In Focus Japan - The legacy of the Heisei Era

IN FOCUS

2019. 3rd Issue Free of Charge

Japan—The Legacy of the Heisei Era

Geopolitics

Economy

Society

Culture

IN FOCUS

2019. 3rd Issue Free of Charge

Japan—The Legacy of the Heisei Era

All rights reserved. Articles found in this publication are the intellectual property of the Antall JĂłzsef Knowledge Centre. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Welcoming Words

5

Introduction 6 Basic Country Data Infographic 8 Demographic Turbulence and its Costs: the Challenges for Japan 9 Interview with HE Norbert Palanovics, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Hungary to Japan 12 Interview with HE Dr István Szerdahelyi, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Hungary to Singapore 16

In-Depth 20 A Country of Permanent Renewal 22 Prime Ministerial Profile: Shinzō Abe 29 Geopolitics in an Evolving Region 35 An Alliance Made Even Greater? The US–Japan Alliance in the Heisei Era, Okinawa, and the American Military Presence 41 Japan’s Territorial Issues with Neighbouring Countries 48 North Korea and the Issue of Japanese Abductees 52 The Dynamics of Normalised Sino-Japanese Relations 57 The Whaling Industry: Then and Now 63 Nuclear Reactors, Accidents, and the Future of Nuclear Energy Policy: Changing Dynamics After the Fukushima Crisis 66 Rethinking Defence—Shifting Capabilities and Focus Points of the JSDF 77 Japan and the Developmental State 80

Economy 84 Japan’s Struggle for a Stable Economic Recovery After the Bubble Burst 86 American Perceptions of Japan at the Dawn of the Heisei Era 91

Society 98 The Oldest Imperial Family in the World 100 Earthquakes, Tsunamis, and the Wrath of Nature 107

The Sustainability of Japanese Work Culture 111 Aum Shinrikyō—Terror and Encroaching Threats 118 Japanese in Brazil 123

Culture 128 The Main Characteristics of Japanese Literature in the Heisei Era 130 Kanji—A Contentious, Yet Ever-Stimulating Writing System 136 Seasonal Festivities in Japan 140 Interview with Maki Stevenson, Goodwill Ambassador of Japanese Cuisine to Hungary 144 Tastes Like Family 148 Anime—A Bridge Between East and West: The Movies of Hayao Miyazaki 152

7 Hungary and Japan Hungarian–Japanese Relations in the New Age Pál Teleki and Japan Apologising, Refusing, and Thanking in Hungarian and Japanese: Different Languages and Different Strategies Exchange Opportunities Between Hungary and Japan in the Heisei Era

158 160 166

171 176

8 Antall József Knowledge Centre About AJKC “Regional Dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative” Conference Our Releases Foreign and Security Policy Conference Budapest 2019 Guest Authors Authors of AJKC References of Pictures and Used Data

182 182 184 188 189 190 193 194

9 Next Issue In Focus: The Gulf—Complex and Divided

198 198

WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers,

Editor’s Introduction

The present issue of In Focus aims at reviewing Japan’s past thirty years. Spanning from 1989 to 2019, the Heisei Era saw tremendous changes in the country. This is a period when, after Emperor Hirohito’s death, Japan finally left “the postwar” behind. Finding a new place in accelerated globalisation, repairing the economy after the “Lost Decade,” establishing a formidable power in defence, recovering from natural and nuclear disasters, and seeking long-term solutions for economic stagnation were but a few major challenges of the Heisei Era. Alongside the ups and downs of politics, it was also a period of stupendous cultural achievements: Japanese cuisine, video games industry, taiko drumming, and anime features have conquered the whole world.

The Heisei Era, a period of political–economic rollercoaster and cultural ascendancy, ended on 30 April 2019 upon the abdication of Emperor Akihito. The Reiwa Era has just begun in the face of multiple challenges and opportunities.

Whether Japan will be able to resuscitate its economic dynamism, whether it will come to play a major role in international affairs, whether it gains back its championship in innovation and technology are all the questions of the Reiwa period. This issue of In Focus stops for a moment at the crossroads of the two historical periods. Please join us in reviewing the ups and downs behind, challenges ahead, and the eternity of cultural greatness.

The current issue of In Focus aims to provide a comprehensive account of Japan's contemporary political, economic, social, and cultural life, with a special focus on the symbolic difference between Emperor Akihito, who resigned in April, and Emperor Naruhito, who ascended the throne in May. The publication will examine Japan in the Heisei Era, while presenting the country's current security policy challenges and the characteristics of its international relations.

The death of Emperor Hirohito in 1988 opened a climactic era for Japan—although it was not a culmination of the continuous development of the post-war era, as many would have thought.

It introduced many systemic issues and challenges to the country, however, that would redefine it to a nation never seen before.

The rampaging political vacuum of the 1990s has greatly contributed to the country's sinking into recession and then into the lingering stagnation of the Lost Decade, while the ticking demographic bomb and regional tensions also weighed heavily on the country.

But which neighbours are having second thoughts about Japan and why? What is the Emperor's role in the 21st century? What are the cultural traditions that survived the storm of globalisation? This issue tries to provide an answer to these and many other questions.

Emese Schwarcz—Editor

Tamás Péter Baranyi—Editor-in-Chief WELCOMING WORDS

5

2

INTRODUCTION

BASIC COUNTRY DATA OFFICIAL NAME: JAPAN (日本・NIHON/NIPPON) NATIONAL ANTHEM: KIMIGAYO, “HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY’S REIGN” CAPITAL: TŌKYŌ (東京) AREA: 377,973 KM² GDP: USD 5.071 TRILLION (NOM) USD 5.632 TRILLION (PPP)

Hokkaidō

PROCLAMATION: 3 MAY 1947 HEAD OF STATE: SHINZŌ ABE (安倍晋三) EMPEROR: NARUHITO (徳仁) OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: JAPANESE POPULATION: 126,440,000 FORM OF STATE GOVERNANCE: CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS: 47 PREFECTURES, INCLUDING 43 NORMAL PREFECTURES, 2 URBAN PREFECTURES, 1 METROPOLIS, 1 CIRCUIT CITY WITH THE LARGEST POPULATION: TŌKYŌ (8,336,599)

Niigata

Kyōto Hyōgo

Kōchi

Tōkyō

Ōsaka

Ōita

REGIONS KYŪSHŪ

CHŪBU

CHŪGOKU

KANTŌ

SHIKOKU

TŌHOKU

KANSAI

HOKKAIDŌ

DEMOGRAPHIC TURBULENCE AND ITS COSTS: THE CHALLENGES FOR JAPAN Minchung Hsu

Japan has the oldest population in the world, due to the improving life expectancy and declining birth rates since decades. The life expectancy in Japan increased from 72 years in 1970 to 80 years in 1995, and it reached 84 years in 2016 (see Figure 1a). In 2016, 26.6% of its population was 65 years old or above, while this ratio in OECD countries was 16.5% on average. The large aging population combined with long life expectancy implies a huge demand for health care and an extraordinary financial burden.

86 84

(a) Life expectancy at birth

82 80 78 76 74 72 70 68

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

(b) Fertility rates in Japan 2.6 Marital fertility rate

2.4

Total fertility rate

2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 1: Demographic changes in Japan

2010

In addition, fertility rates in Japan have been well below the replacement rate since the mid-1970s. The total fertility rate (TFR) fell below 1.5 after 1990 and became relatively stable at around 1.4 after 2000 (see the purple line in Figure 1b). Figure 1b also shows marital fertility rates (TFR of married women) so is the violet line in Figure 1b. The gap between the violet and purple lines has been growing—it was less than 0.3 in 1970 and became 0.5 in 2010, when marital fertility continued at 1.9. As the non-marital birth ratio in Japan is very low (2%), the enlarged gap indicates that the decrease in marriage rate might be an important factor accounting for low fertility.

The data shows that the ratio of men who were not married by the age of 50 was about 20% in 2010, while this ratio was close to 0 in 1980.

Given the trend of increasing longevity and declining fertility, the old-age population share (aged 65+) in Japan surpassed the population share of children in the mid-1990s. Figure 2 shows this demographic pattern clearly. As a result, the share of working-age population (aged 15–64) started to shrink in 1990 (the beginning of Heisei Era), when it reached 70%, and is projected to fall down to 50% of the total population in 2050 (see Figure 2a) with the old-age dependency ratio rising to 80% (see Figure 2b).1 At about the same time, in the early 1990s Japanese economy also experienced a significant slowdown. Figure 3 shows the real GDP of Japan from 1970 and that of the US as a reference (with each country’s 1970 GDP being normalised to 1). The average growth rate of Japan before 1990 (i.e. the slope of the purple line) was higher than that of the US, but it became substantially lower after 1990.

The economic growth of Japan has not yet recovered since then.

INTRODUCTION

9

100

80

(b) Japan’s dependency ratios

(a) Japan’s population structure

90 80

60

Dependency ratio (%)

Fraction of population (%)

70

0–14 15–64 65+

50 40 30 20

70 60 50 40 30

10 0 1980

Total dependency ratio Elderly dependency ratio

20

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

10 1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Figure 2: Aging in Japan

This demographic change directly affects the supply of labour in Japan, and it has been a major challenge to the economy since the beginning of Heisei Era. It does not only reduce the number of workers but also the hours worked per worker and the aggregate productivity. This is because older people on average participate in the labour market less, work less hours, and have a lower labour productivity compared with younger cohorts.

A recent study by Thomas Cooley and Espen Henriksen suggests that the demographic change in Japan, which leads to increases in the fraction of old population and the median age of population, may partially account for the economic slowdown since the early 1990s through changes in both labour supply and aggregate productivity.2 In addition to economic growth, the trend of population aging also creates a number of challenges for the Japanese society including health care and fiscal sustainability. In my recent research (co-written by Tomoaki Yamada), we study the impacts of aging population and emphasise the cost of maintaining the universal health insurance (UHI) system that provides health insurance coverage to all residents, as in most OECD countries.3 The elderly face greater health risks and require much more care than young people. Data show that the average per person medical costs for individuals aged 65 and above is approximately four times bigger than that of 10

INTRODUCTION

those under age 65 (see Table 1). Figure 3 depicts the trend of medical costs in Japan. The medical costs to GDP ratio shows a sharp increase since 1990 that coincides with the demographic trend and the economic slowdown.

However, under the current system, the burden of financing health care falls primarily on the working-age population, as approximately 90% of the UHI’s costs are financed through general government revenues and a premium (which is charged to workers and employers) that is levied on employers and workers. Given that the demand of health care increases as a result of population aging, if the current UHI system is to be maintained, either the government subsidy or the insurance premium must be raised to pay for the additional costs. Either way, the financial burden on the working age population will be

MEDICAL COST BY AGE GROUP

Age group

Per person medical cost (1,000 yen)

Percentage of total average (%)

Total

307.5

100.0

Under 65

177.1

57.6

65+

717.2

233.2

Table 1

4.0 Japan

United States

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0 1970

1975

1980

1985 1990 1995

2000 2005 2010 2015

Figure 3: Japan’s medical care cost

heavier, which may depress labour supply and crowd out household savings.

Moreover, Japan has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among advanced economies. Its net debt to GDP was about 116% and gross debt to GDP was above 200% by the end of 2010. This fact may constrain the government’s ability to issue more bonds to finance its expenditures.

We have observed several reforms during the Heisei Era in order to maintain the UHI system and ensure the fiscal sustainability. The UHI co-payment rate was 10% for all individuals in 1990. In 1997, the co-payment rate increased from 10 to 20% for individuals aged below 70.

The co-payment rate for individuals aged below 70 further increased from 20 to 30% in 2003.

The co-payment rate for individuals aged between 70 and 74 also increased from 10 to 20% in 2008. These reforms aimed to control the fiscal burden from health care expenditures.

Even so, the consumption tax rate in Japan has increased significantly—it was 3% in 1990 and 5% in 1997, 8% in 2015, and it is going to be 10% in 2019. Moreover, the social security tax rate was 13.58% in 1990, and a reform in 2004 set a gradual increase in the tax rate rising to 18.3% in 2018.

If the current trend of aging continues, based on our simulations with a general equilibrium life-cycle model, we suggest that, without any reform, as a lower bound, an additional 5.7%

tax on labour income will be required only to finance the increased UHI costs in the next thirty years. If the government is also required to maintain the same benefits of its public pension system, the extra tax burden will be more than doubled.

After the bubble period roughly around 1985 and 1990, Japan experienced sharp transitions during the Heisei Era (the last three decades), including significant changes in both the economy and demography. Although the Heisei Era is ending, the challenges will not stop.

The demographic changes in Japan seem to significantly hinder the slow recovery from its prolonged slump after the bubble burst. Reforms are necessary to increase fertility, encourage labour supply, ensure fiscal sustainability, and improve economic activities/efficiency. The potential reforms might include, for example, a better child care and family support, a structural change in the labour market to provide more flexibility for workers with families or other constrains, a change in immigration policy and services to attract foreign workers, streamlining the social security/insurance programmes, and a tax structure reform to reduce distortions and improve the fiscal sustainability. The current government has started some reforms, but there is still a long way to go, and, for sure, it will still be challenging for the new era, Reiwa, that has started in May 2019.

ENDNOTES 1 Projections are based on the estimates by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

2 Thomas Cooley – Epsen Henriksen: The demographic deficit. Journal of Monetary Economics. 2018/January. 45–62.

3 Minchung Hsu – Tomoaki Yamada: Population Aging, Health Care, and Fiscal Policy Reform: The Challenges for Japan. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2019/April.

547–577.

INTRODUCTION

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INTERVIEW WITH HE NORBERT PALANOVICS, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF HUNGARY TO JAPAN Emese Schwarcz, July 2019, Tōkyō, Japan

Norbert Palanovics Hungary’s ambassador from 2016, HE Norbert Palanovics has a long history with the country of Japan. He received his economist degree in the city of Pécs, and also studied in Sweden and then in Japan, where he completed his doctoral studies in international relations. Having worked as a foreign correspondent in Japan, Ambassador Palanovics has first-hand experience of the G8 Summit in Hokkaidō and the 2011 Tōhoku triple disaster. As he led the Tōkyō branch office of Pick Szeged, he has rich knowledge of East Asian and Southeast Asian markets.

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INTRODUCTION

Your Excellency, the Heisei Era was quite the challenge for Japan both politically and economically. How would you describe Japan’s current power position compared to the end of the Shōwa Era? The Heisei Era was a very interesting period for Japan. The country experienced the burst and the aftermath of the economic bubble, a long economic stagnation compounded by deflation. However, as I see it having been in the country for a while now, Japan matured a lot during these three decades.

More importantly for us, the Heisei Era coincided with the changes that took place in Central and Eastern Europe thirty years ago.

Several developments shaped the country during recent years along with the demographic challenges, the ageing population, and the low birth rate that started to impact Japan during the Heisei Era. The Heisei Era brought fundamental changes for both Japan and Hungary. Hungary experienced a dramatic expansion in foreign relations, while Japan slowly slid into recession. Did the economic troubles influence our relations in any way? Were they noticeable in Hungary?

Not at all. Our strong economic relations started at the very beginning of the Heisei Era. “Magyar” Suzuki set up its operations in Esztergom in 1991 and started production in 1992. It was one of the first, if not the first, large-scale Japanese investments in our region. Suzuki not only brought its suppliers to Hungary, but word also spread among Japanese companies that Hungary is a good place to invest. That was the first wave of Japanese investment. We have now been experiencing a second, very strong wave for the last few years, as many companies with factories in Hungary are reinvesting or expanding their facilities. Several new Japanese investors have also chosen Hungary as their location.

We are very proud to say that, currently, there are more than 165 Japanese companies operating in Hungary, and this sheer number is a good indicator of the strong economic relations between the two countries.

How would you describe Japan’s presence and activity in the Central European region?

As I mentioned, economic relations have been very strong for the last three decades, and Japan has been a very important investment

and trade partner for Hungary. In the political field, our relations have long been characterised as one without any big issues. This has also meant, however, that the relationship between Japan and Central Europe has not been the primary focus of Japanese foreign policy for a while. Due to our international activities, however, and, due to the growing role and influence of the Central European region, it is a fortunate development that Japanese politicians and leaders are getting more and more interested in Central Europe, especially the V4 countries. This growing interest was recently manifested in two high-level summits within one year, when Prime Minister Abe met the leaders of the Visegrad Countries, and we strongly hope that this momentum will continue in the future as well, including in the area of bilateral political relations.

It is a fact that we have not had a Japanese Prime Minister visit Hungary since Prime Minister Kaifu in January 1990, but I hope that this can soon change, as it is in the interest of both Japan and our country.

Hungary had the pleasure of welcoming members of the Imperial Family several times during the Heisei Era. Of these occasions, the year 2002 was especially memorable, when Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko accepted Prime Minister Medgyessy’s invitation, and 2017, when Prince Akishino and his daughter, Princess Mako, embarked on a research trip. Prince Akishino is reportedly interested in Hungary’s livestock breeding—can we expect more visits in the future?

We are very proud that Princess Kako, the daughter of His Imperial Highness Crown Prince Akishino, will visit Hungary and Austria in September this year. It will be the first official visit of Princess Kako to a foreign country, and it is an honour that she will go to Hungary and Austria, countries that are celebrating the 150th anniversary of their diplomatic relations with Japan this year.

Can you describe the Hungarian community in Japan?

“…WE NOW HAVE THE LARGEST NUMBER OF JAPANESE STUDENTS AT OUR MEDICAL FACULTIES…” We have about 600-700 Hungarians living in Japan, and the number of Hungarian tourists is rapidly growing. Most Hungarians live in the Kantō area, which is Tōkyō and its surroundings.

The next big community is in the Kansai area, around Ōsaka. The profile of the Hungarians in Japan is very diverse: we have university students, researchers, expats, those who came for reasons of marriage, etc. The embassy is trying to keep them close together. We have an annual national day reception on 15 March for the Hungarian community, and we have also introduced Farsang in February and “Mikulás” pre-Christmas events at the embassy for Hungarians with children in Japan. We also provide free tickets to several cultural events to the community. There are also plans for the Hungarian Cultural Institute, which will be opened at the end of this year, to provide further opportunities for Hungarians in Japan.

Eötvös Loránd University, Károli Gáspár University, and the Budapest Business School have been quite successful in furthering exchange and other scientific relations with Japan. What are the specifics of higher education opportunities between the two countries?

Higher education exchanges are booming.

Traditionally, many Japanese have come to study at our world-famous institutes for musical education, especially the Liszt Academy of Music.

We are very proud, however, that we now have the largest number of Japanese students at our medical faculties. This programme started in 2006, and we now have more than 450 INTRODUCTION

13

Japanese students studying full-term (from the first year until graduation) at our medical schools in Budapest, Pécs, Debrecen, and Szeged.

Hungary probably has the largest number of Japanese medical students studying outside Japan, and this fact has become quite big news in Japan as well, often covered by the national media. We constantly emphasise the level of our education, and it is also important to mention that Hungary offers almost one hundred Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarships to Japanese students who wish to come to study in Hungary.

The bilateral exchanges also have a strong momentum between different Hungarian and Japanese universities. A good example for this is the event that the Tempus Public Foundation and our embassy organised last year to further enhance relations. Fourteen Hungarian universities participated, and we had more than fifty representatives from various Japanese universities. The event was a great success.

Traditionally, Jōsai University in Tōkyō has had the strongest ties with Hungarian higher education institutions, but we could help prestigious universities, for example Keio University, to expand their relations with potential Hungarian partners as well.

Let us look into the future. In 2019, the Heisei Era ended, and the people welcomed a new Emperor on the throne. What can we expect from Emperor Naruhito? What do we know about him?

I believe that His Majesty Emperor Naruhito will be successful in continuing his father’s legacy, and, as the name of his era, Reiwa, suggests, he will be able to create “beautiful harmony.”

His Majesty studied at Oxford, and his research interest are water policy and water conservation.

He often took part in and gave lectures at international conferences, including the World Water Forum in Brazil last year, where he also met our President János Áder.

2019 also marks another important event: this year is the 150th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations between Hungary and 14

INTRODUCTION

“WE CAN ALREADY SEE MORE EUROPEAN PRODUCTS ON THE SHELVES OF THE JAPANESE SUPERMARKETS, AND THIS TREND WILL CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE AS WELL.” Japan. The Embassy of Japan in Hungary is preparing various events for this occasion—how will the Embassy in Tōkyō commemorate the event?

Our dream is to have 150 Hungary-related events all around Japan this year. Even if we do not reach this goal, we definitely set a high bar to make this year truly memorable. We have already had several interesting programmes. We are proud to introduce groundbreaking events, such as a collaboration between contemporary music by Hungarian composers and traditional Japanese Noh theatre. The Budapest MÁV Symphonic Orchestra had a wonderful concert at the prestigious Suntory Hall in Tōkyō in May, where Maestro Kenichirō Kobayashi conducted the orchestra. This was the first time when the Maestro’s new piece that he composed for the anniversary year was performed in Japan.

Crown Prince Akishino and his family also attended the concert, and it was widely covered by the Japanese media.

It is very important to mention that we do not have events in Tōkyō only but in other cities and towns as well. I have just returned from

Hiroshima and visited Shimane prefecture earlier to commemorate the anniversary, and we have also introduced Hungary, especially Hungarian thermal hot springs, with the help of a fantastic photo exhibition at several hot spring resorts in the Japanese countryside.

We have two major projects for the second part of the year: One is the exhibition at the New National Art Gallery in Tōkyō, where more than a hundred pieces, including works from Csontváry, Szinyei Merse, and Munkácsy from the Museum of Fine Arts and the Hungarian National Gallery, will be exhibited. Several of these pieces have never seen to Asia, and we expect more than a hundred thousand visitors at this exhibition.

The other project is the opening of the Hungarian Cultural Institute in Tōkyō, which can truly create the legacy of the anniversary year.

We believe that it will further boost our cultural activities in Japan and make Hungary even more attractive for the Japanese.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is currently spending his fourth term in office, but his tenure will end for good in 2021. Although there are speculations about who might follow him, there is no elected successor on the horizon. How can you define Abe’s Central European foreign policy during his second stint? Do you expect any changes in the relations in the post-Abe era?

I believe that Prime Minister Abe is aware of the importance of Central Europe, as indicated by his determination to take part in two V4+Japan summits within one year. I truly hope that this momentum continues, and, hopefully, we could soon have important bilateral discussions between our prime ministers as well. We have a lot of common interests, and we would be more than open to share our experiences at a high-level summit.

In February, the EU and Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force, to a warm welcome by the Japanese.

What kind of benefits does this mean for Hungarians living in Japan?

The EPA is a breakthrough agreement; it is indeed a big milestone in the field of economic relations between Japan and the European Union. The Japanese media was quick to highlight that the tariffs on wine from Europe— including Hungary—would be scrapped, making our wines cheaper for Japanese customers. We can already see more European products on the shelves of Japanese supermarkets, and this trend will continue in the future as well. I believe that it will have a positive impact on our exports too, and we will be able to export more high-quality Hungarian agricultural products— meat, foie gras, honey, wine, frozen vegetables, and fruits—to Japan. Recent years have witnessed a trend that Japanese customers are more conscious about both food safety and quality, and Hungary is more than ready to serve the needs of the Japanese market.

INTRODUCTION

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INTERVIEW WITH HE DR ISTVÁN SZERDAHELYI, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF HUNGARY TO SINGAPORE Emese Schwarcz, June 2019, Singapore

Dr István Szerdahelyi Born in 1959, Ambassador Szerdahelyi started his diplomatic service in Tōkyō as a Second Secretary in 1990. After earning a PhD degree in International Relations, he assumed the position Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Hungary to Japan in 1999, one which he kept until 2016, when he continued his career in Singapore, also as an ambassador.

In 2000, His Excellency was decorated by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan with The Order of the Rising Sun. His field of expertise includes the modern history of Japan, and international relations and politics in East Asia and the Pacific.

16

INTRODUCTION

The Heisei Era ended in April, when Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga announced the name of the new era Reiwa (令和). The origin of the name was received with mixed responses, due to its Japanese, rather then Chinese classical literature origin. This Japanese source is the first classical poetry collection written in Japanese—and while the original expression comes from the line “It is the beginning of spring in the auspicious month, with the glorious weather and peaceful breeze,” where “auspicious” and “peaceful” makes up Reiwa, some took the kanji characters quite literally.

In a literal interpretation, the meaning of the first character is ‘order.’ What does that make of the Heisei Era? What conclusion can we form about the previous era that leads us to the pursuit of peace through order?

It comes as no surprise that after a long period filled with political and economic instability, the Japanese long for a stability here to stay, which would require order in both of these spheres. But Japan was not alone in these hardships – Hungary was also

experiencing quite the challenges throughout the 1990s, when the country went through a fundamental political and economic transformation.

We asked our long-serving and experienced diplomat, HE Dr István Szerdahelyi about the relations between these two very distant countries.

Your Excellency, originally you are a historian, so you are in a unique position to assess the role Japan has been playing in Asia in the past 150 years. For many years, Japan was seen as a major threat and an envied economic model. How much did it change, and for better or worse, during the Heisei Era? Up until the beginning of Heisei Era in the early 90s, Japan experienced dynamic economic growth and was a regional leader in terms of economy. Alas, Japan reached a point of stagnation and the economic growth of neighbouring countries started to accelerate.

As a consequence, Japan lost its unique position as a leading global powerhouse, however, it still remains one of the major players in the region, and even globally.

And how would you describe the bilateral relations during

the beginning of Heisei Era? How did the Japanese partners receive the democratisation of Hungary?

During this period, Japan supported and provided advice in different areas of economic transition. As Hungary transitioned into a democracy, Japan soon realised that the Eastern European market would grow and there were more opportunities to be introduced and potential to develop. Hungary was seen as a good trade partner and also a country that could benefit from foreign direct investment. In fact, several Japanese companies decided to set up manufacturing plants in Hungary, such as Suzuki.

regional cooperation. What were the attitudes of the Japanese governments toward the group in these early years? Have these changed over time?

The four Visegrad Countries have become a valuable and important partner over time for Japan. As the V4 countries have become the regional powerhouse and engine of the European economy, there has been an increase in the number of Japanese companies setting up plants and businesses in Hungary. There are constant and robust high-level discussions between the Visegrad Group and Japan, helping to maintain the ongoing strong and close relationship between the countries.

You were serving as a Second Secretary at the Embassy of Hungary in Tōkyō during Prime Minister József Antall’s term.

In 1991, PM Antall visited Japan to meet Emperor Akihito. Both of them were presented with an unprecedented and extremely challenging situation—PM Antall with the end of the soviet regime, and Emperor Akihito with the end of his father’s reign, who represented Japan’s wartime imperial identity. In a period of uncertainty and dramatic change, what was it like serving at the embassy?

Japan has always had high regard and recognition for Hungary, especially in its culture and arts. However, as a post-communist economy, it was a common assumption that Hungary might not be as advanced compared to other countries.

During this period of dramatic change, the main focus and task of Hungary was to change the mind-set and perspective about Hungary in the eyes of foreign nations. Building a brand new image of the country that showcases a confident and reliable European nation was of paramount importance.

2016 marks the year when you became Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore.

Singapore, just like many other countries in the region, has a complicated history with Japan. Can you elaborate on the historical relations between the two?

Bitter memories born during the Japanese occupation are yet to be forgotten by the Singaporeans, however, with the Declaration of

As Prime Minister Antall was pursuing the expansion of foreign relations, the Visegrad Group, a cultural and political alliance of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia was formed to enhance

Stamp printed by the Hungarian Post Office depicting “Geisha in boat” by Yeishi INTRODUCTION

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BUSINESS IN HUNGARY The Hungarian headquarters of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) was set up in 1992 in Budapest. The main mission of the office is to promote business exchange activities between the two countries. Such

activities are investment to Japan, exports from Japan and investment from Japan. As of 2019, the following major cities are on the radar for Japanese investment: Kaposvár, Zalaegerszeg, Veszprém, Dunaújváros, Szolnok, and Nyíregyháza.

YEAR TO DATE

COUNTRY/AREAS

EXPORT

IMPORT

174 124 406

179 192 356

-5 067 950

ASIA

91 192 311

85 977 436

5 214 875

EAST ASIA

87 191 229

84 046 647

3 144 582

ASEAN

26 065 448

27 548 314

-1 482 866

EUROPE

23 213 751

24 296 584

-1 082 833

EUROPEAN UNION (28)

21 466 336

21 407 402

58 934

Germany

5 174 715

6 311 583

-1 136 868

France

1 705 081

2 846 603

-1 141 522

United Kingdom

3 735 165

1 948 217

1 786 948

Italy

1 249 875

2 658 224

-1 408 349

Austria

327 940

442 943

-115 003

Poland

753 595

235 892

517 703

Czech Republic

420 465

283 754

136 711

Slovakia

58 906

64 644

-5738

Hungary

484 387

181 399

302 988

5 303 620

20 209 995

-14 906 375

TOTAL

MIDDLE EAST

BALANCE

(Note) Area groupings defined here are as follows: East Asia – ASEAN, P.R. China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Republic of Korea ASEAN – Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia Asian NIEs – Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore European Union – Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, Finland, Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia

Value of exports and imports by area and country (thousands of US dollars, %), March 2019 18

INTRODUCTION

Independence, the general attitude of the country leadership has morphed considerably.

Singapore’s first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, mentioned on a number of occasions that there are many things that Singapore could learn from Japan in building a modern state. The bitter memories faded over time and now Japan is an important partner of Singapore. Nowadays, both countries are enjoying a good and friendly relationship.

In your professional point of view, and your experience, what might be the reason for countries that engaged with Japan under the World War II have different tone in relations towards Japan? Why is Singapore different from China or South Korea?

The duration and the brutality of the Japanese treatment received by China and Korea were considerably longer and harsher as compared to the South East Asian nations. The wounds that were inflicted were deeper and the countries, therefore, have different attitudes towards Japan. Singapore is considered a pragmatic country and it is more focused on the present and the future.

“THERE ARE CONSTANT AND ROBUST HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE VISEGRAD GROUP AND JAPAN” The main aim of the Eastern Opening policy is to diversify economic relations, thereby gaining more stability. The Hungarian government has emphasized this point on many occasions, drawing attention to the need to create and explore more possibilities rather than focusing only on EU countries.

Compared to Japan, does Hungary have different foreign policy goals with Singapore? Is there any similarity?

Our foreign policy for Japan and Singapore runs on quite a similar course line, as there are many similarities between the two countries. Although the size and scale of the Singaporean economic market are much smaller, it is a very demanding market with high expectations, much like Japan, which is quite important for Hungary to consider. Furthermore, both countries focus strongly on R&D and a highly educated workforce, which is something to be mindful about when engaging.

How could you describe the importance of strengthening and amplifying relations in Asia? What are the enhanced Hungarian economic and politic aims when we talk about the an ’Eastern Openinig’ towards Singapore or Japan?

INTRODUCTION

19

3

IN-DEPTH

A COUNTRY OF PERMANENT RENEWAL Tamás Péter Baranyi

There is a reason why Japan has been a source of inspiration and admiration for so many in the developing world. If one seeks to capture the most distinctive feature of Japanese civilisation, it is likely to be its incredible skill to renew itself and embark on a course radically different than before. From the Meiji Restoration of the late 19th century to the postwar democratic transformation, Japan has shown itself ready and willing to change—without sacrificing any of its unique characteristics.

Japan entered modern history by establishing the Tokugawa Shōgunate—a country of a strict class system, extreme discipline, and excessive fear of the outside world. This latter was amply justified by the fate of other Asian powers, which either came within informal Chinese orbit or fell prey to Western imperialism, as China itself did.

The Shōgunate presided over the precarious balance of warring landlords—an equilibrium inherited from the high middle ages. The paramount importance of maintaining such a balance required the freezing of social mobility, a ban on Western cultural import, and the dominance of the warring caste—the samurai—in society. The shōgun—the first samurai of the nation—was for all practical measures the leader of the country, while the emperor was largely a ceremonial figurehead.

Christianity, especially the Order of Jesus already firmly present on the Asian mainland, was banned, and believers were tortured and executed.1 Voluntarily isolated—due to the policy called sakoku (鎖国・closed country, country in chains)— as it was, Japan still had major channels to receive some Western ideas, albeit under the strictest possible control. The most important of them was the Dutch merchant colony on the island of Dejima, the goods and news it carried, and the scientific knowledge it passed on. This latter was called the rangaku (蘭学・Dutch learning) and mainly comprised basic chemical, biological, and anatomic 22

IN-DEPTH

knowledge. All this shows the already dual approach of the Tokugawa regime: isolation at large with strictly controlled channels to let the Shōgunate itself cherry-pick what it deems important for the future of Japan. The result of this mentality was the curious duality that Japan was the second most isolated country in Asia with the widest knowledge about the non-Asian world in stock.2 THE CENTRALISATION TURN According to the widely known story, American Commodore Matthew Perry “opened up” Japan in 1853, arriving at its shores with American ships and threatening with bombardment. The Japanese, in stark contrast to the Chinese experiences of the early 19th century, decided to let in the foreign “barbarians.” Apparently too weak to resist, the Japanese decided to receive the foreign legation and embrace what it would definitely entail: trade, contact, and challenge from the outside world.3 This development has been praised by the rest of the world ever since.

Academics have debated why Japan was particularly successful in the late 19th century modernisation scramble—a contest which even many European nations failed—while most of Asia could not catch up. An already existing Western knowledge, carefully filtered and controlled but still present, was undoubtedly helpful. For the Japanese who always looked on China as the centre of civilisation, it was easier to look elsewhere for inspiration than for the Chinese themselves who would have had to give up cornerstones of their identity in pursuit of Western knowledge. The separation of powers in Japan—the shōgun and the emperor—played a certain part: the duality of the structure made political change easier to carry out: even the shōgun could be deposed in the name of the emperor. Timing was also different: by the time

Commodore Perry anchored in Edō Bay, news of China’s defeat in the Opium War had been circulating in Japan for more than ten years. By 1853, one part of the Japanese elite had already prepared for such an encounter; moreover, they promoted the opening of the country. This challenged the established picture: it was not merely Commodore Perry who “opened Japan,” but Japanese society also opened up itself.4 Intensified foreign presence embittered the inner divide in Japan and led to a period of civil strife, in which supporters of the last Tokugawa shōgun and those of reform-minded strongmen from Southern Japan clashed. The struggle was further deepened by the death of the emperor and the accession of his son Mutsuhito (posthumously called Meiji) to the throne. The Boshin War—a last-ditch attempt by the shōgunate to hold on power—was effectively a civil war in which the reform-minded faction styled themselves as “defenders of the Emperor,” as opposed to the shōgun who was now framed as a usurper.

The civil war resulted in the utter defeat of the shōgunate, the victory of the reform-oriented faction, and the centralisation of the country. This latter was so important that certain scholars describe Tokugawa Japan as a loose coalition of states—as opposed to the unitary Japan emerging from the civil strife.5 With the cloak of legitimacy provided by Emperor Meiji, the new oligarchy of Japan embarked on a complete revamping of the state: the lifting of social barriers, land reform, administrative reform, military reform, centralisation, and massive industrialisation. For inspiration, the Japanese court hired foreigners to share their know-how in medicine, law, governance, military affairs, and even culture.

These Europeans were referred to as o-yatoi gaikokujin (御雇い外国人・hired foreigners). As time went on, Prussian influence became paramount, especially in the army, once Jacob Mecken had reformed its training after the Prussian model. The Japanese constitution, promulgated in 1889, was also modelled after Prussia’s. So were the new patterns of industry.

By the final decade of the century, the fact that Japan had became a modern, prosperous, industrial nation was undeniable.

THE IMPERIAL TURN The splendour of the new Meiji state, however, was unhinged. The Meiji elite was still fearful of losing ground and sinking into a Western semi-colonial state. It was imperative to stabilise Japan’s position, especially given the fact that the islands lacked most of the natural resources necessary for successful industrial development.

With those ideas in mind, coupled with an increasing population and self-esteem of the people, Japan was set on an Asian expansion.

The Meiji elite, in turn, was faced with the question of what type of internationalism they should take on.

It has often been suggested that Japanese imperialism was a derivation of resourcehunger in an island environment lacking the necessary resources to feed a rapidly growing industry. Even though that played a role, a closer look also points to the fact that early acquisitions, such as Korea and Taiwan, were not that resource-rich either. 6 Especially in the early phases, a more cultural and strategic line of thought comes in. Japan, as a country still in semi-colonial status, wished to gain complete independence from European domination by self-strengthening and success.7 Indeed, these efforts brought about the desired outcome. While, in the mid-19th century, it was impossible to renounce the unequal treaty between Japan and even Hawaii (a non-white country under American sway and thus perceived more “European”), the final decade of the century saw the liberation of Japan from this type of humiliation. 8 The utter victory of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), concluded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the occupation of Taiwan, was a turning point after which Japan was never considered a natural stock for economic colonisation. This outlook was crystal clear from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902—the first instance of Britain giving up its traditional “splendid isolation.” 9 Japan was not, however, treated as an equal partner of European powers—a fact that contributed to furthering imperialist designs and resentment towards European imperialism.

IN-DEPTH

23

Sea of Okhotsk Kuril Is. (1875)

SOVIET UNION

Southern Sakhalin (1905)

MANCHURIA

(1905, 1932 puppet state)

MONGOLIA

Hokkaidō

Harbin  Vladivostok JEHOL 1933

INNER MONGOLIA SHANSI

CHINA

Hankow (1937)

East China Sea

TONGKING Hanoi

 Pangoon (1942) Andaman Sea

FRENCH INDOCHINA 

Gunatra Natuna Besar Strait of Malacca Singapore (1942)

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Additional Occupation by 1940 Daitō Is. (1876)

Additional Occupation by 1942 Demilitarised Zone of the Tanfku Truce (1933)

PACIFIC OCEAN Luzon

Philippine Sea

Manila (1942) South China Sea

PHILIPPINES

Saigon

BRITISH MALAYA

Additional Occupation by 1938

Taiwan (1895)

 Hong Kong Canton (1937)

Hainan (1939)

THAILAND

Phnom Penh Gulf of Thailand

Macao

Additional Occupation by 1937 Additional Occupation by 1939

RYŪKYŪ IS.

 Amoy

Japanese Empire in 1870 Acquisitions until 1932

Ningpo

Nanchang

BURMA

Tōkyō 

(1905, protectorate, 1910  annexed) Seoul Shantung Pen (1915–1917) Tsushima Yellow Sea Strait Shikoku KIANGSU

 Peking

INDIA

JAPAN

Sea of Japan

KOREA

Yap (1914)

Leyte Sulu Sea NORTH Brunei  BORNEO BRUNEI SARAWAK Borneo

Mindanao

Celebes Sea

Palau (1914)

0

200 400 600 800 km

The greatest extension of the Japanese Imperium

Yet another turning point came with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, which brought about a whole new dimension of Japanese power. Often dubbed as “World War Zero,” Japan’s blow to Russia had far-reaching consequences: a revolution in Russia, a realignment of powers in Europe, a rise of status for Japan, and an inspiration for the rest of Asia. It seemed that expansion was the key to success—the challenge became identifying the ideal means to expand. There were those who promoted economic expansion in a southward direction, the control of sea routes in the South China Sea, and peaceful engagement with Southeast Asia. For such a move, a navy was essential. There were others who considered a northern route more apt with Korea, Manchuria, 24

IN-DEPTH

and the Russian Far East as the main targets.

The latter group focused on military occupation and power politics and wished to rely on astrong army. Finally, the army’s position won, which was amply demonstrated by the rising political influence of this more conservative force, the Japanese expansive behaviour in World War I, as well as Tōkyō’s willingness to intervene with some 70,000 troops in the Russian Civil War.10 The army was solidified as a source of power, and “Northeast Asia” as the territorial goal.

The “De-glorification of the West” in Asia, which began with Russia’s defeat in 1905, coincided with the rise of Japan’s stature in the world. In these years, everyone in the less-developed world wished to emulate, or, at least, relate to Nippon11—even in distant

Hungary, the idea of mysterious family ties between the two peoples gained currency.12 Still, Japan did not quite reach the “equal status” desired by Tōkyō. Not only were the Japanese pressured to renounce gains in the Treaty of Port Arthur (1905) after defeating Russia, but they could not capitalise on their pro-Entente policies in World War I either.

Furthermore, the utmost aim of Japanese diplomacy at Versailles—the adoption of a racial equality clause that recognises Japan to be on par with European nations—was also defeated. The ensuing resentment was a contributing factor in Japan’s turning away from multilateralism in foreign policy.13 In the years of the Taishō Democracy14—a short interval between the world war and the economic crisis under the aegis of Emperor Taishō—the expansion was carefully balanced against a peaceful international system in Asia.

An extensive cultural diplomatic engagement across the Pacific was blooming between the US and Japan: schoolgirls from both nations were playing with dolls manufactured in each other’s countries as a way to establish deep links between the youth of the nations.15 As China drifted towards internal chaos, however, an opportunity presented itself, and the army essentially managed to usurp state powers. The Manchurian Incident ushered in a new era where it was no longer the court or the Diet but the army to decide policy in the Japanese Empire.16 The imperial turn of Japan was almost complete after the 1931 invasion of Manchuria and the establishment of central portions of China as Japan’s industrial base. The mass brutalisation of people after the taking of Nanjing in 1937 was perhaps the most infamous episode in the history of Japanese imperialism. In the final phase, when metropolitan countries became more and more immersed in a European quagmire, the penetration into European colonial domains also started.17 Japanese ambitions, coupled with a homegrown sense of supremacy, resulted in one of the most spectacular imperialist struggles in history connected with the similarly grandiose and fateful German expansionism in World

War II. The history of Japan in World War II began with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and resulted in massive gains. The capture of most of Southeast Asia and the occupation of Singapore—a remarkable military feat— represented the apex of the Japanese Empire.

American forces were, however, able to gain more and more territory from this empire from 1943 to 1945. Shortly after the collapse of the Axis Powers in Europe, the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 facilitated an unconditional Japanese surrender. Japan had lost its empire and experienced utter defeat. Contrary to widespread assumptions about last-ditch Japanese fanaticism, Japanese peace feelers were present in 1945, but, ultimately, to no avail.18 It has lately been suggested that the reason why Japan surrendered was not the nuclear destruction itself, but the need to avert the eventual Soviet partaking in the occupation of Japan.19 THE NATION STATE TURN Perhaps the most remarkable renewal of the country occurred right after the Occupation of Japan (1945—1952) by American forces. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, or SCAP—the high authority of the occupation— first implemented strict measures, but as the Cold War installed, they decided to be more lenient in order to facilitate renewal. In the maelstrom of war defeat and moral bankruptcy, the Japanese elite was able to reshape itself and the state in a democratic yet conservative fashion. The military was disarmed and deprived of political influence by the constitution, the industrial–military houses of zaibatsu were fractured, and new democratic processes were established.20 In fact, the democratisation of Japan was so successful that the late 20th century American policy of democracy export was largely inspired by that success.21 The political system was deeply reformed, but it still remained unchanged in key points. The emperor remained in his position, but he had to renounce his divinity, which is an unprecedented alteration of Japanese tradition IN-DEPTH

25

and mythology. Enforcing this measure and reflecting on the war, he made a Declaration of Humanity on New Years’ Eve of 1946, assuring the people that he was a human being capable of making mistakes. A central authority needed to be re-established, people to be reassured, institutions to be set up. In one word, the Japanese “embraced defeat” in order to overcome it.22 The Occupation of Japan was one of the last exercises of Western colonialism on the Asian mainland in a cultural sense— however, it led to no political or economic exploitation, but rather a radical kick-start of Japan as a nation state.

Pure occupation was ended by the San Francisco Treaty—a treaty of peace between the US, Japan, and minor powers. The Japanese called it katamen kōwa (片面講和), a partial peace, as East European countries and the Soviet Union refused to sign it. One day after the peace treaty, a bilateral security agreement with the US was also signed, according to which American forces continued to be responsible for the security of Japan—and enjoy unrestricted use of facilities. The disarmament of the Japanese armed forces ensued, as the Japanese constitution renounced the right to initiate war as such.23 The decision to renounce imperialist aggrandisement was not without rewards: the economy was now tuned to recovery, consumer goods, and cheap exports. Its growth was based on the relative intactness of certain branches of industry, worldwide demand, a homeward turn, and measures of fiscal restraint.24 The Korean War, from 1950 to 1953, admittedly served as a major boost for the Japanese economy due to war-related purchases by the US; in fact, some say it was like a Marshall Plan for Japan. By the mid-1960s, Japan was not only “catching up” with the US and other major industrial centres but also taking over in some industries, the most important of which were machine tools and consumer electronics.25 Japan had not only become a developed country by these years, but had, in fact, once again reached a height of international respect and prestige. They had shown a path for neighbouring Asian nations— most importantly, Singapore and the Republic of 26

IN-DEPTH

Korea—and even Eastern Bloc countries were racing to get a better share of the Japanese market.

By the early 1970s, Japan was irreversibly a middle-class country with a peace agenda and a nation state without imperialistic ambitions.

Economic success substituted military prowess as the primary source of pride for the nation.

The US–Japanese alliance provided security, while Japan’s economy provided prosperity.

This setup changed in 1971 with the double shocks launched by the Nixon Administration of the US. The first shock was the American decision to let loose the Bretton Woods system—a financial decision of which the most harmful effects needed to be absorbed by US allies like Japan. The second shock was the Sino-American rapprochement. In fact, US Ambassador Kōichirō Asakai had often had nightmares about the US recognising the People’s Republic of China without forewarning.

“Asakai’s nightmare,” as it was called in diplomatic circles, suddenly came true. Despite Japanese fears of a downturn in US–Japan relations, the opening to China did not lead to the feared nightmarish situation, as the Americans were likewise fearful of a pro-Soviet turn in Japan. What happened instead was a more flexible environment in East Asia that was beneficial to both China’s reform and Japan’s stature.26 Since then, however, US relations vis-à-vis East Asia have been more delicate: it is now a Japan–US–China triangle.

However, some have pointed out that the American engagement with Japan has always been strategic, while with China it has been tactical.27 The Japanese economy was still sound, and the trade deficit it caused for the US was ballooning. In fact, the 1980s saw a rising fear of Japanese power in the US. Ezra Vogel’s famous Japan as Number One and a set of similar books were emblematic of the growing anxiety—which may sound silly today in light of the later developments.28 But the 1980s were characterised by a deepening fear of Japanese strength. Even though, in the mid-1980s, some measures were taken in the US against the

Postcard depicting the Japanese occupation of the Siberian town of Khabarovsk during the Russian Civil War

Japanese automobile industry, it never ceased to be a cause for concern.29 On top of that, Japan replaced the US as the most important investor and aid-provider in the whole East Asian region. Japan thus arrived at the end of the Cold War as a strong and prosperous nation state, eager to play a more important role in the international sphere.30 CONCLUSION: WHICH WAY TO TURN? Japan has since seen ups and downs in both politics and economy. The 1990s were perceived as a “Lost Decade” in the wake of the collapse of the Japanese asset price bubble. This collapse, in turn, dragged a degree of political stability down with it. Recovery was underway, but the soaring numbers of the Japanese economy and the respectful consistency of Japanese politics did not truly recover for quite some time.

In terms of economy, some have used the analogy of a “middle-income trap” to describe the situation in Japan as a “high-income trap.”31

Others have pointed to deeper structural problems that derail development: the alarming demographic situation and the closed nature of Japanese culture that makes immigration virtually non-existent.32 Shinzō Abe’s premiership was surrounded by high hopes: political stability, after all, may feed social and political changes that could reinvigorate the country. Not that the country is not among the richest and most successful on Earth, but its dynamism has now long been lost. A set of economic practices—known as “Abenomics”—were invented to reignite this dynamism. Aside from changes in economic outlook, the country’s adherence to the peace agenda was also questioned during Abe’s premiership. Even though many criticise Abe’s leadership, the electorate seemingly thinks that an internationally more active Japan, with the effects of an expanded defence industry and some degree of liberal economic reforms, could put the country again on the right track.

IN-DEPTH

27

One thing is for sure: if there is a country that has been the most successful in taking different roads, it is Japan. Even though growth slowed down in the mid-Heisei Era, those who think Japan’s prominence was merely a Cold War feature may be surprised in the coming Reiwa Era.

12 Tóth Gergely: Japán–magyar kapcsolattörténet, 1869–1913.

Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2018.

13 Cf. Guoqi Xu: Asia. In: Cambridge History of the First World War, edited by Jay Winter. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013. 479–510.

14

A popular expression for the early Taishō Era

(1912–1926).—Ed. 15 Rui Kohiyama: The 1927 Exchange of Friendship Dolls: U.S.–Japan Cultural Diplomacy in the Inter-War Years.

ENDNOTES

Diplomatic History. 2019/April. 282–304.

16 Hata – Coox, 282–309.

17 Beasley, 176–220.

1 Their trials gained worldwide recognition after the 2016

18

movie Silence directed by Martin Scorsese and based on the

FOIA. <https://bit.ly/2JZi78I > Accessed: 3 May 2019.

Japanese novel by Shūsaku Endō.

19

2 Ian Buruma: Inventing Japan, 1853–1964. Modern Library,

Soviet Occupation? Foreign Policy. 5 August 2015. Accessed:

[New York], 2004. For the fullest account of the Dutch

3 May 2019.

influence on Japan through the Dejima regime, see Bársony

20

Márton: A japán diplomácia kapuja a Tokugawa-shogunátus

conglomerates in the Empire of Japan, possessing considerable

időszaka alatt. Dejima szigete, és jelentős lakói: követségben

influence over economy and even political decisions.—Ed.

a nyugati civilizáció (1775–1829). Disszertáció, ELTE BTK,

21 Noah Feldman: What We Owe Iraq, War and the Ethics of

Budapest, 2010.

Nation Building. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004.

3 For a complete account of the Perry Mission, see: George

1. Cited by Gergely.

Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers. CIA Sergey Radchenko: Did Hiroshima Save Japan From

Zaibatsu (財閥・financial clique): Industrial and financial

Feifer: Breaking Open Japa: Commodore Perry, Lord Abe,

22

and American Imperialism in 1853. Harper Collins Publishers,

award-winning book: Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake

New York, 2006.

of World War II. Norton & Company, New York, 1999.

4 Buruma.

23 Guthrie-Shimizu, 251–254.

5 Sunyoung Koo: The instability of Japanese national identity

24 Yutaka Kōsai – Andrew Globe: The Postwar Japanese

and the advent of the new Meiji state. Yonsei University, Hong

Economy,

Kong, 2017.

Japan, edited by Peter Duus. Cambridge University Press,

6

Cambridge, 1989. 499–504.

Bill Gordon: Explanations of Japan’s Imperialistic

See the narrative and title of John W. Dower’s

1945–1973.

In:

Expansion, 1894–1910. Bill-gordon.net. December 2003.

25 Arrighi, 24–26.

<https://bit.ly/ 2PREEV6 > Accessed: 3 May 2019.

26 Michael Schaller, 171–175.

7

27

W. G. Beasley: Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945.

The

Cambridge

History

of

Neil Silver: The United States, Japan, and China.

Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. 6–7, 34–36.

Setting

8

<https://on.cfr.org/2WNTdik > 24 March 2000. Accessed:

Lorenz Gonschor: Revisiting the Hawaiian Influence on

the

Course.

Council

on

Foreign

Relations.

the Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen. The Journal of Pacific

5 May 2019.

History. 2017/1. 52–67.

28

9 Avner Cohen: Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and

Studies. Los Angeles – London New Delhi – Singapore –

British Foreign Policy 1901–1903: From Collaboration to

Washington, SAGE Publications Ltd., 2014. 360.

Confrontation. Australian Journal of Politics & History. 1997/

29 More about this topic in Zsolt Pálmai: American Perceptions

April. 122–134.

of Japan at the Dawn of the Heisei Era.

10

30 Michael Schaller, 175–180.

Ikuhiko Hata – Alvin D. Coox: Continental Expansion,

James Babb: SAGE Handbook of Modern Japanese

1905–1941. In: The Cambridge History of Japan, edited by

31

Peter Duus. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989.

income

271–282.

<https://s.nikkei.com/2wAE7hs > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

11

Nippon (日本): The country of Japan, in Japanese

language.—Ed. 28

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Frederic Neumann: Time to talk about the high trap.

Nikkei

Asian

Review.

24

May

2015.

32 Jeff Kingston: A modern Japán kihívásai. Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2019.

PRIME MINISTERIAL PROFILE: SHINZŌ ABE Emese Schwarcz

The current Prime Minister (PM) of Japan, Shinzō Abe (安倍晋三), is a unique premier in the political history of Japan in many ways. His three important characteristics are: he was the youngest PM to win elections, the first PM to be born after World War II, and the longest-serving PM after the war. Although, at first glance, these features seem like marginal trivia, they all came to define his premiership in one way or another.

Family circumstances are also important in Abe’s case. As he was born into a politician dynasty, his maternal grandfather was Nobusuke Kishi, a controversial wartime industrial vice minister in the occupied territory Manchukuō, later to become prime minister between 1957 and 1960. Amongst others, Kishi’s role is what made him a controversial individual: he was part of the war criminal PM Hideki Tōjō’s inner circle, and, as the American Occupation was established, he was indicted as a war criminal too, even though he was not convicted, and he could soon return to the political sphere.1 He took part in creating the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the most influential party in Japan to this day, to establish the quasi-one-party rule. Being an avid supporter of the US–Japan Security Alliance, it was under his premiership when the security treaty was realised, which prompted considerable opposition from the public in the form of demonstrations. Kishi’s political aspiration to maintain and enhance American relations was largely inherited by Abe. Being the grandson of such an unpopular Prime Minister, however, can make everyday politics difficult for him.

The young Shinzō Abe entered the political arena by becoming an employee of the foreign ministry, following in the footsteps of his father, Shintarō Abe, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs under nationalist-leaning PM Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982–1987). Nakasone is considered

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzō Abe attends an EU–Japan summit in Brussels, Belgium, 21 March 2017.

Nobusuke Kishi in 1954

to the last statesman to maintain premiership for a longer period before Japan’s revolving-door prime ministerial malaise poisoned the political scene. The beginning of the Heisei Era, up until the debut of Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi in 2001, was petrified by premiers staying for a IN-DEPTH

29

THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN The LDP (自由民主党・Jiyū Minshutō) is the product of a merger between two major parties in 1955, namely the Liberal Party (自由党・Jiyūtō), led by the legendary Shigeru Yoshida, and the Japan Democratic Party (日本民主党・Nihon Minshutō), led by Ichirō Hatoyama.2 The LDP came to be a right-wing conservative party, but, due to its extensive size, several different ideological directions can be identified within the its ranks.

Upon the merger, the LDP became such a powerhouse in Japanese politics that its rule was unbroken up until 1993. This period was called the “1955 system.” While the 1955 system was over by 1993, aside from one more failed election in 2007, the LDP is still the leading political party to this day. The secret of its success is threefold. First, the postwar economic recovery, technological

progress, and national security all contributed to the LDP’s success thanks to PM Yoshida, and kept its popularity high for the majority of the “economic miracle” period. Second, the opposition parties were diffused for the most of the Shōwa and Heisei Era, and they had very weak influence compared to the institutionally embedded LDP. The main cause of their low persuasive force is the lack of ideological framework and a strategy that simply builds on defying the Liberal Democratic Party. However, these alone are not engaging enough for the general public. The third and final reason for the LDP’s success can be identified as the party’s ability to integrate and assimilate opposition party policies into their agenda. These three causes are, of course, only a part of the whole picture, as the LDP has had time to build an intricate political machinery that employs financial support groups and an exclusive bureaucratic and business network that the opposition is cut off from.

maximum of one year, if not for a shorter period, which led to a deepening economic recession and Japan’s inability to be effectively represented on the world stage. This period made the voters lose their trust in the LDP—which had been the only party ruling at this point since World War II (except one incident when the Democratic Party of Japan took the wheel for a short while). In 2001, the entry of the strong-willed, maverick Prime Minister Koizumi gave entry to Abe too, this time as chief cabinet secretary. This position was quite important for his later successes, as he took on the role of the defender of the abductees’ case: after North Korea had admitted that they had indeed abducted several Japanese citizens in the 1970s, Abe started to promote the issue and took steps to solve it. Unfortunately, the Koizumi cabinet turned away from North Korea diplomatically; therefore, the solution was not found, but Abe became a flagship supporter of the cause.

In 2006, he was elected prime minister for the first time, and he won by building his campaign on the above-mentioned North Korean abductions

issue. His first premiership was very different from his current one and even controversial in many points. Controversial—or mistaken—as several of his missteps caused him to leave his office almost exactly one year after his inauguration. Such missteps were the promotion of policies echoed by far-right groups: patriotic education (particularly assisting history books with toned down versions of World War II atrocities committed by the Empire of Japan), hostile attitudes towards China and the Koreas about the comfort women issue (viz. the controversies around women and girls forced into prostitution during the war), and the promotion of the constitutional revision, more specifically an amendment to Article 9, which renounces maintaining air, ground, or marine military forces or equipment, as well as the sovereign right to use military force in international disputes.

The nationalist undertones of these policies, and several related government scandals involving pensions, had rubbed the voters the wrong way, which led to the governing party’s losing its majority in the upcoming Upper House

30

IN-DEPTH

elections. Soon after the defeat, citing health problems as the reason, Abe resigned.

His first term as prime minister re-established the leadership deficit right up until 2012. Abe seemingly learned his lessons about the sentiments of the voter base and developed a completely different campaign strategy and policy profile to match the needs of the general public. In the 2012 elections, Abe introduced his campaign relying heavily on the new “Abenomics” programme, with its famous three arrows: aggressive monetary policy, expansionary fiscal stimulus, and structural reforms.3 Shifting the focus from foreign policy and security to a more fundamental issue that affects every citizen more directly was the pragmatic paradigm shift that Japan needed. Abe understood that without solving the problem of the two-decade-long, deepening recession, Japan could not represent its interests in the international community and keep its ranking both economically and politically.

His calculations payed off, as he was yet again elected as a prime minister, but, this time, in coalition with the Nichiren Buddhist, centre-right positioned Kōmeitō (公明党).4 During the beginning of his second premiership, Abe was cautious with his policies. Concentrating on the economy was not only a part of a strategy but an utmost necessity too, considering that the restoration after the threefold Tōhoku disaster in 2011 was still slow and insufficient. The new fiscal policy was aiming to increase government spending, partly in construction projects, which the Tōhoku region desperately needed. But the general image about Abe being a hawkish nationalist has not faded. Before becoming prime minister for the first time, he published a book written by him, Towards a Beautiful Country.

My Vision for Japan. (美しい国へ・Utsukushii Kuni e), which is considered an origin story of his political orientation.5 In this book, Abe explains that stigmatisation as the grandson of an indicted war criminal has played a major role in his becoming a conservative politician.

He also expresses his positive views about nationalist programmes that he promoted during his first term, which also contributed to negative perceptions of him. In the heavily pacifist and

demilitarised Japan, nationalist sentiments are disagreed upon, as a big portion of the society supports Article 9 wholeheartedly. Abe, however, wants to promote a more organic view of the country’s security: nationalism and patriotism aside, the early Heisei Era, and especially the first decade of the 2000s, brought along a dramatically changing international landscape.

