, UK, and Australia not trust their partners enough to inform them? News reports emanating from Australia seem to indicate that at least India and Japan were aware, but considering these reports are coming from the Australians after the fact insinuates these are efforts to douse fires. It is for the first time ever that France has recalled its envoys from the US and Australia (Corbet 2021) and also cancelled the Franco-British Defence Ministers’ meeting (Sabbagh, Borger & Stewart 2021) and the first-ever India-France-Australia Foreign Minister Trilateral meeting that was to be

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held on the sidelines of the UNGA (Chaudhury 2021). From reports out there, relations are frayed and may take time to heal.

The towering unintended consequence of AUKUS is that it has put several existent security architectures and arrangements to the test of relevancy. The US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are members of the Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence-sharing alliance, which was an outcome of the UKUSA Agreement. Some have argued that AUKUS is different from FVEY as it focusses on military capability. Keeping AUKUS from the attention of France could be considered a calculated risk, but keeping it from FVEY partners in a way also questions whether the bonds built during World War II are still relevant. The least it does is to show that the times have changed. How will this impact the Quad and its efforts to expand its membership through Quad Plus is another issue of critical importance. However, Harsh Vardhan Sringla, the Foreign Secretary of India, has stated that AUKUS will not affect Quad’s functioning (LiveMint, 2021). With the creation of the core team, aka AUKUS, India, and Japan automatically turned into tier 2 Indo-Pacific partners; so do Canada, and New Zealand. Not to mention the so-called Quad Plus members who are already out of the ‘big league’ even before joining the bandwagon. Arguably, the launch of AUKUS on the sidelines or after the Quad Summit would have willy-nilly garnered the support of Japan and India – something which the US and Australia should have tried.

WHO IS TRULY BEHIND AUKUS? Considering the brickbats received so far, and the fact that AUKUS seems to go against conventional wisdom, one wonders who was at the driving seat. Criticism of AUKUS has been directed primarily at the US which was already reeling from its shambolic exit from Afghanistan.

It is difficult to see this as driven by the US primarily because it makes little sense for the US at this juncture, except, of course, the more than $50 billion-dollar defence deal. The USled Quad has been already dominating discussions in and around the region. Efforts have also been made to establish some form of Quad institutionalisation. There was growing interest within the region with even talk of potential new members in an expanding Quad (or Quad plus). It seems illogical to go ahead with an initiative that not only challenges the sensibilities of some of the potential members but also makes the current members peripheral as security providers to the Indo-Pacific region.

If it was just for the defence deals (the France-Australia deal was worth US$66 billion), the US could have made a bid as one of its initial bidders alongside France, Germany, and Japan, in 2016. This ‘deal’ looks like something that Trump would pull off, but he didn’t. Believing that AUKUS will tie the US further to the region’s security does not help either because the US is already bound by several military pacts with friends and allies in the region.

Australia seems the likely protagonist but considering that of all the Quad members, it is facing the most severe economic punishment, such a move seems riskier and might incite even stronger retaliation from China.

The UK seems to be the real beneficiary. It has been pushing to play a more prominent role in the region. We had earlier argued in another piece that the UK could have achieved this by strengthening the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) (Mishra & Wang 2021).

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But perhaps, that may not have been enough. AUKUS gives London the attention it has been seeking since the Brexit, made sweeter by the fact that its announcement came just a day before the EU announced its much-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy. The speed at which AUKUS was announced strengthens the hypothesis that London used AUKUS to steal the EU’s Indo-Pacific thunder, considering that it may have been more appropriate for the announcement to have been made after the Quad summit in New York.

WAY FORWARD The question now remains is how this will impact dynamics within the region and whether AUKUS is sustainable. Will it attract the support of the other members of the Quad? There are two ways that this can go. One, that shared concerns will force both India and Japan to accept AUKUS and even work together with it, even if they are unsure of the approach being taken. On the other hand, AUKUS may well reflect that the Quad has perhaps not met the US’ expectations of making it a hyper-security-centric Launchpad. AUKUS has also impacted both Japan and India’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies (Free and Open Indo-Pacific and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative respectively) which they have long been working on.

In the case of ASEAN, it is expected to remain ambivalent due to its differences in views with the US on the threat of China, and its preference not to jeopardise “ASEAN Centrality” (Strangio 2021). Even so, more pressure will be applied by both China and the US on ASEAN to choose sides, which is bound to affect ASEAN solidarity. The best-case scenario would see ASEAN firmly ambivalent; at the worst, it will break apart (though this scenario is highly unlikely).

The EU, which has endeavoured to play a more proactive role in the region, does not seem to change its approach in the Indo-Pacific. Whilst China remains a concern for the EU, it does not seem interested in tackling China militarily. This seems logical considering the varied interests are concerns of the EU members. The EU’s approach is robust, proactive, and direct and one that is premised on bringing “tangible gains to the table, the most important being the ‘normative dimensions of a rules-based and peaceful order” (Mishra 2021). AUKUS is the antithesis of that. With France smarting from their treatment, it is even more unlikely that AUKUS will obtain support from Germany and the EU (Blenkinsop & Emmott 2021), signs of which are already emerging (EU unveils 2021).

The EU might provide a good alternative as they could be seen as a more trustable partner to small and middle powers in the region now. It has been reported that New Zealand will possibly shift more towards the EU and the Pacific (McKenzie 2021). Interestingly, it was reported that India’s External Affairs Minister had spoken to his French counterpart after the announcement of AUKUS to speak on matters including Afghanistan, Indo-Pacific, and creating “a truly multilateral international order” (France to work 2021).

