The Realities of the US – Japan Defense Alliance — A Crash Course in the Wake of the US Presidential

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

THE REALITIES OF THE US – JAPAN DEFENSE ALLIANCE — A CRASH COURSE IN THE WAKE OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS EMESE SCHWARCZ

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

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© Emese Schwarcz, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

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THE REALITIES OF THE US – JAPAN DEFENSE ALLIANCE— A CRASH COURSE IN THE WAKE OF THE US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS EMESE SCHWARCZ

FOREWORD1 The Japanese-American defense alliance has been a defining factor in Japan’s foreign and defense policy for more than 70 years. With the enactment of the pacifist constitution in 1947, this new rulebook—and especially its famed Article 9—stripped the country of its sovereign right to wield war as a way of sorting out international conflicts, while it also established a prohibition on maintaining air, navy, or ground forces as part of a national army. Additionally, the Japanese Government is obliged to allow and pay for American military bases to be built on Japanese soil. In return, under the ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan’,2 the US forces stationed in Japan are to defend the country’s territorial waters, provide an anti-ballistic missile capability, and through disaster response in cooperation with the Japanese Self Defense Forces. As a result, Japan currently gives home to 84 American military facilities, their headquarters being the Yokota Air Base in the capital city, Tōkyō. Their largest accumulation is on the southern island, Okinawa, which hosts approximately 25,000 troops.3 The American military presence serves a primarily geopolitical goal, because from Okinawa, the US can keep the East Asian region under surveillance, which is—and was during the Cold War—a key tool to monitor Russia and China. And while for a country completely demolished during World War II, this was a viable solution for outsourcing national security in order to focus all available resources on rebuilding the country economically and quite literally.

However, in modern times, this unusual reliance is slowly turning into a liability, hanging over Japan’s proverbial head, much like the Sword of Damocles. The changing regional power balance and geopolitical realities have reshaped core necessities and objectives for both Japan and the US. With it came a differing general perception in Japanese—mainly Okinawan—people as well, regarding the presence of US soldiers and bases. Seventy years has passed since the end of World War II, and during this period, much dissatisfaction and even hatred grew towards the soldiers, due to dangerous traffic accidents, murders,4 rape

I would like to thank Zsolt Pálmai for his invaluable help in writing this paper.

1

Available on the following link: <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html >

2

John Feffer: Okinawa: Will the Pandemic Transform U.S. Military Bases? Institute for Policy Studies. 20 July 2020. <https://ips-dc.org/okinawa-will-the-pandemic-transform-u-s-military-bases/ > Accessed: 2 November 2020.

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4 Julian Ryall: Anti-US rage: rapes, murders, accidents, and now this in Okinawa. South China Morning Post.

1 January 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2126112/anti-us-rage-rapes-murdersaccidents-and-now-okinawa > Accessed: 20 October 2020.

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crimes,5 pollution, and general violation of domestic laws6 and COVID-19 countermeasures.

In this paper, I will summarize the current state of the US-Japan security alliance, with a quick look at its possible future and present challenges.

THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE, IN LOCAL TERMS The animosity towards the American troops in the past few decades escalated to a point where it translates to local politics. The Okinawan people elected Denny Tamaki (his original name being Tamaki Dennis) for the post of governor in 2018, a politician known for his family background that many Okinawans can relate to: Tamaki was raised by a Japanese single mother, and had an American father who he never knew. He currently serves as one of the most important engines for the conflict between Okinawa Prefecture and the central administration of the country, but also between Okinawa Prefecture and the US administration. It is a biaxial dispute, mainly because the Abe Administration has always backed the American standpoint.7 So far, at the time of writing this paper, the newly-established Suga Government has yet to comment on the most pressing issue, said issue being the plans to relocate Okinawa’s largest US base, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The problem (for the Okinawans) is not necessarily the notion of even the relocation of the base―on the contrary, many have been advocating for it at least since the 1990s, but plans were formulated for it much earlier.8 But the fact that the base is located in the very center of Ginowan city, therefore noise, ground (soil contamination), and air pollution became a major issue over the years, not to mention potential threats to public safety caused by military activities. Even American experts have stated before that the base is violating safety standards set by the US Department of the Navy.9 The many aircraft accidents that happened in the past 30-40 years backs this view up.

