Human mobility in the context of climate change and environmental risks—The case of Kiribati

A J R C A N A LY S E S

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE AJRC2021E15

Bianka Restás

HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS — THE CASE OF KIRIBATI

d i g i t a l i s t u d a s t a r. a j t k . h u

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© Bianka Restás, 2021 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2021 ISSN 2416-1705

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HUMAN MOBILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS — THE CASE OF KIRIBATI BIANKA RESTÁS

INTRODUCTION Climate change, along with migration, displacement and human mobility that it might trigger, has increasingly attracted global attention in recent years. Throughout human history, migration and climate have always been connected, however, the effects of climate change are likely to increasingly determine migration patterns in the future. It is well-known that climate change can act as a “risk multiplier” or “vulnerability multiplier”,1 as it might exacerbate existing tensions and challenges in those parts of the world that are already fragile due to socio-economic, political, or demographic factors. Environment and climaterelated natural hazards might not only aggravate these problems but could also intensify conflict dynamics in certain countries and force people to leave their homes and move to safer places. The current analysis aims to explain the nexus between climate change and human mobility, and also, the current and future challenges related to it. To do so, the author will present the case of Kiribati, a small country where the effects of climate change are already significantly impacting the the socio-economic structures.

UNHCR, the United Nations Refugee Agency calls attention to the fact that as a result of global warming, extreme weather events—such as heavy rainfall, drought, heatwaves, tropical storms—are becoming more unpredictable, intense, and regular, and they also increase the risk of further rapid- and slow-onset hazards, such as floods, landslides, erosion, wildfires, and desertification. In parallel, sea-level rise is causing increased coastal flooding, erosion, soil salinisation, and the risk of permanent inundation in low-lying areas.2 In 2019, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), found that nearly 1,900 disasters triggered approximately 24.9 million new displacements across 140 countries and territories worldwide. This is the highest figure recorded since 2012 and three times the number of displacements induced by conflict and violence. In the case of 23.9 million

Changing Climate, Changing Migration: No “Climate Refugees,” But Still a Role for the UN Refugee Agency.

Migration Policy Institute Podcasts. 19 April 2021. <https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkLnBvZGJlYW4uY29tL21pZ3JhdGlvbnBvbGljeS9mZWVkLnhtbA/episode/bWlncmF0aW9ucG9saWN5LnBvZGJlYW4uY29tL2FlZjYyMDUyLTk3YTktM2NkOS1hOTE5LTQ4NTU1NzE5YzA3Ng?sa=X&ved=0CAUQkfYCahcKEwjY79DbsrzwAhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAg&hl=hu > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

1

2 Tim Gaynor: ‘Climate change is the defining crisis of our time and it particularly impacts the displaced’. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 30 November 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/ latest/2020/11/5fbf73384/climate-change-defining-crisis-time-particularly-impacts-displaced.html > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

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people, weather-related events were the main reason behind the displacement, such as storms (13 million), floods (10 million), wildfires (528,500), droughts (276,700), landslides (65,800), and extreme temperature (24,500).3 It is well-recognised that in the most cases, displacement linked to climate change is taking place within national borders.4 For instance, people who are forced to leave as a consequence of extreme weather events such as hurricanes, cyclones, and floods, tend to stay as close to their homes as possible and return when the event ceased or its immediate impacts are reduced. On the contrary, displacement and movement across international borders is more likely to occur when additional factors are at play.5 Future climate change projections indicate that “previously unprecedented extreme weather events may become the norm rather than the exception and it is widely agreed that such events—in combination with other drivers of population exposure and vulnerability—will amplify the risk and challenges of displacement over the 21st century.”6 The elaboration of effective responses to these phenomena requires not only further research but also adequate local, national, and regional mitigation and adaptation strategies, disaster risk management plans, as well as increasing the resilience and capacity of the vulnerable populations around the world. While climate change has already started to show the magnitude of its negative impacts on the planet, people, and the socio-economic systems, governments and international organisations have launched several strategies and plans to both mitigate the effects and adapt to the changing environment.

LEGAL PROTECTION AND DEFINITION PROBLEMS: “CLIMATE REFUGEES” OR “PERSONS DISPLACED IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE”?