CONCLUSION AUKUS and the EU’s strategy reflects many things. It reflects how each views the rise of China and the nature of its relations with it. It reflects both their goals (the EU a multipolar world order; the US maintaining hegemony). It also reflects the preferred approach that

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the EU and the US (and its close allies) are willing and capable of pursuing (multilateralism vs unilateralism). It further showcases how the EU and the US view the region and the developments within at large. The US is often accused of viewing developments in the region too much from a security angle, while the EU views it more multidimensionally, perhaps also because unlike the US, it does not have to keep its regional hegemonic order in its favour. Developments so far on the Indo-Pacific front tell us that what was started as a mission to push China back and create a transparent rules-based order, isn’t going to be that straightforward and easy.

A positive thing about AUKUS, though, is that with its launch Australia, the UK, and the US have drawn a line in the sand. It also marks who they trust the most in the region, and India, Japan New Zealand, and South Korea (the so-called potential members of the to-belaunched Quad Plus) aren’t those – at least officially. The US has already made it clear that India and Japan will not be invited to join AUKUS (Hindustan Times, 2021). It is also clear that whatever the rhetoric is on ASEAN, the US, the UK, and Australia have given a strong hint that they aren’t going to put their money on her either. At the least, it will stop all the tiptoeing that’s been going on until now. The gauntlet has been thrown, exposing the rest of the countries to greater strategic anxieties and making the Indo-Pacific more contested.

Dr Rahul Mishra is a Senior Lecturer at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Malaysia, where he heads the European Studies programme. He is also associated with the University’s Centre for ASEAN Regionalism. His latest publications include Asia and Europe in the 21st Century New Anxieties, New Opportunities (Routledge, 2021) and India’s Eastward Engagement from Antiquity to Act East Policy (SAGE, 2019). He tweets @rahulmishr_ Peter Brian M. Wang is currently serving in the Malaysian Government and has held various portfolios, the majority of which was spent at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) of Malaysia. He is currently attached with the National Institute of Public Administration (INTAN) where he lectures and undertakes research on economic- and international relations-related policy. He is currently working on his PhD on the architecture of regional orders at the AsiaEurope Institute, University of Malaya.

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REFERENCES Aukus: UK, US and Australia launch pact to counter China (17 September 2021). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-58564837 AUKUS will not have any impact on the functioning of Quad says govt. (22 September 2021). LiveMint. https://www.livemint.com/news/world/aukus-will-not-have-any-impact-on-the-functioning-of-quad-saysgovt-11632254683447.html Blenkinsop, P. & Emmott, R. (21 September 2021). Germany warns of lost U.S. trust as France wins EU support. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-weighs-australia-options-urges-britain-restore-trust-2021-09-21/ Chaudhury, D. R. (22 September 2021). Aukus Impact: France Pulls Out of Trilateral with India, Oz. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/aukus-impact-france-pulls-out-of-trilateral-with-indiaoz/articleshow/86418998.cms Corbet, S. (18 September 2021). France recalls ambassadors to US, Australia over sub deal. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/france-recalls-ambassadors-us-australia-submarines-0322cefb3783f9e90ee8f 0c3a738717e EU unveils Indo-Pacific strategy in response to US-led pact (2021). DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/ en/eu-unveils-indo-pacific-strategy-in-response-to-us-led-pact/a-59203426 on 22 September 2021.

France to work with India to promote ‘truly multilateral’ order (18 September 2021). AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/18/france-work-with-india-promote-truly-multilateral-order Malaysia and Indonesia warn Australia’s Indo-Pacific pact could trigger nuclear arms race (18 September 2021).

South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3149286/malaysiaand-indonesia-warn-australias-indo-pacific-pact McKenzie, P. (18 September 2021). Aukus pact could push New Zealand to deepen relations with Europe and Pacific. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2021/sep/19/aukus-pact-couldpush-new-zealand-to-deepen-relations-with-europe-and-pacific Mishra, R. (4 August 2021). The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is Good News for ASEAN. RUSI. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/eus-indo-pacific-strategy-good-news-asean Mishra, R. & Wang P.B.M. (12 August 2021). The Five Power Defence Arrangements: time for the ‘quiet achiever’ to emerge. ASPI The Strategist. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-five-power-defence-arrangements-time-for-the-quiet-achiever-to-emerge/ Mohan, C. R. (16 September 2021). India Welcomes AUKUS Pact as China Deterrent. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/16/aukus-india-australia-uk-us-submarines/ No plan to include India and Japan in AUKUS security alliance yet: US. (24 September, 2021). Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/no-plan-to-include-india-and-japan-in-aukus-securityalliance-yet-us-101632423848914.html Sabbagh, D., Borger, J. & Stewart, H. (19 September 2021). UK-France defence summit cancelled in Aukus row. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/19/uk-france-defence-summit-cancelled-in-aukus-row Strangio, S. (17 September 2021). What Does the New AUKUS Alliance Mean for Southeast Asia? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/what-does-the-new-aukus-alliance-mean-for-southeast-asia/ Vock, I. (16 September 2021). “Stab in the back”: How the new Aukus pact sparked French outrage.

The New Statesman. https://www.newstatesman.com/security/2021/09/stab-in-the-back-how-the-newaukus-pact-sparked-french-outrage Yeo, M. (18 September 2021). What are the regional reactions to the new US-UK-Australia security pact?

Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/09/17/what-are-the-regionalreactions-to-the-new-us-uk-australia-security-pact/

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