It is simply impossible to operate a military base so close to residential areas. Therefore, the plan to move the base elsewhere was drawn up. The question―and the point of contention―is the where. The US leadership chose the less-populated Henoko, a coastal district of Nago city northeast to Ginowan, which is absolutely unacceptable to the Okinawans and their political representation, for many reasons. The three principal ones being: 1. Okinawa Prefecture already houses 71% of all US facilities present in Japan, which places an unfair burden on the southernmost prefecture. The base should be relocated elsewhere in Japan.

5 Beihei ni yoru seihanzai, kichi no gai de ōi keikō, saita wa Naha-shi 65-ken. Okinawa Times. 21 October 2020. <https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/651034 > Accessed: 30 October 2020.

US Military Base Issues in Okinawa. Okinawa Prefectural Government. September 2011. <https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/documents/us%20military%20base%20issues%20in%20 okinawa.pdf > Accessed: 29 October 2020.

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Linda Sieg: Japan to push ahead with U.S. base relocation despite Okinawa referendum result. Reuters. 25 February 2019. <https://reut.rs/3k7HzGI > Accessed: 9 November 2020.

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8 Futenma chronology: Outrage sparked relocation. The Japan Times. 22 November 1999. <https://bit. ly/38qIQqj > Accessed: 9 November 2020.

C. Douglas Lummis: Futenma: ‘The Most Dangerous Base in the World’. The Diplomat. 30 March 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/futenma-the-most-dangerous-base-in-the-world/ > Accessed: 10 November 2020.

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2. Environmental protection. The Henoko and Oura Bay area hosts more than 250 endangered species. Protective measures to preserve biodiversity have not been developed.10 3. Tectonic vulnerability. There are active earthquake fault lines beneath the shoreline, which poses extreme risk to any facility built in the vicinity. Soil has also been deemed too soft for construction, the correction of which would be time consuming, way too expensive, and damaging to the environment.11 The political leadership of Okinawa have supported these points in different ways. First, the then-Governor of Okinawa, Onaga Takeshi withdrew the prefectural government’s permit for the landfill and construction in 2015, which was later revoked by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in 2019.12 The case was reignited later, and was brought to the Supreme Court, but the court ruled in favor of the central government. Onaga however did not give up―he travelled to the US to convince officials and senators to support the cause, but to no avail.13 When Denny Tamaki took over the governor’s seat, he initiated a public referendum over the question of the relocation in 2019. More precisely, the question of the referendum was “Should Futenma be relocated to Henoko?”. And while the turnout was sufficient, there was a problem with it: this referendum was legally and politically nonbinding, even if 72% voted against the move.14 And this is very important: the fact that the central government is willing to disregard the plight of its people, for the sake of keeping a military alliance steady, bears no small relevance. Especially in a larger context.

BURDENS OF THE ALLIANCE―TWO SIDES OF A COIN We have discussed some of the social and environmental burdens that comes with housing military facilities of a foreign country, but we have so far avoided the elephant in the room: the financial burden. And this is a very important part of the US-Japan alliance, even more so in the wake of the US Presidential Elections.

Money matters―for some US presidents more, than for others. In that respect, President Donald Trump maintained a unique relationship with ex-Prime Minister Abe Shinzō during his presidency. On one hand, he welcomed Abe’s attempts at solidifying his “golf-diplomacy”, which was a strategy to stabilize the US-Japan alliance through building a personal relationship with President Trump―most of which was comprised of playing golf together

10 Why Do We Oppose the Relocation to Henoko? Okinawa Prefectural Government. 21 February 2017. <https://bit.ly/35imwwU > Accessed: 11 November 2020.

Yamashiro Hiroji-Kitaueda Tsuyoshi: More Reasons Why a New Base Must Not/Cannot Be Built at Henoko, Okinawa. The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus. 15 December 2018. <https://bit.ly/3lrsGAI > Accessed: 11 November 2020.

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Top court rejects Okinawa's bid to stop government filling in Henoko bay. The Japan Times. 27 March 2020. <https://bit.ly/3pfBzzs > Accessed: 11 November 2020.

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13 Shannon Tiezzi: In US, Okinawa Governor Pleads Case Against Base Relocation. The Diplomat. 4 June 2015. <https://bit.ly/2IoOfmU > Accessed: 11 November 2020.

Okinawa: Tokyo to overrule referendum on US base. BBC. 25 February 2019. <https://bbc.in/32ydUAH > Accessed: 11 November 2020.