According to the definition of the International Organization for Migration, “environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”.7 Although the term “climate refugee” is gaining ground in the media, it should be underlined that the 1951

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC): Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020. <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/ > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

3

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: How climate change is multiplying risks for displacement. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 2 December 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/ stories/2020/12/5fc74f754/climate-change-multiplying-risks-displacement.html > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

4

Ibid.

5

Human mobility in the context of climate change UNFCCC-Paris COP-21. Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility. November 2015. <https://www.internal-displacement. org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201511-human-mobility-in-the-context-of-climate-changeunfccc-Paris-COP21.pdf > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

6

International Organisation for Migration: Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) — Glossary. July 2014. <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/meclep_glossary_ en.pdf?language=en > Accessed: 17 May 2021.

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Refugee Convention does not make provisions for people displaced by climate change.8 According to the Convention, a “refugee” is someone “who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.”9 In some circumstances (mentioned for instance in the OAU Convention adopted in 196910 and the Cartagena Declaration adopted in 198411), the definition extends to persons fleeing “events seriously disturbing public order.”12 Climate change typically creates internal displacement before it reaches an international level and forces people to move across borders. However, there might be circumstances when the refugee criteria of the 1951 Convention or the broader refugee criteria of regional refugee law frameworks could apply.

People may have a valid claim for refugee status, for instance, when the negative impacts of climate change interplay with armed conflicts and violence. Taking into consideration the above, in 2020, the UNHCR issued “Legal Considerations” to guide interpretation and direct international discussions towards such claims.13 Nevertheless, the term “climate refugee” is not endorsed by UNHCR yet, and it is more accurate to refer to “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change.”14 Even though the role of refugee law in providing answers to climate change-induced displacement is uncertain and limited, the principle of non-refoulement might provide a basis for protection in certain circumstances. Under international human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status.15 Taking into account that for instance, due to climate change, serious risks emerge in the case of low-lying islands in the Pacific Ocean, if there is no chance to save the livelihood and the land of people in these countries, security

Gaynor, 2020.

8

Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 3. <https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

9

OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis-Ababa. 10 September 1969. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 3. <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/oau-conventiongoverning-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html > Accessed: 21 May 2021.

10

Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. 22 November 1984. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 36. <https://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declarationrefugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html > Accessed: 21 May 2021.

11

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Climate change and disaster displacement.

UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. <https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.

14

United Nations Human Rights Office of The High Commissioner: The principle of non-refoulement under international human rights law. <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/ GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf > Accessed: 17 May 2021.

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conditions undoubtedly might render their migration as a forced one. Therefore, sending back people to a place that is under threat by rising sea-level can be considered inhuman and might also violate their right to life.16 It is important to note that international negotiations and agreements (e.g. The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change17; The Paris Agreement18; The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development19), and voluntary global compacts (Global Compact on Refugees20) in recent years have raised awareness for climate-induced displacement in certain contexts and also proposed legally nonbinding recommendations to provide solutions to vulnerable communities and individuals and to protect their rights.21 However, these recommendations are being considered and/ or implemented by states in most of the cases voluntarily, therefore, their effectiveness is significantly limited.

CLIMATE VULNERABILITY IN THE PACIFIC REGION AND KIRIBATI It is generally acknowledged that climate change is acting as a “risk multiplier” on food insecurity and adverse health conditions of communities in the Pacific region.22 Due to their low-lying topography, atoll23 islands are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and their inhabitants are in many cases being at risk due to limited land availability, and as a consequence, potential food insecurity and water stress. Kiribati, the country with the lowest GDP per capita in the Pacific, can be described as a textbook example of climate vulnerability due to its limited land area, salinisation of aquifers, coastal erosion, the low elevation of islands, increasingly frequent “king tides,” and droughts. During the past few

Diana Wiszt: Tomorrow's Atlantis. In: Tamás Péter Baranyai—Cecília Varányi: In Focus: Environmental Migration, 2018/ 3. Antall József Knowledge Centre. 73. <https://digitalistudastar.ajtk.hu/en/in-focus/in-focusenvironmental-migration > Accessed: 17 May 2021.

16

The United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) first recognised the growing importance of human mobility with the adaptation of the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework.

