Discussion on Europe’s Future in the post-COVID-19 era - National Perspectives

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DISCUSSION ON EUROPE’S FUTURE IN THE POST-COVID-19 ERA — National Perspectives DALMA BODOLAY – ZSOLT CSEPREGI – PÉTER DOBROWIECKI ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – DR BALÁZS HAMAR ELINA HERÉDI – BIANKA RESTÁS – ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL DR PÉTER STEPPER – BEÁTA TÓTH – ÁGNES VASS

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© Dalma Bodolay, Zsolt Csepregi, Péter Dobrowiecki, Alessandro D’Onofrio, Dr Balázs Hamar, Elina Herédi, Bianka Restás, Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, Dr Péter Stepper, Beáta Tóth, Ágnes Vass, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

DISCUSSION ON EUROPE’S FUTURE IN THE POST-COVID-19 ERA — NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES DALMA BODOLAY – ZSOLT CSEPREGI – PÉTER DOBROWIECKI – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – DR BALÁZS HAMAR – ELINA HERÉDI – BIANKA RESTÁS – ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL – DR PÉTER STEPPER – BEÁTA TÓTH – ÁGNES VASS

THE MULTIFOLD CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE QUESTION OF SOLIDARITY DR PÉTER STEPPER

INTRODUCTION The European Union struggles to fight the recent period of different types of crises (polycrisis), as described by several books, papers and arguments in the scientific literature.1 The primary reasons of the European economic crisis are the global financial crisis of 2008, the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the prolonged reform process of the bank union and the lack of fiscal policy integration. The unprecedented increase of asylum application resulted in the refugee crisis of 2015, that was due to the worsening economic conditions in the countries of origins (Kosovo, Albania, Bangladesh, Pakistan etc.) and the increasing security threats in conflict zones (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan). Member states with different historical and cultural experiences (former colonial empires, semi-periphery and CEE region) did not react in the same way, which undermined European solidarity and increased tensions among member states. The third significant challenge of the EU 27 arose from the exit of Great Britain. On the one hand, this precedent revealed that a European society could vote for leaving and believe in a future outside the European Union, on the other hand, Brexit decreased the common budget significantly, making it even more difficult to resolve major disputes stemming from the different priorities of member states during the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations.

1 Desmond Dinan – Neill Nugent – William E. Paterson (eds.): The European Union in crisis. Palgrave, London, 2017.; Jonathan Zeitlin – Francesco Nicoli – Brigid Laffan: Introduction: The European Union beyond the polycrisis? Integration and politicization in an age of shifting cleavages. Journal of European Public Policy.

2019/7. 963–976.

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ECONOMIC CRISIS Due to one of the EU’s fundamentals, the Maastricht criteria created heated debates among member states following different kinds of crisis management policies. Germans, with a developed economy and production market would demand rigorous fiscal regulations, and maintain criteria, which help to strengthen the stability of the Eurozone and Germany within it. Developing countries would prefer the loosening of fiscal policy to generate surplus enabling the stimulation of the economic sector burdened by stagnation. At the time of creating the euro, the original idea about integration presumed a common market that would guarantee the free movement of goods. Hence, the natural balance created by the traditional rules of market economy would have resulted in the convergence of prices and salaries all across Europe. As a natural consequence of EU accession, new members had the option to introduce the euro instead of their national currencies, and they would have preferred choosing a European monetary policy, an incentive attractive enough to pay attention to the Maastricht criteria. Stiglitz explicitly criticized to creation of a fiscal union before/without a political union, thus issuing a bond (ECU/euro), but not even considering to increase the minimal level of common budget (1% of the total GDP of member states).

He found it also problematic doing this with a limited national fiscal policy, without proper common banking regulations. Furthermore, he warned against having no plans for tackling an economic crisis in Europe, but it is even worse that our own European institutions did not allow any kind of bail-outs packages for such situations.2 I do not claim that the aforementioned flaws would lead us to the only logical alternative of creating a federal state of Europe, on the contrary, I argue that the integrating of a policy field without paying attention to the legitimacy of European legislation would sooner or later cause problems.

Therefore, it is essential to have a common ground on what European decision-makers think on the notion of solidarity.

MIGRATION CRISIS Germany supported, as always, a policy built on solidarity and pragmatism as far as the situation caused by the Syrian civil war is concerned. In 2015, the number of asylum applications in the EU member states increased dramatically within a single year.

Emphasizing the German motto, “Wir schaffen das” is not surprising, if it comes from a great power, which lost its sovereignty in the Second World War and used the concept of shared sovereignty to rebuild itself as a European regional hegemon. However, not many followers of this idea can be seen across Europe. Even in Germany, the Wilkommenskultur’s popularity had its own limits, especially if we look at the rise of the far-right Alternativa für Deutschland and the relatively weak recent elections results of the CDU/CSU party.

Conservative leaders (such as Jarosław Kaczyński, Viktor Orbán, Janez Janša, Matteo Salvini) could not understand and did not share the German idea to take responsibility for the people coming from North-Africa, Syria, Afghanistan.3 They did not want to share this burden Joseph Stiglitz: The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. W. W. Norton, New York, 2016.

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Stepper Péter: A kényszermigráció mint biztonsági fenyegetés a visegrádi országokban. Nemzet és Biztonság. 2018/1. 132–158.

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at a time,4 when their labour-intensive economies did not need labour migration, their voters were not prepared for the social challenges stemming from the cultural differences and the budget for integration projects was not big enough. The idea of refugee reallocation and resettlement quotas were not just politically flawed.5 Some liberal think-tanks6 also perceived the involuntary transport of asylum-seekers purely based on a mathematical formula as something inhuman and harmful. Visa liberalization and a more liberal labour migration regulation would decrease the number of asylum applications from their viewpoint, thus the crisis of the overburdened refugee system could be prevented. As a result of this, human trafficking could be decreased significantly, thus it helps the work of law enforcement agencies as well. Of course, a naturalization campaign could not work without widespread political support for the idea. Without legitimacy, right- and left-wing parties can bolster their popularity in the short-term. The fear from that outcome prevented those measures, and the membersstates supported a more and more restrictive EU migration policy since the early 2000s.

BREXIT Since 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is not an EU member-state anymore, and the long process of exiting the EU, started after the 2016 referendum, has finally ended. The 2019 EP elections are over, the fate of British MEPs parliamentary seats and the mandate of the newly elected MEPs has been clarified, the new EU Commission has been approved by the EP and the Council, and Urusula von der Leyen’s team could start its work. The real political consequences of Brexit are not yet to be revealed, but sooner or later, we will be able to analyse the decision-making procedure using a pattern large enough for deeper understanding. It is highly probable that during the decisionmaking in the council there will be less chance to form a blocking minority because of the qualified majority process. This coin, however has two sides. The economically liberal Brits supported free market and laissez-faire policies combined with restrictive fiscal policies also adopted by Germany. Southern and Central European member states, however, would have preferred a looser fiscal policy and a European Bank able and willing to help with the implementation of bail-out measures, if needed. Germany lost one of its allies in this debate on fiscal policy. On the other hand, migration policy was another hot topic, where the Brits supported the more restrictive policy approach of Southern and Central European states, hence, they lost their politically conservative supporter. This situation seems to be a paradox, because of the economic necessity of having an available cheap labour force in Britain, while opposing large-scale labour migration from a societal perspective. The best example for that is connected to the agriculture sector. During the COVID-19 pandemic, free movement across certain member states has been suspended temporarily, making 4 Stepper Péter: The Visegrad Group and the EU Agenda on Migration: A Coalition of the Unwilling?. Corvinus Journal of International Affairs. 2016/1. 62–82.

About the problems of CEAS reform see: Stepper Péter: The Challenges for Common European Asylum Policy: The Practice of Detention in Hungary. Biztpol Affairs. 2014/2. 29–49.

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6 For more see Elspeth Guild – Carrera Sergio: Rethinking Asylum Distribution in the EU: Shall we start with the facts? Centre for European Policy Studies. 17 June 2016. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/rethinkingasylum-distribution-eu-shall-we-start-facts/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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it really hard to reach Western European countries via railway or bus transport. However, food companies found it profitable to start new charter flights from Bulgaria and Romania in order to guarantee the inflow of cheap labour force to British farmlands, where local citizens did not want to take up the vacant agricultural jobs.7 It worth to highlight that the United Kingdom was the second largest member state in the EU, and also second largest net payer of the EU budget, providing an annual 11.5 billion euros in 2015.8 The British market was also the third most important export country for the German economy, 8% of the total German export production was directed towards the British islands. WTO tariffs (2-9%) introduced after leaving the EU single market could cause serious troubles for German companies, especially in the automotive industry.9

SOLIDARITY DURING A TIME OF CRISIS The solidarity of the member states and the relations of local and central governments has always been a focal question of managing a federal state. The best example for this could be the United States of America, where the State of the Union (SOTU) addresses gave the opportunity for delegates every year to test the president, who held a lot of responsibilities on his shoulder. Today, SOTU is more or less a symbolic gesture to the voters, without major consequences in the short-term. The EU is not a federal state, even if Jean-Claude Juncker, former president of the European Commission preferred to hold SOTU speeches annually. The EU is more like a sui generis entity based on an intergovernmental approach of shared sovereignty. Member states shared their sovereignty with common institutions, but preserved their rights to manage the fields of defence, taxation, and reallocation of basic social goods on a national basis.10 It would be useful to compare the willingness of members-states showing solidarity for each other, regardless of speaking about a federal state or the European Union. According to Trein, there is negative and positive solidarity on the basis of Durkheim’s concept established in the 1980s.11 Negative solidarity means no more than to support the existing framework of treaties and maintain the current level of intergovernmental cooperation.

In spite of this narrow understanding of cooperation, positive solidarity is the notion for preferring morally right outcomes, out-of-the box solutions, even if the consequences of 7 Denny Pencheva: Coronavirus: flying in fruit pickers from countries in lockdown is dangerous for everyone.

The Conversation. 21 April 2020. <https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-flying-in-fruit-pickers-fromcountries-in-lockdown-is-dangerous-for-everyone-136551 > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

8 Von Hendrik Kafsack: Deutschland überweist das meiste Geld an Brüssel. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

8 August 2016. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/konjunktur/deutschland-zahlt-am-meisten-in-den-euhaushalt-14378202.html > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

9 EU-Sachstand: Ökonomische Aspekte eines EU-Austritts des Vereinigten König-reichs (Brexit). Deutscher Bundestag Referat PE 2 EU-Grundsatzangelegenheiten, Fragen der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. 27 June 2016. <http://www.barbara-lanzinger.de/images/bilder/1467201357.pdf >Accessed: 12 May 2020.

A. H. Treschel: How to federalize the European Union… and why bother. Journal of European Public Policy.

2005/3., 401–418.; Mark Burgess: Federalism and European Union: The Building of Europe, 1950–2000.

Routledge, London, 2000.

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Philipp Trein: Federal dynamics, solidarity, and European Union crisis politics. Journal of European Public Policy.

2020/7. 977–994.

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the decisions have negative impact on the budget. However, they do it otherwise, because of positive societal effects expected from the given steps. This is a characteristic for those that have the required feeling of flexibility budget-wise and believe to be able to decide what is to be considered morally right. Most of the time, they believe that the right decisions derive from the rationality of the “wise men of Europe” and not the aggregate of voter’s opinion, often accusing their opponents with populism. According to Trein, negative solidarity is more favourable for those, where regional identities are heterogenic, intergovernmental approach overcomes parliamentary ideas and a multifold of policy issues requires longterm financial obligations from member states.12 The polycrisis of Europe (Eurozone crisis, refugee crisis and Brexit) shows clear signs of the aforementioned features. Monetary policy, bail-out packages, refugee quota plans and the reform of the Dublin system have been accepted in an environment of heterogeneous regional identities, dealing with a field of interest dominated by intergovernmental decisions, and the necessity of long-term commitments. Positive solidarity in this framework appears as a concept, which presumes the deepening of political and societal integration through building a collective identity. To put it simple, the members of the organization identify themselves as European citizen.

The co-existence of various collective identities,13 and heterogeneity and diversity could fundamentally impact our understanding of solidarity. There are a lot of examples of those, who define themselves as members of an ethnic or religious group, a citizen of a nation, province or the union, hence having four of five layers of identity. The more a person is connected to a group, and creates his own in-group vision of the world, the less he or she is capable of accepting jurisdiction of outsiders.14 This is also characteristic for federal states having multiple nationalities, where national/local governments tend to emphasize their importance against the federal government from time to time and demonstrate how indispensable they are.15 As it was mentioned before, parallel collective identities exist, anyone can be a member of more than one group. A person, also having a strong European identity, finds it much easier to support recent crisis management ideas and burdensharing (migration quotas, increase of the common budget, banking union etc.). In most of the member states of the Western-European and Nordic region this presumption works.

People of CEE countries and the United Kingdom emphasize less their identity of being citizens of the European Union, but share more the values of a single national group being Hungarians, Poles, English etc.16 Trein argues that the more heterogenous the groups are, which were created by collective identities, the higher the chance is for showing only negative

Ibid., 2–3.

12

Émile Durkheim: The Division of Labour in Society. Macmillan, London, 1984.

13

Liesbet Hooghe – Gary Marks: A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: from Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science. 2019/1. 1–23.

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15 Giuliano Bonoli – Marcello Natili – Philipp Trein: A federalist’s dilemma: trade-offs between social legitimacy and budget responsibility in multi-tiered welfare states. Journal of European Social Policy. 2019/1. 56–69.

Thomas Risse: No Demos? Identities and Public Spheres in the Euro Crisis, Journal of Common Market Studies.2014/6. 1207–1215.

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solidarity towards each other, regardless of speaking about a union, or a federal state.17 In the majority of Western European and Nordic states (and even in some Southern European countries), the existence of collective identities is not new, they are inherently multi-ethnic societies. It is partly because of the colonial past (in the case of France, Italy and Portugal), and the less restrictive immigration policies (in the case of Germany, Sweden). CEE countries have also had been multi-ethnic societies having the most colourful ethnic mosaic in history, before the peaceful or violent dissolution of federal states (Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia). As a replacement of these regional powers, great powers decided to support the creation of small states with homogenous societies artificially. The citizens of these successor countries, having painful memories throughout history (especially Poland and Hungary) have in most cases one strong collective identity, which is based on their shared experience of suffering from foreign oppression, still being able to remain Hungarian, Polish. A creation of a secondary identity, namely being European citizens is not impossible, but it will be the result of a slow process. One of the preconditions of success is the restraint of EU leaders (not just bureaucrats, but also politicians of great powers) in not trying to increase their jurisdiction and powers by decreasing other’s national sovereignty. One of the most important question to answer is: how to resolve the limited development of EU political processes in the absence of positive solidarity (which is only a utopia) and homogenous collective identities. To answer this question, it is worth to analyse the decisions of the past political era (2014–2019), and the performance of EU bureaucratic leaders.

THE HERITAGE OF EU INSTITUTIONS’ LEADERS The functioning of the EU Council decision-making process fundamentally changed after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, by creating the institution of permanent council presidency. Several experts tried to evaluate the activity of the first president, Hermann van Rompuy after the end of his presidency. Some of them accused Rompuy with being too sympathetic towards major power’s interest and he gave up some of his plans in order to guarantee the success of MFF negotiations. This constant struggle to find compromises helped him to gather the votes necessary both in the Council and the Parliament.18 With Rompuy being the first of his kind, there is no indication for any comparison related to his performance as President of the European Council. Hence, we simply could not know that the aforementioned compromise-seeking behaviour derives from the original weakness of the position, or it reflects Rompuy’s personal qualities. Other scholars argue,19 that the prominent resemblance of powerfulness is a false image of the Council presidency, without having realistic chances of bearing significant pouvoir. However, Count Herman Achille Van Rompuy, a former prime minister of Belgium proved himself to be a professional Trein, 4–6.

17

Ingeborg Tömmel: The standing president of the European Council: intergovernmental or supranational leadership? Journal of European Integration. 2017/2. 175–189.

18

Desmond Dinan: Leadership in the European Council: an assessment of Herman Van Rompuy’s presidency.

Journal of European Integration. 2017/2. 157–173.

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mediator, knowing every single trick necessary for successful negotiations. During the Eurozone crisis, the economic experience of Rompuy was more than useful, and he could identify himself as a respected, politically neutral figure, always seeking for the best and most rational solutions.

As the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker became a remarkable and notorious political figure, but it is still up to the history to decide if he was indeed the primary political leader of the EU during his commission period. According to Ingeborg Tömmel, Juncker tried to implement a very ambitious political program during a time, when the political environment was far from ideal from his perspective. In the first years, he reformed the function of the Commission, created a detailed and well-written program for various policy fields, but forgot to negotiate enough with the major players.20 As a consequence of this, he could not convince the political leaders of member states to follow him, and to vote for his plans, which proved to be a serious mistake. After his mid-term as the president of commission, he took more and more time to discuss and negotiate with key players, and he was successful to convince them concerning the viability of his suggestions, using compromises, instead of pushing a bold agenda. 21 Although he could present only a few tangible results in terms of actual law-making, but he triggered a debate on the future of Europe and the importance of supranational institutions versus intergovernmental negotiations. Nonetheless it remains a question unanswered, how this debate will transform the entire European Union in a long run.

The president of the European Parliament guarantees that the procedural rules are not harmed in any way during the decision-making procedure, while also representing the institution in international relations. His main function is to give the final permission for the EU budget after the long voting procedure of the major institutions. He is instated for 2 and a half years, but the mandate can be prolonged for another 2 and a half years occasionally.

However, only Martin Schultz served as president for the parliament in five consecutive years, because his mandate has been prolonged in 2014. Before David Sassoli, 30 different politicians served as head of parliament, his predecessor was Antonio Tajani.

Tajani has been elected with the support of both of the conservatives and Eurosceptic parties with a very little margin of simple majority. In return of this favour he tried to gain wide-range popularity by paying attention to gender balance in his cabinet, resigned as a vice-president of the commission and also rejected to get further remuneration on this basis. First and foremost, he tried to present himself as a person who represents every single person in the EP (le président de tous les députés).22

CONCLUSIONS 20 Ingeborg Tömmel: Political leadership in times of crisis: the Commission presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker. West European Politics. 2020/5. 1141–1162.

Ibid., 1158.

