Fluctuating Political Capital During and After the Pandemic in Japan

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

FLUCTUATING POLITICAL CAPITAL DURING AND AFTER THE PANDEMIC IN JAPAN

EMESE SCHWARCZ

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

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© Emese Schwarcz, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

FLUCTUATING POLITICAL CAPITAL DURING AND AFTER THE PANDEMIC IN JAPAN EMESE SCHWARCZ

PREFACE The year 2020 turned out to be nothing like anyone could have ever imagined. The outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic at the end of 2019 followed by its fast evolution into a global pandemic the next year took most of the countries by surprise. Levels of preparedness in both medical equipment and in government policies vary by countries. It is safe to say, that no country can fully prepare for such a monumental pandemic, even if its health care system is as advanced as Japan’s, which is why it is more important to have an adaptive leadership capable of fast and appropriate reaction in times of crisis. And as Japan is one of the most experienced countries in disaster management and relief measures, many are curious of the policies made by the Abe Administration—more so because disaster management has been a make it or break it situation for Japanese governments in the past. This paper therefore tries to evaluate the current political climate around the Japanese leadership, in light of the havoc caused by the coronavirus pandemic, while simultaneously looking into the near future to try to predict what Japan has in store in regard to political stability.

INITIAL RESPONSES In global comparison, as of 27 May, the fatality rate (according to government data) of Japan is relatively low,1 however, the government has received quite a lot of criticism for its virus management, both domestically and from the international observers. And this is reflected in government support rates too: Prime Minister Abe Shinzō is one of the only two world leaders (Brazil’s Bolsonaro being the other one) that suffered in support rates due to their response to the pandemic.2 In order to understand the correlations, let us look into the timeline.

A Japanese citizen was among the first cases of confirmed infected outside of China, identified as early as January,3 but remarkably—despite the geographical proximity—the virus did not start to spread explosively in Japan until mid-March. The slowness of the first wave and the ease with which the experts were able to identify the patient zero might have contributed to the perceived false sense of security that became a guiding principle later on. But before the second wave hit the country, a massive blunder impacted Japan: the

Total confirmed COVID-19 deaths per million people, May 12, 2020. Our World in Data. 12 May 2020. <https:// ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-covid-deaths-per-million> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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Covid-19 has given most world leaders a temporary rise in popularity. The Economist. 9 May 2020. <https:// www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/05/09/covid-19-has-given-most-world-leaders-a-temporary-rise-inpopularity> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

2

Novel Coronavirus – Japan (ex-China). World Health Organization. 16 January 2020. <https://www.who.int/ csr/don/16-january-2020-novel-coronavirus-japan-ex-china/en/> Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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Diamond Princess cruise liner. On 3 February, the Diamond Princess cruise ship arrived, and was placed under quarantine at the Port of Yokohama, after diagnosing a recent passenger with coronavirus. The initial time period of the quarantine was 14 days, however soon the virus started to spread dangerously fast among the 3,700 passengers and crew members. And this is where the administration received the first blow. The communication about the situation on the ship was less than detailed, therefore as if a bomb was set off, Iwata Kentarō, an infectious disease expert at Kobe University Hospital uploaded a video to YouTube detailing his experiences sneaking aboard the Diamond Princess. Due to the English language of the video, major international news outlets—such as BBC or CNN— picked up the story with the speed of light. In his video, Iwata gave an account of the severity of the chaotic situation on the Diamond Princess: rather than infection control specialists, bureaucrats were in charge; there was no real separation between “safe zones” and “infected zones”; workers were eating with their gloves on; etc.4 Naturally, Iwata’s report gave a huge leverage to opposition politicians criticising the government’s handling of the crisis, which only strengthened after the quarantine period expired, and the Japanese passengers could go home. These passengers were not forced to stay in quarantine in their homes, and reports about them getting sick started to pour in shortly after5, which caused concern and uncertainty among the Japanese. This only intensified, when it turned out that health care workers leaving the ship were not tested for the virus, in the faith of them having “mastered the technology to prevent infection”.6 Around a week later, the government decided to counter the growing mistrust toward the leadership, and suggested that all elementary, middle, and high schools—but not nursery schools—should close from 2 March until the end of the spring break, which meant about a one month period. Yes, only suggested— and we can see later that the Abe Administration’s general pandemic management policy greatly builds upon “soft measures”, rather than on strict restrictions that other countries employed. But back to the school closure. Schools were asked to close down, without an all-encompassing lockdown, which put the parents into a difficult situation. Who will take care of the children at home, while the parents are working? Of course, PM Abe requested that companies let the parents take paid leave,7 but the rigidity of the Japanese work culture did not make this possible for everyone. On 28 February, Hokkaidō Prefecture Governor Suzuki Naomichi took a bold step and declared a state of emergency for the prefecture, completely independently of the central government, which poses serious questions regarding the government’s disaster management plan, most of all its integrity, but this