17

The Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015 during the twenty-first Conference of Parties in Paris (COP21), when persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change were rendered more visible within the wider international policy arena.

18

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. United Nations Department of Economic and Social AffairsSustainable Development. <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal13 > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

19

20 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Part II. Global Compact on Refugees. United Nations, New York, 2018. 2-3. <https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

Changing Climate, Changing Migration: Who Manages Climate Migration? Evolving Global Governance.

Migration Policy Institute Podcasts. 2 April 2021. <https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkLnBvZGJlYW4uY29tL21pZ3JhdGlvbnBvbGljeS9mZWVkLnhtbA/episode/bWlncmF0aW9ucG9saWN5LnBvZGJlYW4uY29tL2U2YTk2YjY1LTZmODctM2RjOC1iM2ZlLWZhZDdlNTdkMWNmZg?sa=X&ved=0CAUQkfYCahgKEwjY79DbsrzwAhUAAAAAHQAAAAAQuyE&hl=hu > Accessed: 9 May 2021.

21

22 John P. Cauchi—Ignacio Correa-Velez—Hilary Bambrick: Climate change, food security and health in Kiribati: a narrative review of the literature. Global Health Action. Volume 12, 2019 - Issue 1. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. gov/pmc/articles/PMC6507958/ > Accessed: 10 May 2021.

23 An atoll is a ring-shaped coral reef, island, or series of islets. An atoll surrounds a body of water called a lagoon. Sometimes, atolls and lagoons protect a central island. Channels between islets connect a lagoon to the open ocean, or sea. Source: National Geographic. <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/atoll/ > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

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years, Kiribati caught the headlines with increasing frequency in relation to its vulnerability to climate change, and several articles pointed out that there is an increasing risk that the atolls that make up Kiribati might submerge in this century due to sea-level rise.24 The submersion of small island states in the Pacific might become a reality due to sea-level rise in this century, therefore, the lowest-lying islands (Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands) will need to take concrete actions to provide security to their inhabitants with the support of the international community. The worst-case scenarios suggest that entire populations will be forced to relocate or will become displaced, and as a consequence, their future is highly uncertain.25 Kiribati is located in the central Pacific Ocean and consists of 33 atolls (with a maximum height of 3 to 4 m above mean sea-level), with a total land area of about 800 square km, and an Exclusive Economic Zone of 3.5 million square km of ocean. Kiribati includes three island groups, the Gilbert Islands, the Line Islands, and the Phoenix Islands with a total population of 117,606 people. Tarawa, the capital city of Kiribati—located about halfway between Hawaii and Australia—is one of the most densely populated areas in the world, and home to around half of Kiribati’s total population.26 Most people live a subsistence lifestyle, as the country is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, having only a few natural resources. The main industries are tourism and the exports of fish and fish products, ships, coconut oil, and copra, while its main agricultural products are coconut, roots/tubers nes, banana, vegetables, taro, tropical fruit, poultry, pork, nuts, and eggs.27 The increase of global temperature affects the health of coral reef ecosystems in Kiribati causing coral bleaching,28 and in parallel, climate change, through its impacts on sea-level rise, also leads to coastal erosion and saltwater intrusion. As the United Nations Development Programme and other international organisations highlight, the more frequent and damaging storm surges bounding on the edges of the land will reduce agricultural productivity in Kiribati, such as pandanus varieties and coconut.29 The combination of its geographic location and economic situation makes Kiribati one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, and the abovementioned challenges will significantly determine the future of its already vulnerable and resource-constrained population in several ways. As mentioned, Kiribati is a place where the impacts of climate change have already had severe consequences on

Cauchi et al., 2019. 1.

24

Wiszt, 2018. 72.

25

The United Nations Sustainable Development Group: Kiribati. <https://unsdg.un.org/un-in-action/kiribati > Accessed: 4 May 2021.

26

The World Factbook: Kiribati. Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/ countries/kiribati/ > Accessed: 6 May 2021.

27

28 Warmer water temperatures could result in coral bleaching. When water is too warm, corals will expel the algae (zooxanthellae) living in their tissues causing the coral to turn completely white. This process is defined as coral bleaching. When a coral bleaches, it is not dead, therefore, it can survive a bleaching event. However, they are under more stress and are subject to mortality. Source: National Ocean Service <https://oceanservice. noaa.gov/facts/coral_bleach.html > Accessed: 6 May 2021.