As much as Japan was applauded for its military neutrality for a long time, the Afghanistan War and the War on Terror posed serious questions about Japan’s contribution to the United Nations, and thus, to international security. During the Iraqi War (2003–2011), for example, due to the strict regulations on its scope of action, Japan could only participate by sending unarmed troops to at least help with infrastructural tasks.

However, these troops ended up being a burden on the regulars, as they also needed protection.6 But lo and behold, the East Asian region did not steer clear of international conflicts either.

Around the time Prime Minister Koizumi was the head of state, North Korean adversity was on the rise. The expanding weapons arsenal and military capacities of North Korea and the strengthening hostile attitudes towards Japan posed a question to the leaders of the country: What to do in the event of an attack? Imagining a possible clash was not a delusional concept anymore when North Korea started to regularise nuclear tests.7 While the rest of the region— including China and the Philippines—reacted to the changing environment by increasing their defence capacities, Japan had and has its hands tied. And PM Abe is painfully aware of that.

Abe stated in his book that he welcomes nationalist ideas but it is necessary to mould them to the current sentiments of the international arena. This pragmatic thinking proved to be applicable in multiple issues. Take the controversy around the Yasukuni Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine (靖国神社) is a Meiji Era shintō memorial site for those who lost their lives for the country in wars, be civilian or military personnel.

Controversy ensued only when the Chief Priest of the shrine decided to enshrine the souls of 14 Class A war criminals too, along with Hideki Tōjō, in 1978. 8 The act was followed by an IN-DEPTH

31

THE STRONGMAN OF THE ABE ADMINISTRATION Tarō Asō (麻生太郎), current Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, is an old friend and ally of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe. Born into a wealthy politician dynasty, Asō is known to be the grandson of a postwar prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, and the son of the mining and construction giant ASO Group’s chairman. His sister contributed to the family’s

elevated social status by marrying into the Imperial family and becoming the wife of Emperor Emeritus Akihito’s cousin-in-law, and, thus, Princess Tomohito of Mikasa.

Although he and his family are Roman Catholics, this did not pose an obstacle to his political career, as he has been around in the mainstream since 2003.13 Becoming the minister of internal affairs and communications under PM Koizumi, he and Shinzō Abe entered the arena at the same time. After Abe’s fall in 2007, Asō was the one to become prime minister before the opposition parties took power for the second time in the postwar era.

Known as the gaff minister, Asō is infamous for his controversial and often inappropriate statements. Some of these were his exclaimer that he wants to build a Japan that “rich Jews want to live in” or a statement that he wished the Emperor would visit the infamous Yasukuni Shrine. Moreover, once, he even applauded the Nazi method of amending a constitution.14 Despite the public’s distaste for this kind of behaviour, Asō’s position is stable in the party.

His experiences as prime minister during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis provided him with a fixed position as a finance minister when Abe took the wheel in 2012. He now leads a large party faction, with around 60 members under him.

unwavering deprecation of regional actors that were devastated by Imperial Japan during World War II, while the Emperors themselves decided to cease their visits to the shrine in an attempt to express their disapproval.9 Going forward, the Yasukuni Shrine became a trope of ultranationalism because all those of far-right identity would visit the Yasukuni regularly. During the 2000s, Shinzō Abe was no different, which contributed to him being labelled ultranationalist or even revisionist. 10 In his second round, however, aside from one visit at the beginning of his term, Abe made sure not to visit the shrine anymore. He does send offering every once in a while, but this

carefulness shows the extent of his evolution compared to his infamous first term in 2006.

The same can be said about the military-related issue too. As much as Japan is being criticised by the United Nations for the lack of contributions, regional voices are bashing the country for its unofficial army, the Self-Defense Forces. Growing regional tensions are channelled towards the notion of constitutional amendment. While Abe sees the amendment as an optimal solution, it is not so simple to execute. First, the ruling party has to have a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Diet (which it has had since 2017), and then, the government has to conduct a national referendum with a simple majority reinforcing

32

IN-DEPTH

THE CHIEF COORDINATOR OF THE ABE ADMINISTRATION Yoshihide Suga (菅義偉), a self-made politician with no family network, was chosen for the post of chief cabinet secretary in the second Abe administration in 2012, but much like Asō, he has been around for a long time. He also served as Abe’s Minister of Internal Affairs in the first Abe cabinet, which indicates how much Abe trust him. While Suga usually draws less

the people’s wish to amend Article 9. This latter is the riskier factor, as opinion polls show around 50-50% on both sides of the spectrum.

That is why timing is very important in initiating a referendum, which has prompted Abe to work up both his popularity and the government support rates in the past couple of years.

Reaching higher support is definitely a great challenge because money-related scandals have hit his popularity a few times, the most infamous of them being the Moritomo Gakuen and the Kake Gakuen scandal in 2017.11 Both of these scandals involved government favouritism towards educational institutions, with questionable—mainly overly patriotic—

attention than Asō, his role is invaluable to the Abe administration, as his office can be regarded as a sort of policymaking centre.

Abe definitely could not maintain his position without Suga nurturing his public image.

Of course, in this sense, not only the scandals pose difficulties, but Suga was the one to put out fires after Abe’s first term as a prime minister. Besides, although he became a top-tier ally of the prime minister, Suga is known to switch his loyalty regularly: he already abandoned both Abe and Asō in the past. He does not have any policy preferences, but he is a master of balancing the cabinet and harmonising the administration, all the while aspiring to carry out structural reforms.15 New appointments, resignations, and political behaviour (e.g.

Yasukuni Shrine visits, or the lack of them) are all controlled by him, which makes Suga the powerhouse of the Abe administration.

background in the case of Moritomo Gakuen.

And while Abe’s support ratings suffered a considerable blow, he bounced back by advancing or managing foreign policy issues. Such issues mainly include territorial disagreements with Russia and China, World War II-related disputes with South Korea, and the aforementioned battered North Korean relations. 12 In the 2017 House of Representatives election campaign, Abe built his programme around the North Korean threat, which was escalating considerably, as this was the year when Pyongyang launched two ballistic missiles over the territory of Japan. PM Abe’s campaign concentrated on asserting that a IN-DEPTH

33

security threat such as this can only be counterbalanced by a stable and experienced government. Once again, being experienced is an important point, which is why the curtain has closed in front of the opposition.

Looking into the future, the current term ends in 2021 for Shinzō Abe. Although he promised to the LDP’s voters that he would carry out the constitutional amendment by 2020, the overly swamped 2019 political calendar with the G20 meeting in Ōsaka and the double elections in summer make it practically impossible to do so.

Following this year, the Olympics will also be sure to pack on the to-do list and prevent the leading party from concentrating on such a complex procedure. As relations with South Korea seem to sour, and the World War II peace accord with Russia is still out of the question, Abe leaves behind a mixed legacy. However, it is undeniable that these matters are harder to solve than it seems at first glance and as Japan is barely out of recession, and it is in a demographic turmoil, the Japanese political scene has to produce a competent heir akin to Abe—but at least one that can hold the power and can bring about stability for the Japanese people.

6 Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan. History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s. 2nd edition. John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, 2012.

7 North Korea profile – Timeline. BBC News. 26 April 2019. <https://bbc.in/2JzCU2J > Accessed: 18 Aprils 2019.

8

Yasukuni Shrine: Chief priest to quit after criticising

Japan’s

emperor.

BBC

News.

11

October

2018.

<https://bbc.in/ 2JbuZaK > Accessed: 18 April 2019.

9 The shrine is inseparable from its counterpart, the Yūshūkan Museum. The museum offers information, objects, and artefacts of the wars Japan has taken part in since the construction of Yasukuni. The museum, however, is as controversial as the shrine, as it tries to push the victim narrative about Japan’s role in WWII and hides facts about atrocities against other nations.

10

Ultranationalism and revisionism

have become each

other's synonyms in the past 30-or-so years. Several different civic groups and small political parties have been formed around the ideology in the Heisei Era that have considerable influence on the political spheres but less impact on the voters themselves. Their ideology builds on denying and protesting the facts about the atrocities committed by the Imperial Army during the first half of the 20th century and on the aspiration to return to the Meiji Constitution with all of its values and moral order regarding the role of the emperors, patriarchal society, women’s place in the labour market, and patriotic education for the children. Read more on this topic here: Emese Schwarcz: A Forming New Political Identity for Japan.

AJRC-Analyses. 2019A02. <https://bit.ly/2ot6FIT > 11 The Kake and Moritomo scandals and the bureaucracy.

ENDNOTES

The Japan Times. 20 October 2017. <https://bit.ly/2IVyQsV > Accessed: 18 April 2019.

12 Other authors of this issue will further elaborate on these

1 Kishi Nobusuke. Encycloædia Britannica. <https://bit.ly/

disputes.

2vwfxhn > Accessed: 2 May 2019.

13

2 Shigeru Yoshida was a diplomat and the first prime minister

population.

after World War II (1946–1947, 1948–1954). He was the

14 Emese Schwarcz: Large and in Charge: Who is Taro Aso?

one who set Japan’s postwar foreign policy course that

The Diplomat. 28 July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2GWOzG1 >

contributed to the country becoming the world’s second

Accessed: 18 April 2019.

biggest economy. Hatoyama became prime minister after

15 Makira Izuru: Abe’s Enforcer: Suga Yoshihide’s Stabilizing

Yoshida’s term ended.

Influence on the Cabinet. Nippon.com. 25 September 2014.

3 Abenomics is a portmanteau from Abe and economics.

<https://bit.ly/2ZN1uC1 > Accessed: 18 April 2019.

4 Nichiren Buddhism is the largest and most popular school of Japanese Buddhism, founded by the 13th century monk, Nichiren.

5

Reiji Yoshida: Formed in childhood, roots of Abe’s

conservatism go deep. The Japan Times. 26 December 2012. <https://bit.ly/2GWLlRU > Accessed: 18 April 2019.

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Catholics are making up around 0.5% of the total

GEOPOLITICS IN AN EVOLVING REGION Attila Gergely

Given the pace and expanse of the contemporary geopolitical transitions both in Japan’s regional environment and beyond, as well as the intensity of the apparent shift in Japan’s foreign policy to respond to it, observers may feel confident to say that, in the Heisei Era (1989–2019), especially in its last third, change has been more pervasive and transformative than in the preceding Cold War decades. Based in particular on the foreignand-security-policy-related legislative work of the current Abe administration since its inauguration in December 2012, the increasingly proactive moves of Japan on the regional and global scene, not to mention the views on the “rise of China,” “global power shift,” and “Japan’s strategic normalisation,” one might infer that the Heisei Era, which ended on 30 April 2019, delivered a distinct geopolitical legacy for the new one. The very concepts of geopolitics and evolution may, however, serve as reminders of broader horizons.

HEISEI LEGACY? On 20 March 2019, HE Ichirō Fujisaki delivered a lecture in Budapest.1 One could hardly find a person more qualified to answer the question on Japan’s Heisei foreign policy legacy. Mr Fujisaki served as Japan’s Ambassador to the United States, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and is currently the President of the Nakasone Peace Institute. When asked about the foreign policy legacy of the Heisei Era, his assessment was that the Heisei Era had no particular foreign policy legacy of its own. While the response may sound somewhat startling from someone whose career included jobs instrumental in shaping such a legacy, its potential readings are instructive for a variety of reasons.

For one, let us have a cursory look at the March 2019 foreign and security policy headlines of

the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s major dailies.

The following are topical titles: “Russian envoy to Japan: no barter trading for disputed islands”; “US looks to get more cash from Japan, other allies that host its troops”; “Japan deploys missile batteries, troops close to Senkaku Islands”; “MSDF chief of staff, destroyer set to attend fleet review in China”; “Abe –Trump meeting planned to discuss North Korea policies.” All these issues, highly representative of Japan’s current foreign policy agenda, have backgrounds going well beyond the Heisei Era. There are also other reasons why restricting attention to the three decades of Heisei may be misleading. For the Japanese, “Heisei” is but one of 239 era names (as of 30 April 2019) spanning 1374 years of Japanese history. In this sense, Mr Fujisaki was only hinting at the fact that historical time tends to be perceived in Japan on a different scale. In the words of Carol Gluck (appearing at a European conference as the foremost international authority on Japanese history a couple years ago): “change in Japan is a long-distance run.”2 Even her formulation does not do full justice to the actual state of affairs. In Japan, change is predisposed to perpetuate the business of primordial continuity.

What this means in practice has recently been on visual display to the world when Reiwa, the name for the new era that began on 1 May, was announced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga on 1 April.

In Japan’s traditional chronology, 2019 is the year 2679, and the contrast in timescales also applies to the region Japan is embedded in. Taking her two most immediate neighbours, taking Korea’s official National Foundation date, 2019 translates to 4351, while according to China’s customary calendar, 2019 is in fact the year 4717. As psychological surveys also show, time orientation is patently IN-DEPTH

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SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

More than half of the peolpe on Earth live within this circle

There are more people in this circle than outside of it

Harbin Beijing Tianjin

MEGACITIES This circle contains 22 of the world’s 37 megacities, with each being home to at least 10 million people

Chengdu

Lahore

CITY SIZE (in millions)

Dhaka

Kolkata

40

Wuhan Kyōtō-Ōsaka-Kōbe

Chongqing

Mumbai

20

Tōkyō

Shanghai

Delhi Karachi

Seoul

Bangkok

Bengaluru

Shenzhen Guangzhou Manila

10 Jakarta 1.3B 1.2B 1.1B 1.0B 0.9B 0.8B 0.7B 0.6B 0.5B 0.4B 0.3B 0.2B 0.1B 0

1. China 2. India 3. Indonesia 4. Bangladesh 5. Japan 6. Philippines 7. Vietnam 8. Thailand

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Asia—the population epicentre 36

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

9. Myanmar 10. South Korea 11. 5 other 12. Malaysia 13. Nepal 14. North Korea 15. Taiwan

12.

13.

14.

These 19 countries represent more than half of the world’s population.

15.

= 3,777,580,230

more long-term in East Asia than in the contemporary West.

Even if one is inclined to dismiss “mythical chronologies,” it remains true that Japan’s regional predicament cannot be adequately assessed in terms of a few years or decades.

The interstate relations within the region—a primeval civilisational complex and a geopolitical arena in its own right—are among the oldest on the globe and are treated as such by the states involved. But how to define the region?

AN ELUSIVE REGION To begin with, in the given context, even the applicability of the concept of region was questioned by Eisuke Sakakibara (“Mr Yen” as he was named during his tenure as Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs). He notably reminded his European interviewer: “Look, Europe may be a ‘region’, but Asia is the world itself.” What Sakakibara might have been referring to was that Asia, as Japan’s immediate geopolitical environment, is not merely one among several world regions: it is one of the dipoles of the intercivilisational field of world affairs.

The thirty-seven states of geographic Asia currently comprise nearly 60% of the world’s population, the combined GDP of which is expected to approach 45% of the global output by 2020, while more than 55% of total Asian trade is realised within Asia, which is close to EU levels. According to American forecasts, the share of six Southeast Asian countries in the global GDP may be more than twice that of the European Union by 2040, while the labour force of the ten ASEAN countries is predicted to grow by 11,000 workers per day in the coming 15 years.

It is still another question whether Japan is part of Asia. By conventional geography, the answer may seem straightforward, but, when it comes to Japanese identity, the answer is much less affirmative. And this is due not only to Japan’s modern age “turnabout” of “leaving Asia, entering the West.” Apart also from proverbial Japanese ambiguity, it is well-known that most of the Japanese are more than

reluctant to identify with “Asia.” Certainly, it must have been so for ages partly because of Japan’s insularity, but it has had at least as much to do with a peculiar exceptionalism (to which Japan is far from being an exception, save for its particular content). As a result, Japan has mostly found itself between all possible worlds, those of Asia and of the West included. Both in the China-centred world order and in the Westcentred one, Japan has tended to be an outlier, and, for the last 150 years, this attitude has implied a multilevel Japan/East–West structure of its strategies in geopolitical games.

Even if the assertion of an “Asian Japan” may be unacceptable by the criteria of a unique Japanese self-image, it is hardly contestable that, by physical location, Japan is adjacent to the Asian continent, and, in more immediate terms, it has for millennia been set in the civilisational massif of geographic Northeast Asia. However, the regional demarcations of these concepts, and those of the subunits ranging between an all-inclusive Asia and its China–Japan–Korea core, are widely variable.

By convention, Asia is usually divided into five subregions: Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia (comprising East Asia proper), Australasia, South Asia, and Central Asia. For Japan’s geopolitical condition, the intermediate setting of East Asia is of manifest priority. For East Asia’s regional delimitation, there are, however, more than a few established options. The classic postwar American definition included only Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, regarded as authoritative for its geopolitical research, includes China, Japan, the two Koreas, Mongolia, and Taiwan in its East Asia concept. There are a number of parallel labels, with substantial variations in their coverage, like “Far East” or “Western Pacific” (in earlier times), and Pacific Asia or Asia Pacific (more recently).

RIVAL DESIGNS The 2018 edition of Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook applies the term “Asia–Oceania region” as a standard designation for the Asian context of Japanese foreign policy, stating, alongside other IN-DEPTH

37

AP E C

APEC (Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation)

facts: “It is the world’s growth centre… Total exports and imports of East Asia Summit member states (excluding the U.S. and Russia) is 10.2 trillion US dollars, making it the second largest market behind the European Union (10.6 trillion US dollars).”3 Here, reference is made to the East Asia Summit process, launched in 2005 (and involving the US and Russia since 2011), which currently includes 18 countries. Later on, the yearbook adds various other “regional frameworks,” such as Japan–ASEAN (ASEAN+1), the Japan–Mekong cooperation, ASEAN+3 (with 13 member states), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, with 25 member states, being the only comprehensive security arrangement for the region), and the US-initiated Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, with 21 “member economies”).4 Among these, one could justifiably dwell more on, for example, ASEAN+3, or ASEM, largely generated and globally reinforced by EU–Asia interactions, also well articulating the North–East & South–East composite structure of East Asia. Or, as multilateral frameworks, one could add, for example, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (ASEAN+6, adding India, Australia, and New Zealand to ASEAN+3), as well as the China-centred formations of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with eight member states), the Belt and Road Initiative (currently 38

IN-DEPTH

involving 152 countries), or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank related to the latter (with 97 approved members worldwide).

By the first East Asia Summit in 2005, for instance, “East Asia” had been enlarged to include India, Australia, and New Zealand—then, from 2011, the United States and Russia. In a more immediately geostrategic context, after the introduction of the term “Indo-Pacific” into policy discourse by the second Obama administration, the Trump presidency officially renamed the US “Pacific Command” to “IndoPacific Command.” Since this development is of eminent importance for the geopolitical landscape Japan is also facing, it may be worthwhile to cite at some length how the Indo-Pacific Command’s Area of Responsibility is officially delineated: The area “covers more of the globe than any of the five other commands and shares borders with all… The 36 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than… 3,000 different languages, several of the world’s largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defence treaties. Two of the three largest economies are located in the Asia-Pacific… The AOR includes the most populous nation in the world, the largest democracy, and the largest Muslimmajority nation… The region is a vital driver of the global economy and includes the world’s busiest international sea lanes and nine of the

ten largest ports. The Asia-Pacific is also a heavily militarized region, with seven of the world’s ten largest standing militaries and five of the world’s declared nuclear nations.”5 Although the wording at some points refers to the “Asia–Pacific,” the span of the hyper-region encompasses both the Pacific and the Indian oceans, as the website’s map unambiguously demonstrates it (and as, among other groupings, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India articulates it).

Even the foregoing, rather restricted sample of regional architecture projects may aptly denote some of the trends underlying the intricate geographies of “East Asia” and its regionalisation processes: a) Practically, all of the proliferating regional schemes have their own regional coverage, partly overlapping with, and partly diverging from all the others. b) Powers not directly part of the region’s conventional geography tend to have critical influence on it. c) Regional coverage has tended to expand far beyond East Asia; it is increasingly about the mutual involvement of China, and Asia in general, with the rest of the world.

If one adds geopolitical variables consolidated in the post-Cold War Heisei Era, one may get a topography with manifold global ramifications, compounded, among others, by antiterrorism, health, climatic, cyber, and outer space vectors of foreign and security policies, not to mention Japan’s extraregional trade networks to meet basic resource needs (e.g. through the South China Sea), foreclosing any notion of a self-contained region and highlighting uncompromising “core interests” shaping rival regional designs.

REIWA REBALANCE? The Indo-Pacific is, however, just the most recent—albeit, in some ways, the most inclusive—one in a fourfold sequence of “evolutionary” regimes: first, there reigned the age-old “tributary system” of a China-centred world order, supplanted between the end of the

19th century and the end of World War II by a Japanese “imperial system,” to be replaced by the post-World War II “Pax Americana,” metamorphosing in recent decades into a “post-Cold War regime” still in the making.

Even if the percept of its foreign policy legacy may be questioned, the Heisei Era, coinciding with the post-Cold War period, has witnessed multifarious and deep transformations in Japan’s geopolitical constellation. While it has had high expectations and zenith points, it has also experienced decline. One of the determinants in the constellation has been Lee Kuan Yew, “Asia’s elder statesman,” identified back in the mid-1990s thusly: “Asia has never seen a strong Japan and a strong China at the same time.”6 By the time Japan was getting free of some of the defeat-imposed postwar constraints and announced its claim for an enhanced world role as a “normal power,” China’s spectacular rise had already been under way. Since then, China’s (and East Asia’s) ongoing rise in some dimensions has run parallel to Japan’s relative decline. With a separate paper in the present volume on Japan–China relations, let it suffice to quote just a telegraphic summary on the reversal of proportions in Heisei times: In 1990, “China’s GDP was only 11% of Japan’s and even its GDP measured in PPP was 47%.

China’s FDI was merely 2% of Japan’s. Even measured in PPP, China’s GDP per capita amounted to only 5%. China’s merchandize exports accounted for 22% of Japan’s. In terms of military expenditure, China was 35% of Japan’s.” China rapidly caught up, however, during the Heisei decades: “By 2010 China’s …

GDP exceeded Japan’s. China is now more than doubled that of Japan in terms of GDP and quadrupled in GDP PPP. In terms of trade volume, China has tripled that of Japan. China exceeded Japan in FDI outflow in 2010 as well…

The only weak area is GDP per capita… China’s share of Japan’s GDP per capita increased from 1.3% in 1990 to 20.9% in 2016.”7 Around Heisei 5 (1995), Japan had its highest share in global GDP at more than 15%, by Heisei 25, China had exceeded that, while Japan’s share had declined below its 1970 level of 8%.

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39

One could cite related details on end, population trends included. Although, from the closing of the Cambodian war in 1990, the Heisei Era experienced Asia’s post-Cold War “long peace,” in the same period, by official data, China’s military spending (now No. 2 globally) became more than double (in estimates of real spending more than fourfold) of Japan’s official figure.

Given the nature of lateral pressure, the script of relative shrinking applies also to the long-time (extra)regional hegemon, the United States.

What the above in geopolitical implications adds up to was eloquently expressed by Shinzō Abe as Japan’s Prime Minister in his April 2015 address to the Joint Meeting of the US Congress: “We must make the vast seas stretching from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans seas of peace and freedom… For that very reason we must fortify the U.S.–Japan alliance.

That is our responsibility… No new concept should ever be necessary … it is an alliance that cherishes our shared values of the rule of law, respect for human rights and freedom… Let the two of us, America and Japan, join our hands together and do our best to make the world a better, a much better, place to live. Alliance of hope—together, we can make [a] difference.”8 Whether hope can be translated into reality, long shadows of history notwithstanding, depends heavily on whether genuine reconciliation and positive-sum cooperation among contestants can prevail in Asia’s tough neighbourhood—crucially, within and without its hard but divisive core. To some extent, this cannot be endogenously achieved; therefore, external countervailing actors may prove to be indispensable for a geopolitical, even evolutionary, rebalance.

ENDNOTES 1 In the joint arrangement of the East Asia Club of Pázmány Catholic University and the Embassy of Japan in Hungary.

2

Hiroki Manabe: Interview with Carol Gluck: Change

in Japan is a Long-distance Run. Working Group for 40

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Peace

and

Demilitarization

of

Asia

and

the

Pacific.

17 September 2013. <https://bit.ly/2J89Dfe > Accessed: 18 September 2013.

3

Diplomatic Bluebook 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Japan, 2018. 24.

4

Diplomatic Bluebook 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Japan, 2018. 87–88. (“Member economies” includes Taiwan.)

5

USPACOM Area of Responsibility. U.S. Indo-Pacific

Command. <https://bit.ly/2VsLw1r > Accessed: 7 May 2019.

6 Lee Kuan Yew: Key-note lecture for the 1997 Singapore Conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

Cited by Koro Bessho: Identities and Security in East Asia.

Adelphi Paper 325. International Institute of Strategic Studies, Oxford University Press, 1999. 33.

7 Ming Wan: Japan–China Relations and the Changing East Asian Regional Order. In: Japan and Asia’s Contested Order.

The Interplay of Security, Economics, and Identity, edited by Pempel T. J. – Y. Sohn. Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 225.

8

Shinzo Abe: Toward an Alliance of Hope. Prime

Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 29 April 2015. <https://bit.ly/ 1OEzqbA > Accessed: 1 May 2015.

AN ALLIANCE MADE EVEN GREATER? THE US–JAPAN ALLIANCE IN THE HEISEI ERA, OKINAWA, AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE András Bartók

“Donald and Shinzō Make Alliance Even Greater”—catchy words on a golfing cap given to the president of the United States by the Prime Minister of Japan in 2017. If nothing else, the theatrical exchange shows how the US–Japan alliance has evolved to adapt not only to a changing security environment and operational challenges but also to the changing patterns of international politics in the age of diplomacy tailored to fit the paradigms of social networks.

However, this symbolic and amicable moment does not reflect the social and political strains of hosting American troops in Japan, a sensitive issue, especially in Okinawa Prefecture, where most of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) are stationed. The dynamic of the alliance can be captured in this duality. In a geopolitical sense, it is a mutually beneficial arrangement. Geostrategic incentives are clear.

The US provides a boost to Japan’s security, as

Donald Trump and Shinzō Abe showing “Donald and Shinzō Make Alliance Even Greater” caps

well as some deterrence capabilities that otherwise would be limited by the country’s pacifist security doctrine. Japan provides the US with a forward military presence in the Western Pacific, a clear strategic necessity if Washington wishes to carry on the long geopolitical tradition of controlling crucial choke points of global sea lines of communication. However, in terms of domestic politics and local issues, the bilateral security cooperation comes at a price. While the disapproval towards asymmetric burden sharing and Japanese companies’ economic rivalry with American counterparts have occasionally played some part in the US political discourse, the problematic aspects of the US–Japan relations have been much more integral to Japanese public debate.

Some dissatisfaction has gone hand in hand with most milestones of the security cooperation first established by the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan in 1952. The revision of the Treaty in 1960 was followed by significant civil protests after the Japanese Diet had voted on its ratification.1 Moreover, while most of Japanese society has internalised the alliance and Japan’s role in it, some—traditionally left wing—political factions call for a more literal adherence to the country’s pacifist Constitution, as well as distancing Japan from US security involvement in Asia. Concerns about US pressure on Japan’s foreign policy has been a constant factor since the postwar reconstruction, and the organic desire for Japan to be independent of this influence, especially in terms of regional foreign policy, is encapsulated by the phrase datsu-bei-nyū-a (脱米入亜), “entering Asia without the United States.”2 IN-DEPTH

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Japan’s Heisei Era ushered in a process in which the US–Japan Alliance had some difficulty in terms of its social and political context, but in the final years of Heisei it nevertheless seemed like these strains were much less relevant, with the military aspect of the cooperation standing on firmer ground than ever.

Social and political issues can be illustrated by two major developments in Japan. First, the country’s legal yielding to international and US pressure calling on Japan to take on a more active role in global security dynamics. Second, the problem of USFJ military installations in Okinawa has become a major theme in general election campaigns and was a major political issue in 2009. The former theme may be highlighted in a series of new laws, each gradually easing the country’s self-imposed restrictions on deploying the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (自 衛隊・Jieitai or JSDF) abroad, culminating in the 2015 legislation allowing Japan to practice the right of collective self-defence. The latter issue seems to have followed a trajectory whereby it rose to the level of national political debates in the 2000s, but has since returned to the level of a local issue in the last few years.

American military bases in Okinawa Prefecture 42

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The Alliance also saw changes in the doctrinal background of the Japan–US cooperation, as well as some shifts in the composition of the military assets of the USFJ. With consecutive revisions of the Security Cooperation Guidelines, operational and doctrinal cooperation had significantly deepened between the two militaries. While at the beginning of the Heisei Era the USFJ went through some minor decrease in capabilities, by the middle of the period—in the 2000s—this had trend reversed, and Japan today is host to one of the largest US overseas military contingents.

Taking stock of the Alliance, the US military presence, and the security cooperation at the final days of Heisei, we see an arch of overall positive development. While problematic issues have certainly put a strain on the alliance regarding its sociopolitical dimension, the security cooperation aspect and the whole American military presence have come to be footed on more solid foundations than during the somewhat uncertain initial post-cold war years.

SOCIOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS— OUTSIDE PRESSURE ON JAPANESE DEFENCE POLICY AND THE PROBLEMS OF US MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA PREFECTURE With the end of the Cold War, bilateral geopolitical configurations and most of the international security cooperations had to adjust to changing circumstances. While the name of the Heisei Era3 highlights optimistic views on the future diminishing of global conflicts, hopes of the “End of History” did not come true, neither on a global scale, nor for Japan—at least not in a way that would mean a lack of challenges and relevant political problems.

One such issue was that expectations increased from the US and even from the international community on Japan to shoulder the burden of global security more actively.

Based on restraints of the county’s pacifist constitution, during the 1991 Gulf War, Japan did not send troops to the Middle East but provided funds for the operations amounting to USD 13 billion. Even with this substantial

financial support, Japan had to face increased criticism about not dispatching any personnel.4 As a result, a steady progress of legal reforms began in the early 1990s, aiming at allowing Jietai troops to take on operational tasks in international cooperation, starting with the first overseas dispatch of Japanese military personnel to take part in minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf.5 These changes opened the door for a long process of gradually easing restrictions on Jieitai troops deployment beyond Japan’s territory.

While the specific political arguments and negotiations are beyond the scope of this paper, it should be mentioned that each further easing of restrictions was followed by a heated debate and usually came with substantial short-term repercussions in terms of the public political support for the given administration.

Nevertheless, after the 1990s, Japanese lawmakers made possible an ever-increasing operational participation for Jietai troops dispatched abroad. This process culminated in a package of new security and defence-related laws that were approved in 2015 and came into effect in 2016. While not the only major one in Japan’s defence policy, the most significant of these changes in 2016, at least when it comes to an operational doctrine for the US–Japan alliance, was the introduction of the concept of “collective self-defence.” This meant a break with long-term doctrinal configurations that would only allow Japanese troops to engage an enemy if they were to be attacked. This change opened the possibility for Jietai troops to protect allied assets that came under attack even if they themselves did not. The first mission—more symbolic than operationally necessary—carried out under these doctrinal changes came on 1 May 2017, when Japanese helicopter carrier Izumo (DDH-183) and destroyer Sasanagi (DD-113) escorted an American military transport on its cruise through the Western Pacific. In this regard, the Heisei Era gave way for changes in Japan’s defence policy that would finally allow the operational “normalisation” of its alliance with the United States, i.e., the doctrinal possibility of collective self-defence. While not

necessarily the kind of all-out contribution that defence planners in Washington might have hoped from Japan, it is still a significant step up in contributions to the bilateral security cooperation.

The other major sociopolitical issue for the Alliance is the presence of USFJ troops on Japanese territory, the most central case of which is US bases in Okinawa Prefecture.

The Japanese public had been weary—to say the least—of the USFJ force concentration in Okinawa since the beginning of the postwar alliance structure,6 but the issue took priority on a national political debate in the campaign leading up to the 2009 Lower House general elections. Among many different promises for structural reforms, Yukio Hatoyama, PM candidate of the Democratic Party of Japan, promised to relocate the USFJ marine air base from Futenma, Okinawa, to outside of the island prefecture. Hatoyama and the DPJ won the election in 2009, but, like in the case of many of their structural promises, he found that he could not carry out the relocation plan.7 A combination of ultimately inconclusive negotiations with the US, domestic institutional opposition to the relocation plans, and a general loss of support for his administration culminated in Hatoyama’s resignation, and the failure of the Futenma promise was one of the major reasons for his stepping down.8 While the issue—namely, that, while Okinawa is one of the smaller prefectures, it hosts almost three-quarters of all USFJ forces—has remained on the agenda since Hatoyama’s resignation, no major successful central governmental electoral campaign has made a promise to relocate the air base. It seems that Futenma—and, more broadly, the US military presence in Okinawa— which was elevated to a level of a major national policy issue in 2009, returned to a local level in the final days of the Heisei Era. US–JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION AND THE USFJ PRESENCE IN JAPAN While the social and political aspects of bilateral security cooperation development were not without issues in the three decades of Heisei, IN-DEPTH

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the doctrinal and operational aspects, as well as the presence of US military capabilities in Japan, enjoyed a steady progression with an overall positive tone.

The doctrinal progress of closer cooperation has been recorded by the consecutive guidelines on security cooperation adopted by the two sides, first in 1978, then in 1997, and most recently in 2015. The first version, in 1978, mainly set down existing practices of defence planning and cooperation, without much focus beyond the territorial defence of Japan. Only its last paragraph mentioned some possible areas of cooperation on situations in the Far East that might be relevant to the security of the island nation, mostly referencing the use of USFJ facilities for securing Far East contingencies.9 The first revision of the Guidelines came into effect in 1997, after the Taiwan Strait Crisis, which elevated both US security attention towards East Asia and most regional actors’ sensitivity to security issues concerning the rise of China. The 1997 Guidelines thus contain a much more detailed roadmap for not only a security cooperation in the deterrence posture and the territorial defence of Japan but also much more comprehensive cooperation in Article V, “Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.”10 The most important development after the 1997 Guidelines has been the joint efforts regarding ballistic missile defence based on

the AEGIS-equipped naval assets currently operated not only on US Navy ships but three classes of Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels as well.11 The third version of the Guidelines, which has been in effect since 2015, adopted a posture towards a highly integrated and comprehensive bilateral alliance.

With a high level of interoperability and cooperation, the US–Japan alliance now encompasses joint efforts in defence planning and development in the technological sphere, as well as new dimensions of military activity, space, and cyber defence.12 While issues like Futenma might have produced some political friction over the years, the evolution of the actual defence and security cooperation shows that the alliance is able to steadily adapt to new challenges, both in terms of regional threats, such as the North Korean WMB and ICBM programmes, and military threats arising from new domains such as space and the cyber world.

Another indicator of the strategic weight of the Alliance is the volume and composition of USFJ troops stationed in the country throughout the three decades of Heisei.

As shown above, the beginning of the Heisei Era meant a steady reduction in US overseas military presence, including USFJ forces, with a considerable cutback in US Air Force and Marines personnel. Not by any coincidence, the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s saw a spike in US presence in Japan, with a temporary dip in the early 12,150

16,500 15,600 14,000 23,700

20,000 14,300

8,300

13,900

12,504

19,200

7,300 1,900

6,700 1,530

5,200 1,800

1989

1994

1997

1999

US Army

US Navy

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12,500

18,800

17,850 14,183

2,000

USFJ personnel by service (1989–2019)

14,700

9,250

14,950

20,250

1,750

3,725 2,544

6,750 2,500

2,700

2004

2009

2014

2019

US Marines

US Air Force

2000s—most likely because of the War in Afghanistan and Iraq—and a new surge in the 2010s. With the rise of China’s military capabilities and especially its naval capacities—, as well as due to tensions over the Korean peninsula—one can observe a surge of power projection capacity in how US Air Force, Navy, and Marine presence grew to late Cold War levels.13 Furthermore, an overview of the key capabilities and major weapons systems deployed to the USFJ shows a similar pattern of slow and steady reduction in military presence, with a noticeable increase at the end of the Heisei Era. The composition of fighter aircraft deployments to the USFJ shows the strategic significance of the US military presence in Japan, highlighted by the fact that there is currently a substantial number of the latest generation of fighters, such as the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning, on hand.

Another element of USFJ power projection capabilities is the major naval surface combatant ships, aircraft carriers, and amphibious landing ships.

As we have seen with the increase in personnel since the 2010s, US Navy and USMC power projection assets stationed with USFJ had significantly increased by the end of the last three decades. The spike in the number of surface warships, currently consisting mainly of 8-9 Airleigh Burke-class destroyers and 3-4 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, highlights the role the US–Japan alliance plays in US geostrategy, namely the importance of forward deployment in an increasingly contested maritime environment, the Western Pacific. The phrase attributed to Yasuhiro Nakasone, one of the most prominent Japanese PMs of the late Cold War, still seems to apply to Japan perfectly today: the “Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier” (不沈空母・fuchin kūbo).

AN “UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER” ON NEW WATERS? Taking a look at the end of the Heisei years and then the era of Reiwa, the anticipation of change is a natural tendency. However, in terms of the dynamics of the US–Japan alliance, the main

72 48

49

48 36

36

40 27

16

0 0

0

1989

0 0

0

F-18

F-22

2004 F-4

F-15

F-16

22

14 12 2019 F-35

USFJ fighter aircraft composition (1989–2019)

13

9

8

3

1 1989 Aircraft carrier

4

4

1

1 2004

Surface combatants

2019 Amphibious landing ships

USFJ major naval assets (1989–2019)

takeaways of the last three decades might just indicate that radical changes for the future are not very likely. While the sociopolitical aspect of the alliance has had its strains move more towards the centre stage of political debate in the 2000s, it seems unlikely that unresolved issues, such as the military bases in Okinawa, will resurface with the same national attention in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, US military presence, with key power projection assets, seems to have kept pace with the increasingly contested operational maritime environment of the Western Pacific.

Trends towards increasing military capabilities by regional powers—mainly the People’s Republic of China—are unlikely to change, and, accordingly, we might assume that Japan will be the most important overseas forward deployment location for US military presence in East Asia. Leaders in Tōkyō and Washington will weigh their concerns over the alliance and the current configuration of USFJ deployment against the geostrategic benefits of the security cooperation. Most likely, the benefits of the latter will highly outweigh the problems caused by the former.

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JAPAN’S BASE PROBLEM—TODAY Emese Schwarcz On 24 February 2019, the people of Okinawa Prefecture were given a platform to express their opinions about the relocation of Futenma US Air Base to a new, less populated part of the island chain. The outcome of this referendum sent a clear message to the central government—yet nothing seems to have changed so far. Why is the relocation needed, and why do Okinawans oppose it? What is the meaning of the referendum?

Okinawa, the southern islands of Japan, has been quite a unique part of the country both culturally and politically. The former Ryūkyū Kingdom, although close to Japan both culturally and in proximity, was annexed to the Empire of Japan in 1879.

The Ryūkyū Islands received cultural influence from both Japan and China, thus evolving into a cultural entity quite unlike either of them. The language, the clothing, and the food all resemble in one way or another one of these countries, but the Ryūkyū identity has always distanced itself from them. This mentality has contributed largely to the ominous situation that the central government has to deal with in present times.

The annexation and the forming of Okinawa Prefecture were quick and efficient, with the aim of Japanising the population and abolishing the distinctive Ryūkyū identity, and thereby creating a homogenous Japan. These steps—and the many civilian victims forced to commit suicide for the sake of the Imperial Army during World War II—created a looming hostility towards Japan’s central government, not only on the civilian but on the political level too.

The end of World War II resulted in the American Occupation (1945–1952), a first in the history of the country. For strategic

46

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and geopolitical reasons, Okinawa was selected to host the newly built US Air Force bases. The maintenance costs of these bases placed an uncomfortable burden on the country, but the presence of the US military personnel posed further issues to the locals.

Since the main facility, Futenma Air Force base, is located right at the heart of the densely populated Nago city, various problems arose in the past couple of decades. The most general ones are noise and air pollution, not to mention the several accidents that caused public safety concerns among the locals. Major outrages were also triggered by the marines committing serious crimes in the past. One of them was the infamous 1995 rape incident, when three servicemen kidnapped, beat, and raped a 12-year-old schoolgirl. In another case, a transport helicopter crashed into a building of the Okinawa International University. In 2018, helicopter parts fell on a playground and a daycare centre, endangering young children. Vandalism, littering, and overall bad behaviour on behalf of the marines have compelled the locals to initiate protests against the stationed US military personnel.

Most of the local politicians win their elections with the promise of forcing the central government to relocate the base

ENDNOTES 1 The initiator of this revision was PM Nobusuke Kishi. More on him in Emese Schwarcz: Prime Ministerial Profile: Shinzō Abe. 2 #脱米入亜is for example a hashtag on Twitter under posts and news articles. <https://bit.ly/2YfWEeY > 3 One explanation for the name Heisei we would refer to is its longer version (平和達成) coming from a phrase 内外、天地とも 平和が達成される, meaning the achievement of peace both in a domestic and an outside world.

4

Tim Kelly – Nobuhiro Kubo: Gulf war trauma began

Japan’s retreat from pacifism. Reuters. 20 December 2016. <https://reut.rs/2VYCeKQ > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

5

Hiroshi Aizawa: Perushawan sōkai-tei haken no igi to

kyōkun — sōkai butai no rekishi to kaijō bōei-ryoku seibi no ikisatsu kara no kōsatsu. NID News. 2014/December. <https://bit.ly/2VSq31N > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

outside of Okinawa—a promise that is sure to cater to most locals. And while talks about the relocation began many years ago, the US–Japan alliance ended the negotiations with a new location that is still on the territory of Okinawa Prefecture—this time to the north, in Henoko, which is known to provide habitat to the endangered dugong species near its shores and has a rather problematic tectonic plate underneath, which is weak against earthquakes.

In the February referendum, the people of Okinawa were able to express their approval or disapproval over the relocation, and 70% of the people said no to it. It is important to note that, this time, “no” expressed disapproval of the new location, and not the overall relocation of the base.

The referendum was non-binding, and the central government, unfortunately, seems to pay no heed to it. The gears of the relocation process are already turning, but current Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki, the half-American politician from a Japanese single mother, who never knew his marine father, is eager to clash with the Abe Administration in any way he can to further the cause of the anti-relocation efforts.

6 Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan. History, politics, and social change since the 1980s. John Wiley & Sons, Malden, 2012. 130–131.

7 (Shasetsu) torikaeshi tsukanu Hatoyama shushō no Futenma shissei. Nikkei. 29 May 2010. <https://s.nikkei.com/2QijXlA > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

8 Jun Hongo: Hatoyama quits as prime minister. The Japan Times. 3 June 2010. <https://bit.ly/2YG9Fi8 > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

9

The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

(November 27, 1978). Minisitry of Defense. <https://bit.ly/ 2HvXsXA > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

10

The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

(September 23, 1997). Minisitry of Defense. <https://bit. ly/2WnWx3K > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

11

Successful PAC-3 Flight Test. Japan Defense Focus.

No. 11. <https://bit.ly/2WV2Icx > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

12

The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

(April 27, 2015). Minisitry of Defense. <https://bit.ly/2w8hh0s > Accessed: 5 May 2019.

13 Tables compiled based on data from The Military Balance yearbooks for the corresponding years.

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JAPAN’S TERRITORIAL ISSUES WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES Béla Háda

From a Central European perspective, Japan seems to have been one of the most stable countries in the world in the last decade. Every scholar of East Asian international relations and strategic prospects knows about the territorial disputes with the Russian Federation over the Kuril (or Chishima) Islands, and the debates with China and the two Koreas regarding the activities of Japanese soldiers and the colonial administration in the first half of the 20th century, but these issues seemed to have low conflict potential. The reason for the differing Central European reading of the situation is the different historical heritage its nations have. Most of the territorial disputes between neighbouring countries in our region have given rise to a great fundamental antagonism in the fields of ethnopolitics and national identity.

Although it is difficult to compare the Japanese situation to this, the stakes of the territorial disputes are no less severe. Moreover, in the last decade, these debates seemed to have been much more serious than before. Despite the integrity of the four main islands—the core areas of the Japanese state—the importance of the small disputed islands is undeniable from the perspective of the geopolitical and strategic transformation of Northeast Asia and, consequently, from the perspective of the future of Japan.

This short article aims to explain these territorial issues.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE ISLAND DISPUTE The volcanic chain of the Kuril Islands between Hokkaidō and the Kamchatka Peninsula, known in Japanese as the Northern Territories (北方領土・hoppō ryōdo) was a less inhabited frontier area between the zones of 19th-century 48

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Russian and Japanese expansion. According to the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, the whole Kuril archipelago became a Japanese territory in exchange for the island of Sakhalin (樺太・Karafuto).1 This remained the situation until the end of World War II, when the Soviet Union occupied all of the islands. Japan did not recognise this unilateral action, but, as a defeated country, it could not do much against it. Japanese grievances mainly concentrated on the Russian occupation of the southernmost islands, Kunashiri (国後), Etorofu (択捉), Shikotan (色丹), and the Habomai islets (歯舞群島・habomai guntō), which —according to their interpretation—are not elements of the Chishima Archipelago but part of Hokkaidō Prefecture, which had come under Japanese sovereignty through the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda.2 During the following decades, the international legal status of the islands remained unresolved.

However, this does not mean that the two countries have not discussed the matter at all.

On 19 October 1956, the two parties signed the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration, which —among others—committed the Soviet Union to transferring two small areas (the Habomai Islands and Shikotan), but made no mention of the two large islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu.3 This document also concluded the war and restored the diplomatic relations between the two states. According to the Joint Declaration, the actual transfer of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was supposed to take place after the signing of a peace treaty—which has not taken place to date.4 Later, the Soviet side denied the existence of any unresolved territorial issues in Soviet– Japanese relations. This position was also inherited by the Russian Federation in 1991.

Russia, as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, did not foreclose the possibility of a final peace agreement in principle, but, in practice, it has never shown enough flexibility for this.

In all probability, it was primarily due to the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles issue.

Nowadays, the three southern Kuril Islands and the small islet group—the so-called Northern Territories—are claimed by Japan as part of the Nemuro Subprefecture of Hokkaidō Prefecture.

Russia named them Southern Kuriles, which means that these islands are inalienable parts of its territory. According to 2017 data, thousands of people live in the disputed area, mainly Ukrainians and Russians.5 As Japanese residents were expelled at the end of World War II, the ethnic bases of Japanese territorial claims were abolished by force.

However, Tōkyō has not given up its claims, and has maintained that the dispute over the islands should be resolved before the signing of a peace treaty. At their Singapore meeting in mid-November 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to accelerate negotiations of a peace treaty based on the Soviet–Japanese joint declaration of 1956.6 Albeit slightly, this seems to be a shift from the former standpoints.

The Russian side showed openness to a minor territorial concession on the status quo. Though Putin’s offer is hardly satisfying for the Japanese government, the Singapore meeting brought new impetus to the diplomatic process. Until this manuscript was closed, there had been further rounds of high-level talks in December 20187 and January 2019.8 Despite the diplomats’ optimism, the probability of the Russian retreat from the two (or four) islands seems slim. Russia keeps its East Asian neighbour under permanent pressure, which fits well in its foreign policy of strengthening Russian influence in Eurasia.

The status quo serves Moscow’s interests, and Japan has no ways of forcing further concessions from it.

GIANTS OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE In Europe, hardly anybody heard about the so-called Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands of the

East China Sea (尖閣諸島・Senkaku-shotō in Japanese, Diaoyu in Chinese) before the 2000s.

Until recent years, the sovereignty of the group of eight uninhabited islets was only one among the numerous controversial issues between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan.

Like several other tensions in the Northeast Asian region, it emerged at the end of World War II and with the fall of the Empire of Japan.

Japan annexed Senkaku/Diaoyu as terra nullius under the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and it remained a de facto Japanese territory as a part of the Ryūkyū Islands after the 1951 San Francisco Treaty.9 However, Chinese authorities (of both the Republic and the People’s Republic) have always disputed the legal basis for the Japanese claim. According to the Chinese standpoint, Japan occupied the islets, together with Taiwan and the surrounding islands, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. As this treaty was repealed, the islands should have returned to China.

Nevertheless, apart from the clash of legal and historical interpretations, this dispute would hardly have had real conflict potential if significant hydrocarbon stocks had not been found near the islets in the 1970s. From then on, the strategic importance of these small rocks in the East China Sea has increased because of the potential resources in the immediate area: the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands occupy a territory of approximately 40,000 square kilometres rich in deepwater natural gas and crude oil fields.

There is no doubt that these potential sources would be beneficial for both of the two great hydrocarbon importer countries. Since the 2010s, entering the disputed area has become more common for both parties. Growing naval capacities have also intensified the tensions, the strong national emotions, and the mutual concerns about each other’s security and defence policy.

Of course, the situation in the PRC and Japan are markedly different. Almost all the oil and gas consumed in Japan comes from overseas sources. Since the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and the Fukushima incident, the Japanese energy sector has grown more dependent on IN-DEPTH

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JAPAN CHINA SENKAKU ISLANDS Senkaku islands map. Japan and China territorial disputes

fossil fuels.10 Although China overtook Japan among the world’s top natural gas and crude oil importers, the share of imported gas and oil in its total consumption is approximately 40% and somewhere above 60%, respectively. Albeit very high, it is still significantly lower than in Japan. At the same time, Chinese naval forces are showing rapid build-up. The country’s apparent goal is to create a blue-water navy capability, and, in the near future, this could endanger Japanese interests both in its energy security and in its territorial sovereignty. Despite the “normalisation” process of Japanese defence policy, in the long term, the PRC will have significantly higher “hard power” potential than the island state. Obviously, this will increase Japan’s concerns about Chinese expansion, whose first target may be Senkaku.

TAKESHIMA AND THE NAME OF THE SEA From a Korean perspective, the Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945 was the nadir of Koreans’ national history. The experiences of the occupation substantiated the suspicious and hostile attitude towards Japanese strategic aspirations and the country’s historical selfconcept. Generally speaking, a historical heritage such as the Japanese rule can induce what some might consider overreactions in case of symbolic issues. The debated name of the sea between the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Islands is a widely known example of this. The sea in question is the so-called Eastern Sea, which is actually known as the Sea of Japan both in the island country and the west. Seoul sees this name as a remnant of 50

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Japanese imperialism, and thus South Koreans protest against it, insisting on the appellation “Eastern Sea.” Simultaneously, Japan has a territorial dispute with the Republic of Korea (ROK) over the sovereignty of a group of small islets named Takeshima (竹島) in Japanese, or Dokdo in Korean. Internationally, the islets are classified as the Liancourt Rocks. The islets lie to the north-west of Honshū, approximately midway between South Korea and Japan. They consists of two bigger islets and three dozen small rocks.

There is no consensus on who was the first to have administrative control over the archipelago.

The clash of various Japanese and Korean historical theories has not led to a mutually acceptable solution yet. Like the territorial issues discussed earlier, the Takeshima debate is also rooted in the second half of the 20th century.

Even though the United States has considered the islets to be under Japanese sovereignty since the 1950s, Washington has declined to interfere in the territorial debate between its two key East Asian allies.11 The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea12 confirmed the status quo: according to it, South Korea occupies the islets but recognises that both countries claim them as their territory. This resulted in the current situation, and, at the same time, froze the conflict.

Just like the Senkaku/Diaoyu affair, this conflict also involves national pride and self-image. The Takeshima/Dokdo dispute became one of the symbols of the Korean nation’s spiritual unity.

North Korea supports the ROK’s position on the territorial affiliation of Dokdo: it was even

suggested that the two Korean states should defend it against Japan together if it becomes necessary—just another example of why Tōkyō cannot ignore Koreans’ strong national identity and their narratives of modern history.

Nevertheless, current debates between Japan and the ROK are based on primarily ideological and symbolical antagonism, and not on substantial security dilemmas. Takeshima/ Dokdo does not have as great strategic importance as the Senkakus. Therefore, it is hardly a basis for serious confrontation. Despite the problematic and sometimes uncomfortable relationship between Tōkyō and Seoul, the two governments are aware of the importance of constructive dialogue and have not allowed the debate to escalate.13

keeping Tōkyō under pressure to serve foreign or trade policy purposes, but they seem noticeably detrimental to efforts aimed at limiting the country’s military capabilities.

ENDNOTES 1

Akihiro Iwashita: Japan’s Border Issues. Pitfalls and

Prospects. Routledge, London, 2016. 33.

2 Kazuhiko Tōgō: The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity. Japan Forum. 2011/1. 123–145.

3 Robin Harding – Henry Foy: Russia and Japan push to resolve Kuril Islands dispute. Financial Times. 28 November 2018. <https://on.ft.com/2UBhMPu > Accessed: 12 March

CONCLUSIONS Nowadays, Japan’s territorial debates tend to lead to more risky situations than in the previous decades. This phenomenon is closely related to a transformation in the geostrategic environment of Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific Region. The rise of the PRC has posed a number of challenges to Tōkyō, now seemingly a prisoner of the strategic rebalancing of the Asia-Pacific.

Its fundamental interest lies in the stability of the geostrategic status quo, but, over the decades, it has become more and more evident that its economic and military capabilities alone are not sufficient to maintain a comfortable degree of security against its major regional challengers.

This encourages closer cooperation with the US, which can also be observed in Japanese strategic documents. The island state has long been Washington’s number one East Asian ally, and closer strategic cooperation between them seems to be a logical answer to the growing Chinese and Russian presence in the region.

In the field of security and defence policy, this rebalancing process has been stimulating the so-called “normalisation,” the process of Japan removing its restrictions on the use of military forces. The latter, however, had caused great discontent in Beijing.

Japanese territorial debates, such as the Kuril and Senkaku disputes, might be suitable for

2019.

4 Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. 19 October 19 1956.

5 See: Okabe Yoshihiko: Russia’s Violation of Fundamental Rules of International Law after the World War II: View from Japan. Centre for Russian Studies. 11 July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2X0RBhF > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

6

Japan–Russia Summit Meeting. Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Japan. 14 November 2018. <https://bit.ly/2v1rLOQ > Accessed: 4 March 2019.

7 Junnosuke Kobara: Abe and Putin designate negotiators for peace treaty and islands, NIKKEI Asian Review. 2 December 2018. <https://s.nikkei.com/2VDOlZf > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

8

Japan–Russia Summit Meeting. Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Japan. 22 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2GkC2Mt > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

9 Treaty of Peace with Japan. San Francisco, 8 September 1951.

10 See more: Strategic Energy Plan [Provisional Translation].

Agency of Natural Resources and Energy. July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Ks5OCL > Accessed: 14 March 2019.

11

Kim Young-jin: Dokdo spat poses dilemma for US.

The Korea Times. 24 August 2012. <https://bit.ly/2D8yquY > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

12

Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the

Republic of Korea. Tōkyō, 22 June 1965.

13

Narushige Michishita: Japan and South Korea, the

Friendly Foes of East Asia. The New York Times. 9 February 2018. <https://nyti.ms/2UWO3jm > Accessed: 2 February 2019.

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NORTH KOREA AND THE ISSUE OF JAPANESE ABDUCTEES Tünde Lendvai

The abduction issue between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a priority matter that hampers the forming official diplomatic relations between the two countries. Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, campaigned in the past with propagating the case of the taken citizens, to prioritise the issue as Japan’s main diplomatic goal. As various investigations and intelligence agencies uncovered the abductions and identified why and how they had occurred, Japanese authorities discovered that the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) had played an important role in them. In the light of this revelation, the government of Japan strongly insists that North Korea disclose the names of cooperating Chongryon members, while continuing investigation into many other cases of citizens who were likely taken by these agents.

WHAT MADE THE ABDUCTIONS POSSIBLE? When discussing the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea, a review of the Japan– DPRK relations, as well as an overview of the economic and social background of the time when they happened must be provided.

Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan had an active economic relationship with the DPRK under the aegis of the seiken bunri policy (政権分離), which meant that economic interests should be separated from politics. There was even a regular shipping route between Niigata (Japan) and Wonsan (North Korea), where the infamous “smuggling ferry,” the Man Gyong Bong-92, transferred both personnel and containers full of goods. Yet the two neighbouring countries did not share diplomatic ties. Japan’s permissive re-entry visa policy for 52

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zainichi1 Koreans coming back from North Korea held the possibility that the Niigata–Wonsan ferry route could not only transfer instructions and orders for spies (of which Japanese authorities warned the country’s leadership), but it also allowed North Korean agents to cover themselves as zainichi and enter South Korea.

The only formal bond between the two countries was held by the Chongryon (or Chōsen Sōren in Japanese), which functioned as a de facto embassy and organised the daily life of those zainichi Koreans who shared the North’s political ideas. There were rumours in Japanese society and authorities that the problematic communist wing of the zainichi and the leading circles of Chōsen Sōren did not only represent Pyongyang’s policy and propaganda but got engaged in the regime’s intelligence activity. Various scandals emerged around the Chongryon over espionage activities and the illegal financing of the regime’s evolving military tests with income from pachinko parlours2 and through the cooperation of Chogin credit unions (special institutions of Chōsen Sōren financial activity). In 1967, the investigation of the failed attempt to assassinate the South Korean President Park Chung Hee 3 led to zainichi suspects as well, and revealed a dangerous connection between the case and Chongryon members travelling to the DPRK on the Niigata– Wonsan ferry route.4 HOW WERE THE ABDUCTEES TAKEN? Between 1977 and 1983, Japanese investigation authorities uncovered numerous abduction cases under unusual circumstances which suggested the possibility of a North Korean involvement.

Among the nearly one hundred cases, seventeen Japanese citizens were surely kidnapped by

North Korean agents, although Pyongyang notoriously denied their involvement. From 1991 on, Japanese diplomats and their governments have referred the abduction issue in every forum to North Korean diplomats and Japan’s allies in hope for mediation. An investigation into the Chongryon’s financial and other connections with Pyongyang took place at the same time.

The Japanese found their suspicions confirmed in 1997 when a deserting North Korean intelligence agent mentioned a Japanese abductee during questioning by Japanese officials, and the description matched Megumi Yokota, a 13-year-old girl who vanished in 1977. Reacting to this news, the families of the abductees made a platform named Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea, and petitioned the government of Japan to act upon the issue, while Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto threatened Pyongyang with suspending food aid (n.b. this was during a great famine in North Korea). Tensions between Japanese society and Chongryon members led to many cases of violent assault against pro-North zainichi people, including harassment of students, as well as bomb and bullet threats, which worsened after the North Korean ballistic missile launches. The police had to be stationed around the Chōsen Sōren’s main headquarters in Tōkyō to protect it from enraged people.

The evolving hatred in Japan was conditioned by the government, as Shinzō Abe acted against the Chongryon’s economic ties and suggested cutting off all economic relations by implementing UN resolutions approved to prevent state terrorism.5 Unexpectedly, in September 2002, at a summit in Pyongyang to normalise diplomatic relations between Japan and the DPRK, Kim Jong Il apologised to Prime Minister Koizumi for the abduction of Japanese people. Kim promised that he would prevent such incidents from recurring, punish the people responsible, and help abductees reunite with their family. The negotiation talks were suspended under pressure from Koizumi until the kidnapped returned to Japan, yet the parties made a declaration to move further towards the resolution of security issues.6 In the end, the DPRK recognised thirteen Japanese citizens as victims, and the two parties set up a joint investigation team to find out their fate. According to the North Koreans, out of thirteen cases eight people were dead, including Megumi Yokota, who was said to have committed suicide. At the Japanese government’s request, Pyongyang sent their remains to Japan, but the DNA test did not confirm a match with the genetic code neither in Megumi’s nor in Kaoru Matsuki’s case, who had been taken from Europe. The DPRK also found

LOCATIONS WHERE ABDUCTEES DISAPPEARED

10

12

SEA OF JAPAN 9

3 7

1 6

2 4

North Korea claims the death of the abductees.

