In Focus- GULF

IN FOCUS

2019. 4th Issue Free of Charge

The Gulf—Complex and Divided

Interviews

Society

Culture

Economy

IN FOCUS

2019. 4th Issue Free of Charge

The Gulf—Complex and Divided

All rights reserved. Articles found in this publication are the intellectual property of the Antall JĂłzsef Knowledge Centre. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Welcoming Words

5

Turkey and the GCC—A Complex Relationship (C)overt Relations between the GCC and Israel The Gulf Region as a Global Aviation Hub

103 108 112

6 Introduction 6 Basic Country Data 6

Interviews 10 Interview with HE Mihály Bayer, Former Hungarian Ambassador to Yemen, China, Moldova, Ukraine, and Kuwait 12 Interview with HE István Venczel, Former Hungarian Ambassador to Pakistan and Iran 16 Interview with Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, President of the Emirates Policy Center 18

Culture and Political History Pre-Islamic Cultural Legacies in the Persian Gulf Intercoastal Migration and the Multilingual Landscape of the Gulf Islam and Politics in the Gulf Understanding Iran: An Iranian Perspective on Forty Years of the Islamic Republic The Arab Gulf Moment The Moment of Small Gulf States

22 24 29 35 41 48 55

International Relations, Security and Economy 60 The Past and Present of US–Gulf Relations 62 Gulf–South Asia Ties: Not Just Oil, Trade, and Expatriates 69 A Great Opportunity or a Serious Risk?—What Does the Persian Gulf Mean for China and the New Silk Road?

75 Small Country, Big Ambitions: The United Arab Emirates in the Libyan Conflict 81 Nuclear Issues in the Persian Gulf 88 The UAE and the Pursuit of Sustainable Security 94 The Future of The Oil and Gas Industry in the Arab Gulf Region 99

Antall József Knowledge Centre About AJKC Our Releases Foreign and Security Policy Conference 2019 Guest Authors Authors of AJKC References of Pictures and Used Data

116 116 118 120 124 126 127

7 Next Issue In Focus: Tech Companies— The New Sovereigns?

130 130

WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers,

Editor’s Note

There is an often overlooked, yet extremely significant transformation in the Gulf countries.

This development is multifaceted: countries of the region are experiencing one of the most successful reforms in history as they move away from single product economies to complex and modern capital centers, while they are also taking up an ever-more active role in the international life of the Gulf. This latter is a reverberation from a relative retrenchment of great outside powers from the region, and the emergence of local middle powers. This realignment in the region results in an increasing visibility of the inherent diversity of the region as well as an intensification of divergence.

The lead-up to the year 2020, when the United Arab Emirates will host the Dubai EXPO 2020, is an ideal vantage point to look back and ahead and give an overview of new trends and features that have remained essentially the same in the past centuries. A rich cultural heritage, a turbulent international role, a continued importance in energy and commerce, and an increasing role in the security of the Gulf itself are central tenets to this summary. This transformation is also remarkable from a Central–Eastern European point of view as commerce between our regions and international cooperation should continue to be in high gear.

As co-editor of the present issue I kindly invite our Readers to join us in this virtual tour around one of the most vibrant regions on Earth.

In the early 2010s the MENA region had been blown up and new elites had capitalised on the popular discontent. We had seen the decline of the “authoritarian bargain” and the rising of a new era of state-society relations as the result of the Arab Spring. However, what we assumed to be the birth of new democracies soon turned into chaos and disorder. Libya, Syria, and Yemen are still burning while Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, and Lebanon are at crossroads. The Gulf monarchies successfully stabilised their regimes so they could focus their attention to Africa and the Levant. However, in the last five years we have seen fundamental developments in the Gulf which resulted in multiple crises. The decline of oil prices led to the end of the rentier state model. The elites needed to find new ways to stabilise their economies which also necessitated social reforms. The regional order, which was rested on the US’ paternalism and the GCC’s political umbrella, has also changed.

The standoff between Iran and the Arab Gulf monarchies is somehow the aggregation of the last ten years’ crises of the Middle East.

While this compendium of short essays will not provide solutions for these issues, we made our best to point out the many complexities of the region which so far did result only in a very weak unity but mostly resulted in divisions. I hope that the confused and exhausted spectator of the unfolding events will find this issue relaxing and enlightening.

Tamás Péter Baranyi—Editor-in-Chief

Ádám Éva—Editor WELCOMING WORDS

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2

INTRODUCTION

KUWAIT

BAHRAIN

QATAR UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BASIC COUNTRY DATA

KUWAIT

OFFICIAL NAME: State of Kuwait (Arabic: ‎‫ – دولة الكوي ت‬Dawlat al-Kuwait) NATIONAL ANTHEM: Al-Nasheed Al-Watani (Arabic:‎‫ النشيد الوطن ي‬, lit. “National Anthem”) CAPITAL: Kuwait City (Arabic: ‫ مدينة الكويت‬‎) AREA: 17,818 km² GDP: USD 141 billion, GDP per capita: USD 33,537 EMIR: Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah GCB (Arabic: ‫ الشيخ صباح األحمد الجابر الصباح‬‎) OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 4,137 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: constitutional emirate

BAHRAIN

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Bahrain (Arabic: ‫مملكة البحرين‬‎ – Mamlakat al-Bah.rayn) NATIONAL ANTHEM: Bah.raynunā (Arabic: ‫بحريننا‬‎, lit. “Our Bah.rain” CAPITAL: Manama (Arabic: ‫المنامة‬‎) AREA: 778.3 km² GDP: USD 37,75 billion, GDP per capita: USD 21,439 KING: Hamad bin Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa (Arabic: ‫)حمد بن عيسى بن سلمان آل خليفة‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 1,569 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: constitutional emirate

QATAR

OFFICIAL NAME: State of Qatar (Arabic: ‫دولة قطر‬‎– Dawlat Qat. ar) NATIONAL ANTHEM: As-Salam al-Amiri (Arabic: ‫ السالم األميري‬lit. “Amiri Salute”) CAPITAL: Doha (Arabic: ‫الدوحة‬‎‎) AREA: 11,581 km² GDP: USD 192 billion, GDP per capita: USD 63,222 EMIR: Tamim bin Hamad (Arabic: ‫)تميم بن حمد آل ثاني‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 2,781 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: constitutional monarchy

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

OFFICIAL NAME: United Arab Emirates (Arabic: ‫ – اإلما رات العربية المتحدة‬al-ʿImārāt al-ʿArabīyyah al-Muttah.idah) NATIONAL ANTHEM: Īšiy Bilādī (Arabic: ‫ عيشي بالدي‬lit. “Long Live My Nation”) CAPITAL: Abu Dhabi (Arabic: ‫ظ ِب ي‬ َ ‫أ َُب و‬‎‎) AREA: 83,600 km² GDP: USD 414 billion, GDP per capita: USD 40,782 PRESIDENT: Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Arabic: ‫خليفة بن زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان‬‎‎) OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 9,630 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: federal constitutional monarchy

IRAQ

IRAN

SAUDI ARABIA OMAN

BASIC COUNTRY DATA

OMAN

OFFICIAL NAME: Sultanate of Oman (Arabic: ‫ع مان‬ ُ ‫ سلطنة‬‎– Salṭanat ʻUmān) NATIONAL ANTHEM: as-Salām as-Sultānī (Arabic:‫ نشيد السالم السلطاني‬lit. “Sultanic Salutation”) CAPITAL: Muscat (Arabic: ‫)مسقط‬ AREA: 309,500 km² GDP: USD 79 billion, GDP per capita: USD 15,664 SULTAN: Qaboos bin Said al Said (Arabic: ‫)قابوس بن سعيد البوسعيدي‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 4,829 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: unitary parliamentary absolute monarchy

SAUDI ARABIA

OFFICIAL NAME: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Arabic: ‫ – المملكة العربية السعودية‬al-Mamlakah al-ʿArabīyah as-Saʿūdīyah) NATIONAL ANTHEM: ʾĀša l-malik (Arabic: ‫ النشيد الوطني السعودي‬lit. “National Anthem of Saudi Arabia“) CAPITAL: Riyadh (Arabic: ‫)الرياض‬ AREA: 2,149,690 km² GDP: USD 782 billion, GDP per capita: USD 20,775 KING: Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Arabic: ‫)سلمان بن عبد العزیز آل سعود‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic POPULATION: 33,702 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: absolute monarchy

IRAQ

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Iraq (Arabic: ‫ – جمهورية الع راق‬Jumhūrīyyat al-'Irāq) NATIONAL ANTHEM: Mawt. inī (Arabic: ‫موطني‬, lit. “My Homeland”) CAPITAL: Baghdad (Arabic: ‫)بغداد‬ AREA: 438,317 km² GDP: USD 226 billion, GDP per capita: USD 5,511 PRESIDENT: Barham Salih (Kurdish: ‫)بەرھەم ئەحمەد ساڵح‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Arabic, Kurdish POPULATION: 38,433 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: federal parliamentary republic

IRAN

OFFICIAL NAME: Islamic Republic of Iran (Persian: ‫ – جمهوری اسالمی ای ران‬Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān NATIONAL ANTHEM: Sorud-e Melli-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslāmi-ye Irān (Persian: ‫سرود ملی‬ ‫جمهوری اسالمی ای ران‬, lit. “National Anthem of the Islamic Republic of Iran”) CAPITAL: Tehran (Persian: ‫)ته ران‬ AREA: 1,648,195 km² GDP: USD 454 billion, GDP per capita: USD 6,952 PRESIDENT: Hassan Rouhani (Persian: ‫)حسن روحانی‬ OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: Persian POPULATION: 81,800 million FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: Islamic republic

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INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEW WITH HE MIHÁLY BAYER, FORMER HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO YEMEN, CHINA, MOLDOVA, UKRAINE, AND KUWAIT Tamás Péter Baranyi, Ádám Éva

HE Mr Mihály Bayer

Which states in the Gulf did you come into contact with during your career?

In 1980, I worked as a desk officer for the Gulf in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).

After serving five years in Libya, I returned to the Department of the Middle East and North Africa, where I had plenty of opportunities to communicate with Arab partners, including the countries of the Gulf. In 1991, I became ambassador to Yemen. Between 1995 and 1999, I was in charge of the Africa and Middle East Department of the MFA. After 1999, I led Hungarian diplomatic missions in a number of countries and held senior positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I completed my last mission abroad between 2014 and 2018 as ambassador to Kuwait. I believe that I had extensive contacts with representatives of the countries of the Middle East in general, and the Gulf in particular.

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How would you describe the Hungarian diplomatic relations with the Arab states of the Gulf?

The countries of the Arab world have always been important to Hungarian foreign policy.

The region is not only a neighbour to Europe, but it is an important export market for our economy as well. The oil wealth of the Gulf countries and their huge revenues made their markets extremely attractive for Hungarian exporters. However, it was difficult to develop cooperation with most of them because of their reluctance to deal with Communist countries. The first country ready to cooperate with Hungary was Kuwait, which established diplomatic relations with us in 1964. The others only followed in the first half of the 1990s. The last country to complete this process was Saudi Arabia in 1995.

However, the lack of official relations did not mean that our goods did not reach the markets of the Gulf. It was Kuwait which played a very important role as an intermediary between us and the Gulf economies. In the late 1980s, Kuwait and Iraq were extremely important buyers of Hungarian products and services in the region. It is probably correct to say that the value of Kuwait’s import from Hungary in the 1980s exceeded more than half of the accumulated value of our current export to the GCC countries. The hard currency coming from the Gulf through trade relations was very important for Hungary to manage its difficult financial situation during that decade.

In the field of foreign policy, Hungary supported the Arab states in the main issues of the Middle East and had active contacts and good relations

with most of them. I believe that our constructive cooperation with Middle Eastern countries helped us begin the process of rebuilding our relations with Israel in 1987 and the establishment of a Hungarian Representative Office in Tel Aviv as well.

After 1990, Hungarian foreign policy payed special attention to the Gulf countries, despite our occupation with the political and economic changes and our European and NATO integration.

The new Hungarian leadership initiated contacts with the Gulf, and clearly expressed Hungary’s wish to establish official ties.

Did the Gulf War have any effect on the Hungarian–Gulf relations?

The Iraq–Iran War in the 1980s, as well as the isolation of Egypt, related to the signing of the Camp David agreement in 1978, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel strengthened Iraq’s desire to take over the leading role in the Arab world during the Arab summit held in Baghdad in spring 1990. Iraq failed to achieve this goal, partly because of the position of the Gulf states.

Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 created a very complicated situation, and it was obvious that this adventure cannot bring anything positive for the region.

Hungary expressed its strong denunciation of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and demonstrated its support through joining the International Coalition for the Liberation of Kuwait. Since then, our clear position and the Hungarian contribution to the liberation of Kuwait have been very warmly mentioned by all Kuwaiti political partners. Our solidarity with Kuwait and the Hungarian contribution to its liberation was definitely appreciated by other Gulf countries as well.

Who are Hungary’s most important partners in the Gulf?

Our diplomatic network has been extended in the recent years in the Gulf. Today, we have embassies in Kuwait, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Muscat, covering the countries of the entire Arab Peninsula.

THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF— IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR SIZE OR POPULATION— ARE RUNNING HUGE PROJECTS. OUR EMBASSIES ARE READY TO OFFER HUNGARIAN ENTERPRISES THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MARKET, AND HELP THEM CONTACT BOTH GOVERNMENTAL AND BUSINESS PARTNERS. As you have already seen, we have always had excellent, one might even say flawless, relations with Kuwait. Kuwait’s moderate foreign policy and its role as a mediator to defuse tension in the region has always been highly appreciated. Kuwait is open for any contact and cooperation with us. Similarly, our relationship has been good with the United Arab Emirates.

Dubai has become a commercial centre, and the UAE is considered to be the most innovative country in the Gulf region. Therefore, it is in our interests to have a good partnership. Qatar is a very open partner as well. It goes without saying that we are interested in maintaining good INTERVIEWS

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THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS THAT CANNOT BE CONCILIATED FOR THE TIME BEING. THEREFORE, CURRENT CONFLICTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO CONTINUE OR FREEZE THAN GET STRAIGHTENED OUT IN THE SHORT TERM. relations with Saudi Arabia due to its political and economic role in the region. Although Saudi Arabia and the UAE are our two most prominent regional trading partners today, we are equally open towards all countries of the Gulf.

In which sectors does Hungary have potential in the region?

To describe the Gulf market, the first thing to underline is that it is extremely competitive.

The multinational or foreign-owned companies, which export goods and services from Hungary normally, use their company channels for executing contracts with their partners. But the situation in case of the SMEs is different. As I saw during my term in Kuwait, it is a big challenge for them to enter the market. To win contracts, they need to win the trust of 14

INTERVIEWS

potential partners first, and this requires strong determination, perseverance, and regular visits and contacts.

As I see, we have real potential in the IT and ICT sectors, as well as the food industry.

Start-ups probably can find partners to help finance the development of their products.

We know that Saudi Arabia plans to invest in nuclear energy, which could be further supported.

Cooperation in the field of water management is also promising. Working with international majors as subcontractors may also be an option for some of our companies. And I would not exclude that sometime Qatari LNG may arrive in Hungary to help us diversify our natural gas sources. We are also expecting further investments from Oman, which is already the biggest investor in Hungary from the region.

The countries of the Gulf—irrespective of their size or population—are running huge projects.

Our embassies are ready to offer Hungarian enterprises their knowledge of the market, and help them contact both governmental and business partners.

In addition to bilateral cooperation, how do you assess the importance of the V4, the EU, and the NATO in the region?

The Gulf has been, for many decades, a theatre of strategic competition between big international and regional players. Its oil wealth, the growing use of LNG, as well its strategic location, have increased its importance for the whole world.

That is why the Gulf countries have been seeking the support of the major international and regional players to safeguard their own interests. These partnerships used to be mainly bilateral.

The importance of the EU has been recently growing in the region, however, it was a little slow in building up its diplomatic presence. The first EU Delegation in the Gulf opened in Riyadh, then in Abu Dhabi, and in Kuwait last July. In the second half of 2018, Hungary was at the forefront of improving EU–Kuwait relations as the member state performing the local EU presidency. EU relations are not equally important to all Gulf states. While Kuwait has some focus on the EU, other countries are less

interested. They are not too open for the value-based approaches of the EU, and in particular for issues related to human rights.

It is very important to note that the Gulf states are under the US security umbrella, so, for them, this constitutes the primary relationship. Currently, the war in Yemen presents a security risk for the Gulf states that plays down the importance of other channels.

The importance of NATO in the region should not be exaggerated. NATO—similarly to the EU—is complicated for them. A NATO–GCC partnership is in place, and there is a NATO training centre Kuwait, but other GCC countries are not involved to the same degree.

The Gulf states do not really understand the V4 framework, and our V4 cooperation does not offer V4–Gulf cooperation formulas either. For Hungary, as I see it, the EU’s activity in the region may be the most important multilateral framework.

In Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, we see infightings and a struggle for power. These conflicts do not help create stability and a better life for the citizens of these countries. There are many different kinds of interests and perceptions that cannot be conciliated for the time being. Therefore, current conflicts are more likely to continue or freeze than get straightened out in the short term.

How do you see the outcome of security problems in the region?

The embargo on Qatar by Saudi Arabia was somewhat unexpected. However, Qatar is currently addressing this issue successfully.

Therefore, there is little chance that this conflict will be resolved very soon. The conflict divides the Gulf Cooperation Council into three groups: besides the quarrelling parties, Kuwait and Oman want this issue to be resolved through negotiations and have made mediation efforts to this end. Qatar has been recently represented on low levels at some GCC meetings, however, this cannot be considered, for the time being, a real indication of ending the conflict. Qatar is a major energy power, so it intends to enjoy certain freedom in pursuing its own foreign policy. Balance and security in the region are also upset by tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Iran and the international community. Unfortunately, we have not reached the point where the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, can be renegotiated. What we are currently witnessing is arm-twisting and position-taking. Domestic debates do not help consolidate relations either.

INTERVIEWS

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INTERVIEW WITH HE ISTVÁN VENCZEL, FORMER HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN AND IRAN Ádám Éva, Tamás Kozma

HE Mr István Venczel

Could you briefly summarise your experience as a diplomat in the Gulf region?

As an expert in international relations, I specialised in Iran and Afghanistan; therefore, I dealt mainly with Hungarian relations with these two countries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years. I participated in diplomatic missions in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, later, in the independent republics of Central Asia. I last served in Iran as ambassador between 2003 and 2007.

Could you briefly describe the development of diplomatic relations between Hungary and Iran?

The history and socio-political affairs of the countries in the Gulf region have not developed uniformly. On the Arab side, the current states have gradually gained independence. For some time, these countries abstained from official diplomatic relations with the countries of the then socialist camp, except, of course, for the Soviet Union, which was a global power. Nevertheless, 16

INTERVIEWS

Hungary had economic and trade relations with some of them. Iran has developed close relations with the US. Thus, for a long time, Hungarian– Iranian relations were mainly formal, but diplomatic accreditation was maintained throughout.

Despite political disagreements and mutual suspicion, we opened an embassy in Tehran in the 1950s, and our diplomatic presence was first at the executive level and then at the ambassador level from the 1960s. That time, bilateral relations began to develop in almost every respect, which was also linked to the Shah’s reform policy called “white revolution” that sought to strengthen relations with Eastern European and Far Eastern socialist countries in foreign policy and foreign trade. Over the next twenty years, Hungarian–Iranian relations did not develop spectacularly but in a balanced and gradual manner, which was in line with Hungarian economic interests. During the 1960s and 1970s, our relations with Iran had gained the attention of the Hungarian Foreign Service. The Hungarian Embassy grew in small steps and its commercial department expanded, which also accommodated corporate representatives. As the volume of trade was growing, the prestige of this relation in the system of Hungarian foreign relations also increased.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the communication with Iran became more complicated, everything became more difficult to handle. This can be explained by the bloody war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s and the fact that many new, inexperienced people were brought into the Iranian government apparatus who were suspicious and difficult to deal with. The change of regime in Hungary also complicated the conditions for building the relations, mainly due to the above-mentioned mutual suspicion.

FOR A LONG TIME, HUNGARIAN–IRANIAN RELATIONS WERE MAINLY FORMAL, BUT DIPLOMATIC ACCREDITATION WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT.

more favourable conditions were created for developing relations. Trade started to grow again, and our relations have also become more active in non-economic fields, including in the political, cultural, and educational spheres. For example, after many years, the Hungarian Prime Minister visited Tehran for the first time. However, these positive signs, gestures take longer to have their positive effects. The escalation of tension in the Iran–American relationship since approx. 2017, mainly due to the nuclear policy of Iran, again threatens the cooperation between Iran and a lot of other countries, including Hungary, to come to a halt, or a recession. However, as far as possible, it is worth trying to maintain and improve our relationship.

Previously, Hungarian foreign policy essentially pursued the bandwagoning with other socialist countries. If Hungary pursued its own ways, it usually did not occur with developing countries but with the West. However, none of the socialist countries had bad relations with Iran.

The failure of the socialist system and the change of regimes in Eastern Europe was perceived as a change for the better and supported by the Islamic Republic. Subsequently, however, they did not fail to note that the Central and Eastern European countries—according to their view— did not take advantage of the situation to consolidate their independence, but they aligned with the West. The development of relations after the change of regime was overshadowed by the very tense, hostile relationship between Tehran and Washington. This situation has gotten worse since approx. 2005, when Iran become subject to an international sanctions regime due to its nuclear policy. Although the Hungarian government complied with these decisions, it did not attempt to overfulfill the requirements.

Unfortunately, trade has fallen in these years.

While we were talking about USD 100 million in the past (a few times even hundreds of millions!), in the years of sanctions, trade between Hungary and Iran declined to only tens of millions of dollars.

Sanctions against Iran have begun to be lifted as of 2015, when an international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program was reached. After that,

What factors should the Hungarian diplomacy consider when seeking relations with Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf?

The Hungarian diplomacy maintains good relations with both Iran and the Arab states on the other side of the Gulf. It is therefore out of the question that in any regional debate Hungary will behave differently than neutrally. Hungary has no significant power or influence in the region and could not contribute significantly to the resolution of the problems. The only exception to this would be if the interested parties themselves asked for assistance—possibly of a technical or logistical nature. It is worth paying attention to how we communicate with our partners. One should always remember that, in the case of Iran, we are working in/with a country that has thousands of years of history, a civilisation that has faced many challenges throughout its history, many times it has been conquered, but most of the time the conqueror melted into the conquered culturally. We can only protect and assert our own interests if we understand the other party’s interests and the motivations behind them.

INTERVIEWS

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INTERVIEW WITH DR EBTESAM AL-KETBI, PRESIDENT OF THE EMIRATES POLICY CENTER Ádám Éva, Tamás Kozma

Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi

The Emirates Policy Center (EPC) was established in September 2013, during the turmoil of the Arab Spring, to study internal and external threats to nation-states in the Arabian Gulf region and the broader Arab world. Some threats have been eliminated since then, but, at the same time, new threats have emerged in the region. In your opinion, what are the issues that most importantly shape the Gulf region’s security agenda in our days?

Militias and militant groups’ keenness to hijack state sovereignty still poses a fundamental security threat, which is the case in Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. What makes things worse is that this threat has become more dangerous in the wake of the Arab Spring. The decision of war and peace must be in the hands of the nation-state, not in the hands of militias, militant parties, and groups with transnational agendas. Such a situation poses a major obstacle to the provision of stability, economic 18

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development, sound political environment, and security. Arab and GCC countries have zero tolerance towards Iran and Turkey’s inclinations for domination and interference in their internal affairs. State sovereignty must be respected and whoever seeks influence should try to exercise positive and legitimate influence, not negative influence based on compulsion, incitement, violence, rupture of national fabric, employment of extremist and terrorist forces to serve expansionist agendas, and the myth of power.

From the experience of the Arab Spring, Emirati diplomacy believes that the biggest challenge is to “try to make change that people want while ensuring institutional stability of the state,” and disempowerment of extreme elements or those who adopt advocates of violence and terrorism.

Do you see a resolution coming for Gulf’s crises (the war in Yemen, the blockade on Qatar, the nuclear threat of a post-JCPOA Iran), or are you expecting protracted conflicts? Is the future of the Gulf based on regional integration (a stronger GCC or “Arab NATO”) or strong individual states?

We are still far from reaching comprehensive solutions to these crises. It seems that all efforts made only aspire for their successful management.

Unfortunately, this has been unattainable so far.

In these crises, local, regional, and international dimensions are intertwined, which makes them more entangled and complicated. I think that the first step to make positive breakthroughs and achieve solutions is to build confidence among parties involved in the dispute or conflict. Until now, the Arab region has lacked the experience of “lessons learned;” what happened in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere did not raise the alarm to start a new realisation that military

FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ARAB SPRING, EMIRATI DIPLOMACY BELIEVES THAT THE BIGGEST CHALLENGE IS TO “TRY TO MAKE CHANGE THAT PEOPLE WANT WHILE ENSURING INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY OF THE STATE.” solutions are catastrophic, prioritise dialogue, negotiations, and political solutions to military ones, and also the importance of accepting the other and rejecting zero-sum games. The Houthis in Yemen are under the illusion that their military coup supported by Iran would enable them to dominate Yemen. Iran is also under the illusion that the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 is a green light for its expansion at the expense of Arab countries and the infiltration of these countries by sectarian militias. The UAE declared its full conviction that Tehran’s policies are harmful to the Arab world and the nuclear deal with Iran was not suitable for the tasks it was made for. Therefore, if this situation does not change, we are indeed facing long-term struggles. One of the impacts of these struggles is the Qatari crisis that has led the GCC to become less effective and unable to play its role as required. As issues of regional security

became more complicated, unilateral policies seem ineffective in securing sustainable stability; they rather keep everyone under pressure and attrition.

The United Arab Emirates has experienced an unprecedented growth in the past decades, and, as outlined in the Vision 2021, it aims to become one of the best countries in the world by 2021. Could you please mention a few areas in which the UAE desires to become outstanding?

In their statements, UAE officials reiterate the idea that the world is entering the Fourth Industrial Revolution that will bring closer the material and human worlds in an unprecedented way to push the human civilisation forward with a parallel help by qualitative human skills and Artificial Intelligence. Having said that, UAE officials point out that “more than 1 million jobs will change in the UAE (in the coming years) and will be open to global competition and attract industries that help the UAE to succeed.”

According to the UAE assessment in this context, which was expressed by Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, at the World Government Summit 2018: “existing skills are not sufficient and human capital is the major element in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. We must reconsider our education system to cope with the next stage” which is characterised by the emergence of unprecedented new innovations, technologies, and methods that would merge the material, digital, and biological realms in ways that might create radical shift for humanity.

Sheikh Abdullah pointed out that, as part of its “Vision 2021,” which was launched in 2010, the UAE seeks to shift to a knowledge society, in which the individual is the first step of the shift to a knowledge-based economy. Therefore, we have to reconsider our education in a transparent and brave way, work to build a new education system that keeps evolving in accordance with future skills, and increase supervision over education systems, as well as develop curricula of critical thinking.

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According to “Vision 2021,” the priority of the UAE is to prepare for the future and the post-oil age by adopting a strategy of diversifying sources of income, empowering the private sector, restructuring the labour market, heading towards a knowledge-based economy, and realising the importance of investment in education, scientific knowledge, technology, the outcome of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and space industry.

This has motivated Sheikh Mohammad Ben Rashid, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, to establish the Soft Power Council, the Council for the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the National Space Program, while he also appointed minsters for Artificial Intelligence, sciences, advanced industries, and water and food security.

If the UAE succeeds in these fields, it means that it has succeeded in implementing “Vision 2021” and other ambitious visions.

ARAB AND GCC COUNTRIES HAVE ZERO TOLERANCE TOWARDS IRAN AND TURKEY’S INCLINATIONS FOR DOMINATION AND INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Does the economic and technological development of each Gulf state create a very competitive environment, and, if yes, does everyone benefit from the competition?

GCC countries have significant financial resources and vast economic potentials, and it is certainly true that technological breakthroughs create tempting opportunities for development, competitiveness, quality, and production improvement, as well as growth and prosperity.

What really determines disparity at the individual level are efficient governance, effective management of human and material resources according to world standards, and the optimal use of science, technology, and investments in building successful partnerships. In their long-term strategy, GCC countries seek to address disparities by integration policies and making the best use of various GCC capacities to enrich and further develop their societies.

serve policy and decision-making in their national governments. It is important to ensure that lines of communication between these think tanks and policy-making agencies in these countries are kept open and robust. Moreover, these think tanks need to improve their performance through the introduction of latest technologies and methodologies in strategic analytics, risk prediction, and strategic foresight. They also have to limit speculations in their work as much as possible, and learn how to draw lessons from various cases and studies.

How would you evaluate the role of think tanks in the Gulf region today? How can they successfully contribute to policy making?

GCC countries need more professional think tanks that can compete to provide the best possible consultations and policy recommendations to 20

INTERVIEWS

EPC’s flagship event, the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate, has become one of the most prestigious meeting points in the world for those interested in foreign policy.

According to the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report 2018, EPC and Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate was ranked 10th in the best think tank conference list. What is the key for success of this event?

As EPC’s most significant annual event, the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate (ADSD), usually seeks to systemically approach hot issues regionally and globally, as it faces the challenge of applying new methodologies that produce in-depth

analysis of these files. At ADSD, experts look at controversial issues from the bigger picture and examine them from different angles, rather than from “misleading signals” that are meant to mislead and distract analysts and decision makers alike. As an annual intellectual platform to discuss transformative shifts regionally and globally, ADSD is not characterised only by being well organised in terms of individual panels, participant interventions, and time management, but also by hosting a selection of subject matter experts in the relevant topics of discussion. Individual interventions and questions are carefully prepared by EPC based on advanced analytical methodologies to ensure that these contributions are more condensed, rich, and of great value. Moreover, this gathering offers a great opportunity for researchers, experts, and politicians to meet face-to-face and enrich the exchange of viewpoints and insights through valuable feedback from the distinguished audience.

How do you see the future research agenda of EPC? What are the topics that you think will require growing scholarly attention in the upcoming years?

I think the topics that will receive more scientific attention in the coming years would primarily be centred around one area: improving capabilities and methodologies for crisis predictability, strategic foresight, and political risk analysis that depend on software systems and computer technologies. EPC is always keen to develop its capabilities in political risk analysis, scenario-building, proposing optimal strategies, and producing forecasts at different levels, with the aim of providing conclusions and policy recommendations to inform policy-making.

There is a big window of opportunity that the UAE can use to improve relations with Central Eastern Europe, particularly through the basic role played by think tanks in deciphering and handling uncertainty that currently dominates the international scene. Today, we live conditions that are different from those that governed international relations in the Cold War era or the ones prevailing for two decades following that.

The fluidity of the current regional scene stems from the volatile and unstable global order itself.

According to experts and analysts, unlike the weak and fragmented Russia during the post-Cold War period, represented by the crumbling leadership of Boris Yeltsin, Moscow has become an influential and interventionist actor under Vladimir Putin’s leadership. While China went ahead with its plans in developing its economic power, the US, under Presidents Obama and Trump, tended to redefine its involvement in the world scene and conflicts.

With more doubts being raised regarding the future of the European project as a whole— notably with the fallouts associated with Brexit— to be sure, the US remains the world’s only superpower. However, the real question remains: how the GCC countries and Central Eastern Europe can effectively engage in such an uncertain scene.

It is important for the GCC countries and Central Eastern Europe to approach their common interests in light of shifting global dynamics in order to expand windows of opportunity, reduce common threats, and face challenges to security, development, investments, and governance.

Both sides need to develop a mechanism of cooperation in a world that almost merges materialistic, digital, and biological aspects in a manner that would reshape humanity in the decades to come.

Since our institution is based in Central Eastern Europe, we are always interested in our partners’ views on how they perceive cooperation with our region. What do you think, how can relations be strengthened between the Gulf region and Central Eastern Europe?

INTERVIEWS

21

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CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

PRE-ISLAMIC CULTURAL LEGACIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF Iván Szántó

In common knowledge, the Persian Gulf has been synonymous with petrochemicals for more than a century, during which it has become the core energy supplier for the world economy.

This fairly recent aspect of the region, however, should not eclipse the thousands of years before rigs, refineries, and tankers, when oil and gas reserves were waiting undisturbed for their turn under the seabed. Instead of these industries, the pre-hydrocarbon Persian Gulf was a thriving transregional arena for trade in goods as different as hardstones, copper, horses, and pearls, even if, at certain periods, it may have been a peripheral region from the global perspective.

Although oil and gas were absent from the list of goods offered by the ancient Gulf, the connective role of the region in pre-industrial commerce was already related to its underlying geology. Despite their similar look on the map, the water body to the west of the Arabian Peninsula, i.e., the Red Sea, sharply differs from its eastern equivalent, i.e., the Persian Gulf. The former is a rift valley created by the tectonic divergence of the African and Arabian plates, the maximum depth of which reaches more than 3,000 metres below sea level, with steep, rocky outcrops forming most of its coastline. Good natural harbours are few and far between, and, as a result, its function in transit trade, especially before the opening of the Suez Canal, was little more than that of a bottleneck of the Indian Ocean towards the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the Persian Gulf—a shallow underwater extension of the Arabian Plate, which collides with the Iranian Plate under pressure by the Red Sea Rift to form the Zagros Mountains along the Iranian–Iraqi border (and the mountains of Oman) and the vast alluvial 24

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

hydrocarbon reserves—is characterised by a depth never exceeding 90 metres, a varied shore, and a network of islands. These facilitate excellent conditions for shipping with small vessels, which helped the Persian Gulf develop into one of the first regions worldwide where seafaring activities appear in the archaeological record. Moreover, the Persian Gulf links the Indian Ocean and the main navigable fluvial artery of West Asia, the Tigris and Euphrates.

These two rivers enter the Gulf in a confluence, the Shatt al-Arab or Arvand (its Arabic and Persian names, respectively). For the surrounding high cultures of the Mesopotamian, Iranian, and Arab hinterlands, the Persian Gulf provided an arena of commercial exchange and cultural connectivity, a “Mediterranean,” in the original sense of the world.

Deep in the Iranian mainland, cowry shells and minerals, such as obsidian, attest to the development of a combined naval and overland trade as early as nine thousand years ago, several millennia before the beginning of written history.1 Lapis lazuli found in Neolithic Mesopotamia may also have travelled from Afghanistan via maritime routes, although, in later periods, the emergence of cities in the Iranian Plateau created an overland alternative.2 Apart from this material evidence, we have almost no clues regarding the organisation of Neolithic trade and its participants. Traces of institutionalised trade become visible much later. In the second half of the third millennium BC, the kings of Ur in Mesopotamia amassed large quantities of chlorite objects, native to Eastern Iran (Kirman province), where storage and manufacturing facilities of this stone were established to cater for the Mesopotamian and other markets.3

Ruins on the Faikala Island

From the same period, Iraqi-style pottery appears in Oman, suggesting commercial contacts between these regions.

It seems that Mesopotamian states, with their surplus of crops and manpower, took the lead in regulating intra-Gulf trade, yet the practical aspects of seafaring, including shipbuilding and navigation, were under the control of local participants, especially the insular states of Tilmun (Dilmun) and Tarout, as well as the country of Meluhha of the Mesopotamian sources, which can be identified as the Indus Valley civilisation.

The Indus River shows similarities with the Tigris–Euphrates fluvial system: as an annex of the Indian Ocean, it connected heavily populated agricultural mainland centres and the ports of Sind and Gujarat.4 It is noteworthy that in the Kirman region, which our sources mention as Marhashi, stretching between Mesopotamia and Meluhha, we do not find a similar fluvial artery linking the urban centres of the hinterland with the coast, and this lack poses difficulties in the understanding of local economics, especially because Bronze Age ports in the region are barely known. Despite this, the presence of chlorite objects from Kirman in nearby Oman

(then called Makan), suggests intense maritime contacts that were possibly maintained without Mesopotamian or Indian mediation. The main asset of Oman, in turn, was copper mining.

At the height of Mesopotamian power, especially during the reign of Sargon of Akkad and his successors (ca. 2350–2200 BC) and later during the Babylonian Empire (18th–17th centuries BC), the aggressive militarism of these mainland polities successfully integrated the entire Gulf trade into a single economic system in which Kirman and Oman were subjugated.

Apart from their hard power tactics, the Sargonic kings also leveraged soft power towards their neighbours, especially through distributing their surplus of cereals (barley and wheat) and manufactured goods, including textiles.

Mesopotamia was not the only dominant player in the Bronze Age trading network of the Persian Gulf, as it was often rivalled and sometimes eclipsed by a similar conglomerate of city states, collectively and not entirely correctly known as the Elamite Empire, in today’s southwest Iran, adjacent to Iraq. Elam is a somewhat anachronistic appellation for a succession of states and confederations which existed under CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

25

various names in the oil-rich Iranian lowlands of Khuzistan province between the third to the first millennium.5 At times, Elamite rulers could subdue their Iraqi rivals and, at these times, they may have wielded influence over the entire Gulf region. Similar to the Mesopotamians, they relied on Makan and Tilmun seamen to keep the flow of goods in circulation.

