The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Transatlantic Security and NATO

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND NATO

DOMINIK P. JANKOWSKI

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

Contact: H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2 Phone: +36 20 310-87-76 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu Web: ajtk.hu/en

© Dominik P. Jankowski, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND NATO DOMINIK P. JANKOWSKI

The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a global public health crisis, with powerful security ramifications. NATO countries have been disproportionately impacted by the outbreak; five out of ten countries with the highest number of fatalities (as of late June 2020) were NATO allies.1 As of August 2020, the global death toll overpassed 800,000, with an estimated 23.8 million infections. The increased stress on public health systems has pushed many of them to maximum capacity. The broader ramifications are driven by measures governments have put in place to combat the rapid spread of the virus (the so-called “flattening the curve” campaign) by imposing social distancing, quarantines, lockdowns and temporary closure of borders as well as businesses. Because of its magnitude, economic dimension, and lethality, the COVID-19 crisis has raised a wide range of questions that pertain to how seismic the crisis is, how much it will shape international politics and security.

COVID-19: FIVE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES COVID-19 will have a significant impact on world politics. Andrea Gilli from the NATO Defense College in Rome offered a compelling overview of lessons identified and presented five strategic consequences of the pandemic which is bringing about an age of “bigness”: big choices, big divide, big tech, big state, and big retrenchment.2 All five pillars will have a direct impact on transatlantic security and NATO. Big choices means that COVID-19 will most probably once again prove that politics is, in fact, deeply path-dependent. Major events in the past—such as the end of the Cold War, 9/11, the 2008 financial crisis, the Russian aggression against Ukraine—show that even minor decisions can have major and long-lasting consequences.3 The crucial question is how the perceived effectiveness of the wider multilateral system—with an initial likely focus on the WHO, but spilling over into other organizations such as NATO—may spark intensified debates about the ideology, legitimacy, quality and future of the multilateral order. In fact, the WHO’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been the subject of controversy. Experts have raised concerns about the agency’s deference to China and increasing Chinese influence

COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (JHU). <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html > Accessed: 30 June 2020.

1

2 Andrea Gilli: Microparasites and the age of bigness. [In:] Thierry Tardy (ed.): COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics. NDC Research Paper 9/2020. NATO Defense College, Rome, 7. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/ news.php?icode=1440 > Accessed: 30 June 2020.

Ibid., 8.

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over the institution.4 President Donald Trump has been particularly critical of the agency, announcing an end to the U.S. relationship with the WHO. In the COVID-19 pandemic, the world’s most powerful countries have been demanding that WHO follow their respective sovereign interests for reasons that have little to do with global health. As David P. Fidler underlined COVID-19 could be described as a “Westphalian virus,” bringing state-centric, “Westphalian” international order back to the forefront.5 In the recent months, multilateral governance and cooperation has been challenged by the pandemic, as the measures taken at national level—such as border closures, bans on exports of personal protective equipment, face masks and sanitizing gel, or exit from lockdowns—have sometimes preempted multilaterally coordinated reactions. As the response to COVID-19 still requires numerous decisions to be taken, there is a growing possibility that the perceived legitimacy, cohesion and effectiveness of the Euro-Atlantic community and security order could be impacted. The geopolitical centre of gravity of COVID-19 for NATO has very visibly been in Western Europe and North America, highlighting mutual interdependence among all allies. This will, in particular, be shaped by the extent to which Europe and North America will be able and will want to coordinate their “paths down from the peak,” especially when it comes to the sharing of medical data, equipment, pharmaceuticals, but also the easing of travel restrictions. The development of such measures could contribute to a strengthened transatlantic bond, while an apparent or real lack of coordination – or even the adoption of openly hostile measures – could contribute to aggravating perceptions of transatlantic crisis.

According to Gilli the crisis has strongly impacted our societies creating a big divide in three ways. Firstly, a physical divide in social interaction which limits access to medical and financial resources, but also some digital technologies. Secondly, an ethical divide between those prioritizing the value of public health and those giving priority to wellbeing. Thirdly, a divide between protected and unprotected workers or between those who can and those who cannot work from home.6 Socially, the severe rises in unemployment will undoubtedly have ramifications for social stability and poverty rates. The non-profit group Oxfam, working on the alleviation of global poverty, suggests that an additional 548 million people could be pushed under the World Bank’s poverty threshold.7 Depending on the distribution of such an impact globally, this could give rise to further mass migration flows. Mass migrations have historically happened in waves. Therefore, there will inevitably be a post-COVID-19 wave of economic migration, some of which will follow traditional or historical patterns.