North Korea denies abductees entered its territory.

Returned to Japan

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5 The location where abduction took place is unknown

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6

7 July 1978 Suspected Abduction Case Involving a Couple

7

31 July 1978 Suspected Abduction Case Involving a Couple

Mr Kaoru Hasuike

Mr Yasushi Chimura

(20, Niigata Prefecture)

(23, Fukui Prefecture)

Ms Yukiko Hasuike

Ms Fukie Chimura

(Maiden name Okudo) (22, Niigata Prefecture)

(Maiden name Hamamoto) (23, Fukui Prefecture)

Kaoru Hasuike disappeared after he went out stating that he was going out and would soon be back. Similarly, Yukiko Okudo disappeared after going out. The couple returned to Japan in October 2002.

The couple disappeared after going out, stating that they were going on a date. The couple returned to Japan in October 2002.

9

12 August 1978 Suspected Abduction Case Involving a Mother and a Daughter

Ms Hitomi Soga (19, Niigata Prefecture)

Ms Miyoshi Soga (46, Niigata Prefecture)

They disappeared after going out, stating that they were going shopping.

Ms Hitomi Soga returned to Japan in October 2002. The safety of Ms Miyoshi is unknown. (North Korea denies she entered its territory.)

The return of Hitomi Soga, the Chimura couple, and the Hasuikes to Japan in October 2002. Their family members arrived separately in 2004

out that five of the abductees were still alive, among them Hitomi Soga, who had not been named beforehand by Japanese authorities.

However, North Korea claimed that her mother had not entered the country, although she disappeared alongside her daughter. In many 54

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cases, information was dubious, so there is a slight chance that a few abductees are still alive and kept in captivity by the regime, while the Japanese government shared the eleven suspects’ names and portraits with Interpol.7 It was still unclear whether the Chongryon had been aware of the agents’ instructions, and whether they had participated in the operation or just provided technical support.

During the complex official investigation, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査・Kōanchōsa-chō) revealed a possible connection between the abduction cases and the Chongryon’s underground intelligence organisation, the Gakushū-gumi. Information from different sources affirms that this organisation may be responsible for political propaganda and has a membership full of extremists. It was also accused of cooperating with the yakuza and conducting intelligence activities with North Korean sleeper agents under a cover organisation, but neither of the statements was based on concrete,

incontestable proof. Its involvement emerged in the kidnapping of the 13-years-old Megumi Yokota from Niigata, who was said to have been thrown into an unidentified car, probably provided by Chōsen Sōren’s Gakushū-gumi members, while on the way home from school. 8 WHY DID NORTH KOREA KIDNAP JAPANESE CITIZENS AND WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM? North Korea has stated that they have used the kidnapped victims for teaching Japanese language and customs while training spies, and for translating and explaining intelligence reports or information gained from newspapers. In addition, undercover agents were now able to use the identity of the abductees while deployed in Japan or South Korea.

There were many cases where more than one person was kidnapped. A young couple, Kaoru Hasuike and Yukiko Okudo, were taken from a festival on the sea coast, and there was also the disappearance of Yasushi Chimura and Fukie Chimura, who were on a date. These four people and Hitomi Soga, who was taken with her mother, were lucky enough to be able to return to Japan.

The Hasuikes, who spent altogether twenty years in North Korea, got married and had two children during their captivity. But when the regime let them visit their homeland, expecting them to come back, they chose to stay in Japan. The couple spent two years without their children until Pyongyang let all family members travel to Japan in 2004. The Chimuras and the Hasuikes’ five relatives returned with Prime Minister Koizumi from the Second Summit of Japan–DPRK, while Hitomi Soga met three of her family members in Jakarta. Returning to Japan, Kaoru Hasuike wrote a book about their twenty-year captivity, titled Abduction and Decision, in which he details his life translating Japanese newspaper articles for North Korean officials.9 THE EFFECT OF THE ABDUCTION CASES ON JAPAN–DPRK RELATIONS Under Kim Jong Il’s lead, there were efforts on both sides to reinvestigate the abduction cases by discussing details on a governmental level.

However, concrete action was delayed. The last major step forward on the issue occurred during the rule of Kim’s successor, Kim Jong Un, in 2014, when Yokota’s parents could meet their granddaughter Kim Eun Gyong.10 Later, at the Stockholm summit with Japan, the DPRK agreed to establish a Special Investigation Committee and reopened the abduction cases, while the Japanese government abolished sanctions against the Kim regime. In the end, North Korea suspended its efforts after Japan introduced new sanctions against them because of its continuous nuclear and missile tests. Kim Jong Un declared that the regime would no longer cooperate until Japan paid a certain amount of ransom for the hostages and cover the costs of the investigation.

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe made it clear that the return of the abductees is a priority for Japanese diplomacy and a criterion for normalisation. The government of Japan is not willing to recognise the abductees as hostages but only as victims, so the government will not pay for the DPRK’s investigation, and it is ready to apply more unilateral sanctions to increase pressure. It continuously demands that North Korea release the Japanese abductees (including two pro-North zainichi infants taken in 1973), recognise every other unidentified victim, and cooperate with the investigation. Furthermore, North Korea would have to reveal the identity of those Japanese (supposed zainichi Koreans and Chongryon members) who helped the agents in the abduction. In exchange, Japan could establish official diplomatic ties with the regime and fulfil the Pyongyang Declaration’s11 promises, which were made during the suspended DPRK-Japan normalisation talks in 2002, while lifting some of the numerous sanctions against the Pyongyang regime (which could be fundamental to the long-term survival of the communist system) and resuming humanitarian aid from Japan.

As seen above, the Chongryon was a sponsor and a cover organisation for Pyongyang’s intelligence activities in Japan, training agents and spies in its headquarters or helping them to leave for North Korea for training or conducting IN-DEPTH

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actions in South Korea. Meanwhile, the Chongryon is also the only place for the Korean minority in Japan with a Northern identity to ensure legal defence, and provide subsistence and ethnic education. The association is also the only entity to mediate between the leadership of the two countries and help solve the abduction issue, facilitate the victims’ return, and alleviate tensions emerging from the current security challenge around the Korean Peninsula byfostering dialogue. Thus, the Japanese authorities decided to arrest Chongryon leaders and individuals responsible for, e.g., espionage, illegal finance, and sponsoring intelligence activities, instead of involvement with the organisation itself. The government was thereby able to protect the minority’s livelihood opportunities while avoiding accusations of ethnic discrimination by the international community. What Japan could do with the current moderate US–DPRK dialogue is keep the captives’ return as a marginal point in its allies’ negotiating conditions, while also emphasising the importance of their common interest in disarming and denuclearising the communist regime as a first step to regional stability. Japan used to put pressure on Pyongyang by holding back even humanitarian aid until the remaining abductees were released and until it abandoned its nuclear weapons efforts, although without any success. In accordance with the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration, the resolution of the abduction issue is a precondition for the normalisation of diplomatic relations and a key element in the future of the North Korean minority in Japan.

Korea was divided. The Japanese authorities did not provide them Japanese nationality, only permanent residency.—Ed. 2 Pachinko parlours are gambling establishments, where people can play with arcade games, similar to slot machines in the West. Most of the pachinko parlours are owned by zainichi, due to it being almost the only way for them to earn money due to their diminished employment opportunities.—Ed. 3 Considering that the leader Kim family members’ names are usually written in the Korean order (Last name–first name) in international media and scholarly works, in this article we follow the same order for all the Korean names, in contrast with Japanese names.—Ed. 4 Dewayne J. Creamer: The Rise and Fall of Chosen Soren.

It’s Effect on Japan’s Relations on the Korean Peninsula.

Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2003. page 41–48. <https://bit.ly/2IDVKm5> Accessed: 5 November 2018.

5 Creamer, page 54-55.

6 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2002. <https://bit.ly/2XHCcDO> Accessed: 9 May 2019.

7 Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2018. page 16. <https://bit.ly/ 2IbVFHo> Accessed: 1 May 2019.

8 Creamer, page 58.

9 Buzna Viktor: Elrabolva Észak-Koreában. Tokió az elhurcolt japánok hazaengedését kéri. Magyar Nemzet. 12 March 2018. <https://bit.ly/2KOgYQU> Accessed: 9 May 2019.

10

Chronology of Abductions. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Japan. 2018. page 23. <https://bit.ly/2IeIupg> Accessed: 1 May 2019.

11

A bilateral agreement between Japan and the DPRK

was signed by Chairman Kim Jong-Il of the DPRK National Defense Commission and Japanese Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi on 17 September 2002. The two leaders met in Pyongyang in order to normalise relations, economic and cultural ties, while initiating official bilateral relations. Japan would provide economic cooperation in granting aids, long-term loans, and humanitarian assistance while both

ENDNOTES

side affirm that it will not commit actions that threatens the security of each other. The declaration contains the review the legal status of North Korean residents in Japan and their

1 Zainichi (在日・Japan resident) is a term for ethnic Koreans residing in Japan since before World War II. The majority of them were relocated to Japan during the Japanese Occupation of the Korean Peninsula (1910–1945), either by force as cheap labour or free will. The complexity of their status caused major disturbance, when the occupation ended, and later when 56

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cultural property.

THE DYNAMICS OF NORMALISED SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Viktória Anna Papp

THE PARADOX OF CHINA–JAPAN RELATIONS China and Japan share more than two thousand years of history, and their relations have been quite complicated all throughout it—sometimes in cooperation, sometimes in violent conflict.

After World War II, the countries normalised their diplomatic relations in 1972, which have changed significantly since then. Not only has the international order transformed, but so has the role that East Asian countries play in it.

Today, as the second and third largest economies in the world, Japan and China’s combined GDP accounts for more than a fifth of the global output, surpassing the US and Europe’s share, and, as major military powers, they are of cardinal importance in global affairs as well as for the security, stability, and prosperity of the East Asian region and beyond.

The China–Japan Joint statement of 1972, the China–Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed in 1978, the China–Japan Joint Declaration of 1998, and the China–Japan Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” issued in 2008 serve as the so-called four basic documents of Sino-Japanese relations. The four-point consensus on improving China–Japan ties agreed on by the Shinzō Abe and Xi Jinping administrations also joined the list in 2014.1 These documents outline the basic provisions for bilateral ties; however, they are far from being the fundamental basis of the relations between the two East Asian states.

One of the main features—and contradiction— of current Sino-Japanese relations is that, in their case, great economic interdependence and antagonistic political and diplomatic relations

can and do exist at the same time.2 It has often been argued that interstate conflicts are restrained under open international markets and intensive economic exchanges, but the China–Japan relations do not quite fit this claim.

On the contrary, their relations are characterised by clashes over historical narratives, geopolitical rivalry, and territorial disputes. Although the situation has not devolved into armed hostility, their bilateral ties have been particularly tense at times. On the other hand, economic and trade relations have become mutually beneficial and interdependent in the past four-five decades.

Japan and China are among each other’s top trading partners, and their economies are deeply complementary. Japan is the third largest source of foreign capital in China, and exports large quantities of high value-added capital-andtechnology-intensive goods to China, while China’s exports to Japan primarily consist of low value-added labour-intensive items.

The paradox of Sino-Japanese relations can be understood through different approaches that are not mutually exclusive.3 Firstly, it is often seen as a consequence of a power transition in East Asia. The rise of China, along with the relative decline of Japan, has transformed the countries’ rather amicable bilateral relations since their diplomatic normalisation. For the most part, before the mid-19th century, China was the preeminent power in East Asia, before Japan took the lead and became the regional hegemon of the entire Asia-Pacific region in the 20th century. Since the first decade of the 2000s, China has been taking a leading role again: its economy has already superseded Japan’s, and the country has been increasingly spending on its military with an ambition to become a major global power, which inevitably causes concern in IN-DEPTH

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A U S T R A L I A The political map of East Asia

Japan. Secondly, from a geopolitical perspective, bilateral ties deteriorated, as the common enemy they faced during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, collapsed.4 Thirdly, antagonism between the East Asian powers can also be understood as the “clash of nationalisms.” The modern national 58

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identity of the Chinese people, as well as the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, are built upon the anti-Japanese sentiment that mainly stems from the experience of the Japanese invasion and the Second SinoJapanese War, and has been intensified by the

patriotic education campaign which started in the 1990s. As for Japan, nationalism is a complex amalgam of the pride based on economic prowess and the fear of being surpassed by China. Therefore, it is more ambivalent than China’s nationalism towards Japan.5 The Japanese still feel a sense of superiority over the Chinese, observing their society, economy, and domestic politics with much criticism, yet they are anxious about China’s rapid growth and Japan’s economic stagnation. In the Japanese political mainstream, nationalism has also flared up because of a generational change and the growing dominance of conservatives since the 1990s. Finally, the role of the main political leaders is also crucial in the dynamics of bilateral ties. Japanese prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine (seen as a symbol of Japanese militarism

by Chinese and Koreans), for instance, have always caused resentment in the Chinese and aggravated bilateral relations. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s (2001–2006) annual visits to the shrine fuelled diplomatic tensions and anti-Japanese mass demonstrations. Whereas, even amidst the power transition in the region, under the administrations of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (2007–2008) and Yukio Hatoyama (2009–2010), who both refused to visit the shrine, Sino-Japanese ties were rather cordial.

What has been a major source of distress between China and Japan, in particular, is the dispute over the islands that are known as Senkaku in Japan and Diayou in China. The uninhabited islands are situated between Taiwan and Okinawa in the East China Sea and are administered by Japan, but China (as well as Taiwan) also has staked a claim to them for decades. The islands are of not much value per se, but their strategic location, the fishing rights near them, and their oil and natural gas reserves make them especially important. Incidents between Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese fishing vessels are frequent around the islands, and coast guards often confront each other, too.

Difficulties between the two states also focus on the question of Japan’s “normalisation.”

Although Japan technically has a military force (the Japan Self-Defense Forces), it is very

narrowly defined and limited by Japan’s postwar, pacifist constitution. The current and longestserving Prime Minister since World War II, Shinzō Abe, has advocated for a constitutional revision which would allow Japan to have a traditional military appropriate for its economic power. The need for military normalisation is often justified by the threat from North Korea; however, this possibility has provoked strong opposition from the Chinese, as they have bitter experiences with Japanese militarism. The United States plays a pivotal role in this relationship, as it is an important ally of Japan, providing for its military security and maintaining about 50,000 troops at several military bases in the country. Revising the constitution, however, would certainly cause an arms race in the region and make the Chinese–Japanese relations even tenser.

BILATERAL RELATIONS AFTER NORMALISATION As most allied countries after World War II, Japan recognised Taiwan (the Republic of China) as a legitimate state; therefore, it did not have official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Bilateral relations between the two countries started to improve after China’s split with the Soviet Union, which made the San Francisco system and Japan’s partly demilitarised status acceptable for Beijing. Even though in the 1960s bilateral trade volume was significant between the countries, and both sent cultural and economic delegations to the other, the Cultural Revolution temporarily halted further improvements. When Japan recognised the PRC, the countries finally established formal diplomatic ties in 1972.6 It was not only the Nikkuson Shokku (or Nixon Shock, a reference to American President Richard Nixon’s decisions to recognise China and suspend the convertibility to the US dollar) that troubled Japanese foreign policy and exports, which pushed Japan towards diplomatic normalisation with China, but also Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s ambition to lessen Japanese dependence on the United States and gain access to the Chinese market.7 IN-DEPTH

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A stamp printed in China, celebrating the 20 th anniversary of normalising diplomatic relations with Japan

Along with the newly established diplomatic ties came a robust development of economic and trade relations, which were bolstered by the Chinese reform and opening-up policy. The 1970s, and more so the 1980s, were the golden age of the post-World War II history of China and Japan, mainly because it was in all parties —Japan’s, China’s, and the United States’— interest to maintain the San Francisco system and further deepen their relations. When Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in 1978, he pledged to revive the good relations that existed between the states for most of their shared history.8 Consequently, cultural and youth exchange programmes were launched, and China was eager to import advanced technology and took an interest in Japan’s modernisation. Japan was still enjoying steady economic development, and the increasing activities of Japanese companies in the region aligned well with China’s need for economic modernisation. As the reform and opening-up policies progressed, China also became an important destination for Japanese FDI. Japan’s China policy have at the time been largely shaped by a sense of guilt about its past aggression and the pragmatic means of compensating for it. Instead of paying reparations for Imperial Japan’s invasion of China, the island country provided a generous aid to its neighbour through the “Official Development Assistance” (ODA) scheme after signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two countries in 1979. Through the 60

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ODA, Japan aimed to support China’s reforms, its economic development, and integration into the global economy. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in China, a quite favourable image of Japan appeared, one of an advanced, developed country at the forefront of modernisation. In China, there were many who had personally experienced the war, but, due to governmental efforts to facilitate reconciliation, anti-Japanese sentiments were more or less calmed. Similarly, at the time, most Japanese did not see China as an enemy, since, despite the American influence in Japan, anticommunism was not very strong.

The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident did not have any serious impact on Japan’s China policy, and bilateral relations remained relatively positive; Emperor Akihito even visited China for the first time in 1992 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of diplomatic normalisation. After the incident, however, the Chinese government, trying to regain its legitimacy, started its patriotic education campaign that mainly focused on China’s victimisation and anti-Japanese sentiments. 9 The campaign affected every aspect of Chinese life—posters on the street, textbooks, TV shows, movies, newspapers, etc. all boosted national pride. China also criticised Japan for “whitewashing” history books used in schools, portraying World War II, its causes, and the actions of Japanese soldiers in a misleading manner. At the same time, the Japanese felt that the majority of Chinese people were not aware of the extent of Japanese contributions to China and the apologies already extended.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the international and security environment of East Asia changed, but maintaining the regional balance of power remained in the interest of the US, as well as China and Japan. Even though bilateral economic development reached a more advanced stage as a result of Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, political relations in general deteriorated. Besides the Liberal Democratic Party’s having lost power after more than four decades, in the 1990s, Japan was struggling with economic stagnation as a result of the asset price bubble. China was also going through a power transition, while experiencing dynamic

economic development and becoming militarily more active with its nuclear tests and missile drills, for instance. As a response to China’s increasing assertiveness, Japan urged the US to revise the guidelines for their defence cooperation, and the countries announced an alliance for the 21th century and the intention to work together should a situation threatening the security of Japan or that of the region arise.

China explicitly rejected such Cold War politics and announced a new security concept aiming to increase security through diplomatic and economic exchanges and continued its “peaceful rise.”

Since the turn of the millennium, SinoJapanese relations have been characterised by growing political tensions, animosity on both sides, whilst economic ties continued flourishing. As a consequence of changing US foreign policy priorities after 9/11, Washington did not take practical steps towards amending the framework for defence cooperation with Japan. Later on, it became clear not only for the Japanese leadership but for most of society as well that Japan should rely less on its American ally and gradually move towards military normalisation. Thus, in 2010, Japan initiated a shift in the Self-Defense Forces’ Cold War focus and began preparing for more active engagement in the future, which expectedly caused distress among the Chinese leadership. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization, which intensified economic relations with Japan. After the financial crisis of 2008, however, Japan started to fall behind, and the mainland Chinese GDP surpassed that of Japan in 2010 (Japan’s GDP per capita is still larger, however). As for current economic relations, complementarity is losing momentum, as there seems to be a shift, as labour costs in China are increasing and its economic growth is slowing. Japan can no longer invest in China as a low-cost manufacturing base, as China shifts towards higher value-added manufacturing and services.

After the global financial crisis, it became apparent that the balance of power was shifting in the region, and China’s emergence as a

global political, economic, and military power became unquestionable, generating more tension in East Asia. China has been increasing its military budget, and today it competes with the US in East Asia. However, its military strength is still far from that of the US. This turn of events made it necessary for the United States to pay closer attention to East Asia, resulting in the regional foreign policy strategy Pivot to Asia, an attempt at re-balancing and engaging with East Asian countries. Naturally, China continuously raised concerns about the American military presence and Japan’s military normalisation.

Tensions between China and Japan flared up over territorial issues in 2012, when Tōkyō announced the purchase of three islets from private owners, triggering anti-Japanese riots in China. A year later, China announced setting up air traffic restrictions (the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone) over the disputed islands, which, of course, was condemned

by Japan.

As two strong political leaders, Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, and Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, emerged in 2012, Sino-Japanese relations reached a stalemate. As a result of China’s continuing maritime intrusion into Japan’s waters, Tōkyō had to cement its alliance with the US, but it tried to show goodwill and advocated for a peaceful way of managing bilateral issues. To gain the support of the anti-Japanese public at home and in the midst of a domestic power struggle, the new leader, Xi, could not take reciprocal steps just yet. In 2014, however, the parties were ready to issue the four-point agreement about developing mutually beneficial relations and continuing the bilateral political, economic, and security dialogue.

Furthermore, recent developments in bilateral relations, e.g., Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Beijing in October 2018—the first visit to China by a Japanese prime minister in almost seven years—followed by the signing of several cooperation agreements, show a détente in the relations of the two East Asian countries.

However, this easing is mostly a collateral effect of the Trump administration’s hardline stance on IN-DEPTH

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China and the ongoing trade war. Also, Japan was one of the harshest critiques of China’s cooperation platform, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at its start, but it is now more willing to engage with BRI projects. Japan may have changed its stance on Xi’s initiative—however, it is still competing with China for influence and launched similar initiatives (e.g. Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, Asia-Africa Growth Corridor) with other partners, such as India.

The current thaw should not be expected to last, as some fundamental issues, such as territorial disputes between the countries, most probably will not be solved. The Chinese leadership has been vocal about certain unequivocal national interests, including its refusal to compromise on its territorial integrity, and soon it will have every capability to enforce such policies. In order to substantially improve relations, the countries should mitigate sensitive issues and further strengthen the areas of cooperation that have already proved to be working, and, in this process, the top leadership of China and Japan could play an important role.

ENDNOTES 1

Shin Kawashima: Forty-five years of normalized Sino-

Japanese diplomacy. The Diplomat. 11 September 2017. <https://bit.ly/2vC4rKu > Accessed: 15 April 2019.

2 Lam Peng Er: China–Japan Paradox: Antagonism despite interdependency. In: China–Japan Relations in the 21th Century. Antagonism Despite Interdependency, edited by Lam Peng Er. Springer, Singapore, 2017. 2–9.

3 Ibidem.

4 Takahara Akio: Forty-four years of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations since normalization. In: China–Japan Relations in the 21th Century. Antagonism Despite Interdependency, edited by Lam Peng Er. Springer, Singapore, 2017. 27–32.

5 Yang Linjun: A Clash of Nationalisms: Sino–Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century. In: China–Japan Relations in the 21th Century. Antagonism Despite Interdependency, edited by Lam Peng Er. Springer, Singapore, 2017. 83–100.

6 Eszterhai Viktor: A második világháborút követő ázsiai hatami rendszer egyensúlytalanságai: A japán normalizáció és 62

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Kína változó stratégiái. In: Traumák és Tanulságok. A II. világháború öröksége a Távol-Keleten edited by Salát Gergely – Szilágyi Zsolt. Typotex – Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem, Budapest, 2017. 51–52.

7 Odd Arne Westad: Restless Empire. China and the world since 1750. Vintage Books, London, 2012. 413–414.

8

Ezra F. Vogel: History overshadows present, future

Japan-China relations. The Japan Times. 1 January 2014. <https://bit.ly/2DMXqYV > Accessed: 15 April 2019.

9 Louisa Lim: The People’s Republic of Amnesia. Tiananmen Revisited. Oxford University Press, New York, 2015. 146–147.

THE WHALING INDUSTRY: THEN AND NOW Emese Schwarcz

Japan’s whaling customs have been under scrutiny for more than half a century now, and with globalisation—and the resulting extensive activism—it might not be surprising that the international community is not in favour of commercial whaling. Although the Government of Japan has been quite vocal about whaling being an integral part of Japanese culture, the whale meat consumption culture has changed quite a bit in the last hundred years. A polarising debate has emerged, especially after Japan proclaimed its withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission (IWC, an organisation with the mission of helping conservation efforts targeting whale species) in December 2018.

Withdrawing from such an organisation triggered mixed—but mostly negative—opinions in the international community, but the context is much more layered than environmental activists would have people believe.

While it is true that the consumption of whale meat has been a part of Japanese culinary diversity, it has had a marginal role overall.

During World War II, whale hunting was put

on pause almost entirely, but the American Occupation after 1945 coincided with a considerable food shortage in the devastated country, which led to General Douglas MacArthur’s decision to promote whaling. In his perspective, whale meat not only provided an easy substitute with its high nutrition value and low cost but reinstating whaling also stimulated economic activity.1 The reappearance of whale meat in Japanese food culture proved to become a nostalgic element in the memory of elderly people, who make up a considerable percentage of today’s Japan due to the rapidly ageing society. No matter how much sentimental value is attached to whaling, the rejuvenation of the war-torn country brought about unprecedented economic fortunes, and whale meat became superfluous. Pushing back the whaling industry, however, was a result of different factors, culminating in Japan joining the IWC in 1951. Originally, the goal of the commission was to gather pro-whaling countries to serve as agents in conservation. Conservation, however, had the purpose of livestock control

100

CHANGES IN IWC MEMBERSHIP 12

3

22

29

32

29

34 28

25 19

IN-DEPTH

2012

17 19

37 34

34 26

27

35 37

2011

2000

11 10 13 1996

8 10 9

1994

10 10

1991

7

1988

7 7

1982

4 8

1976

8

6 9

13

1979

1

2

1973

1964

1961

1

1970

2 4

1967

3 2

1958

1955

1952

0

1 3

4 15 15 13 12 11 4 10 10 1949

10

1 1

1948

20

1 1

2002

30

2001

40

3

2004

4 4 26 13 8 10 6 22 27 30 8 21 21 19 18 20 2

1985

50

30

36

19

4 28 26

2003

Pro-whaling countries

2008

Anti-whaling countries

2007

60

5 4 40 40 7 32

2006

No voting rights/absentee countries

2005

70

22

2010

80

2009

90

63

to ensure a future where whaling can be reinstated, thus stabilising the whaling industry in the long term.2 From the perspective of its mission, the IWC has transformed quite a lot over time. The first change came in the 1970s, when the number of non-whaling members started to increase rapidly. There has been a suspicion on the Japanese side that, for example, the purpose of taking in landlocked countries was to manipulate the balance of votes in favour of anti-whaling efforts.3 As a result, the total moratorium on commercial whaling came into effect in 1982.

With the act of suspension, however, overall whaling was not banned, as the IWC planted a couple of loopholes that Japan tried to take advantage ofâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;most commonly by killing a limited number of whales for research purposes. But the international community levelled serious criticism towards this research-oriented whaling, because they were not going to accept Japan killing the whales and selling their meat even in cases when the research procedure did not require killing the animal. Moreover, even if the whale meat industry in Japan became a very small, niche market, IWC members and Sea Shepherd activists would accuse Japan of whaling only to keep this market alive, rather than purely for research. As a result, activist 2600

groups created a harsh international environment that forced top retailer Aeon to stop selling whale meat in 2003. About ten years later, the International Court of Justice in The Hague came out with the decision to prohibit Japan from whaling in the Antarctic, which became a cause for the e-commerce company Rakuten also to stop selling whale meat in order to avoid the eroding of its image.4 The decision to leave the organisation rested on multiple bases. Japan was not the first to leave, and, just as Iceland in 1993, the East Asian country had a good reason for taking this step. First and foremost, Japan criticised the IWC moratorium for being counterproductive, as it strayed from the original goal: to help the whale population to rebound in order to resume commercial whaling.5 Now that the endangered species had recovered in number, Japan wanted to reintroduce whaling in a careful and sustainable way. But the organisation had transformed from its original sentiment to a completely anti-whaling community of countries, pushing Japan to the periphery. The IWC argued that whaling should not contribute to industry, as the activity is a cruel and inhumane act against these animals.6 As one might suspect, hidden elements are also present in the equation. Japan argued multiple times that those couple thousand minke

WHALING IN JAPAN SINCE 1985

2400 Â

2200

Fin (Antarctic) Sei (North Pacific) Sperm (N. Pacific & Coastal) Brydes (N. Pacific & Coastal) Minke (Coastal) Minke (North Pacific) Minke (Antarctic)

2000 1800 # of Whales Taken

1600

Note: The whales caught in 1985, 1986, and just over half of 1987 (totalling 5,519 whales) were "under objection" of the IWC ban; the rest (16,323 whales) are under the "scientific permit" exception.

All numbers current through the end of the 2016/2017 season.

1400 1200 1000 800 600 400

Season (beginning in the second half of the year indicated)

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2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

0

1985

200

whales captured under the umbrella of scientific research were not enough to disturb the genetic diversity of the millions of minke whales. The same cannot be said about the Pacific bluefin tuna, which essentially replaced whale meat in Japanese diets after the moratorium was adopted.

Additionally, many anti-whaling countries are major tuna traders. To avoid sanctions on tuna fishing, Japan decided to leave the organisation.

Another pressure could have been the fact that, in 2018, the domestic whaling industry in Japan was completely on the brink of collapse. Whale meat consumption has massively decreased from 200,000 tons (1960) to 3,000-5,000 tons in the past couple of years.7 Additionally, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai both operate with a constituency where whaling is still a priority; therefore, it is plausible that such high-profile politicians might have inspired the decision.

So what are the consequences of the withdrawal? While critics fear that whaling in Japan can become unregulated and possibly damaging to the biodiversity of the oceans, the reality might be just the opposite. The IWC regulation permits research activity in the North Pacific and the Southern Ocean, which Japan has utilised immensely, so with the departure from the organisation, Japan’s scope of action is actually much more restricted spatially, which also allows the numbers in the above-mentioned waters to recuperate. Releasing the country from the moratorium means that Japanese fishers can now only operate in the country’s coastal waters and its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). And while the IWC has no authority over non-member countries, the Government of Japan promised to set a quota on whaling each year according to IWC standards to prevent any damage on genetic diversity.

Quitting the IWC might reinvigorate the whaling industry in Japan, but there is still a problem with the demand. Boosting whaling can create new jobs, but the equipment and the ships are very expensive, so if the demand for whale meat does not change, the industry will remain on the brink of collapse. And while

standing up against the IWC can strengthen the domestic support of PM Abe and SecretaryGeneral Nikai among the conservatives, the decision not to comply with an international framework can weaken Japan’s position when it wants to force other countries to do so.8 The Japanese might be able to enjoy some rare traditional dishes again, but the question is whether they want to, as rumours have been circling about whale meat being unsafe not only for pregnant women but for regular people too, due to its high levels of mercury.9 To build an industry against these obstacles might be futile—but the overall outcome will only be visible in the next decade.

ENDNOTES 1 Akane Okutsu: Why Japan risked condemnation to restart commercial whaling. Nikkei Asian Review. 19 February 2019. <https://s.nikkei.com/2T7JhyA > Accessed: 27 May 2019 2 History and Purpose. International Whaling Commission. <https://bit.ly/2JHJRPb > Accessed: 27 May 2019.

3 Russell Fielding: Japan’s Scientific Whaling Ruse Is Over.

Foreign Policy. 7 February 2019. <https://bit.ly/2E5tI1O > Accessed: 28 May 2019.

4 Japan’s Rakuten to halt whale meat sales after ruling. BBC. 4 April 2014. <https://bbc.in/2HEPnQm > Accessed: 28 May 2019.

5

Thisanka Siripala: Japan Loses Bid to Reinstate

Commercial Whaling. The Diplomat. 15 September 2018. <https://bit.ly/2VUJdiP > Accessed: 28 May 2019.

6 Dennis Normile: Why Japan’s exit from international whaling treaty may actually benefit whales. Science. 10 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2ADlcVG > Accessed: 28 May 2019.

7 Okutsu.

8 Okutsu.

9 Whale & dolphin meat tested in Japan exceeds mercury limits. Environmental Investigation Agency. 8 April 2015. <https://bit.ly/2YTf5X2 > Accessed: 29 May 2019.

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NUCLEAR REACTORS, ACCIDENTS, AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY: CHANGING DYNAMICS AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA CRISIS Masao Kikuchi

INTRODUCTION The Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011 had tremendous impact not only on Japanese society and its energy policies but also policy dynamics itself, i.e., how energy policies, including nuclear energy policies, are framed and formed. This article tries to elucidate the changing dynamic roles and functions of the judicial branch and local governments in nuclear energy policy in Japan.

It has been understood that nuclear energy policy in Japan has evolved with the industrial policies for economic growth. Before the Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011, neither the judicial branch, nor the local governments were regarded as influential or dynamic actors in the nuclear energy policy-making process. Many local and high courts avoided intervening in the nuclear policy by ruling that, as long as it was reasonable, the decision on the site and the operation of a nuclear power plant are within administrative discretion, and, thus, it does not fall under the jurisdiction of judicial intervention.

As a result, the judicial branch essentially supported the government policy in the litigation sued by civic groups. Many local governments in rural areas tried to attract nuclear power plant construction, as it also promised subsidies from the national government and solid tax bases with the construction, while creating jobs. Once the nuclear power plant reactor was constructed and started operating, the value of the facilities was impaired, and the property tax revenue began decreasing. Then, local governments asked power companies to construct one more reactor in order to maintain the revenues from 66

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the power plant. Local governments were seen as an agent of the national government and power companies’ policies.

After the Fukushima crisis, both the judicial branch and local governments became more independent and influential actors in the nuclear policy-making process. In 2014, the Kansai Electric Power Company’s (KEPCO) application to resume the operation of the two nuclear energy units of Ōi Nuclear Power Plant met with strong protests, and the Fukui local court granted an injunction against the operation in 2014. After the Fukushima crisis, consent by local mayors and governors became the de facto necessary condition to resume the operation of nuclear power plants in all of Japan. In the gubernatorial or mayoral elections of nuclear plant-sited local governments, candidates are pressured to express their stance on the nuclear power plants in a more explicit way than before. Anti-nuclear policy civic groups gradually changed their lobby focus to local elections as well.

How were the judicial branch and local governments involved? Or how did they contribute to the forming of the current state of nuclear energy development? What were the changes in the roles and functions of the judicial branch and local governments in the nuclear power policy-making process? Are they promoters, barriers, or gatekeepers during the procedure? To answer these questions, this article focuses on the changing role of the juridical branch and local governments in the nuclear energy policy-making process in Japan, especially before and after the Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011. By so doing, the article tries to understand the changing nature and dynamics

MAP OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN JAPAN BWR meaning Boiling Water Reactor, PWR meaning Pressurised Water Reactor

Nuclear Power Plant

Tomari Power Station

PWR (in operation) PWR (under construction) BWR (in operation)

Ohma Nuclear Power Station

Tsuruga Power Station

Fugen ATR (under decommissioning)

Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

Higashidoori Nuclear Power Station

Monju FBR (under construction) Mihama Power Station Ohi Power Station

Shimane Nuclear Power Station

Shika Nuclear Power Station

Onagawa Nuclear Power Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Takahama Power Station

Fukushima Daini Nuclear PowerStation Genkai Nuclear Power Station

Tōkai Power Station GCR (under decommissioning) Tōkai Daini Power Station

Ikata Power Station

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Units 1&2: Under decommissioning

Sendai Nuclear Power Station

of the nuclear power policy process in Japan.

The article first explains the basic and traditionally understood nuclear power policy structure and process in Japan. It then explores the changes in the roles of the judicial branch and local governments after the Fukushima nuclear crisis in 2011.

NUCLEAR POWER POLICY AND “NUCLEAR VILLAGE” By its very nature, a complex issue such as nuclear power, which can have a major impact on the population, creates a public policy challenge. Because the issue is scientific and

esoteric, general policy and specific critical decisions tend to be made by a closely knit network of a few professionals and technocrats.

Consequently, the resultant nuclear policy often adopts an exclusive, self-regulatory outlook, in which the very same persons who have formulated policies and programmes are also the ones responsible for their implementation, regulation, and supervision.1 These characteristics were also present in the situation in Japan: a closely knit, club-style group, dubbed the “Nuclear Village,” developed the nuclear policy of the country. This “village” is a policy-making unit comprising government IN-DEPTH

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officials, scientists, and—significantly—power company staff members. This lack of impartiality augmented by the rise of the closed system of making nuclear policy was one of the root causes of the debacle in Fukushima.

Japan has nine power companies which control the electricity supply market. They are monopoly corporations that have been historically well-protected by the central government. As of 2010, nuclear energy accounted for about 30% of the total power consumption in the country. These nine firms operated a total of 54 nuclear reactors, some of which were more than forty years old. In fact, the Fukushima Daiichi2 Power Plant came into operation as far back as 1971. Nonetheless, the firm applied for an extension of the use of the old Fukushima reactors for another forty years. The application was still pending when the disaster occurred in 2011.

Concerned Japanese have long claimed that both the central administration and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has been in power for most of the postwar era, have been too lenient and lax in managing the electric power firms. In fact, rather than enforcing stringent controls, the government helped these utility enterprises to facilitate the construction of nuclear power plants in different parts of the country. Not only the LDP but the government, later led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2009 to 2012, also had plans to increase nuclear power to more than 50% of Japan’s total energy consumption by 2030. To achieve this objective, central authorities hoped to construct nine new reactors by 2020, and additional five by 2030. As part of these programmes, the government enacted three different laws as early as in 1974, all intended to extend handsome subsidies to local governments willing to make spare land available for the power companies and nuclear reactors.

According to the model, any area in which a nuclear power plant is proposed receives a total of JPY 44,900 million (approximately USD 561 million) over ten years before the facility is completed. Once the reactor begins to function, the area gets an additional JPY 1,215 billion 68

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(approximately USD 1,518 million) over 45 years.

To execute the programme, more than 95% of the national finances for the country’s energy source development have been earmarked for the construction of atomic power plants.

The money previously designated for the nuclear energy expansion would also be utilised to appease rural towns and villages.3 Many rural regions with declining populations and industries have found these public handouts alluring and have actively sought to benefit from them. In some rural areas, a major portion of the local government budget comes from national grants. Residents in these areas are usually content with the government programme. Some of them could sell their property to a power facility for substantial profit, while people can also enjoy public facilities, such as luxurious swimming pools and athletic gymnasiums, in addition to centres for the elderly, all built by the local government with the money made available by the central subsidies and taxes paid by the power companies.

Rural regions with nuclear power reactors risk becoming “one-industry towns,” dependent on financial handouts from government and industry, and thus subservient to the will of the electricity supply companies. Often they face a dilemma: local taxes on the power plant gradually depreciate as the equipment ages, while the cost of running community facilities increases. The chief executive of the power plant in Futaba4 (Fukushima Prefecture) addressed this problem by pushing it into the future: he solicited the construction of additional plants from the government and the industry. As this example shows, the original acquisition of nuclear power plants can create a vicious circle: to sustain local finances, rural communities resort to asking for the construction of additional dangerous facilities.

Several political and administrative problems have also contributed to the present nuclear issues in Japan. One major concern has been a lack of oversight: the government appears to have been too lax in controlling the electric power industry monopoly. For many years, both the promotion and the regulatory agencies of

nuclear power policy were under the same ministry (and department), which shows the lack of impartiality of the regulatory agency. The practice stems from administrative traditions unique to Japan’s political environment. What might be considered a flagrant conflict of interests in other democracies is normal in Japan: there are cases when government bureaucrats retired from nuclear regulatory agencies became employed by the electric power companies right after they left office.5 In order to avoid public scrutiny and restrictive regulation, these officials would initially take a consulting job at an enterprise for a few years, but would soon move up the ladder to become one of the leading executives in the electric firm.6 Similarly, it was a long-standing custom that the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which is in power now, received political contributions from these power firms. Ostensibly, at least, the power firms no longer provide direct and open monetary contributions to the conservative party. However, these electric companies have numerous subsidiaries, and these subcontractors frequently form voter-mobilising machines for conservative candidates.

In fact, the Fukushima nuclear crisis helped to divulge several unsavoury aspects of Japanese politics.7 Cosy relationships between the national government and monopoly power companies were brought to light. According to media information, over the last fifty years, more than 68 high-ranking officials in the central government have taken executive positions in one of the nine major power companies after they retired from public service. As of 2011, 13 former high-ranking bureaucrats were members of the board of directors in power companies, strengthening the amakudari system. One member of the board of directors of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) was a former bureaucrat in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is the regulatory agency of the nuclear power industry.

The close rapport between public officials and the industry may also account for the lack of stringent regulation and supervision of the

power companies in the past. TEPCO’s reactors encountered a number of issues over the years prior to the catastrophe. The company concealed these accidents, often submitting false reports to the government about safety incidents in one of their plants for a long period.

These past incidents demonstrate a lack of governmental integrity and firmness vis-à-vis the leading power industries. Adding credence to the theory of a cosy government–industry relationship is the fact that, when the Fukushima disaster was first exposed, TEPCO staff members, rather than representatives from governmental regulatory agencies, held the first press interviews and provided information about the crisis. Naturally, the official company line downplayed the extent of the calamity, and initial reports avoided using the term “meltdown” in the media conference. It was not until a considerable time later that the firm publicly admitted that the meltdown of radioactive rods had occurred just a few hours after the tsunami had knocked out the Fukushima plant. During all this time, the central government, including the chief cabinet secretary from the DPJ (Yukio Edano), only echoed information issued by the power company. The regulatory agencies failed to collect vital data on the breakdown of the reactors in Fukushima independently.

NUCLEAR POWER POLICY AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH The first court case by a civic group against a nuclear power plant was launched in 1973, demanding the operation license for the Ikata 1 reactor in Shikoku island to be cancelled.

Since then, more than thirty cases have been brought before court by civic groups. However, many local and high courts avoided intervening with nuclear policy, as it was regarded as being within the “discretion” of the government.8 More recently, the judicial branch has become more directly involved with scientific and technological issues than nuclear promotion and safety policies.

There are two types of litigation that can arise in relation to nuclear power plants. The first type is to sue in administrative litigation, where IN-DEPTH

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the government is the defendant, and the petitioner demands that the approval for the plant construction and/or operation be annulled.

Before an action can be filed, challenging a construction or an operation license for the plant, a written objection must be lodged with the government agency which granted the license within sixty days of granting the license.

If the objection is dismissed, or if it is not responded to within three months, it is possible to proceed with court action. It is also possible to file a lawsuit, demanding that the operating licence be declared invalid without going through these procedures after the sixty-day period has lapsed, but, conventionally, filing such a lawsuit is more difficult when the licence has been granted, and the reactor is already in operation.

ISSUE OF STANDING In the administrative litigation regarding nuclear power plant construction or operation licence, not everyone can file a lawsuit.

Although many citizen groups filed a lawsuit for fear of health risks, in most cases, the court dismissed their claim before deliberation simply because of the lack of standing.

Although the Fukushima crisis and, in the past, Chernobyl proved that nuclear accidents cause widespread damage, courts granted a narrow application of the standing to those who were directly affected by the construction and operation of the plant. In the case of litigation challenging the government granting of construction licence, people, such as the property owner whose land was compulsorily acquired by eminent domain, was directly affected with the construction.

In the administrative litigation against the construction and operation of the Monju FBR (Fast Breeder Reactor), the local court first dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing in 1987. In the appeal trial in the high court, the court considering possible hazards granted standing only to those who lived within a radius of twenty kilometres from the plant. The trial was actually brought to the Supreme Court, but this is only allowed under 70

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certain circumstances: where there is a question regarding constitutionality where a particularly important law is involved, or where the decision goes against a Supreme Court precedent. In the Monju case, the Supreme Court expanded the group of plaintiffs with standing to those who lived within a sixty kilometres radius from the plant and remanded the case in 1992. In the remanded trail, the high court ruled that the safety studies of the history of earthquakes were flawed, and the reactor’s licence was void in 2003. Yet this order did not last for long. Two years later, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling, claiming that the court should impart the case to the government agency. Although the case itself was closed, this court decision explicitly extended the standing to those who lived within a radius of sixty kilometres from the plant in consideration of possible hazards. It used a strict and narrow interpretation of the standing and turned the claim away at the door. This shift of the decision on standing is indicative of the judicial branch’s changing stance towards nuclear power policies.

DISCRETION ON TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE AND BURDEN OF PROOF A basic rationale based on which the court has almost always supported the government’s nuclear policy is the discretion on technological expertise and the burden of proof. In the administrative litigation challenging the government’s granting a licence and the approval of the nuclear power plant and its operation, the court and judges in charge actually do not deliberate or consider the safeness of the nuclear power plant. What the court is considering is the reasonableness of the government decision on granting the license.

As a nuclear power plant is built based on a highly complicated architecture of advanced technologies, the judges who were trained not as experts on nuclear sciences—and thus are “amateurs”—only consider whether there are clear and distinct defects in the government’ standard, examination, and approval of the application by the power companies. In other words, there is a huge discretion on the

definition, measurement, and establishment of the safeness of the plant in technological experts. So the judicial review is applied only to the administrative disposition on the basic safety design of the nuclear power plant.9 Due to its highly complicated technological nature, in the litigation regarding nuclear power plant licencing and operation both in administrative and civil litigations, courts essentially laid the burden of evidence of the given fact on the defendant, not the plaintiff who are non-specialist. So both the government and the power company try to prove that the safety standards, measurements, and examinations are all reasonable, and the establishment of the safety measures by

the company reasonably met the standards set by the government.

However, as there is a huge information gap among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the judges, amateurs, and experts, it is not fair or sufficient for the burden of evidence to meet the requirements, creating an unreasonable situation for the defendant. In 2006, the Kanazawa local court granted the injunction, and the plaintiff won the litigation. In its ruling, the court placed the burden of evidence that the possible accident that the plaintiff claimed had not reasonably happened on the defendant, instead of the burden of evidence that the construction met all the requirements and its standards are reasonable. This change in the

ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION CASE

LOCAL COURT

HIGH COURT

SUPREME COURT

Igata No. 1 reactor

Matsuyama, 1978

Takamatsu, 1984

1992 (defeated)

Tōkai No. 2 reactor

Mito, 1985

Tōkyō, 2001

2004 (defeated)

Fukushima Daini No. 1 Reactor

Fukushima, 1984

Sendai, 1990

1992 (defeated)

Igata No. 2 reactor

Matsuyama, 2000 (dismissed)

Monju

Fukui 1987

Nagoya, 1989

1992 (expansion of standing and remanded)

Monju (restart)

Fukui, 2000

Nagoya, 2003 (won and license void)

2005 (defeated)

Tomari No. 1 and 2 reactors

Sapporo, 1999 (dismissed)

Ōma Plant

Hakodate City Government sued the national government in 2014 (in progress)

CIVIL LITIGATION CASE

LOCAL COURT

HIGH COURT

SUPREME COURT

Onagawa No. 1 and 2 reactor

Sendai, 1994

Sendai, 1999

2000 (defeated)

Shiga No. 1 reactor

Kanazawa, 1994

Nagoya, 1998

2000 (defeated)

Takahama No. 2 reactor

Ōsaka, 1993 (dismissed)

Shiga No. 2 reactor

Kanazawa, 2006 (won and injunction)

Nagoya, 2009

2009 (defeated)

Takahama No. 3 and 2 reactor (resume operation)

Fukui, 2015 (won and Injunction) Otsu, 2016 (won and Injunction)

Ōsaka, 2017 (defeated)

in progress

Ōma Plant

Hakodate City Government sued the power company in 2014 (in progress)

Table 1: Major litigation cases (both administrative and civic litigations) regarding nuclear power plants in Japan IN-DEPTH

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MIYAGI

Prefecture

ONAGAWA

Earthquake 11 March 2011 14:46 (JST) 9.0 Magnitude

FUKUSHIMA I – Daiichi FUKUSHIMA II – Daini

TŌKAI

TŌKIŌ

J A PA N

PACIFIC OCEAN

LEGEND Earthquake epicenter Damaged nuclear power plant Radioactive contamination

A map showing the epicentre of the 2011 earthquake and the position of nuclear power plants

burden of evidence about the safeness of the power plant in the ruling had a significant impact on the basic rule of the nuclear power plant litigation. Nonetheless, this local court opinion did not last long. After the power company made an appeal to the court, the high court deemed the reactor safe in 2009. The Supreme Court dismissed the claim of the plaintiff in 2010.

In 2014, another local court (the Fukui local court) granted the injunction of the operation of the Ōma Nuclear Power Plant, and, eventually, the power company stopped commercial operation.

In 2017, the Hiroshima High Court ordered the suspension of the Igata Nuclear Power Plant’s operation. The court questioned a decision by the Nuclear Regulation Authority that potential 72

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risks associated with volcanic eruptions would not breach the stricter regulations introduced following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis.

These cases indicate the gradually changing nature of judicial involvement in the safety issues of nuclear power plants. Courts are becoming more actively involved in safety issues, especially with injunction or suspension, asking both the government (the ministry and the independent regulatory authority) and the power companies to reconsider possible safety concerns. Notably, the Hiroshima High Court decision to suspend the Igata plant was for a limited (nine-month) period. This limited-time suspension would have a nuanced message questioning both the electric company and the government whether

their estimates of the potential size of possible earthquakes were reasonable, and if the safety screening conducted under stricter regulations set after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster was credible.

To avoid judicial intervention in the government decision on the safety of nuclear power plants, the court thus avoided judicial intervention in the nuclear policy itself even after the Fukushima crisis. So the court has been reluctant to make any judgement on highly political matters, such as nuclear policy and national security policy, and, consequently, whether the government employs a pro-nuclear policy or not is purely up to the decision of the policymakers.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE NUCLEAR POWER POLICY-MAKING PROCESS Japan’s nuclear power policies began after Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Three years later, the government allocated the first expenditure for nuclear energy development. One year later, in 1955, the government enacted the Basic Law of Atomic Energy Development and formed the Nuclear Committee and the Nuclear Bureau within the prime minister’s office. While nuclear power policies have evolved at the central governmental level, the question of where to place a nuclear power plant is a different matter and resulted in harsh debate.

To promote the establishment of an actual power plant, three power source development laws were enacted in 1974, creating a sophisticated system of government subsidies.

The three laws are comprised of the Power Source Development Tax Law, the Power Plant Facilities Community Development Law, and the Power Source Development Special Account Law. The laws required all Japanese power consumers to pay, as part of their utility bills, a tax that was funnelled to communities with nuclear plants. Practically, there is a huge demand for power supply in urban areas, and power plants, run on either nuclear, hydrogen, or thermal power, tend to be located in rural areas. These laws aimed to collect money from consumers in urban areas and return it to the

rural communities that accepted power plants as kind of a “compensation” or “inconvenience fee.” This money was used to promote the locality’s acceptance of a nuclear plant.

For instance, more than 25% of the financial revenue of Futaba, a small rural town which housed the Fukushima nuclear power plant, came from different taxes paid by the company.

On Futaba’s main road, there used to be a huge signboard that read “Nuclear Power: the Energy for a Bright Future.” This slogan was removed after the Fukushima crisis. After the nuclear crisis, almost the whole town area was designated as a restricted area, and its entire population, including the town office, was relocated. This is the high price they had to pay for having ten reactors in their town.

As a result of local governments attracting nuclear power plant constructions with their handsome subsidies, a total of 54 reactors were located in the entirety of Japan before 2011.

The number of municipalities housing nuclear power plant reactors is 23. Out of these, 18 municipalities have town or village status, which indicates a small rural community.

However, this political landscape has been gradually changing among local governments since the 1990s, as they explicitly dispute the central government’s nuclear power policies.

One example is Maki, a small municipality in Niigata Prefecture. In Maki, a nuclear power plant construction plan was proposed by the power company in 1982. Part of the proposed site had already been bought by the power company through a front company (a real estate agent) as a future amusement park site. In 1996, a town mayor was elected with support from civic groups opposing the plan. Later that year, a local referendum was held to decide whether to accept the power plant in Maki. The turnout rate was more than 88%, and 61.22% of the voters voted No, while 38.78% voted Yes (the rest of the votes were invalid). After the referendum, the power company officially withdrew the application, and the plan was halted.

Another example worth mentioning is the case of Hakodate regarding the Ōma Nuclear Power Plant’s construction. In 2014, Hakodate’s IN-DEPTH

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city government in Hokkaidō Prefecture brought a lawsuit in order to halt the construction of a nuclear power plant on the other side of the Tsugaru Strait. The mayor of Hakodate sued both the national government in an administrative litigation to nullify the decision and the power company in a civil litigation for enjoining the construction, asserting that an accident there would bring catastrophe to neighbouring municipalities. Until now, no municipality in Japan has ever taken legal action to stop a nuclear power plant from being built.

The construction of the Ōma plant started in 2008, but it was suspended after the Fukushima crisis in 2011. The construction resumed in 2012, just one year after the Fukushima crisis.

The plaintiff argued that Hakodate and other municipalities within a thirty-kilometre radius of the plant should be given the right to consent to the construction. However, the central government, the representatives of which were also present in court, argued that Hakodate is not qualified to request the suspension of construction, referring to past precedents for building nuclear power plants and laws for regulating them. Meanwhile, the power company submitted a report contending that the proposed risks regarding the facility are indeterminable because the power plant is still under construction. Therefore, it said, the litigation has no legal merit and the company asked the court to dismiss the case.

The litigation is still in progress at the local court level, and there is no projection as to how the lawsuit would develop at this moment.

However, this lawsuit is indicative of the changing political landscape of Japanese nuclear power policy, especially in relation to the local government. In fact, consent to the construction by the host municipality and prefecture is not required by law; it is only based on the civil affairs agreement between the power company and the host local government. In the Fukushima nuclear crisis, the government ordered the evacuation from the area within a twenty-kilometre radius of the Fukushima No. 1 plant, and most of this area is still designated as “difficult to return zone.” After the Fukushima 74

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crisis, nuclear power plants in Japan had additional natural disaster measures and prepared to resume operation. Most mayors of the municipalities located within a thirtykilometre radius of the plant argued that local consent is a necessary condition. In Niigata Prefecture, there is a total of seven reactors waiting to resume commercial operation.

A gubernatorial election in Niigata was held in 2016 and 2018, and the candidate who explicitly refused to consent and opposed resuming operation in the nuclear power plant won the election by a margin of 6.3% against the runner-up who promoted restarting the plant in 2016. In the 2018 election, after the governor who had won in 2016 resigned because of a sex scandal, the candidate who kept a cautious stance on resuming the operation of the plant and was supported by the LDP won the race by 3.4%. Besides the Maki, Hakodate, and Niigata cases, after the Fukushima crisis, candidates are pressured to express their stances on the nuclear power plant in the local gubernatorial and mayoral elections in nuclear hosting communities or within the thirty-kilometre radius of the plant.

THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICY, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS This article has so far tried to elucidate the roles and functions of the judicial branch and local governments in nuclear energy policy in Japan, both of which were not regarded as influential actors and thus were overlooked in previous studies. They were not regarded as independent and active actors in the nuclear policy-making process, especially before 2011. It is partially true that although hundreds of litigations were made to challenge the government and power companies by civic groups, the Supreme Court never issued any ruling against either the government or any power company.

In retrospect, this decision was pivotal in the development of Japan’s nuclear energy programme. Especially in administrative litigation challenging the government decision on the approval of the construction and operation of

Anti-nuclear occupy tent pitched near the National Diet Building in Nagata-chĹ? in 2015

the power plant courts essentially slammed the doors shut to the plaintiff due to lack of standing, and even when the court had granted the standing, they tried to avoid judicial intervention by leaving the deliberation of the safety standard and measures to the experts.

Nonetheless, after 2011, a local court granted the injunction to resume the commercial operation with careful deliberation of the safety standards and measures. The courtsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; stance toward government nuclear policy has not fully changed yet; however, there has been a subtle but important change in the manner of the courts.10 Meanwhile, the change of the stance and role of local governments in nuclear policy-making appears more dynamic. Local communities in rural areas were promoters of the nuclear power plant construction and operation, thanks to the national government subsidies and the economic contribution by power companies.

Once the community had accepted the site of the plant, its construction and later operation promised a seemingly everlasting economic and social development for poor rural communities.

But the Fukushima crisis revealed that having nuclear reactors can have a high price that hosting communities have to pay.11 Many local governments within twenty or thirty kilometres of the nuclear power plant now argued that such developments need consent not only from the hosting local government but also from neighbouring communities. There has emerged a new strategy of anti-nuclear civic groups forming alliances with elected mayors and local council members regardless of their party sympathies.

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in Fukushima in 2011. Many commentators noted that the root cause of the invariance of its basic policy lies in the rigid “nuclear village” relation. Most of the existing scholarship focuses on the relation between power business and politics. Nonetheless, as it has been discussed in this paper, the role of the judicial branch and local governments should not be overlooked, as both are becoming more influential actors.

This change in the roles of the judicial branch and local governments has impacted the strategies of both pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear civic groups. Their campaigning and lobbying strategies used to mainly concentrate on the central politics both in the Diet and central agencies, but, more recently, campaigning and lobbying efforts have focused more on litigations and on local elections. This indicates that a new political channel is gradually forming, aiming to exert influence under the still-rigid triad of politics, government, and industry in the nuclear policy-making process in Japan.

Focusing on these actors would contribute to a better understanding of the changing nature of nuclear power policies in Japan and other countries.

ENDNOTES 1 Akira Nakamura – Masao Kikuchi: What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet Learned: Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan. Public Administration Review. 2011/ November–December. 893–899.

2 Daiichi means No. 1.

3 Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. (2009). Dengen Ritsuchi Seido no Gaiyō [An Outline of Land Acquisition for Energy Development]. Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade, Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. < https://bit.ly/2XFlLb1> Accessed: 11 June 2019 4 Futaba is one of the towns that were evacuated completely after the Fukushima Daiichi Disaster.—Ed. 5 This is a common practice in Japan dubbed amakudari (天下り・descent from heaven): bureaucrats upon retirement are rewarded with executive or other high positions in corporations related to their active-years job. The system 76

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has been contested against many times during the Heisei Era, for it poses conflict of interest during the pre-retirement years, and it is often related to corruption.—Ed. 6

Richard A Colingnon – Chikako Usui: Amakudari. The

Hidden Fabric of Japanese Economy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2003.

7 Richard J. Samuels: The Business of the Japanese State.

Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective.

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987.

8 J. Mark Ramseyer: Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan. Theoretical Inquiries in Law. 2012/July. 457–485.

9 Shindō Muneyuki: Shihō yo! Omae ni mo tsumi ga aru.

Genpatsu soshō to kanryō saibankan. Kodansha, Tōkyō, 2012.

10 Daniel P. Aldrich – Timothy Fraser: All Politics is Local: Judicial and Electoral Institutions’ Role in Japan’s Nuclear Restarts. Pacific Affairs. 2017/September. 433–457.

11 Jose A. Puppim de Oliveira – Urbano Fra. Paleo: Lost in participation: How local knowledge was overlooked in land use planning and risk governance in Tōhoku, Japan. Land Use Policy. 2016/March. 543–551.

RETHINKING DEFENCE—SHIFTING CAPABILITIES AND FOCUS POINTS OF THE JSDF Péter Dobrowiecki

WINDS OF CHANGE In accordance with the country’s new military guidelines, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (自衛隊・Jieitai or JSDF) undergo a series of changes that—together with the new air, naval, and army acquisition programmes—will result in the creation of a more mobile and deployable military force. Mobility and the availability of adequate tools at hand are of key importance to the JSDF, as its main focus is now on China and its rapidly growing modern naval and air arsenal.1 For many decades following the end of World War II, Japanese forces were trained, equipped, and prepared to fend off, in close cooperation with US forces, a possible Soviet military invasion against the country’s main islands. This priority, in accordance with the baselines of Japan’s pacifist 1947 constitution and the re-establishment of the country’s military forces in 1954, meant that the JSDF was gradually becoming a well-armed force equipped with weapon systems that aimed to primarily discourage possible adversaries from an attack or, in the worst case, prove to be suitable to defend the country, and chiefly the northern island of Hokkaidō, from invading forces. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to the disappearance of a traditional military threat by the mid-1990s. This void was steadily filled by an assertive China, an unpredictable North Korea, and a growing Russian Pacific military presence.2 The renewed emergence of Chinese territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, combined with the creation of a potent Chinese surface fleet that, by the end of the upcoming decade, might have as much as half a dozen aircraft carriers at its disposal, means that the JSDF has to readjust

its capabilities if it wants to guarantee Japan’s territorial integrity—including that of the disputed Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture (controlled by Japan but claimed by the People’s Republic of China, where they are known as the Diaoyu Islands).3 Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines, published annually since 2004, highlight this shift. During the last one and half decades, Japan has initiated the acquisition of military assets that have not only cemented the JSDF’s place in the top ten strongest armed forces in the world, but also enabled a much more flexible response to a variety of future security threats.4 These include the purchase of fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft, the commissioning of major naval assets, and the modernisation/reorganisation of the army.

NEW ACQUISITIONS Currently, there are several projects underway to continuously modernise the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) aircraft fleet.

Japan announced its intent to purchase 42 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter aircraft from the US in 2011, with 38 of them being assembled locally

by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. In December last year, the JSDF opted for the additional procurement of 105 aircraft—63 of the conventional take-off and landing F-35A variant and 42 of the STOVL (short take-off and vertical-landing) F-35B variant. Deliveries are in progress and, as of May 2019, 12 F-35s have been accepted into service with one lost in an accident this April. Moreover, Japan and the US agreed on the sale of further airborne early warning and control (AEW) E-2D “Hawkeye” planes, augmenting the already-existing fleet of 13 aircraft (the total number will reach 26 planes). The JASDF’s heavy-lift capability will IN-DEPTH

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The Type 16 MCV and …

also significantly increase in the upcoming years with the gradual build-up of its locally assembled Kawasaki C-2 heavy transport fleet; three of the airplanes are already in service, with a further 17 on order.

In 2009, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) commissioned the first of two Hyūga-class helicopter destroyers (helicopter carriers), that became the largest ships built for the Japanese navy since the end of World War II. These were followed by the even larger ships of the Izumo-class (Izumo and Kaga, commissioned in 2015 and 2017 respectively).

Although, officially, the ships are referred to as littoral escort ships/destroyers by the JMSDF, their characteristics, capabilities, and size are similar to ASW carriers (anti-submarine warfare carriers). While the Japanese officials maintain that the four ships’ primary role is to defend Japanese territorial waters and assist in humanitarian/disaster relief missions, the abilities of the carriers, especially those of the Izumo class, allow their participation in a much wider variety of missions. Last December, the Japanese government approved the conversion 78

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… Type 10 MBT, symbols of more mobile land platforms

of the Izumo-class warships into aircraft carriers capable of operating the F-35B, while redesignating the Izumo-class ships to multipurpose operation destroyers.5 The new ASW carrier force is not the only sign of Japan’s increasing naval potential. The JMSDF’s advanced submarine force is also steadily growing. Its most recent unit, JS Ōryū, the Force’s first submarine powered by lithium-ion batteries, was launched in October 2018.6 Similarly, the 2018 establishment of Japan’s first

marine unit since the end of the war, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, also signals that Tōkyō aims to create a mixed force that is capable of conducting fast amphibious landings in order to retake territories occupied by adversaries—should the need arise.

Parallel to the amphibious brigade, the SDF initiated the formation of new units called rapid deployment regiments (RDRs) within the structure of the Japan Ground Defense Forces (JGSDF). These units aim to exploit the additional mobility of new vehicles that were already designed in accordance with Japan’s new military strategic priorities in mind. The domestically developed new 8×8-wheeled Type 16 mobile combat vehicle (MCV) and the Type 10 “Hitomaru” main battle tank (MBT) are prime examples of this, as both symbolise the shift within the JGSDF from a massive but sluggish MBT and artillery force to a smaller but more mobile force.7 A change that saw the reduction of heavy armour and howitzers in the force from 700 and 600 to 300-300 MBTs and howitzers respectively. Due to its weight, the Type 10’s predecessor, the Type 90 MBT, was deployed only in Hokkaidō, as a large number of roads and bridges were impassable for it. In contrast, the highly automated Type 10 is operated by a three-person crew, and its reduced weight— with a mass of 44 tonnes, it is much lighter than contemporary MBTs—allows it to pass 84% of Japan’s bridges, making its nationwide deployment far easier.

Over the last decade, the JSDF has witnessed a gradual shift in the priorities that were originally set out for it during the rearmament of Japan at the height of the Cold War. The rapidly changing security environment in the East Asian region led to the rethinking of Japanese military procurement and modernisation priorities. The exact future specifics of the Japanese defence capacity enhancement remain to be seen; however, it is already clear that with its boosted naval capabilities, integrated rapid reaction and maritime expeditionary forces, and downgraded heavy army equipment the JSDF is becoming a much more flexible military than it had been in the past 65 years of its existence.

ENDNOTES 1 National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation). Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 17 December 2013. <https://bit.ly/2DSDdB3 > Accessed: 20 April 2019.

2

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and

Beyond

(Provisional

Translation).

Ministry

of

Defense.

18 December 2018. 5–6. <https://bit.ly/2J2T4Bi > Accessed: 16 April 2019.

3 Kyle Mizokami: Get Ready, U.S. Navy: China Might Soon Be An Aircraft Carrier ‘Superpower’. The National Interest.

22 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/2VLovpE > Acessed: 25 April 2019.

4

Japan

Military

Strength.

Global

Firepower.

<https://bit.ly/2YOAn8U > Acessed: 16 April 2019.

5 David Axe: Japan’s Naval Future: ‘New’ Aircraft Carriers Armed with F-35s. The National Interest. 2 December 2018. <https://bit.ly/2J2zDso > Acessed: 17 April 2019.

6 Ankit Panda: Japan Launches First Lithium-Ion Equipped Soryu-class Submarine. The Diplomat. 5 October 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Y8zveg > Accessed: 17 April 2019.

7

Kelvin Wong: Rising sons: Japanese ground forces

transformation continues apace. Jane’s International Defence Review. 2019/February. 40–45.

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JAPAN AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE Fülöp Kovách

There are few periods in global economic history as exciting as that of the Japanese economic miracle spanning from the 1950s to the 1990s, through which the island nation was able to catch up to the United States in terms of per capita income—and, for a short period, even overtake the Western giant. In the most dynamic decade of the miracle, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, rates of growth often exceeded 10%. In the meantime, Japanese industry kept climbing to higher levels, with more added value. In the 1950s, light industry still dominated the domestic economy, while Japanese companies were making inroads into machinery. The story of how the Japanese automotive industry conquered the world is well known, just like how Japanese firms took a leading role in the 1980s in entertainment electronics. This study offers a current interpretation of the Japanese economic miracle—that of the model of developmental state—and its continuing significance.

The concept of the developmental state was propelled to world fame by Chalmers Johnson in his 1982 book MITI and the Japanese Miracle.1 In Johnson’s view, Japan implemented an economic strategy that consisted of import replacement and was export-driven at the same time. Tools of import replacement included protective tariffs, limitations on capital import, and domestic capital creation. This latter could be realised through high savings and investment rates. The typical failure of countries experimenting with import replacement was averted via export orientation. An important element of this strategy was an undervalued currency, which helped Japanese exporters on the world market. According to Johnson’s central thesis, the bureaucracy designated preferential branches of industry and thus essentially laid down the trajectory of development.

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The goal was the creation of internationally competitive, high-added value branches. The Japanese state consciously steered capital and labour to more developed industries while, at the same time, cutting back on less developed sectors. This planning activity was done at the MITI—the Ministry for International Trade and Industry— after which the book itself was named. Continuous incentives for the designated direction of development was secured by cheap loans provided by the Ministry of Finance, which, in turn, were realisable because of the high rate of savings. An integral part of this plan was the conscious development of human capital, high-quality education, and the creation and support for leading universities. Furthermore, retraining programmes played a key role and became indispensable for supplying the rapidly transforming and developing industrial structure. Johnson called this the “plan rational state.”

This model was also adopted in certain ways by Korea, Taiwan, and various Southeast Asian states. This process has been described as the flying geese paradigm. 2 It is less known, however, that the roots of these successful postwar institutions reach back to prewar times. 3 A most emblematic institutional example of this is the MIC— Ministry of Commerce and Industry—which played a role very similar to that of the MITI before World War II. The Japanese company structure would lived on, and prewar industrial giants, the zaibatsu, continued to operate under the name keiretsu.

CRITICISM OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE The model set up by Chalmers Johnson was, of course, widely criticised. According to critics, the Japanese economic miracle was

not a result of the work of an influential and overblown bureaucracy; it rather happened despite it. In stronger words, the bureaucracy could not spoil the economic miracle. 4 No one denies the role of the state in creating human capital, but supporting export is a more debated issue. Cheap loans (cheap capital) and the undervalued yen helped international competitiveness and exports; however, the critics have rejected export orientation as a whole. In their argument, the overwhelming support for exports put the country on an unbalanced growth trajectory.

This trajectory led to abnormalities in the market structure, the price of which needed to be paid by domestic consumers, since the domestic market environment is shaped primarily by domestic demand, not export markets. Critics also point to the fact that state planning and export-oriented strategies were, first and foremost, aimed at industrialisation, which—an unfortunately well-known fact in Hungary—does not necessarily equal economic development.

These criticisms are not necessarily debated by the proponents of the developmental state, as they believe the key to success is to deviate from a balanced growth trajectory. Neither do they deny that the cost should in the short term be borne by Japanese consumers, but they also think that, in the long run, this deviation results in an economic miracle that is ultimately worth for everyone. It is similar to the high rate of savings that means less consumption in the short term, but, through higher investment rates, it still leads to economic progress and well-being. The sharpest disagreement is about the role of state planning, industry politics, and preferential branches of industry. Such a degree of state planning does not easily fit into market-oriented thinking, and, thus, criticis focus on individual cases when state planning culminates in a spectacular failure. Planning is, on the other hand, an integral part of Johnson’s model, its implementation, and also the flying geese paradigm. Critics of the model cite economic failures and anomalies of recent decades and trace them back to imbalanced

export-oriented growth. This is often admitted by proponents of the model, but they also raise the question of whether the economic miracle would have still taken place without those policies. Others sharply reject those criticisms and consider the relative failure of recent decades a result of giving in to outside pressure and giving up protectionist policies.

If it is not for the wisdom of bureaucracy, then the question emerges: What alternative interpretations explain the economic miracle?

One of the most obvious explanations is that it does not really need an explanation beyond a stable domestic situation and a favourable geopolitical environment—that is to say, it was not achieving the economic miracle that took considerable effort, but ruining it. Beyond this sort of minimalist interpretation, some also attach importance to the rule of law, the solidified system of ownership, and the high degree of economic freedom. This approach fits well into the institutional economic paradigm, which is very popular today, and according to which the key to economic success is primarily vested in inclusive institutions.5 THE DEBATE IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT This gap between the two interpretations is hardly surprising. Similar debates are brewing in Western countries in the fields of economics and economic policy. To judge the distance between the two viewpoints, first we have to examine the historical context. After the cessation of hostilities in 1945, the conviction that states should take up a bigger role in the economy prevailed in almost all corners of the globe. As a result, state-managed redistribution expanded, mixed economies emerged, and all states started to interfere in economic planning and development to some degree. In this period, the case of Japan was by no means special. There were, of course, differences from Western European models: the Japanese state played an even larger role in setting directions for economic development, while it lagged significantly behind in terms of redistribution rate and constructing social institutions. It is well-known IN-DEPTH

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that, in the wake of the Oil Crisis of 1973, there was a newer wave of liberal, marketoriented economic theories which questioned the previously paramount role of the state.

These ideas increasingly gained currency in economic policy as well during the 1980s.

It was in this context that the work of Johnson was published in 1982, broadly popularising the ideas of its author. The success of the book cannot be explained without knowing the special environment of the 1980s, during which the prospect of Japan’s becoming an (economic) superpower was a defining trait in American public thinking and popular culture. 6 Dethroning the United States was no longer unthinkable, and the vision of a skyrocketing Japan following an unstoppable masterplan hammered out by cold, calculating bureaucrats fit perfectly into this picture. It was not independent of this fear that Japan was forced to give up some of its protectionist policies. One of the most spectacular examples of this was the Plaza Accord of 1985, which essentially put an end to Japan’s policy of undervaluing its currency. Liberal economic policy viewpoints were not absent in Japan either. In fact, it was exacerbated by the 1991 economic crash: since then, from time to time, Japan has tried to reignite its economy by experimenting with liberal reforms. Step by step, Japan has demolished the institutions of the developmental state, and, in a symbolic move, the reorganisation even caught up to the (in)famous MITI in 2001. 7 Due to the shift in economic policy in the 1980s, academic thinking about the development of underdeveloped regions has changed as well. In the postwar period, there was no question that the state should play a key role in modernising the economy in the developing world as well. This view had by then been fatally eroded by the failing state-run modernisation attempts in Africa and Latin America. This was the time when earlier development concepts were replaced with the Washington Consensus. According to the zeitgeist of the 1980s, the Washington 82

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Consensus urged the liberalisation of markets and the rapid implementation of liberal reforms in developing countries. This wave of economic thinking did not spare Hungary either—although this new approach failed to deliver the desired modernisation and economic catch-up here, too. All this placed the Japanese model in the centre of attention. The most relevant part was not necessarily Japan itself—since the country had secured its place in the club of advanced countries well before World War II—but those East Asian states which had admittedly followed the Japanese path and notched up spectacular successes with a prospect of a full-fledged catch-up with the advanced world. Furthermore, the “Japanese way” has become a common reference for anyone—but mostly left-leaning academics—who were critical of mainstream liberal economics in the debates about the role of the state in the economy.

CONCLUSION Examining the role of the state in the Japanese economy is always a contentious endeavor in economics: classic market vs state viewpoints create recognisable frontlines—unfortunately because argumentation often gives way to a “theological debate.” I think no one can seriously debate the role of the state in postwar economic miracles—be it Japan or Western European countries. This, however, does not mean that we should not have a fair share of market logic or that we should accept the disastrous historical experiences of bureaucratic centralisation and central planning. It should rather be kept in mind what almost all economically successful countries have in common: an established system of ownership, the rule of law, and a high degree of entrepreneurial freedom. The fact that in Japan and other East Asian countries the state played a huge role, unparalleled in Western Europe, requires explanations beyond economics.

The enumeration of these explanations truly reaches beyond the scope of this study, but, at least, we have to mention collectivist social values emanating from classic Confucianism and the historical tradition of the meritocratic training and selection of the bureaucratic class.

High savings are also characteristic of East Asia, and they also trace back to these traditional values. This attribute clearly played a major part in the success of the Japanese way. The above features, however, clearly call into question the universality and adaptability of such a model.

The development of Japan and other East Asian countries should not be examined in the classic Western dichotomy of “state vs market,” since alongside a powerful central state, these economies are extremely free in terms of labour rights. The rate of state-managed redistribution is also significantly lower than in Western countries. Singapore, with its barely 10% of redistribution rate, is a case in point.

A superficial observer may take it as a prime example of the night-watchman state of the 19th century—this is the reason why libertarians often take these countries as model states. The State of Singapore, however, in large part following the Japanese example, is much more conscious in interfering with economic development than any Western country.

The Japanese economic miracle and the developmental state model of Japan remain the most important reference points in the debates about economic development. As everyone is interested in how to develop their economy, the case study of Japan is essential and widely studied. On the other hand, Japanese and East Asian traits of the Japanese model need to be kept in mind as a caveat against overenthusiasm as to its adaptability in another country with a different cultural background.

4 Benjamin Powell: State Development Planning: Did it Create an East Asian Miracle? The Review of Austrian Economics.

2005/3–4. 305–323.

5

Daron Acemoğlu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations

Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. Crown Publishers, New York, 2012.

6 Read more about this period in Zsolt Pálmai: American Perceptions of Japan at the Dawn of the Heisei Era. 7 Bai Gao: Japan’s economic dilemma. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

ENDNOTES 1 Chalmers Johnson: MITI and the Japanese Miracle. The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1982.

2 Shigehisa Kasahara: The Asian Developmental State and the Flying Geese Paradigm. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Discussion Papers. 2013/213.

3 Bai Gao: Economic ideology and Japanese industrial policy.

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.

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4

ECONOMY

JAPAN’S STRUGGLE FOR A STABLE ECONOMIC RECOVERY AFTER THE BUBBLE BURST Kumiko Okazaki

INTRODUCTION On 1 April 2019, the Japanese government announced the Cabinet decision to change the name of the imperial era from Heisei to Reiwa.

On 1 May 2019, His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince acceded to the Imperial throne, and the new era’s name has been used from that day forward. Since this special occasion, many of my fellow Japanese have looked back on the Heisei Era, which started on 8 January 1989, with a variety of memories from our own experiences.

From an economic perspective, Japan’s Heisei Era can be roughly divided into three parts: (1) the final expansion and hard collapse of the asset bubble, followed by initial reactions by the government, banks, and enterprises, among others (1989–1997); (2) the domestic and global financial crisis and serious deflation (1998–2012); (3) the implementation of Abenomics (Prime Minister Abe’s economic policy), followed by a gradual recovery (2013–2019).

After more than a decade’s struggle with deflation, the Cabinet Office of Japan has regarded the Japanese economy as being on the road to recovery since December 2012, and in its assessment the recent economic conditions help that gradual recovery. However, with the lower than expected inflation rate, the movement is not as strong as the government and the Bank of Japan (BOJ, the central bank) originally expected (Figure 1).

By contrast, Japan’s huge government debt continues to increase. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the unparalleled government-debt-to-nominal-GDP ratio will be 237% by the end of 2020; much higher than in other advanced economies, and about sixty percentage points higher than Japan’s ratio at the end of 2007. In the super-aged society, peoples’ concern about fiscal sustainability continues to grow, which seriously restrains private consumption.

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ASSET PRICE BUBBLE IN THE LATE 1980S At the end of the Shōwa Era,1 in the latter half of the 1980s, stock and property prices rose at an unusually high speed (Figure 2). The Nikkei 225 Index, one of the representative price indexes in the Tokyo Stock Exchange, rose by over 350% in five years, from 11,542.60 at the end of 1984 to 39,915.87 at the end of 1989.

Property prices in Tōkyō’s commercial area quadrupled in the six years between 1984 and 1990. Although the rise in property prices in local areas was slower, and the extent of the increase was not as large, it was a very rare phenomenon that most property prices across Japan rose simultaneously.

When the Heisei Era started, the stock and property markets were still under some kind of euphoria. Most Japanese were not convinced that the unprecedented asset price increase was rational. However, at the same time, they found many reasons and ways to rationalise the situation, which delayed policy reaction to the overinvestment in asset markets and facilitated the enormous growth in the asset price bubble.

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Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka illustrate the factors behind the emergence and expansion of the bubble, such as aggressive behaviour of financial institutions, progress of financial deregulation, inadequate risk management on the part of financial institutions, introduction of the capital accord (Basel Accord), protracted monetary easing, taxation and regulations biased toward accelerating the rise in property prices, overconfidence and euphoria, the overconcentration of the economic function on Tōkyō, and the expectation that Tōkyō’s financial market would become an international financial centre, among others.2 They conclude that no single factor was responsible for generating the bubble and that, when several initial factors changed, certain other factors amplified these changes, leading to the emergence and expansion of the bubble.

In order to calm speculative investment, the BOJ raised the benchmark policy interest rate five times from May 1989 to August 1990. The Ministry of Finance of Japan (the then supervisory authority) issued guidance for commercial banks to restrict property lending in March 1990.

Eventually, the trend of the asset price rise was reversed. Stock prices on the Tōkyō market started to decline at the beginning of 1990. The property price decline became obvious in 1992.

The nationwide average total property price has continued to decline since then. The property price of commercial sites in central Tōkyō (23 specified districts) showed a double-digit percentage annual decline for six years and did not recover until the mid-2010s. Under these circumstances, the balance sheets of Japanese commercial banks and enterprises deteriorated considerably, which led to the Japanese economy’s lengthy recession initially being called the “Lost Decade,” and later the “Lost 20 Years.”

SERIOUS DEFLATION AND UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICIES When the bubble began to burst, the majority of Japanese regarded the asset price decline as a kind of temporary adjustment and believed that the trend would not continue for long. However, ECONOMY

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the asset price peaks had been so high, and, eventually, the troughs became equally deep.

The negative effect of the asset bubble did not disappear quickly. This was partly because Japan’s potential growth rate had already started to decline, mainly because of the adverse effects of the bursting of the bubble economy and the ageing population. 3 The working-age population (15 to 64 years old) in Japan had increased until 1995, when it began to decline.

The BOJ and the Japanese government implemented several stimulus policies by 1998, which did not result in the desired corresponding positive results. Instead, Japan’s financial system fell into a severe state with non-performing assets, requiring a wide and deep restructuring of the financial system, including the supervisory system. In February 1999, the BOJ announced the implementation of the so-called “zero interest rate policy” to encourage the uncollateralised overnight call rate to move “as low as possible.” However, its positive effect was erased by the bursting of the “dot-com bubble” in the United States in 2000. In response to these economic conditions, in March 2001, the BOJ introduced the quantitative easing policy, in which the central bank set the quantity of money, instead of the interest rate, as the operating target. 4 At the end of the 1990s, the Japanese government focused its attention on the question of whether the country’s economy was falling into deflation. Fortunately, the government’s strong capital support to the banking sector during the period from 1999 to 2003, as well as the recovery of Japan’s export market, helped the economy escape the deflation spiral. Then, in the latter half of 2003, the government’s policy priorities shifted from the issues of non-performing loans and deflation to the privatisation of the postal service and the structural reform of the fiscal system.5 The BOJ cancelled the quantitative easing policy in March 2006, and the government removed the word “deflation” from the monthly economic report in September 2006.

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The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the ensuing Global Financial Crisis saw the major central banks in advanced economies adopt unconventional monetary policies: shifting the operating target to longer-term interest rates, influencing risk premiums mainly through the purchase of risk assets, applying a negative short-term nominal interest rate, and reducing real interest rates by influencing people’s inflation expectations. In October 2010, the BOJ adopted easing monetary policies (“Comprehensive Monetary Easing Policy”), again.

In March 2011, the Tōhoku Earthquake had a major effect on the Japanese economy. Before the earthquake, the Democratic Party of Japan, which was established in 1998, came into power in 2009. Although the party had a lot of new policies, it could not keep the government in order, and eventually lost power in December 2012. Then, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained power and established the second Abe government.6 ABENOMICS AND ITS RESULTS In early 2013, the Abe government unveiled an economic policy package aimed at sustainably reviving the Japanese economy, while maintaining fiscal discipline. According to the government, the centrepiece of Abenomics has been the “three arrows” policy targeting (1) aggressive monetary policy, (2) flexible fiscal policy, and (3) growth strategy including structural reform.

As for monetary policy, the BOJ introduced a much more powerful policy package in April 2013. The policy was named “quantitative and qualitative monetary easing.” The monetary base was set as the main operating target. At the same time, they encouraged a decline in long-term interest rates, expanded the purchase amount of assets such as exchange-traded funds, and removed the zero lower bound of interest rates (implemented in January 2016). In addition, the BOJ attempted to change people’s expectations drastically and thereby increase inflation expectations.7 Okina points out that the “three arrows” announced in 2013 were skewed towards

monetary policy.8 The monetary policy produced lower interest rates and a weaker Japanese yen, which promoted the purchase of Japanese stocks by overseas investors, boosting stock prices and improving the profitability of Japanese listed companies. However, Okina also assesses that the monetary policy failed to boost inflation, and the decline in loan interest rates among regional banks resulted in a deficit in more than half of their financial results.

In 2015 and 2018, Mr Abe was re-elected as the head of the ruling LDP and continued in the position of prime minister. In 2015, he announced the “new three arrows” of “Abenomics”; namely, a strong economy that creates hope, support for child-raising that fosters dreams, and social security that gives citizens a sense of reassurance.

In January 2019, the government led by PM Abe claimed that Abenomics had produced positive results, including increases in nominal GDP, corporate profit, private nonresidential investment, employment figures (especially female), tax revenue, and a declining unemployment rate.9 To date, the fear of the deflationary pressure has been dispelled.

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However, from a long-term point of view, the structural reform has not yet been implemented effectively.

FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR JAPAN One of the critical questions about Abenomics is the extreme easing monetary policy and the low inflation rate. The BOJ has announced that it will continue with easing monetary policies until prices increase to a reasonable level. However, if the bank continues to purchase large amounts of government bonds, there is a possibility of causing serious inflation when it tries to exit from the easing policy.

Destroying fiscal discipline is another risk of the BOJ’s easing policies. The BOJ’s purchase of government bonds supports the government’s funding easily, undermining the government’s self-discipline in balancing the budget. Japan’s extremely high governmentdebt-to-GDP ratio requires continuous focused attention (Figure 3).

Demographic change is also a serious risk factor. The diminishing population and proportion of the younger generation require much more social security expenditure, and

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declining productivity is a risk from the reduction in the working population.

To normalise the above-mentioned imbalances, structural reform is needed. The fact that Japan could maintain a semblance of stability during the difficult Heisei Era has ironically given Japanese people reasons not to act to change the status quo immediately. A cautious stance toward reform activity often helps to maintain social stability; however, sluggish movement might also mean missing a chance to create positive change in society.

The Japan Association of Corporate Executives calls on Japanese executives to escape the situation of being like a frog in slowly boiling water.10 Not just business executives but all Japanese citizens, including politicians, scholars, ordinary business people, and students need to recognise a degree of crisis and promote drastic reform for the future.

Otherwise, Japan faces a diminishing place in the global economic society.

ENDNOTES 1 The Shōwa Era started in December 1926 and ended in January 1989.

2 Kunio Okina – Masaaki Shirakawa – Shigenori Shiratsuka: The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons. Monetary and Economic Studies. 2001/February (special edition). 395–450.

3

Hiroshi Nakaso: Evolving Monetary Policy: The Bank of

Japan’s Experience. Bank of Japan. 18 October 2017. <https://bit.ly/2J6uZZB > Accessed: 14 March 2019.

4

Under the “quantitative easing policy,” the BOJ set the

outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank as the operating target. The current accounts at the BOJ consisted mainly of commercial banks’ deposits. This was the start of the BOJ’s implementation of unconventional monetary policy.

5

Yoshikawa Hiroshi (ed.): Defure keizai to kin’yū seisaku.

Baburudefure-ki no nipponkeizai to keizai seisaku. Cabinet Office, Economic and Social Research Institute – Keio University Press Inc., Tōkyō, 2009.

6 Before this opportunity, Shinzō Abe had led the government as prime minister from September 2006 to August 2007.

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7 Nakaso.

8 Yuri Okina: Abenomics after five years. East Asia Forum.

24 September 2018. <https://bit.ly/2XWXyge > Accessed: 14 March 2019.

9 Abenomics: for future growth, for future generations, and for a future Japan. The Government of Japan. January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2GT0RPI > Accessed: 14 March 2019.

10

Kobayashi Yoshimitsu (ed.): Kiki-kan naki yudegaeru

Nihon. Kako no enchōsen-jō ni mirai wa nai. Japan Association of Corporate Executives–Chūōkōron-Shinsha Inc., Tōkyō, 2019.

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN AT THE DAWN OF THE HEISEI ERA Zsolt Pálmai

In 1994, Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko made their first visit to the United States since the former’s ascension to the Chrysanthemum Throne and the beginning of the Heisei Era. Observed in a vacuum, the 16-day, 10-city tour was par for the course for official trips to the US by royalty: a mostly formal and pleasant affair, dotted by the occasional awkward-but-thoroughly-human moments—a success by all traditional metrics, especially considering how different these two major developed nations are. But context, as always, is key: perhaps more than a formal reinforcement of a postwar alliance by two symbols of state (Clinton had begun his first term in office just 16 months prior), the occasion helped usher out for good a time in American public consciousness that had been preoccupied with the notion that Japan, as a rising economic powerhouse, was a threat to US businesses and, at certain points, even the American way of life. It was a turn for the better in American perceptions of its East Asian ally, although, from a historical perspective, it appears as little more than a silver lining around the loss of the very vitality that had made Japan a presence capable of intimidating even the world’s predominant superpower.

In his welcome address, delivered on the South Lawn of the White House, President Clinton made only subtle references to the difficulties of the recent past—and by that point was able to do so from a more favourable position, as US economic indicators had begun to paint a considerably brighter picture: “Your Majesties visit us at a moment when it is clear that the destinies of our two peoples are inextricably linked, a moment in history when every day yields new challenges. But those

challenges bring with them the opportunity for us to carve new paths together.”1 The entire event—culminating in the first state dinner hosted by the Clinton White House— reflected the intent of transcending, and moving on from, the negativity that had crept into the relations of the two countries since the early 1980s. An imperial visit was well-suited for this purpose: per Japan’s postwar constitution, the “office” carries no official political or diplomatic weight and the couple were consequently not invited into the Oval Office. Instead, their trip, a reflection of the Japanese government’s explicit intent of winning hearts and minds in the US, included visits to a number of major cities from Charlottesville to Honolulu to attend baseball games, elementary school classes held in Japanese, as well as meetings with ordinary citizens, local leaders, and former presidents Carter and Reagan.

Yet the significance of everything that followed pales in comparison to the state dinner, and due not to the high degree of formality involved, but rather a very specific section of the guest list.

Seated alongside a relatively standard fare of celebrities—and no doubt at the centre of the visit’s aim of “promoting friendship and goodwill”—were captains of American industry from, among others, Bethlehem Steel, Xerox, Chrysler, Motorola, McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, General Motors, and MCA Universal— representatives of which had long complained about their lack of access to the Japanese market and the resulting imbalance with their Japanese counterparts that they perceived as unfair.2 After decades of growing cooperation and mutual appreciation, the 1980s saw a return of anti-Japanese sentiments in the United States in ECONOMY

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First Lady Hillary Clinton and Empress Michiko standing in front of the White House

ways that sometimes echoed the raw personal frustrations, as well as the zeitgeist-driven media-wide agitation, seen during the first half of the 20th century. The golden period of American industry and prosperity had been 92

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brought to an end, the country had suffered an oil crisis and its first military defeat in Vietnam, and a general sense of national optimism had given way to uncertainty. It was against this backdrop that a booming Japanese

economy, complete with confident and at times perhaps even arrogant economic players, came to make waves in several layers of US society in the 1980s.

“Foreign Direct Investment” (FDI) and “trade deficit” became trigger words guaranteed to elicit negative responses, especially from people involved in manufacturing—whether they worked in the factory or owned it—due to the imbalance that had arisen in US–Japanese trade relations and the perception that Japanese corporations were “taking over” parts of the country. By the late 1980s, the US had become a net debtor for the first time since before World War II3 and had a trade deficit of USD 120 billion, 44% of which was with Japan, which enjoyed a surplus of more than USD 80 billion.4 More tangibly, American manufacturers and producers of all kinds of goods from rice to cars and consumer electronics lost market share to Japanese competitors, who, in turn, enjoyed protection in their respective field from foreign rivals by their government. Consequently, Japanese investors began making large-scale investments in the US, including highly symbolic purchases, such as that of Rockefeller Center and the Columbia movie and record companies.

By the beginning of the 1990s, economists had come to predict that the US would lose its status as the world’s number one economy to Japan by 2010.5 The resulting tension was exacerbated by the context of the Cold War. For all the headway that Japan, a beneficiary of US military presence in the region, was making in the global economy, it was spending relatively little on its own defence capabilities, which made it an easy target for criticisms of “freeriding” (note the modern-day echoes). Making matters worse was an incident in which a subsidiary of Japanese electronics giant Toshiba, together with a Norwegian consortium, sold technology to be used in submarines to Moscow, and did so illegally.6 Unsurprisingly, the media fallout was considerable.

Not that the American media needed much of an excuse to portray Japanese businesses and their representatives as dangerous and

predatory. For one thing, Japanese economic actors, be they massive multinational corporations or world-renowned businessmen, were often simply referred to collectively as “Japan”—a generalisation that Western businessmen and corporations tended to be spared, but when, for example, the aforementioned Columbia acquisition took place (with Sony as the buyer), Newsweek’s cover read “Japan Invades Hollywood.”7 These years of increasingly normalised “Japan-bashing” produced a consistently alarmist commentary on a rather wide stylistic palette, from measured and professional (if, in retrospect, misguided) analyses to borderline propagandistic pieces asking, for example, whether Japanese companies were investing in the US movie business because they want to dictate what Americans should watch.8 One of the most memorable low points is “The Danger from Japan,” a 1985 cover story in The New York Times by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Theodore H. White. In it, the respected author not only blamed Japan for every stumble of American industry but went so far as to threaten the country with a reaction of cataclysmic proportions: “The superlative execution of their trade tactics may provoke an incalculable reaction—as the Japanese might well remember of the course that ran from Pearl Harbor to the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay just 40 years ago.”9 As a response in The Washington Post pointed out, in just the previous year, the US’s trade deficit with Canada had been USD 20 billion—the same as with Japan in 1983—yet it had failed to inspire White to label Canada as a threat.10 Meanwhile, in another echo of today’s international relations, The New York Times also ran an advertisement by Donald Trump, claiming to be “sick and tired of being kicked around” by supposed allies like Japan.11 And it was not just opinion leaders in the press who revealed a frustrating preoccupation with Japan. American mainstream culture from the era abounds in portrayals of Japanese businessmen as cold, calculating, and efficient: Popular works of fiction, such as Michael Crichton’s Rising Sun, Tom Clancy’s Debt of ECONOMY

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Vincent Chin, the murdered Chinese–American who was mistaken for a Japanese

Honor, and movies such as Gung Ho tackled the issue to varying degrees and with varying sensitivity, but invariably with a degree of scepticism regarding (at least) the business practices that had come to be associated with Japanese corporations. In non-fiction as well, a wide variety of books came out with titles such as Yen! Japan’s New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America, The Enigma of Japanese Power, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead, and Game Over: How Nintendo Zapped an American Industry, Captured Your Dollars, and Enslaved Your Children.

These publications were, of course, just a few elements of a common feedback loop, where people’s fears and frustrations created a market for such works, which, in turn, fed (and validated) people’s fears and frustrations.

While the majority of Americans remained sympathetic toward the Asian country throughout the 1980s, there was a visible break in the previously constant growth (at least according to the relatively infrequent polling) of proJapanese sentiments. A 1972 poll found that the distribution of favourable versus unfavourable 94

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views of Japan was 72% to 17%, and, by 1980, the same figure was 84% to 12%. However, by 1982, this had shifted to 63% and 29%.12 This decline continued well into the early years of the Heisei Era, when, at one point, five of six polls even measured a slim majority of unfavourable opinions of Japan among Americans.13 Moreover, a poll in 1991 found that 77% of Americans viewed Japan as an economic threat14—in fact, fear of the country’s economic power (among both the general public and people in leadership positions) at this point was even greater than the anxiety over Soviet military strength.15 On multiple occasions, these sentiments had several unfortunate real-world manifestations.

Politicians from both major parties gave legitimacy to violent outburst through rhetoric portraying Japanese competition as a near-existential threat and even went so far at one point as to perform violence on a piece of Japanese technology, when a group of Representatives took sledgehammers to a Toshiba radio on the steps of the Capitol in the wake of the revelation of the company’s above-mentioned dealings with the Soviets (meanwhile, no such protests were held against the Norwegian company involved in the same deal or the French company involved in another like it).16 On a politically smaller but more personal scale, Midwestern factory workers, who had seen, among others, around 250 thousand jobs disappear from automobile plants, would sometimes vent their anger by burning Japanese cars and flags, via signs featuring messages, such as “Park your import in Tōkyō,” and generally creating an atmosphere of hostility for Japanese employees of rival corporations.

Things eventually got to a point where even Sony Chairman Akio Morita felt compelled to go on record, saying, “Things appear to have gotten as bad as they were on the eve of World War II.”17 Without a doubt, the most extreme incident was the one involving Vincent Chin, a 27-year-old Chinese-American man, who was murdered by two American autoworkers who mistook him for Japanese and blamed him for the loss of their jobs.

These attitudes and events, as well as the emotions that gave birth to them, seem all the more pointless and tragic if we consider the gross degree to which the significance of Japanese economic activities in the US were exaggerated. While Japanese economic actors indeed made an impressive push Stateside, they by no means prioritise the country over other targets, and by the end of 1987—two years after White’s cover story in The New York Times—Japan’s holdings amounted to just 12.6% of total foreign holdings (very close to where they would stand at the end of the decade),18 and about 1.3% percent of the total stock of US reproducible capital, while investors from Western Europe held roughly 51% of all foreign assets.19 What this suggests is that Japan was, more than anything, a convenient scapegoat: its businesses began expanding in American-dominated fields at a time when the US was experiencing a downturn in its economic fortunes, and its culture and people were “more foreign” than previous competitors, together providing fertile soil for a major alarmist wave.

So how did Japan manage to reverse its fortunes with regard to its image in the United States? In the end, it came down to soft power and a turning of the tide of (economic) history.

As mentioned before, even during the darkest days of “Japan-bashing,” there appeared to be a deep reservoir of goodwill toward, or at least genuine fascination with, Japan—and the country had a tremendously deep well of exportable goods that resonated with consumers in the US, especially young people.

With the Western release of the Nintendo Entertainment System and the Game Boy (in 1986 and 1989 respectively), the Kyōto-based company did not so much conquer the video game industry as brought it back from the dead after its implosion at the end of the (American) Atari-dominated era, setting it on a course of growing cultural and economic significance that continues to this day. When, in 1991, Nintendo purchased the Seattle Mariners, allowing the team to remain in the city, it did so with the explicit aim of changing the narrative around the

Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko arrive at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts

increased prominence of Japanese companies in the country. Meanwhile, anime and manga represented an intriguingly foreign yet accessible take on popular American entertainment mediums and helped define a decade for a generation of “90s kids.” While, as it will be seen below, it would be a mistake to claim that these alone would have been enough to reverse the above-mentioned negative tendency in Japan’s perceptions among Americans, it is a telling detail that Japan’s cultural exports overtook the country’s total exports in value around the middle of the 1990s.20 However, perhaps the most important factor in the reversal of the previously discussed tendencies was the change in the two countries’ economic fortunes and relations—which, as we saw above, were misunderstood and misrepresented, to begin with. The Clinton years are remembered fondly by Americans for a reason: economic growth averaged 4% between 1992 and 1999, median household ECONOMY

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income grew by 10%, unemployment dropped from 8% to 4%, and Wall Street saw a fourfold increase in stock value.21 And then there was, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union, marking the American victory in the Cold War unmistakably.

This alone might have sufficed to alleviate fears of and overreactions to Japanese economic expansion, but, almost concurrently with the nascent US economic boom, Japan started down a long path of paying a heavy price for the past decades of growth. That growth, thanks to real estate speculation and careless lending by Japanese banks, fuelled a bubble economy that burst in the early 1990s, sending stocks tumbling in a crash that launched what has come to be referred to as the Lost Decade.

This period was characterised by deflation, record low stock markets, as well as a drop in GDP and real wages, which halted economic expansion for over ten years22 and brought about what one analyst called “the deepest slump in any developed economy since the Great Depression.”23 Together, these factors brought about nothing short of a reset in American attitudes toward Japan. The mid-1990s saw a rapid rebounding of public opinion from the historical (at least by postwar standards) slump seen in the early years of the decade. With the economy once again picking back up, confidence in the US’s economic prowess replaced the sense of looming of an Asian threat. Since around 1996, polls have shown a relatively consistent increase in not just Japan’s favourability in general but also “friendliness” toward Japanese people in particular among Americans, a trend that has continued to this day, with the former around 87% (a stark contrast with the below-50% dip seen in the early 1990s),24 and the latter around 65% (up from 43% in 1991), with the 77-20% split between people who perceived Japan as an economic threat and those who did not in 1991, having more or less flipped around (between 24-72%) by 2016.25 By the time Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko arrived in the US in 1994, the local media—not long ago at least partially complicit 96

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in feeding the “Japan scare”—was ready to give them a warm welcome. Reports from the period provide tactful accounts of a multitude of charming details about the couple’s multi-city tour, highlighting their sophistication, friendliness, elegance, and even good command of English—noting the contrast with the “more aloof manner” of the previous emperor.26 It was an easy gesture, of course, as the fears that had led American public discourse to develop distorted images of many things Japanese had given way to well-founded optimism. However, for the Japanese side, the nearly unanimously friendly reception and the surge of general goodwill came at the price of losing the dynamism that had facilitated and characterised Japanese economic and social development until the end of the 1980s.

In his welcome address, President Clinton brought up a positive element of Americans’ preoccupation with his guests’ country: “In our elementary schools and colleges, you will meet thousands of Americans struggling to learn and to master your wonderful Japanese language.

These studies, in fact, are among the fastest growing courses in our schools today.”27 While this had no doubt been true for a while, the time when the president could confidently make this claim was coming to an end: along with attendance at such courses, Japan’s mindshare, which had rapidly grown to such proportions that it ended up partially defining the previous decade, would soon wane, as Americans once again grew friendlier to—or at least more comfortable with—their closest East Asian ally.

ENDNOTES 1 Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony for Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko of Japan. 13 June 1994. In: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. 20 June 1994. 1278. <https://bit.ly/2ZZ25k1 > Accessed: 15 April 2019.

2

Donnie Radcliffe – Roxanne Roberts: Basking in the

Rising

Sun.

The

Washington

Post.

14

June

<https://wapo.st/2H6ncYS > Accessed: 12 April 2019.

1994.

3

John H. Makin: Japan’s Investment in America: Is It a

Threat?

1988/November–December.

Challenge.

8–16.

22

Justin Kuepper: A Brief History and Lessons of

Japan’s Lost Decade. The Balance. 30 January 2019.

Accessed: 10 April 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2Vg0reY > Accessed: 20 April 2019.

4 David Brock: The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing.

23

The National Interest. 1989/fall. 29–40. Accessed: 10 April

2002. <https://econ.st/2H3ocOS > Accessed: 20 April 2019.

2019.

24

5

Martin

Fackler:

Japan

Goes

From

Dynamic

to

Japan’s Lost Decade. The Economist. 28 September Jim Norman: Favorable Views of Japan, China Keep

Climbing. Gallup. 6 March 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Vf86dH >

Disheartened. The New York Times. 16 October 2010.

Accessed: 16 April 2019.

<https://nyti.ms/2H3wnKR > Accessed: 14 April 2019.

25 Swift.

6

26

Martin Tolchin: ‘Japan-Bashing’ Becomes a Trade

T.R. Reid: Japanese Emperor to Visit U.S. Cities

Bill Issue. The New York Times. 28 February 1988.

Next Summer. The Washington Post. 7 January 1994.

< https://nyti.ms/2LoS7oP > Accessed: 16 April 2019.

<https://wapo.st/2LA7Lxw > Accessed: 16 April 2019.

7 Japan Invades Hollywood. Newsweek. 9 October 1989.

27 Remarks at the Arrival Ceremony for Emperor Akihito and

8

Empress Michiko of Japan.

Andrea Chronister: Japan-Bashing: How Propaganda

Shapes Americans’ Perception of the Japanese. MA Thesis, Lehigh University, 1992. <https://bit.ly/2LpmICy > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

9

Theodore H. White: The Danger from Japan. The New

York Times. 28 July 1985. <https://nyti.ms/300QsJt > Accessed: 17 April 2019.

10

Hobart Rowen: Low Point in Japan Bashing. The

Washington Post. 1 August 1985. <https://wapo.st/2DRu4bI > Accessed: 17 April 2019.

11 Brock.

12

Robert Lindsey: Resentment of Japanese of Growing,

Poll

Shows.

The

New

York

Times.

6

April

1982.

<https://nyti.ms/2Jf0UXM > Accessed: 15 April 2019.

13

Jim Norman: Favorable Views of Japan, China Keep

Climbing. Gallup. 6 March 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Vf86dH > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

14

Art Swift: Fewer in U.S. See Japan as an Economic

Threat. Gallup. 7 December 2016. <https://bit.ly/2JjVESH > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

15 Chronister.

16

Matt Novak: That Time Republicans Smashed a

Boombox With Sledgehammers on Capitol Hill. Paleofuture.

9 May 2016. <https://bit.ly/2LpYLez > Accessed: 12 April 2019.

17 Lindsey.

18 Chronister.

19 Makin.

20

Green H. Steven: The Soft Power of Cool: Economy,

Culture and Foreign Policy in Japan. Toyo University Repository

for

Academic

Resources.

March

2015.

<https://bit.ly/2ViiqBv > Accessed: 20 April 2019.

21

Kurt Andersen: The Best Decade Ever? The 1990s,

Obviously.

The

New

York

Times.

6

February

2015.

<https://nyti.ms/2oOEwsg > Accessed: 19 April 2019.

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SOCIETY

THE OLDEST IMPERIAL FAMILY IN THE WORLD Emese Schwarcz

The Japanese Imperial Family is said to have the oldest imperial line in the world, going back approximately 2,700 years. According to Japanese mythology, the first emperor was born to the sun goddess Amaterasu, and therefore the emperors were revered as gods for many centuries and were considered as leaders of the Japanese nation. Although their level of influence and actual power changed over time due to the shōguns gaining ground in the country’s leadership, they remain highly respected as the symbol of Japan and Japanese unity and as spiritual leaders of the country.

It was the Meiji Restoration starting in 1868 that elevated emperors back into the monarch’s seat, restoring and uniting power in their hands.

Thus the Meiji Era (1868–1912) became the period when a kind of personality cult started to form around them.1 The ascendance of Emperor Meiji ended the rule of shōguns, and his policy decisions resulted in a strong and modern army that helped the Empire of Japan to defeat

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Russia in the Russo–Japanese War (1904–1905) and occupy the Korean Peninsula (1910).2 As the reverence towards the emperor strengthened, so did the prevalence of Shintō. The function of the emperor and its connection with Shintō was established and became a key element as soon as the prewar ideology created State Shintō, a unified religion to define the nation. After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the leaders of the American occupation made sure to abolish State Shintō and do away with the godlike position and perception of the emperor, to wipe out completely the ideology that helped the Japanese expansion before and during the war.

The new (and current) constitution, written by the General Headquarters (GHQ), gave birth to a new type of emperor: one deprived of political power or influence and has a strictly ceremonial role in leading the country. His political influence is limited by law, so much so that it is strictly prohibited for him to publicly form an opinion about any political matter. However, present-day emperors are still heads of Shintō, delivering ceremonial and religious rituals and addresses.

Their responsibility toward the Japanese people is representing them on the world stage and giving spiritual support in times of natural destructions and tragedies. A unique and complex role indeed: Emperor Emeritus Akihito (reign: 1989–2019) was reportedly confused about what the role of a “symbol of state” really was. Given that the constitution has only limitations rather than clear instructions as to what an emperor should do, Emperor Emeritus Akihito hoped to adapt the contents of the role to the ever-changing 21th century.3 Emperor Emeritus Akihito did present an image theretofore unprecedented. To counteract the effect of his father’s complicated legacy, he did the most he possibly could to visit the countries ravaged by the Empire of Japan during the

The Imperial Family in 2013. The first row, from left to right: Empress Masako, Emperor Naruhito, Emperor Emeritus Akihito, Empress Emerita Michiko, Prince Hisahito (son of Prince Fumihito), Prince Fumihito of Akishino (younger brother of Emperor Naruhito), Princess Kiko of Akishino. The back row from left to right: Princess Mako (elder daughter of Prince Fumihito), Princess Aiko (daughter of Emperor Naruhito), Princess Kako (younger daughter of Prince Fumihito).

first half of the century. During these visits, he concentrated on presenting an apologetic and remorseful attitude towards these nations to ease the lingering pains of war and re-establish good relations with them. But not only foreign nations had to be propitiated. The imperial couple first visited Okinawa after the war, when they were only crown prince and princess. At that time, the adversity between the central government and the war-ravaged Okinawa was so strong that the couple were attacked by a leftist extremist, who threw a Molotov cocktail at them. However, even this experience did not deter the Emperor from pursuing good relations with the people of Okinawa, a clear sign of which is his ten further visits to the prefecture during his reign.4 His resilience and determination to be close to the people—even through using common speech patterns instead of the stiff and difficult court language—brought him and his institution close to the hearts of the Japanese, revolutionising the image of the monarch. This proved to be a considerable contribution to

the cause of the abdication by firing up public support, even though there has not been a precedent for abdication for over 200 years.

In 2016, when the words of Emperor Akihito were broadcasted throughout the country, expressing his wish to abdicate due to failing health, his aspiration was overwhelmingly supported by the public. At the age of 82, Akihito had already been through heart surgery and treatment for prostate cancer.5 The challenges of the abdication were mostly legislative, for the current constitution does not have any regulation on ending a reign. Although it is obvious now that Akihito’s firstborn son, Crown Prince Naruhito (59), was the one to follow him, the imperial succession has been a touchy and problematic topic in the past thirty years.

INHERITING A COUNTRY As a dynasty with patrilineal descent, the imperial court has a strict rule on male-only inheritance.

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they marry a commoner. This behest has become an increasing problem after the war, as the then-Crown Princess Masako (55) had only one child, a girl named Princess Aiko (17), after being put under immeasurable pressure to give birth to an heir.

Since the Imperial Household Law (1947) wrote off eleven branches from the Imperial Family, securing the succession became much more difficult for the main branch.6 The elimination of these families from the Imperial roster served the purpose of cost-efficiency.

However, while Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko were blessed with three children, out of which two were male, their successor, Naruhito, had more trouble. As the new Imperial couple were unable to give birth to a baby boy, worrying tones started to appear among the general public, the government, and the Imperial Household Agency, or Kunaichō.

These worries have led to the government taking a step forward by assembling an advisory panel that would discuss the legal background

KUNAICHŌ The Imperial Household Agency (宮内 庁・kunaichō), which acts as a ministry for all imperial matters, is an intricate bureaucratic institution that manages and controls all aspects and details of the lives of the imperial family, including their budget.7 The two official functions of the Kunaichō are assisting in meetings with foreign dignitaries and performing ceremonial tasks and duties.8 Many of those working at the agency prefer a more traditional image for the royals, distant from its people and stripped from all humanity. For an agency that has been serving the family since the 7th century, when emperors were revered as gods, this is not that surprising. However, in these modern times, especially after Emperor Hirohito renounced his divinity, the Kunaichō’s values and goals cause dissatisfaction and conflict even in the imperial family.

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of allowing women to ascend the throne, which was banned by an 1889 law.9 Writing off the family branches and prohibiting women from succeeding have already posed a massive challenge of how to secure the bloodline of the world’s oldest imperial family, but the 1947 Constitution also stipulates that any female member marrying a commoner shall be stripped of title and affiliation to the imperial family.

Such was the fate of Naruhito and Fumihito’s little sister, Princess Sayako, now known as Sayako Kuroda, when she married Yoshiki Kuroda, Fumihito’s long-time friend from a very prestigious—but commoner—family in 2004.10 The princess lost her title of Princess Nori but was given a considerable sum by the government as dowry. Having to integrate into society as a functional and economically active member can be quite a challenge for these women, and soon the eldest daughter of Prince Akishino, Princess Mako (27), will have to experience the same, as she has announced her engagement to Kei Komuro, her university sweetheart. And there are many others too—the abolition of the royal branches forces all young female members to lose their titles, because there are practically no royal males to marry anymore. Adapting to a new lifestyle is not an easy task for the royals: Princess Sayako was reportedly practising driving a car and grocery shopping all by herself in preparation for her new life. In the same way, Emperor Naruhito shared a pick-me-up in his book about his university years titled The Thames and I, wherein, in an attempt to use the washing machine the first time in his life, he almost flooded the entire dormitory he stayed in.11 The succession fright, the government talks, and the pressure on the Crown Prince and Princess finally eased in 2006, as Prince Akishino and his wife, Princess Kiko, announced her pregnancy with a baby boy, later to be born as Prince Hisahito, third-in-line for the throne. The succession, therefore, is secured, but, considering the number of female members of the family (13 out of 18), the current Chief Cabinet Secretary referred to a government intention to explore possibilities of allowing female members to

keep their title in case they marry a commoner.12 The government’s willingness to adapt to the current situation despite being mostly conservative sends a positive message to the people of Japan. A similar mentality is expected to be represented by Emperor Naruhito. The new monarch definitely has a fresh and modern posture, as already indicated by his actions and experiences during his years as a Crown Prince.

As for the Emperor Emeritus, the coming years will resemble his earliest ones at the

beginning of his reign, as he will have to define what an abdicated emperor should or should not act like. One crucial question that worries the right is how eloquent Akihito will be: the Imperial Law only bans reigning emperors from forming opinions about political issues but says nothing of abdicated emperors. And as Akihito is known as somewhat of a critic of the current Abe administration and the conservativerevisionist sentiments, the politicians representing these ideas are fearful of the Emperor Emeritus’ influence on the public. Time will tell.

ROYAL PROFILES Their Majesties the Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako (126th Emperor) Emperor Naruhito is a unique monarch for Japan in more than one way. Being the first to be born after World War II, he is also the first not to have experienced the horrors of the war—a trait he shares with the current prime minister, Shinzō Abe. He is also the first emperor having been allowed to be brought up by his mother and, then, to study abroad. The Emperor is a highly educated monarch, holding a bachelor’s degree in History. He continued his higher education in the United Kingdom at Oxford University, where he studied the history of transportation on the Thames in a postgraduate programme. The often humorous experiences while living with his peers as a commoner in Oxford later gave him the impetus to write his book The Thames and I. Returning to Tōkyō, Naruhito got to know Masako Owada, an Oxford-and Harvard-educated aspiring diplomat from a good—but also commoner—family, during his master’s degree studies.

The couple’s journey is one with many ups and downs. Empress Masako was first reluctant to accept the then-Crown Prince’s marriage proposal, for she valued her carrier in diplomacy, and was fearful of the traditional and secluded imperial court. She said no twice before she accepted Naruhito’s proposal—he reportedly won her heart by saying: “You might have fears

Their Majesties the Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako (126 th Emperor)

and worries about joining the imperial household.

But I will protect you for my entire life.”13 The Emperor has stayed true to this promise.

Although the Empress Emerita Michiko also came from a commoner household, after the wedding in 1993, Masako had considerable trouble fitting into her new life, with all of its rules and restrictions. Her doctors diagnosed her with “adjustment disorder”: an expression used to define depression and anxiety in this case.

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Empress Masako’s troubles were twofold: as Crown Princess, she was immediately put under immense pressure to give birth to a male heir—one she was unable to do in the end.

As expected, the Kunaichō was apprehensive, so much so that even her husband expressed his distaste for the treatment his wife had to deal with, an act had been unprecedented from the family’s part until that time. 14 The other stress factor is closely related to this same problem. Not only did she have to give up her career as a diplomat, but as the years went by without her getting pregnant, the Kunaichō started to “influence” her duty schedule in a way that she was not allowed to embark on foreign trips—a duty through which she had planned to modernise the image of the imperial court. Unexpectedly enough, Emperor Naruhito commented on this issue as well, saying that she had “worked hard to adapt to the environment of the Imperial Household for the past ten years, but from what I can see, I think she has completely exhausted herself in trying to do so. It is true that there were developments that denied Princess Masako’s career up to then as well as her personality driven by her career,” referring to the behaviour of some of the Kunaichō’s bureaucrats. Such open criticism toward the Kunaichō is rather uncustomary on the family’s part but shows the Emperor’s resolve to be protective of his wife.

The stress over producing an heir exhausted Masako immensely. Even after Princess Aiko was born, she shut herself in the palace and stayed away from her royal duties for a long time. Before Emperor Naruhito’s enthronement, Masako said in an interview that she felt insecure about becoming an Empress, but she would do her best to carry out her duties. In another interview, Emperor Naruhito explained that slowly but surely Masako’s duties and scope of activity had been expanded, and while the title of Empress carried more responsibilities, he did not want her to take on them all at once. 15

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The troubles of the imperial couple represent a somewhat systemic problem in Japan: the clash of tradition and modernity. A woman’s struggle to advance in her career, while yielding to society’s pressure to give birth is a phenomenon familiar to many all around the world. And, in a similar way, accepting and talking about mental health issues is still not as normalised as it should be—yet the imperial couple can lead the way in increasing acceptance. Emperor Naruhito himself is already known as a promoter of acceptance of the ailing. For example, in November 2018, the then-Crown Prince was caught helping a Paralympian runner as a guide. 16 He is also a propagator of the need for environmental awareness. The Emperor has been known to promote the modernisation of the Imperial Household, but he is also very mindful of his father’s legacy in the role of Emperor. He watched from up close, as Akihito sculpted a modern function for the Emperor, and as he accompanied his parents on many of their Pacific trips, he supposedly adopted their views on history and responsibility too. In 2015, Naruhito said: “Today when memories of war are set to fade, I reckon it is important to look back on our past with modesty and pass down correctly the miserable experience and the historic path Japan took from the generation who know the war to the generation who don’t.”17 Their Imperial Highnesses Prince (Fumihito) and Princess (Kiko) Akishino Prince Fumihito (53), better known by his title Prince Akishino, is in a unique position now that his brother ascended the throne. The Imperial Law states that only an emperor’s son can receive the title “Crown Prince”; therefore, Prince Akishino will be titled as “heir to the throne” next year, in April 2020.18 Prince Akishino met his wife, Kiko Kawashima, during his university years at Gakushuin University, while pursuing a degree in Law and Biological Science. Princess Kiko comes from a middle-class family; his father is a prestigious

Their Imperial Highnesses Prince (Fumihito) and Princess (Kiko) Akishino

professor of Gakushuin University. The princess herself is educated in psychology and social psychology and is a talented speaker of multiple languages. Her family lived in Pennsylvania until she was six years old, before relocating to Vienna for a short while. Therefore, she can speak English and German without fault or accent. After becoming a member of the Imperial Household, she took an interest in sign language, which she learned in Japanese and American English too.19 Upon their marriage in 1990, the country celebrated them, even if Empress Dowager Nagako (Emperor Akihito’s mother) and the Kunaichō did not like the idea that a middle-class commoner would join the Imperial Family. Not to mention that the younger brother should not wed sooner than the Crown Prince. Upon their marriage, the couple was issued a new title, Akishino, and permission to form a new branch. The couple was blessed with two daughters, Princess Mako (27) and Kako (24), and later with the unexpected new heir, Prince Hisahito (12).

Similarly to his brother, Prince Akishino has a history of voicing his opinions about various topics related to the court. His first notable controversial statement questioned the constitutionality of the official Shintō rite to enthrone his father being financed by the government. He echoed this position again in 2018, this time referring to his brother’s enthronement. He argued that the rite called Daijōsai (大嘗祭・Great Thanksgiving Festival) is of a highly religious nature; therefore, its

sponsorship by the government goes against the separation of church and state. 20 His opinion is not exactly irrelevant, as Emperor Akihito was also targeted for the same by left-leaning voices when his Daijōsai was under preparation. And as the Imperial Household budget is made up of government funds, it is understandable for Prince Akishino to think that the same might be more suitable for such an event. The Kunaichō, however, referred to the precedent in their explanation as to why finance it again from separate government funds.

Prince Akishino also publicly stated his disapproval about his brother’s criticising the Kunaichō for the harsh treatment they gave to Princess Masako. He marked Naruhito’s comments “regrettable,” and he said his brother should have consulted with Emperor Akihito before making his unusual remarks.21 The media often likes to imagine a possible rift between the brothers, but the Chrysanthemum Court is still much too closed from the public to know. It is apparent, however, that now that Naruhito is emperor and the spotlight is on him, the public might witness a more detailed representation of their relationship.

Prince Akishino will also have to appear more frequently due to his increased number of tasks as the first in line for the throne. Both he and Emperor Naruhito will have to create a role and an image for themselves to define the Reiwa Era.

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ENDNOTES

society.

The

Japan

Times.

22

February

2019.

<https://bit.ly/2UQlKCU > Accessed: 6 April 2019.

1 Simigh Fruzsina: Akihito császár és a japán monarchia.

15

PAGEO Geopolitikai Kutatóintézet. 17 August 2016.

from the Imperial Throne. Nippon.com. 8 April 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2Kswzar > Accessed: 29 March 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2G3z0e2 > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

2 The Meiji Restoration and Modernization. Asia for Educators,

16 Yudai Ogata: Naruhito guides Paralympian on palace run

An initiative of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at

ahead of enthronement. The Asahi Shimbun. 20 November

Columbia

2009.

University.

<https://bit.ly/

1BMpli5 >

Katsuhisa Saitō: Crown Prince Naruhito: One Step

2018. <https://bit.ly/2It2lBh > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

Accessed: 5 April 2019.

17

3

burden

Tomohiro Osaki: Emperor reflects on Japan’s past,

Kyoko Hasegawa: New imperial couple to face heavy of

tradition.

Japan

Today.

7

April

2019.

future and his ‘endlessly long’ quest to pin down role after

<https://bit.ly/2KggxjH > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

30 years on throne. The Japan Times. 24 February 2019.

18 Japan to Hold Key Event for Prince Akishino in April 2020.

<https://bit.ly/2X0iwdr > Accessed: 29 March 2019.

Nippon.com. 10 October 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Ghsq53 >

4 Yasuhiko Shima: Akihito, Michiko head to Okinawa for final

Accessed: 8 April 2019.

time as imperial couple. The Asahi Shimbun. 27 March 2018.

19 David E. Sanger: Tokyo Journal; She’s Shy and Not So

<https://bit.ly/2Kwgj8i > Accessed: 29 March 2019.

Shy, Japan’s Princess Bride. The New York Times. 26 June

5 Martin Foster: Japan’s Emperor Akihito says health is failing

1990. <https://nyti.ms/2GfnT2Q > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

and hints at abdication. The Guardian. 8 August 2016.

20 Prince Akishino questions Japanese government financing

<https://bit.ly/2aTvHau > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

of Shinto-linked rite. The Japan Times. 30 November 2018.

6 Philippa Fogarty: The princess, the palace and the shrinking

<https://bit.ly/2X6eTTr > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

royal line. BBC. 19 May 2017. <https://bbc.in/2G705Nz >

21 Japan’s crown prince under unprecedented public criticism.

Accessed: 5 April 2019.

Business Recorder. 1 December 2004. <https://bit.ly/2Ga3A5X >

7

Accessed: 8 April 2019.

Gale Eisenstodt: Behind the Chrysanthemum Curtain.

The Atlantic. November 1998. <https://bit.ly/2Z2bx5C > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

8

Organization and Functions of the Imperial Household

Agency.

Kunaichō,

The

Imperial

Household

Agency.

<https://bit.ly/2Z50N6p > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

9 Reiji Yoshida: Government panel to debate letting woman ascend throne. The Japan Times. 28 December 2004. <https://bit.ly/2UrRnTU > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

10

Gabriel Aquino: Who is Sayako Kuroda, the former

Princess Nori of Japan? Royal Central. 18 April 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Kseb1l > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

11 Crown Prince Naruhito’s memoir of time at Oxford reissued in English ahead of May 1 accession. The Japan Times.

29

March

2019.

<https://bit.ly/2G7rmiL >

Accessed:

5 April 2019.

12 Japan to begin discussions on Imperial succession system, including creation of female branches of royal family. The Japan Times. 18 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/2U8SVgx > Accessed: 5 April 2019.

13 Japan’s Princess Masako opens up on insecurities and health. BBC. 9 December 2018. <https://bbc.in/2Qm378l > Accessed: 6 April 2019.

14 Reiji Yoshida – Sakura Murakami: Crown Princess Masako: A symbol of Japanese women’s struggles in a male-dominated

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EARTHQUAKES, TSUNAMIS, AND THE WRATH OF NATURE Emese Schwarcz

A burden of Japan is a strong inclination to natural disasters, be they weather-related or topographical.1 Weather-related disasters, such as typhoons and heavy rain seasons (梅雨・tsuyu), are induced by extreme climatic fluctuations, which is explained by the country’s geographical location. In general, Japan’s climate is already somewhat hectic: summers are hot, while winters are very cold. Winters in Hokkaidō can reach −20 °C, while summers in Kyūshū can have a minimum temperature of 28 °C.2 High humidity exacerbates the high temperature which can be increasingly hard to bear in the capital city of Tōkyō, where the “urban heat island” effect can intensify the temperature even more, due to energy usage, notably the overuse of air conditioners.3 One might ask to what extent the temperature has increased. The summer of 2018 proved to be an important indicator of times to come: 65 people were killed, and roughly 22,000 hospitalised in a

single week alone, calling forth predictions about the effects of the ongoing climate change.4 Topography is another key factor in natural disasters, as the numerous fault lines in the country contribute to the high number of earthquakes each year. Occasional tsunamis, which are the aftermath of a larger earthquake, can be very destructive, because the complex coastlines in Japan are vulnerable to high waves.

All these can be traced back to the fact that Japan lies on the infamous Pacific Ring of Fire, a popular expression for the Circum-Pacific Belt, marking a horseshoe-shaped territory in the Pacific Ocean that is the world’s most seismically active region.5 The belt is cluttered with epicentres and active volcanoes, burdening the countries lying in its range with the highest number of earthquakes per year. Of course, it is not only the number of earthquakes that is higher, but their intensity too.

In the last ten years alone, Japan experienced

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two major disasters that were destructive enough to make it into the history books: first, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami, followed by the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, and then the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes. What both of these have in common is the unexpected severity of destruction in infrastructure and human lives.

Material, economic, and social damages are now accounted for, and their combined effects are still halting recovery to this day.6 THE COSTS OF A DISASTER The economic costs usually not only place a temporary burden on a country but can also deepen existing problems. Since the early Heisei Era, Japan has dealt with a recession and a deflation spiral, which are being slowly consolidated through the implementation of the three tenets of Abenomics. 7 Key issues that need to be alleviated are female employment, the burden of an aging population on the social security net, population decline, and a high suicide rate among the economically active population. In the event of a larger disaster, these issues can worsen.

Generally speaking, disasters that occurred in the past couple of years have influenced economic growth in a number of ways: due to the destruction, both household and business spending decreased, the net export rate shrunk, and business investment declined.8 These factors made the already falling consumption rate worse. In September 2018,

JAPAN’S ECONOMIC GROWTH QUARTERLY GDP TOTAL, PERCENTAGE CHANGE, PREVIOUS PERIOD, Q1 2016 – Q4 2018

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2016

2017

2018

Q1 0.71 Q2 0.03 Q3 0.23 Q4 0.22

Q1 0.88 Q2 0.44 Q3 0.62 Q4 0.40

Q1 -0.10 Q2 0.48 Q3 -0.60 Q4 0.48

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Ōsaka was struck by Typhoon Jebi, leaving considerable damage in its wake. The most critical damage was concentrated around Kansai International Airport, destroying transport infrastructure, and thus delaying exports.

A major earthquake in the same month caused even more difficulties by hurting tourism and the services industry.9 These events, therefore, affected economic growth negatively, so much so that, in the second quarter of 2018, relevant indicators showed the fastest decline in more than three years. Foreign economic factors, such as the trade war between the US and China, are coupled with occasional dramatic setbacks imposed by nature – increasing the challenges that Abenomics has to face.

SOCIAL COSTS In the case of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, where recovery has dragged on and the future is unclear, we can talk about not-so-temporary social effects too (social in the sense of demographic changes). Tōhoku, a region already struggling with depopulation and aging, suffered a devastating blow as a result of the threefold disaster. Around half of the victims were said to be older than 65.10 Since the elderly are obviously more vulnerable in case of disasters, these numbers show a worrying tendency in the demographic tree. Depopulation was already a problem before 3/11, as young people had begun leaving this relatively isolated region for better job opportunities. 11 While urbanisation seems to be a growing issue in many other countries, Northeast Japan experiences an accelerated migration because of the lingering risks of nuclear radiation and the scale of the destruction.

Unsurprisingly, in the case of the Tōhoku disaster, social issues have also unfolded.

Survivors fleeing to other regions and big cities have found themselves discriminated against because much of the general populace is afraid of radiation, and have consequently branded the survivors as “contaminated.”12 Female survivors are especially exposed to distress and stigma regarding marriage prospects, as many would

be reluctant to father a child to someone they believe is likely a radiation-affected woman, even if the survivor in question was never exposed to radiation. A similar phenomenon also arose after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. But not only single women are under pressure. A new expression was born after 3/11, describing a worrying trend: “atomic divorce,” or genpatsu rikon (原発離婚), describes those cases when a couple decides to separate over different views on radiation safety.13 An inclination for further segregation can also appear in times of disaster, mainly against foreign residents, or ethnic Koreans and Chinese.

In 1923, the Great Kantō Earthquake prompted disturbing social unrest. False rumours spread fast about ethnic Koreans taking advantage of the chaos and poisoning wells to take revenge for the occupation of the Korean Peninsula, which led to a large-scale massacre, where Japanese residents and law enforcement killed more than 6,000 Korean residents in the disaster-hit area.14 While a tragedy like this has not occurred since, major earthquakes and tsunamis have given birth to a considerable amount of hate against these groups in the online sphere, spreading rumours about them looting the affected areas.15 What is different now than in 1923 is that, this time, authorities such as the police and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) do not get involved in this spreading of hate, and a considerable resistance that wants to silence xenophobic and groundless rumours can also be found on the internet.

SOCIAL GAINS AND THE EFFECT OF A COLLECTIVE TRAGEDY Despite the worrying social consequences, the Japanese people are said to be remarkably resilient when it comes to disasters. As a nation that experiences thousands of earthquakes per year (including minor tremors), the people of Japan have learned to cope with challenging situations and to rely on social order in times of despair. Criminal activities in disaster-hit areas are relatively non-existent, and the country’s setsuden (節電) policy, encouraging the population to save energy after the Fukushima

A still of the destruction the 3/11 tsunami left behind

disaster in response to fears of power outages, was overwhelmingly successful.16 International university students were also mobilised in the wake of the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake in order to provide disaster relief information in multiple languages for foreign residents.17 Historical occurrence of major disasters plays a fundamental part in post-disaster behaviour.

To alleviate the damages, Japan has a very sophisticated and advanced safety net, including the following features: 1. Earthquake-resistant buildings.

Most buildings in Japan, especially in and around Tōkyō, are built in a way that, in case of an earthquake, they remain flexible and move along with tremors.

2. Phone emergency alert system. Phones bought in Japan will alert the user 5 or 10 seconds beforehand in case of an earthquake.

3. Earthquake-sensitive bullet trains. The sensors built in Shinkansen trains force them to stop immediately.

4. Automatic TV channel change. In case of emergency, television sets change to live news coverage to deliver useful information about shelter or evacuation.18 5. Comprehensive education.

Japanese schools make sure that students from the youngest age are prepared for a tremor.

Drills are held regularly, and convenience stores sell survival kits.

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These preparedness-improving measures are highly effective and much-needed. The Meteorological Agency is constantly producing predictions, one of which has caused widespread worry: the government, along with the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Resilience, reinforced the prediction that, in the coming 30-or-so years, a major earthquake would take place in the Greater Tōkyō Area. 19 There is historical precedence to consider: every 100 years, a devastating magnitude-7-class quake occurs, which usually destroys the areas in or around the capital: so it was with the 1923 Kantō earthquake and the 1855 earthquake that demolished the city of Edō, i.e. the present-day Tōkyō. The fact that even the government acknowledges this prediction gives hope for the future that the necessary preparations will be made to minimise economic damage and loss of human life.

9 Japan natural disasters highlight vulnerable infrastructure, impact on tourism. The Straits Times. 12 September 2018. <https://bit.ly/2YttTfL > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

10

Masateru Hino: Demographic trends should not be

overlooked: aging and depopulation in Tohoku. The 2011 East Japan Earthquake Bulletin of the Tohoku Geographical Association. 9 April 2011. <https://bit.ly/2WrxAk1 > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

11 Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan. History, Politics, and Social Change Since the 1980s. 2nd edition. John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, 2012.

12 Masaharu Maeda – Misari Oe: Mental Health Consequences and Social Issues After the Fukushima Disaster. Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health. 2017/2S. 36S–46S. 13 Becky Alexis-Martin – Thom Davies: Japan earthquake: social aftershocks of Fukushima disaster are still being felt.

The Conversation. 23 November 2016. <https://bit.ly/2fr3pqq > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

14 Shōji Yamada: The Great Kantō Earthquake, the Korean Massacre and its Aftermath. The Responsibility of the Japanese Government and People. Sōshisha, Tōkyō, 2011.

15

Tomohiro Osaki: Different disaster, same story: Osaka

quake prompts online hate speech targeting foreigners.

ENDNOTES

The Japan Times. 19 June 2018. <https://bit.ly/2YzgjXX > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

16 Kingston.

1 Disasters and Disaster Prevention in Japan. Ministry of

17 The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake. Kumamoto University.

Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2014. <https://bit.ly/2Wtn9wj >

<https://bit.ly/2V9d6fX > Accessed: 11 March 2019.

Accessed: 12 March 2019.

18

2 Climate – Japan. Climates to Travel. <https://bit.ly/2A45djP >

preparation has spared it from a far worse fate. The

Accessed: 12 March 2019.

Guardian.

3 Katsuhisa Uchiyama: Cities and Heat-island. DBJ Research

Accessed: 19 March 2019.

Centre on Global Warming, Discussion Paper Series. 2011/7.

19 Race against time to prepare for massive Tōkyō quake. Nikkei

4 Eric Johnston: Record-breaking high temperatures likely a

Asian Review. 1 July 2017. <https://s.nikkei.com/2U1I6lo >

‘new normal’ for Japan, experts warn. The Japan Times.

Accessed: 25 March 2019.

24 July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2Oyhl26 > Accessed: 10 March 2019.

5 Ring of Fire. Encyclopædia Britannica. Updated: 31 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2IXVbG5 > Accessed: 10 March 2019.

6

Becky Oskin: Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011:

Facts and Information. Live Science. 13 September 2017. <https://bit.ly/2h22I9R > Accessed: 10 March 2019.

7 Read more on the topic of Abenomics in the chapter: The long struggle with economic recovery in Japan after the asset bubble by Kumiko Okazaki 8

Mitsuru Obe: Japan’s economy shrinks after a slew of

natural disasters. Nikkei Asian Review. 14 November 2018. <https://s.nikkei.com/2uy5YxL > Accessed: 5 March 2019.

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Justin McCurry – Ian Sample: Japan’s earthquake 11

March

2011.

<https://bit.ly/2Fz498P

>

THE SUSTAINABILITY OF JAPANESE WORK CULTURE Judit Hidasi

THE SALARYMAN, THE SYMBOL OF JAPAN’S POSTWAR ECONOMIC SUCCESS Both in and outside of Japan, many share an image of Japanese work culture based on the notion of the ”salaryman.” A salaryman (サラリーマン・sararīman) is a salaried whitecollar worker who shows paramount loyalty to the corporation/organisation/institution he works for. Japanese white-collar workers are generally university-educated, while blue-collar workers normally only have a high school diploma or attended a trade or technical school.

Japanese blue-collar workers work 40 hours a week on average, from 9am to 5pm with occasional overtime work. The white-collar worker, however, may work well over 12 hours a day or 60 hours a week and can spend the rest of his waking hours commuting. In Japanese culture, the salaryman—also called as “working samurai”1—is seen as someone whose goal is to be a successful businessman, regardless of the impact on his family or his happiness, as his commitment and loyalties lie more with the company than their family.

Generally speaking, Japan’s society aims to prepare its people to work primarily for the collective good rather than just the individual, and so the salaryman is a result of this, just as much as a fundamental part of the system.

He is expected to work long hours, additional overtime, to participate in after-work leisure activities, such as drinking in izakaya, singing karaoke, and visiting hostess bars with colleagues or business partners, and to value work over all else. 2 The life of a salaryman revolves around work. The activities that he does outside of work typically involve his coworkers, which lessens the distance between him and work.

The traditional model of the salaryman-hiring culture went through several changes during

the Heisei Era, as the looming recession created difficult social and economic situations for the Japanese. With the spread of globalisation, as well as the aging society taking a progressive turn, new hiring schemes were born, seemingly putting an end to the system of life-long employment. And while the classical “economic miracle” working paradigm went through a transformation, the traditional pattern of salaried workers’ career path is still alive and well. This pattern has several distinct characteristics.

1. Companies hire once a year, with a starting date of 1 April. The Japanese term “Simultaneous recruiting of new graduates” (新卒一括採用・shinsotsu ikkatsu saiyō) means that during recruiting season, companies select from the given year’s crop of college seniors and recent graduates. The connection between one’s major and the finally obtained position is mostly not as straightforward as in the Western world. Graduates do not go for professions but particular companies.

New employees will have to go through trainings, and the kōhai (junior) has to respect his or her senpai (senior).3 2. Dual tracks. Many (mostly large) companies have two paths, a non-career track (一般 職・ippan shoku) and a career track (総合 職・sōgō shoku) for newly hired regular workers. Ippan shoku is meant for women who work as non-professionals and mostly handle assistant jobs, with practically no promotion possibilities. Men are usually hired from the very beginning for career tracks.

3. Regular transfer between departments.

Every year, before the start of the new financial year, staff gets reassigned to a new position or to another department in the company. This ensures a better insight over the company’s activities for the employees.

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4. Tanshin-Funin (単身赴任・solo assignment).

A salaryman might not only end up being transferred to another department, but sending an employee to a branch office in another city or country is an established practice in the Japanese corporate world.

The family is not able to follow the breadwinner in every case, staying behind and thus risking the possibility of an even more distant family life.4 5. Lifetime employment (終身雇用制度・shūshin koyō seido). Companies used to expect their employees to stay with them until retirement, around the time they reach the age between 55 and 62. As a reward for the demonstration of their loyalty, companies rarely fired the salarymen unless under special circumstances.5 6. The seniority wage system (年功序列・nenkō joretsu). New employees begin with a standard basic wage and receive an increase in pay for each year of service.

Quitting a company for another can be disadvantageous, as employees would start from a lower end of that company’s wage scale, and these workers, after a few years of employment, enjoy a wage level that they could not match if they moved to another company. This system underpays young workers but rewards them well in later years, even if their productivity declines.6 7. Paternalism. Japanese managers are expected to treat their subordinates at restaurants and bars after work at their own expenses, take care and be supportive about their personal matters in exchange for the employees’ dedication.

8. Overtime. It is a part of life for most regular employees in Japan. In some companies, overtime is paid, in others, employees do “service overtime” without payment.

The Japanese expression on leaving for home—“Excuse me for going home before you” (お先に失礼いたします・o-saki ni shitsurei itashimasu)—is an explicitly stated acknowledgement that, by leaving the office first, the pressure and the remaining workload go on the other members of the 112

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group left behind, irrespective of the fact that even leaving as “first” might fall into the range of actual overtime.

9. Commuting. In some cases, it can be as long as two hours per direction in extremely crowded trains.

10. Holidays. While many Japanese salaried employees receive paid vacation time as part of their compensation package, very few workers actually make use of it. Due to the workplace culture, Japanese workers are reluctant to book vacation time on their own, for fear of leaving coworkers behind to pick up the slack. Instead, if Japanese workers do take a day off, they typically take one during one of Japan’s national holidays (sixteen days in a year). Japanese employees tend not to take as many holidays as contracted. Most of them could take fifteen days of paid holiday per year, but the majority take only half of that, and there are employees who will not take any. In Japan, sick leave is not paid, so when somebody is sick, he has to take a day off.

11. Sharing credit for accomplishments. Credit for accomplishments is shared with the rest of the work group. Pride in one’s work is expressed through competition with other parallel sections in the company and between one’s company and other companies in similar lines of business. Thus, individuals are motivated to maintain wa (和・harmony) and participate in group activities, not only on the job but also in after-hour socialising, mostly drinking (飲み会・nomikai).

Japan is a collectivist society, where the emphasis is on the group and not on the individual. The interests of the group are superior to the ones of the individual, who, if necessary, has to make personal sacrifices to keep up the group cohesion. As the Japanese saying goes: Deru kugi wa utareru (出る釘は打たれる・The nail which sticks out will be hammered.). This means if you stand out, you will be criticised or have to leave the group.

This model, although less prevalent since the crisis of the 1990s and the “Lost Decade,”7

remains widespread in the country. Having said that, in recent times, only about 9% of Japanese companies have retained a lifetime employment system for new hires. Company loyalty is weakening, and the number of employees who change workplace for a higher salary or new challenges is also on the rise.8 All these changes affect relationships inside the company and create tensions. Some employees still believe in the old system, while others enjoy the benefits of the new one. Young employees are not willing to sacrifice their free time for the company.

They value merit instead of loyalty.9 Nowadays, becoming a suit-and-tie salaryman looks far less appealing to the younger generation, who have begun to question the system and look for alternative ways to live and work. The changes also require different leadership and management styles.

WORKING CONDITIONS—SPACE AND TIME Working conditions are determined by the compact use of space. Small, closely spaced desks often form one large table so that everyone faces the others. There is not much room for individual use—space surrounding the employees must be kept neat in order to serve the needs of collective supplies. The supervisor sits at the head, the youngest at the foot.

Communication is continuous because the talk among employees is oftentimes overheard by all the others. Workspaces are for work exclusively; only a few, if any, personal touches permitted.

Coupled with the diminishing Japanese workforce, the average hours worked in a week have been on the rise at many medium-to-large companies. It is common for many employees to work twelve or more hours a day in certain industries, despite contracts claiming an 8-hour work day. At many companies, there is a written-in overtime allowance per month in the contract. Often, the first 20-40 hours of overtime are “service overtime” and, therefore, unpaid.

This has gradually led to the growing number of karōshi (過労死・death attributed to overwork) and karōjisatsu (過労自殺・suicide by overwork) cases, and the phenomena also started to affect more and more women.10 Initially, the ailment was known as “occupational sudden death,” as the fatalities were primarily job-related. In their quest to make good impressions on their bosses, workers began putting their loyalty to the ultimate test. It is estimated that more than 10,000 workers die annually owing to cerebral/ cardio diseases caused by work overload. Only a small percentage of these cases involve blue-collar workers.

TREND IN HOURS ACTUALLY WORKED AND NON-SCHEDULED HOURS WORKED

Annual total of hours actually worked 総実労働時間（年間）

総実労働時間数及び所定外労働時間数の推移 (hour) 2,500 2,250 2,000 1,750 1,500 1,250 1,000 750 500 250 0

Annual scheduled hours worked 所定内労働時間（年間） Annual non-scheduled hours worked 所定外労働時間（年間）

2,432 2,170

2,239 2,039

262 1960

2,108

2,052

1,946

1,866

1,859

1,798

1,808

1,792

1,788

1,720

1,654

1,662

1,643

1,634

200

162

186

139

144

146

149

154

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2012

2013

2014

Notes: 1) The total of hours actually worked is the sum of scheduled hours worked and non-scheduled hours worked. The scheduled hours worked is the number of hours actually worked between the start and close of working hours according to the employment regulations of an establishment, and the non-scheduled hours worked is the number of hours actually worked when starting work early, working overtime, being called in for unscheduled work, working on holidays, etc.

2) Annual hours worked were calculated by multiplying monthly hours worked by 12 and rounding off fractions below the decimal point.

3) Establishments with 30 employees or more were surveyed.

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% out of total number of suicides

PERCENTAGE OF SUICIDES DUE TO WORK PROBLEMS (YEAR) 10,00% 9,00% 8,90% 8,80% 9,00% 8,20% 9,30% 9,00% 8,80% 7,50% 8,00% 8,50% 7,70% 7,00% 6,00% 6,70% 5,00% 4,00% 3,00% 2,00% 1,00% 0,00% 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 Year

As of March 2018, the Labour Standards Act (LSA) states that an employer should not exceed a 40-hour work week for employees.11 Exceeding this work week requires an exclusive worker– management agreement, and overtime is to be compensated with a corresponding wage increase. Certain newly implemented reforms in the Industrial Health and Safety Law—albeit non-binding—mandate employers to arrange for overtime workers to be provided with health guidance.

In 2016, the government launched an initiative called Premium Fridays, in which it encouraged companies to allow their employees to leave at 3pm on the last Friday of the month. But it was found that not even 4% of employees in Japan actually left early on the first Premium Friday.

ATYPICAL WORKING STYLES In January 2019, the figures for Japan’s employment situation showed that the ratio of the employed stood at 59.7%, and the number of employed totalled 66,650 million against a population of 126 million, out of which 22,062 million people were employed full-time.12 This means that only one-third of all employees work full-time. Meanwhile, the number of part-time employees stood at 7,129 million, while job vacancies had risen to 990,091.

Japan’s lifetime employment system has been challenged in the last twenty years. In the 1990s, the baby boom generation, around seven million people, moved to the top in company hierarchy. As already mentioned, Japan has a seniority wage system, so these 114

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employees became very expensive for the companies. This was also the time when the economic crisis started. Companies decided to fill up open positions with freelance and temporary workers with lower pay and no job security. The ones who still enjoy the benefits of lifetime employment are those working at large enterprises, and they amount to 30% of the full workforce and are mostly men. 13 The number of non-regular staff increased, which shows that some companies are no longer able to offer the same benefit package for everyone. A special category of part-timers is called “freeters.” Freeter (フリーター・furītā) is a Japanese expression describing young people unable or unwilling to enter full-time employment, thus either hopping from parttime job to part-time job instead of pursuing higher education, or being unemployed for an extensive amount of time. The birth of the freeters can be traced back to a notion of protest against the salaryman system or the highly competitive educational system. 14 According to the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, there were already 4 million of freeters in 2001. 15 Many Japanese people worry about the future impact of freeters on society. If they work at all, freeters often work at convenience stores, supermarkets, fast food outlets, restaurants, and other low-paying, low-skill jobs. The rise of internet businesses has allowed some freeters to work from home and be self-employed. Some experts predict, however, that the labour shortage created

by Japan’s ageing population will increase career options for freeters. 16 The longer somebody is a freeter, the more difficult is to start a career, as Japanese companies prefer to hire new workers fresh out of high school or university. While the employment situation is changing, large traditional companies still see a new employee as a lifetime investment.

They much prefer to hire a young person who offers a longer period of service and will be easier to mold. Often, the only option left for freeters is to continue working at low-income part-time jobs, making it difficult to establish

their own household. Consequently, many of them choose to stay free with their families as “parasite singles.”

THE GENDER BIAS Japan’s labour force is decreasing and companies are hiring more women than before.

Women are getting more skilled and some can maintain careers, while having families due to family-friendly policies.17 In 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe introduced his economic policy package called “Abenomics” to boost the stagnating Japanese economy—and a part of this package is actually called “Womenomics.” He recognised that there is great potential in increasing female work participation and closing the gender employment gap. The target to increase female work participation has been reached. In 2016, the female employment rate in Japan was 66.1%, which is above the OECD-34 average of 59.46%.19 However, more than 55% work part-time or are engaged in some other non-regular type of work. Regarding the number of hours worked, it can also mean only a couple of hours per week. Many women work on fixed terms, doing computer programming, interpreting, secretarial work, book-keeping, etc.20 Women earn on average just 73% of what Japanese men take home.

After having a child, it is very difficult for Japanese women to continue working as a

POPULATION AGED 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY LABOUR FORCE (2018 ANNUAL AVERAGE) TEN THOUSAND PERSONS

REGULAR EMPLOYEE

REGULAR EMPLOYEE

2347

1138

NON-REGULAR EMPLOYEE

NON-REGULAR EMPLOYEE

669

1451

PART-TIME WORKER, ARBEIT (TEMPORARY WORKER)

PART-TIME WORKER, ARBEIT (TEMPORARY WORKER)

347

1143

full-time employee. Even companies who try to support the promotion of women put women on a more clerical or administrative career track, which in a later stage of career makes further promotion to top management impossible.

One of the initiatives of the Abe government is to increase the number of female managers in Japan. In listed companies, the proportion of female executives was 3.7% in 2017, and the goal is to increase this figure to 10% by 2020.21 Such initiatives and quotas can naturally have undesirable side effects. Some women are promoted to functions which are top management positions in name but, in reality, only symbolic.22 In private corporations, the proportion of female managers was 10.6% in 2011, and it was at a similar level in 2018. Only 6.6% of the general managers are women, and 3.7% of the executives in listed companies are female.23 Certainly, there are numerous factors and arguments against the Womenomics programme and these include the following: 1. Social expectations and social thinking promoting traditional gender roles do not support this process of change. The principle of danson johi (男尊女卑), i.e., the rule of men over women, which is rooted in the main principles of Confucianism, is an attitude that still defines and determines the mentality of a large number of men, mainly in the middle-aged and older generations, who are in decision-making positions currently.

Up until the most recent times, girls were raised in a spirit of aspiring to become ideal ryōsai kenbo (良妻賢母), i.e., good wives and wise mothers.

2. Employees rigidly stick to traditions, and, for that reason, they are not very keen to give up male dominance.24 3. Many women are hesitant about taking up jobs and are alarmed by the latent persecution, bullying, and harassment still characterising some workplaces: these actions are aimed at making women’s lives difficult in the workplace, and, consequently, women may eventually decide to leave the world of work for good. Such bullying SOCIETY

115

and harassment include matahara (マタハラ・maternity harassment), the act of bullying or making comments on mothers or expectant mothers, sekuhara (セクハ ラ・sexual harassment), and pawahara (パワハラ・power harassment), the misuse of power.

4. A change in women’s attitudes is also necessary for the success of Womenomics.

A lack of self-confidence, the underestimation of their skills and capacities, as well as a fear of potential vilification prevent many women from fighting for the rights and opportunities that they deserve based on their skills, knowledge, and qualifications.

It can easily be realised and acknowledged that, in Japan, the elimination of female underemployment, i.e., the more effective and successful utilisation of female potential, can generate an immense amount of social energy.

As a result of the mobilisation of women’s and girls’ thus-far hidden skills, capacities, and knowledge, the future is certain to abound in truly great achievements. As pointed out by Kawaguchi and Mori, “despite a plummeting working-age population, Japan has sustained its labour force size, thanks mostly to surging employment among women.”25 FOREIGN WORKERS The population in Japan declined in 2017 for the seventh consecutive year, with people over 65 making up 28% of the population.

According to government estimates, by 2025 there 6 million labourers will have disappeared from the workforce. Who is going to carry out their work? The job-to-applicant ratio in Japan is at a historic high of 1.58, i.e. 158 jobs for every 100 applicants in 2019. The country and its government are eagerly looking for solutions of the labour-shortage problem.26 Japan is investing heavily in technologies such as unmanned convenience stores and replacing caregivers at elderly homes with robots, but it is unlikely that artificial intelligence can come close to replacing the shortfall in labour.

Under the government’s 2018 Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management and 116

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Reform, 27 Japan will allow a greater number of foreign workers into the country, marking a major shift in its immigration stance. Japan expects as many as 345,150 applicants for two new visa categories through 2023, many of them from other Asian countries. The new law will enable foreign blue-collar workers from fourteen fields, including construction and elderly care, to live and work in Japan.

Applicants will have to prove technical and Japanese language skills; hence, most of the applicants are expected to be those who completed the trainee programme in Japan. 28 They will be issued visas to work for up to five years. Permanent residency, including for their families, will be open to those with higher skill levels.

CHANGES AND PERSPECTIVES Japan has experienced rapid growth in non-standard employment and, particularly, in part-time work in the last thirty years. There is a growing shift in Japanese working conditions, due to both the government intervention in response to declining birth rates and labour productivity, and companies competing for an increasingly scarce numbers of workers in the wake of a drop in the working-age population caused by low birth rates. Annual average working hours in Japan stand at 1,600 hours, but company policies aim at more flexible working time regimes, including measures to reduce working hours. Many Japanese companies are improving working conditions, e.g., by providing amenities such as sports facilities and gyms. The Japanese government is pushing through a bill that would make it compulsory for employees to take a minimum of five days leave a year. The bill also aims to ensure that high-income employees in certain sectors such as finance be paid according to performance rather than hours worked. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is pushing labour reforms that would abolish overtime pay for specialists earning more than JPY 10 million a year (USD 83,000). The idea is that, by ending overtime pay, workers will be encouraged to leave the office earlier.

It remains to be seen if political intervention will achieve shorter and more flexible working hours, and if regulatory interventions such as the current “work-style reform” package of the Japanese government can be expected to have a measurable impact on traditional work culture.

16 Shusuke Murai: Can Japan, land of lifetime employment, handle the rise of freelancers? The Japan Times. 14 May 2017. <https://bit.ly/2YsG5fO > Accessed: 11 April 2019 17 Kingston (2011).

18 Judit Hidasi: The Social Effects of the Abe Government Economic Growth Stimulating Reforms – on Womenomics.

Transactions of The Asiatic Society of Japan. 2018/10. 75–96.

19

Women and Men in Japan. Gender Equality Bureau,

Cabinet

Office,

Government

of

Japan,

2018.

<https://bit.ly/2XZbLcn > Acessed: 1 April 2019.

20 Sugimoto.

ENDNOTES

21 Women and Men in Japan.

22 Hidasi.

1 Chie Nakane: Japanese Society. London, Pelican, 1970.

23 Women and Men in Japan.

2

24

Izakaya is the Japanese word for a pub equivalent to

Nagy Stephen R. (ed.): Japan’s Demographic Revival.

a tapas bar, where one can consume drinks and light

World Scientific Publishing Company, Singapore, 2016.

meals—(Ed.).

25

3

in Japan, 2000-2016. IZA Wolrd of Labor. 217/385.

Yoshio Sugimoto: An Introduction to Japanese Society.

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Kawaguchi Daiji – Mori Hiroaki: The labor market

<doi: 10.15185/izawol.385 >

4 The Life of a Salaryman: time, space, career path. Culture

26

at Work. 2003. <https://bit.ly/2HJapfl> Accessed: 21 May 2019

resistance to immigrants by helping foreigners find work.

5

Quartz. 14 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/2xZewQr > Accessed:

Kristin Wingate: Japanese Salarymen: On the Way to

Extinction?

2011.

<https://bit.ly/2EhNxmg>

Accessed:

Isabella Steger: A woman is challenging Japan’s

21 May 2019

20 May 2019

27

6

and Reform 2018. Provisional Translation. 15 June 2018.

The Seniority Wage System (nenkō joretsu). Cross

Currents.

2003.

<https://bit.ly/2YEgnoQ>

Accessed:

Basic Policy on Economic and Fiscal Management

<https://bit.ly/2HpBbcC > Accessed: 14 July 2019.

20 May 2019

28

7

savior in Japan’s blue-collar labor influx. Nikkei Asian Review.

Jeff Kingston: Japan’s quiet transformation. Abingdon,

Eri Sugiura and Mitsuru Obe: Small businesses see

Routledge Curzon, 2004.

31 March 2019. <https://s.nikkei.com/2OFOubZ > Accessed:

8

21 May 2019

Sugimoto and Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan.

Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2011.

9

David Matsumoto: The New Japan. Debunking Seven

Cultural Stereotypes. Yarmouth, Intercultural Press, 2002.

10

Chris Weller: Japan is facing a ‘death by overwork’

problem — here’s what it’s all about. Business Insider.

18 October 2017. <https://bit.ly/2VpTVOb > Accessed: 13 April 2019.

11 Act No. 49 of 7 April 1947, amended by Act No. 42 of 2012.

12 Japan Statistical Yearbook. Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2019.

13 Kingston (2011).

14 Hugh Cortazzi: The ’freeter’ phenomenon. The Japan Times.

14 February 2001. <https://bit.ly/2VD46yT> Accessed: 21 May 2019 15 Yuki Honda: ’Freeters’: Young Atypical Workers in Japan.

The Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. 2005. <https://bit.ly/2WRtW3K> Accessed: 21 May 2019 SOCIETY

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AUM SHINRIKYŌ—TERROR AND ENCROACHING THREATS Francis Grice

INTRODUCTION For commuters on Tōkyō’s subway, 20 March 1995 began like any other day. Yet a terrorist attack carried out with chemical weapons would cause the death of thirteen innocent people and injure six thousand more that day.

The perpetrator was the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyō (オウム真理教・Oumu Shinrikyō), which still exists today in several different forms.

Aum originated as an acupuncture clinic set up by a blind man from a modest family background, Chizuo Matsumoto in 1984. Within a few years, Chizuo changed his name to Shōkō Asahara and transformed the clinic into a millenarian religious cult known as Aum Shinrikyō (“Supreme Truth”). This organisation embraced the idea that a global war was coming between the Western and Asian worlds that would extinguish all life, except for the true believers. At first, the cult simply offered its

A CONCOCTION OF ALL KINDS The ideology of Aum is somewhat of a mix from all the bigger religions, grouping together Indian Buddhist, Christian, occult and new age themes and tenets. The leader Asahara made sure to include a personality cult too, and publicised his own image as a god incarnate, first as Christ reborn, then as the reincarnated Shiva, god of destruction.1 Even the early Aum was resourceful enough to use popular mediums in the early Heisei Era, trying to gain ground and popularise Asahara’s ideology through manga (Japanese comic books) and anime (Japanese animation).

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Shōkō Asahara in 1995

followers the ability to survive this apocalypse, but later sought to bring about the end of the world itself.2 From these early beginnings, the movement grew rapidly, eventually acquiring a followership of over 10,000 members in Japan and 40,000 abroad, with bases in Australia, Germany, Indonesia, Russia, Taiwan, and the United States.3 It penetrated into the heart of many public and private institutions, including universities, science academies, businesses, the police, the armed forces, government, and even the yakuza criminal syndicate.4 To ensure their loyalty, members were subjected to ideological brainwashing, immersion in Aum educational materials, physical seclusion from outside friends and family, deprivation of food and clean water, sleep denial, regular beatings for even minor transgressions, and electric shock therapy through PSI (“Perfect Salvation Initiation”) headsets. 5 Aum raised its funds through the sale of fake products, running front

businesses that were staffed by underpaid cultists, and by extorting money and property from members. Capitalising upon these and other illicit practices, the cult had raised an estimated USD 300 million to USD 1 billion by 1995.6 THE ATTACKS Aum initially sought to gain power by political means and, in order to do so, put forth 25 candidates for the lower house of the Japanese Diet in 1990. Despite running a campaign that cost USD 7 million, Aum won just 1,783 votes and failed to secure even a single seat.7 In the face of this failure, Asahara and his followers increased their embrace of violence and terror as tools for advancing their cause.8 Abductions and assassinations were two violent methods that the cult sought to achieve its goals. The use of these began as early as 1989, when Aum murdered the lawyer Tsutsumi Sakamoto and his family after they took up the cases of several dozen Japanese families against Aum.9 A further attack was made in 1994 against Aum cultist Tadahito Hamaguchi after he was labelled an informant. The following year, a notary outside of the cult, Kiyoshi Kariya, was abducted and tortured to death, after his sister defected from the organisation, in an unsuccessful attempt to pry her location from him.10 Yet Aum’s ambitions for its violence were far greater, and so it sought to manufacture and use a vast arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, which were either created domestically, stolen from the Japanese government, or purchased abroad. The exact number of attacks that Aum carried out before the Tōkyō subway gas attack remains unknown, but one estimate suggests that it made as many as seven biological and ten chemical strikes. 11 One notable attack came in 1994, when Aum tried to kill three judges who were presiding over a fraud case involving the cult by spraying sarin throughout their neighbourhood. The judges survived, but seven people were killed, and 144 more were injured. 12 Aum was only found to have been

GOING INTERNATIONAL It is a common misconception to deem the Aum dangerous to only Japan, as Asahara and the members had a comprehensive plan to target the US, particularly starting with New York City after destroying Japan and murdering the emperor. The numerous branches in other countries reinforce the worries about the seriousness of these plans. Although Japan has and had strict gun laws, the close ties with the yakuza enabled the cult to accumulate a large number of guns, which were developed in the US, where the cult had a not-for-profit corporation set up. Their laboratory kept for developing the biological weapons were set up near Perth, Australia.13 This location was also used for conducting experiments on sheep. A helicopter was purchased in Russia with the intention to spread sarin gas with higher efficiency.

involved after the Tōkyō subway sarin gas attack some nine months later.

Aum’s efforts reached their zenith in the infamous chemical attack on Tōkyō’s subway system during the morning rush hour on 20 March 1995. At 7:45am on that fateful day, five Aum agents embarked upon different trains, carrying packages filled with sarin gas.

By 8:15am, each of the five had pierced their package with an umbrella and escaped back into the city above. The noxious liquid and its fumes that leaked out had devastating effects upon the commuters and staff who encountered them, killing thirteen people, injuring six thousand more, and causing mass panic across the city.

THE AFTERMATH Two days later, the Japanese riot police in chemical warfare suits stormed Aum’s headquarters at Mount Fuji and other Aum sites across the country. Here, they uncovered the torturous conditions to which the cult had subjected its members, along with huge SOCIETY

119

including some of Ashara’s family. Jōyū and 200 other cultists then left in 2007 to establish a rival organisation known as Hikari no Wa (光の輪・“The Circle of Rainbow of Light”).

A further fracture within Aleph occurred in 2013 over who should succeed Asahara as leader, resulting in the creation of a third offshoot called Yamadara no Shūdan (山田らの集団・“Yamada’s Group”).

Emergency personnel respond to the Tōkyō subway sarin attack

stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

The police then set about rounding up the leaders of the sect, which took some time to achieve.

Asahara, in particular, evaded capture for two months, during which time Aum repeatedly denied its involvement, obstructed the police investigation, and even committed further acts of violence. This included attempting to murder the Tōkyō Police Commissioner, attacking a train with an improvised cyanide gas generator, and placing cyanide gas-filled plastic bags in a Tōkyō subway station and a shopping mall.14 Eventually, 190 members of the cult were found guilty and sentenced, although the severity of their punishments varied. 15 Some members received relatively light sanctions, such as Fumihiro Jōyū, who was imprisoned for three years, but, for many, the sentences were more serious. Most prominently, thirteen senior leaders were sentenced to death, and these sentences were carried out in July 2018.

Yet Aum itself was never shut down. While the government removed its protected religious status, it opted not to invoke a Subversive Activities Prevention Law that would have permanently closed the cult. When Jōyū was released in 1999, he took control of Aum and oversaw its name change to Aleph (アレフ・Arefu, “Start Anew”). A few years later, a major schism appeared within Aleph between Jōyū and other influential members of the cult, 120

SOCIETY

AUM’S SUCCESSORS The largest of Aum’s three successors is Aleph, which has a membership of around 1,500 people, followed by Hikari no Wa with about 150 and Yamadara no Shūdan with just 50.

The three groups are thought to possess assets worth at least JPY 1 billion (USD 9 million) between them.16 When recruiting, the sects often target young people who are less likely to have heard about Aum and, to this end, promote themselves through youth centred mediums, such as yoga classes, universities, and social media.17 Initially, the sects often hide their name or masquerade as different organisations, and it is only after the potential recruits have been interacting with the sect for some time that they reveal their true names. By this time, the emotional ties are often so great that the potential recruit stays on regardless.

Each of the three sects has officially renounced their connections with Aum, protest their innocence, and regularly request to be released from surveillance by the government’s Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA).

Jōyū has enjoyed some success in this regard, and his Hikari no Wa was temporarily removed from surveillance through a lower court ruling in 2017 (although this decision was overruled in February 2019). 18 Yet the PSIA remains unconvinced of their sincerity and believes instead that the three groups represent a significant threat because they share a common fealty towards the late Asahara and aspire to advance his objectives. They report, for example, that Aleph celebrates Asahara’s birthday annually, displays photographs of him in their facilities, promotes his teachings, and uses educational materials on the Tantra-Valrayana—

a doctrine Asahara used to encourage murders.19 It has also engaged in illegal behaviour, such as committing fraud on the lease of a condominium and scamming a woman out of tens of thousands of yen in membership dues. 20 Hikari no Wa exhibits a number of similarly worrying traits, including retaining a structure and training system that is nearly identical to Aum at its peak.21 Although it is too small and new to have drawn much attention from the PSIA, there is little reason to believe that Yamadara no Shūdan differs from its larger peers.

It is not yet known what impact the recent execution of Asahara and the other Aum leaders may have had upon the intentions of the three groups. Prior to their deaths, experts warned that there might be a violent backlash, but this has not so far materialised at the levels feared. In the past few months, however, there have been some small-scale attacks that may have been carried out by members of Aum’s successors or others who were inspired by their creeds, although this link is as yet unproven.

One attack took place during the 2019 New Year celebrations, when 21-year-old Kazuhiro Kusakabe drove his car into a crowd in the Harajuku district of Tōkyō, after failing to set other celebrants on fire in the nearby Meiji Shrine.22 Kazuhiro later confessed that he acted “in retaliation for an execution” but did not clarify whether he meant the deaths of Aum’s former leaders, other executions, or the death penalty in general.23 Another happened later in January when about twenty pharmaceutical and two newspaper firms received envelopes filled with a powder thought to be potassium cyanide. The letters claimed to be from the recently executed Aum leaders and threatened to disseminate the powder more widely unless a ransom of bitcoins valued at KRW 35 million (USD 30,000) was paid.24 Regardless of whether or not these attacks were carried out by Aum’s sucessors, the very fact that they could have been underscores a crucial lesson: while Aum is often viewed as a historical horror, the cult remains active today and still represents a very real and present danger for Japan and the wider world.

ALEPH LEADERS: UNKNOWN, BUT PROBABLY AT LEAST SOME OF ASAHARA’S FAMILY FOUNDED: 2000 NUMBER OF MEMBERS: 1,500 HEADQUARTERS: SAPPORO, HOKKAIDŌ

ENDNOTES 1 Jake Adelstein: Aum Shinrikyo: The Japanese Killer Cult That Wanted to Rule the World. The Daily Beast. 7 September 2018. <https://bit.ly/2ZJuPwT> Accessed: 24 April 2019.

2

Winston B. Davis: Dealing with Criminal Religions: The

Case of Om Supreme Truth. The Christian Century. 1995/July.

708.

3

Saad Alqithami – Jennifer Haegele – Henry Hexmoor:

Conceptual Modeling of Networked Organizations: The

HIKARI NO WA LEADERS: FUMIHIRO JŌYŪ (HEAD) AND HIROSUE AKITOSHI (DEPUTY HEAD) FOUNDED: 2007 NUMBER OF MEMBERS: 150 HEADQUARTERS: TŌKYŌ, HONSHŪ

YAMADARA NO SHŪDAN LEADERS: MISAKO YAMADA FOUNDED: 2013 NUMBER OF MEMBERS: 30–50 HEADQUARTERS: UNKNOWN

Case of AUM. In: Case Studies in Intelligent Computing Achievements and Trends, edited by Biju Issac – Nauman Israr. CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2014. 394.

4 David E. Kaplan – Andrew Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World. The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia.

Crown Publishers, New York, 1995. 26–29, 169–171, and 187–188.

The three successors to Aum

5 Kaplan–Marshall, 60–63.

SOCIETY

121

6 Meredith Box – Gavin McCormack: Terror in Japan. The

23 Chika Mori – Lee Jay Walker: Terrorist attack in Tōkyō

Red Army (1969–2001) and Aum Supreme Truth (1987–2000).

after car hits eight people: the shadow of Aum. Modern Tokyo

Critical Asian Studies. 2004/March. 103.

Times. 1 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2GajJIw > Accessed:

7 Kaplan–Marshall, 46–47.

8 April 2019.

8 Rohan Gunaratna: Aum Shinrikyo’s Rise, Fall and Revival.

24

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 2008/August. 3.

newspapers, food and drug companies under names of

Tom Barnes: Potassium cyanide sent to Japanese

9 Kaplan–Marshall, 37–43.

‘doomsday cult’ leaders. The Independent. 29 January 2019.

10 Jake Adelstein: A Short History of Aum Shinrikyo, their

<https://ind.pn/2G7qdaZ > Accessed: 8 April 2019; Suspected

murders, and the failure to stop them. Japan Subculture

potassium cyanide sent to Japanese newspapers, drug

Research Center. 10 July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2IdfP53 >

and food companies: media. Reuters. 28 January 2019.

Accessed: 8 April 2019.

<https://reut.rs/2DakMaC > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

11 Holly Fletcher: Aum Shinrikyo. A profile of the Japanese religious cult that carried out the 1995 subway sarin attack. Council on Foreign Relations. 19 July 2012. <https://on.cfr.org/2ItKho1 > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

12 Fletcher.

13 William J. Broad: Seismic Mystery in Australia: Quake, Meteor or Nuclear Blast? The New York Times. 21 January 1997. <https://nyti.ms/2MUHw0N> Accessed: 30 May 2019 14 Box–McCormack, 104.

15

After more than 20 years of trials, Japan’s Supreme

Court removes final obstacle to Aum executions. The Japan Times.

21

January

2018.

<https://bit.ly/2KKUu5d

>

Accessed: 8 April 2019.

16 Ex-Aum executive Joyu Offers apology to cult’s victims on day of Asahara’s execution. The Japan Times. 6 July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2De5KAO > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

17

Members of Aum Shinrikyo religious cult sects reach

record high. Cult Education Institute/The Japan Daily.

24 December 2012. <https://bit.ly/2G7pk2i > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

18 Tokyo Court Backs Extended Surveillance of Aum-Linked Group. Nippon. 28 February 2019. <https://bit.ly/2IsVJDd > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

19 Surveillance of Aum successor cults extended three more years. Cult Education Institute/The Japan Times. 24 January 2019. <https://bit.ly/2Z8UoaD > Accessed: 8 April 2019; Aum Cult Leaders’ Execution: Why Now? Why Only 7?

Japan

Forward/The

Sankei

Shimbun.

14

July

2018.

<https://bit.ly/2P4PpD7 > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

20

Aleph raided over alleged lease fraud. The Japan

Times. 19 February 2018. <https://bit.ly/2X6tRIV > Accessed: 8 April 2019.

21 Surveillance of Aum Successor Cults.

22 Man who plowed car into pedestrians on New Year’s had planned to ignite crowds at Meiji Shrine. The Japan Times.

4

January

2019.

8 April 2019.

122

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<https://bit.ly/2P6o17V

>

Accessed:

JAPANESE IN BRAZIL Zsombor Szabolcs PĂĄl

Perhaps no other Asian and Latin American countries have such long-standing and strong common historical ties as Japan and Brazil.

It all goes back to the end of the 19th century and stems from the coinciding economic and demographic needs of the two societies.

At the time, Brazil was a young state having gained its independence only in 1822 and transitioned into a republic in 1883. One of the leading products of its economy was coffee, but the great plantations where it was cultivated, especially in the SĂŁo Paulo region, needed a massive pool of manpower. At first, this was covered by slaves brought from Africa; however, right from its earliest days of independence, the country had had to face an increasing push from Britain to abolish slavery.1 Finally, bowing to pressure in 1850, Brazil put an end to the slave trade, and, in 1888, to slavery altogether.

The prospective abolition of the cheap and easily available workforce, of course, made Brazilian politicians and businessmen think about a possible substitute, and, fearing potential revolts, they preferred luring foreign citizens to plantations over drawing on the already-present black ex-slaves.2 Japan, in the meantime, saw a forceful resurrection: it launched a programme to catch up to Western states and adopted a new Constitution in 1889. Its old, feudal-style class structure was reorganised, its economy revamped and modernised; a process which had shown heavy fluctuations until industrialisation gained momentum.3 These changes had a substantial influence on the agricultural sector too, causing unrest in the countryside.4 During this period, Japan also experienced population growth,5 a phenomenon quite unseen through the last one and the half centuries of the previous Tokugawa Era.6 As a consequence, swelling tensions appeared within the peasantry, since it

A poster from Japan calling for emigration to Brazil

was forced to pay the price for modernisation through the newly introduced land tax. Frictions, coupled with the burgeoning populace, needed safety valves. Thus, many Japanese ventured overseas, particularly to Hawaii, the United States, Canada, and, later, Latin America. 7 Although, seemingly, there was both demand and supply, things did not play out as easily as one would assume. Brazilian decision makers, lest their land become mongolised and degenerated, preferred European immigration, so much so that, at first, their legislation was explicit about prohibiting the entry of Asian and African workforce into the country. That said, not just the Brazilians but the Japanese also objected, as a delegation left with bad impressions of Brazilian fazendas.8 However, on a state level, relations started to form: in SOCIETY

123

1895, the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Trade, and Navigation.9 Finally, things were stirred up when Brazil set about alleviating its earlier restrictions because the European supply of manpower showed signs of exhaustion. The legislative process paved the way to a bill eliminating all constraints in 1907.10 In the meantime, the United States became saturated with immigrants, prompting it to start placing restrictions on immigration.11 These changes made it possible for the government of São Paulo and Japan to sign an accord on sending and receiving three thousand Japanese within three years. So, in 1908, the first large shipment of Japanese arrived in Brazil, bringing 781 passengers to satisfy the demand on local coffee plantations.12 The first Japanese had a hard time adapting to the conditions they found on the farms of São Paulo. Local authorities were dissatisfied with them, insisting that they were less productive than, for example, Italians. Japanese newcomers were disenchanted too, as they believed they were not at all distinguished from former slaves, while the low-quality food, the climate, and the new lifestyle also caused troubles for them.13 Be that as it may, a next group arrived in 1910, and, little by little, most of the Asian outlanders started to get by in their new home. In 1914, there were already around 10,000 Japanese in the State of São Paulo, and their number had reached over 132 thousand by 1932, although the state government stopped subsidising further transits because of its financial difficulties.14 The largest Japanese contingent—about 67% of the total entries—arrived between 1924 and 1941, after the United States had banned immigration from Asia, and the Japanese government had taken over granting subsidies to emigrants to Brazil, while private companies had also launched initiatives to incentivise the flow of manpower to the Latin American country.15 The Japanese soon became landowners, set up the first major cooperatives in Brazil, and specialised in polyculture and cotton. In 1930, they held only 1.8% of the land of São Paulo but were responsible for 29% of its agricultural production.16 Thanks to the financial and technical 124

SOCIETY

support from their state, as well as their mobility, entrepreneurship, and parsimoniousness, they experienced a social ascendance during the interwar period,17 although their presence caused increased polemics, and their activity—and, from 1934, even the number of new entries18— was restricted.19 Obviously, with Japan being part of the Axis, while Brazil aligned with the Allies, relations between the two countries were cut. The last Japanese ship with Japanese immigrants arrived in Brazil in 1941, and, then, until 1952, immigration was reduced to the minimum.20 Around that time, there were roughly 205,000 Japanese and Japanese descendants in Brazil.21 After the war, the two countries made a fresh start by signing a treaty of commerce in 1949, and immigration would resume during the 1950s. Thus, in the coming one decade, over 50,000 new Japanese would enter Brazil,22 and the number of Japanese totalled more than 400,000.23 In 1958, on the 50th anniversary of the Japanese migration to Brazil, even Prince Mikasa from the royal family visited his compatriots living in the Latin American country—an act that had no shortage of emotional moments, as members of the Japanese colony in the newfound capital burst into tears when he was tricked into seeing them.24 Later, on subsequent anniversaries, Prince Akihito and his wife also paid visits to Brazil, which has become a kind of tradition over time.25 The last ship loaded with Japanese arrived in Brazil in 1973, bringing only a few hundred immigrants to the country, 26 as Japan was experiencing a sharp economic growth during

Japanese immigrants working on a Brazilian coffee plantation

those years and the reasons for emigration had evaporated. By that time, the Japanese were almost fully integrated, which is well demonstrated by the fact that, at the beginning of the 1960s, São Paulo had several Japanese elected officials.27 According to a survey from 1998 made by the country’s statistical bureau, only 1.3% answered “Japanese” to the question “What is your origin?”28 At the time, Brazil’s population was around 170 million,29 meaning that over 2 million people had Japanese family ties.

However, around the 80th anniversary of Japanese immigration to Brazil, a different trend appeared. The muscular Japanese economy of the 1980s that was in a desperate need for manpower, coupled with economic troubles in Brazil during the same period, made several nikkei—as they are called in Brazil—to change their mind and go back to their homeland to work. A real boom in this reverse flow of migration started after 1990, triggered by a change in Japanese migration law. In the nearly two decades that followed, the number of these so-called dekasseguis residing in Japan added up to around 94 thousand.30 This furore, however, is unlikely to speed up in the future, 31 as Japanese enjoy relatively high social status in Brazil and are likely to get much worse jobs in Japan, where they do not really feel home either, experience an identity crisis,32 and encounter discrimination.33 Home to the largest, 3,800,000-strong Japanese diaspora,34 Brazil profited in many ways from its Japanese ties. On the one hand, as already mentioned, the Japanese were an extremely industrious workforce in Brazil.

Besides, during its postwar economic miracle, Japan sought good investment opportunities abroad, while Brazil tried to attract foreign investment to fuel its economic growth. Thus, the Japanese chose Brazil as one of the first countries to make their long-term investments, and so, up to the beginning of the 1980s, after the United States and Indonesia, Brazil became the third biggest recipient of Japanese investment, while the two states also built up a thriving complementary trade relationship.35 However, sound economic ties were torn

Prince Mikasa (Takahito) during his visit to Brazil

during the 1980s, the so-called década perdida (i.e. lost decade), when Brazil suffered from both political and economic turbulence and uncertainty, while Asia produced spectacular growth rates. Consequently, the Japanese lost their enthusiasm about their Brazilian investments.36 Conversely, when Brazil found its way to recovery during the 1990s, the Japanese economy slumped into a recession and failed to re-establish its former economic relations. In the meantime, South Korea and China would appear in the region and get a strong foothold,37 becoming rivals to a Japan slowly regaining its interest in Brazil, a big emerging market which successfully increased its political and monetary stability towards the end of the 1990s.38 The rivalry notwithstanding, Japan now considers Brazil an important investment destination, 39 and, in 2018, with its USD 530 million investment, it had the 13 th position in the ranking of the countries with the most investments in the Latin American state, 40 putting money above all into the automotive, infrastructure, food, shipbuilding, and energy sectors. 41 The mutual openness towards cooperation is also reinforced by good political relations and the reciprocal expression of faith in furthering economic collaboration.42 However, only time will tell whether Japan can catch up with China, India, and others in an Asian scramble for Latin American raw materials and markets. As things stand, it might even luck out in the coming years with President Bolsonaro’s Brazil seeking ways to loosen ties with China.

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125

TOTAL

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

21 093

18 960

13 087

20 542

22 043

22 769

34 335

44 457

31 679

UNITED STATES

4 465

2 614

2 383

3 977

4 644

4 522

6 073

7 047

4 902

NETHERLANDS

1 892

3 372

1 444

7 705

3 208

3 506

8 129

4 639

6 515

LUXEMBOURG

285

1 013

238

747

139

746

2 857

5 937

537

SWITZERLAND

182

347

336

364

342

1 659

905

803

380

SPAIN

2 767

587

710

1 054

1 220

1 564

2 202

3 851

3 424

FRANCE

1 913

1 815

825

486

1 458

763

1 233

2 880

2 141

CHILE

62

47

67

23

103

27

717

264

1 027

UNITED KINGDOM

416

475

253

275

153

426

1 053

693

1 032

CANADA

441

989

117

592

1 435

1 287

819

1 442

1 372

JAPAN

827

504

1 368

243

779

660

501

4 099

1 673

ITALY

281

473

390

429

346

254

313

385

232

GERMANY

1 047

628

506

795

1 388

867

1 801

1 086

2 473

PORTUGAL

1 692

1 019

202

571

335

347

517

1 051

384

TOTAL UNITED STATES

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

52 583

69 530

60 543

49 850

56 404

58 169

53 300

60 345

46 187

6 144

8 909

12 310

9 024

8 580

6 866

6 544

11 078

NETHERLANDS

6 702

17 582

12 213

LUXEMBOURG

8 819

1 867

5 965

SWITZERLAND

6 445

1 194

4 333

7 419

10 511

8 791

11 573

10 540

10 894

9 230

5 067

6 659

6 599

7 395

4 305

2 421

2 333

1 973

1 126

965

1 288

1 189

SPAIN

1 524

8 593

2 523

2 246

5 962

6 570

3 554

2 309

3 394

FRANCE

3 479

3 086

2 155

1 489

2 945

2 841

2 778

3 168

1 294

941

830

2 013

2 963

1 273

1 024

846

1 620

1 038

1 030

2 749

1 978

1 707

2 031

1 691

3 596

1 171

900

CHILE UNITED KINGDOM CANADA

751

1 789

1 950

1 215

912

978

543

303

1 310

2 502

7 536

1 471

2 516

3 780

2 878

1 412

537

1 123

300

457

986

902

868

1 720

2 835

1 521

686

GERMANY

538

1 125

826

1 011

1 574

3 453

1 826

3 221

3 793

PORTUGAL

1 203

491

551

596

3 161

386

247

318

172

JAPAN ITALY

The change in FDI in Brazil in million USD—Japan’s interest revived with the crisis in 2008.

ENDNOTES 3 Kazushi Ohkawa – Henry Rosovsky: Capital Formation in 1 Boris Fausto: Historia do Brasil. Editora da Universidade

Japan. In: The Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The

de São Paulo, São Paulo, 1995. 192–197.

Industrial Economies Capital, Labour, and Enterprise (Vol. VII.),

2 Mônica Raise Schpun: L’immigration japonaise au Brésil.

edited by Peter Mathias – Michael Moissey Postan. Cam-

Six générations en un siècle. Cahiers du Brésil Contemporain.

bridge University Press, Cambridge – New York – London –

2008/71–72. 25.

Melbourne, 1978. 141–144.

126

SOCIETY

4 W. G. Beasley: The Japanese Experience. A Short History

28

of Japan. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1999. 220.

Budapest, 2016. 81.

5 Hiroshi Ohbuchi: Demographic Transition in the Process of

29 Brazil – Population. Countryeconomy.com. <https://bit.

Japanese Industrialization. In: Japanese Industrialization and

ly/2XgHzwU > Accessed: 13 June 2019.

Its Social Consequences, edited by Hugh Patrick. University

30 Jeff Kingston: A modern Japán kihívásai. Antall József

of California Press, Berkeley – Los Angeles – London, 1976.

Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2019. 208.

329–333.

31

6 Jean-Noël Biraben: Le Point sur l’Histoire de la Population

Brazilians and the Future of Brazilian Migration to Japan.

du Japon. Population. 1993/2. 446.

International Migration. 2014/April. 66–83.

7

32 Kingston, 207.

Daniel M. Masterson – Sayaka Funada-Classen: The

Soltész Béla: Hátizsákkal Brazíliában. Európa Kiadó,

David McKenzie – Alejandrina Salcedo: Japanese-

Japanese in Latin America. University of Illinois Press, Urbana

33

– Chicago, 2004. 8–9.

dans la migration de brésiliens au Japon. Cahiers du Brésil

8 Schpun, 27–29.

9

Alejandro

Aproximações

Contemporain. 2008/71–72. 229–255.

Ratsuo e

Lili Kawamura: La discrimination sociale et culturelle

Uehara:

Relações

Distanciamentos.

Asia

Brasil–Japão: &

Argentina.

34 Who are “Nikkei & Japanese Abroad”? The Association of Nikkei & Japanese Abroad. <https://bit.ly/2IbSEXq >

<https://bit.ly/2ZlVBus > Accessed: 12 June 2019.

Accessed: 13 June 2019.

10 Schpun, 30.

35 Uehara.

11 Masterson – Funada-Classen, 9–10.

36 Edmundo Sussumu Fujita: O Brasil e a Ásia do Leste –

12

Apontamentos para a construção de parcerias sinérgicas.

História da imigração japonesa no Brasil. Assembleia

Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo. 1 October 2008.

Politica Externa. 2011/2. 81–104.

<https://bit.ly/2MvBkwV > Accessed: 25 March 2018.

37 Henrique Altemani de Oliveira: Os blocos asiáticos e o

13 Schpun, 34.

relacionamento Brasil–Ásia. São Paulo em Perspectiva. 2002/

14 História da imigração japonesa no Brasil.

January–March. 120–121.

15 Daniela de Carvalho: Migrants and Identity in Japan and

38 Uehara.

Brazil. The Nikkeijin. Routledge, London – New York, 2003.

39 Fortalecendo a Parceira Estratégica e Global: a Política

5–6.

do Japão para o Brasil. Embaixada do Japão no Brasil,

16 Schpun, 31–37.

2017. 6–7.

17 de Carvalho, 37.

40

18 de Carvalho, 6.

milhões. Jornal Estado de Minas. 16 January 2018.

19 História da imigração japonesa no Brasil.

<https://bit.ly/2Zo9KqO > Accessed: 29 April 2019.

20

41

120 Anos de Amizade Japão–Brasil. Embaixada do

Investimentos do Japão no Brasil foram de US$ 530

Bolshova Yekaterina Vladimirovna – Shcherbakova

Japão no Brasil. 8 October 2015. <https://bit.ly/2wNjoXS >

Alina Vyacheslavovna – Shcherbakov Denis Arkadyevich:

Accessed: 13 June 2019.

Investitsionnoye

21 de Carvalho, 6.

meksikoy: tekushcheye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya.

22 de Carvalho, 7.

Yezhegodnik Yaponiya. 2015. 105–112.

sotrudnichestvo

yaponii

s

braziliyey

i

23 História da imigração japonesa no Brasil.

42 Abe touts growth as Japan, Brazil bolster economic ties.

24 Conceição Freitas: O Dia em que JK fez os Japoneses

The Japan Times. 2 August 2014. <https://bit.ly/2WG8x1n >

Chorar. Correio Braziliense. 9 August 2007. Cited by

Accessed: 14 June 2019.; Visita do Presidente da República

Japão: O Fim Ou Um Novo Começo? 23 April 2011.

ao Japão – Tóquio, 18 e 19 de outubro de 2016. Portal

<https://bit.ly/2Xd4poQ > Accessed: 13 June 2019.

do Governo Brasileiro. Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

25

Visitas da família imperial japonesa já se tornaram

tradição.

Tribuna.

6

November

2008.

<https://bit.ly/

11 October 2016. <https://bit.ly/2ZtIIi3 > Accessed: 14 June 2019.; Em Davos Bolsonaro se reúne com premiê do

2RdMTeG > Accessed: 13 June 2019.

Japão.

26 William Fernandes Bernardo: Porque o brasileiro é uma

<https://bit.ly/ 2WJOoHQ > Accessed: 14 June 2019.

Jornal

Estado

de

Minas.

23

January

2019.

coisa e o japonês é outra: trajetórias de vida e memória da imigração japonesa na região de Barbacena, MG. Thesis.

Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, Juiz de Fora, 2013. 8.

27 História da imigração japonesa no Brasil.

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THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE LITERATURE IN THE HEISEI ERA Dr Judit Vihar The bursting of the bubble economy at the advent of the Heisei had wide-ranging consequences.

One of them was that people became disillusioned with the economic miracle they had believed in and felt that they needed a place to escape from this disappointment. Thus, many people felt driven to escape into the enjoyment of various fields of art. An active or passive engagement with the arts provided consolation, as well as intellectual pleasure, new role models, and an opportunity for self-expression. What are the kinds of art and the various genres that crossed the borders of Heisei Era Japan to achieve worldwide success?

During Heisei, Japanese poetry, and in particular haiku (俳句), achieved global popularity. Thus, it also gained many fans in Hungary, especially by the beginning of the new millennium. In Japan, poetry has been remarkably popular since its beginnings. In fact, at one point, it was considered so important that a separate ministry was dedicated to it. The basic unit of the Japanese poem is not the syllable, but the mora. This means a syllable that usually consists of either a short vowel, or the combination of a consonant and a vowel. Unlike European poetry, Japanese poems are not characterised by even-numbered syllables and verses but odd-numbered ones.

In the Middle Ages, people would pass the time by writing endless chains of poetry. The collaborative poem (連歌・renga) was a collective genre, with examples created by one poet writing the first three lines (5,7,5), another one the second two (7,7), then yet another contributing three lines again, and so on. By the end of the 16th century, the popular collaborative poem’s first three lines had become a separate unit, giving birth to haiku, with a mora structure of 5,7,5— summarising the poet’s message and emotions in just 17 mora. This jewel of world literature is 130

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one of the most concise fixed-form poems. One requirement of the classic haiku, the golden age of which was in the 17th century, was that it had to feature a word referencing the season that the work is about. When, for example, the poem was inspired by the spring, it had to feature a word having to do with that season, such as spring rain, nightingale, a fresh bud, and so on.

When readers encountered verses about pines or herons, they were reminded of the idea of a long life. Dew drops and the foam of waves became the symbols of impermanence and evanescence, wild geese ascending to the sky stood for lovesickness, and the sound of cicadas represented loneliness. Thus, one word, one reference was enough to evoke associations in the reader. The intent of haiku is none other than to carve the passing moment into marble.

Due to the many limitations (wordplay, inclusion of known geographical locations, the “cutting word” that divides verses), the traditional Japanese haiku more or less became calcified in its formal requirements by the 19th century and became forgotten by poets for a while in the second half of the 1900s, as the influx of European and American culture brought free verse into vogue. However, with Shiki Masaoka (正岡子規・1867–1902), traditional Japanese poetic genres returned to prominence. Masaoka’s work launched a revolution not only in Japanese poetry but world literature as well: it reinvigorated dying classical Japanese genres. This resulted in the birth of modern haiku, which does not require references to the seasons or adherence to the many rules of form. As a result, in Heisei Era Japanese poetry, three genres prospered: free verse, haiku, and the 31-mora tanka (短歌) typical of early Japanese poetry.

Now, let us get to know one of the greatest poetic voices of the era. Born in Osaka in the

Shōwa Era, in 1926, Noriko Ibaraki (茨木のり子) was an exceptional practitioner of free verse until her death in Tōkyō in 2006. She was an outstanding female member of the generation of post-war writers, a multi-faceted artist, whose free verse included themes such as wartime responsibility and important moments of rebuilt civic life, but perhaps her most beautiful works are her self-reflexive poems. Her most famous poem is Watashi ga ichiban kirei datta toki (わたしが一番きれいだったとき・When My Beauty Shone).1 In addition to her poems, she wrote essays and radio dramas, and translated the works of Korean contemporaries. Her collected poems were published in 1999 under the title Yorikakarazu (倚りかからず・“Without Support”), with great success. For her work, she was awarded the Yomiuri Prize.2 One representative of the kind of modern haiku that breaks with traditional forms is Ban’ya Natsuishi (夏石番矢・1955, born Masayuki Inui).

In addition to breaking the constraints of classical haiku, he creates modern, multi-coloured poems.

His original and translated haikus number about ten thousand, and his essays, which serve as a guide to writing haiku, are known around the world. He is the director of the World Haiku Association and the Tokyo Poetry Festival Committee. He is the editor and publisher of the haiku journal Ginyū, as well as the annual compendium of the best haikus from around the world in their original language, including English and Japanese. He is one of the organisers of haiku world conferences. In 2010, when Pécs, Hungary, was the cultural capital of the European Union, his organisation held a World Haiku Festival there, with much success. ŌE, MURAKAMI, ENDŌ, ISHIHARA—THE MOST PROMINENT WRITERS OF THE HEISIEI ERA In the Heisei Era, in 1994, Kenzaburō Ōe (大江健三郎・1935) was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, with the following reasoning: “With poetic force [he] creates an imagined world, where life and myth condense to form a disconcerting picture of the human predicament today.”3 This made Ōe the second Nobel laureate

among Japanese writers, and it is not at all surprising the he received this award: these days, we should especially pay attention to those literary figures who feel a responsibility for every human being, our environment, and the world we live in, and almost all of his works reflect this sense of responsibility. After World War II—just like Kōbō Abe (安部公房), who died in 1993, he appeared as a member of the après guerre group of writers. He already became widely known during his university years, and for his short story Shiiku, published in 1958, he received the Akutagawa Prize, for speaking out against senseless killing and war.4 1958’s Ningen no hitsuji (“The Human Sheep”) shows what an invading army and its foreign soldiers mean to a people. The Japanese people suffer having their humanity trampled on as mute sheep.

At a conference in Budapest, in 1997, Ōe said the following: “We have to find common, mutually acceptable ideas and starting points for solving global problems. As far as I can tell, at this point, everyone is preoccupied with themselves. It is dangerous when the community of nations is unable to make plans together for the future of Earth.”5 In his Nobel Prize-winning novel, 1967’s Mannen gannen no futtobōru (万延元年のフット ボウール・The Silent Cry) he also implies that, despite the one hundred years that has passed since 1860, the world remains fundamentally the same. After the late 1980s, Ōe turned away from the popular Japanese genre of the I-Novel (私小説・shishōsetsu) and began writing shorter stories and novelettes.6 During this time, his science-fiction pieces often featured the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima—see, for example, 1990’s Chirōtō (治療塔), or 2003’s Nihyaku nen no kodomo (二百年の子供・ “[The 200 Year Old Child”). Kaifuku suru kazoku (恢復する家族・ A Healing Family), published in 1995, is about the healing effect of the upbringing that the writer and his wife’s gave their child, who was born with a disability but went on to become a famous composer. His later works often raise issues of faith and religion: such is the case in an autobiographical piece written in 2000, Torikae ko (Chenjiringu) (取り替え子[チェンジリ CULTURE

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ング]・Changeling. Ōe has received numerous prizes, including Japan’s Order of Culture, which he was to accept in 1994 from the emperor but refused to do so, as he does not recognise any power greater than democracy.

The bad boy of the modern Japanese novel, Haruki Murakami (村上春樹・1949), has also been nominated for a Nobel Prize on multiple occasions. In 2019, he himself asked not to be considered for the award. He is known and popular around the world, and his works, which have been translated to fifty languages, have sold millions of copies. In the late 1970s, he was inspired by a game of baseball to write his first novel. Kaze no uta o kike (風の歌を聴け・Hear the Wind Sing) received first prize at a literary competition. The author then closed his jazz bar, Peter Cat, and moved to Europe in 1986. His 1987 erotic autobiographical novel, Noruvei no mori (ノルウェイの森・Norwegian Wood), brought him international success. He relocated to the United States for years, before returning to his homeland in 2001 after the Tōkyō sarin gas attack and the Kōbe earthquake.

Today, Murakami—alongside Victor Pelevin from Russia—is an outstanding figure of magical realism. He often gives his novels English titles.

Dreams, memories, and cruel realism are present throughout his work, and are imbued with bitter humor. He sees people as satellites who just rush past each other on the paths of life. Music tends to play an important role in his writing.

Characterisation is not one of his strong suits, as he tends to prefer mysticism while weaving a romantic story. His heroines are very similar: they are all beautiful, sensitive, erudite, and delicately built. They tell their secrets to young male protagonists in grand monologues or letters and often attempt suicide with more or less success. Murakami’s characters are lonely observers; his novels hardly feature any extended dialogues. Several of his novels have been adapted to film and theatre. His most notable Heisei Era works are 1999’s Supūtoniku no koibito (スプートニクの恋人・Sputnik Sweetheart), 2002’s Umibe no Kafuka (海辺のカフカ・Kafka on the Shore), and 2017’s Kishidanchō Goroshi (騎士団長殺し・Killing Commendatore).

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Shintarō Ishihara (upper) was friends with the most (in)famous 20 th century author, Yukio Mishima (lower)

A notable member of the older generation of Heisei Era writers is Shūsaku Endō (遠藤 周作・ 1923–1996), the most prominent Japanese Catholic writer, who wrote most of his works in the Shōwa Era. 1966’s Chinmoku (沈黙・Silence) and its movie adaptation brought him international recognition. The novel tells a moving story from the time of the persecution of Christians in 17th-century Japan. Endō’s other major works include Fukai kawa (深い河・Deep River) from 1993, which depicts the inner doubt and struggle of five Japanese tourists during a visit to India. In the final years of his life, the writer suffered from severe kidney problems. In accordance with his will, his two most important books were placed in his grave.

Another representative of the older Heisei Era writers is Shintarō Ishihara (石原 慎太郎・1932), who won the prestigious Akutagawa Prize in 1951 for Taiyō no kisetsu (太陽の季節・Season of the Sun). In addition to literature, journalism, and directing movies, he was also involved in politics as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party. He was eventually elected to the upper house of the Diet, and later served as the

Governor of Tōkyō from 1999 to 2012. He was also the head of a theatre company at the time and travelled to the North Pole, before retiring from the rough and tumble of politics in 2014.

To this day, he publishes short stories written in first person, often about World War II. In 1989, he co-authored “No” to ieru Nihon (NOと言える 日本・ The Japan That Can Say No) with Akio Morita, in which they call on the Japanese people to resist the United States. In 1996, he won the Mainichi Bungakusho Special Prize.

His most notable collection of short stories was published in 1990, with the title Waga jinsei no toki no toki (わが人生の時の時・The sublime moment of my life).

One of Japan’s most well-known sci-fi authors is Sakyō Komatsu (小松 左京・1931–2011), who won the Nihon SF Taishō Award multiple times.

His work—inspired by the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—reflects his concern that Japan might disappear from the Earth as a result of a catastrophy. At the 65th World Science Fiction Convention in Yokohama in 2007, he was an Author Guest of Honor. He lived to see the Tōhoku distaster of 2011, in the wake of which he expressed his hope that Japan would get back on its feet and continue moving forward.

WOMEN IN MODERN JAPANESE LITERATURE As surprising as it may seem, the first notable practitioners of Japanese prose, the creators of the Japanese literary language, were women— since, in the early Medieval Period, men were only allowed to write in Chinese. In the 10th century, several epic genres became popular in Japan. Among these, the diary became especially popular and was polished into a literary genre by aristocratic women writing in Japanese.

It was during this time that, thanks to the work of women, various well-known adaptations of stories were born—, including classics of world literature such as Shikibu Murasaki’s (紫式部・ 973/978 – c. 1014/1031) Genji monogatari (源氏物語・The Tale of Genji). The situation of women worsened after the 12th century, and by the beginning of the 17th, they had become

completely oppressed and helpless. Before they got married, they owed their fathers limitless obedience, and when—motivated by material considerations—they were married off through a matchmaker, their husbands could do whatever they wanted to them. Following the 1868 Meiji Restoration, their conditions began to improve.

For the first time in many centuries, a woman, Ichiyō Higuchi (樋口一葉), who died at the young age of 24 in tuberculosis, spoke out through her short stories. She called attention to the plight of seamstresses, the misfortune of prostitues, the fate of women unable to escape brutal marriages, and love affairs with tragic endings.

In modern Japan, the situation of woman has changed a lot, and will continue to do so. There are renowned female poets, but the majority of women still do not enjoy social equality to men. They are independent only until they get married—afterwards, the responsibility for maintaining the household and raising the children falls almost entirely on women. For this reason, Japanese women today have a hard time giving up their independence and do not consider it a goal in life to stand before the altar as early as possible.

The generation born during and right after World War II saw an increasing number of women get their work published. Some wrote with raw honesty about women’s lot, human relationships, while others attempted to adopt Western sensibilities. Yet others went with a more light-hearted tone. Among the female writers of this generation, Yūko Tsushima (津島佑子・ 1947–2016), Osamu Dazai’s second daughter, stands out. She was not yet one year old when her famous writer father successfully committed double love suicide with his lover. Tsushima’s mother then raised her and her two siblings, one of whom, her brother, had Down Syndrome.

When Tsushima turned ten, she lost him as well.

As a result of these family tragedies, her work always offers a look at the relationship between parent and child, man and woman, in an objective tone. Abandonment and breakup are common themes in her writing. And her hardships did not end with the death of her brother: her marriage failed, and she divorced her husband in 1976, CULTURE

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after which she raised her two children alone, until the unexpected death of her son in 1985.

While at university, she placed first in a short story competition, before joining the Bungei shuto (文芸首都・“Literary Metropolis”), after which her literary output began to increase. She also played an active role in literary life by attending a forum on the Gulf War, as well as symposia of writers of Japanese and other descent. Following in her father’s footsteps, she also wrote in the I-Novel style. Many consider her a feminist writer, but she rejected the label. Tsushima’s work marked the first appearance of the figure of the modern woman in Japanese literature.

She disregarded social conventions and wrote bravely about sexuality, bad marriages, and the life of single mothers. She talked about this in the following words: “I have never written about happy women. This is not because I like unhappiness, but it comes from my firm belief that misfortune is not always bad. Happiness can spoil people. Happy people can lose sensitivity, and, as a result, they become poor in terms of human qualities.” 7 She received several prizes and awards. From among her late works, the 1998 novel Hinoyama: yamazaru ki (火の山―山猿記・ Mountain of Fire: Account Of A Wild Monkey) stands out, for which she received the Tanizaki Prize and the Noma Prize. Meanwhile, for 2001’s Warai ōkami (笑いオオカミ・Laughing Wolf) she received the Osaragi Jirō Prize, and the Murasaki Shikibu Literary Prize for Nara Repōto (ナラ・レポ ート・Nara Report).

Banana Yoshimoto (吉本ばなな・1965), born Mahoko Yoshimoto, represents a somewhat more superficial but also more emotional authorial attitude in line with American stories. She took the name Banana allegedly because she loves banana flowers. In the late 1980s, she practically burst into literature, a phenomenon that ended up getting dubbed Banana Genshō (“Banana Phenomenon”). Her works are popular with young people not just in Japan but the US as well. Her first novel, Kitchen (キッチン), was published in 1987, and sold two million copies in Japan. It has since seen seventy editions altogether. It is a discussion of the problems of urban families with parents who are either divorced or live 134

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separately, which poses serious problems to the young people affected. Yoshimoto’s novels, short stories, and essays have been translated into thirty languages. Yoshimoto is also greatly influenced by manga, anime, and movies, in addition to Western writers, such as Stephen King. Her postmodern style also often displays the influence of the “cuteness” that became a buzzword in Heisei. Her language and devices often come from pop culture. Her protagonists are also often women, who closely resemble the heroines of shōjō manga (Japanese comic), which is aimed at young women. Her first full-length novel, Amurita (アムリタ), won her the Murasaki Shikibu Literary Prize in 1994. Aruzenchin babā (アルゼンチンババア・Argentine Hag) was published in 2002 and adapted into an anime the same year.

Kaori Ekuni (江國香織・1964) has been called the female Haruki Murakami, whose writing is full of sweet-sad emotion, which has put her at the top of bestseller lists not only in Japan but in South Korea as well. Her works—like those of Yoshimoto and Murakami—often have English titles. She has also created manga, anime, and cinema. Her first successful novel, 1991’s Kirakira hikaru (きらきらひかる・“Shining Brilliantly”), was also made into a movie. Twinkle Twinkle, from 1999, tells the story of a fake marriage, while the short story Duke (ヂューク・2000) is about a grandfather-like dog.

Eimi Yamada (山田詠美・1959), who often goes by the pen name Amy Yamada, first made a name for herself as a manga author. She was a frequent visitor to Tōkyō’s entertainment district, Roppongi, which inspired her to present scenes of violence against foreigners and the life of African-Americans. Yamada, as well as three other female writers who have gained a large following, Yōko Tawada (多和田葉子・1960), Sayaka Murata (村田沙耶香・1979), and Hitomi Kanehara (金原 ひとみ・1983), may have started their career during the Heisei Era, but they will likely reach their peak in the Reiwa Era. All three of the latter writers have won the Akutagawa Prize, and their early writing covers subjects that are totally new to Japanese literature and are related to pressing issues of our time.

THE YOUNG GENERATION OF JAPANESE WRITERS Of course, younger writers have also put out remarkable work. It might not even be necessary to look at their contributions separately from that of the female writers, but there are certain conditions that still justify doing so. Firstly, women were forced to endure such oppression in the seven centuries between the 12th and the 19th, that no major writer came from among them, even though the Japanese literary language had been established by them. After the late 19th century, but even more so in the 20th and 21th, the work of female Japanese writers achieved prominence, as already discussed above. Secondly, the reason for distinguishing between female and male literature is that Japanese society is highly polarised, and thus, the two gender categories are also sharply divided. For example, bookstores have separate sections for literature aimed at women and men. Women tend to write about issues that concern women, while men about things that men are interested in.

In the Heisei Era, Ryū Murakami (村上龍・1952) stands out for offering a critical (and often shocking) look at the society around him through fictional prose, movies, television shows, and the internet. He received the Akutagawa Prize in 1976 for Kagirinaku tōmei chikai buru (Almost Transparent Blue), a novelette about sidelined and disillusioned Japanese youth which sold over three million copies. In 1997, she published the psychothriller In za miso sūpu (In the Miso Soup), for which she received the Yomiuri Prize.

The book is an accurate and cruel document of society and the darker side of life in Asia around the turn of the millennium, with a style and imagery that represent a direct continuation of classic psychological novels.

Keiichirō Hirano (平野啓一郎・1975) is member of the younger generation, who, at age 23, already won the Akutagawa Prize for Nisshoku (Sunshine). In 2005, he spent a year in Paris as cultural ambassador, and even spent time in Hungary on a scholarship. Another favorite of younger readers is Genki Kawamura (川村元 気・1979), whose Sekai kara neko ga kieta nara (If Cats Disappeared from the World) from 2012

sold over one million copies in Japan, has been translated into eleven languages and adapted into a movie. He has received awards and prizes for a number of his books, movies, and anime.

CLOSING REMARKS During the thirty years of the Heisei Era, haiku, anime, and manga became worldwide phenomena. While the confines of this essay are too narrow to accommodate cinema and theatre, epic works experienced nothing short of a renaissance in Japan, and the era also gave the country its second Nobel Prize for Literature, awarded to Kenzaburō Ōe in 1994.

The epic was also made richer by the fact that female writers were now also making valuable contributions to it. It is not unreasonable to expect this tendency to continue in the Reiwa Era, yielding further complelling, beautiful, and valuable works of literature in Japan.

ENDNOTES 1 Translations of a literature’s title in italics are the official international translations, while English titles in quotation marks are regular translations of the original Japanese titles.—Ed. 2 The Yomiuri Prize for Literature is a literary award founded by the Japanese daily newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun.—Ed. 3

Kenzaburo Oe. The Permanent Secretary, Swedish

Academy.

13

October

1994.

<https://bit.ly/2Jti84y >

Accessed: 3 April 2019.

4 The Akutagawa Prize is one of Japan’s most sought after literary prizes presented semi-annually.—Ed. 5

Oe Kenzaburo Budapesten. Keleti Füzetek, edited by

Hidasi Judit. Keleti Kommunikációs és Továbbképző Intézet (Külkereskedelmi Főiskola), Budapest, 1997. 7.

6

The Japanese I-Novel is a unique genre, in which the

authors are the centerpiece of the work, usually accompanied by self-revealing narration.—Ed. 7 Chieko Kuriki: Yuko Tsushima. Chicago Tribune. 22 January 1989. <https://bit.ly/2Ho6ZzD > Accessed: 7 April 2019

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KANJI—A CONTENTIOUS, YET EVER-STIMULATING WRITING SYSTEM Ákos Stéger

A tangible tension filled the air in Japan on 1 April this year, as millions of spectators in their homes and on the streets focused their attention on the prime minister’s official residence, waiting for a most important announcement: this was the day when the name of the new imperial era would be revealed to the public. Millions waited with bated breath as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga flipped a board of calligraphy to reveal two characters that signified a new age.

The momentous sight was met with the rustle of a hundred cameras capturing the news: the age of Reiwa (令和) was just an arm’s length away.

After the noise died down, the Japanese prime minister extolled the significance of the choice of these characters for being the first instance in history that an era name was picked from classical Japanese literature instead of Chinese.

They argued that their decision to choose the poem titled “Song to the plum blossom” (梅の花の歌・Ume no Hana no Uta) from one of Japan’s most ancient anthologies, the Man’yōshū (萬葉集)1 was carried out in accordance with the judicious counsel of an expert committee, and they emphasised how this choice symbolised a promise of renewal, peace, and thriving for

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshidide Suga introducing the name of the new era 136

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the future of Japan. News channels exhibited an animated excitement throughout the nation: Ōsakan street food vendors offered an all-youcan-eat deal on octopus balls (takoyaki) to all customers whose names contained any of the characters of the new era. Stamp-making enterprises so unique to the country burned the midnight oil to carve new stamps in preparation for the years to come, and travel agencies brainstormed in a flurry to muster up the best idea that they can build around the new period name.

Those who observed this atmosphere that characterised the revealing of the two characters could get a hint of how giant a part of Japan’s cultural identity is defined by its script. The Chinese characters—or as the Japanese call them, the kanji—have bewildered and inspired linguists, historians, philologists, and average language users alike for several thousand years.

They are more than a mere tool to record ideas, concepts, and data: they carry a profound meta-layer with a cultural and cognitive imprint of people in the East Asian cultural sphere. If we unpack the meta-package embedded in the term “Reiwa,” then we soon discover a talisman-like symbolicism: the character rei means “auspicious,” and wa means “peace, harmony.” Thus, the intention behind the choice of this era name is to foster a peaceful Japan untouched by war unlike the Shōwa Era (1926–1989) and spared from natural disasters unlike the last era, Heisei (1989–2019).

However, not everyone shares the enthusiasm about the hopeful name choice for the new generation, and a dismissive tone has also emerged. Not long after the news, Japanese social media was full of posts expressing condemnation and comment sections under

online videos were filled with disdain: Japanese, Chinese, and Western users alike left sarcastic remarks questioning on what grounds the name Reiwa can be considered Japanese when the cited part of the poem in question was, in essence, meant to be a homage to a very similarly worded piece of classical Chinese poetry?2 Some other voices rushed to bring swift justice to the question, saying that the “genuinely Japanese” argument falls through, as the poem had been written in a modified version of classical Chinese.

But are these really constructive paradigms for approaching the relationship between script, literature, and cultural identity? Does the fact that the poem was written with a foreign set of characters alter the significance of the actual work? We need to be more careful than that when choosing our perspectives because, according to this logic, we would not be able to refer to the vast majority of 10th-century Hungarian literature as Hungarian on the grounds that it was recorded in Latin. We could similarly end up getting hold of the wrong end of the stick by identifying the English language with a pure Anglo-Saxon vocabulary, thus dismissing the entirety of postHastings English literature. This approach could be considered completely counterproductive to what really matters, namely the contents that individual cultures create and the context they bear for the individuals within. Our cultures are heterogeneous and do not function on an allor-nothing basis; therefore, it is paramount to keep in mind that culture, literature, and national identity encoded in these should always be approached with a descriptive, rather than prescriptive intention. Our world is not one of perfectly clear divides between absolute schemas of black and white, but one that is grey at best if seen from an adequate distance. The more we zoom in, the noisier the picture gets for all the meta-information that it contains.

From this point of view, every aspect of culture is a template ready to be borrowed, reworked, and loaded with concepts peculiar to certain cultures. This is why we acknowledge the share of European nations individually in gothic architecture, illuminated manuscripts, operas,

and stained glasses for contributing to our shared Greco-Roman legacy. The relation of “Song to the plum blossom” to the rest of East Asian literature is arguably analogous to that. The way the Japanese poem paid homage to and borrowed elements from an ancient Chinese literary piece was in no way a sign of the poet’s lacking originality. On the contrary, the poet Ōtomo no Tabito’s (大伴旅人・665–731 AD) thorough knowledge of old Chinese literature and ability to complement the old framework with fresh elements can be considered a sign of true literary greatness.

That being said, there is something that we have to acknowledge in the conflicting implications that the kanji communicates towards language users: that it does shed light on a deep-rooted dichotomy inherent to it. Every nation that was linguistically affected by the Chinese characters carries more or less the same ambivalent attitude towards kanji, one that is based on a varying ratio of favouring their practicality on the one hand and antagonism towards their ancient qualities on the other.

Considering that this script was created in a culture that was distant both spatially and temporally, it does communicate strong implications of outlandishness in its essence, and yet it is simultaneously tightly interwoven with the local cultural fabric. It would be a mistake to believe that this kind of ambivalent sentiment was first aired in the wake of the recent era announcement in Japan. It is a rather inherent part of the script’s nature that came about due to its long history that can be traced back as long as the Bronze Age. In its earliest form during the Yin dynasty (殷代・16–11th century BC), Chinese characters were simplified pictograms modelled on actual observed images. A great deal of the characters depicted animal and human sacrifices, tortures, conquests, reprisals, and superstitions, thus allowing for a very graphical insight into the society and beliefs of the people of those ages. In fact, this kind of a primitive value system was in many respects outdated even by the time of Confucius, let alone the 7th century, when the Chinese script first spread across Japan in great numbers.

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Even China had episodes of detachment to their script, and, just as in Japan, there were plans to completely abolish it at one point.3 In light of the above, I believe that the real question that we should ask is not to what extent the “Song to the plum blossom” belongs to Japanese literature. The question should be why this outlandish script got so organically assimilated and why it has endured throughout the times.

The answer may lie in an amalgamation of the characteristics it possesses: a distinctive kind of iconicity that allows for the characters to be filled with customised contents by individual cultures and an adaptability that allows them to adjust to the world that is rapidly changing around them. These notions are hardly anything to compare with western scripts. The iconic property of kanji can be seen in the fact that they function as mnemonic devices that support abstract thinking and pattern recognition.

A representative—if not notorious—example for that iconicity could be a simple character which is taught in the first grade in Japanese elementary schools, the kanji for life: 生 (i, u).

Unassuming as it may seem first, if we note that this pictogram originated in the image of a young plant growing out of the ground, it rightfully evokes a range of associations around the notion of birth, growth, and life. Evidently, the Japanese language also differentiates between these concepts and has separate expressions for each. However, what sets apart languages with logographic scripts from others is that these concepts are tethered together by the same character, incorporating all these different concepts in a single image. The same kanji is used when we write the words ikiru (生きる・to live), nama de (生で・raw), haeru (生える・to grow), umu (生む・to give birth). The enumeration is far from over, since there are (at least) nine more readings only to this character, and it is just the tip of the iceberg, for there are thousands more kanji. Even if the variety of different readings is not as extreme as in the case of 生, the intuitive, association-based nature of the characters remains. The adaptability of the characters can be best observed in their endless capacity to incorporate very different layers throughout 138

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history. There were instances when they served as mediums that introduced new ideas to society, especially in the Meiji Era after 1868.

Japan at the time saw an unparalleled degree of development and modernisation, and that, of course, left a remarkable linguistic imprint as well.

More than an astonishing 10,000 neologisms were coined in this period, and what made it even more bewildering was that these new concepts all entered the Japanese cultural context in the shape of kanji words. The word for “train” was created by adding the characters for “electricity” (電・den) and “carriage, car” (車・sha), resulting in 電車 (densha). Similarly, the character for “heart, soul” (心・shin) was joint with the kanji for “principle, basic rule” (理・ri) to result in shinri (心理), meaning psychology.

While these were newly created words, another prevalent method involved assigning a modern interpretation to already existing, archaic compounds. A very direct example is the term kakumei (革命) meaning revolution. The old vocabulary lacked a word that matched the western term, so the Japanese innovators borrowed the above expression from archaic Chinese and gave it a new connotation. The two respective characters mean renew and mandate, and the word originally meant the change of dynasties. These creations can be considered genuinely Japanese-made4 and today are shared in the everyday register in languages with kanji-heavy literature in Japan, China, and Korea. The process whereby the Japanese shaped the kanji to their image is far from over, for creating identity traits requires constant reaffirmation. Modern instances of kanji adaptability have been increasingly likely to come in the shape of a more liberal character usage. Japan (and, on that note, also China) has taken remarkable steps towards emancipating the characters from the arcane, scholarly rigidity that once surrounded them. One sign of this was when Japan opted for kanji simplification after World War II. With the help of a council that consisted of representatives of newspaper companies and other scholars, a list was created that contained the most important and frequent characters for everyday use. The ones

that were deemed unnecessarily complicated were either simplified in their shape or replaced with characters that carry similar meaning, shape, or sound. This list, the so-called jōyō kanjihyō (literally meaning Chinese characters for regular use) has undergone two revisions, and now comprises 2,136 characters. The latest addition to this modern custom of simplification happened in 2016, when MEXT (Japanese Ministry for Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) disclosed their new policy on acceptable hand-written variants of individual characters. These are truly forward-looking efforts to be seen as statements on their own.

They communicate that the script policy has made a significant step from a prescriptive nature to a descriptive one, catering for individual creativity in writing.

There might be no better example where the sentiment detailed above is put in action than the yearly Sōsaku (lit. created) Kanji Contest.5 People from all walks of life are called upon to invent and submit a completely new character that either reflects on recent issues or is entertaining. This represents, in my view, the most beautiful aspect of this script: it is a celebration of the mnemonic utility of highly intuitive characters and a display of the true glory of artistic freedom in expression.

Above, I hope to have given a brief overview of the various thoughts that come to mind with respect to the announcement of the new era name. In short, I believe what this event represents is a call to let go of paradigms that emphasise cultural territoriality and instead acknowledge the great degree of cultural interlinking that characterises our civilisation.

Through adopting a holistic approach, we need to start considering culture as a whole that consists of significant fragments and focus on the individual contributions to the whole. The kanji is a perfect example of putting this approach to use. Time is frozen in kanji—and yet they are current: they reveal a narrative of an ancient invention that has been transmitted across ages and nations to take on countless connotations. This granted the characters that they develop into the contentious, yet ever-

stimulating script system they are today, which never fails to inspire its users. While challenging language policies and education, they also reflect on societies and the way Japanese are. Every period and every nation has left its distinct cultural layer on the kanji script, and the characters, in turn, have also left a decisive mark on the cultures that have used them: this is the perspective we should inspect them with.

Just as it has been the case with the many generations before, it is now the turn of the Reiwa Era to invent new ways to mould the script to its needs, assign new uses to it, and fill it with unique content. It is most stimulating thought to imagine what the future will bring for a script that remains ancient and modern, alien and well-known, playful and profound at the same time.

ENDNOTES 1 lit. Anthology of Ten-thousand Letters, assembled in the 8 th century AD 2 The piece in question is titled Return to the Field (歸田), written by later Han period scholar Zhang Heng (張衡・AD 78–139).

3 This is most well summarised by Lu Xun (鲁迅・1881–1936), a key figure to modern Chinese literature, a great advocate of character abolishment and Mao Zedong’s favourite writer, with whom the saying “if the characters do not die, China will perish” is associated.

4 The technical term for this kind of word creation is wasei kango (和製漢語), or kanji words invented in Japan.

5

Sōsaku Kanji Contest. The Sankei Shimbun. 2019.

<https://bit.ly/2GHWCFk > Acessed: 29 April 2019.

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SEASONAL FESTIVITIES IN JAPAN Marianna Lázár

Although Japanese festivities have religious elements, for most festival participants, the coherence in their ritual behaviour does not derive from such religious categories as Shintō or Buddhism. From their point of view, participating in seasonal festivities (年中行事・nenjū gyōji) is a way to spice up their everyday lives, while also nurturing tradition. These annual events are actually Shintō festivals and rites with Daoist influence, or Buddhist–Confucian customs that have evolved into a holiday.1 Among them, there are a couple of customs that were adopted from ancient China but were later transformed and adapted to Japanese culture. This article is a brief introduction to Japanese festivities.

In present-day Japan, several popular rituals and traditional festive occasions exist. Every city, town, and village has at least one matsuri (祭り) a year. The word matsuri is mostly used to refer to Shintō rituals and joyous festivals. Large-scale festivals are often held in summer, and feature a lot of communal activities. They last for many

days and give a cultural identity to large towns or cities, while also attracting visitors and tourists.

There are also various local festivals that are mostly unknown outside a given prefecture.

Smaller matsuri in rural areas are usually held in spring or autumn and based on the rice-growing cycle. Festivals typically focus on one or more particular deity (kami or any entity possessing “divine status”) who are worshipped at the event.

They often include processions and traditional rites such as sumo wrestling or music and dance performances. Generally, matsuri are colourful events with a carnivalesque atmosphere and the lingering smell of festival food. When there is a procession, it often features a “portable shrine” (神輿・mikoshi), used to carry the worshipped deity, in addition to specific ceremonial items such as sacred flags, banners, instruments, unique festival floats mounted with a decorative halberd, etc.

The procession of the mikoshi looks quite like a parade where the kami visits and blesses the local community that is devoted to it.2

Dancers at the Harajuku Genki Matsuri Super Yosakoi festival 140

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Notable seasonal festivities include the following: centuries-old annual shrine festivals (例祭・reisai), setsubun (節分・marks the beginning of spring),3 cherry blossom festivals, autumn (harvest) festivals, rites of life such as Girls’ Day (ひな祭り・hina matsuri)4, New Year rituals (初詣・hatsu mōde),5 a shrine visit to celebrate a child’s third, fifth, or seventh birthday (七五三・shichi go san), various summer festivals, Tanabata festival, Obon festival, etc. The dates of some national holidays, which also happen to be one of the nenjū gyōji such as Adult’s Day (成人式・seijin shiki)6 in January, have been moved to a fixed Monday in order to have guaranteed three-day weekends.

Special seasonal festivals (節句・sekku)7 are held on auspicious dates of the Chinese calendar.8 One of the five sekku is called the Tanabata (七夕) festival, which is held on various days between July and August in Japan. This largescale festival celebrates the annual crossing of the Vega and Altair constellations. Its origins were adapted from the Chinese Qixi Festival and the Korean Chilseok festival. According to the original tale (“The Cowherd and the Weaver Girl”), the Milky Way separates Orihime (Vega) and Hikoboshi (Altair), who are lovers and are allowed to meet only once a year on the seventh day of the seventh lunar month of the lunisolar calendar. Japanese people celebrate this day by writing wishes on small pieces of coloured paper (tanzaku) and hanging them on a bamboo stalk. Most of the events are held along rivers or shopping streets, which are decorated with large, colourful streamers. Many businesses design special Tanabata versions of their wares. On Tanabata night, festival participants (mostly Japanese men and women) wear traditional clothing called yukata, an essentially less hot, easier-to-wear, and less expensive version of kimono.

Another famous annual event is called Obon (お盆), which is a three-day period that has been celebrated in Japan for more than five hundred years. Obon’s starting date varies from region to region: it is celebrated around 15 July (in the Kantō region), around 15 August (the most common date), or on the fifteenth day of the

One of the traditional Japanese dances at the Obon festival in Tokushima

seventh month of the lunar calendar (Shikoku, Okinawa). Originally, Obon is a Buddhist custom that has evolved into a holiday during which people return to their families in their hometowns and visit their ancestors’ graves to honour their spirits. At the same time, it is believed that ancestors’ spirits return to visit their relatives, so paper lanterns are hung or welcoming fires (mukaebi) are lit to guide the spirits to the home altars. Families also send their ancestors’ spirits back to their permanent dwelling place under the guidance of fire: this rite is known as okuribi.

Japan’s most famous okuribi rite is the Gozan no Okuribi in Kyōto.9 Five giant bonfires are lit with a distinctive shape on mountains surrounding the city; three of the fires form giant Chinese characters. From the 14th century, Obon has traditionally included a joyful dance for public entertainment, known as bon-odori: Awa odori (in Tokushima), Kawachi ondo (in the Kansai region), and Tōkyō ondo (Tōkyō) are some of the more famous dance performances. The dance looks and sounds different from region to region.

They may involve the use of different kinds of fans, colourful towels, or small wooden clappers.

The music for a present-day Obon festival is not limited to folk songs; it can be a modern upbeat tune or a nostalgic enka10 song as well.

The over-1,100-year-old Gion (祇園) festival is probably the most significant large-scale festival in Japan.11 It is an annual festival of the Yasaka Shrine located in Higashiyama district of Kyōto, and it is one of the “three largest festivals” of CULTURE

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Japan held right after the end of the rainy season in July. The event has been held annually since 970 as a purification ritual, but, after medieval times, it eventually became a way for wealthy citizens to show off to their neighbours. The highlight of the festival remains the yamaboko parade, with giant wheeled floats. These floats are pulled on their huge wooden wheels, with chanting musicians and special performers aboard. Moreover, they are covered with

centuries-old Japanese treasures and foreign luxury items.12 In the past, there was only one float procession (due to numerous incidents of damage by fire and war), but, from 2014, a preservation association has returned the festival to a form closer to the original with a total of thirty-three festival floats separated into parading on 17 July and 24 July.13 There are a variety of events one can attend during the Gion festival, such as the lantern reception, the

SHINTOISM The Shintō (神道・the way of the gods) religion is quite unique compared to other mainstream faiths such as Christianity or Buddhism. It does not have a particular founding father, and it does not worship many gods, but rather sacred spirits residing in objects, natural elements, or abstract concepts such as fertility. These sacred spirits are called kami (神). Upon death, the deceased also becomes a kami to be revered by the family in all generations to come.

Even the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, who is considered as the ancestor of the emperors of Japan, counts as a kami.

Even though holy scriptures, such as the Bible for Christianity or the Quran for

Islam, cannot be found in Shintō, there are a few basic tenets. This is why most rituals are either conducted to ward off evil spirits or to make offerings to kami. Sacred shrines are built for these purposes—however, they can be found not only in cities or mountains but also in homes in the form of altars.

Portable shrines are popular during festivals.

Emissaries of the Shintō faith are priests, priestesses, and miko (shrine maidens), whose main task is to assist in rituals and do the upkeep in shrines. Unlike in many other religions, these emissaries can marry and have children. 16 About 80% of Japanese take part in Shintō-related activities, such as festivals, but only a small percentage identify as an institutional Shintoist.

A Miko in a shrine in Tōkyō

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mikoshi purification ritual, kagura performances, the folding screen festival, or the popular Yoiyama event.14 During Yoiyama, the floats are lit up and put on display for the city to enjoy, and Kyōto citizens and visitors flock to the Shijō-Karasuma area to celebrate.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning Tenjin matsuri (天神祭り). Together with Kyōto’s Gion festival and Tōkyō’s Kanda festival,15 the Tenjin festival in Ōsaka is considered one of the “three largest festivals” in Japan. The two-day celebration (it falls on 24–25 July every year) is a major annual summer festival of the Ōsaka Tenmangū Shrine, held to ward off pestilence and wish for good health and peace for Ōsaka’s citizens. “Land procession” and “boat procession” are the two main events of the Tenjin festival today, and they take place during the day and in the evening, involving several mikoshi (decorated with a gold phoenix on top) and about one hundred boats. The land procession is led by red-hatted drummers and citizens in 8th–12th-century imperial clothes. At sunset, the land procession moves to the Ōkawa River, for one of the largest boat festivals in the world.

Fireworks and bonfires are lit as offerings during the boat procession at night, creating a truly hypnotic sight. The Tenjin festival embodies what makes Ōsaka distinct from any other part of Japan: everything from the loud hand clapping through the bunraku theatre, folk music, and festive food stalls to the fire display screams “Ōsaka culture.” It is truly a great opportunity to enjoy a hot summer day in Japan while wearing traditional yukata and enjoying the celebration.

4 The focal point for the Girl’s Festival is a display of beautiful dolls representing the emperor, the empress, and their court in a formal dress. Most homes with young girls will have a display. Actually, Children’s Day in Japan is a celebration for boys, corresponding to the hina matsuri for girls.

5 On the night of New Year’s Eve or the next day, people visit their local shrine or temple.

6 Adult’s Day celebrates people coming of age at 20.

7

They were traditionally held at the ancient Japanese

imperial court.

8 The first day of the first month, the third day of the third month, and so on.

9 Kyoto’s Gozan no Okuribi (京都五山送り火). Oh! Matsuri.

2019. <https://bit.ly/2Ws1aWU > Accessed: 16 April 2019.

10

Enka (演歌) is a Japanese musical genre resembling

traditional music the most in singing technique and instruments. Modern enka became popular in the Shōwa Era, becoming a defining element of postwar culture.

11 Gion Matsuri｜祇園祭. Discover Kyoto. 2019. <https://bit. ly/2UPVeWg > Accessed: 16 April 2019.

12 Luxury items from outside Japan were obtained via the Silk Road from the 16th century onwards, and some floats display artwork from the Middle East and Europe on their sides.

13

29 out of the 33 remaining floats are designated as

Japan’s Important Tangible Folk Cultural Property, and the yamaboko parade of Gion Festival are recognised as a UNESCO cultural heritage.

14

Kagura (神楽・god-entertainment) is a special Shintō

theatrical dance.

15 Kanda festival, held in every odd-numbered year in Tōkyō, is a nationally renowned festival dating back to the Edo period. About 200 mikoshi parades to honor the deities of the Kanda Shrine.

16

Shinto. Japan-guide.com. 16 April 2018. <https://bit.

ly/2km64TR > Accessed: 2 May 2019.

ENDNOTES 1 Since Japan adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1873, many rites are no longer in tune with the seasons.

2

The mikoshi are carried through the neighborhood and

temporarily installed at various places where the deity is entertained with different performances.

3 People throw beans at someone representing a demon and chant “Out with the demons, in with good luck!”

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INTERVIEW WITH MAKI STEVENSON, GOODWILL AMBASSADOR OF JAPANESE CUISINE TO HUNGARY Emese Schwarcz, March 2019, Budapest, Hungary

Maki Stevenson A Japanese who grew up in the heart of Texas, after being a professional cellist, received her chef’s diploma at the Natural Gourmet Institute for Health and Culinary Arts in New York. Having more than ten years of experience in teaching in Budapest, her goal is to spread knowledge about different ways to eat, cook, and appreciate cultures. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries appointed her culinary institution as Goodwill Ambassador for Japanese Cuisine in 2017.

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In 2017, you were named Japanese Cuisine Goodwill Ambassador to Hungary by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan. What can you tell me about your background?

My husband is Hungarian. We met in Texas. I was a cellist all my life before gastronomy, and after I got my master’s degree I was supposed to go to Columbia, where I had a job already lined up.

But being a very naive musician, I did not know much about the world, so when I read about the Columbian drug cartels in a newspaper—mind you, this was in the 1990s—I felt like maybe it is not the best place to be after all.

Then we moved to New York, and that is where my career changed. I enjoy music very much, but I was also very interested in the relationship between food and health, the historical and cultural preconditions, and how we make our food choices. Soon my husband’s work sent us here to Budapest, so half by accident and half by choice, we have been here for twelve years. So that is how I ended up here.

Here, we have founded two culinary schools. One is called Makifood, and it is twelve years old. Makifood is targeted towards home cooks interested in advancing their knowledge through

workshops. In each class, we focus on one theme, whether it is a cuisine or a specific type of food, for instance, sourdough bread. Then we started another school about two and a half years ago, called the Culinary Institute of Europe (CIE). This institute offers a comprehensive one-year training for seasoned professionals, future entrepreneurs and investors, and, of course, enthusiastic amateurs.

So it is geared toward those who either want to learn something new or want to freshen up their knowledge. The courses are not exclusively about Japanese cuisine, but we do include that also.

Our goal is not only to educate professionals but to educate the market as well. If somebody registers at CIE, they might not have an immediate plan for opening their cafe or restaurant, but these people will one day become better consumers, they will go out into the world and know what is considered good and what is not. They make better-behaved customers. And that raises the bar in general.

And what does it mean to be a Goodwill Ambassador for Japanese Cuisine?

The purpose of those who received this title is to broaden the awareness of Japanese food culture and gastronomical culture

and to showcase the usage of ingredients, popularising the cuisine through, for example, an actual restaurant. In our case, it is even more direct because we are an educational institution.

Outside of Japan, people might know what miso soup is, but they assume that miso soup means it contains clams, tofu, and green onion.

And when I tell them that we also eat potato miso soup or whatever is in season, they are surprised. I think what the Japanese government is saying is that we go beyond stereotypes and debunk misconceptions about, for example, what miso soup is, as there is not just one type of dashi or one type of miso.

Japanese cuisine varies from region to region.

I think it was interesting that we are the only school that has this title in Europe. I think that was also the point of appointing us because we believe in building up a community about exchanging knowledge. For this reason, we often do partnerships. We have had chefs come from Japan, ingredient purveyors come from all over Europe, and they want to give a tasting even if it is about street food ingredients. They want to spread knowledge about Japanese cuisine and to prove that Japanese food is more than just sushi. That is why we host these kinds of events.

Do you organise events to promote Japanese cuisine as a commemoration of the 150th anniversary of diplomatic relations?

This year, with the Japan Foundation, we hosted a fermentation master who came from Japan in June. He conducted a public workshop on fermented food, specifically the Japanese natto. As you know, fermented food is a characteristic of basically every culture.

But in Japan, it is quite an important speciality; you could say it is the essence of our gastronomy because the basic flavour enhancers all are fermented. When there was no refrigeration, and you needed to be able to preserve food, this is how you survived.

And it is an epiphany of not just gastronomy but history and culture too.

Then, in September, another important aspect of Japanese cuisine was presented, as a master

Lecture on Niigata cousine by Setsuo Morimoto, executive chef of Bandai Silver Hotel, organised by the Japan Foundation in 2012

chef came from Kyōto to do a demonstration on traditional cuisine. This event will also happen in cooperation with the Japan Foundation.

You have stated before in an interview that you arrived in Budapest as a vegetarian.

Japanese cuisine uses many vegetables, making it easier to go vegetarian—in harsh contrast with Hungarian meals. What was your first reaction to Hungarian food?

I was lucky in that I had had Hungarian friends in University before I came here. I remember one girl making a paprikás csirke.1 She was complaining that it was not real sour cream we had in the States, which I did not quite understand. I remember asking another student who is from New Zealand about what Hungarian food is like, and he said it is all paprika. He said everything is paprika, and then you put sour cream on it.

So that was my first encounter with Hungarian food, and when I came to Hungary, I was vegetarian. It was really interesting to be a vegetarian in the 1990s. I had a lot of rántott karfiol, rántott sajt, rántott gomba, with a lot of tartár mártás.2 But then my diet was changed by the influence of culinary school. New York is brutally cold in the winter, so you start to crave leves and hot stews.3 And so my diet changed, and I began to try out more of Hungarian cuisine.

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Traditional Japanese cuisine—or washoku— was registered as a UNESCO intangible cultural heritage in 2013. What is washoku?

What would you name as a distinct attribute of washoku that makes it special and a cultural treasure?

I think if you just boil it down to one word, it is harmony. Balance. It is not one or the other. And it defines our entire culture in a sense. It is not dominant, but it is as it should be. It is definitive, but it is not. It depends on the person, on the maker, and on the person on the receiving end as well. For a Japanese person, it is not as defined as you would think. Washoku can contain rice, soup, and, let’s say, three

WASHOKU AS AN INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE Washoku (和食・meaning Japan or harmony, and food or to eat) is traditional Japanese food, although it does not only represent the cuisine itself but an entire culture of preparing and producing food as well.

According to the UNESCO website, “washoku is a social practice based on a set of skills, knowledge, practice and traditions related to the production, processing, preparation and consumption of food. It is associated with an essential spirit of respect for nature that is closely related to the sustainable use of natural resources.”4 Respecting nature and nurturing familial bonds while achieving a healthy lifestyle is of the highest priority in traditional Japanese cuisine. Characteristics of washoku include a large number of items on plates, mainly seasonal vegetables, fish, and rice.

Some scholars contest the idea of washoku, arguing that Japanese cuisine—even traditional cuisine—is changing constantly, having several foreign influences. Regional diets and food are also very diverse; therefore, the unifying term of washoku does not have descriptive qualities.5 The word itself was developed in the Meiji Era (1868–1912)—a period famous for rapid nation-building.

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vegetables. But washoku may have many other variations too.

As for why it was chosen, I think 3/11 inflicted quite a bit of a change, both psychologically and emotionally. Personally, I felt like Japan was not going to exist anymore, that everything could disappear in a blink of an eye. Being designated as a cultural heritage means that everything is archived. Not just within the country but outside of it as well. It opens a lot of doors for the know-how and knowledge to go out of the country and beyond. It attracts attention. Now there are a lot of young foreign apprentices who want to become masters of the cuisine; there are numerous cases when the last-generation master has no apprentice, and that is when a Frenchman comes out, preserving the knowledge. So, I think, in a way, designating washoku as a cultural heritage attracts the attention of the world, thus contributing to saving traditional values and skills.

Culture is prone to change over time. Have you experienced any change in Japanese food consumption over the past 20-30 years? How about the Hungarian customs?

Can you identify any similarities?

It is a bit difficult. I know today’s Hungary is much smaller than it once was, which has had a certain effect on the diversity of food. In Japan, food very much varies from region to region, which is also very true in case of a landlocked country, such as Hungary. There might be quite a lot of similarities in that aspect, but, of course, Japan having access to seas makes the picture totally different. But, in general, obviously, food is about coming together, eating, and sharing.

The way of consuming food, however, is changing everywhere, especially because in the larger cities people are not getting together as much.

But if you go to the countryside in Hungary, you still see that the sharing of food is prevalent: when someone makes a big portion of something, he/she gives it to a neighbour, or, at weddings, all the neighbours celebrate together. I see that this is still common, and you see the similarity in both countries, but it is not so much about what you eat, but more about how it is done.

Change is another similarity. In Buddhism, which was very popular throughout Japanese history, four-legged animals were forbidden to be consumed for a long time. But when the borders were opened up, and different cultures started to come in, eating and consuming animal protein became more popular. You could say in gastronomy, the Japanese are always very curious and accepting of different cultural foods. Of course, that does not automatically mean that we adopt that food into our culture.

Sometimes there are some modifications to better accommodate the tastes to the Japanese tongue. This is the case with Indian curry too.

Japanese curry (or karee) somewhat resembles the original, but it became very much Japanese.

And I hope that a similar thing will happen in Hungarian cuisine as well. If you look at modern Hungarian cuisine, it does not resemble the traditional. It is not about one being better or the other. It is just different. It is just renewed and revamped, and it absolutely does not mean that the old is bad or worse. Evolving is key in the history of any cuisine.

According to your experience with living in Hungary, what do you think about Hungarian perceptions of Japanese cuisine?

What is the basic attitude towards it?

In the past 20 years, there was an emphatic expansion in knowledge in Hungary, and I think this is a worldwide trend, where the Internet has had a huge impact. No one needs to leave their home any more to look up or order foreign food.

They could even order the ingredients online. So I think, in general, attitudes towards Japanese cuisine have changed. But here in Hungary, there is a fast-paced change, and it is much faster than anywhere else. If you look around in Budapest, Japanese fast food is everywhere.

Hungary is changing so rapidly in this respect.

eaten this or that, many of them say that they not only have, but they have even travelled to Japan. I think economic power plays a considerable part in this: many households now have the financial capability to travel abroad, even for such long distances. Today, with cheaper airlines and just simply earning more, Hungarians, in general, have more opportunities to explore the world, and it is not considered such a luxury as before. This is especially true for young people. I think travelling abroad teaches a young person more than a year of school education could. Not just because you learn about another culture, but rather because when you come back to your own culture, you re-evaluate it.

There is a definite change in what is accessible regarding Japanese food, especially ingredients. What do you think is the reason for this market expansion?

I think that there are more Japanese living in Hungary than ever before, plus the financial power of Japan is not something to take lightly.

We have a dwindling population, so our market is shrinking, which is why we need markets outside of the country. I think East Central and Eastern Europe is considered an unexplored territory in this sense, which attracts Japanese tourists as well.

ENDNOTES 1 Chicken paprika 2

Deep-fried cauliflower, deep-fried cheese, deep-fried

mushroom with a lot of tartar sauce.

3 Leves means soup in Hungarian.

4

Washoku, traditional dietary cultures of the Japanese,

notably for the celebration of New Year. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization – Silk Roads.

You also mentioned that your aim with your culinary schools is to educate people and the market as well. Do you feel that the bar has been raised?

Yes, absolutely. I am always surprised that whenever I ask my students whether they have

<https://bit.ly/2Z1rt8h > Accessed: 3 April 2019.

5 Ryo Kohsaka: The myth of washoku: a twisted discourse on the “uniqueness” of national food heritages. Journal of Ethnic Food. 2017/June. 66–71.

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TASTES LIKE FAMILY Anikó Gorácz

Ever since it picked up steam in the 1950s, the Japanese film industry has from time to time astonished lovers of quality cinema all around the globe. In spite of the ascendancy of Bollywood, Hong Kong movies, and South Korean directors, it is still Japanese movie culture that stands out in an Asian context. Speaking about Japanese movies is not only warranted because of 1950s classics—such as Akira Kurosawa, Kenji Mizoguchi, and Yasujirō Ozu—or the new wave of the 1990s, with Takeshi Kitano as its most famous figure, but also due to contemporary movies that have just landed in theatres. In recent years, more and more Japanese films have appeared with success in A-list film festivals, thus finding their way to European audiences.

As diverse as they are, contemporary Japanese movies feature their share of recurring themes and motifs. The ageing and atomisation of society, loneliness, seclusion, the loss of family, or the quest for family have often provided the leitmotifs for Japanese films. None of them is without antecedents: if we think of Ozu’s 1953 masterpiece, the unforgettable Tokyo Story, we instantly realise the continuity, even if it is no longer the war that engenders those social problems that transcend into personal and family relations, but the hurried life of our modern society. Longing, nostalgia for traditions, and an imperceptible sense that something is lacking and lost forever. Those issues inevitably invoke the genre of melodrama or a melodramatic tone, as well as a slow-burning, meditative tempo.

Protagonists long for partners, a family, a life full of hope, which often takes the shape of a place seen in childhood, or a meal long time not tasted.

They long for a life that may have never existed, and where they and their families are safe, and which is fortified with the walls of traditions.

Travelling into the past, ferreting out old tastes and places, browsing among vintage diaries are, 148

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in fact, a quest for self-discovery, through which a protagonist searches for his or her place in this world and signposts to follow. The natural desire for continuity, belonging, and community is an especially poignant issue in a society where an increasing amount of people lead lonely lives, and the numbers of hikikomori (引きこもり)—young people voluntarily excluding themselves from human relations and the outside world—are on the rise. After previous generations, whose ties to traditions and old models are being severed, the younger people only have blurred images of why family ties and real—not virtual— communities are important. That is why an increasing number of its members (estimates point to some 30 to 35%) plan their lives without family and children.

FAMILY AS A PRESERVING FORCE Last year’s biggest success came in the form of Hirokazu Kore-eda’s Shoplifters: after twenty years, this movie finally earned the greatest recognition for Japanese cinema at Cannes: the Palme d’Or. It was also nominated for Best Foreign Film at the 2019 Academy Awards, but the prize finally went to another movie.

Kore-eda’s 2018 movie is centred around the institution of the family—just like his previous works. In his 2004 movie, Nobody Knows, a 12-year old boy has to take care of his stepsiblings after their mother abandons them and leaves them in an apartment where money, food, electricity, and water are all running out.

The boy, forced to become an adult too early, has to figure out how to survive abandonment and take care of those he is responsible for.

Family is also at the heart of Kore-eda’s Like Father, Like Son, which won the 2013 Jury’s Prize in Cannes. This movie portrays the story of a young couple who are one day notified that their newborn baby was swapped in the hospital

for another. This unforeseen turn makes the parents rethink what family is in the first place: a tie of blood or a community of love. What changes when it turns out that one whom you have loved and responsibly taken care of for years is not your biological child? Do you want to get back your heir by blood who is practically a stranger, or do you want to give up someone who has become your family by accident?

The director interwove social issues with this personal story, as the family we get to know at the beginning is a well-to-do one, with a father who is a successful businessman, while the other family is of much more modest means.

Such a situation could well be a worn-out cliché from a soap opera, but this time, it focuses instad on the businessman father’s character development: he has to realise that instead of the ties of blood and providing for material well-being, it is rather the emotional bond that ties his son and him together—in fact, that makes a family a family. Already in this movie, Kore-eda touches upon a problem that affects an increasing proportion of Japanese society: poverty—note that, according to statistics, one out of six Japanese children live in need.1 At the same time, he points out how much a family is worth, regardless of material goods. The humble family raising their child in loving care actually gives him more support and consequently a happier childhood than the one that provides him with material goods while keeping an emotional distance.

The question “What makes a family a family” is also posed by Kore-eda’s above-mentioned Shoplifters, albeit with more social criticism added to the present-day story. This time, the family in question lives in absolute poverty, struggling for their daily livelihood, supplementing the grandmother’s pension and the parents’ little salary, hard-earned at construction and factory jobs, with regular shoplifting. Their situation further deteriorates when the father and his teenage boy meet a neglected young girl suffering from the bitter cold and take her home. Of course, their home is a small, overcrowded, and scanty habitation, already shared by five persons—the grandma, the parents, the wife’s sister, and

Movie poster for Shoplifters

a son. The union is intended to last for one night only, but turns into weeks and months. When the disappearance of the girl becomes a TV news story, the family has to decide which way to go. They are forced to maintain the girl’s fake identity in order to evade the attention of the police. It is revealed only at this point that they wish to keep the police away not only because of their regular shoplifting: in this family (so to speak), no one is what they seem to be. Again, it is not the ties of blood, but financial dependence and interdependence that are the soil in which the sense of responsibility is rooted and from which it blossoms into love—this is the foundation of the family and its preserving force.

The questions posed by the director are yet again essential: which is better for a child: being with her real parents, who throw her around at will as if she was a ragdoll, or with the group of strangers who gave her a family, a home, and warmth? And what is more important for a senior person: her biological relatives who are ashamed CULTURE

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The stars of the movie Our Little Sister at the 2015 Cannes Film Festival: Masami Nagasawa, Kaho, Suzu Hirose, and Haruka Ayase

of her, or her other “children” who alleviate her old age solitude with their presence and care?

And what happens if the latter noble intentions also border on illegality, fraud, theft, blackmail, and kidnapping? Does the ideal of the family justify illegal means? Is it okay if the viewer is rooting for the family, made up of strangers, to stay together? The questions that the director asks are excellent, and he drives his audience skillfully through the movie in such a way that it provides an insight in each character’s motivations and lets them discover that superficial selfishness sometimes hides higher aims and goodwill. Uplifting, shocking, and harrowing scenes lead us to our own answers, and presumably, this is what the director wanted in the first place. He did not want to provide a definitive answer but to let there be as many answers as there are recipients. Because the family is not a uniform or homogenous entity, it is impossible to give a one(-size-)fits-all answer to the question of what it really is.

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TASTES FROM THE PAST According to anthropological studies conducted among immigrants, the process of integration among those who settle in a new country goes through different phases. What disappears first is always the national language of the predecessors; then come the traditions of holidays and everyday rituals, i.e. the cultural heritage. Interestingly enough, it is their culinary heritage to which immigrants cling on for the longest. It is also a feature that stands out in the longing and nostalgia that linger in Japanese movies. Naomi Kawase’s 2015 Sweet Bean features a nice, old lady who applies for a job at a local pancake stand and offers the middleaged owner her traditional family sweet bean recipe, which would give pancakes a heavenly taste. Along with the recipe, she also caringly shares her wisdom of life with the surly, distant man. Slowly a friendship takes root—a friendship both of them badly need. The food, the making of the sweet bean jelly, the first pancake they eat

together—those are to become bridges between the two persons. Not only their physical hunger but also their spiritual needs are satisfied when they find a friend in one another. Customers at the pancake stand are mostly students from nearby schools who prefer to have the delicious pastry for lunch. One regular customer, a female senior, befriends the lady and reveals her dilemma of whether to continue studying or start working.

The old lady symbolises the past, the middleaged man the present, and the young girl the future—and the connection among them is manifested in food. This is how a true relation develops among interconnected generations which are constantly drifting apart.

It is no different in Eric Khoo’s 2017 Ramen Shop either; this is a Singaporean–Japanese movie depicting the protagonist’s quest for roots. The man, born from a Japanese father and a Singaporean mother, is forced to embark on a road to get to know himself when his father, the owner of a ramen shop, dies unexpectedly. In his inheritance, he finds the Mandarin-language diary of her long-deceased mother, and so he departs to Singapore to discover a yet-unknown branch of his family.

The man would cook Singaporean pork rib soup even in his father’s shop in secret in order to revisit the taste he often recalled from his childhood. Finally, he embarks on the road of gastronomy to find himself and reunite with his family. Using the diary, as well as old photographs, he discovers that the family was torn apart by a decade-long enmity because her maternal grandmother could never accept that her daughter had married a Japanese man, since the Japanese were notoriously cruel to Singaporeans during the war, and they even had the grandmother’s husband killed.

This is the reason why the old lady is unwilling to talk to her own grandchild, even if the ultimate cause of her daughter’s illness was the grandmother’s incapability to forgive her.

The grandchild explores more and more of the past of his family, the historical antagonisms—and then decides to cook a soup in which he synthetises Japanese and Singaporean traditions. The grandma is finally

relieved, and even though she and her grandson do not know each other’s mother tongue, she is able to teach the old family recipe to his grandchild while cooking together.

The lunch they share is a cathartic moment for both of them, as the boy rediscovers the tastes he had been longing for since childhood, while the grandmother finally shakes off the old guilt and remorse she has been carrying for decades when, in tears, she embraces her lost grandson.

Almost without exception, these movies approach a point where loneliness transcend into attachment, separation becomes family, and valuable human relations—things that give meaning to life—are born. These movies show the depth of the desire in contemporary Japanese society to be able to connect, to live in a community and in a family. Their nostalgia for the past, for the vanishing time, is a projection of this deepest yearning.

ENDNOTES 1

Judy Lu: World Update: Top 10 Facts about

Poverty in Japan. The Borgen Project. 11 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/2z0fVG6 > Accessed: 20 April 2019.

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ANIME—A BRIDGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: THE MOVIES OF HAYAO MIYAZAKI Anikó Gorácz

the world that surrounds them. The vantage point of a child protagonist provides the director with an easy playfulness and freedom from which fantasy is born naturally, thus creating an intensive and inescapable subjectivity.

Hayao Miyazaki (78)

When, in 2003, Spirited Away won the Academy Award for Best Animated Feature, the whole world learned the name of Hayao Miyazaki in an instant. His global fame came late, as by this time the producer, born in 1941, had already directed six feature films which were by no means less important and valuable pieces.

Miyazaki’s movies are magical, absorbing, ambitious, romantic visions—ones that never come across as soppy in spite of the fact that each frame is permeated with emotion and nostalgia. Miyazaki’s protagonists are mostly children, or, in some cases, adolescents, who thus have a unique sense and perception of 152

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GHIBLI—THE BRAND Studio Ghibli was founded in 1985 by Hayao Miyazaki—in cooperation with Director Isao Takahata and Producer Toshio Suzuki—and was destined to become the most successful and most widely renowned Japanese animation studio. Even though Miyazaki reaped most of the success on an international level, his creative partner and good friend Takahata also gained notoriety with some of his productions, such as the Grave of the Fireflies (1988), Only Yesterday (1991), Pom Poko (1994), and The Tale of the Princess Kaguya (2013). While Princess Kaguya has earned an Academy Award nomination, the climax of Takahata’s œuvre is undoubtedly the Grave of the Fireflies—a movie that American film critic Roger Ebert called the greatest war movie of all times, and one that was listed 54th on the best-ranking top 100 list at IMDb. On this same list, Spirited Away became the best-ranking animation movie in the 27th place (ahead of The Lion King at #45), with Seven Samurai (d. Akira Kurosawa, 1954) as the overall highest regarded Japanese movie. Interestingly enough, only nine animation movies could make it into the first 100 of this list, out of which four are Japanese, with three of them Studio Ghibli productions (the Walt Disney Studio—even taken together with Pixar movies—has reached four places on the list), and two were directed

by Hayao Miyazaki. This achievement makes Miyazaki the only person who is represented in the top 100 with two animation movies (Spirited

Away at #54 and the 1997 production Princess Mononoke at the #65). The remaining Japanese animated movie on the list is 2016’s Your Name

by Makoto Shinkai. Needless to say, these listings are not absolute and do not necessarily tell much about the movies themselves—but it makes apparent the ways Studio Ghibli came to represent the whole scene of Japanese movie arts on an international level, as, out of the five Japanese movies on the list, four are anime, and three were made by Studio Ghibli.

CHILDREN OF THE WAR In 2002, after a screening of Spirited Away, the American movie critic quoted above, Roger Ebert, simply called Hayao Miyazaki the greatest animation director ever. Despite the inevitable subjectivity and exaggeration of such statements, it is still hard to disagree with. Miyazaki’s works are indeed visual symphonies in which every musical phrase, every instrument is put in place to reach the innermost emotions. In terms of genre, most of Miyazaki’s productions are melodrama, in which dramatic conflicts have high emotional tension. In these movies, nostalgia and memory work as a guideline with which the director leads us to the profundity of emotions.

Hayao Miyazaki was born during World War II, lived through the conflicted start-over of postwar Japan as a child, and was breastfed social guilt for the war. This was how nostalgia and longing for an ancient innocence became an essential experience for him. His father was an aeronautical engineer who was the director of Miyazaki Airplane, a family-run aircraft parts manufacturing company flourishing during the war. In July 1945, half of the city that hosted the factory fell victim to an air raid and was destroyed.

These early experiences are recurring motifs of almost all his movies. The monumental battle scenes of films such as Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind, Laputa: Castle in the Sky, or Howl’s Moving Castle, the post-apocalyptic visions of the world war, and the protagonists’ heroic fight for peace are all reflections of the trauma of war.

His second feature movie, Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind, is the most obvious example of how he channelled the horrors of war into his movies.

In one of the battles of this movie set in a postapocalyptic world, a gigantic robot—a “magic weapon”—launches two missiles that burn away everything with an explosion that finally melts the robot itself, too. Reflections of the nuclear bomb are apparent in Laputa: Castle in the Sky as well. The super-strong, gigantic robots were manufactured by men for their own defence, but they had long lost control over them. Even though these robots do not cause harm to anyone in the present, as they only take care of the bird nests and graves in Laputa, the floating city, men try again to put them in service of their own evil purposes and use them as devastating weapons.

Pervasive in the art of the deeply pacifist Miyazaki is his idea that it is men who corrupt nature, and the ultimate manifestation of human evil—war—is the thing that corrupts society. His movies are about humankind’s desire for peace, relief, idyll, and the necessary struggle to achieve those ends—and even the necessity of self-sacrifice in the service of such ideals. Miyazaki’s protagonists are anti-war,

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A scene from the Academy Award winning Spirited Away

peacemaking personalities who want to restore or maintain a fragile peace, as well as the harmonious relationship between men and nature, a state which most can find relief in.

RIDING THE WINDS AND DRAGONS Flying is likewise a unifying thread through the movies of Miyazaki, as almost all of his characters fly on fantastic creatures either by magical means or with the help of machines. Princess Nausicaä, the characters of Laputa: Castle in the Sky, or Sophie from Howl’s Moving Castle ride single-seated air-mopeds; the protagonist of Porco Rosso uses an interwar-style hydroplane; the adolescent title hero of Kiki’s Delivery Service rides a witches’ broom, while her friend Tombo’s vehicle is no less than a zeppelin; Mei and Satsuki are riding on the back of the magical sylvan being Totoro; and Chihiro bestrides a dragon. Miyazaki’s last feature, The Wind Rises (2013), is entirely dedicated to the motif of flying, pointedly evoking the family background of the director. The film, set in interwar Japan, is Miyazaki’s foremost biographically inspired work, which portrays the story of a young aircraft engineer against the canvas of the most decisive points in Japan’s history: the Great Kantō earthquake of 1923, the tuberculosis epidemic, the hardships of the Great Depression, and the 154

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country’s role in World War II. Tuberculosis as a biographical feature is already there in Totoro: the girls’ mom is convalescing in a distant hospital while sylvan spirits are taking care of the children. Miyazaki’s mother fought against the disease in a sanatorium for six years during the director’s childhood.

The Wind Rises is not merely an autobiographical piece—just like the artist’s other works, it invites confronting the past as he recounts the history of Japan during World War II, war crimes, and personal bad choices, constantly cautioning the today’s audience that such crimes and sins should never be committed again. War can never be an answer to any problem, as it only brings about suffering, loss, and new problems.

Miyazaki tends to choose female protagonists as heroes of peacemaking. They are the ones who take up arms against oppression, war, dissension, and injustice; and they are those who, one way or another, finally manage to make men align with the cause of peace. In Japanese society, women are traditionally held back, and the individual is of secondary importance behind the community, but the director aims at breaking these thousand-yearold forms and thus uses female individuals, familiar from Western culture, and puts them

into the centre. In Miyazaki’s movies, female protagonists are indisputably destined to be the anointed champions of the desired and necessary change. Nausicaä, Sophie, Mononoke, Chihiro, and the rest are active and acting protagonists who wish to bring change into the ossified state of unrest everyone longs away from.

THE AGE OF INNOCENCE Longing and nostalgia are also central motifs in the movies at hand. The desired peace, tranquillity, and stability are mostly experienced during childhood, and, within the genre of melodrama, childhood movies even more pronouncedly build on personal memories and intense subjectivity. In many of Miyazaki’s works, childhood idyll stands for peace and happiness, especially in My Neighbor Totoro, Kiki’s Delivery Service, or Ponyo on the Cliff by the Sea. Childhood is a gate to primordial innocence and manifests some ancient wisdom that was there before the decay of men. Naturally, the little heroes still have to fight through much conflict, against natural and supernatural evil, and sometimes themselves, but the security and simplicity of childhood are still apparent in the movies. Childhood is a state where everything was natural and evident, whether in making extraordinary friends or experiencing the rampant anger of nature. The forces of nature are ingenuously cast in the movies: water, fire, earth, and wind all take up their roles. Mostly it is the wind as the medium of flying, but fire (Howl’s Moving Castle), and even water (the river god in Spirited Away, the tsunami in Ponyo) can all be tamed and made to be our friends if we accept them as they are.

Miyazaki tends to pick children as heroes because fairy tales and fantasy are natural in childhood. The director looks back with nostalgia upon both childhood idyll and the tales which were told back then. It was easier to perceive and understand reality when good and evil, which every human faces, could still be assigned to protecting and harmful spirits, magic, fantastic abilities and creatures. Miyazaki’s fairy world is an amazing blend of Japanese popular mythology and the characteristic traits of Western folk

culture. Totoro and Ponyo on the Cliff by the Sea give us an insight into this Japanese world of tales, a realm only visible for children, inhabited by sylvan and water spirits who help our protagonists through their hardships. Alongside the adaptation of traditional Japanese mythology, Miyazaki heavily draws on Western culture and likes to put his stories into a European setting.

Porco Rosso is set in the Mediterranean littoral, Kiki’s Delivery Service in a sunny South European city, while Howl’s Moving Castle evokes an imaginary great European port town of the belle époque period—Sophie, after all, comes from a millinery shop that later perishes in a bombing raid. Miyazaki’s fascination with the Europe of an alternative past, but mostly with a scenery resembling Victorian England and, especially, the mining districts of Wales, is apparent in his steampunk adventure Laputa. This movie is essentially a mirror for men and society who live under the spell of technological innovation and whose ties with nature are now completely severed. By divinising technology, mankind essentially worships its own nemesis and does

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not realise that it is not technology that brings about the future. Preserving our environment and finding our way back to unity with nature is a common trait in Miyazaki’s movies (Nausicaä, Laputa, Princess Mononoke). Humanity is part of nature, and if it fails to approach nature with humility and respect, it will become our undoing.

Revering nature and natural gods are deeply rooted in Shintō, which is the foundation of the tales like Totoro, Spirited Away, and Ponyo.

Alongside Miyazaki’s love for his own culture, his admiration for the West is also apparent. He operates in a sort of transitional cultural space between East and West. Miyazaki has worked in Europe, and, among others, he created an 156

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animation series of Sherlock Holmes short stories in Italy, and later directed pictures in Scandinavia. Likewise, his first feature was a European production about a larger-than-life criminal, Arsène Lupin. His movies are also imbued with the fantastic elements of Asian and European fairy tales and mythologies. Demons, spirits, natural gods are Japanese motifs, while witches on broomsticks and their talkative black cats are native to the fantasy world of Europe.

CHIHIRO IN THE RABBIT HOLE The 2001 Spirited Away, which would receive an Academy Award the next year, occupies a most exquisite place in Miyazaki’s œuvre. It is a sort of

synthesis of all his earlier pieces, a childhood movie first, in which puerile innocence meets the material and egotistic world of adults in the narrative framework of a complicated and mystical friendship. On the other hand, it is an adaptation of one of the basic Western narrative topoi, Alice in Wonderland, set in the breathtaking world of Japanese folk tales and Shintō.

Ten-year-old Chihiro moves to another town with her parents, but, by the road at an old shrine, her greedy and disrespectful parents are transformed into pigs by spirits. In order to avoid transformation and to save her parents, Chihiro has to take up a job as a maid at a traditional Japanese bathhouse exclusively reserved for kami spirits. In such a place, the human child is a little unwelcome, but one of the maids sees after her. She also meets Haku, a servant to the chief witch, with whom she works out a special relationship. The movie teaches responsibility for one another and the community, humbleness in the face of hard work, and to judge others in light of their real worth. It shows how to look beyond the material and the physical reality and to discover treasures that are there at the very bottom of the soul of every one of us. When Chihiro starts working as a maid, the witch who runs the bathhouse takes her name away, thus depriving her of the primary symbol of her previous identity. Her name was too ostentatious, said the witch, for which she was thereafter referred to simply as Sen. The girl has to be taught her new name, and also humility, self-sacrifice, and struggling for others in a place where everyone is preoccupied with themselves only.

Pure name magic is the framework of the story: in the end, Chihiro saves her friend Haku by giving him back his long-lost name, and thus his past and true self. Giving and taking away names is always a transformation, which, for Miyazaki’s fantastic beings, engenders not only spiritual but also physical transformation.

armed with special abilities and transfigures into something else. Henshin can occur by magic, but also by everyday human reactions and emotions like untameable anger or glowing love.

Henshin is a focal point in Miyazaki’s works.

Chihiro’s greedy parents, who turned into pigs, were not the only ones who were destined to this disgraceful metamorphosis—a divine punishment in the fashion of Greek mythology.

The pilot of Porco Rosso, due to his experiences of wartime horrors, turned into a pig—and a crusty and unlpeasant person—years before the events of the movie. When a young girl appears in his life, a new hope unfolds that he may become his true self again. In many of Miyazaki’s works, it is a war that causes or triggers henshin. Those are the moments when fantastic protagonists gain the ability to fly.

Chihiro’s friend Haku turns into a dragon; the sorcerer of Howl’s Moving Castle transfigures into a bird god with scales and feathers enabling him to combat the fighter planes in a world war that scorches everything. Transformation or metamorphosis sometimes occur in order to allow two protagonists to connect. In the tale Ponyo on the Cliff by the Sea, Ponyo the goldfish becomes a girl so as to be able to stay with her friend on dry land as well. And this is how in Totoro the sisters become united with the wind to reach their mother in that distant hospital.

The greatest henshin, however, takes place not in Miyazaki’s movie but through them, in the souls of those watching. I am, as we are speaking of Miyazaki, not afraid of becoming sentimental and claim that his movies make us all better persons. If you think a more academic ending would be due here, I rather conclude that Miyazaki’s work propelled the arcane subculture of anime to the canon of film art. His movies are of enduring value, ever true fairy tales that do not fade as time goes by, but rather become ever more current.

MIRACULOUS METAMORPHOSES The cathartic climax of Japanese anime, i.e. physical transformation, is called henshin (変身).

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HUNGARY AND JAPAN

HUNGARIAN–JAPANESE RELATIONS IN THE NEW AGE Dr Anna Székács

HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN–JAPANESE RELATIONS From the 17th century on, we know of several Hungarians who have reached the Japanese shores. Among them, there were priests, travellers, missionaries, and artwork traders;1 however, the beginning of official relations dates back only to the second half of the 19th century.

After the Meiji Restoration, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy established diplomatic relations with Japan in 1869, and the western world also started to get more familiar with Japan around this time, as the opening of ports enabled them to gain insight into a culture that had previously been closed for the outside world.

Japan’s participation in world exhibitions contributed to the spread of this culture. Japanism appeared in Hungary as well, for example, in the paintings of Gyula Tornai or József Rippl-Rónai, or on the ceramics of Júlia Zsolnay.2 Hungarian porcelain, together with sugar, was also a successful trade item in Japan at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Japanese products also started to arrive in Hungary, and, besides art objects and furniture, now they included paddy rice, copper, and fish oil too. 3 Improving trade and political relations were cut off with the start of World War I. Therefore, after the war, the newly independent Hungarian government had to rebuild its relations with Japan from scratch.

After the armistice, Hungary was represented by an honorary consul in Japan, as an embassy was yet to be established. This period was characterised by the revival of civil relations enhanced by the work of Nándor Metzger and Jūichirō Imaoka. Both of them were actively involved in the mutual acquainting of the two countries. The interest in the Japanese language increased, and, in the 1920s, the Japanese language and culture education was transferred from Cluj-Napoca to the faculty of liberal arts in 160

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Budapest.4 In addition to higher education, Hungarian and Japanese specialists also taught language courses. The improvement of interwar political relations was highlighted by Prince Takamatsu’s 1931 visit to Hungary, followed by Nándor Metzger’s appointment as a commercial representative to Tōkyō in 1936. The appointment was motivated by an increase in the number of Hungarians living in Japan, a rising interest in Japanese business opportunities, and the growth in visits by Japanese businessmen.5 The contacts developed through economic interactions facilitated the completion of the political relations—in 1939, a Royal Hungarian embassy was established in Tōkyō. At the same time, a Friends of Hungary Association was established, and dictionaries and Hungarian language books were published. After World War II, official relations were put on hold for one and a half decades, only to be re-established in the late 1950s. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 triggered a strong press response in Japan, while the Japanese felt sympathy towards Hungarians when the revolution was crushed.

In 1959, diplomatic relations were restored by reopening the Hungarian embassy and commercial representation in Japan. The direction of diplomatic and commercial action was for a long time determined by Soviet interests, but, within the confines of this framework, cooperation with Japan stabilised and mutual political, economic, and cultural confidence increased.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE LAST THIRTY YEARS Prior to the change of regime, measures were already taken to help strengthen economic and trade relations between the two countries. In 1979, an agreement was reached on technical and scientific cooperation, and then, in 1980, on

the avoidance of double taxation. Compared to 1967, commodity turnover improved by almost 400 times by 1980, while export rose by eight times and import almost doubled by 1987.6 On the one hand, this result was due to the fact that Hungary was included in the Generalizes System of Preferences in 1986, while, on the other hand, opening local branches of large Japanese trading houses in Hungary also had a significant effect. Their main goal was to strengthen trade; however, they also facilitated the promotion of productive investments.

The regime change resulted in a breakthrough in economic relations, as political barriers disappeared. Hungary was at the forefront of structural transformation, thereby gaining the best position in the region in terms of Japanese direct investment. By 1991, along with Suzuki’s Hungarian branch, there were already five Japanese manufacturing companies in the country, and as investors needed mostly stable political relations, investment incentives, and adequate infrastructure for transportation, Hungary could keep its competitive advantage until the late 1990s.7 By the year 2000, due to the full visa exemption, the number of commercial representations increased, and the composition of their activities showed changes. Typical assembly-based companies (Denso, Sony, Suzuki) were supplemented by manufacturers of consumer electronics products (Aikawa, Alpine, Clarion, TDK, Yamaha) and manufacturers of photographic products, office machines, instruments (Canon, Fujifilm, Hitachi, Minolta Hungary, Nikon, Omron). 8 With Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004, customs duties were reduced, resulting in the local instalment of the car part manufacturers’ supplier chain. As a result, 165 Japanese companies were present by 2007, out of which 53 were manufacturing companies.

However, financial and commercial companies, representations, logistics businesses, and R&D firms were also set up. Later, partly as a result of the economic crisis caused by the Lehman shock, and partly as a consequence of the tragic 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, this number temporarily decreased to

151 companies by 2014. Nevertheless, by 2018, 160 companies (including 50 manufacturing firms) were present in Hungary again.9 Meanwhile, the Japanese companies’ expansion method also changed, as previously they were mostly involved in greenfield investments, but, lately, the acquisition of existing businesses has also become a common practice. As a result, the territorial distribution of these companies is currently about halfway between the capital and the countryside. In the eastern part of Hungary, the number of Japanese companies has significantly increased. 10 Investments, development projects, and factory upgrades all boost Hungarian–Japanese economic relations.11 According to the director of JETRO Budapest, this tendency can be attributed to the preferential treatment of Japanese investment by the Hungarian government and to the strategic partnership that the companies already present in Hungary enjoy.12 The main aims of the Hungarian foreign policy’s so-called Eastern Opening further strengthen Hungarian–Japanese economic relations. In the words of István Szerdahelyi, former Ambassador of Hungary to Japan, this can be viewed as a form of “reopening,” as Japan has been Hungary’s import partner since the regime change. In recent years, capital inflow from Japan into Hungary has accelerated, while exports to Japan (exports of motor vehicles and food products) have grown dramatically.13 The presence of Hungarian small and mediumsized enterprises in Japan has slowly been rising, which is due, among other things, to the fact that there are expert helpers to support trade with Japan. These include the Hungarian– Japanese Economic Club,14 or such consultancy companies as Sűdy és Társa Kft.15 Thus, the upward trend of Hungarian–Japanese economic relations are served simultaneously by the open attitude of the state, the responsiveness of companies trading in Japan to new opportunities, and the expert support given to businesses.

POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AFTER THE END OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY The political relations of the two countries, by virtue of economic, cultural, and civil relations, HUNGARY AND JAPAN

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were already friendly before the regime change. The first prime-ministerial-level meeting happened in 1985, when Hungary was still under Soviet control.16 Following the change of regime in January 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (1989–1991) visited Hungary on an official visit to discuss the economic, commercial, and long-term lending conditions of the two countries.17 The visit was prepared in November 1989 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Tarō Nakayama during an Austrian–Hungarian triple Foreign Minister meeting in Sopron. The first presidential visit was made by the newly elected President of the Hungarian Republic, Árpád Göncz, in November 1990 who participated in the official celebrations of Emperor Akihito’s enthronement. One year later, in 1991, Prime Minister József Antall travelled for an official visit to Japan.

From the 1990s, Deputy Prime Minister Yōhei Kōnō took a significant role in shaping Japanese–Hungarian political relations as the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party and a committed friend of Hungary, who, for decades, was also the president of the Japanese– Hungarian Friendship Society. He visited Hungary for the first time in 1972, as the President of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet. In 1995, he visited Hungary again as Deputy Prime Minister, and a return visit was made by Prime Minister Gyula Horn in the same year. In 2006, Katalin Szili, President of the Hungarian Parliament, received an invitation to Japan, and, in return, she invited Yōhei Kōnō to partake in the 50th anniversary celebrations commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Although members of the imperial family had already travelled to Hungary before the change of regime (in 1985, then-Prince Naruhito, while, in 1994, Prince Takamado and his wife visited Hungary), the first official visit of the imperial couple only took place in 2002. Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko arrived in Hungary at the invitation of President Ferenc Mádl. The visit received wide media coverage and was of enormous significance in bilateral relations, as it drew the public attention to Japan and boosted the development of economic, political, and 162

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cultural cooperation. After Hungary’s 2004 EU accession, Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi received Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány on an official visit that concluded with a joint statement.

In 2009, to commemorate the 140th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, a Memorial Year was held, under the auspices of Prince Akishino. In 2013, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán met Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, with whom he signed a joint declaration on the new partnership between Japan and Hungary. During his visit, the Prime Minister was also received by Emperor Akihito. Within the framework of the parliamentary work, political relations between the two countries are strengthened by the Hungarian–Japanese Friendship Union of the Interparliamentary Union and the Japan–Hungary Section of the IPU. THREE DECADES OF CULTURAL RELATIONS Hungarian–Japanese cultural relations have been moving forward from the outset with the initiative of civilians and the help of dedicated people. The establishment of the Hungarian– Japanese Friendship Society (HJFS) in 1987 brought about a qualitative change in civil relations.18 The purpose of HJFS’s activities was to introduce Japanese culture by organising programmes all over the country. Today, with around 400 members, the organisation is present in the whole country and ensures that Japan is constantly on the agenda in the form of performances, festivals, and cultural events.

In addition to civilian relations and as an effect of the improved political climate in the 1980s, Japanese companies have opened their offices in Hungary, and Japanese scholars also arrived in the country, while Japanese language teachers from Hungary had the chance to participate in scholarship programmes in Japan. The system change also had an effect on cultural relations.

Whereas interest in Japan was already high in the 1980s, the breakthrough in language teaching materialised after the rise of Japanese cultural events in the 1990s. On the one hand, Japanese was included in the choice of languages, so Japanese language education

On 24 March 2019, Sándor Kiss, President of the Hungarian–Japanese Economic Club in Osaka, handed over the Herendi Trophy to Hakuho Yokozuna, winner of the 42 th edition of Hungarian–Japanese Friendship Sumo Cup

was available in lower, middle, and higher education in Hungary.19 On the other hand, the Japanese government contributed considerable financial efforts to spread the Japanese language and culture abroad. It was of great importance that the Japanese Foundation opened an office in Hungary in 1991, as it was the first one to open in Eastern Europe. Hungary was chosen because of the presence of Japanese companies and the high number of Japanese language learners. The office’s task was to organise cultural programmes, to help with language teaching, to carry out educational and coordination tasks, and to manage applications and grants. The Japanese Foundation sent language teachers, Japanologists, curricula, teaching aids, books on various Japanese cultural, economic, and political topics at its own expense.

In 1992, members of the Japanese Foreign Volunteer Service (JOCV) staff came to Hungary for the first time in order to teach Japanese, martial arts, and culture. Until the JOCV’s departure in 2007, 127 volunteers visited the country, out of them 62 language teachers.20

The launch of new language courses in the countryside also improved the popularisation of Japanese culture. In addition to external help, the strength of internal organisation was also significant. Japanese language teachers in Hungary established their own organisation (Hungarian Society of Japanese Language Teachers) to coordinate their work in primary school, high school, and higher education. They developed their own exam materials, textbooks, glossary, and organised training courses. They got in touch with European colleagues and established cooperation with European Japanese language teaching organisations. With the help of joint conference participation and projects, the quality of Japanese language education in Hungary also improved. In addition to language teaching, programmes aimed at presenting traditional Japanese culture have also increased.

Academic cooperation also improved greatly with fellow European Japanologists. In 1992, András Hernádi,21 head of the Japan, East and Southeast Asia Research Centre at the Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy HUNGARY AND JAPAN

163

of Sciences, launched the research project “Contemporary Hungarian Japanology.” Within its framework, a nationwide conference was annually organised, a Japanese language and cultural course was held, and an annotated bibliography was created for each discipline.

The bibliography was especially significant, as it helped to summarise the Japanese publications published in Hungary. The organisation of the 7th Japanology Congress in Budapest in 1997— attended by numerous experts and guests from Japan—was a significant success for bilateral scientific relations.22 This was followed in 2002 by another successful scientific event, the European Conference on Japanese Language Education in Budapest.23 From 2004 onwards, the political aspects of language teaching had to be taken into consideration as well. Our language teachers prepared new textbooks, curricula for native Hungarian speakers, developed exam equirements, conducted examinations, and organised further training, conferences, and workshops. In October 2004, during the meeting between the Japanese and Hungarian Heads of State, the Japanese–Hungarian Cooperation Forum was set up to deepen the relationship between the two countries, with the aim of boosting Japanese language teaching in Hungary. In practice, the first programmes started in 2007 with the financial help of twelve large Japanese companies. The programmes supported the further training of language teachers in Japan, created new rural education sites, and, on the initiative of Hungarian Society of Japanese Language Teachers, a new, uniquely modern textbook series—aimed for Hungarian learners—was created. The Japanese–Hungarian Cooperation Forum ceased its valuable work on 31 March 2014. In 2015, a major project on the history of Hungarian–Japanese relations was finalised with the completion of the Japanese– Hungarian dictionary. The participants of the project were honoured by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Our current cultural relations are balanced.

Japanese film reviews and Japanese festivals are organised regularly, while Hungarian 164

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translations of Japanese authors can be easily found in bookshops.24 Also, the expertise of Ferenc Hopp Asian Art Museum provides Japanese-themed exhibition. The strength and continuity of Japanese–Hungarian cultural relations was clearly showed during the award ceremony of this year’s edition of Hungarian– Japanese Friendship Sumo Cup in Ōsaka, when the monumental Herendi Trophy was handed over to the tournament winner by Sándor Kiss, president of the Hungarian–Japanese Economic Club, who was also present when the first competition was organised back in 1986.

ENDNOTES 1 Ferenc Hopp collected artworks in Japan, which were later exhibited in Hungary. The art trader M. M. Kuhn arrived in Yokohama in 1867 and opened an art export-import shop there. Cf. Kiss Sándor: Japán vonzásában. Magyarok, akik szerették Japánt. Holnap Kiadó, Budapest, 2017.

2

Gellér Katalin – Dénes Mirjam: Japonizmus a magyar

művészetben (Japonism in Hungarian art). Kovács Gábor Művészeti Alapítvány, Budapest, 2017.

3

Since

1893,

Hungarians

were

allowed

to

trade

independently with Japan. Cf. Kiss, 92 and 158, and Tóth Gergely:

Japán–Magyar

kapcsolattörténet

1969–1913.

Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. 133.

4 Japanese language teaching in Hungary started at the end of the 19th century and was linked to higher education. Its first real boom period was between the two world wars. Székács Anna: A japánnyelv-oktatás története Magyarországon. In: Kortárs Japanológia II. Japánnyelv-pedagógia Magyar­or­szá­ gon, edited by Wakai Seiji – Sági Attila. Károli Gáspár Refor­ mátus Egyetem – L’Harmattan Kiadó. Budapest, 2016. 26–57.

5 Kiss, 406.

6 By 1987, exports amounted to HUF 3,282 million, while imports reached HUF 7,117 million. Boromissza Zsolt: Japán– Magyar befektetési kapcsolatok. EU Working Papers. 2007/4.

17–56.

7 Balázsy Laura Márta: Magyarország, ahogy a japán befektetők látják. EU Working Papers. 2002/1. 85–86.

8 Bassa Zoltán: Japán vállalatok magyarországi tevékeny­ ségének tapasztalatai. EU Working Papers. 2007/4. 57.

Boromissza, 22, 43.

9 JETRO Budapest: Japán vállalatok és az általuk foglalkoz­

21

tatottak számának alakulása 2017–18-ban. 2018.

the European Association for Japanese Studies (EAJS). Judit

10

Hidasi followed him in this position.

Interview with Masahide Honda, director of JETRO

András Hernádi is an economist, board member of

Budapest. Székács Anna – Sato Noriko: Japanese Firms

22

in Hungary: Skills Supply and Demand. A Socio-Cultural

member of the EAJS at the Budapest Economic College. The

Background. In: Linked together for 150 years. Hungary

event’s main patron was Árpád Göncz, President of the

and Japan, edited by Csaba Moldicz – Amadea Bata-Balog.

Republic of Hungary, while the Nobel Prize winner Kenzaburō

Hungary and Japan. Oriental Business and Innovation Center,

Ōe delivered a keynote lecture. The conference was attended

Budapest, 2019. 18.

by 500 guests from 40 countries, 140 from Japan.

11 Since 2015: JSR Mol Synthetic Rubber Zrt. in Tiszaúj­

23 The conference was organised by Anna Székács and the

város, GS Yuasa Magyarország Kft. in Miskolc, Nisshin Foods

Hungarian Society of Japanese Language Teachers at the

plant extension in Kecskemét, Zoltek plant extension in

Budapest Economic College. Over 200 guests from 26 countries

Nyergesújfalu, new Bridgestone investment in Tatabánya,

participated in it. As a result, the topic of Japanese language

NIDEC GPM Hungary Kft. plant extension in Bercel. Cf.

teaching in Hungary managed to reach a wide audience.

Székács– Sato, 18.

24 Supervised by Judit Vihar, a new generation of Japanese

12 Székács – Sato, 18.

literary translators are trained. At the same time, she also

13 Tóth, 12, 24.

plays a major role in promoting haiku poetry. See Judit Vihar’s

14

contribution to this magazine about literature in the Heisei Era.

The Hungarian–Japanese Economic Club, chaired by

The conference was organised by Judit Hidasi, board

Sándor Kiss, former Tōkyō commercial advisor, researcher of the economic history of Japan. The organisation has set the goal of helping develop economic relations.

15 A consultancy firm founded by Dr Zoltán Sűdy, former Tōkyō Ambassador, which has had an office in Japan since 2016. It deals with establishing and supporting business relationships between Japanese and Eastern European companies. It plays a major role in introducing Hungarian products to the Japanese market.

16 Prime Minister György Lázár visited Japan that year.

17 Januári Klubülés. Magyar–Japán Gazdasági Klub. 5 January 2015. <https://bit.ly/2EGWWnu > Accessed: 30 May 2019.

18 Norbert Siklósi was the HJFS’s first president. The society was co-chaired by Ferenc Kósa and Imre Székács, and had József Szentirmai as secretary. The current president, Judit Vihar, took over from Judit Hidasi in 2001. The Society works with rural groups and sections (bonsai, martial arts, gastronomy, haiku, ikebana, calligraphy, Japanese garden, origami, reiki) and has a quarterly publication.

19

Besides traditional Japanese language lectures at the

Faculty of Humanities of Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) a practice-oriented Japanese business language training was also conducted at the College for Foreign Trade. As an experiment, Japanese language teaching was introduced at primary school level in Törökbálint. In 1986, a Japanese Language Faculty was established at ELTE, while Japanese language was also introduced as an optional foreign language in a high school (Székács).

20 JICA/JOCV事業終了記念式典の開催. Embassy of Japan in Hungary. <https://bit.ly/2Xev5m4 > Accessed: 6 March 2016.

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165

PÁL TELEKI AND JAPAN Gábor Nyári

INTRODUCTION Count Pál Teleki is known to the Hungarian public primarily as twice prime minister of Hungary who died under unclear circumstances.

His career as an outstanding pedagogue and internationally renowned geographer is less known in spite of the fact that he considered himself first and foremost as a teacher and scholar, not a politician. Two of his most outstanding achievements as scholar are certainly the “Red Map,”1 presented during the Paris Peace Conference, proportionally demonstrating nationalities in the Carpathian Basin, and the so-called Mosul Report of 19252 he compiled as a member of the Mosul Committee, in which he ingeniously synthesised historical, ethnic, geographical, and sociological research on the vilayet3 of Mosul. Teleki took

Count Pál Teleki 166

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it as a failure that none of the above had according influence on decision makers: the Red Map finally accounted for little at the Paris Peace Conference, while the League of Nations and the Hague International Court, when they decided to give this extremely heterogeneous territory to Iraq, did not take effective action to ensure ethnic and religious autonomy the Committee had been advocating.4 By the time he had created the Red Map with his colleagues or had been elected member of the Mosul Committee, Teleki was an internationally recognised and renowned scholar. The international academic society took notice of the young geographer on the occasion of his first major publication if we do not count his 1903 doctoral thesis.5 The title of his volume was Atlas for the History of the Cartography of Japanese Islands—a major work that furnished the exploration of Japan with evidence, logs, and maps, hitherto unpublished.

JAPAN ON THE HUNGARIAN HORIZON For quite some time, Japan was a distant, mystical place for Europeans, of which not much information was at hand. The primary reason for this was Japan’s self-imposed seclusion: it only maintained political and commercial relations with its neighbours—with the only exception of a small Dutch trading colony in Nagasaki—and banned European missionaries from its territory.

This isolation has changed by the mid-19th century, when European—primarily British—and American economic imperialism became more pronounced in the region. Japan was “convinced” of the benefits of opening-up by the pressure imposed by the US Navy that reached the Bay of Tōkyō in 1853. In the ensuing period, a series of treaties were concluded—one with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1869—to the effect that Japan integrated into the world

Map of Japan, pulished in Gerand and Rumold Mercator Atlas in 1620, created by Joducus Hondius.

economy.6 As a result, interest in the secluded and distant Japan began to brew in Europe—as well as in Hungary—so much so that, at the turn of the century, publications about Japan were quite rich. 7 Among the many travellers, we find two of Teleki’s professors and friends, Lajos Lóczy and Jenő Cholnoky, both of whom encouraged Teleki to put East Asia in focus.

TELEKI AND JAPAN Teleki majored in legal, social, agricultural studies, as well as geography at the University of Budapest. His scholarly interests concentrated on the latter, which is partly due to family traditions, as his uncle was the famous Africanist Sámuel Teleki, whose adventures Pál Teleki had been listening to in exaltation.8 Between 1899 and the 1909 publication of the atlas, the young geographer published 14 pieces in Földrajzi Értesítő (“Geographical Herald”), of which two were about Japan. He mentioned the Portuguese

navigators first getting ashore in Japan in his earliest publication and dealt with the mid-19th century political changes that had opened Japan up for European interests.9 Another of his early writings put Japan in focus.

His essay, Japán szerepe Amerika fölfedezésében (“The Role of Japan in the Discovery of America”), begins with the travelogue of Marco Polo, in which the Italian explorer first hints at the Japanese islands as Zipangu—the land rich in spices and gems, opposite to China.10 Then Teleki made a register of what kind of travelogues were written over the following centuries about Japan and its treasures.11 Judging from his literary voice, the young geographer seemingly wishes to get to the East Asian island nation himself, although this dream never came true. He had already paid attention to the explorers, Captain Quast and Tasman, who were later to have key roles in his Atlas.12 In later parts of the work, Teleki turns his attention to Christopher Columbus, HUNGARY AND JAPAN

167

who was trying to find Zipangu and used Marco Polo’s travelogue as a guide to ultimately reach America. His collection of geographical names given by early explorers, Columbus and others, which are hinting at Zipangu (or Japan), is of particular significance. Thus, he concluded that the discovery of America had been motivated by the desire to reach Japan.13 This essay should be seen as a precursor to the Atlas.

On the whole, however, Teleki did not publish many papers in this period: his professor, Lajos Lóczy, Head of the Geography Department, by whom Teleki worked as an intern from 1902 on, told the young apprentice: “You should only work for four years now.”14 Teleki took Lóczy’s advice seriously and doubled down on the four years—during these years he “only” worked on his political science thesis and published the aforementioned minor articles—and mainly conducted research, self-study, and went on study tours. He visited the great libraries, museums, research institutions, and universities of Europe, one after another, and did not spare either energy or money to dig out rarity maps and geography books.15 ATLAS FOR THE HISTORY OF THE CARTOGRAPHY OF JAPANESE ISLANDS This intense eight-year period led to the publication—in both Hungarian and German—of his major work, Atlas for the History of the Cartography of Japanese islands in 1909.

Contrary to what its name suggests, it was much more than just a collection of maps: through those charts, Teleki reconstructed the exploration history of Japan and published in entirety the logs of Captain Quast and Tasman which was dated from 1639. There were exquisite rarities included in the maps, and the scholarly commentaries he had written were quite unique.

Indicative of his scholarly humility, Teleki downplayed the academic importance of his work even in the foreword, raising the attention of readers to eventual language deficiencies.

He described the material he had compiled as “a few new sources,” in spite of the fact that 168

HUNGARY AND JAPAN

it contained several written and cartographic documents that had previously been available only in manuscript. 16 Then he enumerated the places he had conducted research at: Bibliothéque Nationale in Paris, the Nationaal Archief and the Koninklijk Huisarchief in the Hague, the Hofbibliothek in Vienna, Biblioteca Riccardiana in Florence, the Hof- und Staatsbibliothek in Munich, and the Academia das Ciências in Lisbon.17 His Atlas detailed the history of the exploration of Japan, providing valuable information from travelogues with continuous references to what impact certain events had on the development of cartography. The first part described “Marco Polo’s Zipangu,”18 the second part dealt with Japan in 18 chapters, from the discovery by the Portuguese in 1542 to Maurice Benyovszky’s adventures and other 19th-century explorations.19 The written part of the work is concluded by an 11-page detailed index and bibliography.

It is interesting how Teleki contrasted the different travelogues and pointed out how the accounts perceived Japan in many different ways, revealing a thousand faces of this country in different historical periods. In this respect, Teleki’s work also counts as an ethnographical analysis since, for example, it contains one of the first—and not precisely flattering—description of the natives of Hokkaidō (the ainu) from 1565

by Portuguese Jesuit Luís Fróis: “They are clothed with the leather of animals; their bodies are hairy from top to toe, and they wear huge beards and moustaches which they draw away with a wooden peg while drinking. This race is extremely covetous in wine drinking; they’re cruel in war and fearful among the Japanese. If they get wounded in battle, they clean up their wounds with saltwater. This is the only medicine known to this race. They have no things they consider sacred; though they have a certain respect for the sky.”20 The most exciting part of this volume is the analysis of the voyage in 1639 by Mathys Quast and Abel Tasman and the bilingual publication of their entire, hitherto forgotten, logbook. This expedition is of particular interest, as it was launched during a period of total seclusion on

the part of Japan, when even the Portuguese and the Spanish were banished from the Japanese Empire to be replaced by the also heavily restricted Dutch East India Company.

Though, by this time, most of the region had already been discovered by Europeans, there were still many blank spots. There have been reports about islands rich in gold and silver to the East of the main islands of Japan around the 37th and 38th parallels. The team led by Quast was tasked with the exploration of these islands.

Though they were combing the area for months, they never found the Gold and the Silver Islands that promised fantastic fortunes for their explorers, because they diverged from the target with a few degrees from the very outset. Geographically speaking, however, the exploration was not a failure: they were the first Dutchman to see the Bonin (present-day Ogasawara Islands) and Volcano Islands (four minor islands), as well as the Douglas Reef, which had been reached and mapped by Spanish and Portuguese sailors, although quite imprecisely.21 Teleki’s work was, in many respects, outstanding. Similar historical-geographical syntheses were not published before, and Teleki managed to publish a series of hitherto unpublished, valuable source material, maps, and documents.

The Atlas did not go unnoticed in the international scholarly community. Teleki was elected to the committee of old maps in the Geneva International Society of Geography.

In 1911, he was awarded with the prestigious Jomard Prize by the Paris Society of Geography.22 The author was gaining more and more fame in Hungary as well: in 1909, he became Director of the Institute of Geography and, in 1910, the Secretary General of the Society of Geography.

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences elected him as correspondent member in 1913.23 The historian Dezső Csánki, in the member nomination of Teleki, described the reception of the Atlas in a detailed manner, citing numerous recensions written abroad. The German geographer, Hermann Wagner, for instance, wrote the following about Teleki’s volume: “In the

184 gigantic pages, there is such a thoroughly considered and detailed examination of the relevant questions that we take the liberty to claim this work an extraordinary cartographic and geographical history book and almost a model for future books to come. This book is a result of entirely independent research in which the author put the greatest love, endurance, and competence. The author never settles for anything secondary if there is a chance to turn to the primary sources. He had scrutinized the works of all his predecessors and considers their findings as well as their failings so he manage to correct these latter.”24 Oskar Nachod, who, by then, wrote a monograph on Japanese history, claimed: “This work rules over a voluminous and hardly accessible manuscript and print base, in literature as well as maps. The author solves his difficult tasks thoroughly and he is only too humble to call his work Atlas for the History of the Cartography of Japanese Islands.”25 According to the French Henri Froidevaux, the humble title hides an extremely rich and fruitful work in both findings and conclusions, and the author did an almost perfect job in implementation.26 Dezső Csánki, while agreeing with such a positive criticism, added, “Count Teleki’s work gained fame and prestige for Hungarian science in foreign academic circles and, thus, to our nation in entirety.”27 SUMMARY Pál Teleki’s work, under the humble title Atlas, was, in fact, a milestone in both Hungarian and European scholarship on Japan. A completely fresh take on the exploration and geography of Japan with the inclusion of a series of theretofore unpublished items, the Atlas had become a major source of information on the Japanese islands in the years to come.

The author was destined to walk through a tragic though great career in public and academic life. He did not only invest in this monumental geographical work but also capitalised on it: he suddenly became famous, many doors were suddenly open wide for him, HUNGARY AND JAPAN

169

and gained fame as an internationally renowned scholar. Though he never visited Japan and did not have the chance to conduct research into Japan in later years, he became a central personality in East Asian studies. Teleki’s ideas on geography, history, and mapping, however, contributed immensely to the best traditions of Hungarian foreign policy-making, the absorption of knowledge about the far sides of the world, as well as the continuous interest of the Hungarian academic community in Japan.

11 Teleki (1996), 2–5.

12 Teleki (1996), 5–6.

13 Teleki (1996), 6–13.

14 Ablonczy Balázs: Teleki Pál. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2005.

53–54.

15 Kubassek, 7.

16

Teleki Pál: Atlasz a Japáni szigetek cartographiájának

történetéhez.

Kilián

Frigyes

Utóda

M.

Kir.

Egyetemi

Könyvkereskedő, 1909. V. 17 Teleki (1909), V–VI. 18 Teleki (1909), 3–18.

19 Teleki (1909), 19–168.

20 Teleki (1909), 21.

21 Teleki (1909), 45–95.

ENDNOTES 1

Teleki Pál (ed.): Magyarország néprajzi térképe a

22 Ablonczy, 73–74.

23

Nyári Gábor: A Sándor-palotától a ravatalig. Teleki

Pál

második

miniszterelnöksége,

1939–1941.

Kairosz

Könyvkiadó, Piliscsaba–Budapest, 2015. 16.

népsűrűség alapján. Magyar Földrajzi Intézet, Budapest,

24 Csánki Dezső: Dr. gr. Teleki Pál tagajánlása. In: Magyar

1919.

Tudományos Akadémia. Tagajánlások 1913-ban. Horánszky

2 Questions of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq. Report

Viktor Cs. és Kir. Udvari Könyvnyomdája, Budapest, 1913.

Submitted to the Council by the Commission Instituted by

17–19. 18.

the Council Resolution of September 30, 1924. League of

25 Csánki, 18.

Nations, Geneva, 1925. Országgyűlési Könyvtár, SdN/1925.

26 Csánki, 18.

VII.2.

27 Csánki, 17.

3

A vilayet was an administrative division used by the

Ottoman Empire.—Ed. 4 Nyári Gábor: Teleki Pál tevékenysége a Moszul Bizottságban.

International Relations Quarterly. 2016/1. 1–12.

5

Teleki Pál: Az elsődleges államkeletkezés kérdéséhez.

Államtudori értekezés. [Franklin Társulat Nyomdája], Budapest, 1903.

6

Szerdahelyi István: Az Osztrák–Magyar Monarchia és

a Japán Császárság között 1869. október 18-án kötött kereskedelmi szerződés. In: Tanulmányok a magyar–japán kapcsolatok történetéből, edited by Farkas Ildikó [et al]. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 27–43.

7

Farkas Ildikó: Japán megjelenése Magyarországon

a XIX–XX. század fordulóján. In: Tanulmányok a magyar–japán kapcsolatok történetéből, edited by Farkas Ildikó [et al].

ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 63–88.

8 Kubassek János: A földrajztudós Teleki Pál. In: Teleki Pál: A földrajzi gondolat története. Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 1996. 6.

9

Teleki Pál: Korszakok az ázsiai felfedező-utazások

történetében. Földrajzi Közlemények. 1899/1. 15–20.

10

Teleki Pál: Japán szerepe Amerika fölfedezésében.

Földrajzi Közlemények. 1906/1. 1.

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APOLOGISING, REFUSING, AND THANKING IN HUNGARIAN AND JAPANESE: DIFFERENT LANGUAGES AND DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 1 Mika Waseda

INTRODUCTION Every language has a certain set of strategies for performing a given speech act, such as apologising, refusing requests, or thanking invitations. According to Austin, 2 it is not individual words or sentences that figure as the basic elements of human communication, but rather particular speech acts that are performed in uttering words and sentences, namely illocutionary acts or speech acts in the narrow sense.

The words and sentences, especially conventional expressions used for performing a certain speech act, may differ from language to language, i.e. there are cross-linguistic differences, since they are determined by the structure of social or cultural situations.

This aspect is important for language acquisition. One of the major aims of foreign or second language teaching is the development of the students’ communicative competence.

The grammatical competence or grammar acquisition is necessary and essential, but mastering pragmatic strategies and conventional expressions is more significant and, indeed, central for performing speech acts adequately.