Thus, a thorough assessment of the political and economic make-up of the Persian Gulf during the early land empires should clearly distinguish between the external powers and their overarching organisational authority on the one hand and the local protagonists, the Gulf people proper, on the other. Of the latter, the so-called Tilmun (Dilmun) civilisation stands out.

Rediscovered by British archaeologist and petroleum explorer Geoffrey Bibby (1917–2001), the name Tilmun is known to us from Akkadian and Babylonian documents which use it to describe the Arabian coastland and its adjacent archipelago. The name may also have been in use among the locals whose literacy demonstrates their linguistic, and perhaps ethnic, kinship with their Semitic northern neighbours.6 Tilmun is often understood restrictively as equivalent to Bahrain Island, and, in fact, this equation constitutes a major element in modern Bahraini identity, yet ancient Tilmun stretched far beyond this tiny kingdom.

According to cuneiform documents, Tilmun incorporated the entire eastern half of Arabia as far south as Makan. An important centre of this elusive thalassocracy was Tarout Island, which is, by now, connected with the mainland by causeways and is forming a conurbation with Qatif, a major cultural and economic centre of eastern Saudi Arabia. Excavations in Tarout have recovered similar pottery and architecture to Iraqi examples, ranging from the fourth to the second millennium BC.7 The central tell of the island, now surmounted by one of the many 16th-century Portuguese castles across the Indian Ocean, may have been the economic hub of Tilmun at certain periods. In its vicinity, a deep artesian well was dug to provide fresh water for the inhabitants. Monumental statuary reminiscence of Babylonia and seals comparable 26

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

to the Indus Valley civilisation were also found.

On Bahrain Island, the most important Tilmun site is lying underneath Qal’at al-Bahrain, another Portuguese fort, close to the modern capital, Manama. It comprises the largest stone-built fortified and gated settlement in Bronze Age Eastern Arabia, datable to the Sargonic period, and a (probably slightly later built) palace complex. Temples were found in a separate location a few kilometres to the west, near a natural spring, at the village of Barbar. Here three successive masonry buildings are visible, one on top of the other, datable between the first half of the third millennium to ca. 2,000 BC. The lower two feature stunning underground chambers and a sophisticated system of cisterns and water conduits which led the water through the sanctuary into Barbar’s irrigation network.

The Barbar temples signify the centrality of water in Bahrain’s early cults and prosperity. Still in Bahrain, Japanese archaeologists excavated two huge funerary mounds (ca. 27 and 21 metres high) with stone-built burial chambers, while, in Qatar, several groups of stone cairns were unearthed, most notably at Umm al-Ma’, in the north of the country.8 Due to the lack of written documents or additional context, the historical and social background of these monumental burials is still unknown.

A similar well-temple, of the god Inzak, and typical “Barbar” pottery, were also recovered in the far north of the Gulf, on Failaka Island, off the coast of Kuwait. Failaka, thus, was an important link between Mesopotamia and Tilmun. However, its real heyday would come two thousand years later, when it was known as Ikaros after the conquests of Alexander the Great (331–323 BC).9 At this time, a huge square fort was built, which accommodated two terraced Hellenistic temples with Ionic capitals and a Greekinscribed stone stele. Ikaros may have been the base for Nearchus, the great Hellenistic explorer of Asia. However, his story already brings us towards the late antique period.

To return from the people of the sea to their mainland sovereigns, we see that the Mesopotamian- or Elamite-dominated trading network continued until the middle of the second

millennium BC, when cataclysmic events imposed new hierarchies on the society of West Asia.

These incidents include the economic collapse of the Kirman region and Makan, the partial shift of commercial activities from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean (due, for example, to the emergence of Cyprus as the new centre of copper mining, replacing Oman), as well as the immigration of Indo-Iranians into Iran and India. At the end of these developments, the region witnessed the rise of world empires, encompassing the smaller ones of the Bronze Age, such as Babylonia or the Indus Valley Civilisation. The culmination of these world empires was the formation of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great (reigned 550–530 BC).

From having been the ruler of a small, formerly Elamite domain of Persis (Fars), Cyrus went on to become the founder of the largest land empire of ancient history. Initially, Persia may have appeared as a restored and enlarged version of Elam, with its double foothold in the southwest Iranian lowlands and the uplands of Fars. However, Cyrus and his successors, Cambyses, Darius, and Xerxes, members of the Achaemenid Dynasty (550–330 BC), did not stop here. One by one, they appended to their ever-growing realm all the empires of the previous era: Media, Assyria, Babylon, Lydia, Egypt, and India. While the Persians were averse to seafaring, they had at their disposal not only the Tilmunite fleet inherited from Elam and Babylon but also the ships of Gujarat; moreover, they had become masters of the Mediterranean trade through their Phoenician subjects, and they owned the Ionian navy, too—the world’s then strongest seaborne force. In sum, they incorporated the formerly disparate agricultural, industrial, commercial, and military activities in a single world economy. Although the Achaemenid Empire did stay in power only for two centuries, the successive Persian Empires, under the Seleucid, Arsacid (Parthian), and Sasanian Dynasties, held sway over much of Cyrus’ domains for more than a thousand years.

Persia also remained in charge of the Gulf trade and beyond, sometimes as far as Ethiopia, throughout this extremely long period—hence

Lapis lazuli

the origin of the name “Persian Gulf.” However, this empire rarely imposed its cultural and religious priorities on the conquered areas. In fact, the Persian Empire, except for the early Sasanian period, was characterised by cultural pluralism and religious tolerance: in addition to the various forms of Zoroastrianism, the state religion, numerous other creeds were thriving, including Mandaeism, Sabaeism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Judaism—and Christianity. A forgotten element of local heritage, Christianity, was the dominant religion across the pre- and early Islamic Gulf between the 4th and the 9th centuries AD, on both the Persian and Arabian coasts.

Christians were the descendants of persecuted denominations and their local converts, especially Nestorians who emigrated from Byzantium and still practise their religion in modern Iran. At al-Qusur, on Failaka Island, an entire monastic centre has been excavated which included a three-nave basilica and monks’ cells as well as auxiliary buildings.10 Similar basilicas were also found on Kharg Island (Iran) and elsewhere,11 while on the Iranian mainland near the coast several rock-hewn cells may point to more Christian presence, although toponyms could also suggest Buddhism there. Christians and Buddhists alike were evidently familiar with the Indo-Iranian maritime routes, and they were often on the move between Mesopotamia and CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

27

the Levant on the one hand, and the Malabar coast of South India, on the other hand.

It seems that Gulf Christianity was strong enough to coexist for centuries with Islam, which had emerged in the Arabian interior in the 7th century. It took longer for these settled traders, the descendants of the Tilmunites, to convert to Islam than for the nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouin of Arabia. Even after conversion, people of eastern Arabia and the islands typically became Shia, as opposed to the Sunni majority elsewhere.

To this day, the local Shias of the entire region, not only Bahrain, call themselves “Bahrani” (pl. Baharna), as opposed to “Arab,” a term by which they also refer to the adherents of Sunni Islam. They also point out that their Arabic dialect is different from the one spoken by the Sunnis and that theirs might have been the indigenous dialect in the Gulf. If so, these Baharna might be the inheritors of the quickly fading pre-industrial, and even pre-Islamic, world of the Persian Gulf.

Boasting five thousand years of history, the last element of this world which is still lingering in living memory is pearl diving.12 The descendants of Tilmun fishers have been continuing their daring dives for the finest pearls until the middle of the 20th century, when industrialisation penetrated into the region and put an end to this business. Finally, as oil began its flow from below the seabed to shape our modern world, it was the turn of the old Gulf traditions to begin their descent into obsolescence.

ENDNOTES 1

Frank Hole: Studies in the Archaeological History of the

Deh Luran Plain: The Excavation of Chagha Sefid. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1977. 9.

2 Maurizio Tosi – Marcello Piperno: Lithic technology behind the ancient lapis trade. Expedition. 1973/1. 15–23.

3 Piotr Steinkeller: Trade routes and commercial networks in the Persian Gulf during the third millennium BC. In: Collection of Papers presented to the Third Biennial International Conference of the Persian Gulf (History, Culture, and Civilization). Tehran University, Tehran, 2013. 414–451.

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4

Jonathan M. Kenoyer: Socio-economic structures of the

Indus civilization as reflected in specialized crafts and the question of ritual segregation. In: Old Problems and New Perspectives in the Archaeology of South Asia, edited by Jonathan M. Kenoyer. Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1989. 183–192.

5

Henry T. Wright – Gregory A. Johnson: Population,

exchange, and early state formation in southwestern Iran.

American Anthropologist. 1975/June. 267–289.

6

Geoffrey Bibby: Looking for Dilmun. Alfred A. Knopf, New

York, 1969.

7

Marny Golding: Evidence for Pre-Seleucid occupation of

Eastern Arabia. Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies. 1974. 19–32.

8

Masatoshi A. Konishi [et al.]: Excavations in Bahrain and

Qatar, 1987/8. Gulf Archaeological Projects Report. Rikkyo University, Tokyo, 1989.

9

Kristian Jeppesen: Ikaros. The Hellenistic Settlement.

Volume 3. The Sacred Enclosure in the Early Hellenistic Period. Aarhus University Press, Århus, 1989.

10

Vincent Bernard – Jean-François Salles: Discovery of a

Christian Church at Al-Qusur, Failaka (Kuwait). Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies. 1991/. 7–21.

11

Marie-Joseph Stève [et al.]: L’île de Khārg. Une page de

l’histoire du Golfe Persique et du monachisme oriental.

Recherche et Publications, Neuchâtel, 2003.

12

Anita L. Burdett [ed.]: Records of the Persian Gulf Pearl

Fisheries, 1875–1962. Archive Editions Ltd, Cambridge, 1995.

INTERCOASTAL MIGRATION AND THE MULTILINGUAL LANDSCAPE OF THE GULF 1 Dénes Gazsi

The countries surrounding the turquoise waters that connect but also separate the Arabian Peninsula and Iran are home to the world’s top exporters of crude oil and hold the largest reserves of natural gas. These vast resources make the Gulf not only a major global economic artery but also one of the conflict zones of the world.

The ethnic, cultural, and linguistic tensions in the region are exemplified by the naming controversy concerning this body of water.

Numerous terms such as Persian Gulf, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Iran, Gulf of Basra, etc. have been used by divergent political and ideological interests. It tends to be expedient in the general perception of politics to assign specific languages and a sole cultural identity to individual nation states. Yet the countries around the Gulf intrinsically have a multicultural and frequently multilingual population. The fact that the official language of the Islamic Republic of Iran is Persian and the official language of all Arab Gulf States is Arabic does not reflect this heterogeneity. As a consequence, the neutral term without a qualifier, “the Gulf”, will be used throughout this study. The traditions of fishing, pearling, shipbuilding, and longdistance trade on the waterways of the Gulf have for centuries served as a vehicle for cultural exchange among the diverse ethnic and linguistic communities in the region, most notably the Persians and Arabs.2 PERSIANS IN ARABIA Before present-day nation states in the Gulf were born, flourishing trade activity generated a free movement of ethnic groups between the two coasts and even from as far as West India and East Africa. A good example of the free

movement is the foundation of the Bastakiya neighbourhood in Dubai in the 1890s (the contemporary official name of the district is Al Fahidi Historical Neighbourhood). Situated at the entryway to the Dubai Creek where merchant boats entered Dubai, this neighbourhood of mud houses, wind towers, and narrow, winding lanes was built by Persian-speaking immigrants from the city of Bastak. Bastak is located in Iran, in the Zagros Mountains, approximately 110 km north of the coastline opposite Abu Dhabi. Many residents of Bastak left their native homeland in the late 19th century due to harsh living conditions and droughts, the religious persecution that would have forced them to renounce their Sunni faith and convert to the official Shia Islam in Iran, and tax incentives offered by the ruling families on the Arabian coast. Having settled down in Dubai, people from Bastak formed the backbone of the burgeoning transregional commerce.

Not only residents of Bastak but a large number of people from other Iranian villages (Lamerd, Gerash, Ashkanan) emigrated to settlements along the Arabian shore of the Gulf. In addition to Sunni Persians from the Zagros Mountains, Shia Persians from Khuzestan (primarily from the city of Behbahan) and clans of the nomadic Lur population from the adjacent mountain ranges also settled down in present-day Kuwait and Bahrain. In the Arab Gulf States, this group of Persian migrants is collectively known as ʿAjam ( ‫)العجم‬. They carried their local Persian dialects, culture, and architecture with them to Arabia. Historically, ʿAjam is “the name given in medieval Arabic literature to the non-Arabs of the Islamic empire but applied especially to the Persians.”3 In the contemporary era, the ʿAjam are citizens of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman whose CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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Bastakiya neighbourhood in Dubai

families originally hail from Persia. Upon Kuwait’s independence from the British in 1961 and the independence of the rest of the Gulf States in 1971, the ʿAjam who registered with the newly formed nation state governments were granted citizenship. Since then, they have enjoyed generous government benefits and subsidies, similarly to their fellow citizens of Arab descent.

Since their arrival on the Arabian Peninsula over 120 years ago, most ʿAjam have assimilated into the Arabian cultural and linguistic landscape.4 The ʿAjam are by now deeply embedded in the fabric of Arabic societies of the Gulf States.

They dress as Arabs, hold positions in the government, they have become wealthy merchants and speak Arabic in their daily interactions with the Arab citizenry. Yet the ʿAjam still maintain their Persian ethnic identity on some level. They do so by listening to 30

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Persian music, watching Persian movies, and, most importantly, speaking Persian dialects (ʿAjamī) in the circle of family and friends.

Extended families tend to speak the dialect of the Iranian region their ancestors emigrated from. These dialects represent a crossover between Arabic and Persian, as they rely on Persian grammar but incorporate Arabic loanwords from Gulf Colloquial Arabic. The ʿAjam differentiate it from Standard Persian (Fārsī) as well as from both Standard and Colloquial Arabic. However, the level of Arabisation of the ʿAjam and their Persian language knowledge differ from generation to generation.5 ʿAjamī dialects are slowly disappearing among the younger generations.

Some ʿAjam have never visited Iran, while others regularly travel to the ancestral homeland for trade or leisure purposes.

Most societies in the Arab Gulf States have three major dividing lines based on social background, religion and ethnicity: 1) H . ad.ar ( ‫“ )الحضر‬city dwellers” & Badū ( ‫)البدو‬ “Bedouin” H . ad.ar: sedentary population (trade, artisanship, pearl diving, shipbuilding) Badū: non-sedentary population (camel breeding, animal husbandry, agriculture); 2) Sunni Muslims & Shia Muslims Shia Muslims constitute 30-40% of the Kuwaiti and 60% of the Bahraini population; 3) Ethnic Arabs & Ethnic non-Arabs (ʿAjam). Most ʿAjam families belong to the “Sedentary, Shia Muslims, ʿAjam” group, whereas a smaller percentage of them are “Sedentary, Sunni Muslims, ʿAjam.” The majority of the population in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, along with their respective ruling families, belong to the opposite side of the spectrum: “Bedouin, Sunni Muslims, Arabs.” Reliable statistics on the number of ʿAjam in Arab Gulf States is virtually non-existent, this topic being sensitive from a political, ethnic, social, and religious perspective. Regardless, last names are indicative of each family’s origin, and the locals are usually aware of the affiliation and background of other citizens.

Iranian expats who have arrived on the Arabian Peninsula since the 1960s and 1970s are generally excluded from discussions about the ʿAjam as they have not become naturalised citizens of Arab Gulf States and have not assimilated into the predominant Arabic culture.

ARABS IN PERSIA Another rarely discussed segment of the Gulf population that represents the historical free movement between the two coasts are Arabs exposed to Persianisation in Iran. The migration of Arab tribes from Eastern Arabia to the Iranian shoreline during the 18th and 19th centuries and their establishment of villages were extensively documented in government records drafted under the British Residency of the Persian Gulf.

According to documents and travelogues dating back to this period, Arab tribes inhabited most

fishing and pearling villages on the Iranian coast. British diplomat and colonial administrator J. G. Lorimer’s historical and geographical encyclopaedia, the Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia journaled his official travels along Iran’s Gulf coast (1908–1915), where he visited every settlement, listed the local Arab tribes and the number of their members. Towns with great strategic importance, such as Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, and a dozen islands dotted around the area, had become strongholds of Arabic culture by the early 20th century. At the turn of the 19th and 20th century, Bandar Lengeh and its surrounding lands were controlled by the Arab Qawāsim and the Marāzīq tribes, who earned their livelihood from charcoal and firewood trade throughout the Gulf region.6 In 1903, the town’s population of around 12,000 consisted of 5,000 Arabs and 5,000 Persians. According to Lorimer, Hūwala Arabs (his generic term for Arabs living on the Iranian coast) numbered approximately 14,000, spreading from the hinterland of the town of Bandar Kangan in the north as far as Bandar Abbas in the south. In contrast with the majority Shia Persians of Iran, these Arab tribes adhered to Sunni Islam.

Hengam, a calcareous island located immediately south of Qeshm Island in Iran, is a popular tourist destination for scuba divers, dolphin-, turtle-, and shark-watching trips. The island is merely six kilometres long and five kilometres wide but boasts a turbulent history with continued struggles by the Portuguese, the British, and the Sultanate of Muscat to gain control over its territory.7 At the beginning of the 20th century, however, the political allegiance of the island’s population was shaped by their tribal background. This is evident from a confidential report titled Position and Rights of His Majesty’s Government in the Island of Henjam, The Sheikh of Henjam and his Affairs, penned by the India Office of the British Government on 26 September 1928.8 Paragraph 3 reads: “The island, the only place of importance on which is the village of Henjam, an Arab settlement dependent principally on pearl fishing, is inhabited by Arabs belonging to the Beni Yas CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

31

tribe of the Arabian coast. The Beni Yas are said to have migrated to it from the Arabian coast about a century ago, with the permission of the Sultan of Muscat, at a time when Henjam was definitely claimed and administered by that State. They are reported consistently to have refused to acknowledge Persian sovereignty or to accept Persian nationality, and to have made it clear that they would rather leave Henjam than become Persian subjects. They have intermarried throughout with the Beni Yas of the Arabian coast; their commercial dealings and their pearling ventures are all connected with that tribe; their Sheikh is the father-in-law of the Trucial Sheikh of Dabai …”

The account elaborates that the island dwellers of Hengam at the time were members of the Banī Yās, a powerful tribal confederation who had ruled over vast territories from Dubai to Qatar. They were reluctant to accept Persian sovereignty and, instead, maintained extensive cultural and trade relations with their Arab kin on the Arabian Peninsula. The leaders of this confederation are the Āl Nahyān from the al-Falāḥī section of the Banī Yās, current rulers of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The second most significant branch of the Banī Yās is the Āl Maktūm from the al-Falāsī section, current rulers of the Emirate of Dubai.

Since Lorimer’s extensive descriptions, barely any information has been gathered and published about Arabs on the Iranian Gulf coast. The vibrant Arab culture began to fade when, during the 20th century, economic and political trends strengthened the reconfiguration of the longstanding ethnic composition of the Iranian coastline. Contributing factors, among others, were the lucrative job opportunities in the developing oil industry in Arabia, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s decree in 1936 to ban all types of female veils and several varieties of traditional male garments (Kašf al-H . ijāb or “Uncovering of the Veil”),9 and the “Persianisation” policy during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, which emphasised and propagated Iran’s Persian ethnic identity. These factors propelled waves of Arab migration to their original homeland on the Arabian Peninsula, 32

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

where they could easily adapt to the dominant Arabic culture and receive schooling in their mother tongue.

A widespread term to designate Arabs on the Iranian coast, and especially those who have returned to the Arabian Peninsula, is Hōla (in Arabic ‫هولة‬, variously transcribed as Hula, Huwala, Hūwala or Hawala).10 Contemporary Arabs with a background on both coasts prefer the endonyms “Arabs of the Coast” (ʿArab al-Sāḥil), “Arabs of the Eastern Coast” (ʿArab al-Sāḥil al-Šarqī), “Arabs of the Persian Land” (ʿArab Barr Fāris), or “Arabs of Persia” (ʿArab Fāris). Many Arabs who returned to Arabia set up residence in al-Mirfaʾ, a small town 160 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi. Al-Mirfaʾ had been a fishing and pearling village with direct connections to the Iranian side of the Gulf well before Sheikh Zayed, the founder of the UAE, implemented extensive development projects beginning in the 1970s. His goal with al-Mirfaʾ was to provide the “Arabs of the Coast” with permanent housing that resembled the small-town atmosphere of their settlements across the waterways of the Gulf.

Since the mid-2000s, technological advances and broader internet accessibility have offered unprecedented resources for the Arabs on the Iranian side of the Gulf to document their language, culture, and heritage. The “Arabs of the Coast” are making a concerted effort to reclaim and maintain their Arabic roots and identity by engaging in a growing social media activity. Through this activity, they intend to send life signals to their fellow tribesmen in Arabia and the rest of the world. The younger generations of these Arabs are bilingual in Arabic and Persian, while the older generations may only understand Arabic. The “Arabs of the Coast” constitute a diverse community, where residents of every Arab village on the Iranian coast may have a different tribal affiliation and a diverging set of ties to the Arabian Peninsula. The level of Persianisation among them is not particularly high, as “Arabs of the Coast” refuse to associate themselves with the Persian national and Shia religious identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

They feel that their culture and language are

Al-Mirfa

firmly rooted in Arabia. At the same time, “Arabs of the Coast” often discuss online that Gulf Arabs have an inclination to consider them as ʾAjam “non-Arabs, Persians,” judging from the fact that they were born in Iran and might also speak Persian. “Arabs of the Coast” claim that this approach disregards their tribal and religious background. “Arabs of the Coast” in Iran speak various dialects of Gulf Colloquial Arabic that varies from village to village, depending on the area of the Arabian Peninsula from which the tribe originally emigrated.

LANGUAGES OF OMAN The linguistic diversity further south along the Arabian coastline expands beyond the already complex Persian–Arabic dichotomy. The Sultanate of Oman hosts an astounding range of languages in addition to Arabic. Three Modern South Arabian languages, Shehri

(also known as Jibbali), Hobyot, and Mehri, are spoken along the coast in Southern Oman, in Dhofar Governorate. Speakers of the latter two can also be found westwards across the border from Yemen. Bathari, an Afro-Asiatic language, appears on the southeastern Omani coast facing the Khuriya Muriya Islands, while Harsusi, an endangered Semitic language, is present in the villages of a stony desert in south central Oman.

Kumzari, a southwestern Iranian language also spoken on Larak Island in Iran, is native to the Kumzar coast on the Musandam Peninsula in Northern Oman. Balochi, a northwestern Iranian language autochthonous to the Balochistan region that encompasses the borderlands of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, is widely spoken in Oman. Swahili, a Bantu language of the African Great Lakes region, is also attested among the Omani population. The presence of Balochi and CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

33

Swahili is the result of the historical influence of the Sultanate of Muscat (17th–19th centuries) that extended across the Strait of Hormuz to modern-day Pakistan and its strong trade relations with Zanzibar.

8

Richard N. Schofield (ed.): Islands and Maritime

Boundaries of the Gulf, vol. 7: 1920–1930. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. 545.

9

Homa Katouzian: State and Society In Iran. The Eclipse of

the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis. I.B. Tauris, London – New York, 2000. 335–337.

ADDITIONAL LANGUAGES Although Persian and Arabic are the only official languages in the countries surrounding the Gulf, millions of expats from around the world who may not have learned Arabic reside and work in the Arab Gulf States. They speak their primary language(s) within their communities and use English as a bridge language (lingua franca).

The main countries these expats hail from are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, thereby making Urdu, Hindi, Bengali, Malayalam, Tagalog, etc. significant vehicles of communication among the multicultural population of the entire Gulf region.

ENDNOTES 1

For being a linguistic article, this piece uses the Hans

Wehr transliteration of the Arabic alphabet.

2

Husayn Nūrbakhš: Banādir-i Īrān dar Khalīj-i Fārs. Daftar-i

Pažūhišgāh-i Farhangī, Teheran, 2003. 10.

3

C. E. Bosworth: “ʿAjam.” In: Encyclopædia Iranica, vol. I,

fasc. 7. Encyclopædia Iranica Foundation, New York, 1984.

700–701. An updated version is available at <https://bit.ly/ 2kp89lQ > Accessed: 25 August 2019.

4

Mohammad E. Alhabib: The Shia Migration from

Southwestern Iran to Kuwait: Push-Pull Factors during the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. MA Thesis.

Georgia State University, Atlanta, 2010. 59. <https://bit. ly/2lZd0KX > Accessed: 25 August 2019.

5

Hanan Taqi: Two Ethnicities, Three Generations: Phono-

logical Variation and Change in Kuwait. PhD Thesis. Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010. 90.

6

John Gordon Lorimer: Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf,

ʼOmān, and Central Arabia, vol. II B. Gregg International Publishers, Westmead. 1098.

7

Lorimer, vol. II A, 629–633; Willem Floor: The Persian Gulf.

The Rise and Fall of Bandar-e Lengeh. Mage Publishers, Washington, 2010. 56, 145, 150.

34

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10

J. Ḫ. Al-Anṣārī: Tārīḫ ʿArab al-Haula wa al-ʿUtūb.

Al-Dār al-ʿArabīya li al-Mausūʿāt, Beirut, 2011. 48.; Ahmed al-Dailami: “Purity and Confusion”: The Hawala between Persians and Arabs in the Contemporary Gulf. In: The Persian Gulf in Modern Times. People, Ports, and History, edited by Lawrence G. Potter. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014.

301–302.

ISLAM AND POLITICS IN THE GULF Ádám Éva

INTRODUCTION Islam plays an important role in the Arab Gulf states’ and Iran’s societies and politics, and the Gulf, as the locus of the holiest places of Islam, has always played a central role in the global Muslim community’s life both spiritually and in practice. The bond between the local and the global is the pilgrimage to Mecca, an example of orthopraxis, which is in stark contrast with the evolutionary nature of the Islam preached and practised in the everyday life and politics of each and every state of the Gulf. The official Islam of Saudi Arabia has its roots in the Wahhabi socio-religious movement of the 18th century; however, the legitimacy of the institutions based on that movement’s ideas has constantly been re-examined throughout the modern age and has recently been reformed.

In general, Islam and politics in the Gulf is a discourse between tradition and modernity, as well as tolerance and intolerance towards the religiously other. The latter is most evidently manifested in the Sunni–Shia divide. In Saudi Arabia, these discourses are fairly recognisable even by English speakers, as these conflicts are highly mediatised both in English and Arabic.

Bahrain is a country whose heritage is connected to both its location and the Iranian culture. The country’s colonialist past granted its Sunni minority population a dominant position over its Shia majority, which is the source of political tension. Kuwaiti society and politics are not affected by the Sunni and Shia divide as much as those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but intolerance has become a subject of everyday politics since the Arab Spring. Qatar, similarly to Saudi Arabia, has its religious tradition rooted in the Wahhabi movement, but the state did not institutionalise Islam in a similar way as Saudi rulers did. The United Arab Emirates is in a unique place among Gulf

monarchies, as it has a significant Iranian community and a history with the Muslim Brotherhood, while, most recently, it recognised the importance of ecumenism in its international relations. Oman is the home of Ibadism, a unique branch of Islam, which provides a special character to the sultanate that plays a pacifist role in the Arab and Islamic world.

While this heterogeneity of Islam in Gulf societies and non-democratic politics might be sufficient to cause permanent turmoil and quarrels, Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy and the Sunni–Shia divide in Iraq are extra spoilers of Gulf foreign and security policies. Thus, from the perspective of Islam and politics, Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf monarchies definitely belong to the same complex.

SAUDI ARABIA: DEALING WITH THE WAHHABI HERITAGE Since the first Saudi state of 1744, state–society relations in Saudi Arabia have always been impacted and affected by international politics and globalisation, as the kingdom has parallelly been governed by dogmatist and pragmatist elites. While, most frequently, the Saudi state’s political culture is simply referred to as Wahhabism, this homogenisation overshadows the constant struggle between the prodevelopment and pro-regression elites.

The modern Saudi state was built on a religious doctrine which traces its roots back to the conservative legal school of Hanbaliyya and the Hanbalist theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. Between the mid-1700s and early-1900s, the brethren of the Al Saud and the Wahhabis struggled to create an ideal Islamic state which enforces the rigidity propagated by the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance. In theory, both the political and religious leaders of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement agreed on the necessity of returning to the original CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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The Black Stone, the most venerated symbol of Islam

faith of the Muslim ancestors. This retrogression entailed the destruction of any novelty they considered anti-Islam, such as the veneration of saints or any theologically or legally unsubstantiated acts of worshipping, including the whole doctrine of the Shia who were deemed apostates.1 However, this doctrinaire vision and its limited objectives would have been insufficient to draw political profit from the new geopolitical environment after World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. The new opportunities of the new set-up were well recognised by Abdulaziz ibn Saud, first ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (est. 1932), who departed from his doctrinaire followers in the 1920s. The Ikhwan forces (the followers of the strict rules of Wahhabism) criticised the founder of the kingdom for three of his major policies that they deemed anti-Islam: his collaboration with non-Islamic states; his lenience in accepting novelties in society; and his choice to co-opt the Shia tribes.2 Although the ruler defeated the Ikhwan forces, he also institutionalised 36

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Wahhabism as the official political culture of Saudi Arabia in the forms of the religious morality police, the ulema councils, and the judiciary. Thus, although the King of Saudi Arabia has remained the highest authority of Wahhabi Islam to date, which provides him with unlimited freedom in his decisions, this embeddedness of the doctrinaire forces in the state bureaucracy has always put checks and limits on his â&#x20AC;&#x153;adventurousness.â&#x20AC;? The innovations of King Faisal, who is remembered as the ruler who instituted modern and secular reforms, caused mass protests, and he was eventually killed by one of his relatives for his liberal policies.

Although the Saudi monarchs, be they liberal or regressive, have always got religious justification for their decisions from the stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s religious establishment, the Saudi society produced opposition forces that repeatedly demanded more lenience or more conservativism. The official relations with the United States is a case in point. While many consider this relationship a question of development and security, others

criticise it for being a blunt example for the ruler’s anti-Islam and pro-globalisation stance.

The issue of the Shia of Saudi Arabia is another apt example. The state is criticised by international actors for its wrongful treatment of the Shia minority on the one hand, while, on the other, the conservative groups still consider minority policies and the co-optation of the Shia anti-Islam (anti-Wahhabism).

The reign of King Salman, current ruler of Saudi Arabia, and the policies of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman aim at ending this struggle between the pro-development and pro-regression elites. The country faces neverseen economic challenges, and, consequently, the ruler deemed necessary to welcome the effects and products of globalisation and the Western powers as their carriers. Moreover, the monarch felt necessary to not only deal with the country’s Shia minority but co-opt the Shia anywhere in Saud Arabia’s neighbourhood, provided that it serves the country’s interests in the changing geopolitical environment.3 King Salman’s Saudi Arabia is embedded in the international political and economic community to an extent never seen during their predecessor’s reigns. In order to avoid the challenges to his legitimacy as a religious leader, King Salman is defying the authority and freedom of the religious elite. The ruler curtailed the authority of the religious police, reshuffled the ranks and files of the official preachers, and deprived the reform-minded preachers of their freedom of speech or physical movement.4 These decisions do not mean that the religious establishment and the ruler got on a total collision course; what we witness is the ruler reclaiming the authority over forming the narrative on the country’s religious discourse.

IRAN AND IRAQ: SHIA REGIONALISM AWAKENS Iran and Iraq, in some way or another, have always posed an existential threat to the Gulf monarchies by questioning the legitimacy of the Al Saud’s custodianship over the holy places in Mecca and Medina. They did this either as secular military powers or by force of their Shiite

identity politics. Iran’s secular regime, the Shah’s monarchy, was the first to collapse in 1979, after which the country wanted to export its Islamic revolution to the secular states of the MENA region, where Sunni movements and parties had been waiting for their moment to execute an Islamic revolution. Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolution did inspire not only Shiites in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, who then protested on the streets, prompting government crackdowns, but also the kingdom’s Sunni Islamists, who, in the same year of the Iranian revolution, seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in hopes of unseating the Saudi royal family.5 Realising that, for decades, they neglected the religious piety of their subjects and lost some credibility as the custodians of the holy places of Islam both at home and abroad, the Saudi royal family hastily reframed their public image.

The Saudi rulers took the official title of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques (Mecca and Medina) and started to export their Islamic ideology throughout the world through religious organisations, schools, and mosques built or created by the state and operated by the Wahhabi religious establishment, without realising that this will create a backlash against them in the form of radical Islamism. The Iranian revolution, thus, did not create radicalism but, in large part, provided for the resurrection of Wahhabi fundamentalism within the Saudi society, which was exported to the Soviet–Afghan War, Lebanon, Bosnia, and elsewhere from the 1980s.

It soon became very clear that Iran’s Islamic revolution created a system ill-suited for adaptation in the realm of secular Arab states with Sunni character. Within the Iranian republic itself, a debate about the country’s Islamic nature erupted right after the revolution, which was ended by the constitutional enactment of the traditional clergy’s leading role in the Islamic republic’s political system. The socio-political restructuring following the clergy’s ascendance to power has left the clerical class in complete control of all the major organs of the state.6 From that point on, the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution and Islamic state became two separate things. While the ideology of the CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

37

The dome of the shrine of Hussein Bin Ali in the Iraqi city of Karbala, the holiest place of Shia Islam

Islamic revolution (the idea of an Islamic, egalitarian state) is still sacrosanct amongst the revolutionaries, and they see the echoes of the revolution in the world’s great events (Arab Spring, Wall Street movement, etc.),7 the state apparatus is struggling to adapt its values to politics within an international system which is antagonistic towards the Islamic state of Iran as either a principle or an entity. Both components, ideology and politics, were translated into state policies. Iran’s commitment to the revolution is upheld by its Islamic internationalism and, most importantly, its support to the Palestinian resistance movements.

Speaking of politics, Iran’s domestic and foreign policies have always been shaped by its pariah status in the regional and global political and economic systems and geopolitics. After 9/11, a threat and an opportunity defined these policies. The USA became militarily more entrenched in Iran’s neighbourhood (i.e., in Afghanistan and Iraq), posing an existential threat to Iran. On the other hand, the Arab Spring’s effects in the Levant and the Gulf 38

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

created an opportunity for the Shia majorities and minorities (that were previously oppressed) to claim political suffrage through either peaceful or armed resistance. American domestic politics and the events in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have favoured the Iranians, who extended their political and military outreach throughout the region to the detriment of American and Gulf Arab influence. Iran’s strategic approach in the Middle East has focused on supporting Shia non-state clients who have greatly helped Iran expand its regional influence, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.8 This strategic self-defence and military opportunism of the Iranian regime is, for the most part, schematised in both the Western and Middle Eastern public discourse as Shia identity politics and hegemonic endeavours.

THE SMALL STATES OF THE GULF: LIMITED CHOICES The small monarchies of the Gulf region—namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates—do live in constant existential

uncertainty in the neighbourhood of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, three regional middle powers with competitive economic and military capabilities.9 Therefore, their limited choices allow them very little freedom, while they either bandwagon with one of the middle powers or pursue separate ways within the red lines set by their big brothers.

The Gulf states with an Arab identity found a platform which united them in the shape of the Gulf Cooperation Council (est. 1981). However, this unity diminished with time, and Pan-Islamic issues and Muslim identity politics replaced the Pan-Arab sentiment by our time.

After the Arab Spring, popular, revisionist, and radical Islamist movements destabilised Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain, and only the latter could be stabilised by the ancien régime. The remaining three countries have fallen prey to the sectarianised conflict. Bahrain is home to the largest per capita Shia population (75% of the population), mostly of Iranian origin; therefore, it has always been the most exposed to Iranian influence amongst the other small Gulf monarchies. A 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia opposition to the Sunni-minority-led regime of Bahrain’s Al Khalifa ruling family has since subsided, but punishments of oppositionists and periodic demonstrations continue.10 Bahrain is still blaming Iran for inciting the monarchy’s Shia majority to resist, and, therefore, Bahrain is in the group of countries that actively blocks any Iranian influence in Gulf politics.

Kuwait has the second largest per capita Shia population (about 30%) in the Gulf, and it was also exposed to religious sectarianism after the Arab Spring. While the Shia of Kuwait were oppressed in the 1980s, during the Iran–Iraq War, due to their susceptibility to the Iranian revolutionary sentiment, they were rehabilitated after they had sided with the Kuwaiti government during Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Nonetheless, sectarianism has always existed in Kuwait in multiple areas and forms and among different classes, and it reached alarming levels in the aftermath of the mass uprising in Bahrain.11 This escalation was also the result of the lack of Kuwaiti state legislation on discriminatory political statements regarding ethnic and religious

minorities. However, in the aftermath of the 2015 attack on Shia mosques in Kuwait by Salafi radicals, the acts of fraternity between the Sunni and Shia communities proved that sectarianism was not inherent in the Kuwaiti society, and it is incited by actors with a certain political agenda either at home or abroad.12 The UAE traditionally has good ties with Iran and, thus, has a large Shia community while it has a troubled relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Iran’s geopolitical ascendency in the Gulf and its neighbourhood and the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in 2012 moved the UAE’s government to securitise both the Shia and the Muslim Brotherhood in its territory. Besides its continuing crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated groups at home and abroad, Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy has become increasingly aggressive in terms of countering perceived Islamist menaces either in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Syria.13 The UAE’s discord with the Shia and Iran has largely manifested in economic terms without including sectarian aggression or violence. While most of the UAE’s foreign policies is built on antagonistic ideas, in the last couple of years, the country has come out as a propagator of religious tolerance and ecumenism and nurtured a good working relationship with the Christian state of the Vatican.