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and making phone calls, and quite regularly at that. For Abe, maintaining a good relationship meant ensuring his country’s previously outsourced defense, which, considering the rising North Korean ballistic threat and the growing Chinese military presence in the eastern waters, is a growing necessity. Critics of this outsourcing say that maintaining the US bases costs way too much for Japan: according to ex-Defense Minister Inada Tomomi, Japan covered 86,4% (approximately 191 billion yen) of the costs in 2015, and that percentage was not lower than 70% since the 1970s.15 That puts quite a considerable financial pressure on the country, especially if we take the economic performance in the last 30-or-so years into account, which has been far from ideal for a very long time. Starting from the oil shocks in the 1980’s, fighting through the 2008 global financial crisis, and then being ravaged by the 2011 Tōhoku Triple Disaster, time has not been kind to the Japanese economy. And while PM Abe’s economic policy, the so-called Abenomics was able to keep the economy at bay, the worsening effects of a rapidly ageing society, the postponed Tokyo Olympic Games, and now the COVID-19 global pandemic pushed the economy to the edge. And even with this baggage on its shoulders, the country’s leaders find it still appropriate, to pay for the US presence.

1. Table Japan's share in the costs of US military facilities, 2018

Facility

Japan’s share in funding

Approximate cost

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma

100%

USD 12,1 billion

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni

94%

USD 4,5 billion

Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

38%

USD 3,1 billion

Source: Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. 19 October 2018.

However, President Trump had other ideas. While the American public communication about the Trump-Abe relationship was always positive, the Trump presidency was not exactly ideal for the island nation. The US-China trade war for once had a damaging effect on the Japanese economy, but President Trump also made a surprising move when, regarding the payment for hosting American troops, he suddenly demanded Japan to pay a higher contribution sum, quadruple of the original, from March 2021 onward, when the current special measures agreement expires. That means that for roughly 54,000 troops, Japan should pay USD 8 billion yearly. He also made comments, even before his presidential win,

Ayako Mie: How much does Japan pay to host U.S. forces? Depends on who you ask. The Japan Times.

31 January 2017. <https://bit.ly/2IqcCQW > Accessed: 12 November 2020.

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that he deems the usual payments insufficient and unfair.16 Some say, that the demanded amount is only a start, and that it is standard procedure for the US administration, to haggle its way towards a final price.17 Such a high price however, is not something the current Japanese economy can easily swallow, and it pushed the country’s leadership to the need of bargaining with investment promises. Experts said the demand is a double-edged sword: in the event of Japan simply rejecting it, the US would suffer a lot more serious blow financially, should it pull out of the East Asian country. Of course, in the current constitutional legal framework, Japan cannot afford to lose the US alliance. Another interesting aspect of this cost-debacle is that the original text of the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with its later attachment does not require Japan to pay any more than the establishment of the military facilities.18 Right after the destruction of war, that is understandable, and when the country was on the rise economically by the 1970s, due to American pressure, Japan started to contribute more on a voluntary and extra-treaty basis. In this sense, technically, President Trump’s demand could have been disregarded, as Japan has no legal obligation to pay for not even more, but any cost. But regardless of the technical tidbits, Trump’s motley attitude towards Japan raises question about the future of the alliance. And that is not compensated by the fact that since then, Donald Trump has been voted out of office.

Another hiccup in the alliance was palpable, when then-Defense Minister Kōnō Tarō took the liberty to reject and opt out of the much-awaited Aegis Ashore ballistic missile system.

This system would have armed Japan―for the first time since the war―with a capability to strike incoming ballistic missiles before the projectile could reach Japanese territory. The decision surprised not only the US leadership, but apparently the Japanese as well. Kōnō argued that the systems would have cost much more than agreed, and the technology itself is imperfect in a way that it would endanger local communities, and correcting the software was unsuccessful up until this point, so a redesign would be needed.19 With local opposition, and weakening cabinet support rate, it made sense to abandon this plan―domestically, that is. As to what this means for the alliance, and the nation’s actual defense, is unclear.

Some analysts see a slight break of trust towards the US in this action, a sign that the Japanese see the social unrest related to the Black Lives Matter movement underlining deep systematic problems, that could translate to a weakening in the leading role of the US. 20 But then there is a strategic side to the cancellation, with defense-related consequences. From a defense point of view, a successful Aegis Ashore system would free up Aegis destroyers

16 Masaya Kato: Japan squeezed on US military base funding in election year. Nikkei Asia. 18 October 2020. <https://s.nikkei.com/2JY7dBj > Accessed: 12 November 2020.

Jesse Johnson: Trump demanded Japan cough up $8 billion for U.S. troops — or risk pullout, Bolton says.

The Japan Times. 22 June 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eTm6QZ > Accessed: 13 November 2020.

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18 Tanner Greer: American Bases in Japan Are Sitting Ducks. Foreign Policy. 4 September 2019. <https://bit.ly/3nmuaMP > Accessed: 12 November 2020.

Jeffrey W. Hornung: Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System. RAND Corporation. 6 July 2020. <https://bit.ly/32DSr9e > Accessed: 13 November 2020.

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20 Michael Unbehauen-Christian Decker: Japan Cancels Aegis Ashore: Reasons, Consequences, and International Implications. The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press. 25 September 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eVOdPf > Accessed: 13 November 2020.

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in Japanese waters, and so the US navy would be able to redeploy those, for example, to the South China Sea, where Chinese military presence is increasingly aggressive.21 In this sense, the Aegis Ashore system was as much a strategic investment for the Americans towards a more effective military presence in the region, as it was an important tool of protection for the Japanese against the North Korean missile threat. But because the system turned out to be faulty and expensive, if agreed, the Japanese would have funded US aspirations in the region, in exchange to their own defenses reduced for who knows how long. It must be said though, that abandoning the Aegis Ashore does not mean that Tōkyō wants to abandon these kind of defensive capabilities altogether, but this step will certainly have an aftereffect, and we should not cross out the possibility that Japan might aim to become a bit more independent regarding defense in the future. An indication was made for that when Japan drafted up plans for the development of a locally made next-generation fighter jet. Also, the strengthening of relations with India and Australia through the defense forum Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) makes way for alternative options for Japan.

THE BIDEN ERA Before we jump into long-term conclusions about the future of the US-Japan alliance, it is worth discussing what the new Biden presidency might bring to Japan. During his campaign, Joe Biden was not going into much detail about his plan regarding the East Asian allies, but he did emphasize his commitment to further strengthen relations with them and to make his country take on a bigger role in the region. Experts are skeptical about a meaningful relation, because President-elect Biden inherited a country divided in multiple levels: the economy must be nurtured back into health and social unity must be established first, before turning his eyes to the East Asian region.22 And that will take time. Besides, the US withdrawal from the Paris climate accord and the World Health Organization is still a point of interest for the rest of the world, mainly what the new President’s approach will be towards these questions, as it will greatly influence international relations.

In the case of the Futenma-Henoko relocation issue, local Japanese have expressed little to no hope that President-elect Biden will support their cause, as the chief decision-maker is the central government in this case.23 Notwithstanding the fact that Biden was the vice president in the Obama administration, which was a major advocate for the relocation. But that is not to say that Okinawans were hopeful before: during Donald Trump’s presidency, most were afraid of the US due to a lack of predictability, and the president’s hardliner approach towards China.

And as for the US-Japan alliance in whole, positive gestures were made during the first phone call between the two leaders. President-elect Biden―just like President Obama― made a reaffirmation on the US upholding the pledge written in Article 5 of the US-Japan Ibid.

21

Stephen R. Nagy: International disorder: Post-election realities for Japan and allies of the U.S. The Japan Times. 5 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/2IAD3n3 > Accessed: 16 November 2020.

22

For Okinawans, Biden offers little hope of shift on Futenma move. The Japan Times. 9 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/38Jckjj > Accessed: 16 November 2020.

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Security Treaty in the case of the Senkaku Islands dispute as well. Article 5 states that the American military forces are to defend Japanese territories in case of a foreign armed assault. This intent is suggestive in two ways: first, it shows that the Biden administration will follow a tougher approach against China’s military expansion in the East Asian region, and second, President-elect Biden is most probably committed towards the alliance. After all, he is yet to be sworn in, but he already established relations with Prime Minister Suga.

And while there was no mention of the relocation issue, the expiration date of the special measures agreement is rapidly approaching.

Should future president Joe Biden choose to mend relations with Japan, and should he be willing to renegotiate the base problem, the future for the US-Japan security alliance would be less bleak for sure, but that would require an immense expert team and a strong will on the American side. What seems to be certain is that much will depend on President-elect Biden’s approach to Japan, mostly what Japan will choose: to build a closer relationship with the US or to search for alternate allies, like Australia or India.

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