Reiji Yoshida: Expert stirs controversy with video on 'inadequate' virus controls on Diamond Princess. The Japan Times. 19 February 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/02/19/national/video-covid-19controls-diamond-princess/#.XruqX0QzbIU> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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5 Masumi Suga: Japan Cruise Passenger Confirmed With Virus After Going Home. Bloomberg. 23 February 2020. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-23/japan-cruise-passenger-confirmed-with-virusafter-going-home> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

Ibid.

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PM Abe asks all schools in Japan to temporarily close over coronavirus. KYODO News. 27 February 2020. <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/02/c3c57bbce11d-breaking-news-govt-will-ask-all-schools-injapan-to-shut-for-virus-fears-abe.html> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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questions communication inside the government too. And while Governor Suzuki did not issue a lockdown, he did ask citizens to stay at home on the weekends.8 This concludes the period that many regard as the first wave of the pandemic.

POLICY TUG-O-WAR Interestingly enough, the two waves of the pandemic in Japan were carrying different variants of the virus: while the first wave, infecting around 700 people on board of the Diamond Princess can be traced back to the Wuhan-genome, the second one is spreading the European type of the virus, likely through travellers and returnees from abroad.9 Identifying the patient zeros in both periods was the most important for managing the situation, as the government chose to use a strategy defined as the “cluster approach”. This method builds on the theory that the virus hits in groups, or clusters, with a highly infectious individual as the epicentre. Once the epicentre is found, testing becomes more efficient. The problem with this approach is two-fold. First, the cluster approach is most effective at the early stages of spread, therefore not only medical experts, but also the World Health Organization argues that every country should “test, test, test”,10 because the more the testing, the easier it is to fight the pandemic in the advanced stages. The low number of testing gave way to unfortunate speculations, many are convinced that the real number of COVID-caused fatality is hidden away in pneumonia statistics, which points to the second problem with sparse testing: without knowing the real numbers, the population might succumb into a false sense of security. At the earlier stages, it was apparent that Abe’s goal with hiding the numbers was connected to the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, as it was the utmost priority for Japan to hold the games on the previously set date, especially from an economic point of view. Alas, the International Olympic Committee had to postpone the event, because the scenario of a global pandemic turned into a scary reality, and other countries started to pull out of the Olympics anyway.

What is interesting about the cluster approach is that even the government seem to disagree on the appropriate policy, as earlier in May, an expert in a government panel warned the listeners that the actual number of infected might be even 10-times-fold.11 But he cluster approach is not the only point of discussion, or rather, of clash inside the very own ranks of the government. A very strange battle unfolded between PM Abe and his long-time adversary, Tōkyō Governor Koike Yuriko. As soon as the second wave hit Japan, and the capital became a main distribution point for the virus, Governor Koike stepped into

Emese Schwarcz: Where to Now, Japan? The Effects of the Coronavirus in the Island Country. Antall József Knowledge Centre Research Blog. March 2020. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/research-blog/where-to-now-japanthe-effects-of-the-coronavirus-in-the-island-country> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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9 Kenta Noguchi: Kokunai no korona, Bukan de wa naku Ōshū kara denpa? Kansen-ken shirabe. The Asahi Shimbun. 28 April 2020. <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN4X5V9PN4WULBJ00X.html> 10 WHO urges world to ‘test, test, test’. The Asahi Shimbun. 17 March 2020. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/ articles/13221128> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

Nobody knows Japan’s true coronavirus numbers, expert warns as Abe government cops rising backlash.

South China Morning Post. 11 May 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3083876/ nobody-knows-japans-true-coronavirus-numbers-expert-warns-abe> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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action in a way the central government did not seem to do so. She started holding daily press conferences, in which she even scolded cameramen to keep the distance, and to acknowledge the foreign population of the capital, she also started to publish virus-update videos on YouTube in English, which was unprecedented in Japan—even during earthquakes and similar natural disasters, English language information about dangers and necessary procedures is usually scarce. The disagreement between her and the central administration popped up when Koike, together with an executive board member of the Japan Medical Association, and Ōsaka Governor Yoshimura Hirofumi called on the administration to issue a total lockdown on the country, because the spread of the virus reached explosive levels.12 The government was hesitant to do so—the policy limbo lasted a month, and when Abe eventually declared a state of emergency, initially he only issued it in 6 prefectures. Only after almost 2 weeks did the administration expand the state of emergency nation-wide.

TWO-FRONT BATTLE What has become clear during these first 4 months of the pandemic is the tangible division and tension between the central government and local authorities throughout Japan.

It might not come as a surprise that Governor Koike is in constant disagreement with the ruling party because she has been a thorn in the eye of the LDP since 2016: that is when Koike, then still member of the Liberal Democratic Party, announced that she would run for the post of governor. Her ambition did not sit well inside the party leadership—either because they had other plans, or simply because women are still not supported in their bid to take high-level positions in Japanese politics, as cabinet gender ratios clearly indicate—, so she tried her luck with going independent—and she won. Many at the time thought that her chance of becoming the first female prime minister of Japan might grow with the successful organisation of the Olympic Games, but as it has been postponed, her unapologetic assertiveness toward the central government meant to show her resolve to protect the Tokyoites, thus growing her political capital among the electorate. Several other factors help her in this quest, as general dissatisfaction with the leadership grows among prefectural leaders as well. Not long ago, Ōsaka Governor Yoshimura Hirofumi publicly criticized said leadership for providing no instructions on how to supress the pandemic on a local level, and its general sluggishness in creating necessary guidelines.13 Governor Koike got into an argument with PM Abe on the same issue: although Governor Yoshimura was told off that after declaring a state of emergency, creating rules about business closures is prefectural responsibility, when Governor Koike was trying to draw up plans for that in Tōkyō earlier, the cabinet basically forced her to adopt their “revised” version instead, limiting

Calls grow for Japan PM Abe to declare state of emergency over virus. The Mainichi. 31 March 2020. <https:// mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200331/p2g/00m/0na/010000c> Accessed: 13 May 2020.

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13 Eric Johnston: Osaka governor draws rebuke from Tokyo for hinting at lack of guidance. The Japan Times.

7 May 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/05/07/national/osaka-governor-rebuke-tokyo/#.

Xr5Ym0QzbIW> Accessed: 15 May 2020.

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her scope of action.14 In some way, understandably so: the Abe Cabinet also has its own agenda, that is, preserving economic activity as much as possible. The Japanese economy has been in bad shape since the rise of the consumption tax last October (and even before), therefore the—financially—successful Olympic Games would have been the life vest that prevents the country from slipping back into economic recession. Since that did not turn out well thanks to the pandemic, keeping business open and avoiding total lockdown became a priority for the government, even if that means a heightened danger to the everyday people, virus-wise. It has been stipulated many times that Abe and his ministers are relying on Japanese social norms (which build on avoiding skinship and caring for hygiene anyways) and the art of persuasion, namely following rules even when there is no penalty. In the end, it is highly questionable, which contestant will win the favour of the people—the assertive metropolitan, or the indecisive but stable central leadership?

The problem is, that prefectural governments are not the only ones that mirror some kind of fragmentation inside the leadership, as the other member of the ruling coalition, Kōmeitō has also clashed with Abe&Co. on the appropriate policy in managing the pandemic. The main point of disagreement developed over the Kōmeitō-proposed cash handout scheme. At the height of the pandemic, the ruling party announced a plan proposal of giving a 300,000 yen relief payment to qualified households in order to alleviate some of the financial burdens that people experience during the emergency situation. However, the coalition party, that is usually much more adept in social issues, such as education or social welfare, criticized the government for this plan heavily. The leader of Kōmeitō, Yamaguchi Natsuo, growing increasingly dissatisfied with the LDP’s slow response to the pandemic, reportedly gave an ultimatum to Abe to issue a 100,000 yen handout to each and every applying citizen, without any special qualification.15 The bid was successful, and the central government gave way, but the way Yamaguchi behaved highlights an underlying corrosion between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its junior coalition party. And this is troublesome news for the future of LDP, as much depends on a stable relationship with the Kōmeitō. Most importantly—although not relevantly—the Kōmeitō is the key for PM Abe’s lifelong ambition, the constitutional amendment regarding the peace clause, that ensures that Japan does not maintain a military force (which is debatable) or resolves conflict through armed confrontation. The Kōmeitō, which is a conservative party built on the lay Nichiren Buddhist movement, is fundamentally pacifist in principle, therefore has been always against amending the peace constitution. In this sense, if Abe Shinzō wants to still live up to his promise of amending Article 9 of the constitution, nurturing good relations with the coalition partner is of utmost priority. A possible fracture in the country’s leadership is also very dangerous in regards to the trust of the LDP electorate. If not before, now that

Shunsuke Shigeta: Abe and Gov. Koike tussle over Tokyo's business closures. Nikkei Asian Review. 9 April 2020. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Abe-and-Gov.-Koike-tussle-over-Tokyo-s-business-closures> Accessed: 15 May 2020.