Qatar is notorious for supporting the Brotherhood and its offshoots in Doha. Qatar has provided the organisation with financial, media, and diplomatic support, also through the Qatari-owned satellite network, Al Jazeera.

Qatar is also home to prominent Brotherhood leaders, such as the group’s spiritual leader, Yusuf al-Qaradawi.14 Therefore, the failure of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood government had backlashed against Qatar and created a fracture between Saudi Arabia and the small monarchy.

This split led to a discord between the members of the GCC and deepened the geopolitical insecurity largely caused by the antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

CONCLUSION In each and every Gulf state, Islam plays an important role in the domestic and foreign policy CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

39

as either an evolutionary or a reactionary element.

Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam, and, in the last 250 years, a unique synthesis between the political and religious leadership has evolved under the banner of Wahhabism. Due to external and internal pressures, the Saudi state needed to challenge both its domestic religious opposition and Iran’s revolutionary ideas after the 1979 Islamic revolution. This antagonism between the Saudi and Iranian states resulted in the evolution of radical Islamism, which backlashed mostly against the Saudi state. The changing geopolitical environment in the Gulf’s neighbourhood motivated Iran to pursue regional politics under a Shia banner which schematised every move Iran took in the public discourse. Saudi Arabia also found itself in a turbulent geopolitical environment with its large Shia community and its massive religious establishment. While it pursues some sectarian policies, the country prioritised the renewal of its religious discourse and the restriction of the independence of its religious establishment. The small Gulf states have their own issues regarding the Sunni–Shia divide, while Qatar’s adventurism provided for a split within the GCC community and deepened the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As we can see, the debate on tradition and change and the Sunni–Shia divide play an important role in Gulf politics.

ENDNOTES 1

Wahhābī. Encyclopædia Britannica. 14 December 2018.

<https://bit.ly/2BgNQfc > Accessed: 8 October 2019.

2

See Alexei Vassiliev: The History of Saudi Arabia. Saqi

Books, London, 2013. Chap. 12: Increased Centralization and the Ikhwan Movement (1926–1934).

3

Erika Solomon: Sunni Saudi Arabia courts an ally in Iraq’s

Shia. Financial Times. 23 April 2018. <https://on.ft.com/ 2Mn3jAB > Accessed: 8 October 2019.

4

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen – Annelle R. Sheline: Mohammed

bin Salman and Religious Authority and Reform in Saudi Arabia. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Issue 40

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

brief no. 09.19.19. <https://bit.ly/2nR4oag > Accessed: 11 October 2019.

5

Stephen Rakowski: How the 1979 Siege of Mecca Haunts

the House of Saud. Stratfor. 2 July 2017. <https://bit. ly/2GDMLCm > Accessed: 11 October 2019.

6

Riaz Hassan: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: Before and after

the Revolution. Third World Quarterly. 1984/July. 675–686.

7

Khamenei: Arab Revolts Sign Of ‘Islamic Awakening’.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 4 February 2011. <https:// bit.ly/32pjJOK > Accessed: 13 October 2019.

8

Afshon Ostovar: Sectarian Dilemmas in Iran Foreign

Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30 November 2016. <https://bit.ly/2PRwrPc > Accessed: 13 October 2019.

9

See the chapter written by Máté Szalai in this volume of

In Focus.

10

Kenneth Katzman: Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S.

Policy. CRS Report 95-1013. 20 August 2019.

11

Mona Kareem: Shiaphobia Hits Kuwait. Jadaliyya. 17 May

2011. <https://bit.ly/2VTUHVl > Accessed: 13 October 2019.

12

Ibrahim Al-Marash: Shattering the myths about Kuwaiti

Shia. Aljazeera. 30 June 2015. <https://bit.ly/2GSI9bu > Accessed: 13 October 2019.

13

Giorgio Cafiero: The UAE Campaign Against Political

Islam: Implications For London. LobeLog. 27 December 2018. <https://bit.ly/2AcKEBh >Accessed: 13 October 2019.

14

Muslim Brotherhood in Qatar. Counter Extremism Project.

<https://bit.ly/2MOVtyR > Accessed: 14 October 2019.

UNDERSTANDING IRAN: AN IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE ON FORTY YEARS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC Mehran Haghirian

INTRODUCTION Home to more than two millennia of history, Iran has gone through major transformations in its geography, religion, political system, societal composition, and external relations. The 1979 revolution was one of the most consequential events in Iran’s modern history that had wide-ranging and far-reaching impacts on the country’s domestic and foreign policies.1 For more than forty years, analysts and government officials from around the world have strived and struggled to understand the society, political ideologies, and foreign policy of modern Iran.

This article aims to shed light on the realities of today’s Iran from an Iranian perspective.

Viewing Iran through a reductionist prism ignores the fact that the country has not only survived the past forty years under intense international pressures, but the relatively new political system has matured and adapted at every single significant moment in its modern history. Societal diversity in Iran has increasingly strengthened the country as opposed to the fragmentations witnessed all around the region.

The ideological approaches to domestic and foreign policies of the first decade after the

Men holding Khomeini’s portrait during the 1978 Iranian Revolution

revolution have been gradually replaced by pragmatism and the rational pursuit of national interests in the past thirty years. Importantly, the diverse societal composition and the prioritisation of pragmatism has allowed for a diversified foreign policy and decision-making processes under each government. This article explains these realities with the hopes of expanding the international debates on Iran to achieve a more sensible understanding of this ever-important country.

SOCIETAL DIVERSITY Iran is a country of minorities where each corner of the country has a relatively unique ethnic composition. From the Gilaks and Turkamans in the north, to the Balouch in the southwest, the Arabs in the south, Kurds in the west, Azeris in the northwest, as well as Persians and dozens of other ethnicities all around the country, Iran has one of the most diverse populations in the region and, indeed, around the world.

Furthermore, even though the country’s state religion under the Constitution is Shi’a Islam, there are active Christian, Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Sunni Muslim populations that have been recognised in the Constitution as having the same rights as the Shiites, with freedom to practise their religion, have representatives in the country’s parliament (Majles), and serve in various governmental posts.

There have been dozens of reports on the situation of ethnic or religious minorities in Iran, which have often viewed the issue through a reductionist prism. What is important to understand is that the various ethnic groups in Iran are no longer situated in one particular region and have been dispersed all around the country since the early 20th century. This fact CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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The Iranian parliament, the Majles

alone illustrates that, even though, in some cases, the small majority in one particular area might be of one ethnicity, there are also various co-existing ethnic groups. Denying the fact that Persians, or any other ethnic group, are living as life partners, neighbours, friends, and co-workers with the Arab population of Ahwaz, the Balouch people of Bushehr, or the Azeris in Tabriz is diluting the realities of modern Iran. Each ethnic group is an integral part of Iran, and, rather than seeing each as a separate group, one must realise that the combination of all these groups form what is known as Iran today.

Many analysts have focused on presenting these ethnic groups, particularly the Balouchis and Arabs in the southeast and southwest of Iran, as minorities in struggle for economic, political, and social rights. The predominant argument is that these regions are less developed when compared to Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz, the top five metropolises in Iran, through a narrative that the government has forgotten their plight. The reality, however, is quite different. Since the 1979 revolution, there has been a renewed focus on those living in poverty and in impoverished areas of the country in accordance with the slogans of the revolution and the promises of Imam Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader of the revolution. Despite the fact that the country was at war with Iraq for the most part of the first decade and has been under intense international sanctions since its inception, development in all areas of the country has continuously been a key priority of every leader of the executive 42

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

branch of the government in particular, and the entire political establishment in general.

Even though the country has witnessed a number of terrorist attacks in the past forty years, Iran has one of the most stable and secure domestic environments in the region.

While there are some small separatist groups that have illustrated their desire for independence, none have a large support base inside the country. Rather, they are constantly pushed and supported by outside forces. The majority of Arabs in Ahwaz, Baluchis in Bushehr, Azeris in Tabriz, Gilakis in Rasht, and Kurds in Kermanshah identify themselves as Iranians because being Iranian refers to the land they live in, the land they sacrifice their lives for during wars, and the land they all view as their ancient homeland for thousands of years.

For millennia, and particularly in the last century, the diverse and dynamic society in Iran has been debating domestic and foreign policies and, unlike the majority of countries in the region, the Iranian people have been the key source for the transformations that have taken place in the country. Because of the diverse nature of the society, there have been constant, and seemingly never-ending, debates on the level or type of religiosity, nationalism, social justice, and foreign and security policies of the presiding government at any given period. This societal diversity has led to diverse political ideologies in the country and, as such, varying types of governance and domestic and foreign policies under different leaders.

DIVERSE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES By looking at the nationalist and religious sentiments in Iran and the social construct of the Iranian identity, one sees that the leaders of the Islamic Republic have not been, and are not, monolithic, and there have been differing approaches to both domestic and foreign policies. Since the early days of the revolution and after the war with Iraq or during the prolonged nuclear negotiations, multiple groups, organisations, and political parties have emerged with different views and varied levels of influence.

While the majority of these groups and their

members abide by the core principles of the revolution, the Velayat-e Faqih, and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, they differ in their long-term outlook for Iran. Aside from the role of the Supreme Leader, the President and his cabinet have increasingly influenced and altered Iran’s non-strict principles in various ways since the early days of the Islamic Republic.

Since 1981, Iran, unlike the majority of the countries in the immediate region, has succeeded in achieving stability in its political system and has not witnessed any coups or government resignations. The relatively newly established political system has managed to secure peaceful transition of power within the system, be it the office of the Supreme Leader or positions in the executive and legislative branches of the government. Iran’s system of governance has both core attributes and flexible ones, which generate different approaches toward different countries, based on established red lines and the leadership style of different presidents. In other words, while there is an established framework that all leaders of the Islamic Republic observe, there is a wide gap between the approaches of different leaders. Even though the country has experienced chaotic periods, whether during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War or the uprisings in response to the contested 2009 presidential elections, the institutions and political structure of the Islamic Republic have not shaken. Rather, the country has continuously, yet unhurriedly, adapted and matured to the demands of modern times.

While it is clear that ideology took centre stage following the 1979 revolution and during the ensuing eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, pragmatism has largely prevailed in the past three decades. Through the change in leadership following the passing of Imam Khomeini, there has been a dramatic shift in Iranian policy and decision-making process. Since Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Rafsanjani assumed their respective offices in 1989, “pragmatism, professionalism and national interests have come to the fore,” without ideology being abandoned as “a frame of reference.” 2 The Islamic Republic established a series of

ideological red lines that continue to dominate decision-making processes and constrain the implementation of radical changes and reforms.

However, as Hunter argues, the realisation that the undue and costly “emphasis on achieving vague Islamically oriented ideological goals,” which rarely served to secure immediate national interests, forced the Islamic Republic to move towards de-ideologisation.3 DIVERSIFIED FOREIGN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES Iran, according to Salem, is justified in assuming a leading role in the region and on the international stage because of its geostrategic location, vast natural resources, defiance of the United States, scientific and technological advancements, and Islamic revival.4 In the same vein, Hadian believes that Iran is “the most important linkage state in the Middle East,” for reasons of “geography, history, ambition, and a jealously guarded sense of independence.”5 Based on these facts, Iran is central to nearly all issues of importance to the region, including nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy, Persian Gulf security, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and the future of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Afghanistan.6 Iran has fifteen neighbouring countries, seven by land borders and eight through the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. What is even more staggering than the number of neighbours is that Iran is situated in one of the most diverse neighbourhoods in the world. While not included in any of the formal groups of countries, Iran is a gateway to and from Central Asia, Caucasus, Europe, the Indian subcontinent, and the Arab states of the broader Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. As such, Iran is compelled to utilise its geostrategic position to advance its national interests in addition to contributing to preserving stability and security in its immediate region.

The objectives and determinants of Iran’s foreign policy were framed in the early days of the revolution with particular attention to Islamic principles, opposition to imperialism and Western interference, and Imam Khomeini’s personal views on Iran, Islam, and the world.

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Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution

Since 1989, and as a result of the changes in the leadership cadre, the maturation of the Islamic Republic’s determinants, objectives, and the understanding of national interests, coupled with the shifting geopolitics of the region, the Islamic Republic has moved away from expressing desires for exporting the revolution towards aiming for the establishment of strong and durable foreign relations. Many scholars attest that early enthusiastic and reactionary policies of the revolution have been replaced by pragmatic consideration following the sobering realities of years in power. While the revolutionary intent dictated the Islamic Republic’s general outward approach, Menashri argues, the “actual realities have often forced a somewhat greater realism” and an emphasis on the interests of the state as opposed to an “ideological crusade.”7 He goes so far as to say that, with few exceptions, “whenever ideological convictions have clashed with the interests of the state—as prescribed by the ruling elite— state interests ultimately have superseded revolutionary dogma in both foreign relations and domestic politics.”8 Similarly, Ramazani argues that “in every major period of Iranian history the dictate of circumstances has forced 44

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Iranian foreign policy-makers to interpret their religious ideology pragmatically in order to advance the state interests.”9 The war between Iran and Iraq that started a year after the establishment of the Islamic Republic continues to greatly influence its foreign policy formulation. The legacy of the Iran–Iraq War has arguably been the dominant force behind Iran’s policies on the three subsequent major regional events, including the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein, and the Arab uprisings since 2010, and also its security policies following the resurfacing of extremist and terrorist organisations since 2013.

Additionally, the increasing involvement and presence of the United States in the Persian Gulf since 1991 has been, and continues to be, a clear nuisance for the Islamic Republic, and, as Ambassador Mousavian argues, “Iran’s major security threat is the United States military presence in the region and all around the Iranian borders.”10 The way Iran perceives American presence in the region has largely framed its foreign policy approach to regional and international issues since 1979. The contentions between Iran and the United States at the time of the revolution, the subsequent hostage crisis, and the Iran–Iraq War further strengthened the Islamic Republic’s ideological and political opposition to the United States. Once one of the most important allies of the United States, the Shah’s ouster forced a change in US policy in the region, leading to increased partnerships and collaborations with the GCC countries.

Consequently, the United States military presence in the Persian Gulf and the sale of military equipment to GCC states are a primary Iranian concern. As stated by Ambassador Sohrabi: “The West, and particularly the United States, have not increased their presence in the Persian Gulf for the sake of helping the countries.”11 He argues that “more than one hundred military ships in the Persian Gulf is to augment the sales of military equipment to countries that do not have the expertise required to even handle them, but rather, it is intended to further perpetuate conflict in the region.”12

The peoples of Iran

The fact that some leaders and official government representatives view Iran as an irrational actor stems from viewing rationality in their own terms, expecting reasonability rather than factoring in Iran’s national interests.

Kenneth Pollack illustrates in his book that Iran “has been not just rational but prudent, pushing forward when it sees an opportunity, backing off when it sees dangers.”13 As survival and advancement of national interests are the most important elements of rationality in international affairs, Iran’s geostrategic location forces the adoption of policies that are counter to the interests of those who view Iranian leaders as messianic. How rationality is defined by Iran or any other country depends solely on national interests and a cost–benefit analysis of actions.

Rationality does not equate to being reasonable nor adhering to an established norm. Goals, values, and principles of countries are often viewed counter to those of other nations, even though they may be completely rational.

With regards to the decision-making calculus in Iran for both domestic and foreign policies, most scholars and analysts argue that the Supreme Leader has the ultimate say on Iran’s foreign policy and insist that no other factor or person has the power to alter his position.

Al Dosari, for example, argues that Iranian foreign policy has not and will not change, because of the superseding power of the Supreme Leader.

Al Dosari insists that the presidents follow their predecessors’ policy with “slightly different tactics,” while adhering to the overall approach of Ayatollah Khamenei, “as the Supreme Leader is the one who is responsible for steering Iranian foreign policy.”14 This argument, however, falls flat when varying approaches by different presidents are considered, and, as Shabani and Rouhi assert, politics “is never that simple in the Islamic Republic,” since Iranian decision-making process “resembles a pentagon, rather than a pyramid.”15 Simply put, one cannot ignore the number of individuals, institutions, ministries, parastatal CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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groups, and factors such as public opinion that have a strong influence on the decision-making processes in the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s foreign policy is increasingly driven by the presidency and the flexibility it allows through transition of power. After assuming the office of the presidency in 1989, Ayatollah Rafsanjani gradually adopted reformist policies in the face of growing systemic opposition, and, while “these political manoeuvres in many ways reflected personal rivalries,” according to Ansari, they also “reflect different approaches to politics.”16 As a result, Iran’s foreign policy changed from confrontational to constructive cooperation, and Iran once again started to engage the international community after almost a decade of isolation.17 The pragmatic foreign policy of the Islamic Republic continued during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, a reformist who further enhanced the image of the Islamic Republic on the international stage. President Khatami campaigned on a platform for democratisation, dialogue, and domestic and foreign reforms, and was elected with overwhelming popular support in 1997. Khatami’s approach was viewed as counter to the inherent conservative, revolutionary, and ideological policies of the Islamic Republic. In foreign policy, President Khatami was successful in three major areas: proposing the dialogue among civilisations at the United Nations, defusing the tensions over Iran’s nuclear program (until the end of his presidency), and, more importantly, solidifying the overtures to the Arab states that started under President Rafsanjani. In 2005, however, Iran’s foreign relations and policies once again shifted dramatically with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Islamic Republic’s ideological, revolutionary, and confrontational policies resurfaced afresh, and, according to Maloney, “Ahmadinejad’s presidency reversed the trajectory of Iran’s post-war path of moderation, and put the revolution back on a collision course with the international community.”18 Additionally, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program by Ahmadinejad in 2006 led to the opening of Iran’s portfolio at the United Nations Security Council, and, with the increasing tensions between the 46

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Islamic Republic and the United States and the majority of the international community, Ahmadinejad forced Iran back into isolation.

Hassan Rouhani’s surprising rhetoric and victory in the 2013 presidential elections stemmed from his disapproval of Ahmadinejad’s policies and his background as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council until 2005.19 Maloney writes that “as Rafsanjani’s understudy, Rouhani is a quintessential creation of Iran’s post-revolutionary order,” which brought back realism and prudence to Iranian policy formation.20 Similarly, Sen refers to Rouhani’s approach as having a “pragmatist tone with constant emphasis on realism and prudence.”21 From the very beginning of his administration in 2013, President Rouhani demonstrated his determination to portray a new image of Iran: an Iran that seeks peace, moderation, and international cooperation. In an article in The Washington Post that he wrote during his first appearance at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2013, President Rouhani outlined his foreign policy approach: “The world has changed. International politics is no longer a zero-sum game but a multidimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously. Gone is the age of blood feuds. World leaders are expected to lead in turning threats into opportunities.”22 He thus presented a very different modus operandi than his predecessor and one seldom seen in the Islamic Republic.

The Rouhani administration’s foreign policy approach not only succeeded at ending Iran’s nuclear portfolio at the Security Council by signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in July 2015 which led to the lifting of international sanctions on Iran, but, in doing so, his team managed to reduce Iran’s isolation once again while fostering unprecedented engagement with the international community, particularly with the European Union. While much has changed since the Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear agreement, Iran continues to enhance and expand its foreign relations across Asia and Europe.

CONCLUSION There exist hundreds, if not thousands, of articles, reports, and analyses of various aspects of the Islamic Republic that fall into an echo chamberlike approach that underestimates the power and successes of the Iranian society and the current system of governance in the country. A reductionist or selective view of the Iranian society, political system, and foreign policy not only significantly limits one’s understanding of the country but also leads to serious miscalculations when dealing with Iranians, be it in politics, business, or ordinary people-to-people interactions. This article attempted to help explain the realities of today’s Iran to foreign audiences by discussing the maturation of the Islamic Republic after forty years in power with a focus on the multifaceted nature of the Iranian society and the diversity that exists in the country’s decision-making processes.

Once again, this article’s main argument is that Iran’s main strength is the diversity of its population.

The societal diversity in Iran has allowed for diverse political ideologies which have translated to differing, and often dissimilar, governance styles of different presidents. This fact challenges the notion that Iran is a theocratic, autocratic, and messianic state under a totalitarian Supreme Leader with no aspirations for democratic reforms under a republican political system.

5 Nasser Hadian: Iran Debates Its Regional Role. Atlantic Council, South Asia Center. 14 September 2015. <https://bit. ly/2lVj47e > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

6 Hadian.

7 David Menashri: Iran’s Regional Policy: Between Radicalism and Pragmatism. International Affairs. 2007/Spring–Summer.

155.

8 Menashri, 155.

9 R. K. Ramazani: Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy. Middle East Journal. 2004/Autumn. 549.

10 Ambassador Seyyed Hossein Mousavian. Interviewed by Mehran Haghirian on 19 March 19, 2017.

11

Ambassador Abdullah Sohrabi. Interviewed by Mehran

Haghirian on 21 December 21, 2016.

12 Sohrabi, interviewed by Haghirian.

13 Fareed Zakaria: Is Iran rational? The Washington Post.

9 April 2015. <https://wapo.st/2mggg4H > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

14 Khatami visit opens Saudi door. BBC World News. 15 May 1999. <https://bbc.in/2mowM2P > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

15

Mohammad Ali Shabani – Mahsa Rouhi: Rowhani the

Decision Shaper. The National Interest. 26 August 2013. <https://bit.ly/2lTRLdE > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

16 Ali Ansari: Iran under Ahmadinejad: Populism and Its Malcontents. International Affairs. 2008/July. 683.

17

Afshin Molavi: Iran and the Gulf States. United States

Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer. Updated: August 2015. <https://bit.ly/2lVsrnq > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

18

Suzanne Maloney: Iran Surprises Itself and the World.

A New President May Take His Country in a New Direction.

ENDNOTES

Brookings Institute, Washington, 2013.

19 Maloney.

20 Maloney.

1 This article has been derived in part from the author’s MA

21 Gülriz Sen: The Prospects of “Constructive Engagement”

thesis: Mehran Haghirian: Effectuating a Cooperative Future

in Iran–GCC Relations: The Levant Dimension. In: Iran’s

between Iran and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. MA

Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf. Common Interests

Thesis. Washington: American University, School of

Over Historic Rivalry, edited by Maaike Warnaar – Luciano

International Service, 2017.

Zaccara – Paul Aarts. Gerlach Press, London, 2016.12–33.

2

Walter Posch: The Third World, Global Islam, and

22 Hassan Rouhani: President of Iran Hassan Rouhani: Time

Pragmatism. The Making of Iranian Foreign Policy. SWP

to engage. The Washington Post. 19 September 2013.

Research Paper. 2013/April. 17.

<https://wapo.st/1ibaLgG > Accessed: 16 September 2019.

3

Shireen Hunter: Iran’s Pragmatic Regional Policy.

International Affairs. 2003/Spring. 139.

4 Paul Salem: Building Cooperation in the Eastern Middle East. Carnegie Papers from the Carnegie Middle East Center.

2010/June.

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THE ARAB GULF MOMENT Mitchell Belfer

INTRODUCTION In the current international political climate, deploying the term “Arab” certainly leads to the polarisation of the European public discourse.

This is because Arabs, as an ethnolinguistic group, are regularly confused with the religion of Islam, and both are used to describe the population of a vast territory swinging in from the Atlantic Ocean over North Africa into the Levant, rounding south over the Arabian Peninsula to the Gulf, north to Turkey, Iraq, and the Shatt al-Arab.1 Some even use “Arab” to denote areas east of the Gulf and south of the Sahara. Such simplifications lead to misunderstandings. The Middle East, like Europe, is diverse, and, while Arabs certainly

form the majority, other ethnicities live alongside them, such as Berbers, Circassian, Druze, Greeks, Kurds, Maronites, Persians, Turks, and Yazidis, to name a few. Even more importantly, it should be remembered that not all Arabs are Muslim—there are thriving Arab Christian and Arab Jewish communities speckled across the Middle East. Moreover, to add yet another layer to the discussion, Muslims themselves are very divided along levels of religiosity, sects, and schools: Sunni (Sufi, Salafi, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali), Shia (Ja’fari, Zaidi, Ismaili, Alawite), and Ibadi.

Therefore, while historian H. A. R. Gibb was accurate in saying that “Arabs are a people clustered around historical memory,”2 it is

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman who is the mastermind of the country’s economic transformation and it’s anti-corruption campaign.

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important to understand the extent to which that memory can be mobilised to shape the diverse socio-political, economic, and strategic cultures found throughout the region. It is equally important to determine the other factors that contribute to generating the region’s unique models of development. Questions of geography, colonial histories, culture, resource availability, and many other variables converge to affect how the various peoples of the region see themselves—and others. For instance, the small Arab Gulf island state of Bahrain is socially open because its history has been shaped by its underground potable water and the neverending flow of traders and travellers that brought goods, ideas, and often people from distant lands—east and west.3 In contrast, the Arabs of the Sahel were largely isolated from the coastal intercultural exchange and developed their own unique systems of politics and society. In short, the popular idea that Arabs are one people, with one way of thinking and one overarching identity, is to be eschewed.

This work argues that there is a unique Arab Gulf model that is progressive, reform-minded, well-funded, and here to stay. Whether this model eventually glues other parts of the Arab world together remains guesswork and is beyond the scope of this study. With a legacy of failed pan-isms, such as the pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s and the pan-Islamism of the 1990s, there has been a general repacking of the region into its component parts. The Arab Gulf, the Maghreb, the Levant, and the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iraq) subregions each have their own security, economic, social, and political dynamics, and each has developed their own, reflective models.4 The Arab Gulf model is producing a global impact, and seldom does a day pass that does not include a news item from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or the UAE. These have replaced stories from the Maghreb and are even eclipsing the Israel– Palestine conflict. The Arab Gulf polarises because many have vested interests in the success of its model—and others in its failure.

This work explores the main, defining elements of the Arab Gulf model. It presents some of

the main benchmarks that have come to be associated with the Arab Gulf and explain how these have been formalised in the practices and accepted norms of the regional political landscape. In doing so, it also explores some of the internal and exogenous challenges to the anchoring of this Arab Gulf model. It also briefly identifies the countervailing trends, such as Islamism, sectarianism, defection (internal challenges), coupled with political and economic interference, subversion, and geopolitics (exogenous challenges). Stabilising the Arab Gulf and its developmental model is a necessity.

If it fails, the ramifications will be vast.

BUILDING A CIVILISATION While the Arab Gulf states share important commonalities with Maghrebi, Egyptian, Levant, Iraqi, and Yemeni Arabs, such as the centricity of Islam in political and personal interactions, the Arabic language as the lingua franca, and codes of tribal consciousness that assist in directing community and individual behaviours, there remains an assortment of important differences as well. These are derived from environmental constraints, opportunities, resource abundance (hydrocarbons, petrochemicals), scarcity (potable water, arable land), and geopolitical positioning.

Geography, it should be remembered, is destiny.

The inhabitants of the Arab Gulf understand this precept of international relations more than others; after all, it is their inhospitable geography, the endless deserts and sweltering heats, that brought families to form clans and clans to form tribes as a security mechanism. Geography gave rise to Islam in the Arabian heartland as well—not in the lush Persian valleys nor the Nile delta—and it was there that Prophet Mohammed regulated trade and tradition in the joint institutions of marketplace and Mosque.5 It is not a coincidence that the word commonly used for law or Islamic legislation, Sharia, is derived from the more archaic Shar’a, which roughly translates into drawing water without an intermediary (in other words, directly). In the water-starved Arabian Peninsula, rules need to CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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As part of extensive social reforms, women in Saudi Arabia are now allowed to legally drive their car on their own without a male companion.

be obeyed, and Islam produced those rules in order to maintain peace in a very competitive environment.

Although the process of arriving at the current state of affairs is important, this paper now fast-forwards nearly 1500 years and glosses over the process of state-building—the Ottoman, Portuguese, and British hegemony, the rise and fall of the Persian Empire and the Omani Kharijite, the Great Game, Ba’athism, Islamism, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, successive US administrations, Nasser, Saddam, the discovery of oil, and more—and focuses instead on what the Arab Gulf model looks like, rather than where it came from. History may have produced the impetus behind the model, but it is the states today that made the decision to adopt a unique approach to governance.

All the Arab Gulf states have invested heavily in economic and social reform packages.

Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE aim to complete theirs by 2030, Kuwait by 2035, and Oman by 2040. While each of these visions 50

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may differ in terms of implementation phases, they all focus on the same main issues. It is important to flesh these out to better understand just what the Arab Gulf model implies—in practical terms—and to evaluate their legacy.

Without getting in the minute details of each of the programmes, there are identifiable trends that help to make sense of what the Arab Gulf model consists of. In contrast to the many— perhaps too many—analysts of the Gulf who have concluded that the vast hydrocarbon wealth had retarded social development, slowed economic pluralism, and created rentier states, the 2030/2035/2040 programmes intend to take national wealth, redistribute it, and make way for the next generations. So, instead of a rentier system where national rulers expend wealth on those families, tribes, and individuals that assist in propping up leaders, the Arab Gulf states have developed a model where citizens are shareholders and leaders engage in delicate negotiations with all segments of civil society to ensure that national wealth is being put into

projects that develop mechanisms that prepare for the eventual post-oil reality and provide creative outlets—in the national interest—for their youthful population. While this process is not faultless and mistakes have been made, they reflect an attempt to change rather than sink into strategic lethargy and avoid more difficult socio-economic and political questions.

It is also worth remembering that the Arab Gulf states are learning from recent regional history. Gulf leaders and much of their societies are very aware of the dangers of political and religious fundamentalism and seek to cushion themselves from those tides. Iran’s revolutionary model, Tehran’s attempts to proliferate Shia extremist systems to the Arab Gulf—in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—coupled with the Muslim Brotherhood’s strict Salafi ideology, its radical behaviours, and vast networks, have prodded the doubling of the efforts to better channel youthful Arab Gulf energies into productive rather than destructive goals. 6 The subsequent model cannot be separated from politics—it is meant to anchor Arab Gulf societies in more progressive waters.

Inevitably, development is not a page-on-page exercise, and some in the region remain attached to archaic modes of governance. Qatar, for instance, remains committed to supporting the Muslim Brotherhood as a reflection of its relationship to Erdogan’s Turkey, Hamas in Palestine, and the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria (among other legacy relationships fostered by Hamad Al Thani—the Emir’s father).7 This attitude is at odds with the progressive demands of much of Qatar’s population. It is hoped—and expected—that even in Qatar there will be an eventual shift away from supporting radicalism abroad to focusing exclusively on its own socio-political development.

The Arab Gulf model is reflected in the headline goals of the 2030/2035/2040 programmes, and these are worth being briefly presented and assessed in terms of their economic, social, and political dynamics.

Economically, it is impossible to unmoor Gulf economies from hydrocarbons, but that is not the point. It is rather how the money generated

from the sale of petrochemicals and other products of the vast oil and gas deposits found in the region is being spent. For example, Oman seeks to develop its economy to be more internationally “competitive.” This plan has meant that national leaders have sat down with domestic and international businesses to discuss the reforms needed to carve out a strategic niche.

Oman is already engaging with China as a key actor in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. This engagement reflects the way Oman views its competitive advantage—in geographic terms: as a gateway. For another example, Bahrain uncovered immense new oil fields in 2018 (the Khaleej field) but still aims to develop a “robust, thriving economy.” Robust in the sense that it is diverse and based around a shareholders’ society. The country has heavily invested in financial services (including FinTech), aluminium smelting and has a generous entrepreneurial fund to assist Bahrainis in starting up their own business ventures. Oil, in this case, is fuelling economic reform. Other Gulf states have adopted the more ambiguous “economic development” as a headline goal for their programmes, but these too have important diversification elements to them: from meeting infrastructural needs to providing cutting-edge medical facilities and higher education research institutions. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have even prioritised eco-friendly cities (NEOM and Masdar City, respectively), Qatar is looking for ways to marry environmental protection to economic opportunity, and all the Gulf states have slowly introduced value-added taxation (VAT).8 Other trends include enhancing women’s roles in the countries’ economic lives and reducing reliance on expatriate workers. Additionally, the GCC has assisted in opening borders, harmonising currencies, and encouraging interstate trade and investment. Even the current Gulf Crisis, which has excluded Qatar from economic activities in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (largely due to its financial support for nefarious groups in the region), has not dented the idea of great economic integration in the long term. So, while individual GCC countries have developed their own economic reform CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

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programmes, these are compatible with each other and aspire to create a grand region of economic growth, interaction, and development that will benefit the Arab Gulf states, the wider Middle East, and, more generally, the global economy. A one-word characterisation of the Arab Gulf model’s economic dimension would be “progressive.”

Socially, the Arab Gulf states share many of the same features and have prioritised many of the same formulas to enhance their situations for the future. While all six GCC states are predominantly Arab and Muslim, they have steadily been shifting away from those defining meta-narratives and honing national identities that incorporate being Arab and Muslim but are not defined exclusively by them. The UAE’s Year of Tolerance and Bahrain’s Manama Declaration serve as clear examples of this trend.9 The Arab Gulf model aims to build bridges between the religions to show that coexistence is both possible and necessary. Unlike in pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism, it is no longer uncommon to see Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and many other types of citizens and residents sharing public spaces, national resources, and podiums across the Gulf region. Over the past seven decades, the regional trend was in reverse, and the Iranian revolution, coupled with spikes in sectarianism and radicalism, dragged many Arab communities into dark chapters of their history. While the Arab Gulf states were not fully insulated from such turbulence, the effect was limited because of two important social factors.

First, the regional baby boom and a subsequent youth bulge erupted in parallel to the revolution in telecommunication technologies, which opened up international popular culture and social trends to more and more of the region’s young people. Social research tends to look at the negative side of this phenomenon and sees the attraction of young people to radical subcultures emblematic of that marriage.

However, that tells only a partial, fragmented story. The rapid shrinkage of desktop computers into light, transportable laptops, the introduction of multifunctional tablets, the transformation of analogue mobiles into smartphones, the 52

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appearance of digital photography and new, dynamic interfaces, operating systems, and applications have brought the Arab Gulf youth into an internationalist fold. While some criminal and extremist groups have certainly exploited these same technologies to recruit and spread their narratives, the overwhelming majority of people in the Arab Gulf are now more aware of and engaged in international processes and information flows than ever before—and this is positively affecting social developments. To be sure, there were similar circumstances in other parts of the Arab world too. However, only in the Gulf was there a democratisation of access to technology owing to high expendable incomes.

So, unlike Syria or Algeria, which also experienced a baby boom, the wealth distribution in the Gulf ensured that technologies were made widely available instead of being concentrated among the elite. Second, Arab Gulf people are travelling— a lot. From London to Athens, New York, Bali, Sydney, Toronto, young, middle-aged, and older Khaleejis (Gulf Arabs) are holidaying, studying, and even residing abroad. Moreover, these travels have a profound impact on social life at home. New networks are being formed together with a new culture. Gulf Arabic is often spliced with English words and—social, economic, political—ideas from abroad are integrated, imported, and shaped to reflect unique Gulf realities. This is especially true of the hundreds of thousands of students that travel to study in some of the top universities in Europe and the United States. They contribute to their alma maters and, in turn, to their societies on return.

These travellers are truly driving change. For some Arab Gulf states, these trends have only served to reinforce their existing dynamic societies. Bahrain, for instance, boasts a continuous Jewish, multiple Christian, and an assortment of Hindu, Buddhist, and other religious communities—with friction. For others, it was a matter of easy integration. The Arab Gulf model is based on integrating internationalist ideas and a cosmopolitan ethos including social openness and engagement. A one-word characterisation of the Arab Gulf model’ social dimension is “tolerant.”

Politically, there is a great debate that has unfolded in the research institutes and universities of Europe, the US, and the West in general, that looks at the level of democratisation in the Arab world. Examining political participation is, of course, an important endeavour, but arguments tend to be decontextualised. The most common argument maintains that there are low levels of political participation and subsequent leadership accountability in the Arab world. This reasoning is not accurate—at least not in the Arab Gulf. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman maintain popularly elected legislative bodies with decision-making authority, whose members compete in fair and free elections.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates have popularly elected bodies that consult and steer political decisions. None of these bodies is a Potemkin village. They are reflective of the types of political systems the states have, and they matter in developing and legitimising policy choices. All the Arab Gulf states function according to consensusbuilding between socio-economic actors, tribal associations, families, and religious leaders, and major decisions tend to be informed by a wide variety of inputs with the ultimate decision being taken to the highest level only after a discussion with others. The famous majlis (parliament) system remains in place, intact, and meant to act as an internal balance.

Take a quick glance at any of the key figures in the Gulf today: King Hamad (and Crown Prince Shaikh Salman) in Bahrain, Emir Al Sabah in Kuwait, Sultan Qaboos in Oman, Emir Tamim in Qatar, King Salman (and Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman [MBS]) in Saudi Arabia, and Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed (and Crown Prince Shaikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan) together with Shaikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum in the UAE, and it is immediately apparent that they reflect their societies—they are the flag that their people rally around. Even in cases of political turbulence, it is the national leaders that appeal for calm and work at bringing the conflicting parties back to peace when other mechanisms fail. The system of highest political authority may be hereditary, but

Gulf citizens are truly shareholders. A one-word characterisation of the Arab Gulf model’s political dimension is “consensus.”

BEYOND THE CHALLENGE The Arab Gulf model should not be taken for granted. As with any model of development, there are those that stand to gain, and those that stand to lose. One of the first steps MBS took on his accession to Crown Prince was to arrest some 500 members of the House of Saud. They were not selected at random; rather they were imprisoned because they sought to resist the social, economic, and political changes sweeping the country and the region. Many of those arrested were corrupt or exercised power illegitimately. MBS understood that to comprehensively change the country— one of the most conservative in the world—those intent on disruption would have to be challenged.

It was not easy, but it was needed, and the Saudi people lauded it. In Bahrain, there is the persistence of Iran-backed terrorism that attempts to divide—along sectarian lines—the state and prevent the realisation of its national development programmes. Kuwait is stuck between Muslim Brotherhood fundamentalism and simmering Shia radicalism, Oman has a looming succession crisis while Qatar remains partially isolated from the region due to its increasingly warm military relations to Turkey and its economic and political engagement with Iran. The UAE is fighting against Islamic fundamentalism at home and abroad.

The Arab Gulf has tremendous wealth and attracts a wealth of opponents. However, the Arab Gulf model needs to be defended and proliferated. In a world increasingly marked by— left-wing, right-wing, Muslim, Christian, Jewish, and even Buddhist—radicalism, the Arab Gulf model offers a different way of engagement.

It shows that tolerance is possible and that societies, even strictly religious ones, can change for the better, be open and inclusive—of minorities, women, and foreigners. With a little bit of luck, a lot of continuous labour and support, the Arab Gulf moment will be here to stay—for the betterment of the Gulf Arabs, the wider Middle East, and, inshallah, the world.

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

53

ENDNOTES

7

For a good reading into the Muslim Brotherhood, its

relationship to Qatar, and to both Al Qaeda and ISIS see: 1 The Shatt Al Arab (Arvand Rud in Persian) is the waterway

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Ties to ISIS and Al Qaeda.

that is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates

The Counter Extremism Project. 2019/May.

in southern Iraq. The southern portion of the Shatt Al Arab

8

forms the border between Iran and Iraq, and the waters

ae >. For information on VAT in the Arab Gulf states,

empty into the Arabian Gulf.

particularly in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, see Reggie Mezu

2 Hamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb: The Arabs. Clarendon

[et al.]: Gulf Cooperation Council. Managing VAT in the

Press, Oxford, 1940. 3.

GCC: Issues emerging from implementation. Baker

3

McKenzie Global VAT / GST Newsletter. 2018/August.

See Mitchell Belfer: Small State, Dangerous Region.

For the official page of Al Masdar see <https://masdar.

A Strategic Assessment of Bahrain. Peter Lang Publishing,

<https://bit.ly/32oMr1V >Accessed: 28 August 2019.

Frankfurt, 2014.

9

4

Tolerance in a Changing Gulf. The Euro-Gulf Information

The Arab Gulf is understood here as comprising the

For more on this, see Antonino Occhiuto: Religious

members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait,

Centre. 16 November 2018. <https://bit.ly/32ki9gF >

Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Yemen is excluded

Accessed: 28 August 2019.

from this subgrouping even though it is heavily influenced by, and influences, its Peninsular neighbours. This exclusion is due to its low level of socio-political and economic development stemming from its internal division during the Cold War and slow reunification process. The Maghreb includes Western Sahara (under Moroccan sovereignty), Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. The Levant includes Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel is excluded owing to its lack of regional integration and its ethno-social dynamics that do not reflect Arab norms or values. Egypt is included in this grouping, rather than in the Maghreb, owing to its cultural and political interests being more entwined with its eastern than its western neighbours.

Finally, the so-called Northern Tier is borrowed from the language of Cold War alliance formation whereby NATO sought to hem in the Arab Middle East by establishing a northern buffer comprised of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.

In the context of contemporary international politics, Iran can be disqualified from participating in the regional configuration due to the Islamic Revolution, while Pakistan has essentially changed tack and is currently more engaged in its immediate neighbourhood than the Greater Middle East. Despite that Turkey is not Arab, its security dynamic with Iraq and the role it plays in the northern parts of the region foster its inclusion in the subgrouping.

5

On 7 December 2017, the Euro-Gulf Information Centre

hosted Professor Bendikt Koehler. These points were raised during private discussions between the author and Professor Koehler on 8 December 2017 in Rome, Italy.

6 See, for instance: Mitchell Belfer – Khalid Alshaikh: Iran’s Clandestine War on the Kingdom of Bahrain: Saraya Al Ashtar and the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain. Dirasat. 2019/ January.

54

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

THE MOMENT OF SMALL GULF STATES Máté Szalai

At first glance, the small monarchies of the Gulf region—namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates—have a highly unfavourable geopolitical position. Squeezed between the competing giants of a revolutionary Iran, an unstable Iraq, and an overambitious Saudi Arabia, their survival has never been automatic, and, thus, their leverage has always been limited. Nevertheless, necessity often leads to innovation—in the case of small Gulf states, their suffocating circumstances resulted in innovative foreign policies and the ability to navigate themselves amidst great power rivalry and regional chaos. Consequently, today, many talk about the “Gulf Moment,” which is characterised by the growing influence of smaller Gulf states and their successful effort to balance the negative consequences of their relatively small size—or even to capitalise on it.

LIMITED RESOURCES AND HISTORICAL TENSIONS It was a long way for the small monarchies of the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf to establish firmly their presence in the international system.1 Historically, the region (Khaleej in Arabic) has always been located on the periphery of empires with the sole exception of the state of Rashidun caliphate in the 7th century. As a result, political dynamics

Heads of states of the founding countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Abu Dhabi, 1981

were characterised by a constant struggle of local tribes and powerful families. The social memory of this never-ending competition still affects political relations today through a general mistrust among the regimes, in spite of their common Khaleeji identity and overlapping interests. Suspiciousness has especially been visible towards the House of Saud now ruling over Saudi Arabia, a dynasty which has always harboured hegemonic ambitions over the Peninsula and the most resources at disposal.

The only way for poorer and smaller families has been building relations with outside forces and capitalising on their occasional interventions.

Regionally, the Persian or the Ottoman states came handy to balance local competition, but, at least starting from the 18th century, it was the European maritime empires (especially Britain) who have the greatest leverage in the Gulf.

For London, the importance of the Arabian Peninsula was only derivative of maintaining the stability of maritime routes from Europe to India.

As a consequence, they did not care much about tribal rivalries taking place in the deserts; their attention almost solely concentrated on the coastline. They supported those families whom they trusted to be effective and compliant.

This period provided important lessons for the prominent Gulf families now ruling in the small states—as long as they do not harm great power interests and manage to sell an image of a valuable ally, they can use stronger states to their advantage. A telling example for this was the question of “piracy,” a phenomenon perceived by the British Empire as a threat despite being an everyday economic activity in the region conducted by almost all larger families. The struggle to defeat the pirates in the Gulf defined the way in which London saw the region to the extent that it used the term “Pirate Coast” to describe the area stretching from CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

55

Bahrain to the Strait of Hormuz.2 Local families, such as the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi or the Al Maktoum of Dubai, convinced the British Empire that their tribal competitors, the Al Qasimi of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaima, were pirates. Thus, they managed to gather British naval support against their rivals, which enabled them to get the upper hand.

By the 19th century, the British Empire became more interested in local tribal dynamics due to the intensification of rivalry among those tribes and the attempts at incursion by other world powers, such as France or the Ottoman rulers. Consequently, the British formalised the cooperation with their local allies through bilateral and multilateral agreements (the “truces”), according to which the British crown provided protection to them in exchange for maintaining stability in a given piece of land and loyalty. The importance of the emerging “trucial system” could hardly be exaggerated—these pieces of documents introduced the concepts of territoriality and modern statehood while also picked the families who still rule the peninsula.

These agreements were double-edged: they provided security for the evolving small protostates vis-á-vis the Saudis or the Persians while also limited their manoeuvrability in connection with the British Empire and, in general, in the international arena. As a consequence, they evolved under the protective cage of London, shielded from international politics for decades, which enabled them to focus on institutionbuilding and, after the 1930s, on oil-production.

Nevertheless, the decision of the British government to withdraw most of its troops from East of Suez in 1968 ended this period and paved the way to substantive independence.

Despite what we could expect retrospectively, the sudden announcement by London was a shocking surprise for the leaders of the small states, as they were not ready to defend themselves from their larger neighbours.

Consequently, they met in Abu Dhabi to discuss a possible federalisation. 3 Naturally, Saudi Arabia would have preferred the emirates to merge into its jurisdiction, but the Brits (building on the history of the European balance of 56

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

power) did not prefer an overstretching Saudi Arabia. London supported a unity among the smaller states; nonetheless, due to the historical distrust and rivalry between them, the federation only took place among the seven entities now known as the United Arab Emirates.

The rest decided to build their own independent states, despite their relative smallness and the problems arising from the scarcity of resources.

This process led to the current political map of the Gulf region, consisting of three large powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq) and five relatively small states (Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE) struggling to accommodate themselves to the new realities.4 A REGION OF SMALL STATES Usually, we do not really think of the Gulf states as small, due to their large hydrocarbon resources and the perceived richness of their societies. Nevertheless, when one compares them to their neighbours quantitatively, in terms of the most widely used dimensions of state size (see Table 1), it becomes clear why they can be regarded as relatively small countries. In the context of the “Gulf region” comprising the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, and Iraq, their territory, population, economic output, and military capacities seem depressingly tiny. In a system of eight states, equal distribution of resources would mean a 12.5% share at each variable, a ratio which was only reached and surpassed by the UAE in terms of economic capacities and defence budget.

One can argue that the federation, at least economically and militarily, grew out of smallness and achieved a middle-sized status.

In a volatile environment such as the Middle East, being a small state has severe negative consequences. It cannot be self-sufficient economically; thus, it will rely more on foreign trade. Due to climatic reasons, the size of arable land will be minimal or non-existent, rendering agriculture crippled. Due to the strong focus on the industrial production of hydrocarbons, the labour market has always been imbalanced in the small Gulf states, as the population was simply not big enough to meet the workforce

TERRITORY

POPULATION

ECONOMIC OUTPUT

DEFENCE BUDGET

SIZE OF ARMED FORCES

BAHRAIN

0.0%

0.9%

1.7%

1.1%

1.6%

IRAN

35.2%

46.5%

21.5%

10.5%

46.9%

IRAQ

9.4%

21.6%

9.2%

5.6%

17.4%

KUWAIT

0.4%

2.4%

5.7%

5.2%

2.1%

OMAN

6.7%

2.7%

3.4%

6.6%

3.9%

QATAR

0.3%

1.5%

7.9%

1.4%

1.8%

SAUDI ARABIA

46.5%

19.0%

32.6%

52.5%

21.0%

UAE

1.5%

5.4%

18.1%

17.2%

5.3%

Table 1: The share of the basic material capacities of each state in the Gulf region 5

demand of the economy. High population density (resulting from the fact that the Gulf states are smaller in terms of territory than population) can possibly create social tensions and public health risks. Militarily, they have no chance to meet the material capacities of their larger neighbours, which is why they cannot provide for their own security needs. These circumstances can easily result in dependence, weakness, and exposure to foreign influence.

From this perspective, huge hydrocarbon reserves represent a curse in disguise. It is true that the production of natural gas and oil provides the government with fiscal leverage; nonetheless, in absolute terms, this leverage is not enough to compete in capacity-building.

Moreover, the possession of valuable resources coupled with the inability to build up selfdefence makes the small Gulf states attractive targets for stronger states as Kuwait experienced it when Iraq invaded it in 1990.

INNOVATION BORN OUT OF NECESSITY After gaining formal independence by the 1970s, the small Gulf monarchies decided to adopt a below-the-radar foreign policy, which aimed at strengthening their presence in international organisations and maintain stability in the region. However, their security environment has got worse and worse ever since—the process, which started with the Iranian revolution of 1979, continued with the Iran–Iraq War between 1980

and 1988 and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, and led to the American-led intervention against Iraq in 2003, created an unstable, volatile Middle East. The threat of traditional warfare is overshadowed by challenges related to fragile states and state vacuums, including the rise of armed non-state actors, deepening civil wars, and the spill-over of hostilities.

Some of the answers provided by the Gulf monarchies were borrowed from the traditional toolkit of small state foreign policy.

Accompanied by Saudi Arabia, they created the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981, a collective security organisation and socio-economic integration format. Later, after 1990, they engaged in institutionalised defence cooperation with the United States through a series of agreements. Some of them also participated in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Through specialising on key sectors of the 21th century (e.g. trade of energy commodities, financial services, logistics, high-end tourism), they built up a vast network of interdependences, making their survival an interest of greater powers not just in the West but in East Asia as well. Several small Gulf states focused on capacity-building in the defence sector as well, which does not necessarily aim at balancing regional powers but rather achieving relative deterrence—a situation in which a small state does not have enough defensive capabilities to withhold an CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

57

attack but has enough to make the attack so costly that it might deter an aggressor from initiating an invasion.

Besides these measures, which were copied from the traditional textbook of small state behaviour, the Gulf monarchies pioneered several new policies which were innovative and novel in international politics. Many of such actions were actually designed not to overcome the negative consequences of smallness but rather to capitalise on smallness.

First and foremost, several Gulf states engaged in mediation or negotiation facilitation activities.

Qatar played such a role in several regional crises (in Sudan, in Lebanon, in Palestine, or between Washington and the Taliban) similarly to Oman (which helped the diplomatic talks between Iran and the US leading up to the JCPOA) or Kuwait (which tries to bring messages back and forth between Qatar and its neighbours in the recent rift). The international community accepts small states as mediators easily as their perception is usually built on their eagerness to contribute to international peace and stability.

Capitalising on this image, the small Gulf states managed to pursue their interests during the conflict resolution of these regional crises while also enlarging their influence on the ground.

Second, Qatar and the UAE implemented a strategy which can be called virtual enlargement.6

Manama, Bahrein, December 2014 58

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Through the usage of soft power tools and nation-branding activities, they projected an image of effective political and economic governance with the aim to attract investment and political attention. With strategic investments in Europe, Africa, and other regions and participating in the work of international organisations, they turned themselves into stakeholders in the global economy and focused on elite-to-elite relation-building. Interestingly enough, Oman chose the opposite directionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;it did not wish to have a high profile but chose to operate mostly behind the curtain.

Third, they invested heavily in forming the international discourse about specific issues related to their interests. This can be directly conducted through state-owned media, such as the Al Jazeera channel of Qatar or the Al Arabiyya of Saudi Arabia, but also through more subtle ways, such as investing in lobby groups or think tanks all around the world. Again, such activities are better received from smaller states as they seem harmless in the eyes of the general public.

Naturally, not all small Gulf states have been equal in effectivity and success when it comes to innovative policies. The main point of divide between them is connected to domestic stability and homogeneityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those governments which managed to maintain loyalty in internal politics,

such as Qatar, Oman, or the UAE, turned out to have wider leverage and more resources to conduct innovation in foreign policy. In parallel, Bahrain (fighting the effects of deep religious, ethnic, and social divisions) and Kuwait (having a more heterogeneous society in which the cleavages created by the war of 1990–1991 are still vivid today) have more obstacles to overcome.

THE GULF MOMENT “Wherever the Arab citizens go, he nowadays witnesses the Gulf moment in Arab history,” says Abdulkhaleq Abdulla in his book The Gulf Moment.7 Arguably, the Middle East has faced a rapid grow of the influence of both Saudi Arabia and the smaller emirates in the transnational political, economic, and social relations at least since 2011. The new status quo is a result of both an increasing income for oil exporting states due to the hike in the price of the commodity in the 2000s and the postmodern foreign policy strategy these particular Gulf states adopted. Throughout the era of the Arab uprisings, they managed to stay stable (with the exception of a short period in Bahrain in 2011), enlarge their regional and global influence, and become stakeholders in Libya, Syria, or Yemen. One can argue that stable small states are truly having a window of opportunity in such unstable times.

Nevertheless, opportunities can easily come with dangers, and the small Gulf states should not take their ability to endure for granted. As the example of Qatar shows, a small state can easily lose its momentum if it overstretches and loses the sympathy of the transnational public. During an era which is characterised by intrastate and transnational conflicts, they can navigate themselves steadily, but the higher the chances of interstate wars get, the more important classic hard power capabilities may become. With an arms race taking place in the region and tensions mounting in Iranian– American relations, such a possibility should not be underestimated. Moreover, most of the small Gulf states managed to avoid domestic upheavals, but, due to the unsustainability of

their current financial system (deriving from high reliance on hydrocarbon resources), internal stability is not automatic in the middle run.

That being said, the moment of small Gulf states is here to stay. Their case shows how disadvantageous circumstances can contribute to innovative foreign policies, and how small states can actually use smallness to their advantage. In the 21th century, one can easily see that international power relations are not primarily shaped by material resources but adaptability and strategy. For analysts and decision-makers, the lesson is clear: one should not overlook small states because of their size.

ENDNOTES 1 For the history of the Gulf states, see David Commins: The Gulf States. A Modern History. I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 2014 and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen: Insecure Gulf. The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era. Columbia University Press, New York, 2011.

2 Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi: Power Struggles and Trade in the Gulf, 1620–1820. University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 1999.

3 Simon C. Smith: Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf.

Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950–71.

RoutledgeCurzon, London – New York, 2004.

4 Yemen will be excluded from the investigation, due to the unique state-building process taking place in the country.

5 Data from the World Bank Database, 2019. <https://data. worldbank.org/ > Accessed: 3 July 2019. Territory is measured by the size of the land area of the country in km², population refers to the number of inhabitants, economic output equals the value of GDP in current USD. When it comes to military capacities, the military budget is measured in current USD, whereas the size of armed personnel includes official and paramilitary forces.

6 Alan Chong: Small state soft power strategies: virtual enlargement in the cases of the Vatican City State and Singapore. Cambridge Review of International Affairs.

2010/3. 383–405.

7 Abdulkhaleq Abdulla: Lahzat al-Khalij fi al-Tarikh al-Arabi al-Mu'asir [The Gulf Moment in Contemporary Arab History].

Dar al-Farabi, Beirut, 2018.

CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

59

5

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

THE PAST AND PRESENT OF US–GULF RELATIONS Tamás Magyarics

It is a commonplace that the (wider) Middle East constitutes one of the three most important strategic regions for the United States (the other two being the Asia-Pacific region and Europe).

The Asia-Pacific region started to attract increased American attention with the closing of the frontier at the end of the 19th century, and its importance was manifested, among others, in the so-called open door doctrine. Europe originally featured as a point of negative reference in American strategic thinking, in the Monroe Doctrine. Later, the dominant geopolitical ideas also placed Europe, or, better to say, the Eurasian landmass, into a similarly negative strategic frame of reference in the United States. The argument was, and remains, that it is the vital geopolitical interest of the US to prevent one single power from dominating Eurasia. The participation of the US in both world wars may as well be explained within this theoretical framework.

The Middle East in general, and the Persian Gulf in particular, got into the centre of American interests following 1945. On the most general level, Washington’s attention was drawn to the region because of the new global role it started to play in the postwar era. Simply put, the Wilsonian liberal internationalism defined the conceptual framework of the Truman administration’s foreign and security policy.

Furthermore, the US adopted the posture of a “benevolent” hegemon with reference to its allies, and, basically—among others—underwrote the security of the latter, while also dominating and protecting the so-called global commons, including the seas, for the sake of facilitating the free flow of strategic materials and trade wherever it was able to. The 1940s also witnessed the emergence of the bipolar world view, a classic Realpolitik concept in essence, which upgraded the importance of areas which had not prominently featured in the power 62

calculations of the great powers before. These considerations were most succinctly expressed

by Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech given on 5 January 1957 in the wake of the Suez crisis.

The President stated that “[t]he Middle East provides a gateway between Eurasia and Asia,” and proposed that the US cooperate with and assist any nation economically and militarily in the general area of the Middle East in order to exclude other outside forces, namely, the Soviet Union (and Communism).1 In another part of this speech, President Eisenhower referred to the dependence of many nations of Europe, Asia, and Africa on the oil deposits in the Middle East.

It is worth noting at this point that the US itself was not really dependent on oil imports from the Middle East (nor is it even nowadays). In 1945, the US produced two-thirds of the world’s oil (today, some 16%), and Washington first and foremost had two goals in the 1940s and 1950s in the Gulf. First, to ramp up oil production to satisfy postwar European and Japanese consumption as part of the overall economic reconstruction plans; and second, it wanted “to prevent a rival power from monopolizing the region’s oil production and using oil exports as an economic tool against the US.”2 While the US was able to count on the United Kingdom in “sharing the burdens” in the Gulf region, the British came to the conclusion in the early 1960s that they would not be able to sustain their role in the region any longer, and, by the end of the decade, London had withdrawn from “East of Suez.”3 By default, it was only the US that was able to take over as the guarantor of security and stability in the Gulf with the caveat that the Nixon administration did not have the appetite to take on further military commitments during the Vietnam War. The Guam or Nixon Doctrine, which offered economic and political support but not military assistance for Asian

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

Uzbek.

Turkey

Turkmenistan

China

Syria MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Iran

Iraq

Afghanistan

PE

Pakistan

RS

IA

Kuwait

GU

N

RE

Egypt

Southwest Asia theater of operations (Includes bodies of water labeled in red and airspace above these locations)

Bahrain

LF

EA DS

UAE

Saudi Arabia

GUL

F OF OMA

Oman

N

India

Sudan Yemen GUL

F

BAY OF BENGAL

ARABIAN SEA

DEN OF A

TIMELINE OF GULF WAR CONFLICTS 1990

1995

Operations Desert shield and Desert Storm Southwest Asia theater

2000

2005

Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan

Operation Iraqi Freedom Southwest Asia theater

2010

2015

Operation New Dawn Southwest Asia theater Afghanistan

Locations and timeline of major US Gulf war conflicts with US involvement

countries fighting international communism or subversive forces,4 was in practice applied to the Gulf region as well. The US wished to rely on Iran and Saudi Arabia as major allies in the Gulf, and both countries received massive military aid from the US in the 1970s. The regional security structure, however, collapsed with the fall of the Shah in Tehran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Some in the American capital saw a sort of Soviet grand strategy evolving, whose ultimate goal would have been controlling the Persian Gulf and, therefore, acquiring a position in which Moscow would have been able to cause huge damage to the economies of the West. The American concern was not without basis. By 1973, 80% of European and Japanese oil imports originated in the Gulf and North Africa. Today, South and East Asia are becoming more dependent on Gulf oil. The Asia-Pacific region consumes a third of the oil produced in the world, while it

accounts for only a tenth of the total global output. Half of the oil used by India and China comes from the Gulf region.5 Washington, for the first time, had to commit itself to protecting, in the first place, American, European, and Japanese interests by military means if necessary.

President Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union speech on 23 January 1980 declared: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America.” 6 The first time the US military had appeared in force onshore in the Gulf region was in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The number of US forces was doubled in the Gulf in November 1990, and the importance of the Gulf states7 was upgraded for two reasons. One, a substantial amount of oil exports came from them, especially after the sanctions introduced against Baghdad. Two, Iran had emerged in a

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

63

Iran nuclear deal: agreement in Vienna on 17 July 2015.

better geopolitical and geostrategic position after the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s, and after Saddam Hussein had been boxed into a corner in 1991. The Bush administration returned to primarily offshore balancing after the liberation of Kuwait, to a so-called dual containment approach regarding Iran and Iraq—that is, basically a neo-Nixonite policy of providing regional stability by relying on local forces. At the same time, all Gulf states signed bilateral security treaties with the US except for Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia is one of the top spenders on military in the world: it came third after the US and China in 2017 and was the fourth the year before after the US, China, and Russia.8 The US military presence became exceptionally pronounced in Qatar and Bahrain; the Al Udeid Air Base in the latter country is arguably the most important US Air Force base in the Gulf region, while Bahrain ultimately became host to the US Fifth Fleet in 1995 and a forward headquarters of the US Central Command.

A pivotal moment in the relations between the US and the Middle East in general came after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.

As former Deputy Secretary of the State Department William J. Burns put it: US policies changed from restraint and containment to unilateralism and preemption.9 The monarchies of the Gulf states themselves were very worried about both the impact of radical Islamism on 64

their societies and being potentially targeted by al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Moreover, in terms of the regional balance of power, they also feared Iran and Iraq alike. The Gulf states, naturally, wished to stay away from any conflicts because they did not want to be caught in the crossfires of powers more powerful than themselves.

Despite the fact that they wanted to maintain close relations with the US—the only outside power that had the pouvoir to guarantee some sort of stability in the region, to protect them from the aspirations of Iran and Iraq, and to put enough pressure, at least potentially, on the Israelis and the Palestinians to come to an agreement—the general impression among the local leaders was that the Americans did not really understand the political, economic, social, cultural, and religious complexities in the region.

As for the security cooperation, the George H. W. Bush administration was considering some kind of cooperative arrangement with the Gulf states after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, but Washington did not pursue the idea with much vigor, and thus it faded. In fact, the notion was not resurrected after 9/11, because the neconservative advisers (among others, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, etc.) started to focus on Iraq soon; they “shifted from a wider agenda … and toward a single-minded focus on toppling Saddam.”10 As then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Burns remarks in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

his memoirs, the Arab leaders worried “that [the United States] will come in, create a mess, and leave them to deal with the consequences.”11 In fact, they guessed quite correctly in the medium (and perhaps long) term; nevertheless, the US established quite a heavy military “footprint” in the region onshore and offshore alike in the short term.

Prior to 2011, the Arab states in the Gulf region were relying predominantly on regional US hegemony. Their major fear was from the regional aspirations of Iran (whose traditional rival for a leading role around the Gulf, Iraq, was engulfed in sectarian and ethnic strife), which was busy expanding its influence with the assistance of proxies such as Hezbollah or the Iraqi Shiites, while aligning itself with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In fact, distinction should be made between the various Gulf states and their attitudes, in general, towards Iran.

Saudi Arabia is a regional rival and apprehensive of any Iranian move (to a large extent because of the Sunni–Shia opposition), Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were generally aligned with the Saudis in this question, while other—smaller—Gulf states were willing to accommodate themselves to a rising Iran.12 Later on, it was Oman that facilitated a secret back channel between the US and Iran in negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015.13 One of the most significant changes in the 21st century seems to be a “global political awakening” facilitated by the revolution of information technology, including the spread

Members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), created in 1955 as Baghdad Pact with the outside support of the US

of the use of social media.14 The so-called Arab Spring in 2011, which can be interpreted within this context, created tensions between the US and the conservative Gulf states. Most of their leaders believed that the “abandonment” of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, a loyal ally for thirty years, by Washington sent a strong message to other rulers who potentially faced unrest in their own countries. In fact, protests erupted in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet on 14 February 2011 (“The Day of Rage”). A few days later, the authorities cracked down on a demonstration in which several people were killed. As Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa explained to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the lesson he—and others in the Gulf region—had drawn from the events in Tunisia and Egypt was that showing weakness was a mistake. While Secretary Gates urged reconciliation of political differences between the majority Sunnis and the minority Shia, he assured the Crown Prince that “we are prepared to defend you against Iran.”15 The dilemma the US was facing in Bahrain in 2011 was one that had been haunting the decision-makers in America for decades, namely, regional stability and security had enjoyed precedence to the publicly professed US foreign policy based on values; in practice, the latter meant urging the Gulf leaders to introduce political, economic, and social reforms. In fact, the Obama administration remained inactive when Saudi Arabia sent troops to help the security forces in Bahrain, or when Riyadh took military measures, most likely out of proportion, against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen.

The reaction to the majority of the Gulf states to the crisis in Lybia in 2011 was different from the one given to the Egyptian and Tunisian events. This time, they first “pushed through an Arab League resolution to push the US and the UN into supporting a humanitarian intervention.”16 Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE even sent token military assistance to the international forces. However, agreement stopped here for all practical purposes: after the killing of Muammar Gaddafi, they started to back different factions

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March in Berlin in solidarity with the Palestinians, against Trump’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem

in Lybia. The situation in Syria did not differ much in this respect either. The various antiAssad forces enjoyed the assistance of different Gulf states, among others, and the US was unable to force cooperation among them.

The Obama administration’s practical inaction in the Syrian conflict, especially after government forces had used chemical weapons against opposition forces and civilians and, thus, crossed a “red line” announced by the President a year before, questioned US credibility in the Gulf states, and some even started to hedge against their being “abandoned” by Washington as well. Nevertheless, it was not only the Obama administration’s policies that had driven a sort of wedge between the US and the Gulf states; the latter started to provide considerable assistance to Islamic rebels in Syria. Moreover, 2012 was a presidential election year in the US, and the overtly cautious Barack Obama did not wish to complicate his re-election chances by being drawn into another war in the Middle East.

One of his most important election campaign promises back in 2008 was to extricate the country from the quagmire of two wars in the wider Middle East. On a strategic level, the reduced US interest (and influence) during the first term of the Obama administration could be 66

attributed to four factors: (1) the return of politics to the Arab world; (2) the ever-lighter American military footprint in the region; (3) reduced US demand for regional energy resources; and (4) a transition from providing security requirements to enable local states to take more of a lead in regional security.17 One of the consequences of this semi-disengaged US policy was the so-called security dilemma, that is, when “states attempt to increase their own security, they trigger countermeasures that leave them even less secure.”18 One perennial question in a transition from a Democratic administration to a Republican one, or the other way round, is the continuity or discontinunity of the policies pursued by the predecessor. In the post-Cold War era, one can detect more frequent discontinunity in foreign affairs than during the Cold War. Donald J. Trump offered an almost diametrically different foreign and security policy on the campaign trail from Barack Obama’s; in short, a shift away from a broadly conceived liberal/realist internationalism (though President Obama resorted to hardheaded Realpolitik more often than he is usually credited for) towards a unilateralist, protectionist, and transactional approach. President Trump’s Middle East policy

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

seems to lean on two pillars: Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Arab world, no matter how divided it is in issues starting from the Syrian civil war to countering Iran’s regional aspirations, did not welcome the moving of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem—to a large extent because of domestic concerns. Then, the Saudi–Qatar debate in 2017 put Washington on the spot.

Riyadh, among others, expected to solidify its dominance of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, the introduction of a boycott and blockade against Qatar produced some unintended consequences, including strained relations with the US. Qatar is one of America’s most important military allies, and—given the deteriorating relations between the US and Iran after President Trump withdrew his country from the JCPOA—the security of the Gulf region has acquired enhanced importance. What is more, Saudi Arabia ruined the Trump administration’s idea of an “Arab NATO”—a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) of six Gulf states plus Egypt and Jordan designed to be a bulwark against Iranian aggression, terrorism, and extremism in the region.19 (This particular idea was first floated in 2011, but, as early as 1955, a Middle East Treaty Organization was established, which later evolved into the Baghdad Pact and was finally relabeled CENTO after Iraq’s pro-Western regime was overthrown in 1959. The organization, which basically existed only on paper, came to an end after the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979.)

However, there are major obstacles for such a formal organization; among others, the potential members are split over their attitudes towards Iran (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE are hostile, while Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar are seeking accommodation with Iran), and an explicitly Sunni MESA would further polarize the region.20 In the long run, MESA members might be even more dependent on the US than NATO members in Europe, and in the light of a relative American decline abroad and the Obama and Trump administrations’ attempts to cut back American commitments wherever possible, the idea does not seem to have a bright future. Finally, a MESA might create a new “security dilemma” in the region, as Iran is likely

to increase its military spending, which is bound to increase the possibility of armed conflict in the Gulf region.21 The recent American policies in the Gulf region—Barack Obama’s gradual disengagement and Donald Trump’s erratic approach22—have encouraged other major outside powers to try to be more active over there. As Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth put it: “US interests vary substantially between the broader region and the Persian Gulf subregion; and US commitments are more fluid and far less institutionalized than in other core regions.”23 However, for the United States, the wider Middle East remains one of the key strategic regions for maintaining its global leading position, and its “benevolent hegemony” or domination by providing key services to its allies and by deterring such peer competitors in the region as China and—perhaps—Russia. This position requires (1) regional peace; (2) the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; (3) the relatively strong cooperation among the GCC; (4) an environment that is hospitable to US offshore (and, at times, onshore) military presence; (5) the continued deterrence of Iran and security guarantee for the Gulf states; (6) possibly a cautious encouragement for a top-down political reform process in these countries in order to prevent the outbreak of another “Arab Spring” and the subsequent destabilisation of key allies; and (7) achieving a more equitable burden-sharing by carefully planned arms sales to key allies.

ENDNOTES 1 January 5, 1957: Eisenhower Doctrine. Miller Center. <https://bit.ly/30BMTcB > Accessed: 12 July 2019.

2 Anand Toprani: Oil and the Future of US Strategy in the Persian Gulf. War on the Rocks. 15 May 2019. <https://bit. ly/2zpciKp > Accessed: 25 June 2019.

3 For the debate over the Labour Government’s decision to give up British military presence east of Suez, see Gouglas Hurd: Memoirs. Abacus, London, 2004. 195–200.

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4 Richard M. Nixon’s remarks to reporters in Guam on 25 July

21

1969. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976.

Cordesman of the CSIS, who believes that—on the

Volume I. Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969 –1972.

contrary—a stronger Saudi (Sunni Arab) deterrence would

<https://bit.ly/2ZuBwWh > Accessed: 25 June 2019.

lower the risk of any military confrontation with Iran. See, Bob

5 Toprani.

Fredericks: Trump wants to create an ‘Arab NATO’ in

6 January 23, 1980: State of the Union Address. Miller

the Middle East. New York Post. 17 May 2017. <https://bit.

Center. <https://bit.ly/2MFl3sn > Accessed: 2 July 2019.

ly/2Px3KfF > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

7 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the

22 For instance, two weeks after the crisis over Qatar,

United Arab Emirates (UAE). Their geopolitical and strategic

the US sold F-15 fighter jets to Doha in the value of USD

importance is due to the fact, among others, that they are

12 billion.

surrounded by the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the

23 Stephen G. Brooks – William C. Wohlforth: America

Red Sea, and possess the bulk of the known oil and gas

Abroad. The United States’ Global Role in the 21th Century.

reserves in the world.

Oxford University Press, New York, 2016. 118.

An alternative explanation is offered by Anthony

8 Feyza Gümüşlüoğlu: US–Gulf relations: The past, present and future. Daily Sabah. 16 November 2018. <https://bit.ly/ 2K7YpVI > Accessed: 13 June 2019.

9 William J. Burns: The Back Channel. American Diplomacy in a Disordered World. Hurst & Co., London, 2019. 298.

10 Burns, 162.

11 Burns, 166.

12 See more details in Jonathan Spyer’s article: Confidence Game: Losing American Suppor t, the Gulf States Scramble. The Tower. 2014/Januar y. <https://bit.ly/ 2U9vfuo > Accessed: 3 July 2019.

13 For details see Borns, 356.

14 For the theoretical discussion of this phenomenon, see Zbigniew Brzezinski: Strategic Vision. America and the Crisis of Global Power. 26–36.

15 Robert M. Gates: Duty. Memoirs of a Secretary of State.

Vintage Books, New York, 2015. 516–517.

16 Marc Lynch: The New Arab Order. Power and Violence in Today’s Middle East. Foreign Affairs. 2018/September– October. 121.

17 Bruce W. Jentleson [et al.]: Strategic Adaptation. Toward a New US Strategy in the Middle East. Center for a New American Security. 6 June 2012. <https://bit.ly/2Nzg0cQ > Accessed: 11 June 2019.

18 Lynch, 124.

19 Chirine Mouchantaf: What are the chances an ‘Arab NATO’ will work? Defense News. 29 August 2018. <https:// bit.ly/2MIgRJ6 > Accessed: 25 June 2019. There are six of ficially designated major “non-NATO” members in the Middle East and North Africa: Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Morocco. There are two more recent collaborators: the UAE and Qatar.

20

Doug Bandow: Why America Should Say No to an

Arab NATO. The National Interest. 26 November 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Lhmk66 > Accessed: 25 June 2019.

68

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

GULF–SOUTH ASIA TIES: NOT JUST OIL, TRADE, AND EXPATRIATES Narayanappa Janardhan

In recent years, there has been a concerted effort to pilot relations between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and South Asia beyond oil, trade, and expatriates. In search of new avenues to convert the decades-long “buyer–seller” relationship into a more meaningful one, the new mantra is “strategic” partnership.

The changes have taken place amid two parallel developments: 1. There has been a shift in the economic centre of gravity from the West to the East, wherein Asia has surged ahead of Europe and the United States as the top investor in and trade partner of the region. This shift, along with declining US influence in the region, raises security questions that could potentially be answered by the Asian countries, including a few from South Asia.1 2. Several South and East Asian countries have a healthy working relationship with Iran, whose relationship with some countries in the six-member GCC bloc, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain has deteriorated. This situation has created a race among each of the competing sides in the Gulf to extend favours to South Asian countries to expand their influence.

An attempt to analyse these issues inevitably takes us to the heart of the festering conflicts in the Gulf and Middle East regions. They also expose the failure of both regional players and international powers to evolve conflict resolution mechanisms.

While there are references to other South Asian countries, this essay focusses mainly on relations among India and Pakistan and the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the

United Arab Emirates. It is a summary of how their multidimensional economic, diplomatic, and security ties—which have had 5,000 years of history but gravitated towards the West after the GCC countries found oil—are now finding new avenues to re-energise their engagement.

TWIST TO TRADITIONAL TIES For decades, the GCC countries have been the principal oil suppliers to South Asian countries.

The trend continues to this day and is likely to increase a great deal as their economies are set to grow in the years ahead. The GCC countries, for example, currently supply 42% of India’s oil imports, with Saudi Arabia being the largest provider. On the gas front, Qatar is the biggest seller to India.

Shifting gear from being mere buyers and sellers to becoming strategic partners, Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) announced in 2018 that they would be 50% stakeholders in a USD 44 billion megarefinery plant in Western India. In terms of trade, Saudi Arabia and the UAE account for about 75% of the USD 103 billion bill between the GCC countries and India.2 Similarly, Saudi Arabia committed USD 10 billion to a refinery and petrochemical facility in Pakistan’s deepwater Gwadar Port, which is primarily funded by China.3 Tying up with the momentum of the growing economies and their infrastructure development plans in South Asia, Saudi Arabia has expressed long-term interest in investing up to USD 100 billion in India, USD 20 billion in Pakistan, and USD 35 billion in Bangladesh.

The UAE also made major investment commitments in South Asia, including a USD 75 billion spend in India.4

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50

THE MAIN SOURCES OF INDIA’S CRUDE OIL SUPPLY (2018–2019)

IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA

F IGURE IS MILLION T ONNE

40

30 IRAN UAE

20

VENEZUELA

NIGERIA KUWAIT MEXICO

10

0 CRUDE OIL SOURCE

2018

In a clear economic-diplomatic-security framework, the GCC countries sought to play the voice of reason in February 2019 to promote peace and stability in South Asia and, thereby, ensure their interests as well. Saudi Arabia and the UAE used their diplomatic influence to calm the situation after India and Pakistan had resorted to a tit-for-tat military action following a Pakistan-based militant group’s attack on Indian soldiers in Indian-administered Kashmir.5

INDIA’S LARGEST TRADE PARTNERS (2017)

HONG KONG 22 $BN CHINA 72 $BN

USA 65 $BN SAUDI ARABIA 25 $BN

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 53 $BN

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2019

Likewise, India’s energy, trade, and diaspora stakes mean its ties with the GCC countries are diversifying into security and defence cooperation. As part of promoting mutually beneficial strategic partnerships, India and the GCC countries are cooperating in multiple sectors, such as counter-terrorism, money laundering, cybersecurity, organised crime, human trafficking, and anti-piracy.6 In a sign of cooperation in the soft security domain possibly expanding to include hard security in the future, the India–Qatar defence cooperation pact stops “just short of stationing (Indian) troops” in Qatar.7 This pact and the India–Oman defence cooperation agreement, also signed in 2008, are templates for future security cooperation.

More recently, Oman granted India access to the strategically located port of Duqm on the northwestern edge of the Indian Ocean.8 Further, the UAE and India also began joint naval exercises in 2018.9 THE DELHI AND RIYADH DECLARATIONS Apart from Asia’s economic growth, the events of 9/11 in 2001—which increased Western suspicion of GCC investments—and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 against the wishes of the GCC countries, which increased Iran’s

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

influence in Iraq, were turning points in the Gulf’s “Look East” policy. These events conditioned King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’s historic visit to India in 2006—the first by a Saudi king in fifty years.

The official visit resulted in the first intergovernmental document between the two countries—the Delhi Declaration. But true progress occurred in India–Saudi relations when both agreed to go beyond the strengthening of economic and political ties. A “new era of strategic partnership” began after the Riyadh Declaration had been signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Riyadh in 2010.10 This amity was a departure from the past.

Until 2001, India–Saudi ties were hyphenated by the two countries’ relations with Pakistan but were partly de-hyphenated following Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2001. Riyadh then designated the India–Pakistan row over Kashmir as bilateral, thus aligning with New Delhi’s formulation that it did not require third-party mediation. The other GCC countries subsequently endorsed this stand.

India’s growing economy, Islamabad’s stance against joining the Saudi-led war in Yemen and its reluctance to join the 34-nation Islamic coalition against terrorism induced doubts about the intensity of Saudi–Pakistan ties. However, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al Jubeir’s statement in 2016 set the record straight—Saudi Arabia’s “relations with Pakistan do not come at the expense of [its] relations with India,” and the strengthening of Saudi ties with India will not result in compromising its relations with Pakistan, a historic ally.11 The interplay of Iran in South Asia’s ties with the GCC countries is equally important. At a time when Saudi–Iran ties are at their lowest, New Delhi’s ties with Riyadh are chugging along just as fine as they are with Tehran. It is obvious from the fact that India, Afghanistan, and Iran are working together to develop the Iranian port of Chabahar, with New Delhi investing USD 500 million to develop the port.12 India’s need to counter Pakistan, stabilise Afghanistan, access

Central Asia, tap energy requirements, and maintain Indian Muslim sectarian balance makes Iran a strategic partner.

This balancing act has encouraged India to reciprocate the GCC’s “Look East” policy with its new “Think West” policy. India’s former foreign secretary and current Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said: “If the eastern front is building upon longstanding policy, the western one is relatively more recent conceptually, even if India has had a historical presence in the Gulf … I can confidently predict that ‘Act East’ would be matched with ‘Think West.’”13 PROOF OF THE PUDDING IS IN THE EATING With the Saudi–India ties hitting the reset button, the UAE–India ties also improved dramatically, especially after Narendra Modi had become the first Indian prime minister in more than three decades to visit the UAE in 2015. In what has been termed as a “golden era,” their ties have matured and transformed through the signing of the Abu Dhabi Declaration in 2015 and the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2017, which allows to explore cooperation in new areas.14 For example, in a rare cross-investment and energy security deal, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company was awarded the opportunity to store its crude oil in an underground strategic reserve in south India. In return, a group of three Indian oil companies was awarded the opportunity to have a 10% participating interest in Abu Dhabi’s Lower Zakum offshore oilfield, the first such venture by India.15 Moreover, in what could be termed as a “food security for-energy security” deal, the two countries are also discussing “cooperation in the establishment of logistics hubs, cold storage, warehousing and more to operationalise” a food corridor. This corridor is expected to “help in ensuring food security for the UAE, as it will get the best quality agricultural products at cheaper prices” and attract investments to boost India’s agricultural sector.16 Efforts are also underway to tap into collaboration possibilities in hitherto untapped areas—space,

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artificial intelligence, defence equipment production, and railways, among others.

This newfound camaraderie was evident when the UAE was designated as the guest of honour at India’s Republic Day parade in January 2017, just like Saudi Arabia was in 2006.

RESET OF GCC–PAKISTAN TIES Gulf–Pakistan ties have historically been better than Gulf–India ties due to two factors: their common religious identity and Pakistan’s military support to Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. However, these ties severely strained after Islamabad’s refusal in 2015 to join the Saudi-led war against the houthis in Yemen.

Pakistan’s government under former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif put the decision to join the military action to a parliamentary vote. Since a sizeable portion of Pakistan’s population is Shiite, lawmakers voted against engaging in a Sunni–Shiite war in Yemen that would indirectly ensnare their own population in a sectarian battle at home. An upset UAE termed that decision as “contradictory and dangerous and unexpected” and even accused Pakistan of leaning towards Iran, which is accused of supporting the houthis in Yemen.17 However, with Prime Minister Imran Khan assuming office in August 2018, the Gulf–Pakistan ties are on the mend again.

Amid huge economic difficulties, Pakistan used its strategic position to get huge financial commitments from the Gulf nations. Backed by a flurry of bilateral visits by their leaders, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together offered Pakistan over USD 30 billion in loans and investments.

This money helped delay the politically difficult step to obtain loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).18 Apart from loans of up to USD 12 billion from the two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia’s USD 20-billion plan includes a USD 10-billion investment to develop an oil refinery and petrochemicals complex in Pakistan. The size of Saudi investment in Pakistan is second only to that of the Chinese, who have committed more than USD 60 billion as part of the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor projects.

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PAKISTAN’S TOP FIVE TRADE PARTNERS (JULY 2018–MARCH 2019)

QATAR 2.5 $BN CHINA 14.5 $BN

USA 6.4 $BN SAUDI ARABIA 3.2 $BN

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 8.4 $BN Such huge investments could serve two immediate strategic interests of the Gulf countries: For one thing, it helps Riyadh’s political plan to stall recent improvements in Islamabad–Tehran ties. For another, it helps Gulf countries, which are also close US allies, achieve their long-term objectives in the Afghanistan peace process, in which Pakistan is heavily involved. To consolidate the resetting of ties, Pakistan has also recently increased the number of soldiers stationed in Saudi Arabia to train the Kingdom’s forces and bolster its defences.

While the Gulf’s financial assistance considerably decreases Islamabad’s quantum of an IMF loan, Saudi Arabia is also keen to make investments in Pakistan’s mining, fertiliser production, power generation, and renewable energy sectors.

WORKFORCE SUPPLY Another common thread running between South Asia and the GCC countries is the flow of expatriate workforce, a win-win situation for both. On the one hand, the overpopulated South Asia has served as a boon to the underpopulated Gulf countries by providing unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled workforce, which has contributed to the growth and development of the region.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

TOP RECIPIENTS OF REMITTANCE FROM GULF COUNTRIES (2016)

NEPAL 5 $BN

EGYPT 14 $BN SRI LANKA 4 $BN

BANGLADESH 8 $BN

INDIA 36 $BN

PAKISTAN 12 $BN INDONESIA 5 $BN

THE PHILIPPINES 9 $BN

On the other hand, remittances from the region have aided the livelihood of millions of South Asian families and their countries’ economies as well.

Asians in general, and South Asians in particular, are the biggest segment of expatriate population in the Gulf region. South Asians make up between 14.6 and 24.5% of the total population in Saudi Arabia, with Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis being the top three expatriate groupings. In terms of percentage, the UAE has the most South Asians at 59.4%.

Indians are the largest demographic community there, with 38.2% of the total population.19 In terms of remittances, India received USD 80 billion in 2018, with 38.5% coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the case of Pakistan, after the United States and United Kingdom, remittances from Saudi Arabia and the UAE were next on the list.

FUTURE TRENDS AND CONCLUSION While oil, trade, and expatriates will remain the bedrock of GCC–South Asia ties, they are likely to assume strategic dimensions in the future, along with security cooperation gaining currency.

Over the last decade, the security debate in the Gulf has revolved around two viewpoints—one,

less international involvement in the region’s affairs, and two, more internationalisation of the region.

Since the dominant view favours the second option, several GCC leaders and academics have backed the idea of exploring new security arrangements.20 This posture and the shift in the economic power centre from the West to the East enticed the GCC countries to explore alternatives, particularly in Asia.21 Thus, rather than put all eggs in one basket, this “omnibalancing” policy means the region’s ties with the United States are no longer exclusive.22 It is in this context that some scholars, including this author, have been propagating the idea of upgrading the GCC–Asia buyer–seller relationship to a strategic one at both Track 2 and Track 1.5 levels. They are also exploring possibilities for a new collective security architecture, which would involve both Asian and Western powers, including the United States.23 Against such a backdrop, prognosis on the long-term GCC–South Asia relationship is based on three premises: 1. A relationship based purely on economic engagement is untenable in the long run. It needs to convert the transaction-based relationship into a strategic one.

2. It makes economic sense for South Asia to be part of any new international security system in the region that looks beyond the prevailing US-centric security paradigm.

Similarly, it would be beneficial for the GCC countries to have South Asia on board too.

3. The Gulf countries may better recognise South Asia’s influence if the latter assures strategic cooperation in any future security architecture.

The point is that principal Asian players, including China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan, would have to stop riding “piggyback” on US naval presence in the region’s waters at some point and find their means of securing their sea lanes. Since this aligns with the security requirements of the region, it opens interesting and diversifying possibilities in the region’s security arena.

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ENDNOTES

of India. 2 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/331GhFM > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

1 N. Janardhan, “Contextualising Gulf’s Pivot to Asia,” EDA

14 Kallol Bhattacherjee: India, UAE sign strategic partnership

Insight, Emirates Diplomatic Academy, February 2018.

pact. The Hindu. 25 January 2017. <https://bit.ly/331Dexv >

2 Robert Mogielnicki: New opportunities and high stakes for

Accessed: 29 July 2019.

Gulf–South Asia relations. The AGSIW Gulf Rising Series.

15 Khan, Sarmad: Adnoc signs preliminary accord for crude

Issue Paper 2019/4. Also see a video of a panel discussion on

storage with India’s ISPRL. The National, 12 November 2018.

the topic: The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington:

< https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/adnoc-signs-

GCC–South Asia: A new role for the Gulf countries in the

preliminary-accord-for-crude-storage-with-india-s-isprl-

Subcontinent? YouTube. 25 March 2019. <https://youtu.be/

1.791026> Accessed: 20 September 2019.

LG_2OIqC_zI > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

16

3

26 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2FQPWqE > Accessed: 29

Gul Yousafzai: Saudi Arabia to set up $10 billion oil

The golden era of UAE–India relations. Gulf News.

refinery in Pakistan. Reuters. 12 January 2019. <https://reut.

July 2019.

rs/2RnT8jy > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

17 Pakistan minister hits out at UAE over Yemen criticism. Al

4 Government approves India–UAE pact for USD 75 billion

Arabiya. 12 April 2015. <https://bit.ly/2YwNj6i > Accessed:

investment in NIIF. The Economic Times. 23 March 2016.

29 July 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2K5363U >

18

Accessed:

29

July

2019.;

Saeed Shah: Pakistan Turns to Gulf Countries to Keep

Saudi Arabia sees a $100 billion investment opportunity

Economy Afloat. The Wall Street Journal. 22 January 2019.

in India. Khaleej Times. 21 February 2019. <https://bit.

<https://on.wsj.com/2MwQy5j > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

ly/319jaYq > Accessed: 29 July 2019.; Bangladesh eyes

19

$35 bln in Saudi investment but doesn’t give time

tensions and protect their economic interests. Stratfor.

frame. Reuters. 7 March 2019. <https://reut.rs/2Cb5l1p >

29 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/2YGvjDA > Accessed: 29 July

Accessed: 29 July 2019.

2019.

Robert Mogielnicki: Gulf states help defuse South Asia

5 Arhama Siddiqa: Gulf mediation during the Pulwama crisis:

20

Jumping on the bandwagon. South Asian Voices. 19 April

Al-Thani, Emir of the State of Qatar. United Nations General

2019. <https://bit.ly/2YstUTW > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

Assembly, Sixty-second session, 4th plenary meeting, 25

6

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury: India and the Gulf region: building

September 2007. Official Records, A/62/PV.4. 19–21.; Nawaf

strategic partnerships. The International Institute for Strategic

Obaid: Saudi Arabia gets tough on foreign policy. The

Studies. 29 August 2018. <https://bit.ly/2UdVPln > Accessed:

Washington

29 July 2019.

st/2Mu928v > Accessed: 29 July 2019. More recent

7 Sandeep Dikshit: India signs defence pact with Qatar. The

developments in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen—where Saudi

Hindu. 12 November 2008.

Arabia worked on its own, contradicting the United States—

8

Ankit Panda: India gains access to Oman’s Duqm Port,

prove that such statements are not mere rhetoric. Also see US

putting the Indian Ocean geopolitical contest in the spotlight.

poll results have made global politics uncertain. The Gulf

The Diplomat. 14 February 2018. <https://bit.ly/2H5UrgR >

Today. 14 November 2016. <https://bit.ly/2YwPLK2 >

Accessed: 29 July 2019.

21 Christian Koch: Gulf Region Makes Strategic Shift in New

9 Two Indian ships take part in UAE–India naval exercise. Gulf

Global System. Arab News. 22 October 2006.; Christian

News. <https://bit.ly/313f044 > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

Koch: Gulf Needs More, Not Less, External Involvement.

10

Aaraa Magazine. 27 January 2006.

N. Janardhan, “Multilateralism in bilateralism,” The Gulf

Address by His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa

Today. 13 April 2016. <https://bit.ly/2Yxjuyr >

22

11

University.

Harsh V. Pant: Why India and Saudi Arabia continue to

Post.

25

October

2013.

<https://wapo.

Concept propounded by Steven David, Johns Hopkins

grow closer. The Diplomat. 13 April 2016. <https://bit.

23

ly/2GyrfxR > Accessed: 29 July 2019.

Janardhan: A New Gulf Security Architecture. Prospects and

12

Challenges for an Asian Role. Gerlach Press, Berlin, 2014.

India, Iran, Afghanistan hold first trilateral on Chabahar

Ranjit Gupta – Abubaker Bagader – Talmiz Ahmad – N.

port project. The Economic Times. 23 October 2018. <https:// bit.ly/2yovdod > Accessed: 31 July 2019.

13 Speech by Foreign Secretary at Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi (March 2, 2015). Ministry of External Affairs, Government 74

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

A GREAT OPPORTUNITY OR A SERIOUS RISK?-WHAT DOES THE PERSIAN GULF MEAN FOR CHINA AND THE NEW SILK ROAD? Lukács Krajcsír

Months ago, Saudi Arabia made its biggest deal ever with an East Asian country: after Chinese President Xi Jinping had met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Beijing, they signed thirty-five economic and energy cooperation agreements worth a total of USD 28 billion. The ink was still wet when Chinese diplomacy made yet another remarkable achievement with another Arab country. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), visited China and struck up a USD 3.4 billion deal. Besides, several weeks before the Saudi and Emirati trips, the Chinese leadership welcomed Qatar’s emir, amid years of tension between Doha and its Arab neighbours.

In the face of the above-mentioned events, there is little doubt that these countries occupy an important position in China’s foreign policy.

Also, it cannot be denied that the Persian Gulf or the whole Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region offers exceptional advantages for the East Asian country. Despite the fact that, nowadays, it is suffering heavily from environmental changes, human rights abuses, migration crises, and security problems, Beijing sees great opportunities in the region. Not just in economic ways: the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or the Maritime Silk Road have great geopolitical importance because they connect Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe through the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Undoubtedly, the Chinese project is in its first stages, but, even now, the Gulf States—Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen—are the core of the entire (maritime) BRI.

CHINA’S CRUDE OIL IMPORTS

BY SOURCE, 2014 2% 2% 2%

9%

16%

2%

3% 3%

13%

4% 4%

11%

9%

10%

9%

SAUDI ARABIA

ANGOLA

RUSSIA

OMAN

IRAQ

IRAN

VENEZUELA

UAE

KUWAIT

COLOMBIA

CONGO

BRAZIL

SOUTH SUDAN

KAZAKHSTAN

OTHERS

Most of the Gulf States had had strong and fruitful relations with China years before 2013, when Xi Jinping announced the New Silk Road initiative in Astana. Thanks to Beijing’s so-called “five-dimensional paradigm”—this term was created by Caliph University (Emirates) international studies specialist Dr Muhamad

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Olimat—and Beijing’s traditional non-intervention, pragmatic foreign policy, the regional countries became significant partners for China.1 While, in the 1990s, less than 15% of China’s crude oil import was delivered from the Gulf, this figure rose to 51% until 2014.2 If this trend continues, then, by 2020, oil imports are expected to increase to 70%.3 Not only crude oil is important for the East Asian country: by 2014, China became the third largest importer of LNG in the world, and 41% of the total Chinese liquid natural gas import came from the Middle East, mostly from Qatar (34%).4 Despite the Arab naval and land blockade against Qatar in summer 2017, Beijing imported 7.48 million tons of LNG from the Arab monarchy—this amount was 51% more than in the previous year.5 China’s biggest trade partners in the MENA were the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).6 The trade value increased from USD 9 billion in 2000 to USD 163 billion in 2018—so far, the highest point was reached in 2014 (USD 175 billion). Today, Saudi Arabia has become China’s most important trade partner in the Middle East, while the UAE ranks second.7 YEAR

CHINESE—GCC TRADE VALUE (IN BILLION USD)

2000

9,893.19

2001

9,243.71

2002

10,470.62

2003

15,968.45

2004

24,673.02

2005

34,827.08

2006

45,970.81

2007

59,623.69

2008

94,285.24

2009

69,106.88

2010

93,669.47

The value of Chinese–GCC trade, 2000–2014 76

Beyond commerce, the Chinese achieved some remarkable results in foreign direct investment (FDI), too. From 2003 to 2010, Chinese direct investment in the GCC increased from USD 10.66 million to USD 1.675 billion, and then up to USD 2.2275 billion in 2011.8 The Chinese FDI is focused mainly in three areas: energy (SINOPEC, CNPC), infrastructure (high-velocity trains, ports, and underground networks), and telecommunication (mobile phones, internet, etc.).

What really intensifies the Chinese infrastructural investments in the region is the fact that the Gulf States—except Iraq, Kuwait, and Yemen—are full members of the Asian Infrastructure Improvement Bank (AIIB). This bank disposes of more than a USD 100 billion capital to finance the BRI projects worldwide.

Qatar and the UAE have created a joint fund; meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are at the planning stage. Also, it should not be forgotten, that, in the last years, Chinese financial institutions struck a high number of currency swap deals. This is the reason why the renminbi (RMB) is becoming the most active currency used in the UAE and Qatar for direct payments to China—even Riyadh declared that the country was preparing for an RMB funding.9 China and the Gulf have also accomplished great achievements in other sectors. From a cultural aspect, one of the biggest events was the China–Arab States Friendship Year in 2015—from both sides, over one hundred cultural institutions took part in the event. More than 15,000 Chinese are studying in Arab countries, and there are 3,000 students from GCC countries in China. Today, there is a visa-free or visa on arrival policy between China and Bahrain, Iran, and the UAE. The number of Confucius Institutes is also rising: there are two in Iran, two in the United Arab Emirates, and one in Bahrain.10 What really demonstrated the growing importance of the Gulf in Beijing’s foreign policy was Xi Jinping’s first tour abroad in 2016. Days before the Middle East trip, the Chinese leader presented the country’s first Arab Policy Paper: the so-called “1+2+3 cooperation”

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

NEW EURASIAN LANDBRIDGE

CHINA MONGOLIA RUSSIA CORRIDOR

CHINA CENTRAL ASIA WEST ASIA CORRIDOR CHINA PAKISTAN CORRIDOR

CHINA BANGLADESH INDIA CORRIDOR

CHINA INDOCHINA CORRIDOR

M AR ITIME SIL KR O AD

The Belt and Road Initiative

scheme. The energy cooperation is the “core” of the relationship. “2” means constructing infrastructure, trade, and investment, which are the “wings” of the core. The “3” refers to the “three breakthroughs”—the cooperation in nuclear energy, new energy, and aerospace (satellite navigation system, space exploration).11 Moreover, of course, the Belt and Road Initiative serves as the framework for the whole of the “1+2+3 cooperation.”12 Although the Chinese President’s tour took place in a rather tense geopolitical situation (the execution of Saudi citizen Shiite imam Nimr an-Nimr led to a regional crisis),13 he successfully forged several deals with the hosting countries. Xi Jinping first travelled to Saudi Arabia, where he made agreements in almost all dimensions of bilateral relations: from increasing industrial production to intensive and wide energy cooperation, such as building Saudi nuclear reactors with the help of the China Nuclear Engineering Corporation.14

There is no doubt that Xi struck a number of big deals in Egypt, but Iran was the most important venue during the Chinese President’s trip.15 Xi sealed seventeen agreements of a twenty-five-year duration with Tehran; among others, they agreed that, in ten years, the trade balance of the two states could reach USD 600 billion. Similarly, China wished to double the number of its investments in Iran while taking on the construction of two nuclear power plants in southern Iran. The Chinese initiative, BRI, was also touched upon—a few weeks later, the first train through the Silk Road arrived at the Tehran railway station via the Yiwu–Tehran route.16 It is a good question if, since Xi’s 2016 visit, there has been any significant change in the China–Gulf relations, or if regional conflicts in the MENA and tension among the Gulf States have negatively affected Beijing’s Middle East policy.

First of all, it should be mentioned that, from the beginning, the Chinese leadership is fully aware of the great geopolitical risks and security

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challenges in the MENA. The ethnic, political, and religious conflicts, along with major powers’ interventions, have made the whole region unstable and unpredictable. The so-called Arab spring, the rise of terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State Iraq and Levant (ISIL) made their consequences felt within China’s border: the Communist Party of China (CPC) feared that the unrest would not only spread to Central Asia but also to the East Asian country.17 Although a “Chinese Spring” did not break out, terrorism emerged in the East Asian country.

The rising number of Chinese citizen militants in the wars of the MENA region (cca. 1,000 men coming from Hui and Uighur ethnic groups), their return to China, and the growing number of terror attacks in the East Asian country all pointed to the fact that Beijing is far from being able to distance itself from the events in the Middle East. More than a hundred civilians died in these terror attacks, e.g., on Tiananmen Square (2013), at the Kunming train station (2014), at the dozens of places in the Xinjiang region in Western China. These attacks were always followed by a—sometimes excessive—retaliation from the Chinese armed forces.18 At the same time, the Chinese leadership must look out for its investments and citizens in the MENA. Although ISIL was defeated, radicalism has not disappeared. Other smaller— nonetheless aggressive—terrorist groups are still operating in the Gulf. These extremist groups and criminals might hijack or kill Chinese people for their own ideological, political, or even economic reasons. 19 Today, there are approximately 550,000 Chinese—a figure representing around 10% of China’s all expatriates—workers and students in the Gulf States, and they are all potential targets for terrorists. The high number of Chinese in the region also means that Beijing needs to send forces to the region to protect its citizens and investments.

There are some people saying that unless Beijing sends “Chinese boots on the ground,” the East Asian country will not be taken seriously in the Gulf.20 At the same time, these voices overlook that economic interests always go 78

hand in hand with political and security interests.

In late December 2015, the CPC passed a new anti-terror act after a long debate. The new act sanctions those who provide information to terrorists—whether in person, on the internet, or by voice recording—with prison up to five years.

The most interesting article is No. 76, which authorises the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to launch military action in case Chinese citizens and the country’s interests are in danger abroad: Beijing may take military action and cooperate with the local government to defend them.21 Although China did not intervene directly in regional conflicts, year after year, the Chinese security and military cooperation with Arab states gets stronger. In addition, when it becomes necessary, the Chinese leadership sends its own naval ships and armed forces to evacuate its citizens from war zones in the MENA, as it happened in Libya (2011), Syria (2013), Iraq (2014), and Yemen (2015).22 Not only wars and terrorist attacks are jeopardising the BRI but also conflicts among the Gulf States. The biggest one is the “cold war” between Riyadh and Tehran, which dates back many decades. The reasons for this rivalry are not just geopolitical (as both parties strive for the title of the “leading power of the MENA”) and ethnic (as Arabs and Persians have ill will towards each other) but also religious: Saudi Arabia sees itself as the leader of the Sunni world and Iran as the leader of Shia Islam. For years, the two countries have fought proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon—each one supporting their local allies with arms and manpower. Moreover, even as of writing this article (the first half of 2019), tensions are rising in the Persian Gulf, after unknown forces attacked oil tankers and with the Arab monarchies and the United States blaming Iran and sending more troops into the region.23 What makes the Saudi–Iranian rivalry dangerous is that each state has its own allies among the superpowers. While, for the United States, the Gulf monarchies are the closest military allies (after Israel, of course), Russia supports Tehran and its allies in the MENA not just diplomatically and with arms supplies but

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

even with military aid just like in Syria. That is why China is being forced to be very careful not to enrage Saudi Arabia and Iran when it comes to strengthening the relations between Beijing and Riyadh or Tehran—and not to affect the interests of the United States and Russia either.

Despite the fact that this situation can be described as a “diplomatic minefield,” China walks on it with confidence and efficiency.

Beijing has assiduously worked to maintain a delicate balance with both sides and has stuck trade, investment, and energy deals with each side.

Indeed, the Chinese leadership could make some great successes in the political or even in the security field. Since the 1990s, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the only “comprehensive strategic partners” in the MENA. The Chinese diplomacy has made a lot of efforts to achieve the Iran nuclear deal, but, meanwhile, it also supports the Saudi and their coalition allies’ efforts in Yemen and the return of the expelled Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. China can even make joint military exercises with both parties without any negative impact on its prestige. For example, in 2016, China had a joint naval drill with Iran and, a few weeks later, an anti-terrorist exercise with Saudi forces. 24 Also, while 12% of Iran’s arms imports comes from China, Saudi Arabia can afford to get some highly advanced weapons, such as drones and—as one report from the Pentagon suggests—ballistic missiles. 25 There is no doubt that if the Belt and Road Initiative is successfully finished, it will cement China’s economic dominance in the Middle East and North Africa. Also, there is no uncertainty that if the project concludes, Beijing’s willingness for “sending boots on the ground” to defend its investments, interests, and the lives of the Chinese citizens will be much higher. However, does this mean that the more politically and militarily involved China will overtake the United States’ current position in the Gulf? Probably this will be one of the biggest questions in geopolitics and international relations for the next decade.

ENDNOTES 1 The “five dimensions” are energy policies, trade, investments, arms supplies, cultural links, and political cooperation. Muhamad S.Olimat: China and the Middle East: From Silk Road to Arab Spring. London, Routledge, 2013., 34.

2 China. International energy data and analysis. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 14 May 2015. <https://bit.ly/28NmW12 > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

3 Henelito A. Sevilla: The Turbulent Middle East: Analysing Security Issues facing China’s Belt and Road Initiative towards the Region. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2019/2. 195–210.

4 China. International energy data and analysis.

5 Chinese official urges Gulf Crisis settlement through dialogue. The Peninsula. 5 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/2LhoHHw > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

6 The GCC was founded by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Today, there is a regional intergovernmental political and economic union, which consists of all Arab states in the Persian Gulf—except Iraq. Its goals are creating a monetary union, common infrastructural and energetic policies, and counterbalancing Iran’s influence in the region. In the last years, there have been serious conflicts among GCC-members: mostly with Qatar, which negatively affected the function and integrity of the organisation.

7 Xuming Qian – Jonathan Fulton: China–Gulf Economic Relationship under the “Belt and Road” Initiative. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2017/3. 14.

8 Xuming–Jonathan, 15.

9 Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat: Belt and Road Brings Chinese Finance to the Gulf. The Diplomat. 17 May 2019. <https://bit.ly/2X4ClVA > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

10 Confucius Institute/Classroom. Confucius Institute Headquarters (Hanban). <https://bit.ly/1G9bCDM > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

11 Xuming–Jonathan, 19.

12 Nicholas Lyall: Can China Remake Its Image in the Middle East? The Diplomat. 4 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/2UkpSrj > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

13 The Saudi sheik had fought for decades for the rights of Shiites, who amount to 15-20% of the monarchy’s population and are essentially regarded as second-rate citizens. The case led to an attack on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Tehran and the break-up of diplomatic ties. The situation was aggravated by the fact that other MENA countries also entered the debate: Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Sudan supported Saudi diplomatic moves, while Shiites

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around the region held demonstrations against Saudi Arabia,

21 Counter-Terrorism Law (2015). In: China Law Translate. 12

and countries such as Lebanon and Iraq denounced the exe-

December 2015. <https://bit.ly/2KDkrCC > Accessed: 20

cution.

June 2019.

14 China, Saudi Arabia agree to build HTR. World Nuclear

22

News. 20 January 2016. <https://bit.ly/1RzZHsr > Accessed:

MENA, see: Krajcsír.

20 June 2019.

23 Jack Detsch: Pentagon official says ‘campaign’ of Iranian

15 Beijing played a crucial role in the Irani nuclear pact sealed

threats caused US Middle East surge. Al-Monitor. 11 June

in Vienna on 14 July 2015. For more details, see: Emma Scott:

2019. <https://bit.ly/2IKgHgl > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

A Nuclear Deal with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Role in

24 Willem Oosterveld: China in the Middle East: Testing the

the P5+1 Talks with Iran. The Jamestown Foundation. 17 July

Waters, Linking the Lands. The Diplomat. 25 August 2017.

2015. <https://bit.ly/2X8h0dS > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2IMTdaM > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

16 The first Chinese “Silk Road” train arrived at the Tehran

25 Saudi Arabia secretly purchased ballistic missile technolo-

railway station in March 2016 via the Yiwu–Tehran route. It

gy from China: Report. Middleeasteye.net. 5 June 2019.

took the 32-container traction unit for 14 days to cover the

<https://bit.ly/2Xx9PeG > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

For more about Chinese evacuation missions in the

distance of more than 6,500 kilometres. The Yiwu–Tehran route is an important element of OBOR, as it is only a sideway to the Yiwu–Madrid route. Ramachandran, Sudha. Iran, China and the Silk Road Train. In: The Diplomat. 30 March 2016. < http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/iran-china-and-the-silkroad-train > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

17 In February 2011, members of the opposition started to gather at a McDonald’s near Tiananmen Square, but relatively few people arrived at the place, and the “crowd’s” revolutionary mood was not even close to that of 1989. The Chinese government nevertheless judged the event dangerous, and the authorities arrested the participants a little later. Many articles about the reactions of the Communist Party of China and the possible breakout of the “Chinese Spring” were published in Western media (in, e.g., Bloomberg, The Atlantic, The Diplomat) at the beginning of 2011. The Chinese government tried to contain the situation: official Chinese news sites were ordered to use material on the Middle Eastern events edited by the Xinhua state press agency and avoid Western or other Far Eastern sources. The sale of jasmine flowers was banned for a few days in Chinese cities, and, for a short time, search words such as “Egypt” and “jasmine” were also blocked.

18 For more about ISIL-related terrorist attacks, see: Krajcsír Lukács: China’s New Grand Strategy for the Middle East. In: Kína a globális kihívások tükrében – China in the Light of Global Challenges, edited by Hamar Imre – Besenyő János. Budapest, ELTE Konfuciusz Intézet, 2017. 303–322.

19 A Chinese hostage, Fan Jinghui was executed by ISIL in Iraq at the end of November 2015. He was “put up for sale” on the internet for days, but when no “acceptable offer” came, he was beheaded.

20 Steven A. Cook: The Middle East Doesn’t Take China Seriously. Foreign Policy. 13 September 2018 <https://bit. ly/2Qw2O7I > Accessed: 20 June 2019.

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SMALL COUNTRY, BIG AMBITIONS: THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN THE LIBYAN CONFLICT Péter Wagner

One of the most interesting questions examined by international relations is the role small states could play in them. Historically, these states have had numerous ways of asserting their interests in international relations, such as bandwagoning, balancing, integration, or neutrality. In the last decades, the smaller states’ opportunities expanded, and the room to manoeuvre in regional or global international relations widened for them due to the advancement of the multipolar world order.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a good example of this change, as its foreign policy activity is not unprecedented, but its military involvement and active intervention in other country’s domestic affairs set it apart from the group of small states with assertive foreign policy.

The international press often characterises it as “Little Sparta,” indicating that the small country is undeniably punching above its weight in the Gulf region and in the wider Arab world.

The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) population is roughly a bit less than ten million, of which 1.4 million are actual Emirati citizens. The country, which is a bit smaller than Hungary, generates 10% of the whole Arab region’s economic output. One of its most important sources of income is the energy sector, but, unlike most Gulf States, the oil and gas revenues in the country account for only 30% of its GDP. The GDP is determined by the industry and services in around 50–50%.1 The UAE consists of seven emirates.

Economically and politically, Abu Dhabi plays the leading role (having 95% of the UAE’s hydrocarbon assets). This emirate is ruled by the Nahyan family, whose leaders are the presidents of the federation of the seven emirates. The second most important emirate

is neighbouring Dubai, led by the Maktoum family. This emirate’s economy leans on trade and tourism. The Jebel Ali Port is the biggest in the region and the busiest in the Middle East.

A considerable part of the cargo arriving in the Gulf States, Iran, and Iraq transits this port. This significant flow of goods explains why the UAE is the third most important economic partner of Tehran after China and the EU (which alone consists of 28 member states).2 Considering the fact that the exports of the UAE and Iran are highly dominated by hydrocarbons, it seems obvious that Dubai plays a central role in the re-export of goods coming to Iran from the rest of the world. Dubai’s close economic relation with Iran means that the Maktoum family’s foreign policy interests do not always coincide with those of the Nahyan family.

DEFENCE COOPERATIONS AND MILITARY CAPABILITIES The United Arab Emirates is a young country by international standards, as it won independence in 1971. The country’s foreign policy during the first President, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, was characterised by the pursuit of sovereignty and a balanced centrist foreign policy where strengthening cooperation and a peaceful settlement of conflicts got a strong emphasis. The UAE has territorial disputes with Iran, which occupied the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs from the emirate of Sharjah in 1970.

During the Cold War, the threat perception of the UAE and the other Gulf monarchies was dominated by the rivalry of the two neighbouring regional powers, Iraq and Iran. When the Iran–Iraq War broke out in 1979, these countries established the Gulf Cooperation Council in

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order to strengthen the integration in the economic and military spheres.

After the Cold War, the UAE’s foreign policy activity increased and took on a bigger role in missions focusing on international crisis management, which became popular at that time: “The UAE Armed Forces participated in the Arab Deterrent Force that sought to bring to an end the civil strife in Lebanon, and in UNOSOM II, the United Nations peacekeeping and reconstruction force in Somalia. In early 1999, Sheikh Zayed was among the first world leaders to express support for the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to launch its aerial campaign to force Serbia to halt its genocidal activities against the people of Kosovo.

From late 1999 to 2001, the UAE contingent serving with the UN’s peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) was the largest of any of the non-NATO states, and the only one from an Arab or Muslim country.”3 The United States has played an outsized role in the security of the Gulf region since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Washington sent around 500,000 soldiers to defend Saudi Arabia and defeat the Iraqi forces in 1991. After the war, US forces stayed in Saudi Arabia, and new bases appeared in Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait as well. In 1994, Washington and Abu Dhabi signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement.

From the beginning of the 2000s, the US significantly restructured its forces in the region.

The forces withdrawn from Saudi Arabia have been distributed to the small states of the region. The forward headquarter of the Central Command, which is in charge of the region, was established in Qatar’s al-Udeid air base. Bahrain became the base of the US Navy Fifth Fleet while bases for land and naval forces were established in Kuwait. In the United Arab Emirates, the al-Dhafra air base became the hub of US military deployments. This “facility at first only hosted US surveillance aircraft such as the U-2 and the KC-10 refuelling aircraft, but the UAE later permitted the stationing of F-15s; the ‘Stealth’ F-22 Raptor on. The port of Jebel Ali, capable of handling aircraft carriers, is the US Navy’s busiest port of call.” 4 82

During the War on Terror, Abu Dhabi proved to be a trusted ally to Washington. The Special Operation Forces of the UAE and the Air Force were the only Arab military forces participating in the operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The UAE has been participating in the reconstruction of the country since then.

The security and military cooperation between the US and the UAE were further enhanced by the firm increase of US military personnel stationing in the Emirates from 800 to 5,000.

Meanwhile, “around 600-800 UAE military personnel had the chance to study and train in the United States each year.”5 From 2004, the US became the main weapon supplier to the UAE, providing the most up-todate aircraft, helicopters, and missile defence systems. The UAE helicopter fleets include almost a hundred CH-47 Chinook and UH-60 Black Hawk transport helicopters. The United Arab Emirates Air Force also operates around 30 AH-64D Apache attack helicopters, around 80 F-16E Block 60 fighters, and the most advanced Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) ballistic missile defence system.6

IMPORTS OF MAJOR ARMS

BY THE UAE, 1994–2018 1994–98 1999–2000

2911 TIV

2004–2008

2009–13

2014–18

5762 TIV

5425 TIV

1777 TIV 7077 TIV

UAE

France

Germany

Italy

Netherlands

Russia

Turkey

USA

others

TIV= millions of SIPRI trend-indicator values.

Note: Where applicable, up to the four largest suppliers in each period are named.

Further information on the countries categorized as ‘Others’ in each period is available from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “[i]n 2014 the UAE was the second-largest military spender in the Middle East and ranked 14th in the world.

The increase in its military expenditure was particularly large between 2006 and 2014 (136 per cent).”7 SIPRI believes that the UAE’s military spending in 2018 possibly remained the same for two reasons. The import of foreign-manufactured weapon systems has continued, and the country was actively involved in two wars (in Yemen and Libya).8 To sum up, the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces have a robust, well-equipped military, capable of full-spectrum military operations, at least in theory. Its offensive capabilities, the size of the Air Force and Navy, its strategic transport and tanker force are capable of projecting power well beyond its borders. The only question is whether this army is a paper tiger, whose significantly advanced Western-made weaponry is but to show off the country’s wealth and solidify its security cooperation with major Western partners. In the last decades, there was a trend in the Gulf that monarchies spent billions of dollars on weapons and equipment but not on capabilities. The US “sold more planes than there were trained pilots,” 9 while the Gulf countries remained reluctant to use their forces in conflicts or international peacekeeping operations (save the UAE). Consequently, when the Arab Spring started in 2011, and those monarchies felt motivated for the first time to deploy their force in the region, the jury was out on the quality of these armies.

UAE FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT AFTER THE ARAB SPRING—THE CASE OF LIBYA The UAE’s threat perception was influenced by three developments in the last decade.

Foremost, the perceived withdrawal of the US from the region, secondly, the emerging threat posed by Iran, and, lastly, the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood as the consequence of the regimes’ fall in Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. The US’ disengagement from the Middle East did have clear signs. It started with the withdrawal of US forces in Iraq, culminating in December

2011, when the last US troops left the country.

This development was augmented by the Obama administration’s stated aims to turn to the Pacific Region and China (“Pivot to Asia”).

The nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 reinforced this sentiment. The Gulf States’ impression was that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) encouraged Tehran to expand its influence in the wider region by using proxy forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Finally, popular movements during the Arab Spring upheavals toppled or destabilised regimes that previously had successfully kept the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood at bay. Again, the US was reluctant to engage during the events in 2011 and 2012. “Leading from behind” was the phrase the Obama administration used to describe their approach, but it was rather a clear sign of Washington’s hesitation and unwillingness to act decisively in the eyes the Gulf monarchies’ leaders.

Hosni Mubarak’s fall from power in Egypt was especially shocking for the Gulf states. The Egyptian leader was a long-term ally of the US, but, in the eyes of many, Washington let Mubarak fall. Moreover, the White House’s inaction (or support for democratic change) brought the Muslim Brotherhood into play, so the Islamist party won the first democratic election in Egypt, and its leader, Mohammed Morsi, became president. Having witnessed these developments in 2012, most of the Gulf states had to reconsider their relationship with the US and think hard about what would happen to them in a similar scenario.

Reaction to the American disengagement was varied among the Gulf States: “Oman and Qatar have tried to entice America to keep its footprint in the region by offering military access to a new port or by offering free upgrades for an existing military base, respectively. The Saudis and Emiratis, in contrast, have decided that they need to protect their own neighbourhood and thus ramped up their own engagement.”10 The change of attitude of the latter two countries may also be explained by the emergence of Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in the United Arab Emirates.

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Fights on the streets of Tripoli

Both Crown Princes can be seen as leading personalities of more assertive and reassuring foreign policy attitudes in these countries.

Within the foregoing context, the UAE’s foreign policy has become more assertive and even aggressive in the last decade, starting with the deployment of air force assets to the NATO air campaign in Libya against Colonel Qaddafi.

Abu Dhabi has supported rebel forces in Syria (although not on the same scale as Saudi Arabia or Qatar), participated with its military in the suppression of the revolt in Bahrain, and supported the new Sissi government financially in Egypt after the forced removal of Mohammed Morsi. After 2014, the UAE’s al-Dhafra Air Base became the centre of the air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The United Arab Emirates Air Force itself has played a leading role in the bombings, coming only second after the US in terms of the number of missions conducted.11 In 2017, it strongly supported the Saudi-led escalation with Qatar, and it has since participated in the blockade of Doha.

84

The military operation in Libya, Bahrain, and Syria showed how the Emirates’ armed forces had grown mature; however, their final test was the involvement in the Saudi-led coalition’s fights in Yemen from 2015. There, the Emirates’ military deployed a wide range of its offensive capabilities.

Special Forces raided al-Qaeda hideouts in the mountains in full cooperation with their American peers. The United Arab Emirates Navy planned and executed its first-ever amphibious landing operation in Aden, and the ground forces successfully seized the port of Mukalla from al-Qaeda and maintained a security belt around the city afterwards, training and mentoring local tribes. The Emirati forces landed on the Socotra Island while the Navy set up a ring of bases and facilities in Somalia and Eritrea.

THE UAE’s INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA The Arab Spring reached Tripoli at the beginning of 2011. The first civil war in the North African country lasted for eight months and ended with the violent death of Muammar Qaddafi, long-time leader of the country. The UN Security Council

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

adopted Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which authorised member states “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”12 The Security Council also set up a no-fly zone and imposed an arms embargo.

The UAE played a major role even at this stage of the conflict. A GCC meeting was held in Abu Dhabi almost two weeks before the UN SC vote where member states called for a no-fly zone for the first time. A few days later, on 12 March, due to the strong lobbying efforts of the UAE, the Arab League summit also endorsed the no-fly zone over Libya.13 With a strong and unified Arab standing on the fate of the fellow Libyan regime, the Arab League’s decision played a key role in eliminating objections (i.e. a veto) by Russia and China at the final vote on 17 March.

The United Arab Emirates immediately joined NATO air operations and deployed six Frenchmade Mirage 2000 and six F-16 aircraft to Italy, and Special Forces to Libya. Although other Gulf States also participated in the NATO-led air campaign, solely the United Arab Emirates Air Force conducted bombings in Libyan territory.

The United Arab Emirates Special Forces

worked with revolutionary brigades, arming and training them for the fight against government forces, and also cooperated with American, French, and British Special Forces.14 In 2014, the Second Libyan Civil War started between the Tobruk-based “House of Representatives” and the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC). The international community made the decision to support the GNC, which had to rely on the support of Islamist militias and the nearby city of Misrata. In May 2014, the “House of Representatives”-nominated General Khalifa Haftar started Operation Dignity against GNC forces. Since then, Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) has continuously been extending its authority in Libya and defeating opposing forces called Libyan Dawn. By 2016, LNA occupied Eastern Libya, and the major oil-producing regions and terminals on the coast.

While talks between the rival governments of HoR and GNC were maintained between 2016 and 2019, Haftar forces made a surprise push for Tripoli in April 2019.

External players in the conflict can be grouped according to their level of support to internal players. The United States seems to be interested only in counterterrorism-related issues.

When local al-Qaeda or ISIS forces emerged,

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85

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan

Washington has always been ready to engage either directly (with bombings and deploying special forces) or through proxies (using local militias). Another group consists of countries strongly interested in political solutions but not ready to intervene militarily in the conflict. These players include Tunisia, Algeria, Italy, and the European Union. The last group of countries is actively supporting the GNC in Tripoli (Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan) and the HoR in Tobruk (UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) in their internal fight against each other.15 Russia’s positions are blurred, but it is tilted towards supporting Haftar politically and with arms transfer.

Gulf states supported opposing forces in the Libyan civil war. Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, there was a growing rift between Qatar, a long-time supporter of Muslim Brotherhood, and the UAE, Saud Arabia, and Bahrain, a group which considered the Islamist organisation a terrorist organisation. This ideological conflict was then exported to a regional level, where each side found its own partners in the local conflicts in Libya, Egypt, or Sudan.

The different material and financial support by the UAE (and by other countries) has long been catalogued by the UN Security Council. Countries 86

providing arms transfers to parties involved in the conflict in Libya are in violation of UN arms embargo under UNSC Resolution 1973.

The central pillar of the UAE’s presence in Libya is the Khadim Air Base in the eastern desert of the country. As revealed in 2016, Abu Dhabi maintained a significant air power there, which included six IOMAX AT-802 light attack aircraft, two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, two Chinese made Wing Long drones armed with precision guided munitions, and an Il-76 transport aircraft.16 Abu Dhabi’s locally manufactured Nimr and Panthera T-6 Armoured Personnel Carriers also appeared on the battlefields and among the military aid deliveries donated to Haftar’s forces.17 The UAE also provides arms to LNA militias through arms transfers from third parties. In 2015, Russian made Mi-24P attack helicopters were delivered to the Libyan National Forces. An investigation by UN experts later revealed that Abu Dhabi had bought four helicopters of this type from Belarus, and two of them were later illegally transferred to Libya.18 In 2015, the Czech state-owned company LOM Praha sold seven Mi-24 to the UAE. Next year, anti-tank guided missiles and machine guns compatible with the Mi-24 helicopters were also bought by the LNA.19 CONCLUSION Although small in terms of territory and population, the United Arab Emirates has become one of the most influential players in the Middle East over the last decade. Similarly to other Gulf states, Abu Dhabi has deepened its military cooperation with the United States and modernised its military to operate robust and well-equipped armed forces. However, unlike most of its neighbours, the UAE did not hesitate to deploy its troops when it felt the need to defend its perceived national interests.

Currently, in Libya, the UAE is one of the major military powers with its special force and air force assets deployed. In the current civil war, the opposing Libyan forces have their own foreign supporters, which are even willing to break the UN arms embargo to defeat or at least contain the influence of the other side (and its sponsors).

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Abu Dhabi is supporting General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army directly through its assets in al-Khadim Air Base and indirectly, transferring arms either produced in the UAE or illegally imported from third countries. The UAE’s intervention in Libya proves that medium and small states could have a growing role in the conflicts of the coming decades. In a multipolar international system, where the US is not capable anymore of projecting power in every corner of the world, new players could emerge with their own agenda. The case of the UAE shows that these players can achieve limited success when they have the right mix of political will, strategic objectives, and military power.

9

Elana DeLozier: The Dilemma of an Imperfect Ally. The

Washington Institute. 20 June 2019. <https://bit.ly/2ksL55L > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

10 DeLozier.

11 Rajiv Chandrasekaran: In the UAE, the United States has a potent ally nicknamed “Little Sparta.” The Washington Post. 9 November 2014. <https://wapo.st/2lzKjnP > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

12 Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions. United Nations Meeting Coverage and Press Releases. 17 March 2011. <https:// bit.ly/2DodIbZ > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

13 Ethan Bronner – David E. Sanger: Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya. The New York Times. 12 March 2011. <https://nyti.ms/2k0ZlCu > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

14

Sean Rayment: How the special forces helped bring

Gaddafi to his knees. The Telegraph. 28 August 2011. <https://bit.ly/2lWbQji >Accessed: 14 August 2019.

ENDNOTES

15 Active military support can be understood as direct military intervention, military assistance, or arms transfer. See Karim

1 Middle East: United Arab Emirates. Central Intelligence

Mezran – Arturo Varvell: Libyan Crisis: International Actors at

Agency. The World Factbook. <https://bit.ly/1aCjj4d >

Play. In: Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis, edited by Karim Mez-

Accessed: 14 August 2019.

ran – Arturo Varvelli Ledizioni LediPublishing, Milano, 2017.

2

16 UAE’s Forward Operating Base in Libya Revealed. UAS

Countries and regions: Iran. European Commission

<https://bit.ly/1HtooNL > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

Vision. 1 November 2016. <https://bit.ly/2lYc75j > Accessed:

3 Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Founder of the UAE.

14 August 2019.

Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, Washington D.C.

17 Sami Zaptia: UN reports numerous Libya arms embargo

<https://bit.ly/2lZOhGu >Accessed: 14 August 2019.

violations on both sides of the conflict. The Libyan Herald. 12

4 Kenneth Katzman: United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S.

Policy.

Congressional

Research

Service

Report,

June 2017. <https://bit.ly/2lvOTDr > Accessed: 14 August 2019.

RS21852. 25 October 2018. 18.

18 Frank Slijper: Under the radar. The United Arab Emirates,

5 Kenneth, 18.

arms transfers and regional conflicts. PAX. 2017/10. 31.

6 This fleet of aircraft and weapon systems are also augment-

19 Letter dated 1 June 2017 from the Panel of Experts on

ed by a wide array of weapon imported from other countries.

Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) ad-

Until the 2000s, France and Great Britain were the major arms

dressed to the President of the Security Council, 17 June

suppliers. Consequently, the UAE’s ground forces are based

2017, UN Doc. S/2017/466. 157.

on French-made weaponry; they operate more than 300 Leclerc main battle tanks and hundreds of various infantry armoured vehicle. Since then, a number of Russian, Italian, Chinese, German, Turkish, etc. weapon systems have also been incorporated in the armed forces’ inventory. See The Military Balance. Routledge, Abingdon, 2017. 374–375.

7 Pieter D. Wezeman – Alexandra Kuimova: Military Spending and Arms Imports by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. SIPRI Fact Sheet. 2019/May. 6. <https://bit.ly/2lZQ8Ls > Accessed: 14 August 2019 8 Wezeman – Kuimova, 6.

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NUCLEAR ISSUES IN THE PERSIAN GULF Erzsébet N. Rózsa

The Persian Gulf has shown a capability to shape the international agenda and challenge the international community to action on two— interrelated—issues: energy security and military security (threatening energy security). Energy security is usually understood as the safety and continuity of the supply of mostly oil and, increasingly, liquefied natural gas (LNG)— including the sources as well as the transit through the Strait of Hormuz. This understanding, however, hides the fact that the Gulf states themselves rely on these energy resources and transport routes and that their energy mix has also changed and keeps changing dramatically.

Military security dimensions, including the threat to energy sources and transit, have been magnified by the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War (also carrying a nuclear element), the Iranian nuclear crisis, and the so-called “cold war” between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Nuclear energy—and the process to generate it—is in itself of a dual-use nature, meaning that the material, technology, and infrastructure can be used for both civilian and military purposes.

While after the Second World War only a very limited number of states acquired the nuclear know-how for both purposes and it seemed that nuclear energy and weapons would remain the exclusive property of the most developed and most powerful states, it soon turned out that others in the “developing world” would also try to gain such capabilities and succeed in mastering at least some elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. Mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, however, does not automatically mean access to nuclear weapons: all states that have signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, whereby non-nuclear weapon states made a commitment “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or

A view over the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran 88

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receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices … [while maintaining] the inalienable right … to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”1 While all states in the Persian Gulf have been parties to the NPT (as non-nuclear weapon states), the region has also posed the biggest concerns so far: non-compliance with the international non-proliferation regime in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and, more recently, the Iranian nuclear program, which prompted the international community to establish an unprecedented sanctions regime.

The Persian Gulf has been considered a regional security sub-complex2 with three regional powers vying for influence: Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Although Iraq, at the moment, seems more of an arena of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the 1980s saw a war between Iraq and Iran. The third regional power, Saudi Arabia, took the chance to establish the Gulf Cooperation Council to deter both Iraq and Iran in 1981.

Out of the three regional Gulf powers, only two, Iraq and Iran, have had nuclear activities.

Both started their civilian nuclear programmes in the 1960s: Iraq constructed a 2-MW Soviet nuclear reactor (IRT-5000), while Iran—under Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi’s modernisation— had a 5-MW training reactor (TRR or IR-0001) supplied by the USA. Both countries signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—Iraq in 1968 and 1969, respectively, while Iran in 1968 and 1970, respectively—and put their civilian nuclear installations under the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with Article III of the NPT.3 (On a side note: Saudi Arabia joined in 1988, Kuwait in 1968/1989, Qatar in 1989, Bahrain in 1988, Oman in 1997, and the UAE in 1995.)4 IRAQ The Iraqi nuclear program—and its eventual security dimension—attracted international attention first in 1981, when the Israeli Air Force attacked and bombed the so-called Osirak

research reactor (which was supplied by France and is still under construction) under the suspicion that, with its 70-MW output, it was too big to serve research purposes purely and was actually intended to be a basic component of an eventual nuclear weapons programme. Although there is little information that describes the secret military nuclear programme implemented under Saddam Hussein, in the course of the inspections authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSC) following the Gulf War of 1991 (UNSC Resolution 687), its existence was proven, and its elements were dismantled under international supervision. Yet Iraqi non-compliance with the relevant UNSC resolutions led to the withdrawal of the inspectors from Iraq and three days of international coalition bombing as a punishment.

Finally, together with the charge of supporting terrorism and abusing human rights, it provided a cause for the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraq Survey Group established following the war,5 however, could not find any signs of a restart to Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme. Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure was mostly destroyed in the Gulf War and the Iraq War. In 2009, the Iraqi government expressed its interest in (re)starting a civilian nuclear program, and, then, the UNSC lifted the post-Gulf War sanctions prohibiting Iraq from pursuing such an initiative.6 Recently, Iraq even signed an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation with Jordan.7 Yet, in the near future, a new Iraqi nuclear program is not likely to get underway due to—among others—the country’s domestic political problems.8 IRAN With the Iraqi nuclear threat eliminated and the country’s nuclear infrastructure practically destroyed, it seemed that Iran remained the only nuclear power in the Gulf —both with regard to the civilian uses of nuclear energy (at this point the country has the Gulf’s only operating nuclear power plant at Bushehr) and as a potential threat and source of nuclear weapons proliferation. In this situation, being the only state with civilian nuclear capabilities—even if, at the time, Iran did not have the full nuclear fuel cycle—was enough to project its regional power status. The 2003

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89

Iraq War was also a clear reminder that a nuclear weapons program would not be tolerated (the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate “‘judged with high confidence’ that Iran suspended such efforts in the fall of 2003 and concluded ‘with moderate confidence’ that Iran maintained that halt through mid-2007.”)9 and that, if the United States wanted regime change, it did not hesitate to make it happen.

Nevertheless, despite the IAEA inspections in Iran, the United States always suspected the Islamic Republic of secretly having nuclear weapons ambitions. Consequently, when in 2002 it was revealed that the Islamic Republic was working on a uranium centrifuge plant and on heavy water plant to contribute to the plutonium-fuelled research reactor unit planned at Arak—of which the IAEA had not been informed—the international community, but especially the western countries (the E3, i.e. the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), moved swiftly to make Iran abide by its commitments.

This move was especially important as the Iraq War was unfolding at the same time. Following rounds of unsuccessful negotiations to settle the issue, and in spite of the fatwa by Ayatollah Khamenei stating that it was forbidden in the Islamic Republic to produce and use nuclear weapons,10 the IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the UN Security Council in February 2006, which, between 2006 and 2010, adopted six resolutions (four of which included sanctions) requiring Iran to take steps to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program. The sanctions, however, did not stop the development of the Iranian civilian program: on the contrary, Iran mastered not only the very sensitive technology of uranium enrichment but has acquired the full nuclear fuel cycle as well.11 The new round of negotiations between the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1 or E3/EU+3) on the one hand, and Iran on the other, led to the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear deal on 14 July 2015, which was approved by a unanimous vote in the Security Council.12 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was a joint effort not only by the 90

participants in the negotiations; it also involved the European Union and others who helped organise the meetings, provided venues and infrastructure for the negotiations, etc. It was considered a “historic deal” by which “every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off,” 13 subjecting Iran to an unprecedented set of inspections in return for easing and gradually suspending the nuclear-related sanctions. Only one state, Israel, was firmly opposed, while some Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, although they were not openly against it, accepted the deal only grudgingly, fearing increased Iranian influence over the Middle East and, thus, a threat to their own interests and even security.

However, the US withdrawal from the deal, announced by President Donald Trump on 8 May 2018, re-established the Iranian nuclear file as a priority on the international agenda and set in motion a complex array of international activities—political, diplomatic, economic, and financial. The European Union stood firmly by the JCPOA, just like practically the entire international community. However, in spite of the fact that most (the EU, China, India, Japan) have tried to establish specific financial mechanisms to circumvent the U S sanctions and secondary sanctions, it seems that these are not enough.

After a year of “strategic patience,” in the course of which the country abided by its commitments under the JCPOA, Iran started to reduce its compliance (in stages and in a reversible way).

At the same time, by exploiting/committing incidents in the Persian Gulf, it also seemed to increase the threat of war. The further behaviour of the United Arab Emirates (withdrawal from Yemen, delegation to Tehran), Saudi Arabia, and even President Trump (calling off an attack on Iran, tweets signalling readiness to negotiate) seemed to justify the rationale of these moves but, at the same time, made the situation more dangerous.

SAUDI ARABIA (AND THE ARAB GULF) Paradoxically, Gulf Arab nuclear related activities were not initiated to counterbalance the Iranian capability but—as part of an all-Arab effort—to

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

The Arak IR-40 Heavy Water Reactor

counterbalance the Israeli nuclear arsenal.14 In 2006, following an emotional call by then Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Musa on Arab nations to start nuclear programmes to compensate for their inability to force Israel to give up its assumed nuclear arsenal, several Arab states announced plans to start civilian nuclear programmes. In December 2006, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states decided to start preparations for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: in their case, besides generating electricity and/or the production of medical isotopes, the desalination of seawater is also an important aspect. From 2009, however, it seems that the GCC states decided to conduct separate nuclear programmes, if any at all.

Currently, the United Arab Emirates is the only Gulf Arab state which has a nuclear power plant unit completed, with three further units under construction. The Barakah-1 is expected to go online in early 2020.15 Saudi Arabia is planning the construction of two large nuclear power plants to meet the country’s skyrocketing

energy needs, and smaller reactors for the desalination of seawater.16 (A second unit to the Iranian Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is also in the preparatory phase.) The other GCC states have not yet started to move forward: on the one hand, they feel hostage to the “cold war” between Iran and Saudi Arabia, of which the nuclear dimension seems to have gone out of proportion, while, on the other, they have legitimate safety concerns as well (e.g. Kuwait has voiced concerns over the safe operation of the Iranian Bushehr power plant.)

By the second decade of the 21 st century, the Arab Gulf’s attention has turned away from the threat of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, and Saudi Arabia in particular has started to focus on the threat innate in the Iranian nuclear program. Following the announcement of the JCPOA, Saudi Arabia became increasingly vocal about it—to the extent that a still unacknowledged but very much visible understanding with Israel emerged, especially after the Trump administration’s coming into

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office. The US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal and the unprecedented unconditional support by President Trump seems to have not only encouraged the Saudi nuclear plans, 17 but also made it possible to gain access to nuclear technology that would otherwise be made conditional and/or be prevented by the Congress and/or the international community. 18 Nevertheless, nuclear issues in the Persian Gulf may have far-reaching consequences not only for the region itself but for the international community as a whole. It remains to be seen what consequences the ambitious plans of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—and also Iran for that matter—to build nuclear power plants will have for the “nuclear power balance” of the region. “Despite the global decrease, there has been a sharp rise in the number of nuclear power projects either under construction, planned, or proposed in the MENA region—as much as 48 have been put on paper in the last few years.”19 Although this development exposes the regional states to nuclear infrastructure construction companies, the very fact that, in a shrinking global market, the MENA region still aspires to build nuclear power plants gives them some leverage. Nevertheless, the competition for these lucrative deals adds new momentum to the great power rivalry in the region—especially, as Russia and China have successfully increased their share of the contracts to build nuclear power plants.

This exposure, however, may prevent the regional states from trying to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle and, especially, uranium enrichment. At this stage, there are very few (less than twenty) states in the world that are in possession of some or all of the relevant technologies whose spread the international community does not support. Instead, it prefers that, in case of a new nuclear power plant, nuclear fuel be supplied from abroad, by the supplier, and spent fuel be shipped out of the country. (This is the case, e.g., with the Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, where fuel comes from and spent fuel is shipped back to Russia.) Another eventual solution to the 92

proliferation concerns innate in the nuclear fuel cycle (especially uranium enrichment and the reprocession of the spent fuel) is to establish joint companies, in which the participating states would not have all the sensitive technologies and/or would control and supervise each other’s activities. Such a proposal was put forward by Iran at one point.

Ultimately, security concerns related to anything nuclear in the Gulf would have been greatly lessened if the decades-long plan of establishing a security architecture for the Persian Gulf had been realised. Although negotiations have gotten underway time and again, even with the participation of Iran, these have so far not been successful. In the realisation of the tense situation in the Persian Gulf and the failure to realise a Middle Eastern nuclear weapons-free zone in spite of decades of dedication, a specific proposal was put forward by strategists and analysts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Persian Gulf. 20 While this proposal in itself would have been an important confidence-building measure, it has never even been put on the table officially.

CONCLUSION The Persian Gulf as a regional security subcomplex is currently one of the most dangerous arenas of competition among global as well as regional powers. Although only two states (Iraq and Iran) have had experience with nuclear energy so far, this situation is rapidly changing: following the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has remained the only regional nuclear power, but Iraq is trying to restart its civilian nuclear program while the UAE and Saudi Arabia are just starting theirs.

Due to the “cold war” going on between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and in the absence of a regional security system, the concerns emanating from the dual-use nature of nuclear energy are magnified. The decade-long international controversy over Iran’s nuclear program, the JCPOA, and the follow-up of the American withdrawal with all its global and regional implications will have a determinant role in the future of the Persian Gulf.

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ENDNOTES

14

“In the context of the MENA region’s oldest unresolved

conflict – that between Arabs/Palestinians and Israel – the 1

See Article II and Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-

Israeli nuclear arsenal, the existence of which has never been

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

acknowledged nor denied, in line with US policy, has for

2

Barry Buzan – Ole Wæver: Regions and Powers. The

decades been a grave security concern. … the struggle to

Structure of International Society. Cambridge, Cambridge

counterbalance the Israeli nuclear capability and efforts at

University Press, 2003.

reaching parity with Israel in general have come to symbolize

3 See Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-

both Arab unity … and Arab failure to protect Arab interests.”

clear Weapons.

See N. Rózsa, Erzsébet: Weapons of Mass Destruction in

4

N. Rózsa Erzsébet: Weapons of Mass Destruction in the

the Middle East and North Africa. MENARA Working Papers

Middle East and North Africa. MENARA Working Papers, No.

(24). CIDOB - Barcelona Centre for International Affairs,

24. 2018/November. <https://bit.ly/2kuaaxm > Accessed: 5

Barcelona, 2018.

September 2019.

15 Nuclear Power in the United Arab Emirates. World Nuclear

5

Association. Updated: June 2019. <https://bit.ly/2GGpcHV >

In its comprehensive report of 30 September 2004

following the US-led invasion, the Iraq Survey Group concluded

Accessed: 5 September 2019.

that Saddam Hussein had ended Iraq’s nuclear weapons

16

programme after the first Gulf War in 1991 and had not directed

of atomic energy is essential to meet the Kingdom’s growing

a coordinated effort to restart the program thereafter. See

requirements for energy to generate electricity, produce

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on

desalinated water and reduce reliance on depleting hydrocarbon

Iraq’s WMD. Central Intelligence Agency. 30 September 2004.

resources.” Saudi Arabia planned to construct sixteen nuclear

<https://bit.ly/2LUb7bs > Accessed: 5 September 2019.

power reactors over the next twenty years. See Nuclear

6

Power in the United Arab Emirates.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1957 (2010),

In April 2010, a royal decree said: “The development

15 December 2010. UN. Doc. S/RES/1957 (2010).

17

7 Jordan, Iraq sign deal on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

bomb, but without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb,

The Jordan Times. 24 August 24. <https://bit.ly/2ktFRqx >

we will follow suit as soon as possible.” Stephen Kalin – Parisa

Accessed: 5 September 2019.

Hafezi: Saudi crown prince says will develop nuclear bomb if

8

Iran does: CBS TV. Reuters. 15 March 2018. <https://reut.

„Iraq had three nuclear reactors in Tuwaitha, its main

“Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear

nuclear research site, south of Baghdad. One was destroyed

rs/2Isf70t > Accessed: 5 September 2019.

by an Israeli air raid, in 1981, and the two others by US

18

airplanes in the 1991 Gulf war which followed Iraq’s 1990

reckless behavior foments widespread mistrust of its plans to

invasion of Kuwait.” Michelle Nichols – Maher Chmaytelli: Iraq

buy nuclear reactors. Foreign Policy. 22 February <https://bit.

asks U.N. for help to build new nuclear power reactor.

ly/2E3MfdL > Accessed: 5 September 2019.

Reuters. 23 September 2017. <https://reut.rs/2xZEULx >

19

Accessed: 5 September 2019.

Nuclear Power in the MENA Region. Egypt Oil & Gas. 12 June

9

12 2018. <https://bit.ly/2kJwfYK > Accessed: 5 September

As cited in Peter Crail: U.S. Updates Iran Assessment.

Keith Johnson: Who’s Afraid of Saudi Nukes? Riyadh’s

Felix Fallon – Matthew Hoare: Towards an Atomic Era?

Arms Control Today. March 2011. <https://bit.ly/2lLk5Pc >

2019.

Accessed: 5 September 2019.

20

10

See Ayatollah Khamenei’s Opinion on Nuclear Issue.

Destruction in the Middle East and North Africa. MENARA

Khamenei.ir. <https://bit.ly/2lINae5 > Accessed: 5 September

Working Papers (24). CIDOB – Barcelona Centre for

2019.

International Affairs, Barcelona, 2018.

11

For details see N. Rózsa, Erzsébet: Weapons of Mass

Ayatollah Khamenei even thanked for the sanctions,

without which Iran would not have been able to achieve such results. See Ayatollah Khamenei’s Opinion.

12

United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015),

20 July 2015. UN. Doc. S/RES/2231 (2015).

13

Statement by the President on Iran. The White House,

President Obama. 14 July 2015. <https://bit.ly/2lu3n2L > Accessed: 5 September 2019.

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93

THE UAE AND THE PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE SECURITY Richard Burchill

INTRODUCTION In the Gulf region, the multidimensional security threats pose major challenges to local states and societies. The threats posed by terrorism, armed non-state actors, and cyberattacks are a prominent part of the security context, along with intrastate competition. At the same time, the security dimensions of climate change are particularly pronounced for the region. In response, the UAE is leading the region in putting climate change as a priority for national and global security. Domestically, the government has undertaken a wide range of initiatives for

Solar panel paved road scientific experiment, Mohammed Bin Rashid al Maktoum Solar Park, Al Qudra, United Arab Emirates 94

supporting sustainable security by addressing the impact of climate change and moving towards sustainable solutions.

The UAE’s approach to sustainable security is itself a multidimensional strategy that is pursuing sustainable development in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a focus on ensuring human security. In this regard, the UAE is also supporting, as part of its foreign policy, the efforts of other states in mitigation and adaption in response to climate change.

The UAE’s efforts provide many lessons for how we view security and how policies are orientated both domestically and globally in response to the security threats of climate change.

THE UAE AND SUSTAINABLE SECURITY Climate change has been on the periphery of security concerns for a considerable period of time but with little action or collective emphasis on bringing about effective responses. This limited emphasis appears due to the fact that while the impact of climate change is generally recognised, it is continually viewed as a future threat to security, which, in turn, impacts policy action and responses. However, the matter is changing significantly in relation to the emphasis on climate change as a threat to security.

For the past three years, the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Risks Report has identified climate change as a key risk. The 2019 report places “Extreme Weather” and “Failure of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaption” as the most likely security threats and the threats having the largest impact. Weapons of Mass Destruction rate higher in terms of impact but are seen as unlikely.1 The upper quadrants of the WEF report,2 signifying highest likelihood and greatest impact, are mainly climate-related issues, such as water

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

Demo park for Masdar city plan in Abudhabi

crisis, biodiversity and ecosystem collapse, man-made environmental disasters, and even involuntary migration which is likely to be driven by environmental factors.

The UAE is an active player in furthering sustainable security through technological innovations in support of renewable energy and mitigation and adaption to climate change. It is placing considerable amounts of resources into new and innovative solutions to the threats from climate change, both domestically and globally.3 The UAEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s domestic approach has been driven

by Vision 2021, a national plan for human security and development grounded in green growth for sustainable development. This attitude has led to the creation of a dedicated Ministry of Climate Change and Environment to lead national action. In 2012, the Green Economy for Sustainable Development initiative was launched, providing a comprehensive approach to economic activity, development of technology, urban planning, and other activities based on furthering green and renewable energy. The UAEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Green Agenda 2015â&#x20AC;&#x201C;2030 furthers this strategy through a framework that cuts across national and local authorities in the

realisation of long-term development that supports the national needs, growth and development, while not further impacting the global threat of climate change.

The UAE takes a multidimensional view of social, economic, and environmental development at the national level, and this slant feeds into its foreign policy approaches. The country has put together a national committee on the SDGs that brings together various ministries and other stakeholders for managing national and global activities in support of the realisation of the goals. By ensuring the SDGs are a focal point of policy and action, a holistic approach to peace and security within the state and beyond can be undertaken. Such holistic approaches are necessary for ensuring economic growth, and development continues for societies in a way that human security is realised and maintained.

The UAE is also using the SDG framework to further its efforts in global cooperation through a sharing of ideas, policies, and practices with the global community.

In support of global efforts to address climate change, the UAE is establishing itself as a global hub for sustainable development and green

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ENERGY AND ECOLOGY INFOGRAPHICS

Energy industry and ecology of United Arab Emirates vector map with power stations infographic

energy. The UAE was the first Middle Eastern state to ratify the Paris Climate Change Agreement, demonstrating the level of commitment in this area. The Dubai Declaration was issued in October 2016 at the 14th Global Roundtable of the UN Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), establishing a fund worth in excess of USD 25 billion in support of green projects through sustainable financing, in cooperation with the UN Environment Programme’s Funding Initiative. As further proof of the UAE’s dedication and cooperation in addressing climate change, the country hosts the headquarters of the International Renewable 96

Energy Authority. The UAE is also the host of the World Future Energy Summit, bringing together global experts on innovation in green and renewable energy. Meanwhile, the World Expo 2020 in Dubai is taking sustainable development as a primary theme, showcasing what is possible in efforts to mitigate and adapt to the impact of climate change. The UAE recognises that effective development of clean and renewable energy is integral to sustainable development and both are necessary parts of maintaining sustainable security.

This recognition has also driven the UAE’s foreign policy initiatives, where two particular

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

efforts stand out.4 The first is the UAE–Pacific Partnership Fund launched in 2013. The fund covers a range of development-related projects in Pacific Island states with sustainable energy supply being a key feature of them. Ten different projects involving energy generation through solar and wind power were established. These projects brought not only increased energy supplies to the island states but also provided support in the supply of clean water and reduced carbon output significantly. The other project is the UAE–Caribbean Renewable Energy Fund. As with the Pacific Partnership Fund, this project supports a range of projects on renewable energy in the Caribbean Island states.

The projects deal with the reduction of carbon fuels, providing more energy to society and working to offset the impact of climate change.