However, as Erol Yayboke underlined a direct result of COVID-19 could be that migration flows between developing countries become significantly greater than flows between the

David P. Fidler: The World Health Organization and Pandemic Politics. Think Global Health Council on Foreign Relations, 10 April 2020. <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/world-health-organization-and-pandemicpolitics > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid., 8-9.

6

Dignity not destitution. Oxfam Media Briefing, 9 April 2020. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/dignity-notdestitution > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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developing and developed worlds.8 Further down the line, the combination of lockdown, rise in unemployment and poverty creates conditions under which it is reasonable to expect a rise in social tensions and public discontent, leading to more polarized political discourse and growing opportunities for hybrid interference and disinformation.

Big tech means that the COVID-19 pandemic has also impacted the way we perceive technology. So far, digital technologies were primarily seen an opportunity. With this crisis, they have become a necessity. In this context, Gilli identified two initial lessons: • •

the more digitalized the world becomes, the more cyber risks one should expect which will further boost the importance of cybersecurity; the digital economy is characterized by a winner takes-all logic which means that the more one uses digital technologies, the stronger big tech companies become.9

The COVID-19 pandemic has indeed created an opportunity for hostile actors (primarily Russia and China) to engage in stepped up disinformation, cyber-attacks, as well as increased cybercrime.10 Some are already speaking of a parallel ‘infodemic’, often attributing false blame for the COVID-19 crisis or even spreading misleading or false public health information. The Vice President of the European Commission Věra Jourová underlined that “the COVID-19 pandemic is just a reminder about the huge problem of misinformation, disinformation and digital hoaxes. This can create confusion and distrust and it can undermine an effective public health response. We have seen scammers trying to make money to people’s fears, but we have also seen a systemic attack on Europe and our member states, promoted for instance by pro-Kremlin media about how badly we are dealing with the crisis or even that the virus was spread by NATO or that 5G masts are helping to spread the virus. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that proper information can save lives.”11 The risk for disinformation and manipulation will increase as public focus will move away from the initial response to the pandemic to anxiety about economic conditions and personal welfare in the recovery phase. Opportunities for divisive and polarizing narratives, especially in the run up to key election cycles, may multiply.

The rise of the big tech companies will be accompanied by the possibility of technology being used to implement more frequent social control and surveillance. Both elements might lead to a shift in the transatlantic debate about privacy, data standards and pools, and data “sovereignty.” A greater embrace of enlarged data pools that are available to the public sector and analysts for monitoring health and other social trends cannot be excluded. At the

Erol Yayboke: Can I Stay or Can I Go Now? Longer-term Impacts of Covid-19 on Global Migration. CSIS Commentary, 20 April 2020. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-i-stay-or-can-i-go-now-longer-term-impactscovid-19-global-migration > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Andrea Gilli: Microparasites and the age of bigness, 9-10.

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Statement by the North Atlantic Council concerning malicious cyber activities. 3 June 2020. <https://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_176136.htm?selectedLocale=en > Accessed: 1 July 2020.

10

Speech of Vice President Věra Jourová on countering disinformation amid COVID-19 “From pandemic to infodemic.” 4 June 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_20_1000 > Accessed: 1 July 2020.

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same time, China may use the crisis to step up and amplify its advocacy for new internet and digital governance norms and to showcase its technology and form of governance.

Big state means that the pandemic will also have an effect on states and their political and financial stability. COVID-19 has likely pushed the global economy and all NATO economies into a recession. Forecasts suggest that global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will contract by 3% in 2020.12 Based on data provided by the International Monetary Fund, the COVID-19 pandemic is projected to decrease GDP in NATO countries by an average of over 6% in 2020.

However, the IMF is projecting a partial recovery for 2021, with an increase in GDP in NATO countries of over 5% on average.13 Nevertheless, the level of GDP for 2021 is still forecast to remain below that pre-COVID-19. Overall, COVID-19 might enhance the role of the state and re-invigorate its central role in international affairs to the detriment of international organizations. The crisis will spur increases in public expenditure and public debt. This might lead to financial instability and a lack of economic sustainability. At the same time, global supply-chains could be decoupled. This could signify the end of globalization, at least as one knows it.14 As Gilli rightly emphasized “trends towards decoupling started over a decade ago, thanks mostly to additive manufacturing (3D printing) and the rise of the digital economy, and the trend has been accelerated by the trade war between the United States and China.”15 At the same time, one should not forget that decoupling is not costfree. In fact, the prices of many goods will rise and those not able to enter the new supplychains will suffer a net loss of income which will have a direct impact on the transatlantic economic situation and stability.