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15 Satoshi Sugiyama: Komeito cash handout demand highlights Abe's fading power amid outbreak. The Japan Times. 19 April 2020. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/19/national/politics-diplomacy/komeitocash-handout-shinzo-abe-power-coronavirus/#.XsPah0QzbIU> Accessed: 19 May 2020.

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Yamaguchi publicly questioned the prime minister’s crisis management strategies, people are reminded that the LDP-ruled government is not without fault. And failing at times of crisis is a tight rope to walk on: not even 10 years ago Prime Minister Kan Naoto was forced to relinquish his office due to his unsatisfactory management over the Fukushima nuclear meltdown (and the 2011 triple disaster in whole). The witch hunt that was unleashed upon him should be lingering above Abe’s head as the sword of Damocles—yet the prime minister seems to make special effort to estrange the Kōmeitō by deliberately leaving Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide out of major pandemic-related discussions, who is a member of the LDP—at this time—but he is also the closest to the Kōmeitō inside the LDP.16 The unusual behaviour on Abe’s part gave way to serious discussions about the identity of the post-Abe successor prime minister, which does not bode well for the prime minister.

All things considered, the thing Abe should worry about is neither local governments, nor the coalition party, but the silent jury: the people. Government support rates have dived considerably since the declaration of a state of emergency, and the downward trend seem to be consistent in the past several weeks. As mentioned before regarding Kan Naoto and the case of the 2011 triple disaster, ultimately natural disasters and crises are deciding factors in the lifespan of an elected government. Three polls need attention: first, the support rate regarding the evaluation of the government’s crisis-management. On 20 April, Mainichi published an in-house support rate poll, in which 53% of respondents did not agree with the way the Abe Administration is handling the coronavirus situation, and 39% found it adequate.

The Mainichi compared the results to earlier polls, and deemed that the percentage of the latter is dropping. Reasons for that are mostly connected to the wishy-washy rules of the state of emergency, and the tip-toeing around the cash handouts.17 Secondly, general support rates on the Abe Government now stand below 29%, an all-time low in the history of the Abeleadership.18 A very dangerous stance indeed: right before Abe was voted out of office back in 2007, during his first stint as prime minister, his support rate stood at 32%. Abe therefore came dangerously close to the end of his tenure—however, as talented as he is, in coming out from scandals unscathed, the coming months will be a battleground for him and his administration.

And if that is not enough, the playing field will be uneven, as Japan is projected to slip into the biggest economic recession of the post-war era.

And finally, a most interesting poll: a research conducted by the Asahi Shimbun stated that general interest towards politics in Japan is higher now than before the coronavirus.19 And this is important, because Japanese society is already chronically apathetic towards politics. The Liberal Democratic Party has been struggling to grasp the attention of the younger age groups, but the current situation seems to attract the attention for all the

16 [Abe seiken kō] Shushō to Suga-shi ni sukimakaze? Posuto Abe meguru seikyoku no hikigane ni mo. The Sankei News.

15 May 2020. <https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/200515/plt2005150001-n1.html> Accessed: 21 May 2020.

17 Satoru Iwashima: Majority in Japan don't approve Abe govt's coronavirus response: Mainichi poll. The Mainichi.

20 April 2020. <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20200420/p2a/00m/0na/016000c> Accessed: 25 May 2020.

Naikaku shiji-ritsu 29%, hossoku irai saitei ni Asahi Shinbun seron chōsa. The Asahi Shimbun. 24 May 2020. <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN5S74LMN5SUZPS001.html> Accessed: 25 May 2020.

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Ibid.

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wrong reasons. If the younger generations—that have no direct connection to, or memory of the benefits of the Shōwa Era (1926–1989) one-party system led by the LDP—become adept to the misdealings of the government, the LDP will be in a dire situation, and further solidifying their rule without PM Abe should pose a challenge.

Political analysts, and even the opposition parties have been struggling to predict, what must happen to the leadership to push Abe Shinzō out of office, and not once a national crisis was considered. And now, even though the state of emergency is lifted in Japan, and the (official) number of cases dropped to a reassuring rate, dissatisfaction still lingers. It is the decision of the electorate whether to let this mishap slide—for no government can be truly prepared for such a devastating pandemic—or to demand responsibility, like it has many times before.

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