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Qui est Antonio Tajani, le nouveau président du Parlement européen? Lalibre.be. 17 January 2017. <https://www. lalibre.be/international/qui-est-antonio-tajani-le-nouveau-president-du-parlement-europeen-portrait-587e7d0fcd708 a17d569a55a?fbclid=IwAR3SX4nU5vKy5Uka2dkzACz3mXoYipaheC4Vbr4wKzjy25IkGkhofxoBac4 > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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The history of the European integration revealed that there is no development without setbacks. Crises have always helped the European idea to survive and get even stronger.

Maastricht treaty reforms reflected upon the end of Cold War, decrease of European competitiveness and the role of Deutsche Mark in European monetary policy. The promise of opening the East European markets for EU member states also seemed attractive.

Inflexibility of the enlarged EU’s institutional structure showed clearly, why is it necessary to reform the fundamental treaties after 2004. Financial crises (the 1997 stock market crisis in Asia, the Greek sovereign debt crisis, and the 2008–2009 world economic crisis) strengthened this idea. Long constitutional debates resulted in the compromise that we know as the treaty of Lisbon, but another ten years have passed since 2009, which raises the awareness, whether the EU needs new reforms again.

During the time of this polycrisis, the major powers—whose citizens might have a stronger European collective identity—struggled to reform the EU. Part of these reforms failed because of the lack of common ground Europe-wide (asylum policy reforms), but another part of them succeeded (stability mechanism of the eurozone). However, a lot of non-Eurozone members are yet to join the club.

Leaders’ struggled to create a long-lasting heritage during or in spite of this time of crisis.

Tools measuring the rate of success can be various, from the quantity of new legislation, the quality of the acquis, to its durability and willingness of member states to implement it. For the Juncker Commission Presidency, negative solidarity—using Durkheim’s concept—did not create a fertile ground for federalist reforms. Rompuy’s Council Presidency and Tajani’s EP Presidency pushed through some significant co-decisions, however they needed compromises from each member states and MEPs. The adoption of these are not exclusionary results of major powers interests, but also the excellent negotiating skills of EU bureaucrats.

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THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ELINA HERÉDI

Europe has come a long way since the 1951 signature of the Treaty of Paris. Even though the primary purpose of the European cooperation was to promote peace on the continent, it has changed functions time and again throughout different periods. The Treaty of Maastricht replaced the term European Economic Community by the term European Community.23 This name amendment signified a transition in attitudes of what European convergence really means and officialised that it had not been only about economic integration but also about social and political. A transition from a Europe connected mostly on economic terms to a political union was necessary in the post war times as consolidation had to come on a political level. The European Union and its predecessors have created peace in Europe since the Second World War and for that the European Union as an entity received its Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.24 But slowly, for half a century and throughout the peaceful European decades, focus shifted more to the economic stability and to the construction of the single market. This trend seems to be taking a different turn again, towards a Union that looks out for its Member States in political questions, the traditional European values of liberty, democracy and the rule of law finding themselves in the limelight once again.

IN VARIETATE CONCORDIA The colourful THE FUTURE IS EUROPE25 graffiti lately covering the entire wall of a building neighbouring the Berlaymont is a modern manifestation of the EU worker’s devotion to the European project. Less progressively, the European flag’s design has not changed since its official adoption in 1986, the year when, by accident, the Union had exactly twelve Member States. By today, this same flag has also become a good symbol of the unchanging attitudes within the Union about the distinct place of its Member States, oftentimes overlooking the "newer" Member States in the European decision making. It is enough to just look at the share of Member States’ nomination of high-level representatives in the past decade. Nine out of eleven presidents of the European institutions in Brussels (Parliament, Commission and Council) came from the old Member States during the current and past terms.26 These roles, two of them with mostly representative functions do not allow us to let go unnoticed

Treaty on European Union. 7 February 1992. <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/ body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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24 Herman van Rompuy – José Manuel Durao Barroso: From War to Peace. Europa.eu. 10 December 2012. <https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/npp2013_en.pdf > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

25 Eszter Zalán: You can't escape that 'The Future is Europe'. Euobserver. 24 August 2017. <https://euobserver. com/political/138721 > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

List of Presidents of the Institutions of the European Union Wikipedia. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ presidents_of_the_institutions_of_the_European_Union > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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the fact that a quarter of a century on, there is still an unchanging core of Member States that have preferential treatment when it comes to the distribution of leadership roles.

“NURTURING, PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING OUR DEMOCRACY”— BUT WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO BUILD A DEMOCRATIC EU? On the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker presented his White paper on the future of Europe27 on how the Union could evolve by 2025. Including a multispeed Europe amongst his scenarios, he put a mirror in front of the European convergence, and in a way formalised the fact that there is a core–periphery divide existing within the European Union. Even though he seemed to call for more integration, his vision allowed for a divergence of Member States, giving green light to the more developed countries to lead the way for the common good of the EU. The new Commission appears to have a more inclusive vision. The European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen seems to be doing what Germans do best: balancing Europe.

This balancing act comes naturally from the circumstances of the President’s narrowmargined election: the polarisation of the European political landscape with some power loss of the biggest and centre-right group EPP (European People’s Party), the rise of green and populist parties and the appearance of pan-European parties. The consensus made both on an intergovernmental and a political level following the difficult approval of the President herself and of her Commissioners by the European Parliament is clearly shown in the choice of the Commission’s priorities. Titles of Vice-President portfolios such as Promoting the European Way of Life, European Green Deal, Values and Transparency or Democracy and Demography demonstrate the President’s will to build a more democratic Union inclusive of the opinions of the whole political spectrum. The future of Europe is green, gender-balanced, digitalised and–democratic.

In the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, the European Union is at the intersection of multiple long-term challenges in questions where interests of its Member States might diverge:28 on one hand, a migratory challenge—temporarily swept under the rug—and also an economic challenge, that has to be addressed efficiently in order to avoid a full-on recession.

Furthermore, the current crisis has exposed not only the limitations of national-level response, but also the lack of European-level mechanisms and the sluggishness of policy response— revealing a European governance challenge too. The lack of solidarity shown in these critical times has influenced citizens’ trust in the European project and might have long lasting effects on European integration. Recognising the limits of the existing treaties, French and German leaders foresaw this governance problem when tabling an aide-mémoire in the

27 Florian Eder – Ryan Heath – Jacopo Barigazzi – Quentin Aries: Commission outlines 5 scenarios for future of EU in white paper. Politico. 17 August 2017. <https://www.politico.eu/article/breaking-politico-obtainswhite-paper-on-eu-future/ > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

28 Kayvan Bozorgmehr - Victoria Saint - Alexandra Kaasch - David Stuckler - Alexander Kentikelenis: COVID and the convergence of three crises in Europe. The Lancet. 3 April 2020. <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(20)30078-5/fulltext > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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end of 2019,29 suggesting the creation of a two-year-long consultation programme named Conference on the Future of Europe. The Conference accommodates closer cooperation between the European Council, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the citizens with a goal of bringing about institutional reforms, such as the reinvention of the Spitzenkandidaten process in order to construct a more integrated and democratic Union. The initiative somewhat shifts the accent from intergovernmental decision-making and gives way to the rise of pan-Europeanism. It is certain that the European Union, faced with the challenges of a demoralising Brexit and the COVID-19 recovery, will need a strong leadership in the coming period. Expectations are high for the German presidency of the European Council. The future of Europe seems to be green, gender-balanced,digitalised— and Franco-German. Germany is leading the European way (of life) from the centre, both geographically and politically speaking. Germany still represents the middle-ground on the European scene and this role-taking by the Union’s the biggest economy comes naturally.

In a contrast, Emmanuel Macron’s self-positioning in his 2017 speech given at Sorbonne University about his vision on the future of Europe evoked some imperialist nostalgy, with the President envisaging a sovereign, modernised European Union with a Franco-German leadership.30 Two years later, the two Charlemagne-prize winners concluded the Aachen Treaty, showing the world that Europe’s biggest economies are still on the same page despite the fact that Macron’s and Merkel’s representatives competed against each other for seats in different parliamentary groups at the European elections. Emmanuel Macron even wrote a letter, addressed to the European citizens right before the European elections, entitled For a European Renaissance,31 demonstrating that the European and French futures are intertwined in progress. It is clear that the only way for Europe to thrive is together—but does a Berlin-Paris axis still have validity in a democratic Europe?32 Some would argue that the European Union represents a new era in Franco-German imperialism in a coreperiphery context, but even so, most Member States still benefit from building on the legacy and political and economic stability of the two countries.

EUROPE’S EXPORT TO THE WORLD The new Commission’s "Reinforcing our responsible global leadership" motto sounds rather confident, but Europe has to recognise that the world’s financial landscape is changing and that the European Union’s position within the global order is changing with it. The European Union is faced with a race, where we suddenly find ourselves competing against emerging countries that were not so long ago considered to be lacking a capacity for competition, Rym Momtaz – David M. Herszenhorn: Berlin and Paris outline plan for EU makeover. Politico. 27 November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-and-paris-outline-plan-for-eu-makeover/ > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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30 President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A sovereign, united, democratic Europe. French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. 26 September 2017. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/europe/ president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe/ > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

31 Emmanuel Macron: For European renewal. Elysee. 4 March 2019. <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

Philip Stevens: The rights and wrongs of Emmanuel Macron’s vision for Europe. Financial Times. 21 November 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/b8d76f02-0abc-11ea-bb52-34c8d9dc6d84 > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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regarded rather as outlets to European goods and as places to outsource limited manufacturing tasks—and along with it unwanted externalities, like pollution. The COVID-19 crisis will have long lasting effects on the European economy as Member States are indebting themselves in order to limit the long-term damage that comes from businesses going bankrupt causing soaring unemployment rates. The European Union is the world’s largest single market area with the world’s second biggest GDP,33 but it is bound to decline in the coming decades and its leading place is no longer guaranteed. Chinese banks now have bigger assets than their European counterparts34 and the COVID-19 crisis might increase Chinese influence in European recovery through huge investments and lendings.

So, what is our edge in the face of this competition? Europe has been exporting its values and standards for centuries. Compared with other historical players, the European trademark has always been the quality—quality of products, quality welfare systems, quality in arts and sciences. The current Commission’s forward thinking priorities are a reflection of how the EU would like to position itself in the world and it is undeniable that the EU influences the world through its normative power.35 The EU’s global influence today ranges across diverse policy areas from data privacy and competition rules to environmental protection and human rights. But how long can the imperialist legacy last, when on one hand, our biggest western partner seems to be going through a midlife crisis—threatening to pull out from international organisations and from forward thinking multilateral agreements, while on the other hand, China is catching up at a fast pace with an aggressive innovation strategy and growing buying power? It has been shown numerous times that the EU’s norm setting cooperation with its old world ally, the United States, lasts only until the latter’s trade interests require so. And even though the US dollar still makes up 80% of the currency used in global supply chains, China is set out to reform the global economic system,36 simultaneously promoting the "Chinese way". Giant Chinese tech companies have been working on avoiding the financial transferring systems controlled by American and European companies until now used by the US to dictate norms and sanctions all over the world, but this power now seems to be curbed. The European Union’s leading standard setting role in the world is only maintainable if it is paired with an economic power behind it. Or asking the question in a different way, can we tell the world how to do things without a sufficient economic power? Basing our future on the export of the European Union’s soft power to the world might prove to be Brussel’s self-validating argument on the long term while losing influence even in our neighbourhood.

Furthermore, as much as cross-Member State harmonisation of the single market favours stability and hence encourages investments, the European Union’s value-based Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects. International Monetary Fund. April 2019. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr. x=35&pry=20&sy=2017&ey=2024&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1 > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

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34 How covid-19 could change the financial world order. The Economist. 12 May 2020. <https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=VfKfSUqn_GY > Accessed: 28 May 2020.

Ekaterina Savorskaya: The concept of the European Union’s normative power. Baltic region. 2015/4. 66–76.

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How covid-19 could change the financial world order.

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norm setting pursuit has to be fair. Regulations have to be carefully balanced and ultimately serve the purpose of promoting innovation, while at the same time preserving European jobs. Overregulation based on the more progressive normative agenda of the European Commission (such as the Green Deal) might come with the price of chasing business away from those Central and Eastern European Member States that have less modernised industries. The same regulations that accommodate European standards and patents might also promote the transfer of investments, production and services from the less progressive Member States to third countries in important areas, such as the pharmaceutical and automobile industry and IT services, with especially hard consequences for some in the coming period, projecting a multispeed recovery.

The desire of solidarity lettered in the founding treaty of the European Union has to manifest in the design of our future budget. Paris and Berlin have recently revealed their suggestion for an ambitious recovery plan. The plan has met not only with the objection of some ’frugal’ net contributors but also of some net recipient Member States’, risking that the proposition will have an opposite effect: widening the North-South and EastWest divide within Europe. If it wants to stand as a leader in a dynamic world, the future European Union needs to be undivided and democratic not only by bringing decisionmaking closer to its citizens, but also by giving an equal voice to all of its Member States.

A technocratic Europe that bases its future mostly on its current soft power is certain to lose its competitive edge in a fast-changing world. The recovery management will be the proof of the European cohesion pudding.

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THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL—STRIVING TO BE THE FIRST CLIMATE-NEUTRAL CONTINENT DR BALÁZS HAMAR

The new European Commission lead by Ursula von der Leyen has six priorities set out for the period of 2019–2024 37. The first priority, namely the European Green Deal38 , was more elaborated and announced with much fanfare on 11 December 2019. The Commission wanted to underline the deal’s importance and also saw the need to send a positive signal to the participants of the 25th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25). Also, Europe wanted to show to the COP25 participants in Madrid that is prepared to do its part.39 With the European Green Deal, the EU Commission gave a roadmap for making the EU’s economy sustainable by turning climate and environmental challenges into opportunities across all policy areas and making the transition just and inclusive for all.40 President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The European Green Deal is Europe’s new growth strategy— for a growth that gives back more than it takes away. It will cut emissions while also creating jobs and improving the quality of life.”41 The “deal is,” that the EU aims to become climate neutral by 2050. To do this, the Commission proposes to amend the European Climate Law,42 turning the political commitment into a legal obligation and a trigger for investment.43

37 6 Commission priorities for 2019-24. European Commission. 16 July 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/ strategy/priorities-2019-2024_en > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

The European Green Deal. European Commission. 11 December 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/ files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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39 Oliver Balch: EU’s green deal one of few glimmers of hope amid disappointing COP25. Ethical Corporation.

18 December 2019. <http://www.ethicalcorp.com/eus-green-deal-one-few-glimmers-hope-amid-disappointingcop25 > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

40 The European Green Deal sets out how to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. European Commission. 11 December 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_6691 > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

The European Green Deal – our new growth strategy: Op-ed by Commission President von der Leyen.

European Commission. 11 December 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ ac_19_6745 > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

41

Establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law). European Commission. 4 March 2020. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0080&from=EN > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

42

A European Green Deal. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/ european-green-deal_en > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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Reaching this target will require action by all sectors of our economy, including: • investing in environmentally-friendly technologies; • supporting industry to innovate; • rolling out cleaner, cheaper and healthier forms of private and public transport; • decarbonising the energy sector; • ensuring buildings are more energy efficient; • working with international partners to improve global environmental standards.

With the arrival of the COVID-19 crisis, the green future of the European Union, outlined in the Commission’s first priority, was cast into doubt.

On 18 May 2020, before the Commission presented its plan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emanuel Macron presented their own proposal for the economic recovery on the EU level within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).44 They underlined, that the payments should expressly be made to the countries which were hit by the pandemic. In addition, the spending should be in line with the Commission’s priorities like digitization and the Green Deal. This common German-French initiative for Europe has been interpreted as a great step towards an agreement, since without the consent of the two largest member states in the EU it is difficult to achieve progress.

FARM TO FORK AND BIODIVERSITY STRATEGIES, PART OF THE GREEN DEAL The European Commission on 20 May 2020 unveiled two long-awaited roadmaps: one for greening the EU’s food system and the other for protecting the continent’s land, seas and species—known as the Farm to Fork45 and Biodiversity46 strategies, respectively. Both of them are key components of the European Green Deal. Adopted during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, these strategies will also form central elements of the EU’s Corona crisis recovery plan. The release of these two strategies is significant in itself as intensive agriculture and fishing are the biggest drivers of the loss of biodiversity. And the other way around: biodiversity for food and agriculture is indispensable to food security and sustainable development.47 The Commission has taken several radical leaps with the two strategies, and outlined goals which could in fact improve the state of nature in Europe. These include the reduction of chemical pesticide use by 50%, both in terms of quantity and toxicity and the increase of European Union–French–German initiative for the European recovery from the coronavirus crisis. French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. < https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/coronavirusadvice-for-foreign-nationals-in-france/coronavirus-statements/article/european-union-french-german-initiativefor-the-european-recovery-from-the > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system. European Commission.

20 March 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-annex-farm-fork-green-deal_en.pdf > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 Bringing nature back into our lives. European Commission. 20 March 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-annex-eu-biodiversity-strategy-2030_en.pdf > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

46

The State of the World’s Biodiversity for Food and Agriculture 2019. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. <http://www.fao.org/state-of-biodiversity-for-food-agriculture/en/ > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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nature protected areas to ensure that at least 30% of both land and sea areas are protected.

To support the long-term sustainability of both nature and farming, this strategy will work in tandem with the new Farm to Fork Strategy and the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), by promoting eco-schemes and result-based payment schemes.48

NEXT GENERATION EU AND THE MFF On 27 May 2020, during a special session in the European Parliament, the European Commission has put forward its proposal for a major recovery plan.49 To ensure the recovery is sustainable, even, inclusive and fair for all Member States, the European Commission is proposing to create a new recovery instrument called the Next Generation EU, embedded within a powerful, modern and revamped long-term EU budget. To protect lives and livelihoods, repair the single market, as well as to build a lasting and prosperous recovery, the European Commission is proposing to harness the full potential of the EU budget. Next Generation EU’s 750 billion euro program, as well as targeted reinforcements to the longterm EU budget for 2021–2027 (Multiannual Financial Framework—MFF) will jointly bring the total financial firepower of the EU budget to 1.85 trillion euro.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated accordingly: “The recovery plan turns the immense challenge we face into an opportunity, not only by supporting the recovery but also by investing in our future: the European Green Deal and digitalization will boost jobs and growth, the resilience of our societies and the health of our environment.”50 Relaunching the economy does not mean going back to the status quo before the crisis, but bouncing forward. We must repair the short-term damage from the crisis in a way that also invests in our long-term future. All of the money raised through Next Generation EU will be channelled through EU programmes in the revamped long-term EU budget.

The European Green Deal as the EU’s recovery strategy: • a massive renovation wave of our buildings and infrastructure and a more circular economy, bringing local jobs; • rolling out renewable energy projects, especially wind, solar and kick-starting a clean hydrogen economy in Europe; • cleaner transport and logistics, including the installation of one million charging points for electric vehicles and a boost for rail travel and clean mobility in our cities and regions; • strengthening the Just Transition Fund to support reskilling, helping businesses create new economic opportunities.

48 Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 Bringing nature back into our lives. European Commission. 20 March 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-annex-eu-biodiversity-strategy-2030_en.pdf > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

49 The EU budget powering the Recovery Plan for Europe. European Commission. 27 May 2020. <https:// ec.europa.eu/info/files/eu-budget-powering-recovery-plan-europe_en > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

Europe’s moment: Repair and prepare for the next generation. European Commission. 27 May 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_940 > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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After the presentation of the new plan the MEPs broadly welcomed the Commission’s recovery package proposals. The EPP emphasised, that the new money shouldn’t be spent on Europe’s old problems rather on fresh new ideas. The Renew Europe called the proposal a game changer, which is unprecedented in the history of Europe. 51 At the next regular session of the European Council on 19 June 2020 the proposal will be on the table and heavy discussions are expected. Resistance is likely to come especially from the side of Denmark, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands, the "Frugal Four."

The President of the European Council Charles Michel urged all Member States to examine the Commission’s proposal swiftly and work constructively towards a compromise in the best interests of the Union. “Everything should be done to reach an agreement before the summer break. The citizens and businesses of the EU have been heavily impacted by the pandemic. They need targeted relief without delay,” he said.52 The 2021–2027 MFF could become the largest budget in the history of the European Union. The bulk of the proposed recovery measures will be powered by a Next Generation EU program with a financial power of 750 billion euro. The financing will be made possible by the Own Resources Decision, which will allow the Commission to exceptionally borrow up to 750 billion euro on behalf of the Union, through the issuance of bonds, for measures over the period of 2021–2024.53 In normal times this plan wouldn’t fly swiftly, many member states— understandably—would be reluctant to accept it. However, we are living in extraordinary times. In connection to the Multiannual Financial Framework and the 750 billion euro EU Recovery Instrument we have to underline that the member states should benefit from the crisis management package in a fair way. The countries successfully fighting against the virus cannot be penalized by reallocating resources in favour of those states, which were performing worse.

This emergency brought up the need to have a new approach to the European economy combined with the need of greening it. With the European Green Deal as the EU’s recovery strategy, we can say that the COVID-19 crisis helped to come up with an even more ambitious plan for the realisation of the original idea. If these proposals remain in the new MFF, it will be a great opportunity for the future of Europe.

51 EU future at stake: MEPs broadly welcome Commission’s recovery package proposals. European Parliament.

27 May 2020. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20200526IPR79817/eu-future-at-stakemeps-broadly-welcome-commission-s-recovery-package-proposals > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

52 Charles Michel on the recovery fund: “Our citizens and businesses have been heavily impacted by the pandemic. They need targeted relief without delay”. European Council. 27 May 2020. <https://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/05/27/charles-michel-on-the-recovery-fund-our-citizens-andbusinesses-have-been-heavily-impacted-by-the-pandemic-they-need-targeted-relief-without-delay/ > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

The EU budget powering the Recovery Plan for Europe. European Commission. 27 May 2020. <https:// ec.europa.eu/info/files/eu-budget-powering-recovery-plan-europe_en > Accessed: 29 May 2020.

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SLOVAKIA—WILL THE SUCCESS STORY CONTINUE? ÁGNES VASS

Slovakia is often characterized as a success story of the 2004 EU enlargement.

The country’s first 15 years as a member state was marked by a robust improvement— both from economic and political perspective. The Slovak EU membership can be divided into three main phrases so far: the successful, pro-market reforms oriented first period, characterised by significant economic growth; the accession to the Eurozone and the years of the global financial crisis during which Slovakia remained relatively stable and resilient; and the last few years that have been marked by the ambition of belonging to the "core of Europe". Slovakia’s perception of the future of the European Union is influenced by two main controversial trends. On one hand, Slovakia has a strong desire to be seen as a committed member of the EU, while being part of its ‘core’. On the other hand, however, the state institutions are relatively weak and domestic politics are highly influenced by corruption.54 These circumstances draw a mixed image of the country, explaining Slovakia’s dual nature with and to the EU. The aim of this short analysis is to understand current Slovak perceptions on the EU through those issues and questions that were included into the political campaign before the elections in February 2020 with minor overview of the most significant turning points during the country’s EU membership.

When it comes to the foreign policy and more broadly to the geopolitical orientation of the country, there are two main narratives: the pro-European and the one that considers Slovakia as "somewhere in between East and West."55 This duality is also visible when we examine political parties’ attitude towards the EU. There are two main camps: parties with strong pro-Western orientation and positive attitude towards the EU and NATO and parties whose attitude towards the EU and NATO is rather critical or hostile sometimes. In recent years only a minority of the main political parties belong to the latter camp. As a study conducted before the parliamentary elections in 2020 highlights, there is only one hardly Eurosceptic party (Kotlebovci – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS) and two other parties can be considered as soft-Eurosceptic: Sme Rodina (We are Family) and Sloboda a Solidarita (Freedom and Solidarity, SaS) both members of the current government coalition. Parties such as Smer–SD (Direction – Social Democracy) , Za ľudí (For People), Progressivné Slovensko (Progressive Slovakia, 54 Corruption Perceptions Index 2019. Transparency International. <https://www.transparency.org/en/ cpi/2019/results/svk > Accessed: 23 March 2020.

Justin Fantauzzo: Stuck in the Middle: Slovakia between East and West. NATO Association of Canada.

5 June 2015. <http://natoassociation.ca/stuck-in-the-middle-slovakia-between-east-and-west/ > Accessed: 24 March 2020. See also: Nina Hrabovská Francelová: A bridge between East and West: Why many Slovaks see their country in the middle. The Slovak Spectator. 13 June 2019. <spectator.sme.sk/c/22144899/a-bridgebetween-east-and-west-why-many-slovaks-see-their-country-in-the-middle.html > Accessed: 15 May 2020.

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PS) or Spolu (Together) are supporting certain level of EU integration, however, none of them can be considered as Eurofederalists.56 It is typical, that pro-EU parties criticize the EU on certain issues—in case of Slovakia the mandatory migrant quota is a good example of that. After the V4 countries accepted their joint statement against the migration quotas57 in 2017, prime minister Robert Fico announced that he would like to see Slovakia as part of the EU "core"58 and although V4 cooperation is important for the country, it is "not an alternative" to the EU.59 Also, he continued to describe Slovakia as a "pro-European island" in Central Europe.60 While in power, Fico, together with other two high political representatives of the country (the President and the Chair of the Parliament, who was the leader of the anti-Western populist party of that time) signed a declaration in 2017 in support of the country’s immersion to the "core" of the EU61, while he previously voted against Slovakia’s EU integration.62 At that time, the opposition political parties criticised Fico for being unclear about the concept of the "core of the EU". The main argument was, that unlike in the Czech Republic, where the "core" was basically equal with the Eurozone membership, Slovakia have already been member of that, therefore, being part of the "core" has had no message for Slovakia.63 Regarding the current debates about the future of the European Union, this paper focuses on the following main questions being on the European agenda right now: the rule of law and its fulfilment in the member states, the qualified majority voting, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 and the EU enlargement. In regards to the ongoing Article 7 procedures, Slovakia rather maintains a careful position when it comes to the case of Poland and Hungary—as it supports more dialogue before any sanctions. Generally, connecting EU financing with the rule of law is not acceptable for the majority of the Slovak political parties. The leading coalition party, Obyčajní Ľudia (Ordinary People, OL’aNO) is not against EU assessment in the rule of law in annual frequency. However, parties like Za ľudí (also member of the current governmental coalition) maintain a position that on the one hand advocates for the strengthening of the rule of law in EU member states, while on the 56 Zuzana Gabrížová: Slovensko má v politike tvrdých euroskeptikov, no žiadnych eurofederalistov. Euractiv.sk.

18 February 2020. <https://euractiv.sk/section/buducnost-eu/news/slovensko-ma-v-politike-tvrdycheuroskeptikov-no-ziadnych-eurofederalistov/ > Accessed: 25 March 2020.

57 Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of V4 Countries on migration. Visegrad Group. 19 July 2017. <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/official-statements > Accessed: 15 May 2020.

Zuzana Gabrížová: Fico: Jadro bude mať svoju cenu, tak ako vstup do EÚ. Euractiv.sk. <https://euractiv.sk/ section/buducnost-eu/news/fico-jadro-bude-mat-svoju-cenu-ako-vstup-do-eu/ > Accessed: 19 April 2020.

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59 Andrej Matišák: Fico V Berlíne: Únia Je náš životný priestor. Pravda, 4 March 2017. <https://europa.pravda. sk/aktuality/clanok/425330-fico-v-berline-unia-je-nas-zivotny-priestor/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

Speciál k rozdělení ČSFR z vily Tugendhat. Česká Televize. 25 August 2017. <http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ ivysilani/1096898594-udalosti-komentare/217411000370825/obsah/564418-special-k-rozdeleni-csfr-z-vilytugendhat > Accessed: 5 April 2020.

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61 Danko, Fico a prezident Kiska rokovali na Bratislavskom hrade, dospeli k zhode. TASR. 23 October 2017. <https://domov.sme.sk/c/20678975/slovensko-kiska-fico-danko-eu-integracia.html > Accessed: 15 April 2020.

62 Juraj Marušiak: Slovenské politické strany a vstup SR do EÚ (do roku 2012). In: Pohľady na slovenskú politiku po roku 1989, edited by Miroslav Pekník. II. vol. Časť, VEDA, Bratislava, 2016. 275–316.

Richard Sulík: Čo nám prinesie jadro EÚ? Denník N. 29 August 2017. <https://dennikn.sk/blog/865623/conam-prinesie-jadro/ > Accessed: 22 March 2020.

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other reject the idea of increased EU influence in this regard. Only PS/Spolu was supporting not only the idea of peer-reviewing among member states, but they were also in favour of annual monitoring with sanctions and EU funds conditionality. Although the coalition split after the elections, their MEP, Michal Šimečka has become the rapporteur for the new ruleof-law mechanism in the European Parliament.

The qualified majority voting regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the Council of the EU is a question creating cleavages between the Slovak political actors. The majority of the political parties, including governmental coalition parties, have an ambiguous attitude toward this question: they argue, that a compromise should be reached guaranteeing sovereignty. Za ľudí, however, argues that sooner or later Slovakia has to switch to it, while another coalition partner, Sme Rodina are openly against the idea.

As public investments in Slovakia are heavily dependent on the European structural funds, Slovakia has an interest in preserving a well-funded European Cohesion Policy.64 To achieve this aim, Slovakia also joined the Friends of Cohesion grouping and hosted a summit of this platform in Bratislava in November 2019, where a declaration was adopted.65 According to the proposed MFF 2021–2027, Slovakia still remains a net beneficiary, but will receive a smaller portion of the development funds. The other concern in this regard is the above mentioned “rule of law” conditionality in the MFF. Slovakia was not openly against it, but has expressed some legal as well as political reservations about this idea, for instance, arguing that the MFF is not a rule of law mechanism, but a budgetary measure and that some of the conditions could be interpreted ambiguously.66 Taking into consideration that Slovakia is the only member of the Eurozone from the Visegrad Group (V4), the concept of euro area budget should be also mentioned. According to Slovak officials, it should have a stabilizing function67 mainly against macro-economic shocks. Slovakia also supports the reform of the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) and a stronger role for it in the evaluation of countries asking for assistance.

Despite significant changes after the end of more than a decade long political leadership of SMER and Robert Fico, the new Slovak government is following the pro-European path, supporting further integration. However, it has some serious concerns regarding financial questions, as it was visible during the global financial crisis in 2008 and the years after.

As the new government is dedicated to the fight against corruption, we can expect some Marián Koreň: Dlhodobý rozpočet Únie: Komisia chce Slovensku zoškrtať eurofondy o vyše tri miliardy.

Euractiv.sk. 29 May 2018. <https://euractiv.sk/section/ekonomika-a-euro/news/dlhodoby-rozpocet-uniekomisia-chce-slovensku-zoskrtat-eurofondy-o-vyse-tri-miliardy-eur/ > Accessed: 23 March 2020.

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65 Friends of Cohesion JOINT DECLARATION on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021 – 2027. <https:// www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Friends-of-Cohesion-Joint-Declaration-on-the-MFF-2021-2027. pdf?utm_source=POLITICO.EU&utm_campaign=3632132704-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_11_29_05_20&utm_ medium=email&utm_term=0_10959edeb5-3632132704-189693517 > Accessed: 29 April 2020.

Zuzana Gabrižová: Právny štát: Slovensko si sankcie vie predstaviť, má však pripomienky. Euractiv.sk.

23 May 2018. <https://euractiv.sk/section/spolocnost/news/pravny-stat-slovensko-si-sankcie-viepredstavitma-vsak-pripomienky/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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67 Marián Koreň: Ministerstvo financií: Rozpočet eurozóny by mal plniť stabilizačnú funkciu. Euractiv.sk.

28 July 2018. < https://euractiv.sk/section/ekonomika-a-euro/news/ministerstvo-financii-rozpocet-eurozony-bymal-plnit-stabilizacnu-funkciu/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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significant political and institutional developments that could strengthen the country’s proEuropean attitude as well. Despite the fact that the biggest party in the governing coalition, OL’aNO, can be considered as a rather soft-Eurosceptic party, significant changes in Slovakia’s pro-European attitude cannot be expected. Regarding the economic questions, however, Slovakia is representing a rather conservative attitude as it was expressed during the sovereign debt crisis and the Greek bailout. That experience shaped the Slovak perspective towards the advocation of stricter fiscal responsibility and stronger regulations of fiscal issues on national and EU level as well. As the coronavirus is causing serious damages in most of the European countries, the role of the funds and debts offered by the EU will be crucial. At this moment, Slovakia is one of those few countries expected to recover from the crisis caused by the spread of the virus and return to 2019 level of productivity by the end of 2021. If the country was able to maintain its stability and resilience, as it did during the global financial crisis, it should have adequate tools to influence and shape the future of the EU—from financial point of view—towards a community implementing stricter fiscal policies and deeper integration of the Eurozone.

CONFLICTING POSITIONS— A LOOK AT THE CURRENT POLISH STANCE IN THE EU PETER DOBROWIECKI

Since the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland has found itself in a variety of positions within the EU that range from postcard model state to anti-hero status. Poland’s exceptionally good handling of the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, in addition to the country’s active involvement in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and contribution to the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, was well received by older member states—by contrast, Warsaw’s ongoing rule of law dispute with EU institutions, combined with the rise of Euroscepticism among its ruling politicians, has made it the target of continuous criticism in recent years. Currently, Poland finds itself in a paradox situation where, on the one hand, it is not in a position to positively influence the debate on the future of Europe, while, on the other, being the largest new Central and Eastern European post-communist member state, it still maintains a level of influence in the EU 27.68 Łukasz Lipiński – Jan Szyszko: Polityczne sukcesy i porażki pierwszych 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskie.

In: 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej. Raport, edited by Anna Radwan-Röhrenschef. Instytut in.Europa, Warsaw, 2019. <http://ineuropa.pl/in15/ > Accessed: 15 May 2020.; Craig Turp-Balazs: EU proposes 750 billion-euro Covid-19 recovery package, with Poland set to be fourth largest beneficiary. Emerging Europe. 27 May 2020. <https://emerging-europe.com/news/eu-proposes-750-billion-euro-covid-19-recovery-package-with-poland-setto-be-fourth-largest-beneficiary/ > Accessed: 31 May 2020.

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The often heated and politically mutually exploited quarrel between Brussels and Warsaw occasionally lead to speculations regarding a possible future Polexit even more so following the success of the pro-leave camp in the Brexit Referendum in 2016. Also, time and time again, critical voices from within the country or abroad call for Poland’s exclusion/ exit from the EU. This comes as nothing new, as Eurosceptic political forces have been present in Poland ever since its accession—in the current presidential election campaign, two out of the ten candidates openly call for Poland’s withdrawal from the EU. However, the overwhelming majority of the Polish electorate is still largely in favour of the Union69—a fact not overlooked by the ruling coalition government led by the traditionally (mildly) Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party (Prawo I Sprawiedliwość, PiS). Political realities, economic benefits, and Poland’s stated foreign political goals—that require its integration within the two most important groupings of the Euro-Atlantic organisational framework, the EU and NATO— all mean that, despite its seemingly continuous political conflict with the EU, the Polish government will avoid the escalation of the dispute to a breaking point.70 Nevertheless, the ongoing debate has led to Poland’s political marginalisation within the grouping. Whereas Poland maintains good cooperation with the Visegrad countries (V4) and Baltic EU member states and initiated—together with Croatia—the ambitious Three Seas Initiative (TSI) that aims to enhance multi-layer, North–South connectivity among twelve Central and East European EU member states, spanning from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the country’s overall impact on the EU has declined. As a result, Warsaw has not been in a position to channel the focus of European decision-making towards its own initiatives—especially following Brexit, as, with the qualified majority voting, Poland found it increasingly hard to secure the required pool of support for its agenda. A recent example for this was the proposed reform of the so-called posted workers in 2017–2018, when the French recommendation for stricter regulation was accepted by the European Council over the strong objections of Poland and Hungary.71 As such, Poland is losing its bid to be at the forefront of European politics, a key goal envisaged by various Polish governments ever since the country’s accession in 2004. However, partly for the same reasons as above (following Brexit, Poland became the EU’s fifth-biggest state by population and its seventh-biggest economy) and because of its geopolitical position, Poland cannot be completely ignored either

Artur Bartkiewicz: Sondaż: 31,3 proc. Polaków uważa, że Polska może opuścić UE. Rzeczpospolita.

31 January 2020. <https://www.rp.pl/Unia-Europejska/200139835-Sondaz-313-proc-Polakow-uwaza-zePolska-moze-opuscic-UE.html > Accessed: 15 May 2020.; Gazeta.pl: Sondaż. Czy Polska powinna opuścić UE, pozostać w UE? Prawie 90 proc. Polaków wybiera Unię. Gazeta.pl. 1 February 2020. <https://wiadomosci.gazeta. pl/wiadomosci/7,114884,25656477,sondaz-czy-polska-powinna-opuscic-ue-pozostac-w-ue-prawie.html > Accessed: 15 May 2020.; Maria Pankowska: PiS wykorzystuje pandemię, by krytykować UE. Ale Polacy chcą Unii bardziej zjednoczonej [SONDAŻ]. OKO.press. 31 March 2020. <https://oko.press/polacy-chca-unii-bardziej-zjednoczonejsondaz/ > Accessed: 15 May 2020.

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Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017–2021. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland. <https://www.gov. pl/attachment/869184c0-bd6f-4a20-b8af-a5c8190350a1 > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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71 Cécile Barbière: Posted workers: Macron’s first victory in reforming the EU. Euractiv. 24 October 2017. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/posted-workers-macrons-first-victory-in-reformingthe-eu/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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by Germany or France when shaping their own separate vision on the future of the EU.72 In the past, Poland strongly argued against the creation of a multi-speed and federalised Europe, with the PiS-led government promoting, similarly to Hungary, the concept of a Union with strong, equal nation states.73 In recent years, politicians from the ruling conservative Polish government have often struck a Eurosceptic tone, while also embracing the idea of European polycentrism and the notion of civilisational separateness of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) from the rest of the continent.74 In other words, due to its historical and cultural past, the CEE region should become a separate entity in an ideally polycentral EU, thereby avoiding the possibility of falling under the hegemony of core EU member states (most notably Germany and France). The idea also formulates a need for the reconstitution of the EU, while maintaining an institutional continuity, but reshaping the institutions’ field of competence and mission. The four main and interdependent pillars of this vision focus on the geopolitical, institutional, economic and axiological transformation of the Union.75 As such the vision calls for an EU that is built up of autonomous subcentres that can implement the most beneficial, specific economic solutions for themselves. Regarding the institutional aspect, the concept calls for the unanimity of decision-making within the European Council, the strengthening of national parliaments’ control over supranational institutions, the curtailing of European Commission’s and Parliament’s rights to interfere in the domestic laws of member states outside of exclusive EU competence, and the strict enforcement of the principle of subsidiarity.76 In addition, the vision also calls on the EU to “rediscover” its Christian traditions, as the foundation of European identity.77 According to the Polish point of view, the increased influence of larger member states over the European Commission, the centralisation of the EU, and the disregard for national sovereignty were all factors that either contributed or led to the EU’s recent crises (namely, Brexit and the economic and migratory crises).78 Not surprisingly, due to a variety of specific economic and foreign political goals, questions related to the European single market, migration policy, climate policy, digitalisation, defence, and the role of the national parliaments remain high on the Polish EU agenda, with the subject of cohesion funds allocated to Poland within the next, 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework 72 Andrew Wrobel: Poland is an economic success story, but it can do better. Emerging Europe. 7 April 2020. <https://emerging-europe.com/news/poland-is-an-economic-success-story-but-it-can-do-better/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.; Rym Momtaz: Macron plays it pragmatic with Poland. Politico European Edition. 3 February 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-plays-it-pragmatic-with-poland/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

Claire Guyot: Poland defends a Europe of states. Euractiv. 9 April 2018. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/ future-eu/news/poland-defends-a-europe-of-states/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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Krzysztof Szczerski: Utopia Europejska – Kryzys Integracji I polska inicjatiwa naprawy. Biały Kruk, Krakow, 2017.

74

Piotr Tosiek: The Polish Vision of EU Future: Imitation of the Hungarian Model? Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej. 2019/13. 283–293.

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Tosiek, 286.

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Piotr Buras: The EU according to Krzysztof Szczerski. European Council on Foreign Relations–Warsaw Office. 1 August 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-vision-for-europe-mateusz-morawiecki/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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Mateusz Morawiecki: Poland’s vision for Europe. Politico European Edition. 30 April 2019. <https://www. politico.eu/article/poland-vision-for-europe-mateusz-morawiecki/ > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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(MFF) leading the list.79 Since its accession to the EU, Poland has greatly benefited from the distribution of the EU’s cohesion funds, with over 181.5 billion euros received between 2004–2020.80 The 2021–2027 MFF, however, will most probably bring around a completely different budget, with initial suggestions in May 2018 hinting at a deep, even as much as 23% cut, for the potentially allocated fund pool for Poland.81 Naturally, Warsaw strongly contests the budgetary cuts while also rejecting the idea of the rule-of-law conditionality in the application of the next MFF. The brunt of the 2021–2027 MFF negotiations is yet to come, and, with many uncertainties surrounding the European Commission’s COVID-19 recovery plan, Poland will have a hard task if it wants to both lessen the cuts and argue against the rule-of-law conditionality. Nevertheless, the shift in the possible payments for Poland in the EU’s Just Transition Fund (JTF) indicates that the proposed cuts under one financial mechanism might be compensated for via other financial formats—Poland was set to receive two billion euros from the total 7.5 billion euro fund according to an EU budget proposal from early 2020, but the sum allocated to Warsaw was later halved only to be (reportedly) raised to 8 billion euros as part of the recent proposal from May 2020 that would boost the funds budget to 40 billion euros.82 All in all, Poland’s EU membership in the years to come remains certain; however, its position within Europe remains dotted with question marks. The Article 7 procedure against Warsaw is set to stay with us for the time being, which, in addition to the ruling government’s sceptic approach towards the current institutional framework of the EU, will likely be the source of further conflicts with core EU member states.

MFA Press Office: Poland active in the discussion on the future EU Strategic Agenda 2019–2024. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland. 21 May 2019. <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/poland-active-in-thediscussion-on-the-future-eu-strategic-agenda-2019-2024 > Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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In comparison, between 2004 and 2020, Poland contributed 58.5 billion euros to the EU’s joint budget Source: Ponad 123 miliardy euro “do przodu”, 255 tysięcy inwestycji. Ministerstwo chwali 16 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej. TVN24. 1 May 2020. <https://tvn24.pl/polska/bilans-16-lat-polski-w-unii-europejskiej-ponad-30miliardow-zlotych-na-kazdy-rok-czlonkostwa-4571978 > Accessed: 30 May 2020.

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Lipiński–Szyszko.

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Poland’s Climate Minister Michał Kurtyka claimed that an extra 6 billion euros will be allocated to Poland in the increased budget, thereby making Warsaw the fund’s biggest beneficiary. Source: Elena Sánchez Nicolás: EU Commission: Five-fold aid increase for fossil-fuel regions. Euobserver. 29 May 2020. <https://euobserver. com/green-deal/148504 > Accessed: 30 May 2020.

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FRANCE’S STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF THE EU ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

It is evident that in the current situation no country in Europe has a clearer vision regarding what direction the EU should follow in the future as France does. After years of nervous and indecisive leadership which resulted in the erosion of Paris’ influence in Europe and forced, in many occasions, the Élysée to give up its priorities in order to passively accept Berlin’s biddings83—i.e. during the successive enlargement waves in 2004 and 2008 and especially during the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis—now, the time when “France proposes is back.”84 As a matter of fact, France’s national foreign policy’s level of adaptation to the emergence of new priorities on the EU level is once more evident and “Europeanization” has become a very concrete factor for the current French government.85 The long-lived French ambitions to jump into the EU’s driver’s seat have lately incarnated in the political vision of the young French President, Emmanuel Macron who promised to start a season of reforms in Brussels which is to culminate in a more “sovereign, united and democratic Europe.”86 At the beginning of his premiership in 2017 France’s most pro-European leader in recent history had effectively managed to resuscitate Angela Merkel’s cautious reformism to take advantage of Germany’s “reluctant leadership” syndrome by persuading it to support the ambitious French vision.87 Nonetheless the direction of the two countries seems to have slightly diverged in the last months.88 It took a pandemic and the prospect of a dire economic recession to resuscitate the German giant and put all its financial weight—and political influence—into the recovery efforts. It is early to say whether Chancellor Merkel will be ready to follow Macron in some of his most audacious proposals, such as creating a fiscal union for the Eurozone, as the German Chancellor needs to be convinced that this would not just imply a transfer of additional financial resources from richer countries to more indebted ones, but Berlin’s support for a EUR 500 billion European Recovery Fund 83 Julian Coman: François Holland: from Mr Normal to Mr Weak. The Guardian. 28 April 2013. <https://www. theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/28/francois-hollande-mr-normal-mr-weak > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

84 Emmanuel Macron: Initiative pour l'Europe–Discours d'Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique. Élysée. 26 September 2017. <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/09/26/initiative-pour-leurope-discours-d-emmanuel-macron-pour-une-europe-souveraine-unie-democratique > Accessed 8 May 2020.

Christian Lequesne: France and the European Union: a story of reason rather than love. Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). 1 January 2015. <https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/ France-and-the-European-Union-a-story-of-reason-rather-than-love > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

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Emmanuel Macron: Initiative pour l'Europe.

86

Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon. The Economist. Special Report. 13 June 2013. <https://www.economist.com/ special-report/2013/06/13/europes-reluctant-hegemon > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

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88 IIEA: Seeing the Bigger Picture: France and Germany and the ‘Future of Europe’ Conference. The Institute of International & European Affairs. 3 December 2019. <https://www.iiea.com/eu27/france-and-germany-and-thefuture-of-europe-conference/ > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

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is a historic step forward in the process of European unification. Despite the fact that this plan has been backed by the European Commission, which relaunched with an even more ambitious proposal, the final words lie in the hands of the European Council which must decide unanimously. However, the momentum that Macron’s vision is having in Brussels, will help him forget, momentarily, some of his troubles at home—i.e. the yellow vests and pension protests and some turmoil and defection within the ranks of his parliamentary majority—which lately forced the French President to reconsider some of his European ambitions. In the current crisis generated by the coronavirus pandemic, Macron’s plans for overhauling the EU’s governance and building a more sovereign and resilient Eurozone came back into the public eye. If this will be the direction the European leaders will decide to follow in the future, the paths of France and Brussels will undoubtedly cross many times.89 As a matter of fact, recent events have proven the centrality of the Euro in preserving— and reinforcing—the long term economic and political power of Europe. As it is often repeated, the current crisis and its estimated effects on the economy call for a collective response from European leaders, with solidarity as the rallying cry. Failing to do so risks putting the EU in mortal danger. Describing this as the EU’s “moment of truth,” Macron brought back some ideas to the centre of the political debate to reinforce the Euro area as already stated in his “Future of Europe” strategy.90 Experience from the financial crisis of 2007–2009 has already highlighted the weakness of the existing institutional and legal structures in the Eurozone. The crisis revealed the problems arising from macroeconomic imbalances within the Eurozone, reflecting the structural weaknesses of economies and a level of lower competitiveness of some countries in relation to other member states.

As a matter of fact, a symmetric shock such as the current pandemic is indicating that a closer integration within the Euro area is the only realistic solution. The creation of a Recovery Fund at the European level is certainly a step in the right direction but it might be not enough. In this sense, Macron’s plan to create a fiscal union in the Eurozone, with its own budget, capable of absorbing economic shocks and avoiding imbalances that harm the whole common currency zone, and a Eurozone Finance Minister—subject to a Eurozone parliamentary control and tasked with overseeing the area’s resources—is the strategy to pursue.91 Unfortunately, northern countries and, to a lesser extent Germany—despite signing the Meseberg declaration, during the course of which Merkel backed mostly of Macron’s proposals—remain resistant to these ideas, showing that completing the Eurozone governance is an impossible task until member states are jealous of maintaining national sovereignty in matters of fiscal policy.

89 Michel Duclos: 2020 – les perspectives pour la politique étrangère de la France. Institut Montaigne. Blog.

14 January 2020. <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/2020-les-perspectives-pour-la-politique-etrangere-de-lafrance?fbclid=IwAR2-QAjIQwkqIMfa3lr4QXBLIstkM3Q1OdZr6ilUwv4lfJrXoXjtRQm9fxE > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

Victor Mallet and Roula Khalaf: Macron warns of EU unravelling unless it embraces financial solidarity.

Financial Times. 16 April 2020. <https://www.ft.com/content/d19dc7a6-c33b-4931-9a7e-4a74674da29a > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

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Leokadia Oręziak: Fiscal federalism and a separate budget for the euro area. International Journal of Management and Economics. 27 June 2018. <https://doi.org/10.2478/ijme-2018-0012 > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

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In fact, the “frugal” northern countries’ main concern is that pooling more financial resources in the Eurozone budget will only sustain more fiscal-relaxed countries enabling them to avoid the implementation of structural reforms and pursue loose policies. In this sense, France, as one of the EU’s most indebted countries, might it find difficult to claim leadership on such an urgent and sensitive issue until it has regained some budgetary credibility with Brussels. Therefore, the EU’s second biggest economy should make more efforts to reduce its public indebtedness, put its deficit under control and complete the circle of the economic reforms, started by Macron, aimed at liberalizing the French economy overcoming its strong dirigisme and low competitiveness. At the European level it is important that the French President backs also the plans for completing the Eurozone’s banking union while contextually continues to porsue an active alliance-building strategy in Europe attracting also new like-minded forces ready to support the reforms—including treaty changes. Undoubtedly, Paris could potentially play a crucial role in converging the views of the diffident northern member states and act as an intermediary between North and South. As already demonstrated on several occasions, Macron is also strongly committed to follow the path of diversified integration, or the creation of a “multi-speed” Europe. It is in the absolute interest of the EU that France and other willing member states undertake different paths of integration to overcome the current “immobility” or as Macron defined, “differentiation through ambition.”92 The creation of innovative instruments like the SURE (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in Emergency), the temporary opening of the ESM credit lines “without” conditionality, and the discussion over the set-up of the European Recovery Fundare significant steps towards a more integrated Eurozone.93 However, it must not be forgotten that the French strategy, besides being obviously directed at strengthening the EU, represents a national strategy therefore it is carved from the perspective of a sovereign state. Macron, from his side, embodies a modern and more progressive version of gaullisme which aims to extend the influence of France on the European and global stage. In fact, since the period of the early 2000s eastward enlargements, when the centre of gravity within the EU shifted from Paris to Berlin, France suffered a deep leadership crisis. By concentrating the political debate and initiative within the Eurozone, Macron is trying to regain the geopolitical centrality of his country bringing back a France-led western and southern Europe at the core of the European project. However, given the difficulties of the French economy and the increasing gap with Germany, Paris has well understood that it should concentrate its “leadership aspirations” not solely on financial matters. For this reason, and this is probably the most important part of the French European strategy, Macron—as his predecessors—is investing much of the country’s political leverage in developing a stronger European foreign and defence policy. In fact, geopolitics is not an area where Berlin is really interested in taking the lead, leaving more freedom of movement and initiative to Paris.

Emmanuel Macron: Initiative pour l'Europe.

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Antonio Villafranca: L’accordo europeo ai raggi X tra MES, Sure e BEI. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). 22 April 2020. < https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/laccordo-europeo-ai-raggi-xtra-mes-sure-e-bei-25752 > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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President Macron has often insisted that Europe needs a wakeup call when it comes to security matters and the development of an autonomous European defence cooperation, within or independently from NATO, must represent a common goal for all the EU member states.94 In a blunt interview with the The Economist last November Macron called NATO “brain-dead,” and despite the outrage his declaration sparked in many circles, the truth is that the Atlantic alliance is struggling to respond to new global challenges, mostly since Trump’s America rejects the very concept of international community. According to the French President the EU needs to start thinking of itself strategically as a geopolitical power; otherwise Europeans will “no longer be in control of their destiny.”95 Macron’s strategic initiative for the EU has been recently explained during a speech at the Munich Security Conference on 15 February.96 On this occasion the French President insisted on the divergences that arose between American and European interests and reiterated that the “Old Continent” has different priorities from Washington; namely “Mediterranean policy and policy towards Russia.”97 The revival of the dialogue with Moscow has taken an important part in the French President’s strategic vision and it is very likely that the French government will spend significant political capital in building a constructive dialogue with Russia. However, France’s approach towards Russia risks to undermine Macron’s alliance building with many European countries, mostly in Eastern Europe, while also irremediably weakening the credibility of the big European strategic design. In Munich Macron also unveiled France’s new nuclear strategy. Since the UK left, France remained the only nuclear power in the EU. The French President sees the ongoing nuclear arms race as a global threat and strongly emphasizes the creation of a European force de frappe—something that could be roughly translated as a nuclear “strike force.” For this reason, the French government called for a more integrated European defence strategy where France’s unique nuclear might would play a central role. This old paradigm of France’s foreign policy is probably the most contentious part of Macron’s defence strategy. In fact, on nuclear issues, the EU has always been divided between the viewpoints of members with and without a nuclear arsenal, as well as between EU NATO and non-NATO members (some of the latter, like Ireland, are also neutral). Moreover, some EU member states, among them Germany, are hesitant in supporting the French doctrine because they feel that weakening NATO and, therefore, reducing American commitment in Europe, might expose them even more to Russia’s aggressive foreign strategy. As a matter of fact, the future of Macron’s European ambitions will depend to a large extent on the renewal of the Franco-German motor that 94 Olivier De France: PESCO: The Frence Perspective. The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).

February 2019. <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Ares-37.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

The Economist: Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead. The Economist.

7 November 2019. <https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-natois-becoming-brain-dead > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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96 Gustav Gressel–Kadri Liik–Jeremy Shapiro – Tara Varma: Emmanuel Macron’s very big idea on Russia.

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). 25 September 2019. <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ emmanuel_macrons_very_big_idea_on_russia > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

97 Michel Duclos: After Munich, a Macron doctrine on strategic affairs. Institut Montaigne. 26 February 2020. <https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/after-munich-macron-doctrine-strategic-affairs?fbclid=IwAR2WSn yKV3DBdZN4jOZdKDNL-XQ9_51wR-Ot4sYe2FO7d9PO44ZFrNBCU4Y > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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seems to have been set again into motion.98 If the French President will work to become a better and less mercurial diplomat, he would stand a greater chance of convincing Germany and others in supporting him and implementing his ambitious ideas.

STABILITY AND A COMMUNITY OF VALUES— THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE BEÁTA TÓTH

The history of Germany and the European Union has been closely intertwined since the beginning, as Western Germany was one of the founding states of the European Economic Community, which can be considered as the predecessor of the European Union, in 1957.

During the Cold War, the idea of European integration became even more valuable to the Germans, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification, the German government regained its legitimacy thanks to the European integration. Due to its special situation, two aspects have traditionally been important to the German government in its relation with Europe: stability and a community of values. The primacy of these two elements is still present to this day in German policy making when it comes to Europe and is also an integral part of the German perspective on the future of the EU. There is a fundamentally broad pro-European consensus among German politicians, although Eurosceptic positions have emerged from time to time since the reunification, today the German government is committed to issues concerning a common European future. One of the most controversial issues from German perspective is the institutional structure of the EU. German political parties broadly agree on the need to strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the future, while also increasing the efficiency of the decision-making procedures in the Council of the European Union in addition improving cooperation between the two institutions.99 In the long run, it is still in Germany’s interest to strengthen the position of the Community institutions, as they make it possible to preserve political stability in the Union, which also ensures that German influence remains embedded.

Germany is the largest economy in the European Union and also the engine of integration from an economic point of view, therefore it is not surprising that there is traditionally a strong German position regarding economic questions at EU level. The German government is sensitive to the Union’s current macroeconomic problems, especially with Paul Maurice: Coronavirus: la solidarité franco-allemande à l’épreuve. Institut Français des Relationes Internationales. (IFRI). 8 April 2020. <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/coronavirus_ solidarite_franco_allemande_maurice_2020.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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Oskar Niedermayer: Deutsche Parteien und Europa In: Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik, edited by Katrin Böttger – Mathias Jopp. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2016. 176.

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regard to the Eurozone, accordingly Germany is in the forefront of the current attempt aimed to consolidate the Eurozone and especially its banking union aspect.100 The German government also supports the creation of a European Monetary Fund and a budget to help Member States implement the necessary reforms.101 The EU’s common industrial policy has also been much debated, its development at Community level is also a priority for the German Government.102 The European industry accounts for 83 percent of the exports in the Union and is naturally of high priority for the traditionally export-based German economy. The state of European industry is also of high importance in terms of stability, as it guarantees more than 30 million workplaces within the European Union.103 Germany not only needs political, but also economic stability in the EU, because this ensures the influence of the German government in the decision-making procedures of the Union. Furthermore, the German economy can function more effectively in a longterm calculable and consistent environment. This stable environment can be ensured and maintained through a common market and a common currency, subsequently the German government supports all reform efforts that can contribute to the development of united action within the EU regarding economic questions, making the Union a more competent player in international competition. The other basis for German European policy is a European community of values, i.e. a combination of stable economic conditions with solidarity and democratic values, which is also one of the key elements of the approaching German Presidency of the Council of the EU from July 2020.104 However, it is questionable how the reform of Economic and Monetary Union in the EU will take place in the future, as this has long been a matter of serious debate between the German and French governments.105 The cooperation brings significant benefits from a German perspective, since it makes the trade more fluent within the European Union, on the one hand because it reduces the transactional costs, while on the other hand it removes the exchange rate risks within the Eurozone.

It is clear from the issues at stake that German EU policy is still pursuing a very pragmatic approach, as this balanced German position focusing on stability has already proved its Jacques Pelkmans: Europe under Merkel's third term In: Intereconomics. 2013/5. 266., Springer, Heidelberg, 2013. 266. <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10272-013-0469-4.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

100

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet: Zukunftsdebatten in der EU. GroßerWurf oder kleinteilige Reformvorschläge? Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn, 18 January 2019. <https://www.bpb.de/ apuz/283971/zukunftsdebatten-in-der-eu > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

101

Dieter Rehfeld – Judith Terstriep: Rückwärts in die Zukunft? Ein Essay zur jüngsten Debatte um Industriepolitik. Forschung Aktuell. 2019/4., Institut Arbeit und Technik (IAT), Gelsenkirchen, 2019. 2. <https:// www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/194806/1/1662617003.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

102

Europäische Industriepolitik. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie. <https://www.bmwi.de/ Redaktion/DE/Artikel/Industrie/europaeische-industriepolitik.html > Hozzáférés: 2020. május 18.

103

Daniela Schwarzer: Drei Prinzipien für Europas Wiederaufbaufonds: Divergenzen reduzieren, Handlungsfähigkeit stärken, Rechtsstaatlichkeit stützen. Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik. 25 April 2020. <https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/drei-prinzipien-fuer-europas-wiederaufbaufonds > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

104

105 Martin Schirdewan: Wie es ist, kann es nicht bleiben: Ein Debattenbeitrag zur Zukunft. Die-zukunft.eu. <https://die-zukunft.eu/wie-es-ist-kann-es-nicht-bleiben-ein-debattenbeitrag-zur-zukunft-europas/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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efficiency during the crises of the last two decades. As in previous European crises, the German government is expected to take decisive action on crisis management measures, but the Merkel government will unlikely urge any action on EU level without consulting the other Member States first. This is due, on the one hand, to the fact that German EU policy is fundamentally based on the search for consensus between the Member States and, while on the other hand, on the one that the EU provides Germany with a solid framework for political and economic stability. Nor is there any change in the German government’s preference for intergovernmentalism in EU decision-making mechanisms, as this will ensure that the large Member States have greater influence over decisions at the EU level.106 Due to the current crisis, the issue of the common foreign and security policy has also come to the forefront again, in particular with regard to the effectiveness of joint action and, in this context, the creation of a common European army. In this respect, the German government has long been of the view that there is no need for a common army, but since 2018 this position has been seemingly revised,107 the German government is currently expected to gradually support the creation of a common army in the future to create an adequate tool for a more effective and unified EU defence framework.

The German government’s commitment to the EU is also supported by the 2018 coalition agreement, its first chapter already contains German ideas for the future of the EU. The objectives set out in the coalition agreement still define the German government’s European policy today, in particular the efforts to maintain and further develop the traditionally important democratic community of values and a stable economic framework.108 It can be seen, therefore, that Germany’s prospects for the future of the EU continue to follow traditional priorities, the restoring of the stability of the European economy and cooperating at Community level on a solidarity basis are likely to be key factors in Germany’s efforts in the near future as well.

Katrin Böttger – Mathias Jopp: Grundlinien deutscher Europapolitik In: Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik. edited by Katrin Böttger –Mathias Jopp. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2016.

17. <http://iep-berlin.de/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/07/B%C3%B6ttger-Katrin-Jopp-MathiasGrundlinien-deutscher-Europapolitik.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

106

Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 24.

107

Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa, Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland, Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD. Bundesregierung. <https://www.bundesregierung.de/ resource/blob/656734/847984/5b8bc23590d4cb2892b31c987ad672b7/2018-03-14-koalitionsvertrag-data. pdf?download=1 > 6–10. Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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AUSTRIA—THE “CHAMPION OF GREEN RENEWAL” IN CENTRAL EUROPE DALMA BODOLAY

Since joining the European Union on 1 January 1995, exactly 25 years ago, Austria made overall a success of its membership. In fact, being part of the EU brought many visible changes to the country in several areas, while its economy significantly evolved in the framework of the European Common Market. In the last years, Austria witnessed a largescale economic development which is exemplary also from a European perspective: the country’s GDP per capita is today one of the highest in the EU (EUR 44,900).109 Currently, given Austrian economy’s high degree of integration, the country is very vulnerable to the major economic changes happening, both in the EU and on the global stage. As the coronavirus crisis starts to unfold, Austria is expected, as many of its European counterparts, to struggle with its spiralling negative economic effects.

During the period between 2016 and 2019 the country underwent a rapid economic growth which slowed down already at the end of 2019 and experts predicted a further decrease by 2020–2021.110 However, this prediction dates back to a pre-pandemic period and the degree of the economic slowdown is expected to be even bigger. The pandemic is not the only factor which could hamper Austria’s economic success, currently several other factors stand in its way. The most significant is probably the aging society, an issue common to many other Western European states as well. A low birth rate (1.48 children/woman); the increasing life expectancy and the declining number of active workers are all aspects that will impact negatively—if left unanswered—on Austria’s economy in the upcoming years.111 Certainly, the political vacuum left after the fall of Sebastian Kurz’s first government, did nothing to help to ease the challenging situation of Austrian economy. The Austrian political crisis in the first half of 2019 was the result of a scandal involving the leader of the far-right party Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and, Austria’s Vice-Chancellor, Heinz-Christian Strache, who appeared in a video discussing ambiguous lucrative contacts with alleged Russian business representatives in Ibiza, and which caused a major rift within the coalition government. Chancellor Kurz called for a snap-election while a caretaker government led by Brigitte Bierlein was appointed. This provisional government

Statista: Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) pro Kopf in Österreich von 2009 bis 2019. Statista. 28 February 2020. <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/14426/umfrage/bruttoinlandsprodukt-pro-kopf-in-oesterreich/ > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

109

European Commission: Arbeitsunterlage der Kommissionsdienststellen; Länderbericht Österreich 2020.

European Commission. 26 February 2020. 9. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2020-european_semester_country-report-austria_de.pdf > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

110

Statista: Fertilitätsrate in Österreich von 2008 bis 2018. Statista. 21 January 2020. <https://de.statista.com/ statistik/daten/studie/217432/umfrage/fertilitaetsrate-in-oesterreich/ > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

111

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was obviously unable to bring forward any significant reform regarding the economy.112 As a result of the election held in September Kurz’s Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP)—topping the polls but falling short of a majority—decided to form a new governing coalition with the Green Party.113 Kurz’s second government is considered the first attempt in Europe of a conservative party to rule together with the greens, showing how environmental policies do not have necessarily to be associated with the Left, but could be the common ground for all parties who put the protection of the environment as a key value. The Austrian government coalition has currently managed to overcome this ideological hurdle that kept greens and traditionally conservative-right wing parties on the two sides of the political spectrum, thereby offering the chance for Austria to become one of the most committed nations in the fight against climate change in Europe.114 The success of this experiment will depend on whether both governing forces will be able to deliver on their major electoral promises.115 The programme of this “post-ideological” government is a clear attempt to reconcile the priorities of both parties and of their electorates. Next to plans to reduce taxes for companies, ban headscarves for girls under 14 years old and implement a preventive detention system in the event of a threat to national security, such as in terror suspicion cases, the new government pledged to introduce major reforms to become climate-neutral by 2040.

When it comes to environmental protection, the greens successfully pushed their goals at the top of the official government programme and by now climate protection has become one of Austria’s main priorities not only at the national level but at the European level as well.

The country can be considered as a pioneer in Europe when it comes to climate protection measures even if switching to new, green technologies will have probably a costly effect on Austrian economy in the short term. Nevertheless, the federal government has set itself very ambitious goals in order to transform all sectors and, above all, energy supply and infrastructure into climate-conscious ones, considering, of course, also the costs and the gradual burden on public finances.116 During its Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2018, the Austrian government has made it clear that one of the main issues for the country is climate protection and the achievement of the objectives set out in the Paris Convention. During 112 Francois Murphy: Austria's provisional leader pushes for coalition deal by January. Reuters. 11 December 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-austria-politics/austrias-provisional-leader-pushes-for-coalition-deal-byjanuary-idUSKBN1YF18S > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

113 Nationalratswahl 2019. Stimmenstärkste Partei pro Bundesland. Bundesministerium Inneres. 2019. <https://wahl19.bmi.gv.at/ > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

Nikolas Koch: Does Austria’s ÖVP–Green coalition set an example for Europe? BrightBlue.org. 4 March 2020. <https://brightblue.org.uk/our-strategy-austrias-ovp-green-coalition-set-an-example-for-europemustchange-to-defeat-the-evolving-threat-of-terrorism/ > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

114

115 Julia Partheymüller: The new government in Austria: what to expect. The UK in a Changing Europe.

12 February 2020. <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/the-new-government-in-austria-what-to-expect/# > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2020–2024. Bundeskanzleramt Österreich, Wien, 2020. 72. <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/bundeskanzleramt/die-bundesregierung/ regierungsdokumente.html > Accessed: 5 May 2020.

116

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that mandate, it was decided to reduce CO2 emissions from automobiles by 37.5% and to forbid the commercial use of disposable plastic devices such as straws, plastic plates and cutlery, thus reducing the amount of plastic waste generated in Europe.117 A 30% reduction in CO2 emissions from lorries and buses was also agreed upon, a goal Member States will have to reach by 2030.118 The von der Leyen Commission’s New Green Deal has been presented as “a new growth strategy that aims to transform the EU into a fair and prosperous society, with a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy where there are no net emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic growth is decoupled from resource use.”119 From this perspective, Austria set out an even more courageous goal for itself by becoming “climate neutral” already by 2040.120 The Conservative-Green government’s climate program also pledged to introduce a legislation to ban oil and coal-fired heating systems by 2035 and already in April 2020 the last coal-fired power station was closed.121 Before being ratified any new regulation should go through a so-called Klimacheck (climate check), a mechanism necessary also for guaranteeing that already existing laws meet with the government’s climate criteria.122 The Austrian government also decided to take full responsibility for the protection of the environment and agreed to establish a Klimakabinett (climate cabinet) to foster environmental policy cooperation between provinces and cities and better coordinate its implementation.123 Among the appointed member of the Klimakabinett are the leaders of the regional governments, heads of parliamentary groups and two experts.124 Austria’s growing attention for “green policies” will certainly affect the positioning of the country within the wider EU context. In Brussels, the Austrian government has already showed strong support for the EU in implementing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and in taking global leadership in climate protection.125 Furthermore the Austrian government, was recently among 17 European executives which appealed to the European Commission to put forward a brave post-COVID-19 recovery plan which, following the EU New Green

Österreichs EU-Ratsvorsitz 2018. Bundeskanzleramt. 2018. <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/ europapolitik/eu-ratsvorsitz-2018.html > Accessed: 5 May 2020.

117

Österreichs EU-Ratsvorsitz 2018.

118

The European Green Deal. European Commission. 11 December 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/ info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

119

Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. 72.

120

Letztes Kohlekraftwerk in Österreich geschlossen. Die Presse. 17 April 2020. <https://www.diepresse. com/5801455/letztes-kohlekraftwerk-in-osterreich-geschlossen > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

121

Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. 74.

122

Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. 74.

123

Thomas Rossacher: Politik intern- Steirisches Klimakabinett mit sechs Parteifarben. Kleine Zeitung.

14 Januar 2020. <https://www.kleinezeitung.at/steiermark/5751602/Politik-intern_Steirisches-Klimakabinettmit-sechs-Parteifarben > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

124

Aus Verantwortung für Österreich. 72.

125

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Deal guidelines, will guide the EU towards a green transition and digital transformation.126 In this sense, it is exemplary that the Austrian government decided to ask the European Commission to put any state aid programme for European airline companies conditional to the acceptance of green measures.127 Austria’s “green sensitivity” is also evident when it comes to the ongoing discussion over the introduction of the EU’s new budget. However, in this case the contradictions of the conservative-green coalition are even more visible. In fact, Austria traditionally is opposed to any changes that would result in the increasing of the EU’s resources and to the loosening of its rigid financial rules, a position supported by Kurz’s party members and shared with other like-minded member states. At the same time, Vienna’s calls for greater investments for climate protection would necessarily imply a larger EU budget and a bigger intervention of the government in the economy.128 The creation of the conservative-green government is certainly based on a great amount of realism and, as Kurz pointed out, it represents the “best of both worlds.”129 On the other side, the greens’ enthusiasm about being in a governing position may soon be cooled down by political realities. In fact, by making concessions on issues such as immigration and security policy the Greens might alienate more left-wing voters. Nevertheless, even it is not yet to say whether the Austrian attempt will fail or succeed, it is at the same time possible that similar experiments will be repeated elsewhere in Europe. Most notably, in Germany where an alliance of the Christian democrats and the Greens has been considered a likely post-Merkel scenario. Kurz also affirmed in a recent interview that he expects the German Christian Democrats to follow the Austrian example. However, the situation in Austria is different from Germany where the Green party is trying to impose itself as a full-range people’s party—and even attracting disaffected social-democratic voters—going beyond the idea that they are a single-issue party. According to the German Green Party’s leadership, these aims may be put in danger if the party is going to choose the “Austrian solution.”130 As a matter of fact there are currently not many chances to see a repetition of the Austrian experiment in Europe, but eventually the success of the second Kurz government might encourage others to do so.

European Green Deal must be central to a resilient recovery after Covid-19. Climate Home News. 9 April 2020. <https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/04/09/european-green-deal-must-central-resilient-recoverycovid-19/ > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

126

Sam Morgan: Austrian Airlines bailout to be linked to climate targets. Euractiv. 17 April 2020. <https://www.euractiv. com/section/aviation/news/austrian-airlines-bailout-to-be-linked-to-climate-targets/ > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

127

128 Francois Murphy: Austria opposes loosening EU budget rules, finance minister tells paper. Reuters. 28 January 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-budgets-austria/austria-opposes-loosening-eu-budgetrules-finance-minister-tells-paper-idUSKBN1ZR0BD > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

Austria’s Kurz Says Greens Coalition ’Best of Both Worlds.’ Voanews. 2 January 2020. <https://www.voanews. com/europe/austrias-kurz-says-greens-coalition-best-both-worlds > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

129

130 Philipp Grüll: Why are Germany’s Greens rejecting the Austrian coalition model? Euractiv. 21. January 2020. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/why-are-germanys-greens-rejecting-the-austrian-coalitionmodel/ > Accessed: 14 May 2020.

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ITALY: A COUNTRY THAT WOULD DESIRE MORE SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE BIANKA RESTÁS

Altiero Spinelli—the Italian politician remembered as one of the founding fathers of the European Union—wrote in 1967: “The fundamental decisions which have had a determining influence, not only on Italy’s international position but also on its domestic development, were those made during the forties and fifties to incorporate the nation’s reconstruction in the two Atlantic and European multinational establishments. There were possible alternatives.

And in fact, they were considered. Italy’s adherence to the Atlantic and European structures was the result of lively political debate—perhaps the only great foreign policy debate in the country in the sense of the importance of what was at stake.”131 Looking at the initial phase of the European integration and Italy’s decision to participate in the European and transatlantic “project” Spinelli emphasised that “most of the politicians at that time followed this discussion without much attention, but De Gasperi ended up by understanding and adopting the line of action proposed by the Federalists.”132 “Since both the Atlantic and European organizations concerned all of Western Europe, in whose very heart lies Italy, and since the border between West and East Europe proved to be considerably more solid than it initially could have been believed, it is rather probable that in the long run Italy could not at any rate have been able to exclude itself from the force of attraction of these two structures.”133 Spinelli’s vision about Italy’s future role in the European Union and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been justified through recent decades. History and current international politics prove that the country’s membership in the European Union and in NATO are among the most important priorities in the country’s foreign policy. In fact, Italy’s geopolitical positioning today can be best explained through the so-called “Three Circles Approach” a theory according to which Italian foreign policy is shaped by its involvement in its three different spheres of interest: the Atlantic, the European, and the Mediterranean spheres.134 Today the European community is facing a particular historical situation when not only Italy, but all of the EU’s Member States have the chance to contribute to a debate on the future of Europe. This debate focuses on issues of crucial importance. Last February Giuseppe Conte, the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic, delivered his speech on the “Future of Europe” pointing out that the “European project seems to Altiero Spinelli: The Outlook for Italian Foreign Policy. The International Spectator. 26 January 2016 (first time of publication: 1967) 4–5. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03932729.2015.1086054?needAccess=true > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

131

Spinelli, 6.

132

Spinelli, 4.

133

Maria Elena Amadori: Italy: the Three Circles Approach of Foreign Policy. Mediterranean Affairs. 19 July 2016. <https://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/italy-three-circle-approach-foreign-policy/# > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

134

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have lost its propulsive force” and that joint efforts are needed to relaunch this project “to make it regain credibility and cohesion, and to increase its sustainability, effectiveness, and plausibility.” The Italian Prime Minister has underlined “that the great questions to which we are all called upon to respond are questions of meaning: what Europe do we want, what Europe do we need, how do we perceive ourselves, and how do we represent ourselves?”135 Is should be noted that despite the government change in Italy last year—that resulted in the current coalition of the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement replacing the previous, Five Star Movement and the League-led government—Conte has retained his position as Prime Minister. During his speech last year—among others—he underlined two significant questions concerning the future of Europe. On the one hand, he emphasised that a fundamental precondition for guaranteeing a strong Europe is “to ensure its solidarity and cohesion through the collective responsibility of its Member States.” On the other hand, he highlighted that “there are two emblematic challenges that demonstrate the urgency of restoring trust and solidarity in Europe: migration, and economic and financial governance.”136 By mentioning those, Conte pointed out two issues that are particularly important in today’s debate as well, areas where Italy has its own, ambivalent experiences.

The issue of migration has created deep divisions between the European Union in recent years. One of the reasons behind the existing tensions is that the European Union has not been able to provide a comprehensive solution so far that could effectively address the question of migration. In line with the “first country of entry” criterion of the Dublin regulation,137 examining the asylum claim of new arrivals is predominantly falling under the responsibility of the frontline Member States. In practice, this means that a small number of Member States bear the responsibility of processing the majority of asylum claims. As a result of its geopolitical position, Italy clearly belongs to the group of the “most responsible” countries when it comes to addressing migration. Therefore, it is a priority for the country to elaborate a more sustainable, solidarity-based approach in the long run to tackle the problem in a more effective manner. This objective has been pointed out also by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasising the necessity of a fresh start on migration.138 The previous, League—Five Star Movement-led Italian government made migration and border control a question of national security and moved the issue on the top of its political agenda. Although the rhetoric of the current government is far more moderate compared to the approach of the previous coalition, creating a more equal and fair logic in European asylum and migration policies has remained a priority in the current government’s political agenda. The Italian non Debate on the Future of Europe. European Parliament. 13 February 2019. Address by the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic, Giuseppe Conte. Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. 12 February 2019. <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/InterventoStrasburgo_20190212_ en.pdf > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

135

Ibid., 3.

136

Dublin Regulation. European Commission Migration and Home Affairs. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/whatwe-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/dublin-regulation_en > Accessed: 8 May 2020.

137

Bianka Restás: Towards a more sustainable and effective migration management? (Ursula von der Leyen’s proposals to rethink migration and asylum policies in Europe). AJRC Analyses, 2020E12. <https://ajtk.hu/en/ research/ajrc-analyses/towards-a-more-sustainable-and-effective-migration-management-ursula-von-derleyens-proposals-to-rethink-migration-and-asylum-policies-in-europe > Accessed: 21 May 2020.

138

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paper published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in reference to the conference on the Future of Europe pointed out that “Italy believes that the root cause of this problem is exactly the fact that migration was not conceptualized as a real European issue, which requires European responses.”139 European economic and financial governance is the second issue that has been defined

by Conte as an emblematic challenge in terms of solidarity and trust. In this field we have witnessed frequent clashes between Italy and the EU in recent years. It is important to note that in the third quarter of 2019 Italy’s national debt was the second highest in all of the European Union, amounting to 137.3% of Italy’s gross domestic product.140 The question of the Italian national debt and the previous government’s budget plan and debt targets have generated numerous debates between Italy and the European Union last year. In the light of the above, the potential launch of an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP)141 against Italy has been raised too, however, the Commission finally decided not to start the EDP considering “additional fiscal efforts announced by the Italian authorities.”142 Referring to the situation, Conte highlighted in his speech last year: “I have in mind the Italian Government’s 2019 budget—that is sustainable at the social level even more than it is sustainable in economic terms. The economic governance of the European Union must take account of the need to balance growth with stability.”143 Emphasising the question of solidarity in the context of economic and financial governance, Conte pointed out as well that “if we intend to tackle these problems more effectively we will also need to move decisively towards the creation of shared financing tools at the European level that will make it possible for us to face the challenges ahead together, by combining responsibility and solidarity in a balanced way. But as things stand, the inadequate and insufficient solidarity within the European Union also helps to explain why Europe is struggling, and why it is slow to become fairer and more social.”144 It should be noted that under the new government, relations between Rome and Brussels have become “less stormy,” at least until the coronavirus crisis. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted Italy especially hard both in terms of confirmed cases and fatalities and from an economic point of view. As a consequence, Giuseppe Conte had to tackle the situation, Non paper italiano sulla Conferenza sul futuro dell’Europa. Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale. March 2020. 6. <https://www.esteri.it/mae/resource/doc/2020/03/paper_conf_tr.pdf > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

139

National debt in EU countries in the 3rd quarter 2019 in relation to gross domestic product. 2020. January. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/269684/national-debt-in-eu-countries-in-relation-to-gross-domesticproduct-gdp/ > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

140

The EDP is the “corrective arm” of the Stability and Growth Pact and is designed to safeguard the requirement laid out in the Treaty that Member States should avoid excessive levels of deficit and debt (source: European Commission).

141

European Union: Commission concludes that an Excessive Deficit Procedure is no longer warranted for Italy at this stage. The European Sting. 4 July 2019. <https://europeansting.com/2019/07/04/commissionconcludes-that-an-excessive-deficit-procedure-is-no-longer-warranted-for-italy-at-this-stage/ > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

142

Debate on the Future of Europe. 5.

143

Debate on the Future of Europe. 6.

144

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while facing not only a frightened Italian public, but fiscally conservative European leaders as well. In the light of the already visible economic and social impacts of the nationwide lockdown in the country, Conte has pointed out that any recovery plan must include the creation of so-called eurobonds—a joint debt covered by the entire eurozone.145 Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland are staunchly opposed to eurobonds and have instead pushed for the use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and other tools, while Conte insisted that Italy “does not need the ESM,” and called it “a completely inadequate and inappropriate instrument” for the emergency that Italy is facing.146 In an interview with the BBC in March, Conte described the situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as an “economic and social emergency” that was testing the financial structure of every country. At the same time, he emphasised that “the European Union risks failing as a project in the coronavirus crisis.”147 Underlying the necessity of improving EU policies, the Italian non-paper has outlined three areas where policies should be improved according to the government. The first question was migration, the second was the “European Green Deal”, while the third concerned economy. With regards to the “Green Deal” the government pointed out that it is a “political necessity and a moral imperative, for the well-being of the future generations.”148 Regarding the third issue, the paper highlighted that is should be a priority to complete the “missing pillars” of the economic and monetary union: a common guarantee scheme for bank deposits and a mechanism for macroeconomic stabilisation.149 True solidarity, trust, as well as a fairer, a more social and a more cohesive Europe are only few of those characteristics that Prime Minister Conte has mentioned in his speech last year.150 Some of those have become even more relevant during the coronavirus emergency in the country in recent months. Italy’s struggle with the EU, regarding the Union’s handling of the most pressing economical and migratory questions are challenges that impact other Member States as well. Addressing them would be not only in the interest of Italy, but the whole European Union. With regards to current debates on the Future of Europe we should remember that while ten years ago Italy was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration, during the 2010s it has become one of the most Eurosceptic Member States.151 A recent poll reveals that 42.2% of the Italians would leave the EU (according Jacopo Barigazzi: Conte’s gamble – The Italian prime minister is caught between frugal EU leaders and a frightened, furious public. Politico. 22 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/giuseppe-conte-gamblecoronavirus-european-union-leaders/ > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

145

Hans von der Burchard– Paola Tamma: Italy’s Conte threatens to derail EU summit over corona bonds.

Politico. 10 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/italys-conte-threatens-to-block-next-eu-summit-overeurobonds/ > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

146

147 Mark Lowen: Coronavirus: EU could fail over outbreak, warns Italy's Giuseppe Conte. BBC. 9 April 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52224838 > Accessed: 13 May 2020.

Non paper italiano sulla Conferenza sul futuro dell’Europa. 5.

148

Non paper italiano sulla Conferenza sul futuro dell’Europa. 5-6.

149

The whole speech of Prime Minister Conte is available at: <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/ InterventoStrasburgo_20190212_en.pdf > Accessed: 17 May 2020.

150

Rosa Balfour–Lorenzo Robustelli: Why Did Italy Fall Out of Love with Europe? Istituto Affari Internazionali.

23 July 2019. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/why-did-italy-fall-out-love-europe > Accessed: 18 May 2020.

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to data published on 14 May), while the proportion of those Italians would leave the euro (45.9%) is even higher.152 In the light of this fact one might ask whether the current Europe is similar to the one that the founding fathers of the European Union, e.g. Alcide De Gasperi or Spinelli once imagined. The answer to this question is not easy, but the current Union is most probably not exactly that one. The recent proposal for a European Recovery Fund153 by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, aimed to tackle the Coronavirus crisis in the economically most impacted countries could be interpreted as positive sign of EU solidarity. However, Italian response to this initiative will greatly depend on the exact manner of allocation of such a fund, together with the implementation of additional EU tools. Italy’s strong affection for the Union seems to have reached a critical phase and no one knows what the future holds.

ATHENS AS A CATALYST FOR EUROPEAN ANSWERS ZSOLT CSEPREGI

Experts analysing the European Union chiefly consider the policies of the institutions in Brussels, the Berlin–Paris axis’ initiatives and maybe look towards Rome when they are studying the developmental paths of this intergovernmental and supranational hybrid organisation. However, beyond the great powers of the European scene—especially after Brexit—the middle-sized countries are demanding a larger say in the shaping of the future of Europe. It is not a coincidence that the Visegrad Four (V4) and the Frugal Four (which consist of Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) groups became so influential, as they remind the great powers of important values. There is however a voice which is not part of such a grouping, but is still a highly important factor in the Union, namely Greece.

The country which is home to eleven million inhabitants and occupies a strategic, Eastern Mediterranean border location, had a turbulent path towards and within EU integration. The Hellenic Republic stood in the middle of various European crises.

The latest of these was the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, which was the result of the global financial crisis of 2008. However, it is often forgot by the critics that Greece was also the catalysts in the creation of a European level solution, as it is a unique champion of European unity, solidarity and the understanding of the South’s issues in Brussels and Gianni Balduzzi: Sondaggi politici TP, i favorevoli e contrari all’uscita da UE e Euro sono vicini. Termometro politico. 21 April 2020. <https://www.termometropolitico.it/1526062_sondaggi-politici-italexit.html > Accessed: 21 May 2020.

152

Daniel Boffey: Merkel and Macron propose €500 bn EU rescue fund. Guardian. 18 May 2020. <https://www. theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/merkel-and-macron-propose-500bn-eu-rescue-fund > Accessed: 21 May 2020.

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Northern European capitals. This was the case both in the sixties during the European Economic Community (ECC) association and in the eighties after the fall of the military dictatorship and EEC accession (1981).154 Greece’s role as a catalyst was manifested as the force pushing forward the European Union during the European and Greek management of the 2008-2018 economic and sovereign debt crisis. Greece was especially severely affected by the global recession stemming from the burst of the US real estate bubble. Among the causes was the failure to complete the long overdue restructuring of the Greek economy, furthermore the government cheated on its budget reports in order to join the Eurozone. Its membership in the zone also negated the possibility to use devaluation of the national currency as a monetary policy tool.

As a result, from 2010 the country had to undertake the greatest debt restructuring scheme in history, under the supervision of the other EU member states.155 The Greek economic restructuring was not only significant in the country’s history (though not unique), but it has also catalysed large scale European solidarity initiatives.156 Among these, the steps taken by the European Central Bank are the most notable as they injected more than a billion euros into the European banking system.157 In 2015 the disappointment of the Greek voters led to the election of Syriza – Coalition of Radical Leftists, which foretold a disquieting future for the future of the EU as whole. Contrary to its previous reputation, Syriza—even though it dramatically used the threat of Grexit in negotiations—defied expectations and pushed through the structural reforms and restrictions in order to receive the bailout package.

Greece exited the sovereign debt crisis with a more resilient economic structure, soon stepping into the 2020 COVID crisis, under the leadership of the right-wing–conservative New Democracy.158 Currently the main question is whether it can fulfil again its previous role as a unique catalyst towards European unity and solidarity.

ECONOMIC SITUATION This year Greece can expect an economic recession amounting to 4% of the GDP, which will be half or a third of the average contraction in the EU.159 The country can start the recuperation based on a stable domestic economic environment, which is demonstrated by the reappointment for another six years of the renown, technocratic, pro-EU Yannis Almássy Eszter: Görögország európai integrációja. In: A huszonötök Európái, edited by Kiss J. László. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 371–399.

154

155 Miranda Xafa: Lessons from the 2012 Greek debt restructuring. The VOX. 12 June 2014. <https://voxeu.org/ article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

Greece’s Debt. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/greeces-debt-crisis-timeline > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

156

Rebecca M. Nelson – Paul Belkin – James K. Jackson: The Greek Debt Crisis: Overview and Implications for the United States. Congressional Research Service. 24 April 2017. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44155.pdf > Hozzáférés: Accessed: 2 June 2020. 4.

157

Paul Taylor: Greece’s half-miracle. Politico. 12 November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/greecehalf-miracle-kyriakos-mitsotakis-budget-economy-democracy-society-survive-crisis/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

158

159 Balázs Korányi: Euro zone economy to shrink between 8% and 12% in 2020: Lagarde. Reuters. 27 May 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-policy-lagarde/euro-zone-economy-to-shrink-between-8-and-12-in2020-lagarde-idUSKBN2330WU > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

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Stournaras as head of the Bank of Greece.160 Besides a mature and predictable Greek economic policy, two groups of external factors will be highly important. The first is deglobalisation and the severe shrinkage of tourism in a country, where the latter is responsible for 18% of the GDP and almost a million people, fifth of all its labour force is employed in the sector.161 Calling tourism a strategic sector of the Greek economy would even be a gross understatement. Greece is interested in a world traversable for tourists and an internally open Europe, as this in an existential issue for the country. Accordingly, Athens will open its borders on 15 June and will do everything in its power so that European citizens may travel as soon as possible—in an orderly fashion—to visit its historical sights and beaches.162 Furthermore, an open world from the aspect of economy and trade is also a strategic necessity for Greece, possessing the world’s largest naval merchant fleet, which constitutes more than a fifth of all global maritime transportation capacity. 163 Due to these factors we can be assured that Greece will be an important engine for restarting globalisation and may serve as an important partner at the EU’s forums for such an open and export oriented economy as the Hungarian.

Despite having exited the European bailout programme in 2018 and its regained ability to acquire loans on the financial market, Greece has every right to be a beneficiary of the capital injection from Brussels, which will support economic recovery and structural reform following the coronavirus pandemic. According to the current proposal of the European Commission, Greece would receive 32 billion euros (two third in the form of grants, one third in the form of loans) from the stimulus package totalling 750 billion euros.164 Athens supports the allocation of grants instead of loans, based on the value of solidarity in the debate on the EU’s economic future. 165 It would be an especially great challenge if the rebuilding of the economy would be based solely on loans, which is promoted by the Frugal Four versus the current German-French proposal.166 Naturally, Greece also strongly supported the introduction of Corona- or Eurobonds, due to the economic struggles of the last decades. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis insists on common burden 160 George N. Tzogopoulos: Greece economy briefing: The Governor of the Bank of Greece. China–CEE Institute.

25 May 2020. <https://china-cee.eu/2020/05/25/greece-economy-briefing-the-governor-of-the-bank-of-greece/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

For a Sustainable Tourism Industry. Embassy of the Hellenic Republic in Washington D.C. <https://www.mfa. gr/usa/en/about-greece/tourism/for-sustainable-tourism-industry.html > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

161

162 Marianthi N. Hatzigeorgiou – Minakshi Raj: Why is Greece an outlier in EU's Covid-19 response? EUobserver.

19 May 2020. <https://euobserver.com/opinion/148397 > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

Greek Shipping and Economy 2019. Union of Greek Shipowners. <https://www.ugs.gr/en/greek-shippingand-economy/greek-shipping-and-economy-2019/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

163

164 Greece to get 32 bln euros, according to EU Commission proposal. Kathimerini English Edition. 27 May 2020. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/253099/article/ekathimerini/business/greece-to-get-32-bln-euros-according-toeu-commission-proposal > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

Greece presses appeals for rescue fund at EU summit. Kathimerini English Edition. 23 April 2020. <https:// www.ekathimerini.com/251984/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-presses-appeals-for-rescue-fund-at-eusummit > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

165

Zoi Didili: Sassoli warns against two-track Europe during recovery. New Europe. 26 May 2020. <https:// www.neweurope.eu/article/sassoli-warns-against-two-track-europe-during-recovery/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_ medium=facebook&fbclid=IwAR2RubAIMul9LpOF78YVYMJ2K_ID1aYC85aDaVvQKcQh0LVBUD7nzvSdmTw > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

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sharing as we are facing a similarly common, novel crisis.167 The coronavirus crisis changed significantly the previous economic plans of the centre-right government, but even with different methods, Greece is interested in joint European action, a deeper solidarity and introducing a recuperation plan based on employment. This fact is demonstrated by the Greek government’s intent to utilise employment subsidies instead of unemployment benefits, which is another connection with policies promoted by the Hungarian government.168 In the past decade Greece had to renounce part of its economic sovereignty and had to introduce harsh structural reforms in order to receive the EU’s financial bailout package.