The UAE is also taking a long-term view of the cooperation in support of sustainable development and security for the island states.

The provision of training and follow-up sessions to examine successes and next steps are also being undertaken by the UAE, demonstrating a long-term commitment to cooperation in addressing the threat of climate change.

The significance of the UAE’s efforts in relation to the Pacific Island states and the Caribbean states is a demonstration of global leadership in sustainable security. The UAE is using its know-how and technological innovations to support vulnerable states as part of global efforts in response to climate change. These projects alone will not, of course, ensure that the island states will avoid the impact of climate change upon security. These states face a precarious future due to rising sea levels, lack of clean water, and access to sustainable energy.

For the Pacific Island states, in particular, the impact of climate change upon their societies continues due to the absence of effective global action in slowing down the impact of climate change upon the world, highlighting how individual national security depends upon global cooperation.

The UAE is demonstrating how, in a more complex world, “[l]eadership goes beyond material power and is contingent upon entrepreneurial

and intellectual resources, including ideas and innovation.”5 In the turbulence of our world, leadership and strength lies in cooperation on issues of global concern rather than insularity and blaming others. The UAE is taking a leadership role by combining its national and foreign policy efforts to address climate change.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE SECURITY The UAE’s approach to ensuring national and global security in response to climate change provides strategic lessons for further global action. The combining of national efforts into global cooperation stands out as a vital approach to supporting national and global security without falling into unfavourable security dilemmas. Reluctance remains in the international system to further global cooperation in response to climate change due to issues of overlapping priorities in international institutions as well as an absence of political will.

The UN Security Council, the body responsible for international peace and security, is attempting to place the threat to security from climate change and the necessity of cooperation on the global agenda. In 2007, the UN Security Council undertook a discussion on climate change “recognizing that there is a security imperative, as well as economic, developmental and environmental ones, for tackling climate change and for our beginning to build a shared understanding of the relationship between energy, climate and security.”6 In 2018, again, the UN Security Council engaged in a discussion on the security impact of climate change, but it appeared things had not progressed. A key statement from the discussion shows the basics for global action are still being discussed: “We must act together with a joint vision and a commitment to multilateral cooperation. That is our only chance of finding effective and sustainable solutions to this huge challenge.”7 Yet the G20 group recently failed to achieve consensus on the impact of climate change and the Bonn Meetings pre COP25 downplayed, rather than emphasised, the findings of the IPCC Report.8

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Individual states will have their reasons for working to downplay the security impact of climate change. It is imperative to ensure that the security impact of climate change is integral to national security considerations and strategies. This inclusion is not an easy process, as securitising climate change requires a new focus and approach to security. The necessity of working with others is at the heart of sustainable security but runs contrary to traditional notions of national security. However, the national security context and reality has changed dramatically in terms of the nature of threats and how effective responses to those threats are shaped.

The 2019 WEF report not only charts out the increasing risk to security posed by climate change, but it also emphasises how the political will globally to address climate change is not there. There is increasing recognition of climate change, but global cooperation and concerted action is missing. The UAE’s approach to building sustainable security as part of domestic and foreign policy provides a model to be emulated by others and the standard by which international organisations need to foster greater cooperation.

States will continue to experience threat to traditional security areas, and appropriate responses are needed. More holistic approaches to security must be adopted as the global impact of climate change threatens national and global security.

It is imperative that states like the UAE move the recognition of the interconnectivity of national and global security into more dynamic and effective multilateral approaches. The Gulf region faces multiple threats to security, but a continued emphasis on short-term politicalmilitary dominance is not going to bring about long-term security as the impact of climate change grows. All over the world, states are feeling the impact of climate change threatening human security and national security. We need greater awareness of the threat from climate change, but we also need to ensure that actions taken are productive in mitigating the impact and transformative as to how the circumstances are addressed.

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It is imperative to take action now through strong multilateral institutions and cooperation so that actions may move beyond only responding to catastrophic events. Sustainable approaches to security will build resilience in societies allowing for more effective responses to climate change. Post-crisis recovery is becoming more and more difficult due to the impact of climate change upon already vulnerable states and societies. Innovation and cooperation are what is needed to mitigate and adapt to the impact of climate change and for responding when catastrophic events occur. The UAE is currently providing significant leadership in this regard, and its approach to security has significant lessons for the international system.

ENDNOTES 1 The Global Risks Report 2019. World Economic Forum, Geneva, 2019.

2 World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 2018–2019.

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_

Risks_Report_2019.pdf 3 For further information on the UAE’s efforts in this regard, see Courtney Weatherby – Brian Eyler – Richard Burchill: UAE Energy Diplomacy. Exporting Renewable Energy to the Global South. TRENDS Report. 18 September 2018.

4

Further information may be found at the webpage of

Masdar. <https://bit.ly/2G0eBGP >Accessed: 1 August 2019.

5 Amitva Acharya: The End of American World Order. Polity, Oxford, 2014. 10.

6 United Nations Security Council, 5663rd meeting, 17 April 2007. UN Doc. S/PV.5663.

7 United Nations Security Council, 8307th meeting, 11 July 2018, UN Doc. S/PV.8307.

8 Kalina Oroschakoff: Fossil Fuel Fightback Marks Climate Change Talks. EU Politico. 30 June 2019. <https://politi. co/2xnzN5A > Accessed: 1 August 2019.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

THE FUTURE OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN THE ARAB GULF REGION Anwar Al-Kharusi

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GCC REGION IN THE GLOBAL OIL AND GAS SUPPLY MARKET Relative to world hydrocarbon scale, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are highly oil and gas rich, and they produce today about 25% of the world’s oil production and 10% of the world’s gas production combined.

In terms of reserves, they hold today about 30% of the world’s oil reserves and 20% of the world’s gas reserves combined. This signifies the impact such a region has on the global energy market.

Having said the above, it is interesting to note if nearby Iran and Iraq are included in the above statistics, then the extended region holds 45% of the world’s oil reserves and 35% of the world’s gas reserves. The extended region has the potential to produce significantly higher than the current production rates, in terms of both oil and gas, if the political and investment environments were to be favored, stabilized and commercially optimized.

ADDED VALUE TO CRUDE OIL EXPORT BARRELS IN THE MIDDLE EAST The Middle East has been maximizing value by not only exporting crude oil and gas, but also

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OIL PRODUCTION 1000 BBL/DAY

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ARE WE APPROACHING PEAK PRODUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST? It seems many parts of the world, and not only the wider Middle Eastern or GCC regions, have been producing for the past 50 to 100 years most of their large hydrocarbon accumulations or the so-called ‘crown jewels’ fields. Several large fields seem to exhibit close to peak potential production capacity today. Globally and regionally, declining field production is usually counterbalanced by new but smaller field additions or by intensifying existing field development programs to sustain production capacity, i.e. moving to expensive enhanced or tertiary production regimes. The production plot below shows the production leveling capacity in the GCC region from 1980 to 2018.

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investing in additional refining and petrochemical production capacities for both local use and export. In the GCC region, almost all member states have started, beside crude oil and gas export, the production and export of increasing volumes of fuels, commodity petrochemicals in the form of polyethylene and polypropylene, and specialty chemicals such as derivatives used in the plastics, rubber, pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries. Manufacturing of such chemicals is either made inside the GCC region or other regions worldwide, targeting sale of such materials in the regional and international markets, usually and primarily targeting the East Asian region. By utilizing some of the crude to manufacture chemicals, these countries can now positively extract additional value from each oil barrel, but this is not trivial as petrochemical manufacturing requires heavy investments, and expensive technology licensing acquisitions or alliances.

TIGHTENING OIL MARGINS DUE TO OIL PRICE FLUCTUATIONS The world has lived through several peaks and oil price fluctuations, which seem to occur periodically almost every decade or less, as the case proved lately, and this has affected not only suppliers of hydrocarbon but also consumers.

Oil prices do impact quite heavily world economies with indirect effect on several related industries, some affected more than others. It is clear in the Middle East region, even something like real estate is directly affected by oil price movements as GDP is lowered, demoting all associated businesses during rapidly declining oil price periods, while energy companies reducing activities and sometimes cutting staff.

OIL COMPANIES REVERTING TO MORE EFFICIENT INTEGRATION OF UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM BUSINESSES Several major oil and gas companies have in the past spun off downstream from upstream businesses, in their desperation to detach their low margin refining segments from their highly profitable upstream business segments. However, at later years, and while oil price fluctuations were 100

more frequent due to changing world political and financial stability, the integrated upstream and downstream business model started to show resilience and robustness. The integrated model retained by some companies and newly adopted by others has exhibited more sustainable profitability of these integrated oil and gas companies. The profitability of upstream may be challenged during a low oil price cycle while downstream businesses flourish due to cheap feedstock of either crude or naphtha. On the other hand, the profitability of downstream may be negatively impacted during a high oil price cycle due to the rising costs of feedstock, while upstream enjoys sales at expensive crude oil prices.

DIVERSIFYING FROM HYDROCARBON ECONOMIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST Economies in the Middle East have been heavily impacted by fluctuating oil prices, and since this has increased in frequency in the past 2 decades, and with hydrocarbon-based GDP marking more than 50% of governments income, it has necessitated the start of a new era in most of the Middle Eastern countries including the GCC region. It should be noted that the Middle East is in a very different situation compared to e.g. Russia. While Saudi Arabia has a fixed exchange rate regime, making them vulnerable to global oil price changes also in terms of local currency, Russia has a floating exchange rate regime that can keep oil revenues in Ruble terms stable. Whenever the oil price decreases, the Ruble depreciates, increasing Ruble terms revenues for the budget.

The search and hunt for additional GDP sources has been key in the agendas in many countries to diversify from hydrocarbon-based economies. Several projects are now being investigated in various segments of the economy including fishery, agriculture, logistics, minerals, trading, manufacturing and tourism, to name just a few. In addition to economy diversification, alternative energy sources are also simultaneously being seriously investigated. In many Middle Eastern countries, several projects are currently investigating the abundantly freely available

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

Use of solar focused mirrors to generate steam for oil operations in Oman (PDO/GlassPoint, Oman)

energy sources such as solar and wind to capitalize on a wider energy portfolio mix, and by doing so devoting hydrocarbons for more value-added industries. Preserving gas for new investments can be attractive, employing new investments, providing jobs to youngsters and adding new gas-based industries.

Examples of the solar energy's recent utilisation and gas conservation in the Middle East include new small trial wind power plants in Oman for trial purposes, and several large scale solar power plants in both Oman and the UAE. Other unique applications of solar energy is Omanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s currently ongoing solar-focused mirror-based steam project for oil production enhancement purposes.

The concentrated solar or, in other words, focused mirrors project, was lucrative for Oman, as it is used to generate injection steam into oil reservoirs which was otherwise generated using conventional gas. This yielded excess gas volume savings which allowed further uses of the gas to support the ongoing diversification initiatives of the economy, and newly install gas-derived industries in Oman.

THE GLOBAL HYDROCARBON ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST After the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21), the developed countries, pioneered by the European Union, mostly

agree today on taking serious steps towards mitigating the foreseen environmental threats.

Overwhelming scientific evidence confirmed the potentially devastating effects of further increases in atmospheric temperatures due to global warming. Reduction of carbon emissions is top in the EU agenda, and one prime way to achieve this is by diverting from fossil fuels for energy means, into exploiting cleaner renewable sources of energy. On top of this, there are serious research and technological advancements currently being made to make standard fossil fuel-based engines more efficient to consume less fuels and hence make less emissions. In addition to this, many innovative companies are also researching on CO2 capture technologies from the atmosphere to reprocess the CO2 back into carbon-based fuels for energy, in circular form. Other still far-fledged and prohibitively costly ways, and at the edge of todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s technology, include emission collection directly from the source engines or industrial sites, before emission into the atmosphere, and again recycle into useful products or fuels.

The European Union has been, as always, in the forefront in formulating tighter policies on emissions for inner cities, and setting out ambitious goals for a cleaner energy mix, such as renewables targeting 20% of renewables in the energy mix by 2020, to increase to 27% by 2030. Different EU member

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States are currently developing relevant national plans to achieve these targets.

The impact of any cut in fossil fuels due to the move to cleaner energy will be severe on global fossil fuel demand, and as a result on the Middle Eastern rich hydrocarbon region, as more and more of the developed countries worldwide adopt cleaner energy policies. This in turn will result in less reliance on fossil fuels from the GCC countries in the longer term. Therefore, there is a necessity for the GCC countries to plan ahead, and to begin taking serious steps towards integrating renewable energy into their energy portfolio, thereby gradually decreasing their dependence on hydrocarbons.

It is also true, however, that the Middle Eastern countries enjoy the advantage of low prices. As they are at the lower end of the supply cost curve, they are well positioned to exploit their reserves even in a falling oil demand environment, squeezing out higher cost fields due to the price competitiveness. This makes the exit of â&#x20AC;&#x153;oil-dependencyâ&#x20AC;? more difficult.

THE EMERGING RENEWABLES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST Research and technology into renewables have been increasing in the past two decades, and with the continuing and focused efforts supported by the increasing push away from fossil fuels by the environmentalists, renewables have achieved significant cost reductions and remarkable technology progress. It has been indicated by experts that solar PV cell prices have decreased by 80% while the cost of wind energy generators went down by 60%.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST It is clear that renewable energy sources are inevitably penetrating the energy portfolio, and has started to take shape in the last decade along with the fossil fuels; their share is rising and will continue to rise and are thought to stabilize at rates which could disturb the fossil energy industry. This has started in Europe, and shall follow in the USA, East Asia, Middle East and the rest of the world. The Middle East is an 102

ideal region for solar energy applications as there is no need to store energy for longer periods (e.g. between summer and winter, like in Europe). The electricity for air condition is needed when the sun shines. This reduces intermittency problems and also, there is no need for large central grid infrastructure.

The annual growth rate of renewables in 2007 was under 0.5%, whereas the rate in 2018 has increased to about 1%. Comparatively, natural gas growth rate was 0.5% in 2007, and in 2018, it increased aggressively to over 1%. It is interesting to note that the growth rate for oil is unchanged under 0.5%.

Although the Middle East refrains today from taking serious part in the emission reduction initiatives, but the world will soon realize there is little point for one part of the world to be stringent while other parts are not reducing atmospheric emissions. Therefore, the middle East as well as other parts of the world will soon be pushed to follow green energy policies if the world leaders are serious about reducing undesired atmospheric emissions.

Having said all above, however, and in terms of oil and gas production supply requirements, it is also clear that renewables are going to take time to take a significant share in the energy mix.

The share of fossil energy is some 80% today compared to nuclear and renewables, and not to mention oil and gas requirements for other industries including chemicals such as polymers, cosmetics, pharmaceutical and plastics. With increasing demands in all industrial segments including power and other uses, and declining existing oil and gas fields, indicates in short and medium terms, there will be increasing investments in new or enhanced oil and gas portfolios. Oil and gas prone areas like the Middle East, GCC and USA will be prime focus for oil and gas investments in the next several decades.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

TURKEY AND THE GCC—A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP Tamás Kozma

After decades of considerably passive stance towards foreign relations, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the years of Turgut Özal’s presidency, Turkish policymakers have started to rethink and reconceptualise the country’s diplomacy.1 The end of the bipolar world order, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, the crises in the Balkans, etc. were factors that affected Turkey’s direct and indirect neighbourhood and urged the country to become a more active regional player. The gradual opening-up commenced in the abovementioned years reached an even more active level after 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) had been elected for the first time, and, since then, a greater focus has been placed on finding and enhancing Turkey’s regional role.2 Despite the fact that some parts of the Gulf region had historically been part of Turkey’s predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, the Gulf remained largely excluded from the priority list of Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War period due to the fact that Turkey had been paying more attention to maintaining and improving its relations with the West. However, over time, both the changing domestic attitude towards foreign policy and the changing international environment have resulted in Turkey’s growing interest in the broader Middle East and, as a part of it, the Gulf region. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has also been one of the key personalities behind Turkey’s revived diplomacy since 2002, argued in his well-known scientificpolitical credo Strategic Depth that, if Turkey cannot substantially exert influence on its direct neighbourhood, i.e. the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Middle East, then it will be neither able to preserve its geopolitical integrity nor open to the rest of the world.3 This meant that Turkey,

awakening from its previously passive role, has embarked on new tracks, both in terms of its emerging foreign policy dynamism and its broadening regional focus. Given its geopolitical importance, for Turkey, the Gulf region has become an important space in this progress.

Obviously, the term “Gulf” leaves some room for interpretation, and there might be different understandings on which countries should be considered as part of the Gulf region. It is widely accepted that the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, can be called as Gulf states, but we have to add that, when the purpose is to assess overall Gulf dynamics, Iran, Iraq, and Yemen have to be considered, either. This article applies a rather reductionist approach, and its purpose is to focus primarily on Turkey’s relations with the GCC as a whole complex. Still, it should be noted that given the interdependence of regional relations, in many cases, it is hardly possible to draw conclusions without referring to non-GCC actors.

Prior to the 2000s, Turkey maintained rather fluctuating relations with the Gulf states. The intensity of these relations varied from country to country, and the ties were often under the burden of mistrust. Therefore, it was an important step forward when Turkey’s official ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) kicked off after the parties had signed the “Framework Agreement for Economic Cooperation between Turkey and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)” in 2005.4 We have to highlight that, back then, the increasing partnershipseeking attitude among Turkey and GCC member states was rooted partly in the United States’ protracted military presence in the neighbouring Iraq since 2003. This development sent clear signals to both Ankara and the capitals of GCC

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TURKEY’S IMPORT FROM

TURKEY’S EXPORT TO

BAHRAIN

186,842

298,682

IRAN

1,420,433

2,392,778

IRAQ

6,931,258

8,346,170

KUWAIT

144,372

533,895

OMAN

67,441

422,222

QATAR

335,320

1,096,417

SAUDI ARABIA

2,318,411

2,636,039

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

3,780,736

3,137,497

YEMEN

1,239

727,306

TURKEY–GULF TOTAL IMPORT AND EXPORT

13,765,619

19,591,006

TURKEY WORLD TOTAL IMPORT AND EXPORT

223,047,178

167,920,821

GULF’S SHARE IN TURKEY’S TOTAL EXPORT AND IMPORT

6.17%

11.67%

Turkey’s foreign trade with the Gulf countries in 2018, in thousand USD

member states that the United States was expected to be present as a security provider in the common neighbourhood for a longer period, which was a factor that had to be taken into account both by Turkey and GCC member states in their foreign policies.5 Although Turkey had long been a US and NATO ally, and the US had been a key partner of the Gulf states too, the direct presence of US troops in the common neighbourhood stirred up the regional security agenda and created grounds for an improved partnership between Turkey and GCC member states. It is worth adding that, in parallel, NATO itself has also become a framework for securityrelated cooperation between Turkey and the GCC: launched in 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has been established to foster security cooperation between NATO inclusive of Turkey and the GCC member states.6 Regarding the further motivations of the parties, it is necessary to highlight that Turkey has become increasingly seen as a counterbalance to Iran’s regional ambitions, which has long been worrisome for the Sunni Arab world, and the fear of Iran’s growing influence over Arab countries was and still is an important driver behind the 104

relations between the GCC and Turkey.7 In addition to security-related considerations, a further basis for cooperation from a Turkish point of view was the strategic goal to find export markets, new sources of capital investments, and meet partners for energy trade, as the sharply growing energy demand of the importdependent country raised the necessity of securing energy sources from the energy-rich Gulf region.8 Thus, during these years, besides the increased political cooperation, GCC member states, as well as other Gulf countries, became very significant economic and trade partners of Turkey, and, at the same time, the Gulf region became a key target for Turkish soft power, too. Despite a number of issues and the oftencompeting interests, trade could remain a wellgrowing segment of Turkey–GCC cooperation, and, today, more than 11% of Turkey’s export goes to the broader Gulf region.9 The signing of the above-mentioned framework agreement in 2005 was followed in the subsequent years by the conclusion of further agreements, and a number of regular high-level meetings also took place. As a result of a Memorandum of Understanding signed

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

by the parties in 2008, a so-called Strategic Dialogue Mechanism has been launched in order to facilitate political and cultural relations in addition to the existing economic cooperation among Turkey and the GCC member states.10 Also, lengthy rounds of negotiations were held in order to reach consensus about the frameworks of free trade between Turkey and the GCC, but such an agreement has not been concluded yet.11 Based on the aforementioned, one can see that, from the early 2000s, the GCC has become an important forum for Turkey–Gulf interactions, but, of course, given the differences in the interests and capabilities of the individual member states, cooperation between them and Turkey could unfold to varying levels.

Starting from the outset of the official partnership in 2005, Turkey–GCC relations have grown in a cordial manner for a couple of years.

Then the events unfolding in the wake of the Arab uprisings have generated changes in the overall security environment in the broader Middle East, which have led to tensions between Turkey and GCC member states, too.

Similar to the preceding decades, Turkey–Gulf relations have become again full with ups and downs. After 2011, the political and security environment in the Middle East has become highly volatile; an uncertain transformation period commenced, in some countries, regime changes occurred, a protracted civil war started in Turkey’s southern neighbourhood, and, thus, it has become even more complicated to follow the interests of the states in the region. In these years, several factors have caused spats in the Turkey–GCC relations: these are mostly related to their differing views on political Islam and, specifically, their approach to Muslim Brotherhood, the question of Iran, and their relations to another GCC member state, Qatar, and, more broadly, the shifting balance of power in the region.

As an example for the conflictual fields, one can here refer to Turkey’s supportive stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood in the region and the completely opposite point of view of Saudi Arabia, as well as other Gulf states.

Turkey’s support to Mohammed Morsi, who had

Turgut Özal (L), the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1989 and 1993

been elected as president in the post-Mubarak Egypt in 2012 and overthrown in 2013, was a major element of rising tensions between Turkey on one side and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. The latter two condemned the Turkish and also the Qatari support to Muslim Brotherhood, since their fear is that the strengthening of the movement might trigger a change in the regional status quo and lead to the destabilisation of the whole region.12 The Syrian conflict, which is itself a considerably complex, multilayered crisis, constitutes another critical point on the Turkey–GCC agenda.

Although Turkey’s interest in ousting the Assad regime coincided with major GCC interests for a long time, a number of issues have arisen since then and shifted the interests of the parties at least to some extent. Over time, Turkey has become more focused on the Kurdish issue within the Syrian conflict and started to seek for partnership with pro-Assad Russia.13 Also, Turkey, along with Russia and Iran, has become a key actor in the Astana and Sochi peace talks on Syria, which has already had numerous rounds of negotiations. It means that Turkey plays a major role in a cooperation format which is focused on a key Middle Eastern conflict, but in which no GCC states are involved, while Iran is.

Considering that Iran is a top factor in shaping the GCC’s security perceptions and agenda, Turkey’s stance towards Iran will always be followed with great attention and suspiciousness from the Gulf either within or beyond this particular cooperation format.

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The second trilateral meeting between Iran, Turkey and Russia on the facilitation of the Syrian peace settlement

On a side note to the Syrian conflict, one can easily argue that the conflict resolution in Syria is not only about finding some kind of solution for the war-torn country itself—it is also a tool to restructure the regional balance of power.

With regard to this, let us not forget that the transformation the Middle East has been undergoing, and the Syrian conflict in particular, have provided Russia with the opportunity to project power in a geostrategically important space from where it has long been absent. If we think about Turkey, the currently volatile state of the Middle East allows it to strengthen its military presence in more spots of the broader region and become an active shaper of a new regional balance of power, which, again, might be critically viewed by some GCC member states.

The close relationship between Turkey and Qatar has also been polarising the Turkey–GCC agenda, especially since June 2017, which was a major breaking point in the history of the GCC. A group consisting of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, together with Egypt, broke up with Qatar, severed diplomatic ties and launched an economic blockade to isolate the country and to put it under pressure.

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The aforementioned countries accused Doha of supporting terrorist groups and handed their demands over. These demands consisted of thirteen points and called Doha on severing its ties with Iran and stopping the support given to all terrorist, sectarian, and ideological organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

It was also among the demands that Qatar should immediately close a Turkish military base that was established somewhat earlier and stop military cooperation with Turkey on Qatari soil.14 In response, Qatar strengthened cooperation with Turkey in numerous fields, and Turkey deployed further troops in Qatar.15 Moreover, Turkey has become a beneficiary of the intraGCC rift: Qatari imports from Turkey skyrocketed, and, as a result of the economic embargo, Qatar had to restructure its trade and rely on its ally, Turkey, to a large extent.16 On the other hand, in the wake of the rift, Turkey has lost some lucrative business with other GCC member states. As a consequence of Turkey’s backing for Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE cancelled their previous orders for military equipment from Turkey.17 It is worth adding that, despite the ongoing conflict between Qatar and some of the

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

GCC member states, Kuwait also signed a military cooperation agreement with Turkey in October 2018, and, in recent years, Oman has also shown a growing interest in buying military equipment from Turkey.18 As a conclusion, we can see that, in our days, a number of issues link/separate Turkey with/from the GCC member states. Foreign and security policy issues, the state of the regional balance of power, as well as wideranging economic and trade relations, can be identified as the primary fields of interaction.

In some fields, we can find cooperation, while, in others, there is rather rivalry. It is worth underlining that, despite the often fluctuating political relations and the regional goals of the actors, trade and economic relations could substantially develop in the past two decades.

Finally, we have to add that the question of who should lead the Muslim world often gets in the spotlight, too. Considering that the territory of Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam, and the holiest sites of Islam can be found in Saudi Arabia, too, one can argue that the kingdom plays an inevitable role in the contemporary Muslim world. At the same time, the secular Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has publicly voiced his opinion that Turkey is the only country that can lead the Muslim world.19 Reading this statement, one can see that Turkey is not only emerging as a regional actor with regard to its geopolitical positions but also adopting a competitive approach to religion, which might further increase tensions in Turkey–GCC relations.

4

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Republic of Turkey:

Relations between Turkey and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). <https://bit.ly/2OcO6Fq > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

5

Özden Zeynep Oktav: Opportunities and Challenges in

Turkey–GCC Relations. In: GCC–Turkey Relations: Dawn of a New Era, edited by Özden Zeynep Oktav – Helin Sarı Ertem.

Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, Cambridge, 2015.

6

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). Reaching out to the

broader Middle East. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Last updated: 18 November 2011. <https://bit.ly/2FQddGN > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

7

Steven A. Cook – Hussein Ibish: Turkey and the GCC:

Cooperation Amid Diverging Interests. The AGSIW Gulf Rising Series. 2017/1. 1.

8 Oktav.

9

Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu: Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri.

<http://tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=624> <http://tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=625> Accessed: 1 July 2019.

10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Republic of Turkey.

11

Mustafa Gurbuz: Ankara’s Ambiguous Policy toward a

Divided GCC. Arab Center Washington DC. 30 October 2017. <https://bit.ly/2GmDmh9 > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

12

Nader Habibi: How Turkey and Saudi Arabia became

frenemies – and why the Khashoggi case could change that.

The Conversation. 17 October 2018. <https://bit.ly/2yn7RQk > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

13 Cook–Ibish, 1.

14

What are the 13 demands given to Qatar? Gulf News

Qatar. 23 June 2017. <https://bit.ly/2YhhhuT > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

15

Turkey sends more troops to Qatar. Al Jazeera.

27 December 2017. <https://bit.ly/2BLTB3f > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

16 Eric Knecht: Booming Qatar-Turkey trade to hit $2 billion for 2018 as Gulf rift drags on. Reuters. 17 January 2019. <https://reut.rs/2svB6gl > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

17

ENDNOTES

<https://bit.ly/2Yveavw > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

18

1

Ali Bakeer: Challenges threaten the rise of Turkey’s

defense industry. The Middle East Institute. 14 May 2019.

Alan Makovsky: The New Activism in Turkish Foreign

Ali Bakeer: Turkey’s Involvement in Gulf Security.

Gulf International Forum. 11 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/

Policy. SAIS Review. 1999/winter–spring. 92–113.

2MehUyZ > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

2

19

Umut Uzer: The Revival of Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign

Erdoğan: Turkey is the only country that can lead

Policy: “The World is Greater Than Five.” Turkish Policy

the Muslim world. Yeni Şafak. 15 October 2018. <https://bit.

Quarterly. 2018/winter. 29–36.

ly/2PSrPgl > Accessed: 1 July 2019.

3 Ahmet Davutoğlu: Stratégiai mélység. Antall József Tudás­ központ. Budapest, 2016. 119.

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(C)OVERT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GCC AND ISRAEL Zsolt Csepregi

While the Middle East in the early 21st century does not lack significant diplomatic and security developments at all, one of the most interesting among them to follow is the slow but steady alignment between the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) countries and the State of Israel.

The relationship is somewhat different with each GCC member, but there are common themes which give a stable basis for our analysis.

The overall relation between the GCC and Israel is first and foremost shaped by geopolitics.

While Israel likes to label itself as an Eastern Mediterranean country, if one would stand on the Israeli bank of the Red Sea, in good weather, he or she would see the northwestern shores of Saudi Arabia. The two “sides,” therefore, occupy neighbouring subregions in the Middle East, with Jordan being a buffer state between them. From an Israeli point of view, GCC countries separate their state from Iran—a common adversary, although the Gulf states have relations with it that vary from open hostility (Saudi Arabia) to a large degree of accommodation (Qatar, Oman, UAE).

Societal factors shape the relations in a mixed way, as, on the one hand, they are not aided nor hindered by indigenous Arabian Jewish communities in Israel, which, unlike Yemenite, Iraqi, or Moroccan Jews, did not exist in any significant number. However, Judaism itself plays a more symbolic, diplomatic role in the emerging relations. On the other hand, the Palestinian question keeps down the level of cooperation, as GCC countries cannot “leave behind” their Palestinian brethren, partly because of domestic legitimacy. The lack of a political solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains a cap on the engagement.

However, the most important reasons for which a slow dance has in recent years started between the sides are more ephemeral, namely world diplomacy and technology. GCC states 108

understand that their importance to the US has been negatively affected by the shale oil revolution in North America, but they need to maintain both the US security presence in the Gulf and its defence exports. Freedom of navigation is still an important feature to maintain for the current sole hegemon, but closeness to Israel can indirectly aid Gulf states lobbying in Washington, especially when emphasising common fears of an Iran with its regional hegemonic ambitions. Regarding defence exports, the Jewish state is keen to employ all its lobbying power to preserve the US policy of maintaining Israel’s quality edge when it comes to advanced military technology in the Middle East. This is the reason why, for example, the sale of F-35s to GCC members was such an important diplomatic issue during recent years, as Israel aims to block every attempt that would damage its relative military supremacy over its current and potential adversaries, which, according to the Israeli security perception, basically encompass each and every country in the Middle East. By hinting at an eventual accommodation with Israel, GCC states can at least mitigate some of the lobbying pressure of pro-Israel groups in Washington.

We should not, however, underestimate the sincerity of the efforts of the GCC states to accommodate to or, eventually, even welcome Israel as a legitimate power in their region. Gulf states historically had no direct armed conflict with Israel due to geographic barriers and clandestine relations with the Jewish state even during the Cold War (for an excellent scholarship on this issue, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Professor Elie Podeh’s work The Mistress Syndrome: Israel in the Middle East 1948–2016 is highly recommended to read).

During the 1990s, the Oslo Process gave a window of opportunity to liaison with Israel and open “trade representations,” which also served

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An aerial view of the Red Sea, which connects Israel with Saudi Arabia

diplomatic roles. The Second Intifada, the suspension of the peace process with the Palestinians, and Israel’s more assertive military posture vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah in the first decade of the new millennium forced these relations underground. Their recent re-emergence is worth a closer look, as they symbolise greater global and regional developments.

The first of such issues is Iran’s regional ambition, which has taken a turn after the US’s disengagement from Iraq and the Syrian and Yemeni Civil Wars. Iran is deeply entrenched in all three states (plus in Lebanon through Hezbollah), creating a “Shiite Arc” between the Mediterranean and Afghanistan and endangering Sunni Gulf states or at least their regional interests. Iran has also demanded various territories on the Arab side of the Gulf, through historical and religious claims. First and foremost, Saudi Arabia’s Shiitedominated eastern regions and Shiite-majority Bahrain are prime targets for an ascending Iran, alongside the disputed islands in the vicinity of the highly strategic Strait of Hormuz. It is worthwhile to note that these claims and ambitions were there even before the emergence of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, but Israel was at that time actively cooperating with the Shah’s

regime, much more than with the Sunni states.

As the tables have turned, Israel finds that, with the aforementioned Arc reaching its borders, the Sunni Arab states are interested in working with it to counter Iran. Secondly, Gulf states are located at one of the most hostile geographic spots on the globe, the Arabian Peninsula being almost completely a desert. Israel’s advancements in countering desertification, water desalinisation, and advanced agriculture made it an extremely valuable source of technology to the Gulf states which are trying to mitigate their population boom and the inhospitable environment. Israel has turned itself in recent years into a water exporter through water desalinisation, gradually pushing its population core further to the south into the Negev Desert, which shows that there are existing regional solutions to the challenges the Gulf states currently face.

The direct, open engagement was unthinkable a few years ago, when the preferred method was meeting under international umbrellas of different sorts. Indirect contact occurred under US oversight, for example, during the prestigious Red Flag exercises, which aim to develop interoperability between US Air Force, NATO allies, and partner nations, with the Gulf states

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and Israel belonging to the second group.

A second useful channel is meeting during apolitical events, such as think tank forums, or in international bodies. A famous example of this was a series of public, recorded, and very constructive exchanges between Israeli and Saudi ex-intelligence chiefs, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yaakov Amidror and Prince Turki al-Faisal. The Israeli representation in Abu Dhabi under the auspices of the International Renewable Energy Agency means the longest-standing diplomatic presence in the other countries. It was opened in 2015 and served as a platform for Israeli state official’s visit to the United Arab Emirates. While GCC countries officially do not permit Israeli citizens to enter their countries, except for flight transfers, Israeli politicians have recently made highly publicised visits to some GCC members.

Israeli Minister of Culture and Sport Miri Regev visited Abu Dhabi in October 2018 and had high-profile meetings in the country. From an Israeli standpoint, her visit was also emotional because of her Moroccan ancestry: more than two-thirds of the Israeli Jewish population have at least partial roots in Muslim countries. There is an indirect longing to engage with the Muslim world more deeply and cooperatively because of this historical and cultural connection which has re-emerged in recent decades as the so-called Eastern (Mizrahi) and Sephardic Jews have taken more prominent roles in the Israeli society and the overall demographic map of the country. Such symbolic factors also aid the Gulf relations in forming a PR perspective, as it was the case, for example, with the recent inauguration of the first synagogue in Bahrain in recent decades fostered the mainstream Israeli media to sing hymns about the country and its openness. Similarly, even the reception of the leaders of the Jewish diaspora community and—the mostly American—rabbis on the basis of an interfaith dialogue in the Gulf states sparks highly favourable reporting in Israel.

However, the most significant official visit was Prime Minister Netanyahu’s meeting with the Sultan of Oman HRH Qaboos bin Said al Said which also took place in October 2018. Oman, which is positioning itself as an interlocutor 110

among countries in conflict or disagreement, is a natural actor to aid Israeli–GCC cooperation.

The meeting was highly successful from a public diplomacy perspective, showing to Israel that the GCC states are truly interested in developing their relations. The main question is whether the opportunities the emerging relations promise outweigh the importance of the Palestinian question in the parties’ eyes. GCC countries cannot “leave behind” their Palestinian brethren in their plight for an independent state. It would be catastrophic due to domestic political reasons, angering the public which is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Also, GCC states have already made a compromise with the so-called 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, championed by Saudi Arabia, which would accept an independent and secure Israel alongside an independent Palestine. It would be a difficult political task to circumvent this declaration and sign a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel, without at least moving ahead with Palestinian independence. Thirdly, GCC states must not let Iran become the “champion” of the Palestinian question, which would again channel into the domestic political legitimacy of the monarchic and chiefly regimes of the Gulf. Qatar is, of course, a highly autonomous player in this aspect as well. This autonomy, on the one hand, is very useful in funding Hamas and ensuring that the Gaza Strip operate to a minimum degree. While Israel is no friends with Hamas, in case its living conditions became unbearable— even more than today—it is terrified by the prospect of a mass exodus of the approximately two million Palestinians, not necessarily to Israel but to Egypt, and the subsequent destabilisation of the Sinai Peninsula, which is already a hotbed of radical jihadist militant groups. The Qatari infusion of funds to Hamas, which Israel permits, serves as a lid on the turmoil in the Gaza Strip.

Here again, Qatar is an outlying case, and the rest of the GCC is highly wary of Hamas, which they see as a militant offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation the current GCC leaderships see as the arch-enemy of their legitimacy. Israel is, on the other hand, reluctant to hand over the whole of the West

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Bank to the Palestinians, citing security reasons, are more nationalist-religious political figures also a “historic right” to settle the land, and solely for the Gulf states it would not relinquish its hold on the territory. The reigning Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Netanyahu believes in the “outside-in” approach to solving the Palestinian issue, by making peace with the Arab world, and, then, moving on to settle the Palestinian’s plight. Conversely, the Gulf states think in an “inside-out” strategy, which would start by establishing an independent Palestine first.