United Nations Development Programme: Kiribati. <https://www.adaptation-undp.org/explore/asia-andpacific/kiribati > Accessed: 6 May 2021.

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food and water security, infrastructure, human health, and consequently, the well-being of its population. Kiribati is also in a precarious food situation, and as a result of climate change, the country’s food production dropped and its population is relying heavily on imported food, in many cases of poor nutritional quality, leading to high levels of noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) such as diabetes, hypertension, and heart diseases. Along with its geopraphy, population pressures and limited infrastructure both contribute to the vulnerability of the country in terms of food security and health.30 We might presume that the country will experience a significant increase in migration tendencies in the future due to the many challenges it is facing, however, the results of a fieldwork (we will present some of them below) carried out in Kiribati demonstrate that the majority of its population will not be able to leave Kiribati or not even planning to do so. The main questions that derive from these facts is how the country will be able to protect its population, land, territory (and in case the worst scenario happens, its statehood), and what might be the role of the international community to support the country in this particularly problematic context.

MAIN LIVELIHOOD RISKS AND PROBLEMS

DIRECT IMPACT

INDIRECT IMPACT

KING TIDES

Floods

Crops, erosion, wells, no shelter

LACK OF GOVERNMENTAL HELP

Unavailability of funding

Construction of seawalls, tanks for rainwater

UNEMPLOYMENT

Starvation, high crime rate

Sickness spreads, insecurity, and corruption

LACK OF TOILETS

Pollution of air and sea

Unsafe drinking water, contaminated seafood, and wells; sickness spreads

OVERCROWDED HOMES

Limited space

Land conflict

RUBBISH

Destroyed food crops, dust, pollution

No domestic or commercial food

DOMESTIC FIGHTS

Abuse of women

Family disputes, insecurity for children, discrimination of women and children

Figure 1: Livelihood risks in South Tarawa; source: PCCM Kiribati Fieldwork31

Cauchi et al., 2019. 6.

30

Robert Oakes—Andrea Milan—Jillian Campbell: Kiribati: Climate Change and Migration Relationships Between Household Vulnerability, Human Mobility and Climate Change. United Nations University (UNU).

November 2016. 37. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321028361_KIRIBATI_CLIMATE_CHANGE_ AND_MIGRATION_RELATIONSHIPS_BETWEEN_HOUSEHOLD_VULNERABILITY_HUMAN_MOBILITY_AND_ CLIMATE_CHANGE_REPORT > Accessed: 10 May 2021.

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SOUTH TARAWA

OUTER ISLANDS

AT LEAST ONE HAZARD

96%

93%

CYCLONE

26%

42%

DROUGHT& IRREGULAR RAIN

31%

41%

FLOODS

31%

38%

SEA-LEVEL RISE

85%

77%

SALTWATER INTRUSIONS

49%

49%

STORM SURGE

22%

27%

Figure 2: Natural hazards 2005-2015 (Proportion of household impacted); source: PCCM Kiribati Fieldwork 32

MIGRATION TENDENCIES IN KIRIBATI As indicated in figure 2, almost the totality of households were affected by one or more natural hazards in Kiribati in the period 2005-2015. While sea-level rise has impacted for around 80% of the households, saltwater intrusion has affected only half of them. All other types of hazards were more frequent in the outer islands than in South Tarawa.33 A report published by the United Nations University as part of the Pacific Climate Change and Migration (PCCM) Project highlighted that migration is a relatively rare occurrence in households of Kiribati, as less than one-tenth of I-Kiribati34 experienced a movement in previous decades.35 One in seven of all movements (internal and external) can be attributed to environment (14%), meaning that climate change (and associated events/natural hazards) is the third most important reason behind migration after work (42%) and education (26%).36 There are significant differences in migration patterns between the islands of Kiribati: people from Kiritimati are more likely to move overseas (31%) than migrants from South

Ibid. 36.

32

Ibid. 35.

33

The term “I-Kiribati” refers to Kiribatian people and also to their nationality.