Finally, COVID-19 will lead to a big retrenchment in the West, including in the transatlantic community. Gilli underlined that “the mix of social, political, economic and technological developments suggests that in the years ahead, Western countries will have to pay increasing attention to domestic issues: to their societies, their economies, their industries and their polities.”16 This has direct implications on defence. The upcoming recession will probably lead to a new wave of budgetary cuts, which coupled with the difficulty of projecting and sustaining power abroad, may make it more difficult to preserve deterrence and enforce defence around the world. When looking for guidance on what to expect and how to react, the 2008 financial crisis offers some useful insights. Yet, the current crisis will be different, especially as the European threat environment is far more challenging today, making the state’s core task of effective deterrence and defence more urgent than at any time since the end of the Cold War. As Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sophia Becker rightly emphasized “Europe’s strategic environment is different today from

World Economic Outlook, April 2020: The Great Lockdown. International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf. org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020 > Accessed: 1 July 2020.

12

Own calculations, based on the IMF World Economic Outlook April 2020. However, it should be underlined that there is considerable uncertainty regarding any forecast and the associated impacts on financial and commodity markets.

13

Andrea Gilli: Microparasites and the age of bigness, 11.

14

Ibid., 11.

15

Ibid., 12.

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what it was in 2008. In the 2000s, the major military engagements by Europeans were expeditionary operations—and thus to some extent wars of choice. Today, Russia has reemerged, threatening its neighbours more or less openly, and China is increasingly posing a military challenge to Europe and the United States.”17 NATO, with its core task of deterrence and defence, remains the cornerstone of European security. At the same time, this does not make the concept of crisis management obsolete or less important. Indeed, NATO cannot take a tough stance on Russia in the east and neglect the south, including the constant threat of terrorism. Despite COVID-19, NATO must address deterrence, defence, and crisis management simultaneously.

COVID-19: THREE LESSONS IDENTIFIED In the last years the security environment in the transatlantic area has been characterized by the combination of changing threats and questions about the relevance of actors that respond to those threats. On the one hand, threats have emanated from non-state actors such as terrorist groups or have mutated into non-military issues to embrace among others the destabilizing effects of uncontrolled migrations. Meanwhile, the resurgence of Russia in the context of the ongoing militarization of its foreign policy as well as its direct engagements in military conflicts in NATO’s neighbourhood (Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, Libya), together with the rise of China have brought back the idea of great power competition into the security policy calculus. On the other hand, security actors have been challenged in their ability to provide coherent and effective responses to these developments. As Thierry Tardy underlines “individually, states have struggled to tackle what are in essence global and transnational threats; international security organizations – NATO and the European Union in particular – have helped design collective responses, yet they have also suffered at times from a lack of efficiency and mistrust from their own constituencies, both states and people.”18 The COVID-19 pandemic will not be a game-changer that will alter those trends. This, in practical terms, means that NATO will have to remain, as agreed at the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit, “an alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges.”19 Moreover, NATO’s collective defence function remains the bedrock of the transatlantic relationship. As stated at the 2018 summit, “NATO continues to adapt in order to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent, resilient, and adaptable to a changing security environment. This includes an effective response to changes in the posture and doctrine of potential adversaries, and their significant investments to modernise and expand capabilities.”20

Christian Mölling – Torben Schütz – Sophia Becker: Deterrence and Defense in Times of COVID-19. Europe’s Political Choices. DGAP Policy Brief 9/2020. German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 4. <https://dgap.org/ en/research/publications/deterrence-and-defense-times-covid-19 > Accessed: 2 July 2020.

17

Thierry Tardy: COVID-19: shaping future threats and security policies. [In:] Thierry Tardy (ed.): COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics. NDC Research Paper 9/2020. NATO Defense College, Rome, 13. <http://www. ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1440 > Accessed: 3 July 2020.

18

Brussels Summit Declaration. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018, para. 79. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_156624.htm > Accessed: 3 July 2020.

19

Ibid., para. 34.

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At the same time, due to COVID-19 the transatlantic community has identified three elements that will be important in creating a comprehensive approach to security and allowing NATO to better perform its core tasks in the future. The initial lessons identified encompass enhancing resilience, combating disinformation, and embracing climate change.

First, the concept of resilience in nothing new for NATO and allies. At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, allies agreed to enhance their national resilience.21 In this context, resilience is understood as “a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capacity.”22 Resilience reflects an ability to “bounce back” and tackle a crisis and/or threat, but also an ability to adapt to abrupt and potentially long-lasting change. As underlined by Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv “examining the current pandemic is useful for reviewing our understanding of resilience as well as national and NATO preparedness for three reasons: 1. The COVID-19 virus presents a threat to the health, economy and social cohesion of societies on a global level, generating a crisis response; 2. The pandemic increases our understanding of how governments and populations respond to such a widespread crisis over time; 3. It is simultaneously a crisis that is increasingly subjected to attempts to politicise it through disinformation campaigns, which provides us with real-time data on how societies and their populations react when crises are further complicated by politics.”23 Preparing for the complexity of invisible threats requires a much more multifaceted approach than for conventional warfare. It calls for a flexible balance and coordination between civil and military resources depending on the nature of the crisis. A comprehensive approach includes a large range of non-military-centric responses, allowing for different constellations of actors according to the context. Resilience is an important component in a comprehensive approach and civilian resilience is crucial. Indeed, national resilience includes three essential stakeholders: governmental institutions, the private sector, and civil society. While the main focus of NATO has been on the first two elements, the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated that a core element of a resilient state is resilience of society. Having this in mind, allies should invest more in this area.

The whole of government approach is crucial, but might not be enough to effectively deal with crises. An active participation of citizens is especially important in the context of increasing uncertainty of actual changing security environment and emergence of new threats. Societal resilience is the ability to cope with threats of various kinds and adjust to a changing environment. It puts emphasis on the role and responsibility of a household and/

21 Commitment to enhance resilience. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016. <https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_ texts_133180.htm > Accessed: 4 July 2020.

Resilience and Article 3. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm > Accessed: 5 July 2020.

22

Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv: Coronavirus, invisible threats and preparing for resilience. NATO Review, 20 May 2020. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/05/20/coronavirus-invisible-threats-and-preparing-for-resilience/ index.html > Accessed: 4 July 2020.

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or an individual. Hence, trust between citizens and the government plays a key role. People should know that they can rely on state authorities in times of crisis, and simultaneously authorities can rely on citizens. Resilient society is aware of its role in challenging situations and is willing to contribute to work hand in hand with state authorities. The main feature of modern crises (including hybrid) is that they are directly impacting society. Consequently, the overarching aim of allies should be to render society more resilient to all kinds of threats.

The key goals of societal resilience should include bridging the gaps between government/ military and civil society (private and public sectors) and empowering citizens in reinforcing country’s readiness to respond to crises and recover from them quickly. Increasing the importance of societal resilience in NATO, combined with an ongoing strengthening of the traditional deterrence tools, could help to create a modern deterrence/total defence approach against emerging forms of warfare.

Second, disinformation, propaganda and misinformation have been a challenge for decades, but are especially dangerous during the COVID-19 crisis. Disinformation from both state and non-state actors attempts to divide allies, undermine trust in democratic institutions and present authoritarian regimes as better at dealing with the health crisis. It also presents a risk to the public by undermining vital public health messages. The COVID-19 pandemic and the ‘infodemic’ that followed are perfect examples of how dangerous and potentially harmful can false narratives be. NATO views disinformation as “the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information with the intent to deceive and/or mislead. Disinformation seeks to deepen divisions within and between allied nations, and to undermine people’s confidence in elected governments. The Alliance has been dealing with these challenges since its inception and has been actively countering a significant increase in disinformation and propaganda since Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Ukraine, in 2014.”24 The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how vital the NATO-EU cooperation on countering disinformation, propaganda and misinformation will be. Both NATO and the EU found themselves in a situation where authoritarian states were accusing both organisation of sitting on their hands, lack of solidarity, and a general decay of the very ideas behind NATO and the EU. The COVID-19 related flood of false narratives is nevertheless only an exemplification of a general trend: information has become a weapon and disinformation gains in importance as a strategic tool. The methods, channels and narratives will change and adapt, but the main perpetrators and their ultimate goals remain unchanged. Indeed, Russia and China, but also terrorist organisations, will continue to employ disinformation as a hybrid tool to achieve their strategic goals.

NATO and the EU possess unique tools and mechanisms. The ways in which those could be shared with one another to create the synergy effect need to be enhanced.

Notwithstanding the obvious need to follow all the agreed rules and procedures, one should keep an open mind for opportunities. One of the potential ways forward is to concentrate

NATO’s approach to countering disinformation: a focus on COVID-19. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/177273.htm > Accessed: 19 July 2020.