It is also necessary to be acquainted with the interactive and sociocultural rules underlying language use in the target culture.

The above is true for both Japanese students learning Hungarian and Hungarian students learning Japanese. They can acquire grammatical competence in the classroom from textbooks and teachers, but it is not easy to master the use of conventional expressions in the realisation of various speech acts. Conventional expressions are some kind of tacit agreements that the

members of a community are presumed to share. Because of this, it often happens that the meaning intended by a language learner is not what native speakers understand. They encounter communication gaps or cross-cultural language gaps, and this sometimes leads to a culture shock and, in some cases, even negative experiences.

HUNGARIAN EXPRESSIONS OF APOLOGIES Some of our students who learn Hungarian as their primary foreign language at Osaka University experienced such communication gaps when they stayed in Hungary. For example, one student felt uncomfortable and strange when she heard what a waiter said to her at a restaurant. The restaurant was full, and there were no tables available, so the waiter apologised, saying Sajnálom!, “I am sorry.” For her, the verb sajnál means “feel pity/sorry for or to sympathise with.”

She felt strange because she did not understand why the waiter felt pity for her in such a situation.

Instead, she would have expected the waiter to apologise by using a phrase asking for bocsánat (forgiveness), because restaurants are responsible for serving customers, and it is supposed to be their fault if they fail to take care of them.

Apologising would have been a natural response in a Japanese context. In Japan, it is often said that the customer is always right or even that the customer is God (in Japanese, お客様は神様で す・okyakusama wa kamisama desu). In fact, even the word for customer (okyakusama) expresses particular respect, as it is a polite expression meaning “honoured guest.”

In Japan, on entering a shop, a customer is invariably greeted by the clerk’s Irasshaimase, HUNGARY AND JAPAN

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which means “Welcome,” and customers are not even expected to respond to this by saying hello. In Hungary, however, it is considered rude for customers not to say hello when they enter a shop. For this reason, Japanese students should be advised to remember to greet the employees when they enter shops and restaurants in Hungary.

The above-mentioned student, who was puzzled by the Hungarian phrase sajnálom, carried out research on apologising strategies in Hungarian and Japanese for her graduation thesis.3 She created a questionnaire using discourse completion tasks, providing descriptions of several speech act contexts. For example, the participants were asked about how they apologise when they are late for a meeting with friends. At the same time, she also asked them how much responsibility they felt in each situation. The participants were asked to mark the degree of their perceived responsibility on a five-point scale. They were instructed to mark 5 if they felt very responsible and to mark 1 if they did not feel responsible at all.

It turned out that the Japanese generally tend to feel more responsibility than Hungarians in every situation. For example, the Japanese feel responsible even if they are late for some meeting because of a train accident which, as a matter of fact, has not been their fault. Furthermore, the Japanese feel more responsible when they are late for a meeting with their boss than for a meeting with a friend. Such a difference was not observed with Hungarians, and this seems to indicate that the factor of social ranking is especially important for Japanese people.

Let me make a brief digression to clarify the social context of this difference. The characteristics of Japanese society and culture have been studied by a number of researchers.

A classic study of wide acclaim by Nakane4 described the Japanese social structure as a vertical society (縦社会・tate shakai), which means that, rather than among people of equal status, the primary relations in Japanese society are among people who are related hierarchically in a certain social group, such as a school or university community, e.g. one is senior or 172

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junior to the other (先輩、後輩・senpai or kōhai).

Japanese society, on the other hand, places great emphasis on group harmony (和・wa). The consensus within the group is very important and often exceeds any hierarchical differences among individuals in the group.

The characteristics of the country’s social structure are typically reflected in the use of the Japanese language. The Japanese language has a quite complicated system of honorifics.

One must know when and how to use the plain form or keigo (敬語), i.e. respect language. In keigo, there are three sub-categories: the polite, the humble, and the extra-polite respectful form.

The choice of style depends on the interpersonal relationship between the conversational participants. Thus, honorifics are a device for acknowledging one’s relative position in the communicative context.

Japanese speakers have to use appropriate expressions according to the situation and social relations. The Japanese honorific system has a hierarchical nature, reflecting a hierarchically structured society.

In Hungarian, two different forms are distinguished, a polite or formal type of address and a familiar or informal one. As in Japanese, the linguistic form chosen by the speaker depends on the social situation and interpersonal relationship. However, the Japanese honorific system is much more formalised and complicated, and reflects the structure of the society better.

Now, let us return to the original point and take a closer look at the Hungarian apologetic responses included in the questionnaire research.

Besides Sajnálom! (literally meaning something like “I feel sorry for what happened”), Elnézést!

(Excuse me), Bocsánat! (Forgive [me]), and Ne haragudjon/haragudj! (Don’t be angry) were examined in the survey. They express regret, ask for forgiveness, or plead to soothe anger (the English equivalents are, of course, only approximates).

Generally speaking, Bocsánat! (Forgive [me]) is used with relatively intimate, close friends or acquaintances, and, particularly, when the damage caused by the speaker is relatively

small. Elnézést! (Excuse me) is used rather in formal relations, towards someone of higher status or strangers met on the street. Sajnálom! is used in both informal and formal situations, e.g. when someone is late for a meeting with a friend, when someone breaks a vase at a friend’s home or in a shop, or when a waiter spills water on a customer.

Examining the results of the questionnaire, it was unclear in what situation speakers use the expression Sajnálom! (tentatively glossed above as “I feel sorry for what happened”). For this reason, the interviewer asked several native Hungarians about the matter. It soon became clear to her that there is a generation gap in divided usage. Elderly people use Sajnálom! only when they do not feel responsible for some unfortunate situation, such as being late for the meeting because of a train accident, but younger people use Sajnálom! even when they are obviously responsible, e.g. when they are late for a meeting because they have overslept.

According to the results of the questionnaire, whose participants were mostly young people, Sajnálom! is a very frequently used expression (besides Elnézést! and Bocsánat!) when there are no tables available, or when water has been spilt on a customer. Some Hungarians explained that, in the former case, it expresses sympathy and, in the latter, it is the expression of regret. Some hold the opinion that it is used as a device for avoiding responsibility in case the customer may claim compensation.

A 34-year-old professional waiter said he never uses Sajnálom! in such situations.

It seems that the Hungarian Sajnálom! has several functions, and its usage is changing.

It could be said that the primary function of an apology is to restore the relationship between the apologiser and the offended person.

Expressing sympathy for the offended person helps to restore the relationship. Thus, it is understandable why the phrase that expresses sympathy is used as apologising strategy.

JAPANESE EXPRESSIONS OF APOLOGIES Japanese people often say sumimasen (すみません・sorry), when they apologise. 5

When there is a construction, Japanese beg your pardon

Though there are other expressions of apology, such as gomennasai (ごめんなさい・forgive) or moushiwake arimasen (申し訳ありません・very sorry), Japanese speakers most often use sumimasen. This expression also has several different functions: it can be used to request service at a shop (to attract attention), meaning “Excuse me,” just like its Hungarian counterpart, Elnézést! What is more, it is used in a different situation when Hungarian or English speakers would say Köszönöm! and Thank you, respectively.

For example, let us suppose that while sitting in a bus, you drop your pen, and someone sitting next to you picks it up for you. If you are Hungarian, you are most likely to say Köszönöm!

(Thank you). In the same situation, the Japanese would say Sumimasen (Sorry) rather than Arigatō (ありがとう・Thank you). Another example: you see the bus at the bus stop, you want to catch it, make a dash for it, and the driver waits patiently for you to get on. In this situation, Japanese speakers would say Sumimasen to the driver.

It is an act of kindness picking up the pen for you or waiting for you to get on the bus. In a sense, it is more natural to thank than to apologise. In Hungarian, apologetic expressions such as Elnézést! (Excuse me) are least likely to be uttered in the same situation.

Many scholars have noticed this, and tried to explain why Japanese people tend to use an expression of apology, sumimasen, instead of a thanking expression, arigatō, in such situations.

Linguistically, sumimasen is the negated form of HUNGARY AND JAPAN

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the verb sumu. According to the well-known folklorist Yanagida (1969),6 the verb sumu means “become clear,” and the expression sumimasen means the speaker’s mind “does not clear up,” because s/he feels indebted.

The Japanese perceive the above-mentioned situations as if they had caused inconvenience or trouble to the other person by compelling him or her to pick up the pen or forcing him to wait. In this view, the act of picking up the pen is a burden imposed by the pen owner’s carelessness. In the dash-for-the-bus case, you may have caused inconvenience to the other passengers by making them wait. If one of the passengers is in a big hurry, s/he might even get angry.

In such situations, Japanese people feel indebtedness. This type of indebtedness is caused by a favour done by others. The other type of indebtedness is what we feel when we make others suffer, such as stepping on someone’s foot. Japanese sumimasen can be used in both cases. In Hungarian, the former is followed by saying thanks, and the latter is followed by an apology.

Coulmas (1981) investigated the similarity of expressions of apology and gratitude, and concluded that the common link between the two was indebtedness.7 According to Coulmas, expressions of thanks convey the speaker’s indebtedness as a recipient of a benefit, whereas apologies express the speaker’s indebtedness to the other for having caused harm to that person.

This close relationship between apologies and thanks properly explains the use of sumimasen in Japanese. Probably that is why it is often said that the Japanese apologise very often and profusely.

EXPRESSIONS OF REFUSALS AND GRATITUDE Consequently, Japanese speakers use Arigatō (Thank you) not as often as Hungarians. This was revealed by one of our students who carried out research on the speech act of refusal for his graduation thesis.8 Previously, Szili examined Hungarian speech acts of refusal, and showed that there were three dominant strategies at work: 174

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excuse, denial, and apology. 9 The situational choice depends on such factors as social situation, social relation, or the amount of burden that the speaker has to bear. If you fail to perform an act of refusal appropriately, it can negatively affect the interpersonal relations; thus, refusals usually include various strategies to avoid offending the other.

Referring to Szili’s above research, our student conducted a similar questionnaire survey in order to compare the acts of refusal by Japanese and Hungarian speakers. Basically, there are more similarities than differences in acts of refusal. The data show that both Japanese and Hungarian speakers attempt to avoid giving a flat refusal, especially when facing their superiors. Speakers explain why they cannot fulfil the request, then apologise, sometimes offer some alternative possibility, saying, “Today I am busy, how about next time?” They employ direct refusal if the other person is someone of the same social status, such as a friend or a family member.

One of the interesting differences is that Hungarians often say thanks before declining an invitation, e.g. they say, “Thank you for the invitation, but on that day, I do not have time.”

On the other hand, Japanese seldom say thank you. Instead, the typical Japanese way of avoiding a blunt refusal is some indirect and ambiguous expression, such as chotto (ちょっと), literally meaning “a bit, a little,” but depending on the context, it may have a variety of meanings, such as “fairly,” “rather,” “a moment,” etc. In particular, the Japanese use chotto when they try their best to avoid saying no, such as Ashita wa chotto yōji ga atte (明日はちょっと用事があって), i.e. “Tomorrow I have some errands to do.” Even a vague chotto is enough for refusing an invitation. Another typical phrase, kangaete okimasu (考えておきます・I’ll think about it) is also used as a refusal in formal situations.

There is a stereotype that the Japanese are polite, less straightforward, reserved, indirect, or ambiguous. Despite that, depending on the situation, the Japanese can be fairly direct. This is also revealed by a research done by another student of ours.10 She asked both Japanese and

Hungarians how they say no in the following two formal business situations. The first is when an internet service salesperson visits your home and asks you to contract with his company, and the second is when you enter a shop to buy some clothes, and the salesclerk recommends you one item, but you do not like it.

In the first situation, the Japanese tend to use simple, direct refusal, such as iranai desu (いらないです・I do not need), or kekkō desu (結構です・It is not necessary). Hungarians, on the other hand, employ several strategies, thanking, apologising, or excusing, for example, Köszönöm, de nincs szükségem rá (Thank you, but it is not necessary), Elnézést, de már van szolgáltatóm (Sorry, I already have a provider). In the second situation, Japanese people use an indirect strategy instead, giving a reason for the refusal, such as Chotto konomi ja nai desu (ちょ っと好みじゃないです・It is not quite my taste).

Hungarians usually express gratitude first, and then say no, for example, Köszönöm, de nem kérem (Thank you, but I do not want it).

These results obviously disprove the abovementioned stereotype that Japanese people are indirect and ambiguous. Actually, the Japanese are sometimes quite direct and not so polite as Hungarians, considering the fact that Hungarians usually say thanks before refusing.

Possibly it is because of the already-mentioned customer-first service system in Japan that the Japanese do not use polite expressions in the examined situations.

It goes without saying that the differences between Japanese and Hungarian discussed in this article could, and should, be studied in a much more thorough and systematic way.

I believe that the present paper also suggests that speech acts and verbal behaviour cannot be truly understood without reference to cultural and social values and attitudes.

ENDNOTES 1 I am very grateful to László Cseresnyési for his help and valuable comments.

2

John L. Austin: How to do things with words. Harvard

University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1962.

3 Itō Mari: Hangarigo ni okeru shazai kanyō hyōgen [Apology expressions in Hungarian]. B.A. Thesis, Osaka University, Osaka, 2019.

4 Nakane Chie: Tate shakai no ningen kankei. Tan’itsu shakai no riron [Personal relations in a vertical society. A theory of a homogeneous society]. Kodansha, Tōkyō, 1967.

5 Again, the English translations of the phrases can only be approximate.

6 Yanagida Kunio: Mainichi no kotoba [Everday Expressions].

In: Teihon Yanagida Kunio Zenshū 19 [Complete works of Yanagida Kunio 19]. Chikumashobo, Tōkyō, 1969.

7

Florian Coulmas: “Poison to your soul.” Thanks and

apologies contrastively viewed. In: Conversational routines, edited by Florian Coulmas. Mouton, The Hague, 1981. 69–91.

8 Okawa Naoya: Nihongo bogo washa to hangarigo bogo washa no kotowari hyōgen [Refusal expressions of Japanese

CONCLUDING REMARKS We have seen how the speech acts of apology, refusal, and gratitude are realised in Japanese and Hungarian. Overall, the speakers of both languages share similar strategies, but there are also differences due to the social and cultural structures. It can be said that the choice and final linguistic realisation of these strategies are context-sensitive and also culture-sensitive. It is important to examine the differences in speech act strategies between the two languages, as it is useful and helpful in understanding different cultural and social values and attitudes.

and Hungarian]. Osaka University, B.A. Thesis, Osaka, 2019.

9 Szili Katalin: Hogyan is mondunk nemet magyarul? Magyar Nyelvőr. 2002/April–June. 204–220.

10 Motoyama Yuka: Chijin denai aite ni taisuru kotowari no hikaku [Comparative study of refusal expressions towards non-acquaintances]. Manuscript, Osaka University, Osaka, 2018.

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EXCHANGE OPPORTUNITIES BETWEEN HUNGARY AND JAPAN IN THE HEISEI ERA Dr Noriko Satō

BEFORE THE HEISEI ERA The exchange opportunities between Hungary and Japan go back to the Hungarian–Japanese Cultural Agreement of 1938, whereby Yasumoto Tokunaga, an outstanding literary researcher, arrived in Hungary, and art historian Tibor Horváth travelled to Japan in 1940 as the first two exchange scholars.1 Following World War II, the exchange of talent between the two countries was not brought back immediately after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in 1959. Japan only began receiving researchers again in 1965, and Hungary in 1966, in the framework of an intergovernmental exchange programme. In 1980, the Japanese– Hungarian Friendship Society (JHFS) launched a new scholarship opportunity for Japanese students studying in Hungary. For the first time, two Japanese students received a scholarship from the society.2 EXCHANGE POSSIBILITIES IN THE HEISEI ERA, AFTER THE END OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY The beginning of the Heisei Era brought a great change in the history of student exchanges between Hungary and Japan. This is because the beginning of the Heisei Era in 1989 nearly coincided with the change of the political and economic system in Hungary. In the 1990s, interest in Japan grew, especially among young Hungarian people. At the same time, Japanese language education in Hungary was introduced in several institutions from primary schools 3 through secondary schools4 to higher education.

As a result, the Japanese Government created new scholarship opportunities for the Hungarians in addition to the two-year researcher scholarship mentioned above: the one-year Japanese 176

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Language and Culture Scholarship for students involved in Japanese Studies (launched in 1991), the five-or-seven-year Scholarship for First University Degree (launched in 1992), and the Young Leaders Program (YLP) for state civil servants in 2001 and municipal civil servants in 2003; the latter two can also get an MA degree after the training.5 As for Japanese who want to study in Hungary, in addition to the Hungarian state research scholarships, the Japan–Hungary Friendship Society has sent two Japanese scholars annually to Hungary since the beginning of the Heisei Era. One of the society’s board members, Emiko Kume, at the request of the author of this article, found out that the society had provided scholarships for 21 Japanese students in the Heisei Era, most of whom studied music in Hungary.

THE BEGINNING OF SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENT EXCHANGE IN THE HEISEI ERA One of the important results of student exchanges in the Heisei Era was the launch of a secondary school exchange programme. In 1997, the American Field Service (AFS) Hungary, 6 one of the world’s leading international student exchange organisations, launched a student exchange programme between the two countries. Through it, two Hungarian high school students travelled to Japan, and two Japanese students came to Hungary for one year in 1997. From 1997 to 2018, the organisation had a total of 120 Japanese and 119 Hungarian exchange programmes. It is noteworthy that the organisation has had more than 10 Hungarian high school students in Japan every year since 2014, and 10 or 12 Japanese high school students in Hungary in the last two years.7 Besides AFS, another international

The Satsuma Students monument, a memorial dedicated to the first Japanese students who studied abroad

exchange organisation, Youth For Understanding (YFU), also received Japanese high school students in 2002 and 2004, while two Hungarian high school students were sent to Japan.8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXCHANGE OPPORTUNITIES AFTER HUNGARY’S ACCESSION TO THE EU In particular, Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004 gave a huge boost to the development of exchanges and brought about a significant increase in the number of students participating in exchange programmes. The growth in numbers was due partly to a new exchange organiser entering the market, and partly an increase in academic partnership agreements signed between Hungarian and Japanese universities.

In addition to Hungarian music education, which has always attracted many Japanese students, more and more Japanese students

have recently studied in Hungarian medical schools. The Hungarian Medical Universities (HMU), an organisation established by four Hungarian medical schools, began to receive Japanese medical students in 2006.9 According to the website of the organisation’s Tōkyō office, a total of 68 medical students graduated from Hungarian medical schools by 2017.10 In addition, many Japanese students study the Hungarian language in Hungary. They are mainly students of Hungarology from Osaka University. A report from 2009, written by Mika Waseda, Head of the Hungarian Department of Osaka University, says that the university has a partnership agreement with Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) and the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. Within this framework, students in her department can participate free of charge not only in summer courses or undergraduate courses at Hungarian partner universities, but they can also study at HUNGARY AND JAPAN

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the Balassi Institute, the University of Debrecen, the University of Pécs, and the University of Szeged as state scholars.11 According to the latest information from Mika Waseda, the students of Osaka University currently study in exchange programmes with ELTE and the University of Szeged. Every year 10-12 students arrive in Hungary to study, most of them on Hungarian State Scholarships.

More and more institutions of higher education in the two countries are signing academic exchange agreements. Interestingly, this trend stemmed from attempts at internationalisation in both Hungarian and Japanese universities.

Almost all Hungarian universities now have Japanese partners. As a result, Japanese and Hungarian students can now study various subjects, such as economics, international studies, tourism, business, history, and more, at both Hungarian and Japanese universities.

In 2006, the Japanese Government introduced two new state scholarships. One was the oneand-a-half-year Scholarship for Further Training of Teachers, while the other was the Japan– Europe High School Student Exchange Program.

The latter provided various cultural immersion opportunities, including homestay. However, unfortunately, this programme ended in 2010.12 THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW FORM OF EXCHANGE The increase in the number of interuniversity partnerships resulted in not only an increase in exchange students but also the launch of group exchanges and significant development in the content and methods of exchanges.13 In this period, a new type of exchange programme appeared: a short-term group exchange based on multidisciplinary collaborative workshops. A typical example was implemented in 2006 as a UNESCO programme launched by Budapest Business School (BBS) and Ritsumeikan University. At that time, UNESCO awarded a short-term scholarship for the research programme of “Historical City Preservation through Sustainable Regional Economic Development Utilizing Water Resources” for Ritsumeikan University. That year, twelve 178

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students and three teachers from the university visited BBS and conducted collaborative research activities with BBS students who were learning Japanese. While staying for two weeks in Hungary, they had lectures with experts, visited various sites, and participated in various cultural programmes. By the end of the programme, Japanese and Hungarian students gave presentations together on the results of their collaborative research. After it ended, a report was also published about the programme.14 The whole programme plan was created by teachers of the Japanese Department of the BBS. Thanks to the successful cooperation, with the support of UNESCO, ten students and two teachers from BBS travelled to Japan and participated in a two-week multidisciplinary collaborative study in 2007. This research programme was also followed by a publication as a result. Later, the two institutions concluded an academic partnership agreement to accept exchange students from each other.

This type of exchange programme continues today. In 2007, BBS signed a partnership agreement with Jōsai University, and they have since implemented this short-term exchange programme every year, in addition to individual student exchanges. During a ten-day course, students of the two institutions took part in collaborative research workshops in the framework of an intercultural training programme, which focus on different topics each year. At the end of the study trip, Japanese students Japanese gave presentations in English, and Hungarian students in Japanese. The importance of intercultural and multidisciplinary collaborative research workshops was that students could deepen their knowledge of Japanese and Hungarian culture and develop task and intercultural communicative competence.15 SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT OF EXCHANGE OPPORTUNITIES AFTER 2010 During this period, in Hungarian higher education the number of Japanese students grew further, due in part to an increase in interuniversity agreements, and in part to the development of Hungarian State Scholarships. On the one

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Scholarship for Research Students

9

9

9

10

7

7

7

7

7

7

7

Scholarship for Undergraduate Students

1

1

1

2

0

1

2

1

1

0

1

Japanese Language and Cultural Scholarship

3

3

3

3

7

6

9

13

8

5

9

Scholarship for Teachers

2

1

1

0

0

2

1

2

0

0

0

YLP (Young Leader’s Program)

1

0

1

0

0

2

1

1

1

1

1

Total

16

14

15

15

14

18

20

24

17

13

18

Number of scholarships awarded in recent years

hand, Hungarian universities recently signed further academic partnership agreements with Japanese universities, offering tuition exemption to each other. On the other hand, in 2013 the Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarship Programme was launched by the Hungarian Government.

Its core mission managed by the Tempus Public Foundation,16 is to increase the number of foreign students in Hungary and encourage Hungarian higher education institutions to attract top foreign students. Therefore, the Programme has also supported Japanese students studying at Hungarian universities. According to data from the Tempus Public Foundation, the number of Stipendium Hungaricum students from Japan was 57 in the 2015/2016 autumn semester, 55 in the 2015/2016 spring semester, and 72 students in the 2016/2017 autumn semester.17 Since 2014, the Japanese Government has also supported studying abroad and launched the Tobitate Ryūgaku JAPAN Japanese Representative Program,18 which has provided 4 Japanese students with scholarships to study in Hungary.

The Hungarian Government provides scholarships not only for foreign students studying in Hungary but also for Hungarian students studying abroad. In 2013, nine students of BBS won the Campus Hungary scholarship

(Campus Hungary Group Study Tour) and made a two-week study trip to Ritsumeikan University, the institution organising the programme.

Nowadays, an increasing number of Hungarian students get to study in Japan with the Hungarian government’s Campus Mundi Scholarships.

Figures from Japanese government (i.e. the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology or MEXT’s) scholarships in the same period are shown in the table below. Since 2007, on average, 17 students per year have studied in Japan as MEXT scholars.

In addition to the Japanese government scholarships, students studying in Japan have been supported with tuition exemptions or scholarships provided by partner universities, based on an interuniversity agreement or offered by the Japanese Student Services Organization (JASSO). Since 2014, some Hungarian students have also participated in internships at partner universities after studying there.

Other new exchange opportunities were also opened after 2010 in the framework of interuniversity agreements. With the support of the Japan Foundation, from 2010 to 2013, ten student teachers and their supervisor came to the BBS from Jōsai International University for two-three week practices in Japanese language teaching. Student teachers attended Japanese HUNGARY AND JAPAN

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language classes and taught language classes.

From 2013 to 2016, four student teachers came every year for two months. Student teachers did not only practice Japanese language teaching but also spent time with BBS students. Students of both universities developed task competence, furthered their English/Japanese language skills, as well as their intercultural communicative competences.

In 2016 and 2017, the Hungarian Rectors’ Conference organised a two-week summer course at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BUTE) for students from Tōkyō University. The format of this exchange programme was similar to that of others organised by BBS together with Ritsumeikan University or Jōsai University, which were intercultural multidisciplinary collaborative projects. Its novelty was that Hungarian students who participated in it as mentors came from different universities, such as BUTE, ELTE, Szent István University, and BBS, as well as Radnóti Miklós Secondary School.

At the level of secondary education, one of the non-profit foundations, the Hakuhodo Foundation, launched a new type of exchange in 2008 for secondary school students, “aimed at providing opportunities to grow students as global citizens by deepening mutual understanding through cross-cultural 180

HUNGARY AND JAPAN

experiences.” 19 From Hungary in 2010, 2014, 2017, and 2018, a total of “four secondary schools where students learn Japanese, won this scholarship. One of the special features of this programme is that the accompanying teachers received 10, 14, or 20 days of preparatory training in Japan in the year before the exchange programs.

To sum up, what is noteworthy in the 30-year history of exchanges between the two countries in the Heisei Era is that high school exchanges started in the first ten years. At that time, high school students and university students with a scholarship studied abroad individually. There were no group exchange programmes for Hungarian students in Japan. Scholarship opportunities were relatively more limited for both Hungarian and Japanese students, and main scholarships were state-sponsored ones.

After 2000, more and more universities started to sign interuniversity partnership agreements.

As a result, exchange opportunities have expanded, the number of exchange students increased, and group exchange programmes began. In the last 10 years of the Heisei Era, exchange opportunities between the two countries saw spectacular development. The types of scholarships also increased. There are various types of scholarships from state scholarships to scholarships offered by public foundations, by universities, or others.

Hopefully, this trend will continue in the new Reiwa Era and will grow even better.

ENDNOTES 1 Minamizuka Shingo: Nihon Hangarī bunka kōryū no rekishi to genjō. In: Nihon to Tōō shokoku no bunka kōryū ni kan suru kisoteki kenkyū. Association for the Study of Japan’s Cultural Relations with East-Central Europe, Tōkyō, 1982. 56.

2

Kume Emiko: A japán–magyar kapcsolatok története,

1869–2009. edited by Igaya Akiko. Japán–Magyar Baráti Társaság, Tōkyō, 2010. 40.

3 In Hungary, before the change of the political and economic system, teaching Japanese as a second language was first

introduced in an elementary school in Törökbálint in 1987. Cf.

Cultural Center of the Japan Foundation, for developing task

Kiss Ilona: Experience with Teaching the Japanese Language

performance and intercultural communicative competences.

to Elementary School Children in Hungary. Japanese-

16 Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarship Programme. Study in

Language Education around the Globe. 1991/March. 221. In

Hungary. <https://bit.ly/2h9013Y > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

the early 1990s, several other elementary schools introduced

17 Data, Facts, and Statistics. Tempus Közalapítvány. Last

Japanese language education.

modified: 19 June 2017. <https://bit.ly/2IBDnkh > Accessed:

4 In the late 1980s, the Japanese language education was

10 April 2019.

introduced on the secondary level at the Mihály Babits

18

Secondary School. Since then, several secondary schools

JAPAN. <https://bit.ly/2Vrdzgw > Accessed: 10 April 2018.

in Budapest and even in the countryside have introduced

19

Japanese language education.

Foundation. <https://bit.ly/2Du56PO > Accessed: 10 April 2018.

5

Tobi tate! ryūgaku JAPAN to wa. Tobi tate! ryūgaku Sekai no kodomo nihongo nettowāku suishin. Hakuho

Ryūgaku·jinbutsu kōryū. Embassy of Japan in Hungary.

9 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/2UPKZWK > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

6 The AFS was founded in 1947 in the USA. In 1955, the AFS Japan Branch was established, and, in 1990, the AFS Hungary was founded.

7 Based on data from the staff of the AFS Hungary.

8 YFU ni tsuite. Youth For Understanding. Intercultural Exchange Programs. <https://bit.ly/2VfrBCb > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

9

Igakubu shingaku puroguramu. Hungarian Medical

Universities. <https://bit.ly/2Vmszwf > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

10

Sotsugyōsei jisseki. Hungarian Medical Universities.

<https://bit.ly/2ID2YJC > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

11

Mika Waseda: Magyar nyelvoktatás Japánban. In:

Tanulmányok a magyar–japán kapcsolatok történetéből.

Szerk.: Farkas Ildikó – Bincsik Mónika – Basa Zsófi. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 508–510.

12 Ryūgaku·jinbutsu kōryū. Embassy of Japan in Hungary.

9 May 2018. <https://bit.ly/2UPKZWK > Accessed: 10 April 2019.

13 Sato Noriko and Anna Székács wrote a paper about the importance and possibilities of collaborative group works.

Sato Noriko – Székács Anna: Nihongo kyōiku jisshūsei ni taisuru ibunkakan komyunikeeshon nōryoku wo sodateru tameno katsudō to hyōka no jissenn. In: Chūtōō Nihongo Kyōiku Kenshūkai 2013 Hōkokusho. Japan Foundation Budapest Cultural Center. 75–80.

14

The Report of 2006 University Student Exchange

Programme—Historical City Preservation through Sustainable Regional Economic Development Utilizing Water Resources.

Ritsumeikan University, Shiga 15 Az MRK nyári egyetemi programot szervezett a BME-n a Tōkyō Egyetem hallgatóinak. Magyar Rektori Konferencia. <https://bit.ly/2W0MXQx > Accessed: 10 April 2019. The uniqueness of this kind of collaborative exchange programme was highly appreciated by Toshio Hayashi, an expert on Japanese Language Education from the Budapest Japanese HUNGARY AND JAPAN

181

8 ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

The Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in Hungary, during its ten years of existence, has introduced a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education, as well as domestic and international professional audiences.

The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), a Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993).

The Knowledge Centre’s main objectives, in line with the Antall philosophy, are talent management and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events. The Knowledge Centre is a Budapest-based think tank researching topics of national, regional, and international relevance such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the US, China, and the Middle East, security policy, sustainable development, as well as technological and social innovation.

The whole of AJKC works toward strengthening institutional relations both at the national and international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences, workshops, and event series. Our institution’s main office is located in Budapest that operates with three international departments—dealing

with the EU and the V4, the USA, and Asia and Africa—and three thematic departments—focusing on security policy, sustainable development, and talent management. In addition, AJKC has two regional offices in Pécs and Győr, as well as an office in Brussels.

The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scientific works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks. In our autobiographical series, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, recount crucial years and decisions still affecting their lives. Reacting to events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre is made up of works incorporating the latest results of international relations and geopolitics, the history of politics, economics, and psychology.

The think.BDPST conference is AJKC’s most ambitious professional event. The main aim of the project focusing on innovation, new technologies, and regional development, is to put Hungary on the map of large-scale regional conferences, such as GLOBSEC, the Krynica Economic Forum, and the Prague European Summit, by organising the most significant innovation forum in the

region, thereby facilitating a dialogue between the representatives of the economic, governmental, and scientific spheres. The event enjoys the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and the International Visegrad Fund.

Given the fact that Japan is one of the leading innovative nations in the world, the think.BDPST conference encourages the participation of Japanese experts in all of its instalments.

In addition to innovation, the Knowledge Centre puts special emphasis on sustainable development. During the five instalments of the SUSCO Budapest conference series, many topics were examined including sustainable development in general and the sustainable development goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nations, such as sustainable cities and communities, clean water and sanitation, or affordable and clean energy, and environmental migration.

The Antall Jรณzsef Summer School is a ten-day educational programme for MA and PhD students, as well as young professionals that examines the Central European region, in particular the Visegrad Cooperation, and its wider neighbourhood from various aspects through frontal and more interactive forms of education. In 2019, the Knowledge Centre organised the seventh Summer School that revolved around the role of the Visegrad Cooperation in international partnerships such as the EU, OSCE, or NATO.

The objectives of the Knowledge Centre include talent management and the establishment of a higher education network. For these purposes, AJKC organises the annual Danube Regatta. The number of participating universities has grown year after year since its inception: in 2018, on the occasion of the Hungarian Presidency of the Visegrad Group, we welcomed teams from the Visegrad Countries again, who this time not only competed in the rowing and dragon boat races, but in other sports events as well.

In addition to the flagship projects listed above, the Knowledge Centre has other regular event-series that revolve around a selected topic, with each instalment exploring different aspects. One of such event series is on the economic opportunities and prospects of new Asian cooperation initiatives and their impact on Europe. First organised in 2017, this high profile-conferences focus on the Belt and Road Initiative, on all of its economic, financial, and regional aspects, emphasising the regional interconnectivity of the project. The first instalment examined prospects of regional economic cooperation, while the second the maritime silk road. The upcoming event will revolve around is intended to provide space for academic discussion on the impact of the transcontinental initiative on East Asian countries and their perceptions within the European Union.

“REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE” CONFERENCE

Veronika Antall-Horváth, Deputy Director, AJKC gave the welcoming speech, emphasising the key features of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The Belt and Road Initiative is an important element of international trade, whereby Eurasia becomes an integrated economic area. This initiative will undoubtedly have a significant impact on trade opportunities between East Asian and European markets. The conference entitled “Regional Dimensions of the Belt and Road Initiative”, organised by the Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in partnership with China-CEE Institute, was the third instalment of AJKC’s “New Geoeconomic Prospects between Asia and Europe” conference series. It examined how the initiative will bring about the development of regional economic and trade processes and how the affected regions become involved in wider global trade processes.

With the involvement of international experts, the conference provided a scientific discussion on the impact of this trans-continental initiative on East Asian countries and its perception in the European Union and the East Asian region.

184

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

Professor Dr Xin Chen is the Deputy Director General of the Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), as well as the Executive President and Managing Director of the China-CEE Institute in Budapest, which was the partner institution for the conference.

Professor Zuokui Liu, Senior Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The first panel revolved around the perception that the East Asian countries (Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan) might have of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. During the panel discussion, the level of involvement was debated, as well as the BRI’s effect on regional trade balance. Due to its comprehensiveness, the BRI will influence the trade relations of these countries, not only in the East Asian region, but with other trading partners, such as the European Union or African countries. The aim of the panel was to take a close look at this region, and discuss their standpoint with the initiative in detail.

Er i k Fa m aey i s a S e n i o r A s s o c i ate at th e European Institute for Asian Studies Research Institute and a board member of the Chambers of Commerce.

Emese Schwarcz, International Relations Manager at the Asian and African Ríaelations Department of the Antall József Knowledge Centre, was the moderator of the first panel discussion.

Bruno Hellendorff is Joint Research Fellow at the Egmont Institute and European Policy Centre (EPC).

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

185

The second panel of the conference discussed European approaches towards the Belt and Road Initiative, and its goal was to identify the perceptions, challenges, and opportunities with

regard to the project. The panel discussion sought to reflect both on the approach of the EU institutions towards the project, as well as on that of the individual EU member states.

Lin Goethals is the Programme Director for Asia at the European Institute for Asian Studies.

Tamás Kozma, Head of Asian and African Relations Department at the Antall József Knowledge Centre, moderated the second panel entitled European Aprroach towards the BRI. 186

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the University of Łódz, Poland.

Professor Tianping Kong is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Dr Balรกzs Hamar, Head of Brussels Office at the Antall Jรณzsef Knowledge Centre closing the event.

ANTALL Jร ZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

187

OUR RELEASES

Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan

Robert D. Kaplan: The Revenge of Geography

In the early nineties, the Japanese economic miracle came to a halt. The catastrophic market crashes and the ensuing protracted recession shook Japanese society, economy, and politics.

The Hungarian edition of Jeff Kingston’s Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s unveils the radical changes that have taken place since the 1980s, tracing their roots to the period following World War II. The author aims to explain the impact of global, regional, and domestic political shifts which have resulted in controversial challenges in Japan, such as immigration policy, the effects of work culture, the fate of the peace clause of the constitution, the aging society, the difficulties of reconstruction after Fukushima, and the transformative role of the imperial family and the yakuza. The book covers the prolonged era from the turbulent period following Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989 to the election victory of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in 2012, and explains the background of contemporary news reports that are emerging about Japan.

In recent years and decades, technology has shrunk our world, leaving us almost a click away from the places we want to explore. This development has made things much easier for us, but it has not eliminated the need for geographic knowledge—in fact, it has only reinforced it.

Robert D. Kaplan, a former political risk analyst, geopolitical analyst, author of numerous bestsellers, political journalist, and reporter, invites the reader on a journey around the world where the past, the present, and the future all appear on the map.

The author traces the history of the world’s hot spots by examining their climates, topographies, and proximities to other embattled lands.

He then applies the lessons learned to the present crises in Europe, Russia, China, the Indian Subcontinent, Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Middle East.

The result is a holistic interpretation of the next cycle of conflict throughout Eurasia, a visionary glimpse into a future that can be understood only in the context of temperature, land allotment, and other physical certainties.

This indispensable and provocative work shows how timeless truths and natural facts can help prevent this century’s looming cataclysms.

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ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

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AUTH ST

AUTHO ST

Bartók, András Assistant Lecturer, Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of International and European Studies, National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary

An Alliance Made Even Greater? The Us–Japan Alliance in the Heisei Era, Okinawa, and the American Military Presence

Gergely, Attila Senior Lecturer, Department of Japanese Studies, Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Károli

Geopolitics in an Evolving Region

Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, Budapest, Hungary

Grice, Francis Assistant Professor, Political Science and International Studies, McDaniel College,

Aum Shinrikyō—Terror and Encroaching Threats

Westminster, Maryland, USA

Háda, Béla Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Faculty of International and European Studies, National University of Public Service,

Japan’s Territorial Issues with Neighbouring Countries

Budapest, Hungary

Hidasi, Judit Professor Emerita of Budapest Business School, Researcher of Communication and Japanese

The Sustainability of Japanese Work Culture

Studies

Hsu, Minchung Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tōkyō, Japan

190

Demographic Turbulence and its Costs: The Challenges for Japan

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Kikuchi, Masao Associate Professor, Public Policy and Management at Department of Public Management, School of Business Administration, Meiji University, Tōkyō, Japan

Nuclear Reactors, Accidents, and the Future of Nuclear Energy Policy: Changing Dynamics After the Fukushima Crisis

Advisor to UCLG ASPAC, JICA, and other international and national organisations

Kovách, Fülöp President of the Academic Board, Széchenyi István

Japan and the Developmental State

College of Advanced Studies, Budapest, Hungary

Lázár, Marianna Assistant Professor, Department of Japanese Studies, Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures, Faculty of Humanities and Social

Seasonal Festivities in Japan

Sciences, Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary, Budapest, Hungary

Lendvai, Tünde Vice Student President of Advanced College for Security Policy, National University of Public

North Korea and the Issue of Japanese Abductees

Service, Budapest, Hungary

Nyári, Gábor PhD, Historian

Okazaki, Kumiko Research Director, The Canon Institute for Global

Pál Teleki and Japan

Japan’s Struggle for a Stable Economic Recovery After the Bubble Burst

Studies (CIGS), Tōkyō, Japan

191

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AUTHO ST

Satō, Noriko Associate Professor, Budapest Business School,

Exchange Opportunities Between Hungary and Japan in the Heisei Era

University of Applied Sciences

Stéger, Ákos PhD Student of the Doctoral School of Linguistics, Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös Loránd University,

Kanji—A Contentious, Yet Ever-Stimulating Writing System

Budapest, Hungary

Székács, Anna Specially Appointed Professor at the Budapest Business School, University of Applied Sciences,

Hungarian–Japanese Relations in the New Age

Faculty of International Management and Business

Vihar, Judit Retired university professor, Literary historian, translator, haiku poet

The Main Characteristics of Japanese Literature in the Heisei Era

Waseda, Mika Professor of Hungarian linguistics and Modern Hungarian Literature, Graduate School of Language and Culture, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

192

Apologising, Refusing, and Thanking in Hungarian and Japanese: Different Languages and Different Strategies

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Baranyi, Tamás Péter Historian, PhD

A Country of Permanent Renewal

Head of Research

Dobrowiecki, Péter PhD Candidate, Historian Head of EU–V4 Department

Gorácz, Anikó MA, Film Studies Head of Publishing Department

Rethinking Defence—Shifting Capabilities and Focus Points of the JSDF

Tastes Like Family Anime-A Bridge Between East and West: The Movies of Hayao Miyazaki

Pálmai, Zsolt MA, American Studies International Relations Manager,

American Perceptions of Japan at the Dawn of the Heisei Era

Transatlantic Relations Department

Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs PhD Candidate, Historian,

Japanese in Brazil

Research Fellow

Papp, Viktória Anna BSc, International Relations, LLM, International Law and China

The Dynamics of Normalised Sino-Japanese Relations

International relations manager

Schwarcz, Emese MA, International Relations Expert International Relations Manager for Japanese Affairs

Interview with HE Norbert Palanovics Interview with HE Dr István Szerdahelyi Prime Ministerial Profile: Shinzō Abe The Whaling Industry: Then and Now The Oldest Imperial Family in the World Earthquakes, Tsunamis, and the Wrath of Nature Interview with Maki Stevenson 193

REFERENCES OF

PICTURES AND USED DATA Cover Photo

authors: Kokiri, Huhsunqu, and Markalexander100, licence:

Source: T.TATSU/Shutterstock and Pexels, licence: https://

CC BY-SA 3.0.

www.pexels.com/photo-license/. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Postcard depicting the Japanese occupation of the Siberian Inside cover

town of Khabarovsk during the Russian Civil War. Source:

Source: Moon T/Shutterstock.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Taish%C5%8D#/media /File: Khabarovsk_intervention.jpg/Library of Congress, author:

Photos between the chapters

Shobido & Co, licence: public domain.

Source: Shutterstock (2: siripornt/Shutterstock, 3: Sean Pavone/Shutterstock, 4: Rawpixel.com/Shutterstock,

Prime Ministerial Profile: Shinzō Abe

5: metamorworks/Shutterstock, 6: PixHound/Shutterstock,

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzō Abe attends an EU–Japan summit

7: Pavel L Photo and Video/Shutterstock).

in Brussels, Belgium, 21 March 2017. Source: Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock.

2

Nobusuke Kishi in 1954. Source: https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Kishi_Nobusuke_1954.JPG/『アサヒグラフ』 1954

INTRODUCTION Basic country data Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Regions_and_ Prefectures_of_Japan_2.svg, author: Tokyoship & Adrienn Mérész, licence: public domain.

Demographic Turbulence and Its Costs: The Challenges for Japan All the charts and tables were created by Minchung Hsu and designed by Adrienn Mérész.

Interview with HE Norbert Palanovics, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Hungary to Japan Portrait of HE Norbert Palanovics. Photo courtesy of HE Norbert Palanovics.

Interview with HE Dr István Szerdahelyi, Ambassador Extraordinar y and Plenipotentiar y of Hungar y to Singapore Portrait of HE István Szerdahelyi. Photo courtesy of HE István Szerdahelyi.

Stamp printed by the Hungarian Post Office depicting “Geisha in boat” by Yeishi. Source: svic/Shutterstock.

Value of exports and imports by area and country (thousands of US dollars, %), March 2019. Source of data: https://www.jetro. go.jp/ext_images/en/reports/statistics/data/gaikyo201903e_1. xls, compiled by Japan External Trade Organization and designed by Adrienn Mérész.

年4月7日号, author: 朝日新聞社, licence: public domain.

The strongman of the Abe administration. Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Taro_Aso_in_World_ Economic_Forum_Annual_Meeting_in_Davos_(cropped).jpg, author: Sebastian Derungs, licence: CC BY-SA 2.0.

The chief coordinator of the Abe administration. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yoshihide_Suga-1.jpg, licence: public domain.

Geopolitics in an Evolving Region Asia—the population epicentre. Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/majority-worlds-population-livescircle/, author: Jeff Desjardins, licence: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/frequently-asked-questions/.

APEC (Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation). Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:APECMitgliedsstaaten_ map_redraw.png, author: Jjw, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0.

An Alliance Made Even Greater? the Us–Japan Alliance in the Heisei Era, Okinawa, and the American Military Presence Donald Trump and Shinzō Abe showing “Donald and Shinzō Make Alliance Even Greater” caps. Source: https://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shinz%C5%8D_ Abe_and_Donald_ Trump_in_Kawagoe_(1).jpg/http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/ actions/201711/05usa.html, author: 内閣官房内閣広報室, licence: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/terms.html.

American military bases in Okinawa Prefecture. Source:

3

194

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_military_bases_in_ Okinawa.svg, author: Misakubo, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0s.

IN-DEPTH

USFJ personnel by ser vice (1989 –2019), USFJ fighter

A Country of Permanent Renewal

aircraft composition (1989–2019), USFJ major naval assets

The greatest extension of the Japanese Imperium. Source:

(1989–2019). All tables are compiled based on data from

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_territories_occupied_

The Military Balance yearbooks for the corresponding years.

by_ Imperial _ Japan#/media /File:Japanese _ Empire2.png,

Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Japan’s Base Problem—Today. Source: RYUSHI/Shutterstock.

Maximilian Dörrbecker (Chumwa) and Connormah, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0.

Japan’s Territorial Issues with Neighbouring Countries Senkaku islands map. Japan and China territorial disputes.

Antinuclear occupy tent pitched near the National Diet Building

Source: vadimmmus/Shutterstock, redesign: Adrienn Mérész.

in Nagata-chō in 2015. Source: TK Kurikawa/Shutterstock.

North Korea and the Issue of Japanese Abductees

Rethinking Defence—Shifting Capabilities and Focus

Locations where abductees disappeared. Source:

Points of the JSDF

Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (https://www.

The Type 16 MCV and… Source: viper-zero/Shutterstock.

mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kp/page1we_000068.html), licence: https:// www.mofa.go.jp/about/legalmatters.html.

…Type 10 MBT, symbols of more mobile land platforms.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:10TK _

The return of Hitomi Soga, the Chimura couple, and the Hasuikes

005_R_10式戦車_11.jpg, author: Rikujojieitai Boueisho, licence:

to Japan in October 2002. Their family members arrived

CC BY-SA 3.0.

separately in 2004. Source: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000433596.pdf), licence: https://www.mofa.go.jp/about/legalmatters.html.

4

The Dynamics of Normalised Sino-Japanese Relations

ECONOMY

The political map of East Asia. Source: Peter Hermes Furian/

Japan’s Struggle for a Stable Economic Recovery after

Shutterstock.

the Bubble Burst Figure 1: Trend of real GDP growth rate and changes in the CPI

A stamp printed in China, celebrating the 20 th anniversary

of Japan. Data collected by the author from the Cabinet Office

of normalising diplomatic relations with Japan. Source: Lefteris

and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan.

Papaulakis/Shutterstock.

Design: Adrienn Mérész.

The Whaling Industry: Then and Now

Figure 2: Changes in property prices in Japan. Data collected by

Changes in IWC membership. Source:

the author from the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport

http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/140513english.pdf, licence:

and Tourism of Japan. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

http://www.maff.go.jp/j/use/link.html.

Figure 3: Debt amount to nominal GDP ratios in Japan. Data Whaling in Japan since 1985. Source:

collected by the author from the Bank of International Settlement

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Japan_whaling_

Total Credit Statistics. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

since_1985.svg, author: Swift (modified by Grolltech & Adrienn Mérész), licence: public domain.

American Perceptions of Japan at the Dawn of the Heisei Era

Nuclear Reactors, Accidents, and the Future of Nuclear

First Lady Hillary Clinton and Empress Michiko standing in front

Energy Policy: Changing Dynamics after the Fukushima

of the White House. Source: mark reinstein/Shutterstock.

Crisis Map of nuclear power plants in Japan. Edited contents of the

Vincent Chin, the murdered Chinese–American who was

Convention on Nuclear Safety. National Report of Japan for the

mistaken for a Japanese. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.

Fifth Review Meeting. Government of Japan, 2010. Source:

org/wiki/File: Vincent_Jen_Chin.jpg/, author: unknown, licence:

Nuclear Regulation Authority website, http://www.nsr.go.jp/

public domain.

data/000110059.pdf, licensz: http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/ termofuse.html.

Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko arrive at the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. Source: Northfoto/Shutterstock.

Major litigation cases (both administrative and civic litigations) regarding nuclear power plants in Japan. Source: Shindō Muneyuki: Shihō yo! Omae ni mo tsumi ga aru. Genpatsu soshō

5

to kanryō saibankan. Kodansha, Tōkyō, 2012 & information collected by the author. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

SOCIETY The Oldest Imperial Family in the World

A map showing the epicentre of the 2011 earthquake and the

The Imperial Seal of Japan. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.

position of nuclear power plants. Source: https://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/File:Imperial_Seal_of_Japan.svg, author: Philip Nilsson,

org/wiki/File:JAPAN_EARTHQUAKE_20110311.svg, authors:

licence: public domain.

195

The Imperial Family in 2013. Source: Website of the Ministry of

Accessed: 8 April 2019; Aum Shinrikyō: A Timeline. Nippon. 9

Foreign Affairs of Japan (https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea2/ph/

July 2018. <https://bit.ly/2VNOERe > Accessed: 8 April 2019;

page3e_ 000444.html), author: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Matthew Hernon: Cult Confessions: Twenty Years on from the

Japan, licence: https://www.mofa.go.jp/about/legalmatters.html.

Sarin Gas Attack. Tokyo Weekender. 2015/March. 11–13. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Their Majesties the Emperor Naruhito and Empress Masako (126 th Emperor). Soruce: https://www.sp.br.emb-japan.go.jp/

Japanese in Brazil

itpr_ja/jnot_19_04_kicho_jp.html, licence: https://www.mofa.

A poster from Japan calling for emigration to Brazil. Source:

go.jp/about/legalmatters.html.

ht tps://commons.wik imedia.org /wik i/File:Af f iche _%C3% A9migration_ JP_ au_ BR-d%C3%A9b._X Xe_s..jpg, author:

Their Imperial Highnesses Prince (Fumihito) and Princess (Kiko)

unknown, licence: public domain.

Akishino. Source: The Imperial Household Agency website, http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/okotoba/03/kaiken/img/h16-1125-1.

Japanese immigrants working on a Brazilian coffee plantation.

jpg, licence: http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-copyright/.

Source: https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro:Japanese_ Workers_in_Coffee_Plantation.jpg, author: unknown, licence:

Earthquakes, Tsunamis, and the Wrath of Nature

public domain.

The Pacific Ring of Fire. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:Tectonic_ plates _ and _ ring _of_fire.png,

author:

Astroskiandhike, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0.

Prince Mikasa (Takahito) during his visit to Brazil. Source: Arquivo Nacional Collection / https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro: Pr%C3%A D ncip e _Ta ka hito_ Mikas a,_ Ir m%C3%A3o_do_

Japan’s economic growth. Source of data: OECD National

imperador_do_Jap%C3%A3o.tif, author: unknown, licene: public

Accounts Statistics: Quarterly National Accounts, https://www.

domain.

oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-national-accountsstatistics_na-data-en. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

The change in FDI in Brazil in million USD—Japan’s interest revived with the crisis in 2008. Source of data: Banco Central do

A still of the destruction the 3/11 tsunami has left behind. Source:

Brasil, https://www.bcb.gov.br/ftp/notaecon/InvEstrp.xls.

Smallcreative/Shutterstock.

Design: Adrienn Mérész.

The Sustainability of Japanese Work Culture Trend in hours actually worked and non-scheduled hours

6

worked. Source of data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Monthly Labour Survey. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

CULTURE The Main Characteristics of Japanese Literature in the

Percentage of suicides due to work problems (year). Source of

Heisei Era

data: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan. Design:

Shintarō Ishihara (upper) was friends with the most (in)famous

Adrienn Mérész.

20 th century author, Yukio Mishima (lower). Source: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Categor y:Shintar%C5%8D_

Population aged 15 years old and over by labour force

Ishihara#/media/File:Ishihara_Mishima.jpg, licence: public

(2018 annual average). Source of data: Ministry of Internal

domain.

Affairs and Communications, Labour Force Survey, Basic Tabulation, 2018. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

Kanji—A Contentious, yet Ever-Stimulating Writing System

Aum Shinrikyō—Terror and Encroaching Threats

Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshidide Suga introducing the name

Shōkō Asahara in 1995. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

of the new era. Source: Official Website of the Prime Minister

File: Shoko_Asahara.jpg, licence: unlicensed.

of Japan and His Cabinet (https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ content/20190401am.jpg), author: 内閣官房内閣広報室, licence:

Emergency personnel respond to the Tōkyō subway sarin attack.

https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policies/terms_e.html.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Emergency_ personnel_respond_to_the_Tokyo_subway_sarin_attack.png,

Dancers at the Harajuku Genki Matsuri Super Yosakoi festival.

https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/FEMA/Proceedings.pdf, author:

Source: julianne.hide/Shutterstock.

United States Public Health Service, licence: public domain.

One of the traditional Japanese dances at the Obon festival in The three successors to Aum. Source of information: Japan cult

Tokushima. Source: Artem Mishukov/Shutterstock

spinoffs persist two decades after sarin attack. Cult Education Insitute/AFP. 18 March 2018. <https://bit.ly/2UVdvWf >

196

A Miko in a shrine in Tōkyō. Source: Benoist/Shutterstock.

Interview with Maki Stevenson, Goodwill Ambassador of

Trophy to Hakuho Yokozuna, winner of the 42 th edition of

Japanese Cuisine to Hungary

Hungarian–Japanese Friendship Sumo Cup. Photo by courtesy

Maki Stevenson. Photo courtesy of Maki Stevenson.

of the author.

Lecture on Niigata cuisine by Setsuo Morimoto, executive chef

Pál Teleki and Japan

of Bandai Silver Hotel, organised by the Japan Foundation in

Count Pál Teleki. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

2012. Source: posztos/Shutterstock.

File:Pal_teleki.jpg, author: unknown, licence: public domain.

Tastes like Family

Map of Japan, pulished in Gerand and Rumold Mercator Atlas

Movie poster for Shoplifters. Source: The movie’s press kit at

in 1620. Created by Joducus Hondius. Source: Marzolino/

https://encodeur.movidone.com/getimage/qWUJPQNLhvw

Shutterstock.

VGdMzxj9XKfGTz5o37ulmAvQPOyLDSWwkJAlwdqitXGw21atOFGT-0ODsk-KLjY6TaPrNux3vtH_50p_ItyBdeQALaBBJGRWU

Apologising, Refusing, and Thanking in Hungarian and

ST6P9QXcBeQiO9OqsNIWiK145hHWvSHeelgOTiax_3ZdHyD-

Japanese: Different Languages and Different Strategies

6z6muWtfHcXK54GYcRdi83QSYm7NCZJ8hbKZIVTImbwhGFX

When there is a construction, Japanese beg your pardon.

mc44UoFfnB6H, © Wild Bunch.

Source: President KUMA/Shutterstock.

The stars of the movie Our Little Sister at the 2015 Cannes

Exchange Opportunities between Hungary and Japan in

Film Festival: Masami Nagasawa, Kaho, Suzu Hirose, and

the Heisei Era

Haruka Ayase. Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

The Satsuma Students monument, a memorial dedicated to the

File:Cannes_2015_10.jpg, author: Georges Biard, licence: CC

first Japanese students who studied abroad. Source: EQRoy/

BY-SA 3.0.

Shutterstock

Anime—A Bridge between East and West: The Movies of

Number of scholarships awarded in recent years. Source of

Hayao Miyazaki

data: Embassy of Japan in Hungary, https://www.hu.emb-japan.

Hayao Miyazaki (78). Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/

go.jp/itpr_hu/culture_scholarship.html. Design: Adrienn Mérész.

wiki/File:HayaoMiyazakiCCJuly09.jpg, Natasha Baucas, licence: CC BY 2.0.

Illustrative picture with a bar graph and a graduation cap. Source: William Potter/Shutterstock.

O nly Yeste rday. Source: T he movie’s press k it at GKIDS, https://gkids.com/press/, ©1991 Hotaru Okamoto – Yuko Tone – GNH Spirited Away. Source: The movie’s press kit at GKIDS, https://gkids.com/press/, © 2001 Studio Ghibli – NDDTM. Laputa: Castle in the Sky. Source: The movie’s press kit at GKIDS, https://gkids.com/press/, © 1986 Studio Ghibli.

Some memorable scenes from famous Japanese animes.

Source: The movies’ press kit at GKIDS, https://gkids.com/ press/. Upper left corner: Kiki’s Delivery Service, © 1989 Eiko Kadono–Studio Ghibli–N; lower left corner: Howl’s Moving Castle, © 2004 Studio Ghibli–NDDMT; upper right corner: Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind, © 1984 Studio Ghibli–H; middle right block: Princess Mononoke, © 1997 Studio Ghibli–ND; lower right corner: My Neighbor Totoro, © 1988 Studio Ghibli.

7 HUNGARY AND JAPAN Hungarian–Japanese Relations in the New Age On 24 March 2019, Sándor Kiss, President of the Hungarian– Japanese Economic Club in Osaka, handed over the Herendi

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9 NEXT ISSUE IN FOCUS: THE GULF—COMPLEX AND DIVIDED The upcoming issue of In Focus magazine revolves around the Persian/Arab Gulf region and its complex history, culture, and politics.

The region is well-known for the tremendous oil wealth accumulated by the Arab Gulf monarchies; many can experience this first-hand through Dubai’s lifestyle and tourism extravaganza. However, beyond this shining layer of material wealth which creates the illusion of homogeneity, we can find the same cultural diversity in the Gulf as in any part of the Middle East’s other subregions. Beyond the obvious success stories, this diversity has caused a rigid system of permanent political tensions, state fragility, and quarrels not only within the region’s least developed countries and the wealthy monarchies but mostly among them. One magazine issue, or even a single book, is unable to address the entire complexity of state and society relations in the Gulf. The Knowledge Centre, aware that we are only scratching the surface, provides thought-provoking glimpses into issues as diverse as the Gulf’s cultural and linguistic heterogeneity (not limited to the Arab–Persian dichotomy) or its countries’ role in the changing geopolitical environment of the Middle East and North Africa.

Additional issues of In Focus are available on the webpage of the Knowledge Centre, www.ajtk.hu.

Please kindly note that In Focus can be downloaded free of charge.

CONTACT INFORMATION

IMPRINT

Antall József Knowledge Centre Address: 2 Czuczor Street, H-1093 Budapest Web: www.ajtk.hu Telephone: +36 20 310 8776 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu

Publisher: Péter Antall, Director, AJKC Editor-in-Chief: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editor: Emese Schwarcz Editor: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Language Editor: Zsolt Pálmai Proof-reader: Mónika Horváth Contributors: Csilla Lichtenstein, Zita Mihály, Boglárka Szala Layout: Gergely Kiss Graphic Design and Pre-press Preparation: Adrienn Mérész Printed and Bound: Prime Rate Kft. Managing Director: Dr Péter Tomcsányi

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