The Mitsotakis administration wants to reclaim its sovereignty in spite of the COVID-19 crisis, reduce taxes and ease up on the Brussels–Berlin consensus requiring it to produce a primary budgetary surplus. His stance is based on the value of positive solidarity, also discussed by Dr Péter Stepper in his subchapter, leaving behind the suffocating feature of negative solidarity.169 The PM’s key message is that after a decade of successful economic reforms and restructuring, the EU should finally trust the Greeks and recognise their unique efforts.

STRATEGIC LOCATION AND ROLE Greece is the south-eastern bastion of the European continent, its geographic location provides many positive features, but also puts it under significant geopolitical pressure.170 Among the beneficial factors we may list the long seaside, which enabled it to become a great maritime power. Its location also enables it to be the gateway for the EU to the Eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal, to the Indian Ocean. It is impossible to separate the issue of Cyprus from Greece, which monitors the Eastern Mediterranean as a sort of natural aircraft carrier, therefore it is not a coincidence that it is the focal point of Hellenic, Turkish, American, British and Israeli military efforts. The European Union can only project power to the de facto separated island of Cyprus through Greece, which in combination serves as a geopolitical gateway complex.171 The Eastern Mediterranean is an important military and political conflict zone, which at the same time also holds ample economic opportunities—alongside transportation—in hydrocarbon reserves and tourism. It is moreover a unique, Afro-Eurasian civilizational bridge region, with Athens— Ankara/Istanbul—Beirut—Jerusalem/Tel-Aviv–Cairo/Alexandria serving as centres.172 The successive governments in Athens—regardless of political alignment—supported a larger EU presence in the region, especially in terms of energy security and hydrocarbon Eve Tsirigotaki: Kyriakos Mitsotakis insists on issuing a ‘coronabond’. EPT NewMedia. <https://int.ert.gr/ kyriakos-mitsotakis-insists-on-issuing-a-coronabond/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

167

Eirini Chrysolora: PM’s chief economic adviser, Alex Patelis, sees silver lining for economy. Kathimerini English Edition. 12 May 2020. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/252561/article/ekathimerini/business/pmschief-economic-adviser-alex-patelis-sees-silver-lining-for-economy > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

168

On positive stability, see Péter Stepper’s piece in this paper.

169

Lili Bayer: The Strategic Importance of Greece. Geopolitical Futures. 5 April 2016. <https:// geopoliticalfutures.com/the-strategic-importance-of-greece/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

170

Saul Bernard Cohen: Geopolitics. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham – Boulder – New York – London, 2009. 191–192.

171

Ahmet Davutuğlu: Stratégiai Mélység (Strategic Depth, Hungarian edition). Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest, 2016. 296–300.

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resources.173 Athens also called for enhanced vigilance and action against the dangers, primarily illegal migration and Turkish power ambitions, both of which I will touch upon later.

Greece is not only important for the European Union as an Eastern Mediterranean, but also as a Balkan state as well. The 1981 accession to the EEC was significant from a culturalcivilizational perspective as it was the first Orthodox Christian country which joined the community. Therefore, it changed the EEC’s unitary Western Christian membership. With this, it has opened the road towards the Orthodox region reaching up until Romania, which is the most important integration task to complete for the Union. The partnership of Athens is also important because of tangible economic and political reasons. The stabilising investments of Greek banks and companies and Athens’ political will is significant in the Balkans, where outside powers strengthened and played upon internal centrifugal forces.

The name dispute with Northern Macedonia and the question of the Greek minority in Albania proved that, if it wishes to do so, Athens may not only play a positive role in the Balkans, but may also be an obstacle for future integration.174 We cannot take for granted Greece’s support in the Western Balkans, therefore a constant dialogue is required with Greek political forces regarding this question which is a strategic priority for Budapest.

The gateway position is also a source for negative outcomes, such as the power struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean and the issue of illegal migration. The most obvious challenge comes from the current policy of Turkey, which is (again) in a continuous friction with Greece regarding their disputed maritime borders, the access to energy resources and the issue of Cyprus.175 The Hellenic Republic is significantly weaker in military terms than Turkey, so it relies on the backing of the EU member states’ and NATO. Nevertheless, despite the economic crisis, its relatively large army is still a significant power in the region.

All this is of course connected to Turkey’s EU accession process which has stalled by now. While, parallelly Turkey is manoeuvring towards pathways to regional great power status, which it plays out party in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean. We can expect the continuation of clashes with Greece, which will keep the issue of Greek-Turkish relations on the EU agenda in Brussels as well. Greece has a complex standpoint regarding Turkish accession to the EU, as officially it supports Ankara’s accession process, which provides a tool to bind the more powerful and rising Turkey into a behaviour framed by international legal norms (which is also done by NATO).176

173 Scott Carpenter: New Pipeline Deal Gives Europe Access To Eastern Mediterranean Gas Reserves, Angering Turkey. Forbes. 2 January 2020. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcarpenter/2020/01/02/new-gas-pipelinedeal-gives-europe-access-to-eastern-mediterranean-reserves-angering-turkey/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

Athens News Agency: PM Mitsotakis: Greece always Supported EU Integration of Western Balkans.

The National Herald. 7 May 2020. <https://www.thenationalherald.com/greece_politics/arthro/pm_mitsotakis_ greece_always_supported_eu_integration_of_western_balkans-286652/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

174

Günter Seufert: Turkey Shifts the Focus of Its Foreign Policy: From Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. SWP Comment 2020/C 06, 2020/February. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/turkey-shiftsthe-focus-of-its-foreign-policy/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

175

Jacopo Barigazzi: Greek foreign minister: EU should keep door open for Turkey. Politico. 17 May 2020. <https:// www.politico.eu/article/greece-fm-eu-should-keep-door-open-for-turkey-accession-bid/ > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

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The issue of extra-EU manipulation in Greece has become relevant after the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. Lacking sufficient European solidarity, Greece was aiming to obtain alternative sources of financing, which largely meant investments by Russian and Chinese financial actors. The interests of the two players are of course completely different. Russia is trying to achieve greater influence in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, which would contribute to its sphere of influence and role as a great power. The People’s Republic of China is primarily interested in Greece for economic reasons, as part of its goal to build and acquire strategic infrastructure in Europe in the framework of its Belt and Road Initiative. An example of these efforts is the acquisition of the Port of Piraeus in Greece. Athens has joined what is now called the 17+1 Cooperation, which serves as a tool to utilise Chinese excess capital and production in Europe. The ongoing anti-China turn in Brussels makes it especially important what kind of China-policy Athens will follow in the future, as it tries to manoeuvre between European solidarity and attracting further Chinese investments.177 Finally, in the case of illegal migration, Greece has been calling for unified and strong action from the other EU member states. Due to its geographic location it is one of the most important entry points for the masses aiming to reach the EU from the direction of Africa and the Middle East. Athens does everything in its power to halt to entry of the tens and hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants by building fences and strengthening its border defence forces. 178 Greece expects additional tangible assistance from the EU in the form of financing, border protection units and support against Turkish pressure politics. On this issue, it has an ambivalent relationship with the stance of the Visegrad countries. On the one hand, it is obvious that illegal migration has to be stopped at the borders of Greece and the Mitsotakis government considers the immigrants as economic migrants, not refugees, just like the V4. 179 However, Athens would expect that the masses who already gained entry to the EU, should be reallocated between the member states on a quota basis, presenting this appeal as a basic element of European solidarity. From the perspective of Greece this necessity for laying off the burden is logical, but it limits the potential for cooperation with the V4, by only focusing on border defence. The latter is still a crucial factor, accordingly it is in the interest of Hungary to handle the two aspects of illegal migration (joint defence and reallocation) separately in order to gain the support of southern border states at least in connection to the first aspect.

Mark Leonard: The end of Europe’s Chinese dream. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 27 May 2020. <https:// www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-end-of-europes-chinese-dream/?fbclid=IwAR35YNbrF_xLXSXB9AlUwDP3WQbCw_ j31gpUIWVlMIoBH_TFMH4YE19kbOc > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

177

178 Athens vows to beef up border amid concern over fresh migrant push. Kathimerini English Edition.

27 May 2020. <https://www.ekathimerini.com/253100/article/ekathimerini/news/athens-vows-to-beef-upborder-amid-concern-over-fresh-migrant-push > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

Kyriakos Mitsotakis: A Conversation With Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis of Greece. Council on Foreign Relations. 26 September 2019. <https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-prime-minister-kyriakos-mitsotakisgreece > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

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ATHENS AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE Greece is not in the same position, as Berlin or Paris to launch comprehensive plans addressing the future of the European Union. However, its strategic location and its importance as a middle size country provide it with a strong negotiating position in Brussels. Athens clears the path towards new, common, European solutions by following its own self-interests. We may call this the diplomatic tool of “strategic vulnerability.” Greece is at the same time a strong bastion of Europe, but potentially also its Achilles’ heel. Until now, the latter outcome was successfully avoided by stopping the sovereign debt crisis and Grexit, which could have been the doom of the Eurozone, and similarly by effectively handling the latest challenges of illegal migration on Greece’s borders. The leadership in Athens has a very clear system of values and interests, as it is highly interested in strengthening European solidarity both in terms of economic and security policy. Its peripheral position compared to the European centre makes it not less, but much more important in the areas of neighbourhood policy, enlargement and common defence, as it closes the Balkan Peninsula and it is our continental gateway to the Eastern Mediterranean. Athens may very well be an important ally to the Visegrad states, in economic and security issues as well, including tackling illegal migration. The four influential blocs in the current debates on Europe’s future are the Berli –Paris axis, the Frugal Four, CEE and the southern states. Between the latter two groups, Greece provides the most obvious connecting point. Athens could therefore very well serve as a cornerstone of a community of shared interest spanning from Lisbon to Gdańsk, surrounding the European core, home to two hundred million Union citizens.

THE IBERIAN PENINSULA—NO CHANGES IN WONTED ATTITUDES: MORE EUROPE AND DEEPER INTEGRATION ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL

Spain and Portugal, as part of the southern flank of the European Union, belong to a region which is traditionally marked by strong pro-Europeanism.180 This support for the European project has been present since the middle of the 1970s, when both countries ousted their dictatorial–authoritarian regimes, and the new elites were committed to the democratisation of their countries. Most of the new parties saw the democratic transition and the Europeanisation of their country as two interconnected and interdependent projects—and a successful integration as a substantial help to strengthen their new

Nicolň Conti – Maurizio Cotta – Pedro Tavares de Almeida: Southern Europe: a Distinctive and More ProEuropean Region in the EU? In: Perspectives of National Elites on European Citizenship. A South European View, edited by Nicolň Conti – Maurizio Cotta – Pedro Tavares de Almeida. Routledge, London – New York, 2012. 121.

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democracies.181 This idea also found an echo among the wider public. In Portugal, after a period of hesitation, when accession to European Communities was more of a project of the elites, the people grew aligned with both integration and unification in the middle of the 1980s.182 In Spain, however, integration has always enjoyed consensus among the people and their political leaders.183 The popularity of the EC and the EU might also stem from the fact that both Spain and Portugal are so-called cohesion countries which have profited from EU funds to a great degree. This experience has an important role in forming their policies even today.184 The preceding historical legacy is also important, as, today, both countries are governed by parties instrumental in the accession project. In Portugal, Mário Soares, the former leader of the Socialist Party, applied officially for membership in the European Communities as prime minister in 1977 and signed the accession treaty as president in 1985.185 In Spain, the accession treaty was signed by Felipe González, prime minister and Secretary-General of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party.186 Besides, survey results reveal that, even one decade ago, national elites in both countries wanted a more comprehensive and stronger Europe in a larger degree than in average EU member states187 and they felt satisfied with the benefits obtained from the EU integration.188 However, the Great Recession that started towards the end of the first decade of this millennium caused a subtle change in this general attitude, as the underdog position where southern member states were forced into, the economic adjustments imposed by their northern partners, and especially by the European troika (i.e., the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), ignited sparks of Euroscepticism in both societies. In Portugal, the two leading parties, the Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party, chose to comply with all the measures they were expected to by the country’s international partners, which—coupled with the stability of the traditional party system—crimped the emergence of serious Eurosceptic voices or forces, while social discontent could be channelled through the long-established but patchy Eurosceptic views José M. Magone: Attitudes of southern European citizens towards European integration: before and after accession, 1974–2000. In: Southern Europe and the Making of the European Union, edited by António Costa Pinto – Nuno Severiano Teixeira. Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. 223.

181

Magone, 227.

182

Juan Avilés: España y la integración europea: partidos y opinión pública, 1977–2004. Espacio, tiempo y forma. Serie V, Historia contemporánea. 2004/16. 409–423.

183

Mario Kölling – Christina Serrano Leal: Spain’s Balancing Act: Net Contributor or Net Beneficiary of the EU Budget. Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 50/2012. 12 July 2012. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/ wcm/connect/ab4adb804bf2fa469c399d676eb0415a/ARI50-2012_Spain_Balancing_Act_EU_Budget. pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ab4adb804bf2fa469c399d676eb0415a > Accessed: 12 May 2020.; Krzysztof Kutwa–Anna Szymańska: Cohesion policy, or solidarity in action. Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, Warsaw, 2019.

184

Malyn Newitt: Portugal na História da Europa e do Mundo. LeYa, Amadora, 2020. Epílogo. Google e-book.

185

Vanessa Núñez Peñas: Negociaciones de adhesión de España a las Comunidades Europeas (1975–1985). CVCE. < https://www.cvce.eu/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/es/87c372a8-360d-4846-876e-d9d64705a918/a8db829e-3d694f3a-8c25-fb0abaadc288 > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

186

Conti–Cotta–Almeida, 124.

187

Conti–Cotta–Almeida, 123.

188

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of three smaller parties, the Communist Party, the Left Bloc, and the Social Democratic Centre–People’s Party.189 These new-sprung negative sentiments, however, have seldom changed into anti-European militancy and have never really questioned the meaning of the integration process.190 Unlike in Portugal, the crisis unsettled the traditional party structure in Spain, where many new political formations were created in its wake. Among those, Podemos is the one most resembling a “populist,” Eurosceptic party. Its leader, Pablo Iglesias, did really brought forward a few—at least in Spain—unorthodox proposals about, for example, leaving the eurozone,191 but Podemos remained rather an anti-elitist party critical of Europe that never really flirted with hard Eurosceptic views,192 as even its voter base was not too receptive to these ideas.193 Therefore, this left-wing formation only wants to erase the Treaty of Lisbon and give a new, more democratic foundation to EU institutions that it deems neoliberal and overly technocratic.194 Similarly, the radical right-wing party Vox does not professes real anti-European ideas either, since its voter base is almost as proEuropean as that of most Spanish parties.195 In Portugal, in contrast with many other member states, pro-European sentiments also dominated the refugee crisis ailing the continent, as the whole political spectrum and the overwhelming part of the civil society were positive about receiving refugees partly because of humanist convictions and partly for perceiving it as the right way to distribute responsibilities among member states and show solidarity.196 Likewise, in Spain, the appearance of refugees did not elicit negative attitudes towards the EU, since the population did not regard them as a threat to their culture and identity. What is more, there were demonstrations across the country, standing up for migrants while the government also cooperated with its European partners to introduce the refugees’ quota.197 189 Teresa de Sousa – Carlos Gaspar: Portugal, a União Europeia e a crise. Relações Internacionais.

2015/December. 101–104.

Sandra Fernandes – Isavel Estrada Carvalhais: Portugal: A Weak Case for Euroscepticism. In: Euroscepticism in Small EU Member States, edited by Karlis Bukovskis. Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga, 2016. 48.

190

Paolo Igleisas da la solución a la crisis en un minuto. YouTube, uploaded by Fort Apache. 27 October 2013. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H59icqt98fs > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

191

192 Héctor Sánchez Margalef: Euroscepticism in Spain: An everlasting experience? Progressive Zentrum.

1 June 2018. <https://www.progressives-zentrum.org/euroscepticism-in-spain/?lang=en > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Leandro Gago: Is Podemos an Eurosceptic party? EuVisions. 10 July 2017. <http://www.euvisions. eu/archive/is-podemos-a-eurosceptic-party/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.; María Ramos – Luis Cornago: Spanish Disaffection with the EU: is Podemos Eurosceptic? Politikon. 29 December 2016. <https://politikon. es/2016/12/29/spanish-disaffection-with-the-eu-is-podemos-eurosceptic/# > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

193

Programa de Podemos para una Europa con más democraia, derechos, justicia y futuro. Podemos.

May 2019. 5–11. <https://podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Programa_completo_europeas_ Podemos.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

194

Lisa Zanotti –José Rama: Spain and the populist radical right: Will Vox become a permanent feature of the Spanish party system? London School of Economics, EUROPP. 2 March 2020. <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ europpblog/2020/03/02/spain-and-the-populist-radical-right-will-vox-become-a-permanent-feature-of-thespanish-party-system/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

195

Fernandes–Carvalhais, 56–57.

196

Margalef.

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Today, Spain’s present prime minister, Perdo Sánchez, keeping to the political elite’s traditional attitude in Spain, has a noticeably pro-European stance.198 He thinks Europe needs to be mobilised and relegitimated—especially because many would like to see the end of the European project and they must be defied. For the relegitimation, against a backdrop of disputing ideas, the EU should facilitate progress, challenging those who want regression and do not want to move on. This progress should happen in various areas. For one, the EU should make inroads into a more social Europe, all the more because, according to Sánchez, anti-European rhetoric often plays on globalisation-induced inequalities among our societies. With a new social contract, people would be protected against globalisation’s unwelcome effects and see it again as a source of possibilities. However, to achieve this, the EU should become not just an economic and monetary union but a political and social one, too. Secondly, Europe should also guarantee the security of its citizens by strengthening the role it plays in the world, and, therefore, it should make headway towards the creation of a common European security and defence framework. That means Europe should set up its own army to project force wherever it wants and, thus, have a leading role worldwide. To become a true global actor, it should also break away from the unanimity rule and make its decision-making more effective. Besides, Sánchez also thinks that finding a consensus in climate change–related issues and migration is of paramount importance because these are the chief topics used by those who do not believe in Europe and cash in on its division. So, in his vision, Europe should become more united to survive and thrive in the future.

The Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa also believes that European citizens’ wishes can only be properly met by a real union which is more cohesive in economic, social, and political terms.199 To this end, there should be two priorities in the EU’s sights. The first is to conclude the Economic and Monetary Union, as, today, there are still asymmetries and unbalances inside the eurozone, and it is not expected to work impeccably if it only rests on its present monetary pillar. Therefore, the states having the common European currency should carry on with plans to set up a banking union. The second priority is to equip the eurozone with a budget of its own against external shocks while also shaping an integrated economic policy so that the group can invest to create more cohesion among member states and go beyond the traditional north–south, centre–periphery divisions.200 However, this solution should not at all serve as a transfers union or a mechanism to finance national inefficiencies automatically but to incite reforms. The long-term goal is that the eurozone switch from being a set of economies that compete just as other countries the world over to an integrated space whose members think their prosperity and cohesion benefit each part.

Intervención del presidente del Gobierno en el Parlamento Europeo. La Moncloa. 16 January 2019. <https://www. lamoncloa.gob.es/presidente/intervenciones/Paginas/2019/prsp16012019.aspx > Accessed: 10 May 2020.

198

199 Intervenção de António Costa no debate sobre “O futuro da Europa.” Partido Socialista. 14 March 2018. <https://ps.pt/index.php/2018/03/14/intervencao-de-antonio-costa-no-debate-sobre-o-futuro-da-europa/ > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

200 Retomar a convergência, fortalecer a Europa. Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro, António Costa, por ocasião da abertura do ano académico 2017–2018 do Colégio da Europa. Governo da República Portuguesa.

15 September 2017. <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/download-ficheiros/ficheiro.aspx?v=c44d6c1a-625a-40f9aa03-2ba704e4aa93 > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

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However, Costa thinks the EU needs to go reform spirited while resisting both the constant push for revising its treaties and the entanglement in fruitless institutional debates, as, according to him, the Treaty of Lisbon gives the organisation the necessary flexibility to act.201 He feels that the EU should avoid new missions without consolidating what it has already achieved and should equally not be paralysed by different national visions about the future of Europe. These diverse views should instead be respected, but, on the other hand, different member states should also be able to progress according to different geometries, provided participation is open to everyone.

All in all, as Costa claims this new cohesion policy should simultaneously have a strong territorial and social vector,202 both Iberian prime ministers believe Europe in the future needs to be more social and, inseparably, more united. However, Sánchez would further the unification project in many different fields, while Costa is more cautious in his claimed goals and would first proceed with making the monetary and economic union more complete, also adding the foregoing social component, although he statedly finds unification important in other fields, e.g., common security and defence, too.203 The two politicians also agree on the plan of having a Europe of “variable geometries,” about which they have signed a collaboration agreement with France, and they fight for maintaining a cohesion, forging a coalition around their goal.204 The situation upon the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent European response—or the lack thereof—also made the leaders of the two countries divulge their views on how Europe should work, so it is worthwhile to have a look at how these relate to their previous ideas. António Costa uses blunt words, saying that the European Union runs the risk of coming to an end if it is unwilling to face the economic and social effects of the pandemic.205 His harsh words came after the Dutch minister of finances was statedly disinclined to help southern member states financially in their fight against the imminent crisis. Costa thinks those members of the EU who otherwise are the principal beneficiaries of the common market and the eurozone should realise that a union is also about helping each other and they cannot live in isolation.206 He sees the main problem is that the EU’s twenty-seven members proved unable to act unanimously during the last two crises, as there are always a few countries where Retomar a convergência, fortalecer a Europa.

201

Retomar a convergência, fortalecer a Europa.

202

Defesa da política de coesão «é a vontade comum da Europa e dos europeus.» Governo da República Portuguesa. 5 February 2020. <https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc22/comunicacao/noticia?i=defesa-dapolitica-de-coesao-e-a-vontade-comum-da-europa-e-dos-europeus > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

203

Ivo Alho Abral: Sánchez se aliará con Macron para minimizar los recortes en ayudas europeas al campo.

Público. 20 February 2020. <https://www.publico.es/politica/marco-financiero-plurianual-sanchez-aliaramacron-minimizar-recortes-ayudas-europeas-campo.html > Accessed: 11 May 2020.

204

205 António Costa: “União Europeia faz o que tem a fazer ou acabará.” Jornal de Notícias. 27 March 2020. <https://www.jn.pt/nacional/antonio-costa-uniao-europeia-faz-o-que-tem-a-fazer-ou-acabara-11996286.html > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

206 Cátia Rocha: António Costa: “A União Europeia ou faz aquilo que tem a fazer ou acabará”. Dinheiro vivo.

27 March 2020. <https://www.dinheirovivo.pt/economia/antonio-costa-a-uniao-europeia-ou-faz-aquilo-quetem-a-fazer-ou-acabara/ > Accessed: 7 May 2020.

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governments are more focussed on the results of the upcoming domestic election than their responsibilities towards European citizens. For this, he believes that member states should declare whether the eurozone is viable as it is now—or they should look for another, alternative sort of organisation inside Europe as Macron has already suggested with his proposal.207 All in all, he finds that the problem does not lie in the European Commission or Brussels but the Council and the mentality of the member states.

The Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez gave voice to a somewhat similar opinion in an article about the state of the post-crisis EU, published by many newspapers.208 He likewise thinks that, without more ambitious plans to recover and more solidarity, and also without leaving behind national dogmas, Europe will eventually fail. Like his Portuguese counterpart, he feels that, this time, the EU institutions did a great job to face the crisis, but European leaders should put in more effort and show more solidarity while dealing with the financial and economic consequences of the crisis.209 Otherwise, the integrity of the common market will suffer serious consequences as member states will see asymmetries in their recovery.

For this reason, he also proposed the creation of a EUR 1.5 trillion recovery fund.210 The views above suggest that the traditionally pro-European Iberian countries will most probably keep believing in the European project, confessing that greater unification in various fields should be desirable in the upcoming years, as that makes the EU more effective and legitimate. They also believe that not all member states must go along at the same speed and those who want to move faster in different areas can do it, leaving the door open for those who might want to join in later. The matter of cohesion also appears to remain important to them as their countries still profit a lot from the EU’s cohesion policies, and they seem to persevere with their idea to give a social component to Europe, a synonym for bridging the gap between the centre and the periphery and putting a stop to their pariah status in the northern–southern division. Furthering integration cannot be a question in their case, as, for a small and underdeveloped country on the periphery that faces the challenges of globalisation like Portugal, there is no other way to develop its society, and, for a middle-sized but economically faltering country hit by serious inequalities like Spain, there is no other way to stand out.

207 Costa questiona se Holanda quer “ficar de fora” da UE. Expresso. 10 April 2020. <https://expresso.pt/ coronavirus/2020-04-10-Costa-questiona-se-Holanda-quer-ficar-de-fora-da-UE > Accessed: 7 May 2020.

Pedro Sánchez: Europa se la juega. El País. 5 April 2020. <https://elpais.com/elpais/2020/04/04/ opinion/1586022750_086446.html > Accessed: 7 May 2020.

208

209 Pedro Sánchez: Pacto en Europa, pacto en España. Expansión. 25 April 2020. <https://www.expansion.com/ opinion/2020/04/25/5ea4043ee5fdeac0588b45d0.html > Accessed: 9 May 2020.

Luis Alonso: El futuro de Europa, en juego. Euractiv. Last updated: 24 April 2020. <https://euractiv.es/ section/journal-of-europe/news/el-futuro-de-europa-en-juego/ > Accessed: 9 May 2020.

210

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IRELAND: THE LAST ANGLO-SAXON STANDING IS LOOKING FOR MORE VISIBILITY IN THE EU OF THE FUTURE ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

Since joining the European Community in 1973—together with the United Kingdom—Ireland can be considered the country that has been able to make the most of its membership.211 Given the Irish economy’s encouraging performances in the last decades, the “green island” has been often labelled as the EU’s poster child, especially considering the country’s incredible post bailout recovery—in November 2010. As an effect of the world crisis and the failure of the national banking system, Ireland received EUR 67.5 billion in external loans from the European troika (IMF, ECB and European Commission) which it was able to repay in just three years.212 As a matter of fact, in the last 50 years Ireland has moved from being an inward-looking, protectionist economy to a highly competitive, innovative, globalised hub. From the Irish perspective, the EU has provided a platform for greater opportunities to trade, helped the country to attract investments, and the money coming from Brussels to Ireland assisted in the development of important public infrastructure and cross-borders projects. At the same time the free movement of people, goods and capitals has not only allowed Irish businesses to be extensively integrated in the world’s largest common market but has also enables Ireland to benefit from thousands of skilled workers arriving from other EU member states which bolstered the country’s workforce while reinforcing its multi-ethnic component. However, the Dublin–Brussels’ relationship is not a one-way road and while Ireland has embraced the many opportunities provided by Europe, in turn, Europe has strongly benefited from Ireland’s association. In fact, Ireland—currently a net contributor to the EU budget—has a very flexible globally oriented, pro-business economy which makes the country closer in some aspects—i.e. social protection regulations or the welfare state’s dimension—to London or even to Washington than to Paris or Berlin. This very globalist mentality—a feature of the Anglo-Saxon world of which Ireland, after the UK’s departure, remains the only champion within the EU—had a strong influence in developing a more business-oriented attitude on the continent and enabled the EU to become a pole of attraction for many multinational companies from around the world eager to invest in the bloc. From this point of view Ireland represented the main springboard for global businesses into EU markets—a position that the country is determined to maintain in the years to come.

Furthermore, from the political side, Ireland has been pictured by many Eurocrats as the good example of a European member state. In fact, the extremely balanced Irish political landscape, ruled by centrist pro-European parties—which combine elements of social Impact of EU membership on Ireland. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/ireland/about-us/ impact-of-EU-membership-on-Ireland_en > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

211

Ben Tonra: Ireland as a small state success story in Europe? Scottish Centre on European Relations. <https://www.scer.scot/database/ident-12329 > Accessed: 5 May 2020.

212

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conservativism with touches of progressivism—which seems to be immune to the influence of the sovereignist and populist forces that are tormenting the continent, has been often hailed in the bloc. Or so it seemed, at least until the last election in February where, for the first time since the foundation of the Irish state, the centrist Fine Gael–Fianna Fáil duopoly has been broken and coalition-building games are made more difficult by the rise of the left-wing nationalist Sinn Féin. The growth of Sinn Féin, which during “The Troubles” represented IRA’s political wing, has been mostly motivated by domestic political issues, and especially by the severe housing crisis and by the governing parties’ poor management of the health service, which eventually convinced Irish voters to withdraw their support from the mainstream parties.213 At the moment, mostly due to the coronavirus emergency situation, the two centrist parties seem to have overcome their differences and agreed on a joint policy “framework” which should obtain also the support of the Green Party in the following days. Obviously, this decision if on the one hand is a positive outcome because it helps resolving the political vacuum during an emergency situation, on the other hand will raise concerns about the fairness of side-lining a political force which represents a large part of the Irish electorate.214 Beside Ireland’s domestic matters, it is also important to focus on the country’s foreign politics priorities. As a matter of fact, some issues will assume great relevance for Ireland in the near future and will surely influence its positioning in the EU. As is well known, in the last few years Brexit placed the small Irish country at the core of the EU decision-making process, a role that Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has admirably exploited at its best. The reason behind the Irish executive’s extensive engagement in Brexit negotiates is obviously related to the fact that no other country will suffer from the British departure as much as Ireland. But now that “Brexit is done,” Ireland needs to work harder to remain centre stage and give an impulse to the future development within the EU. Leaving aside the issue of the Irish border, which dominated most of the Brexit talks in the last three years, and which is expected to be a contentious point also in the future, Ireland needs to concentrate on a coherent post-Brexit strategy in Europe, especially since the country lost its most important economic partner within the EU. In fact, the Irish economy, even if very successful in diversifying from the UK than the UK has been in diversifying from Ireland, is still deeply integrated with its powerful neighbour and currently, around 80% of Ireland’s exports are transported to or through Britain. On the imports’ side, 41% of Ireland’s food imports and 55% of its fuel imports arrive from the UK.215 It is therefore necessary that, in the prospect of any post-Brexit EU-UK trading relationship, the Irish government should try to act as a bridge and exert pressures on both sides for special arrangements that take into consideration the interlinked nature 213 Alessandro D’Onofrio: Irish Political Earthquake. Why Should We Care about Ireland? Antall József Knowledge Centre. February 2020. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/research-blog/irish-political-earthquake-whyshould-we-care-about-the-last-election-in-ireland > Accessed: 5 May 2020.

Mick Fealty: It is well past time to get on with forming a new government in the Republic… Slugger O’Toole.

4 May 2020. <https://sluggerotoole.com/2020/05/04/it-is-well-past-time-to-get-on-with-forming-a-newgovernment-in-the-republic/ > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

214

Jess Sargeant: Ireland and Brexit. Institute for Government. 19 Februar 2020. <https://www. instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/ireland-brexit > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

215

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of the economies of the two Anglo-Saxons countries. For Ireland, the proximity to Britain does not reflect just economic priorities, but also the cultural and social closeness within the British Isles. From this perspective the Irish approach to any reorganisation of the EU—in the sense of a deeper integration or in the direction of a multi-speed EU—must be balanced by a consideration of its future relationship with the UK. 216 Nonetheless, Brexit might have also opened new opportunities for Ireland. In fact, when in the EU, London represented Dublin’s greatest competitor in attracting international business, interested in setting up their European headquarters. With the UK gone, Ireland remains Europe’s most globalised economy and an effective foreign direct investmentattracting machine. However, this economic model stands in strong contrast with the centralism common to Brussels and to many European capitals. When the “Apple Case” emerged in 2016, with the European Commission accusing the Irish government of giving a competitive advantage and granting substantial tax benefits to the American tech-giant, the divergence between Dublin and Brussels became ferocious. From Ireland’s perspective the Commission’s decision was symptomatic for an EU bureaucracy that is steadily invading areas of national competence—such as taxation—and highlighted the increasing power of larger member states (generally high tax, high social spending economies) to impose their priorities on the small, flexible Irish economy.217 It is also clear that the harmonisation of corporate tax rates between the member states is a key objective of the Commission since the 1960s and the head of the new Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, will not take any change of course—suffice is to say that one of the Commission’s Vice Presidents is the same Margrethe Vestager who led the case against Ireland. Obviously, the Commission’s proposal of an EU-wide tax system for corporate companies, which is supported mostly by the EU’s largest economies, is strongly opposed by Ireland which in turn is trying to protect its low (12.5%) corporation tax rate that has been a magnet for large multinational firms in the last decades. Currently the EU does not have the power to control national tax rates, and any change to this would require a unanimous vote by all members. As it is the case, Ireland’s next battle in Brussels will be fought on this ground and it will be a key priority for the new government to elaborate a working compromise to create a fiscal union based on the foundation of a slimmer, more competitive and less centralised Europe.

However, the recent developments connected to the coronavirus crisis, prompted a slight change in Ireland’s position towards the strengthening of the Eurozone and the bloc’s fiscal powers. At the time of Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to reform the Eurozone, which received a cold response, Ireland was among the eight northern EU states that put the French President’s initiative in stand-by as long as the Banking Union remained incomplete. In the last years Ireland has been positioning itself among the “Hanseatic League” of northern member states, all of them net contributors to the EU budget and Eoin Drea: Why Brexit Changes Everything for Ireland? Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies. 28 June 2016. <https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/why-brexit-changes-everything-ireland > Accessed: 4 May 2020.

216

217 Eoin Drea: The European Commission, Apple and Ireland: the view from the Emerald Isle. Wilfred Martens Centre for European Studies. 7 September 2016. <https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/european-commissionapple-and-ireland-view-emerald-isle > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

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liberal on trade, which are worried by the possibility that the fiscally less responsible states of southern Europe or the “net recipient” eastern member states will dominate the EU.218 The current situation represented an unpredictable threat for the future stability of the Eurozone and the EU’s approach, which until now prioritised adherence to existing budgetary rules over mitigating the worst impacts of the coming recession which could lead to a further deterioration of economic and social conditions in many member states.

As it is often pointed out, an understanding of the exceptional nature of the current circumstances is required and new courageous measures are needed to cope with this extremely disruptive situation. From this point of view Ireland was, together with Belgium, Italy, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Slovenia, among the signatories of a letter to the European Council summit calling for a mutualised debt instrument, called “coronabonds.” This decision signals a shift within in the Irish position in the EU compared to the recent alignment with the “frugal” northern states opposed to a larger budget and greater taxation or fiscal powers for the Union. The debate over “coronabonds” needs to be taken into great consideration because it is expressing a wider conflict over values. It is astonishing to see how in Ireland, as elsewhere, there seems to be a shift from private, individualised, market values towards public, socialised and state ones over the last few weeks. However, Dublin’s change of direction does not come as a surprise and it might be motivated by both domestic and external reasons. From the point of view of domestic politics, the growth of a left-wing party, determined to tackle the most important social issues and to start a massive program of public spending, raised the awareness in the “ruling” establishment that Irish people might consider a more active role for the state in the economic and social life of the country. From an international perspective Ireland, by direct experience, knows what the lack of financial solidarity implies for a country in difficulty and the present shift towards a more common approach will reopen some of those debates about the Eurozone.219 It seemed that situations like the one witnessed during the crisis in 2009–2010 would not be able to take a foothold in Europe; however, the EU member states are there once again, unprepared and Ireland will have the moral responsibility to put its weight in support for a more integrated Eurozone with its own budget to transfer wealth from richer to poorer and to ensure protection for any area hit by an economic shock.

Exactly what the country would have needed just 10 years ago.

Brigid Laffan: Ireland after Brexit. The UK in a Changing Europe. 23 May 2018. <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/ ireland-after-brexit/ > Accessed: 6 May 2020.

218

219 Paul Gillespie: ‘Coronabonds’ row could endanger the European project. Irish Times. 28 March 2020. <https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/coronabonds-row-could-endanger-the-european-project-1.4213161 > Accessed: 5 May 2020.

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