34

The report presents the results of the first nationally representative empirical study of relationships between household vulnerability, human mobility, and climate change in the Pacific. Findings are based upon quantitative and qualitative fieldwork carried out in Kiribati during the early part of 2015 by researchers from the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) and the University of the South Pacific (USP). Project fieldwork involved the implementation of a total of 377 household surveys in South Tarawa (72), North Tarawa 103), Marakei (75), Kiritimati (Christmas Island) (75), and Butaritari (52). Participatory Research Approach (PRA) tools and a Q study were used to complement the overall analysis. An Agent-Based Model (ABM) was developed using the data generated from the fieldwork to simulate the future flows of migrants from Kiribati and migration patterns within Kiribati.

35

36 Oakes—Milan—Campbell, 2016. 42.

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Tarawa (19%) and the outer islands (11%).37 It is important to point out that a large part of the population in Kiribati has not been able to migrate. In the first decade of the 2000s, almost 10,000 people wanted to migrate but could not. The most important reason that prevented migration was the lack of money (75% of all women and 73% of all men), followed by health reasons, family reasons (looking after family members), lack of contacts/jobs at destination countries, and lack of visa/permits.38 According to the household survey, 10,480 movements took place from these islands in the period between 2005-2015, meaning that approximately 10% of the population migrated, of which 79% internally, 13% externally, and 8% for seafaring.39 While almost three-quarters of internal migrants from the Outer Islands moved to South Tarawa, from South Tarawa, a significant number of migrants went to Kiritimati. The results presented by the report demonstrate that internal migration is much more common in Kiribati than international migration. Figure 3 shows that the most common destination for those who migrate externally is New Zealand, followed by Fiji, Australia, and the Marshall Islands.40

DESTINATION

OVERALL

FROM SOUTH TARAWA

FROM OUTER ISLANDS

FIJI

21%

22%

18%

NEW ZEALAND

24%

11%

43%

AUSTRALIA

7%

11%

0%

MARSHALL ISLANDS

16%

22%

5%

OTHER INTERNATIONAL

32%

34%

34%

100%

100%

100%

TOTAL

Figure 3: International migration destinations; source: PCCM Kiribati Fieldwork41

Ibid. 11.

37

Ibid. 54.

38

Seafaring is a vital industry for Kiribati.

39

Ibid. 39-40.

40

Ibid. 40.

41

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REASONS FOR MIGRATION

PERCENTAGE OF INTERNAL MIGRANTS

PERCENTAGE OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

ENVIRONMENT

19%

1%

EDUCATION

28%

28%

MEDICAL AND OTHER

19%

25%

WORK

34%

46%

Figure 4: Internal and international migration by reason; PCCM Kiribati Fieldwork42

The above chart highlights that the proportion of those individuals who migrated internationally as a consequence of environmental reasons reached only 1% in the examined period, while 19% of all internal movements were carried out for the same reason. As already mentioned, many of those who had the intention to migrate, were not able to do so. Those households with people who wanted to migrate but could not, are potentially more vulnerable, therefore, that part of Kiribati’population might become “trapped.” Whether people migrate or not, as a consequence of the negative impacts of climate and environmental change, depends mainly on people’s perception of three factors: firstly, their need to leave, secondly, their desire to leave, and finally, their ability to leave. When people do not feel the need or the desire to migrate despite the problematic circumstances they are facing, immobility does not necessarily lead to negative consequences, for instance when a community has enough resources and/or tools to adapt to these circumstances. However, when people feel the need and the desire to migrate but do not have the means to do so, they can become “trapped” in hazardous circumstances (figure 5).43 This might be one of the future scenarios that a significant part of I-Kiribati could face in the future. It is important to highlight, that even though international migration is currently a relatively rare occurrence for households in Kiribati, there might be a significant increase in movements in the future due to the impacts of climate change and population growth. More than 70% of the households surveyed believe that migration will be unavoidable if the sea-level rise and flooding will further worsen, increasing the amount of saltwater intrusion and the loss of agricultural yields.44

Ibid. 43.

42

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Environment and Climate Change (MECC) Division: Trapped populations. <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/trapped-populations > Accessed: 11 May 2021.

43

Oakes—Milan—Campbell, 2016. 12.