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the NATO-EU cooperation in countering disinformation, propaganda and misinformation on better information and analysis sharing—as the EU now does through its Rapid Alert System—and through pooling human, financial and R&D resources. An additional element to be analysed by the EU, in close coordination with non-EU allies, is to consider imposing high costs—such as individual or other sanctions—on media outlets that produce or promote disinformation, propaganda and misinformation.25 Third, NATO, whilst not the first responder to climate change, can help to collectively address this challenge. The COVID-19 pandemic will reinforce existing vicissitudes, with the public demanding a more coordinated response to global challenges such as climate change. Social mobilization around climate change will have winners and losers. On the winning side will be organizations that provide pro-active responses to climate change.

Entities that undermine environmental stability will lose out.26 In this context, NATO’s approach to climate change should follow the logic of its three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

Collective defence is NATO’s bread and butter task. Including insights from climate projection and modelling in NATO’s intelligence products and processes is definitely not enough. In fact, NATO should not be afraid to act strategically by expanding the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) to its eastern flank. The NPS is a network of fuel pipelines and storage sites, with the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) as its chief element. It spans from ports in France and the Benelux countries to Germany, ending on the former border between East and West Germany. Today, the CEPS mostly serves commercial clients (such as airports in Brussels, Amsterdam, and Frankfurt), whilst maintaining the readiness to supply the military in times of crisis. According to official data, the pipeline transports the equivalent of roughly 1,200 diesel-powered military trucks, running round the clock, day in, day out.27 In other words, the CEPS helps safeguard the environment, while providing the military with a reliable logistic system for their fuel supplies.

Despite those benefits, the NPS has not been expanded to NATO’s eastern flank. Instead, the military has to rely on road and rail transports toppled by pre-positioned storage sites. Academic research proves that pipelines shipments are substantially less energyconsuming than rail, road, and water transport. In turn, pipelines reduce greenhouse gas emissions by between 61 and 77% compared with rail for transporting oil over long distances. Expanding the NPS to the eastern flank would help NATO to significantly “green” its fuel supply logistics, while enhancing the fuel supply of its military forces and plugging the alliance in a broader effort to stimulate the post-pandemic economies.28

25 Yana Brovdiy: Disinformation in Times of COVID-19: Reinforcing the Responses of the European Union and the United States. College of Europe Policy Brief 5/2020. College of Europe, Bruges, 4. <https://www.coleurope. eu/research/publications/cepob-college-europe-policy-brief-series > Accessed: 19 July 2020.

26 Dominik P. Jankowski – Julian Wieczorkiewicz: Toward a “Greener” NATO. Berlin Policy Journal, 15 June 2020. <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/op-ed-toward-a-greener-nato/ > Accessed: 5 July 2020.

CEPS Activity. <https://www.nspa.nato.int/about/ceps/activity > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Dominik P. Jankowski: The NATO Pipeline System: a forgotten defence asset. NDC Policy Brief 8/2020. NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 3-4. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1433 > Accessed: 5 July 2020.

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Crisis management is another of NATO’s core tasks. Allies and partners are not immune to droughts, floods, mudflows, wildfires, hurricanes, storms, and earthquakes. Climate change exacerbates hazards and amplifies the risk of extreme weather disasters. NATO was not designed to tackle these challenges, but over the last couple of years was able to develop relevant instruments and mechanisms. One of them is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), which is NATO’s principal civil emergency response mechanism. In recent months, the EADRCC became famous for coordinating allied responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. But it has a long-standing record of coordinating both requests and offers of assistance mainly in case of natural and man-made disasters. The EADRCC regularly conducts field exercises based on scenarios encompassing environmental challenges. Allies should consider strengthening the EADRCC’s role, including via potential cooperation with private sector.

Cooperative security will be an important element of NATO’s approach to tackle climate change, too. Sharing lessons learned with partners and introducing concrete solutions to help their armed forces to become more climate change-cognizant could create a more predictable and secure neighbourhood. The NATO Science for Peace and Security Program (SPS) should play a leading role in this regard.29 The SPS should become a prime vehicle for developing and promoting cooperation on the smart and energy efficient technologies between allies and partners, including from the Middle East and North Africa, but also from Eastern Europe. Equipping the militaries with sustainable energy sources, such as deployable camps that typically rely on fuel-consuming and polluting diesel generators for power production, could be a case in point.

Dominik P. Jankowski – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO. He previously served in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Security Bureau, and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

All opinions expressed in this analysis are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institution he represents.

Michael Rühle: Scoping NATO’s environmental security agenda. NDC Policy Brief 6/2020. NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 3. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1426 > Accessed: 5 July 2020.

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