The latest but not the most promising example of the GCC’s—albeit indirect—engagement with Israel was the “Peace to Prosperity” Conference in Bahrain, on 25–26 June 2019, which was planned by the US administration as a launching pad for creating the economic pillar of the Israeli– Palestinian peace plan, the “deal of the century” as President Trump had hailed it formerly. The conference was largely seen as a failure by independent analysts, as no breakthrough was achieved. Apart from the US and Israel, all countries reiterated their commitment to finding a political solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and that, although the financial situation and living conditions of Palestinians must be improved, this improvement cannot overwrite their need to establish an independent state.

The conference, on the other hand, brought Bahraini official statements on Israel conveying their stance which can be summed up as the acceptance of Israel’s existence in the Middle East and a preference for engagement provided the Palestinian issue is solved. Some shift might be expected as Oman opened an embassy in Ramallah, which was only very cautiously welcomed by the Palestinians, as one of their greatest fear is that Arab countries would settle for a smaller independent Palestine with Ramallah and not Jerusalem as its capital.

Considering all the above, the Israeli–GCC relations can be compared to an iceberg, with large parts underwater and unseen and some smaller parts tipping over to overt territory.

Security collaboration, clandestine political engagement on regional issues, and even some

economic and scientific cooperation under international umbrellas will continue giving a backbone to the cooperation deeply rooted in shared interests between the parties. We can expect that Israeli leaders, businesspeople, cultural and sports figures will continue to visit the GCC states (which cannot be reciprocally done because of a public backlash against such Gulf “traitors” of the Palestinian cause) and express their hopes that the relations will soon develop into a comprehensive peace treaty.

Meanwhile, their Gulf hosts will remind them of the harsh fact that they will not have overt, full cooperation unless the Palestinian issue is solved, but covert relations can continue and even develop—both parties know that the Israelis will reluctantly settle for that and continue to hope for a greater shift in relations.

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THE GULF REGION AS A GLOBAL AVIATION HUB Tamás Kozma

When it comes to the economic potential of the Gulf region, most of us would firstly think about the abundant oil and gas reserves all over the region. In geopolitical terms, oil and gas have played an unquestionable role in the Gulf region’s emergence in the global arena, while in economic sense, it is beyond doubt that these assets have become the primary sources of the region’s development. At the same time, we have to see that the need for diversification of Gulf economies appears as an inevitable necessity. Rather slowly, but for surely, we are heading towards a post-oil era, in which these countries with the historic experience of being rentier economies have to adapt to new conditions. Although there is a variety of scenarios for the transformation of the global energy market, and thus, for the outlooks of the future incomes in oil and gas exporting countries, we have to underline that there is an ever growing need for investing capital in industries, other than the hydrocarbon sector.

Qatar with National Vision 2030, 1 Saudi Arabia with Saudi Vision 2030, 2 and the United Arab Emirates with UAE Vision 20213 have undeniably made important steps towards becoming diversified, sustainable, and knowledge-based economies, which envisage less dependency

on petrodollars, and foresee a prosperous future and a continued growth of the national economies.

In line with the aforementioned, this article aims to shed light on a key sector, namely the aviation sector that can be assessed in the context of economic diversification of the Gulf countries. Taking the Gulf region’s favourable geographic location into consideration, its connectedness to Europe, Africa, and Asia makes it an ideal transit hub for global air transportation. This sector has been undergoing a significant growth in the Gulf region over the past decade. Airlines, such as the Emirates, Etihad Airways, Qatar Airways, or Saudia have not only become major regional carriers in the Gulf, but have become notable actors in the global aviation industry, too. While Emirates, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways are focused on international flights, in 2017, 52% of the total traffic of Saudia was performed on its domestic flights, which is a main structural difference between the above airlines.4 Based on the above figures, we can see that the Dubai-based Emirates and the Doha-based Qatar Airways stand out in terms of fleet size and the number of destinations flown, but in terms of the number of passengers carried, the

EMIRATES

ETIHAD AIRWAYS

QATAR AIRWAYS

SAUDIA

MAIN HUB: DUBAI

MAIN HUB: ABU DHABI

MAIN HUB: DOHA

MAIN HUB: JEDDAH

FLEET SIZE 270

FLEET SIZE 102

FLEET SIZE 226

FLEET SIZE 147

NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS 158

NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS 84

NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS 160

NUMBER OF DESTINATIONS 95

NUMBER OF PASSENGERS IN 2018 (MILLION) 58.6

NUMBER OF PASSENGERS IN 2018 (MILLION) 17.8

NUMBER OF PASSENGERS IN 2018 (MILLION) 29.2

NUMBER OF PASSENGERS IN 2018 (MILLION) 34

Leading airlines in the Gulf 112

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A snapshot from Dubai International Airport Terminal 3

primacy of Emirates is obviously visible from the statistics. Airports in the Gulf region also compete for the title of being the best hub in the Middle Eastern region. According to Skytrax, the most relevant international air transport rating organisation, the top five airports in the Middle East are Doha’s Hamad International Airport, Dubai International Airport, Muscat, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain.5 In 2019, Doha’s Hamad International Airport has also been chosen by Skytrax as the 4th best airport,6 and as the 5th best transit airport on worldwide level.7 Based on the 2017 year-end data published by the Airports Council International, Dubai International Airport has been the 3rd busiest airport in the world after Atlanta Hartsfield Jackson Airport and Beijing Capital Airport, with over 88 million passengers per year.8 According to the same organisation, in terms of cargo volume carried in 2017, Dubai International Airport and Doha Hamad International Airport reached 6th place with 2.655 million9 metric tonnes and 16th place with 2.02 million10 metric tonnes of freight and mail, respectively. At the same time, no Gulf airport could get into the top twenty in terms of the number of aircraft movements.11 In order to conceptualise the relevance of the aviation sector for the Gulf region, we can invoke the concept of nation branding, coined by the influential policy advisor, Simon Anholt in the nineties. According to Anholt, nation brand is the ‘the sum of people’s perceptions of a country across six areas of national competence.’12 These areas are tourism, exports, people, governance, culture and heritage, and investment and immigration. The conceptual framework on

nation branding proposed by Anholt, is based on the idea that places aim to manage their international reputation, in order to make them more marketable. Based on the above notion, we can approach Gulf-based airlines from this narrative, and assert that most notably Emirates and Qatar Airways have already become important elements of the nation brand of the respective countries. In line with this approach, we can assert that the quality of services provided by an airline might influence public perceptions of the whole country that the airline belongs to. Based on the above, we can argue that airlines are considerable factors in shaping a certain country’s image and reputation. Even without visiting a certain country, just by travelling with its airlines might give an impression to the passengers about the whole country to some extent, and accordingly, we can think about airlines as parts of nation branding. Given the rapidly developing network of destinations, and their accentuated marketing activities, Gulf-based airlines attract a growing number of passengers. Moreover, we can point on the fact that Emirates, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways, but also Bahrainbased Gulf Air are key sponsors of world top football teams, or Formula-1 races for instance, which again supports the visibility of these brands, as well as strengthens the nation brand of the Gulf countries on global level.

Gulf-based airlines offer convenient travel and high-quality of service both on point-to-point journeys, and on connecting flights between continents. Stopover programmes, as well as the visa-free entries or free transit visa-based entries offered by a number of Gulf airlines are

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King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah is the key gateway for Muslim pilgrims arriving to Saudi Arabia

also getting more and more popular among travellers. Thus, Gulf-based airlines do not only focus on transit passengers connecting from one flight to another through one of the Gulf hubs, but they also aim to boost the number of tourist visits to the individual Gulf countries, too.

As a reason behind these airlines’, but especially behind Emirates’ and Qatar Airways’ high popularity, the outstanding quality of their service can be easily identified. While it is a global trend in aviation industry that companies are shifting towards the concept of providing less service included in ticket price, and more optional services that can be purchased in addition to the ticket, Gulf-based airlines have mostly kept their approach for providing classic full service, which increases their popularity among travellers.

In 2018, 15% of the United Arab Emirates’ GDP was coming from the aviation sector,13 and according to the available forecasts, this figure might be reaching over 20% in the coming years.14 The UAE’s blooming tourism industry attracts a growing number of tourists to the country every year. For example, Dubai as the main tourist destination, attracted 15.92 million visitors in 2018.15 Besides the leisure tourism, we have to highlight that the Dubai Expo 2020 will be another major event, which can boost the number of visitors, and thus it could further increase the demand for air transportation 114

services. It is also worth to cast a glance at the Saudi Arabian aviation market. Saudi Arabia has been applying restrictive policies for leisure tourism, and the introduction of regular tourist visas are still in process at the time of writing this article. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has long been attracting a very significant number of travellers arriving for Hajj and Umrah. In 2017, more than 3 million air passengers travelling with religious purposes took alone Saudia charter flights,16 and according to the plans, Saudi Arabia aims to attract 30 million of pilgrims by 2030,17 which assumes a very substantial demand growth for aviation and related services both for Saudia and other companies. Similarly, the so called Neom Project, a futuristic city, which is aimed to become the smart technology and innovation powerhouse of the country, as well as a key tourist destination, is also expected to boost air traffic, once the giga-investment is completed. Speaking about the future outlooks of the aviation sector in the Gulf region, it is worth mentioning that Gulf-based airlines continue to invest in capacity enlargement. Qatar Airways has more than 170 new aircrafts on order,18 Emirates has placed order for 84 new aircrafts,19 while financially troubled Etihad Airways is compelled to partly cancel its previous orders. In addition to that, there are massive plans for the development of airports, too. The new state-of-art terminal of

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY AND ECONOMY

King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah has already been undergoing the process of soft launch, and it is expected to be fully operational soon. According to the plans, with these capacity enlargements the airport will be able to serve up to 80 million passengers a year.20 Although the enlargement of Dubai’s second airport, the Al Maktoum International Airport also known as the Dubai World Central Airport faces delays, it looks forward to an even more gigantic capacity enlargement. By its planned opening in 2030, it will be able to serve 130 million passengers per year in the initial phase of operation, and this capacity would be doubled later on.21 Considering their impressive growth track, it is obvious that Gulf states have become indispensable parts of the global aviation industry, and they have massive plans to further invest in this sector. In line with this, it is likely that the role of aviation sector in their economic diversification endeavours will be further strengthened in the upcoming years.

7

World’s Best Transit Airports 2019. Skytrax World Airport

Awards. <https://www.worldairportawards.com/worlds-besttransit-airports-2019/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

8 Passenger Traffic 2017 Final. Airports Council International. <https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/passengers/ 2017-passenger-summary-annual-traffic-data/>

Accessed:

3 June 2019.

9

Cargo Traffic 2017 Final. Airports Council International.

<https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/cargo/2017cargo-summary-annual-traffic-data/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

10 Ibid.

11 Aircraft Movement 2017 Final. Airports Council International. <https://aci.aero/data-centre/annual-traffic-data/aircraftmovements/2017-aircraft-movements-annual-traffic-data/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

12

Simon Anholt: What is a Nation Brand? Superbrands.

<http://www.superbrandsturkey.com/trcopy/files/Anholt_ 3939.pdf> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

13

Isaac John: UAE aviation set to scale new heights

in 2019. Khaleej Times. 31 December 2018. <https://www. khaleejtimes.com/business/aviation/uae-aviation-set-toscale-new-heights-in-2019> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

14 Ibid.

15 Dania Saadi: Dubai received 15.92 million visitors in 2018 with most coming from India. The National. 24 February 2019. <https://www.thenational.ae/business/travel-and-tourism/

ENDNOTES

dubai-received-15-92-million-visitors-in-2018-with-mostcoming-from-india-1.829533> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

1

Qatar National Vision 2030. General Secretariat for

16 Saudi Arabia aviation: Saudia transforms and the market

Development Planning. July 2008. <https://www.gco.gov.qa/

grows. CAPA Centre for Aviation. 10 August 2018. <https://

wp-content /uploads/2016/09/GCO - QNV-English.pdf >

centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/saudi-arabia-aviation-

Accessed: 3 June 2019.

saudia-transforms-and-the-market-grows-424737> Accessed:

2

3 June 2019.

Vision 2030 – Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. <https://

vision2030. gov.sa/download/file/fid/417> Accessed: 3

17 Ibid.

June 2019.

18 Nick Wenzel: Qatar Airways adds 250th aircraft to its fleet.

3

International Flight Network. 23 March 2019. <https://www.

UAE Vision 2021. <http://fgccc.org/wp-content/uploads/

2016/08/UAE_Vision_2021.pdf> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

ifn.news/posts/qatar-airways-adds-250th-aircraft-to-its-

4

fleet/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

Saudi Arabia aviation: Saudia transforms and the market

grows. CAPA Centre for Aviation. 10 August 2018. <https://

19

centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/saudi-arabia-aviation-

30 A350-900s. Emirates. <https://www.emirates.com/media-

saudia-transforms-and-the-market-grows-424737> Accessed:

centre/emirates-signs-deal-for-40-a330-900s-30-a350-

3 June 2019.

900s#> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

5

Valerie Tan: Emirates signs deal for 40 A330-900s,

Best Airports 2019 by Global Region. Skytrax World

20 People await grand opening of new Jeddah airport. Saudi

Airport Awards. <https://www.worldairportawards.com/best-

Gazette. 16 April 2018. <http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/

airports-2019-by-region/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

532822> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

6 The World’s Top 10 Airports of 2019. Skytrax World Airport

21 Dubai’s Al Maktoum airport expansion delayed until 2030.

Awards. <https://www.worldairportawards.com/worlds-top-

Arab News. 19 October 2018. <http://www.arabnews.com/

10-airports-2019/> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

node/1390546/business-economy> Accessed: 3 June 2019.

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6 ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

The Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in Hungary, during its ten years of existence, has introduced a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education, as well as domestic and international professional audiences. The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), a Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993).

The Knowledge Centre’s main objectives, in line with the Antall philosophy, are talent management and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events.

The Knowledge Centre is a think tank researching topics of national, regional, and international relevance, such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the EU, US, China, and the Middle East, security policy, sustainable development, as well as technological and social innovation.

The whole of AJKC works toward strengthening institutional relations both at the national and

international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences, workshops, and event series. Our institution’s main office is located in Budapest that operates with three international departments—dealing with the EU and the V4, the USA, and Asia and Africa—and three thematic departments— focusing on security policy, sustainable development, and talent management. In addition, AJKC has two regional offices in Pécs and Győr, as well as an office in Brussels, which was established in 2015 to represent the Antall philosophy in the heart of the European Union and promote the values that he stood for on an international level.

The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scientific works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks. In our autobiographical series, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, recount crucial years and decisions still affecting their lives. Reacting to

events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre is made up of works incorporating the latest results of international relations and geopolitics, the history of politics, economics, and psychology.

Hungarian Memories is an original guidebook series by AJKC that presents the common history of Hungary and the country under scrutiny in a unique way, then guides the reader through the various regions, while also recounting the story of locations with Hungarian memories accompanied by their picturesque images.

The think.BDPST conference is AJKCâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most ambitious professional event. The conference, organised in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and supported by the International Visegrad Fund, focuses on regional development and the new perspectives of research, innovation, and future technologies. think.BDPST invites the most notable, creative, and innovative thinkers of the business, NGO, and political sectors to share their experiences and inspire each other to develop forward-thinking strategies that will facilitate the development of the whole Visegrad region. The

event also aims to position Budapest as an ideal destination for enterprises with a pioneering spirit seeking new horizons, new markets to enter, or a new territory and knowledge base to include in their plans for the future.

The Antall JĂłzsef Summer School is a ten-day educational programme for MA and PhD students, as well as young professionals that examines the Central European region, in particular the Visegrad Cooperation, and its wider neighbourhood from various aspects through frontal and more interactive forms of education. In 2019, the Knowledge Centre organised the seventh Summer School that revolved around the role of the Visegrad Cooperation in international partnerships such as the EU, OSCE, or NATO. Each year, the Knowledge Centre organises its Foreign and Security Policy Conference, which focuses on the key diplomatic priorities of Hungary, the Central European region, and the Transatlantic Alliance as a whole, such as the future of NATO, stability in the Western Balkans, and EU defence cooperation. The conference series is organised in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

OUR RELEASES

Tamás Péter Baranyi, Péter Stepper (eds.): NATO in the 21st Century

Kinga Szálkai, Tamás Péter Baranyi, Luca E. Szarka (eds.): Security Policy Corvinae

The year 2019 marks a double anniversary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: it has been seventy years since the alliance was founded and twenty years since the first round of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries. NATO’s founding in 1949 proved to be a turning point for the political and military history of the entire world, while 1999 was decisive for the CEE region in terms of rejoining the West in a political sense. This duality of approach runs through the whole body of the present volume about NATO and its Central and Eastern European experience.

In this book, the editors wanted to compile contemporary issues and perspectives from a predominantly European framework and with a heavy emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe.

Even though a quality NATO compendium must involve global issues—global outlook, burden-sharing—the present book decidedly focuses on NATO as a device of European defence. Recent trends in challenges, the emergence of new security threats, and the responses to them push the alliance to a characteristic new path in the future.

Security Policy Corvinae is a joint publication written by AJKC, the Corvinus Society for Foreign Affairs and Culture, and the National University of Public Service. It aims to cover the current issues of security on a global scale from a distinctively Hungarian perspective.

Be side s traditional approache s and challenges, new advances and issues are continually appearing in security studies, making it necessary to review and reinterpret classic strategies from time to time. This book, striving to be comprehensive to the fullest extent possible, attempts to bring university students and everybody interested in the topic up to date.

The editors’ guiding principle was to examine matters through a problematising prism, which means that both traditional and novel approaches get equal weight, and differences and debates between them are clearly displayed.

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OUR RELEASES

Daniel Yergin: The Prize

Ian Morris: War! What Is It Good For?

The Prize recounts the panoramic history of oil—and the struggle for wealth and power that has always surrounded oil. This struggle has shaken the world economy, dictated the outcome of wars, and transformed the destiny of men and nations.

The Prize is as much a history of the twentieth century as of the oil industry itself. The canvas of history is enormous—from the drilling of the first well in Pennsylvania through two great world wars to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm.

Daniel Yergin is a highly respected authority on energy, international politics, and economics. He received the Pulitzer Prize for The Prize, which was also made into an eight-hour PBS/BBC series seen by 20 million people in the United States. The book has been translated into 17 languages. It also received the Eccles Prize for best book on an economic subject for a general audience.

In his book, the renowned historian and archaeologist Ian Morris tells the gruesome, gripping story of fifteen thousand years of war, going beyond the battles and brutality to reveal what war has really done to and for the world.

War, and war alone, has created bigger, more complex societies, ruled by governments that have stamped out internal violence. Strangely enough, killing has made the world safer, and the safety it has produced has allowed people to make the world richer too.

War has been history’s greatest paradox, but this searching study of fifteen thousand years of violence suggests that the next half century is going to be the most dangerous of all time. If we can survive it, the age-old dream of ending war may yet come to pass. But, the author argues, only if we understand what war has been good for can we know where it will take us next.

Release Date: February 2020

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

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FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY CONFERENCE, BUDAPEST 26 NOVEMBER 2019

NATO and the European Union have an indispensable role in guaranteeing security in the Balkans. However, integration, due to certain difficulties, results in a protracted process that affects individual actors. Is NATO enlargement needed in the Western Balkans? What is Hungary’s role in this matter? Do external powers pose a challenge? Our conference organised in partnership with the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung’s Budapest Office and the British Embassy in Budapest, with the support of NATO’s Public Policy Division aimed to provide answers to these questions.

The opening speech was delivered by László Sinka, Head of the European Union Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hungary, and underlined that, after nearly a decade of predictable development, the Western Balkans are once again showing signs of instability. He said that both the European Union and NATO should strive to remain a credible player in the region.

In her keynote speech Jill Gallard, Deputy Political Director at the United Kingdom’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office highlighted the need for successful integration in the Western Balkans, as the region’s future security greatly depends on it. She emphasized that, after Brexit, the UK would leave the EU, but not Europe. Therefore, they will continue to support Euro-Atlantic integration efforts in the Western Balkans.

The first panel discussion focused on the current realities of geopolitics and the fragile state of stability in the region with Jasna Dragović-Soso, Head of Department of Politics and International Relations at Goldsmiths University of London, Donika Emini, Executive Director of CiviKos Platform and Member of BiEPAG, and Robert Pszczel, Senior Officer for Russia and the Western Balkans at NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division.

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During his input lecture Ralph Wilde, Member of the Faculty of Laws at University College London, gave a presentation on different interpretations of international humanitarian law by the United States and the EU. In his view the greatest challenge for Western Balkan countries was not their accession to NATO, but manoeuvring along the various interpretations of international law.

The second panel of the conference aimed to give a deeper insight into the political realities of Euro-Atlantic integration with Jovana Marović, Executive Director of the Politikon Network and Member of BiEPAG, Anna Orosz, a Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Tobias Rüttershoff, Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Albanian Office.

The second panel discussions was followed by a closed workshop focusing on the interests and specific behavioural patterns of the great powers in the Western Balkans.

The first panel with Jasna Dragović-Soso, Head of Department of Politics and International Relations at Goldsmiths University of London, Donika Emini, Executive Director of CiviKos Platform and Member of BiEPAG, and Robert Pszczel, Senior Officer for Russia and the Western Balkans at NATO’S Public Diplomacy Division, moderated by Péter Stepper, international relations manager at AJTK. The second panel with Jovana Marović, Executive Director of the Politikon Network and Member of BiEPAG, Anna Orosz, a Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade and Tobias Rüttershoff, Head of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung’s Albanian Office, moderated by Péter Dobrowiecki, the Head of the EU–V4 Department at the AJKC.

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László Sinka, Head of the European Union Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hungary

Ralph Wilde, Member of the Faculty of Laws at University College London

Jill Gallard, Deputy Political Director at the United Kingdom’s Foreign & Commonwealth Office

Zsolt Csepregi, Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Antall József Knowledge Centre

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

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G RS UE

G RS UE O

AUTH ST

AUTHO ST

Al-Kharusi, Anwar Member of the board of directors and various subcommittees at MOL Group and had C-level positions at Oman Oil Company

The Future of the Oil and Gas Industry in the Arab Gulf Region

Belfer, Mitchell President of the Euro Gulf Information Centre, Senior Lecturer in terrorism and asymmetric warfare at Metropolitan University Prague, and

The Arab Gulf Moment

Editor in Chief of the Central European Journal of International and Security Studies

Burchill, Richard Director of Research and Engagement, TRENDS Research & Advisory, Abu Dhabi, UAE

The UAE and the Pursuit of Sustainable Security

Gazsi, Dénes Anthropological Linguist specialising in Middle Eastern languages and cultures, former professor at the University of Iowa in the United States and

Intercoastal Migration and the Multilingual Landscape of the Gulf

Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest, Hungary

Haghirian, Mehran PhD student at Qatar University’s Persian Gulf Studies program and a researcher in international affairs at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities

Understanding Iran: An Iranian Perspective on Forty Years of the Islamic Republic

and Social Sciences in Doha, Qatar

Janardhan, Narayanappa Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi

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Gulf–South Asia Ties: Not Just Oil, Trade, and Expatriates

G RS UE

G RS UE O

AUTH ST

AUTHO ST

Krajcsír, Lukács A historian and international relations analyst, currently employed by the Committee of National Remembrance as researcher

A Great Opportunity or a Serious Risk?-What Does the Persian Gulf Mean for China and the New Silk Road?

Magyarics, Tamás Professor at the Department of American Studies of the Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem

The Past and Present of US–Gulf Relations

in Budapest, Hungary, and former Hungarian Ambassador to Ireland

N. Rózsa, Erzsébet Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade and at the Institute of World Economics of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Professor at the Corvinus University of Budapest and the National University of Public Service in Budapest, Hungary

Nuclear Issues in the Persian Gulf

Szalai, Máté Assistant Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest and Senior Research Fellow at the

The Moment of Small Gulf States

Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Budapest, Hungary

Szántó, Iván Habil. Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Iranian Studies at the Faculty of

Pre-Islamic Cultural Legacies in the Persian Gulf

Humanities of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

Wagner, Péter Assistant Professor at the Institute of Social Science and International Studies of the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in

Small Country, Big Ambitions: The United Arab Emirates in the Libyan Conflict

Hungary and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade in Budapest, Hungary

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T H O S

A

R

U

F

K

C

O A J

Baranyi, Tamás Péter PhD, Historian

Interview with HE Mihály Bayer

Head of Research

Csepregi, Zsolt MA, International Relations Expert

(C)overt Relations between the GCC and Israel

Deputy Director for International Affairs

Éva, Ádám PhD Candidate, Expert of Islamic Studies and International Relations International Relations Manager

Kozma, Tamás PhD Candidate, International Relations Expert, Head of Asian and African Relations Department

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Interview with HE Mihály Bayer Interview with HE István Venczel Interview with Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi Islam and Politics in the Gulf

Interview with HE István Venczel Interview with Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi Turkey and the GCC—A Complex Relationship The Gulf Region as a Global Aviation Hub

REFERENCES OF

PICTURES AND USED DATA Cover photo Doha, Qatar, December 2017. Source: Distinctive Shots/ Shutterstock.

4 CULTURE AND POLITICAL HISTORY

Inside cover

Pre-Islamic Cultural Legacies in the Persian Gulf

Source: Iakov Kalinin/Shutterstock.

Ruins on the Faikala Island. Source: Iván Szántó and https://

Photos between the chapters

commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Antiquities_of_Failaka_

Source: Shutterstock (3: Martin M303/Shutterstock, 4: Benny

island_02.JPG, author: Bo hessin, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0.

Marty/Shutterstock, 5: Tudoran Andrei/Shutterstock).

Lapis lazuli (lazuritic gneiss).

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com/photos/jsjgeology/47595980361, author: James St. John, licence: https://www.flickr.com/help/terms.

2

Intercoastal Migration and the Multilingual Landscape

INTRODUCTION Basic Country Data. Sources: worldpopulationreview.com, tradingeconomics.com,

Wikipedia.org,

worldatlats,

Britannica.

of the Gulf Bastakiya neighbourhood in Dubai. Author: Dénes Gazsi.

Photo courtesy of Dénes Gazsi.

Al-Mirfa. Author: Dénes Gazsi. Photo courtesy of Dénes

Flags’ sources:

Gazsi.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Kuwait#/media/File:Flag_of_Kuwait.svg,

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File:Flag_of_Bahrain.svg,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Flag_of_Qatar#/media/File:Flag_of_Qatar.svg,

https://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_the_United_Arab_Emirates.svg, svg,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Oman.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudi_Arabia#/media/

File:Flag_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg, wiki/File:Flag_of_Iraq.svg,

https://en.wikipedia.org/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

File:Flag_of_Iran.svg, licence: public domain.

JRockly

&

Adrienn

The Black Stone, the most venerated symbol of Islam.

Source: imrankadir/Shutterstock.

The dome of the shrine of Hussein Bin Ali in the Iraqi city of Karbala, the holiest place of Shia Islam. Source: CameraAction/Shutterstock.

Understanding Iran: An Iranian Perspective on Forty Years of the Islamic Republic

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/ Persian_Gulf_States.png,

Islam and Politics in the Gulf

Mérész,

licence: public domain.

3 INTERVIEWS Interview with HE Mihály Bayer Portrait of HE Mihály Bayer. Photo courtesy of HE Mihály Bayer.

Interview with HE István Venczel Portrait of HE István Venczel. Photo courtesy of HE István Venczel.

Interview with Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi

Men holding Khomeini’s portrait during the 1978 Iranian Revolution. Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f2/1978_Iranian_revolution_-_row_of_men_ holding_khomeini%27s_photos.jpg,

author:

unknown,

licence: public domain The Iranian parliament, the Majles. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iranian_Majlis.jpg, author: Mahdi Sigari, licence: CC BY 4.0 Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution.

Source:

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khomeini.jpg, author: unknown, licence: public domain The peoples of Iran. Source: https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Ethnicities_and_religions_in_Iran.png,

author:

Worldmapper, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0.

Portrait of Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi. Photo courtesy of

The Arab Gulf Moment

Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman. Source: Matias Lynch/Shutterstock.

127

As part of extensive social reforms, women in Saudi Arabia are

com/article/pti-stories/iraq-continues-to-be-india-s-top-

now allowed to legally drive their car on their own

oil-supplier-imports-from-us-rises-4-folds-119050100471_1.

without a male companion. Source: H1N1/Shutterstock.

html > Accessed: 5 December 2019.

The Moment of Small Gulf States

India’s largest trade partners (2017). Source: Data collected by

Heads of states of the founding countries of the Gulf

the author from Madhuchanda DeyFreepik. Licence: Freepik

Cooperation

License. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Council

in

Abu

Dhabi,

1981.

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Pakistan’s top five trade partners (July 2018–March 2019).

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Source: Data collected by the author from Pakistan Bureau of

Statistics,

http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//

Table 1: The share of the basic material capacities of each

tables/14.06.pdf,

state in the Gulf region. Source: Data collected by the author

tables/14.07.pdf, Freepik. Licence: Freepik License. Design:

http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files//

from the World Bank Database, 2019. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Adrienn Mérész.

Manama,

https://

Top Recipients of Remittance from Gulf Countries (2016).

comm o n s. w i k i m e d i a . o r g/ wi ki / F i l e:M an am a,_Bah rai n _

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Decembre_2014.jpg, author Wadiia, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0.

Stratfor

Bahrain,

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2014.

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Database,

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article/gulf-remittances-feed-asias-economies, Freepik. Licence: Freepik License. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

5 A Great Opportunity or a Serious Risk?What Does the INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SECURITY

Persian Gulf Mean for China and the New Silk Road?

AND ECONOMY

China’s crude oil imports by source, 2014. Source: U.S.

The Past and Present of US–Gulf Relations

Energy Information Administration (last updated: 14 May

Locations and timeline of major US Gulf war conflicts with US

2015)

involvement. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/usgao/

php?iso=CHN, Freepik. licence: https://www.eia.gov/about/

35901758435/in/photostream/; United States Government

copyrights_reuse.php, Freepik License, design: Adrienn

Accountablity Office: Gulf War Illness. Report to Congressional

Mérész.

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.

Requesters, June 2017. 4. Licence: https://www.usa.gov/ government-works. Redesign: Adrienn Mérész.

The value of Chinese–GCC trade, 2000–2014 Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). International Monetary

Iran nuclear deal: agreement in Vienna on 17 July 2015.

Fund. https://data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-

Source:

59B2CD424B85, design: Adrienn Mérész.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/minoritenplatz8/

19067069963/, author: Dragan Tatic, licence: CC BY 2.0.

Members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), created in 1955 as Baghdad Pact with the outside support of the

US.

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File:CENTO.PNG, author: Brejnev, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0.

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Gulf–South Asia Ties: Not Just Oil, Trade, and Expatriates

Kuimova, licence: fair use defined by https://www.sipri.org/

The main sources of India’s crude oil supply (2018–2019).

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arms_transfers.pdf, author: Pieter D. Wezeman – Alexandra

Data for the infographic is retrieved from Iraq remains India’s top oil supplier in FY19, imports from US up 4-folds. Business

Fights on the streets of Tripoli. Author: Gergely Szabó, photo

Standard. 1 May 2019. <https://www.business-standard.

courtesy of Péter Wagner.

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Jebel Ali Port. Source: https://sw.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri. http://tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.

Picha:Jebel_Ali_Port_1_Imresolt.jpg, author: Imre Solt, licence:

do?istab_id=624,

https://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=

istab_id=625, design: Adrienn Mérész.

http://tuik.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?

374729 &page=110 (Dubai Construction Update, #2206, Turgut Özal (L), the Prime Minister of Turkey between

August 17th, 2007, 10:25 AM)

1989 and 1993. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/ Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. Source:

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Forum, licence: CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

Al-Nahyan.jpg, licence: public domain.

The second trilateral meeting between Russia, Iran, and Nuclear Issues in the Persian Gulf

Turkey on the facilitation of the Syrian peace settlement.

A view over the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. Source:

Source: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57199/

https://www.flickr.com/photos/iaea_imagebank/ 8168889729/,

photos/53011, licence: http://en.kremlin.ru/about/copyrights.

author: Paolo Contri/IAEA, licence: CC BY-SA 2.0.

(C)overt Relations between the GCC and Israel The

Arak

IR-40

Heavy

Water

Reactor.

Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Arak_Heavy_

An aerial view of the Red Sea, which connects Israel with Saudi Arabia. Source: Sergei25/Shutterstock.

Water4.JPG, author: Nanking2012, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0 The Gulf Region as a Global Aviation Hub The UAE and the Pursuit of Sustainable Security

Leading airlines in the Gulf. Sources: Data collected by the

Solar Panel Paved Road Scientific Experiment, Mohamed

author from The Emirates Group Annual Report 2018-19.

Bin Rashid al Maktoum Solar Park, Al Qudra, United Arab

<https://cdn.ek.aero/downloads/ek/pdfs/report/annual_

Emirates. agilard/Shutterstock.

report_2019.pdf, Fast Facts and Figures. Etihad Aviation Group. January 2019. https://www.etihad.com/Documents/

Demo park for Masdar city plan in Abudhabi. Lloyd Vas/ Shutterstock.

Figures_JAN-2019.pdf, Etihad Airways Improves Core

Energy industry and ecology of United Arab Emirates vector map with power stations infographic. Vector Icon Flat/Shutterstock.

Region Oil Production Chart. Data for the infographic is retrieved from International Energy Statistics. Total Petroleum and Liquids

Administration.

Performance in 2018 as Transformation Continues.

Etihad Airways. <https://www.etihad.com/en-es/about-us/ etihad-news/archive/2019/etihad-airways-improvescore-performance-in-2018-as-transformation-continues/,

The Future of the Oil and Gas Industry in the Arab Gulf

Other

PDFs/Corporate%20profile/Fast%20facts/Fast-Facts-

Production.

U.S.

Energy

Information

<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/

data/browser/#/?pa=00000000000000000000000000000 00000vg&c=ruvvvvvfvtvvvv1vvvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvsu20 evvvvvvvvvvvfuvg&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.531-AFG-TBPD.A&cy=2016&vo=0&v=H&end=2018&vid=1 > Accessed: 5 December 2019. Licence: https://www.eia. gov/about/copyrights_reuse.php.

Use of solar focused mirrors to generate steam for oil operations in Oman (PDO/GlassPoint, Oman) Source: Glasspoint. https://www.glasspoint.com/wp-content/uploads/ project-slider-images-05.jpg Turkey and the GCC—A Complex Relationship

Qatar Airways

Fact

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March

2019.

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www.qatarairways.com/content/dam/documents/press-kit/ Qatar%20Airways%20Factsheet%20-%20English.pdf, Annual Report Fiscal 2018. Qatar Airways Group. <https:// w w w. q a t a r a i r w a y s . c o m / c o n t e n t / d a m / d o c u m e n t s / annual-reports/2018/19630-Annual-Report-2018-ENDigital.pdf, Our Fleet. Saudia. <https://www.saudia.com/ experience/about-us/our-fleet, Your flight with SAUDIA around

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TRAVEL-WITH-SAUDIA/Where-we-fly/flight-destinations/ Flights_Destinations_SA_en.html, Freepik. Licence: Freepik License. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

A snapshot from Dubai International Airport Terminal 3.

Source: Plamen Galabov/Shutterstock.

King Abdulaziz International Airport in Jeddah is the key gateway for Muslim pilgrims arriving to Saudi Arabia.

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Table 1: Turkey’s foreign trade with the Gulf countries in 2018, in thousand USD. Source: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu:

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7 NEXT ISSUE IN FOCUS: TECH COMPANIES— THE NEW SOVEREIGNS? Over the last decades, we have lived in a period of abiding frenzy about innovation and technology making positive changes the world over. However, today, as it is increasingly permeating our life, technology also comes under trenchant censure on all levels of society. Tech criticism is not anywise a new thing, but these questions must be raised every now and then so we do not lose our grip on in what direction our future evolves.

Do technological companies make a positive change in our life or just snarl it up? Are Big Techs better and more efficient at organising our societies than traditional states? Are their global networks more relevant than relations among peoples administered by countries and governments? Who can protect us and our growingly invaluable personal data if state sovereignty is lost to businesses cutting through boundaries? Can big companies and all their money and capital crank up innovation anyway, or should we look elsewhere for it and do away with trusts and their overwhelming dominance?

In an attempt to answer the foregoing, our next issue, In Focus: Tech Companies—The New Sovereigns? expands on how states, the EU, or jurists try to address challenges emanating from the omnipresence of today’s companies and use an alternative prism to look at business and innovation, while shedding some light on our uncharted future.

Additional issues of In Focus are available on the webpage of the Knowledge Centre, www.ajtk.hu. Please kindly note that In Focus can be downloaded free of charge after registration.

CONTACT INFORMATION

IMPRINT

Antall József Knowledge Centre Address: 2 Czuczor Street, H-1093 Budapest Web: www.ajtk.hu Telephone: +36 20 310 8776 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu

Publisher: Péter Antall, Director, AJKC Editor-in-Chief: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editor: Ádám Éva Editor: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Language Editor: Zsolt Pálmai Proof-readers: Ádám Éva, Tamás Kozma Contributors: Csilla Lichtenstein, Zita Mihály Layout: Gergely Kiss Graphic Design and Pre-press Preparation: Adrienn Mérész Printed and Bound: Alföldi Nyomda Zrt. Managing Director: Géza György

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