44

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Figure 5: Source: International Organization for Migration

CONCLUSION—THE FUTUE OF KIRIBATI AND THE IMPORTANCE OF MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION As environment and climate related changes and extreme weather affect the livelihood, safety, health, economic stability, food and water security of an increasing number of people worldwide, one possible adaptation response of these individuals might be to move to places where their future perspectives are more favourable. Migration as a result of climate vulnerability and environmental risks might be a more and more relevant scenario for the affected individuals in the future. As migration decisions are often attributable to several, interconnected socio-economic, political, and cultural factors and rarely to environmental stress alone, it is particularly challenging to estimate the potential future magnitude of international migration in response to climate change. Even when climate change does play a role, it remains difficult to determine the extent of its influence. It must be underlined that it is easier to measure the impacts of sudden-onset events (e.g. hurricanes and disasters) compared with human movement in response to slow-onset events (e.g. sea-level rise or desertification). For instance, if there is a longer period of drought in a country or region, it is hard to estimate at what point an individual will decide to leave, and especially, how this factor will interact with other root causes. As causality in the case of climate-induced migration is particularly complex, more research is needed to understand the patterns and trends related to environment and climaterelated migration.

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As the present analysis underlined, climate change can act ask a “risk multiplier” or “vulnerability multiplier,” and might interact with other relevant push and pull factors, i.e. circumstances in origin and destination countries that might trigger individuals to migrate.

In the case of Kiribati, environmental vulnerability is present together with several other challenges, for instance, health problems, demographic factors, economic instability, and remoteness. It is important to remember that the vast majority of people affected by climate change remain in their origin country as internally displaced persons (IDPs45) and do not have the intention and/or the necessary tools to cross borders and continents.

If the second is the case, affected populations might become “trapped” in hazardous circumstances. Migration is only one possible scenario for individuals affected by the impacts of climate change. Even though the inhabitants of low-lying islands located in the Pacific are “classic candidates” for potential future international migration, it must be noted that these individuals in many cases—as in the case of Kiribati’s population—have a very strong connection with their land, culture, and tradition, and consequently, they do not even consider migration as an option.

It is therefore of crucial importance to support these vulnerable communities and make their life more resilient and safe. Mitigation and adaptation strategies and strengthening their capacity must be central priorities for national and international instruments and organisations in these regions and countries. The role of development aids and projects is also fundamental, as well as the implementation of national emergency response plans, early warning systems (for instance utilising satellite data to predict future events), disaster risk reduction, and sustainable land management projects. The importance of adaptation measures and the integration of climate risks in water management must also be emphasised to mitigate the increasing water stress. However, these instruments in places where the impacts of climate change are already too severe might not be sufficient, thus, relocation or displacement most likely will be unavoidable in certain situations. If this will be the case, bilateral agreements and regional cooperation networks might have an increasing role in realising dignified relocation. The government of Kiribati and Tuvalu has already purchased land from Fiji intending to prepare for the relocation of their population.

Besides land purchase, area growth by building artificial islands has also been considered as a potential solution for countries being at risk as a consequence of sea-level rise, however, the realisation of such projects would be particularly expensive.46 Futuristic visions of floating houses47 have also been taken into account, another idea that would require a significant amount of financial and human resources. The impacts of climate change cannot be tackled only by the affected international organisations or countries, therefore,

IDPs are “[P]ersons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”

45

Wiszt, 2018. 73.

46

Kiribati Floating Houses. World Architecture News. <https://worldarchitecture.org/architecture-projects/ hfvmm/kiribati-floating-houses-project-pages.html > Accessed: 28 May 2021.

47

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wide-scale international cooperation, involving all relevant actors is of crucial importance.

In December 2019, the European Council set the goal of achieving climate neutrality in 2050, thus fulfilling the most ambitious aspirations of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, the international community has committed to hold the increase of global average temperature below 2°C, as close as possible to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.48 These commitments can be evaluated as positive signs of strengthened international cooperation, however, achieving these goals will require various forms of cooperation, as well as concrete, targeted actions. Low-lying islands in the Pacific Ocean are already experiencing the severe impacts of global warming and climate change, therefore their existence and statehood are at stake. They do not have time for long-term action plans, they need immediate responses.

2050 long-term strategy. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

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Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences