Towards a Renewed Transatlantic Engagement with the Western Balkans: The Role of Europe, NATO, and

A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E

TOWARDS A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WESTERN BALKANS: THE ROLE OF EUROPE, NATO, AND THE UNITED STATES

ANDRÁS BRAUN

COMMENTARY AJRC-Analyses 2019E07

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor Street 2

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© András Braun, 2019 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2019 ISSN 2416-1705

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A N TA L L J Ă“ Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E TOWARDS A RENEWED TRANSATLANTIC ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WESTERN BALKANS: THE ROLE OF EUROPE, NATO, AND THE UNITED STATES

ANDRĂ S BRAUN

After the end of the Cold War, many scholars and politicians expected not only the reunification of Europe but also the supremacy of the liberal democracy as the basis of the new world order. However, the transition was not the same in every region that was previously under Soviet influence. Soon after regaining their independence and freedom, Central and Eastern European countries articulated their geopolitical will to join Euro-Atlantic structures. In other regions, for instance, in the former Yugoslavia, initial reforms, such as the first multiparty elections, did not end up in a democratic transition, rather, long-standing ethnic tensions culminated in a series of armed conflicts. This delayed transition meant that Euro-Atlantic integration initially was not a realistic scenario for the former Yugoslav republics and Albania, and it only became a tangible possibility a decade later.

On the other hand, the Yugoslav Wars triggered a collective response by the European Union and NATO. Learning from the experiences of the Bosnian, Croatian, and the Kosovo Wars, the two strongest institutional pillars of the Euro-Atlantic integration decided to restructure their strategies towards the Western Balkans. As the international community was initially interested in peace- and security-building, some changes that occurred in the early 2000s encouraged decision-makers to offer a Euro-Atlantic perspective for the region. This normative commitment was supported by not only NATO, which was the main security provider in the region, and the European Union but also other important international organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE. More than one and a half decades after the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, there is a slow and lengthy integration process, as the six Western Balkan candidates seemingly have difficulties in fulfilling the accession criteria. On the one hand, these states have to face not only transition-related challenges but also post-conflict traumas. The other source of difficulties is that there is no unity amongst the Euro-Atlantic members on how to deal with the Balkans.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E EU member states are divided over the issue of enlargement, and the United States also seems disengaged, since Washington’s attention drifted away from the Balkans to other regions on the globe. This disengagement, however, created a political vacuum, which might be filled by other external powers. Their presence should not be underestimated, as the Euro-Atlantic actors are by far not the only players in the region.

Therefore, there is a need for a serious reassessment of the strategic approach by the Euro-Atlantic organisations towards the Western Balkans.

After two decades of strong cooperation, the Western Balkans achieved a significant level of development, and there is also stability in the region. However, the lack of unity among Euro-Atlantic stakeholders might easily undermine this fragile stability. This paper argues that the transatlantic alliance has to re-engage with the Western Balkans to turn the Euro-Atlantic enlargement into a success. The first part explains the background to NATO and EU enlargement strategies and briefly summarises the accession-related problems. The second section presents the possible fields of cooperation where the two organisations might have a common interest in the region.

The Balkans as a security challenge and the stabilisation efforts by the international community The year 2019 marked the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start of the democratic transition in the former Eastern Bloc. These events not only contributed to the successful political and economic transformation of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries but allowed to redefine East–West relations in Europe. The aim of the newly elected leaders in the CEE region, József Antall, Václav Havel, and Lech Wałesa, was a full integration into the fabric of Euro-Atlantic organisations.

Their shared belief was that accession to different Western institutions would consolidate political reforms and strengthen their economies.

Moreover, NATO seemed to be the only alternative to guarantee their countries independence and security. The West supported the idea of their membership, and both NATO and the EU decided to accept new members from the CEE region. In this case, accession was a smooth and predictable process. Unlike in the CEE countries, the first multiparty elections in the region were not followed by democratic transformation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Instead, these elections allowed the emergence of nationalist leaders in the new republics. The nationalisation of politics blocked the democratic transition process, and the suppressed tensions ended up in a severe civil war. The war in Yugoslavia meant not only that these republics experienced a different

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E transition process but also a conflict that eventually became a major security problem for Europe.1 Although the European Community and its member states focused more on post–Cold War challenges and the United States was busy with the Persian Gulf War, the two actors also had to reflect on the conflict in the Balkans. What is visible is that, initially, the Euro-Atlantic Alliance, the NATO, and the EU put joint efforts into post-war reconstruction in the Balkans.

Following the successful stabilisation efforts, and also as a result of the collapse of the authoritarian regimes at the end of the decade, the EuroAtlantic integration of the region became a real possibility. The NATO and the EU were both hopeful, and the transition experience of the CEE countries showed that the integration process had a positive added value not only to democratic and economic reforms but also regional relations.

Therefore, NATO was not anymore in charge to provide security in the region, but, similarly to the EU, aimed to encourage new governments to support their Euro-Atlantic accession path.

The year 2003 was crucial in the relations between the Western Balkans and the Euro-Atlantic organisations. The Adriatic Charter,2 launched by the United States, created the possibility of a NATO accession. At the same time, the European Union launched the Thessaloniki Agenda, also supported by the United States. The accession perspective changed NATO’s role in the region: it could not anymore be considered as a simple security provider but represented one of the institutional pillars of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. As we can see, these strategic elements provided not only a new role for the Euro-Atlantic cooperation but also required NATO to adapt to a new geopolitical situation in Europe. As R. Craig Nation noted, the “Atlantic Alliance has been remarkably successful in redefining itself beyond the Cold War, and maintaining its status as the preeminent institutional framework for European and Euro-Atlantic security.”3 The so-called open-door policy served as the basis of NATO enlargement.

This concept was presented in the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995.4 In line with this, in 1997, three Central European states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, were invited to join the Alliance, and they acceded in 1999. In 2004, they were followed by Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the three Baltic states.

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Mladen Lazić: The Making of a New Economic Elite in Serbia. Südosteuropa. 2015/4. 535.

Adriatic Charter. Archive of the U.S. Department of State, 2009–2011. 25 August 2011. <https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/112766.htm > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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3 Robert Craig Nation: NATO in the Western Balkans: A force for stability? Southeastern Europe.

2011/February. 120.

4 Study on NATO Enlargement. NATO. 5 November 2008. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ official_texts_24733.htm? > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E When it comes to the Western Balkans, the following milestones have to be taken into consideration. In January 1994, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace, which served as a bilateral instrument between the Alliance and third countries. Initially, the Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, later, Serbia and Montenegro joined this programme. The Partnership for Peace not only contributed to developing democratic governance, but it also served as a preparation of membership.5 The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement explicitly said that, by integrating new countries into the existing institutions, “NATO enlargement will safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.”6 Another important programme is the NATO Membership Action Plan, aimed to support accession aspirations in those countries that want to join the Alliance. Regarding the NATO accession path of the Western Balkan countries, Albania got involved in the MAP in 1999 and was followed by Croatia in 2002. Besides, the United States also had a decisive role in promoting the idea of NATO membership in the region. Its Adriatic Charter initially aimed to support the membership aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia. In 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro joined the Charter, while Serbia and Kosovo became observers. From this bloc, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro are already NATO members, while North Macedonia is in the process of accession.

The case of Macedonia is a little bit different, since Skopje also started its MAP in 1999. However, as a result of the name dispute with Greece, Skopje’s accession was blocked for almost a decade. Following the ratification of the Prespa Agreement with Athens, the Republic of North Macedonia will most probably become the 30th NATO member in early 2020.7 Concerning the remaining three countries, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, their situation differs from one another. Serbia, due to the legacy of the 1999 NATO bombings, does not want to join the Alliance, and Belgrade is committed to pursuing a military neutrality policy. Although Kosovo showed interest in becoming a member, it will not be possible until there is no solution to the status of Serbia’s former province.8 The situation is even more complicated in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since there is no agreement amongst the entities of

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Ejdus–Kovačević, 10.

6

Study on NATO Enlargement.

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Ejdus–Kovačević, 10.

8

Ejdus–Kovačević, 10.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the country on the question of accession.9 Its continuous enlargement means that NATO did not stop absorbing new members from the region.

Unlike joining the EU, NATO accession seems to be an easier task to fulfil for the countries in the region.10

EU enlargement: an open-ended process The EU as a normative power? The condition-based enlargement criteria When the EU introduced the Thessaloniki Agenda in 2003, there was an agreement between European leaders that transferring the EU’s norms and values to the region would be beneficial for both parties. The commitment of the EU and the Western Balkans to provide the region with a European future seemed promising. However, in the past sixteen years, it turned out that both the candidates and the member states have to face a challenging process. Just like in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries’ accession, the EU based its enlargement strategy on the principle of conditionality. That means the EU offers membership as a reward to those candidates who are able to comply with its criteria. The pillars of the EU’s enlargement strategy are: 1. The Stabilisation and Association Process as the framework of the strategy 2. The fulfilment of the Copenhagen, Madrid, and additional (often referred to as Copenhagen Plus) criteria 3. The European Union’s ability to integrate new members (or else, the absorption capacity of the EU)11

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In 2003, the European Council defined the elements of the accession process, and the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) became the cornerstone of the EU’s enlargement strategy. Besides ensuring stability, which has been a long-standing priority for Brussels, the main aim of the SAP was to provide assistance in the enlargement process. For this reason, the European Commission evaluates the achievements of the candidates through country reports annually. The regional element appears even

9 András Braun – Diána Horváth: The Challenges of the Euro-Atlantic Perspective in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Antall József Knowledge Centre, Research Blog. 20 March 2019. <https://archive. ajtk.hu/researchblog/352/the-challenges-of-the-euro-atlantic-perspective-in-bosnia-andherzegovina/ > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

10 Michel Soula: The Atlantic Alliance and its Role in the Region. In: The Western Balkans at a Crossroads, organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation. NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome, 2018. 77.

11 Marko Kmezić: The Western Balkans and EU Enlargement: Lessons learned, ways forward and prospects ahead. European Parliament, Belgium, 2015. 12–14.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E stronger within the criteria, compared to previous accession rounds.12 Besides regional elements, bilateral dimensions are also present in the SAP. Bilateral elements included agreements on trade liberalisation, financial assistance, cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, and Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs).13 While the Stabilisation and Association Process mainly concerns technical questions, the main aim of the Copenhagen criteria is to define the normative requirements of membership. The Copenhagen criteria aim to transform candidates to be compatible with the political and economic standards of the EU. The political criteria, therefore, require establishing democratic political systems, where institutional stability guarantees the functioning of the rule of law, while the protection of human rights and respect for the minorities are provided. The economic criteria require a functional market economy and the capacity to cope with the EU markets and competition. The EU acquis criteria demand the ability to adapt and implement the obligations of membership effectively. Concerning other capacity obligations, Western Balkan candidates have to fulfil the Madrid criteria by harmonising their public administration systems with the European standards. In addition to that, these criteria also reconfirmed that the EU needs to be able to integrate—or absorb—new members.14 Nevertheless, besides institutional aspects, the aim of the enlargement process was also to contribute to regional reconciliation. For that reason, the EU set up additional tasks to fulfil, and these also included strict conditions. The Copenhagen Plus criteria include—or, in some cases, included—the task of cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), contributing to the returning of refugees, the establishment of regional organisations, and, finally, finding a solution to bilateral disputes. Moreover, candidates must implement and respect a set of political and peace agreements,15 such as the Dayton Agreement, the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Brussels Agreement, or the UN Security Council 1244 resolution.16 These criteria ultimately turned the enlargement into a multispeed process.

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12 David Phinnemore: The Stabilization and Association Process. In: European Integration and Transformation in the Western Balkans, edited by Arolda Elbasani. Routledge, London – New York, 2013. 23–24.

13

Kmezić, 13.

Joining the EU—the accession process. EUR-Lex. Updated: 9 May 2016. <https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14536 > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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15 Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group: The Unfulfilled Promise: Completing the Balkan Enlargement. European Fund for the Balkans. 2014/May. 7–8. <http://balkanfund.org/wp-content/ uploads/2014/05/Policy-Paper-Completing-Enlargement-2.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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Kmezić, 13.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E The current state of play Montenegro is currently a clear frontrunner of the Western Balkans. Its accession negotiations started in 2012, while Serbia’s in 2014. It is crucial to highlight that Serbia’s accession also depends on the normalisation of its relations with Kosovo. Albania has been a candidate country since 2014, and the Commission recommended opening the accession negotiations with Tirana in 2019.17 In North Macedonia, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement entered into force in April 2004. Thereby, the country could be considered as another frontrunner in the region. The Commission has been recommending the Council to start the accession negotiations with Macedonia since 2009, the country being an official candidate since 2005.18 Following the early parliamentary elections in December 2016 and the entry into force of the Prespa Agreement,19 the acquis-screening process has started. However, as a result of the French veto, neither North Macedonia nor Albania can expect the start of the accession negotiations earlier than 2020.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a potential candidate country of the EU at the moment, although the country’s presidency submitted its membership application to the EU. Sarajevo currently waits for the decision of the European Council to become an official EU candidate.20 Kosovo is a potential candidate of the EU, and five member states (Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus, and Spain) still did not recognise its independence.

Kosovo is the only Western Balkan country that is still waiting for visa liberalisation although Pristina fulfilled many key criteria.21

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Disengaged allies?

Europe was not the only power which wanted to take part in restructuring the political and security landscape in the 1990s. It was also in the interest of the United States to maintain close transatlantic ties. As Robert E. Hunter wrote, the post–Cold War era offered the possibility to break 17 Albania 2018 Report. European Commission. 17 April 2018. 97. <https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-albania-report.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

18 Check current status. European Commission. Updated: 10 July 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/check-current-status_en > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

19 Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties. Government of the Republic of North Macedonia. <https://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/spogodba-en. pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 Report. European Commission.17 April 2018. <https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417-bosnia-and-herzegovina-report.pdf > 4.

Accessed: 13 December 2019.

21 Kosovo 2018 Report. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood– enlargement/sites/near/files/20180417–kosovo–report.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E down “the barriers between NATO and the European Union.” 22 Moreover, during the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin, there was a real chance to include Russia in the broader European security structures.23 To that end, Washington argued for the importance of preserving NATO as a strong security instrument, able to guarantee security for the transatlantic alliance.24 Both the Thessaloniki agenda and the Adriatic Charter showed that there was a real consensus amongst the main stakeholders of the transatlantic alliance in 2003 that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the Euro-Atlantic integration.

By offering the Western Balkans a Euro-Atlantic perspective, the European Union and the NATO exercised in tandem a value promoter role, and, at the same time, they also became the main providers of regional security. This Western supremacy could not be questioned for a very long period. The economic crisis and other events, e.g., the growing global influence of China, the war in Ukraine, the migration crisis, the Brexit, and the election of Donald Trump as US President, somehow changed the international scene. These events and changes also meant that the previously strong transatlantic ties started to weaken due to internal disputes. This phenomenon, combined with different accession-related problems, affected the integration process of the Western Balkans.

The first problem: enlargement fatigue and the lack of unity between member states It is a widely discussed topic amongst scholars, and even EU institutions, whether Western Balkan candidates can comply with the political and economic criteria. In the meantime, the EU’s commitment to accept new members has also been questioned in some cases. Following Jean-Claude Juncker’s speech in 2014, when, as President of the Commission, he announced that no enlargement could be expected during the mandate of his Commission, Germany, in line with its enlargement-supporting attitude, decided to launch the Berlin Process. This initiative aimed to reconfirm the EU’s continued commitment to enlargement.25 Regarding the main institutions, the European Commission decided to reflect on region-specific challenges by renewing the enlargement strategy in February 2018. During the same year, the first EU–Western

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22 Robert E. Hunter: Toward NATO Enlargement: The Role of USNATO. In: Open Door. NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War, edited by Daniel S. Hamilton – Kristina Spohr. Brookings Institution Press, 2019. 299.

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Hunter, 299.

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Hunter, 299.

Velina Lilyanova: The Western Balkans’ Berlin process: A new impulse for regional cooperation.

European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing. 4 July 2016. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586602/EPRS_BRI(2016)586602_EN.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E Balkans Summit was also organised in Sofia within the Bulgarian EU Presidency. However, the last two years clearly show that there is a lack of unity amongst EU member states. The 2018 renewed strategy aimed to provide the Western Balkans with a clear roadmap. President Macron opposed opening the negotiation chapters with Albania and North Macedonia. In addition to that, France has recently presented a short non-paper,26 which aims to reform the whole enlargement strategy of the EU. The French position is that Paris will not back that negotiations start until the EU is not institutionally ready to absorb new members.27 As it was already mentioned, the EU’s integration capacity is a key condition for any new enlargement. However, neither the Copenhagen nor the Madrid criteria explained in detail what the term “absorption capacity” means.28 Enlargement fatigue, a popular notion in the Western EU member states, is a clear sign that the EU is not able to absorb new members. This phenomenon has gradually increased and spread since the first Eastern enlargement in 2004. The notion refers at the same time to the attitude of member states towards future enlargements of the European Union and the outcomes29 of Eastern enlargements.30 What is interesting to observe is that, according to a 2018 Eurobarometer survey, enlargement was the only EU policy not supported by the majority of EU citizens.31 In 2018, only 43% supported the idea of enlargement, while 45% opposed it. These figures seem to show a persistent trend, as previous Eurobarometer data showed similar statistics, meaning that the citizens of the European Union do not support the idea of including new members.

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The second problem: the USA’s retreat from the region Initially, the former Yugoslav region was not a priority for American foreign policy. In the first years of the 1990s, it showed more interest in challenges from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, the Middle East peace process, and the reunification of Germany. Washington, therefore, recognised the war in Bosnia mainly as a European issue.

26 Non-Paper. Reforming the European Accession process. 2019/November. <https://www.politico. eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Enlargement-nonpaper.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

András Braun: The Achilles’ Heel of the Euro-Atlantic Integration. Antall József Knowledge Centre, Research Blog. November 2019. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/research-blog/the-achilles-heel-ofthe-euro-atlantic-integration > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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28 Michael Emerson [et. al]: Just what is ‘absorption capacity’ of the European Union. CEPS Policy Brief, No. 113. 2006/September. 9. <https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=5412&pdf=1381. pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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Balázs Péter: Az Európai Unió külpolitikája. Budapest, Wolters Kluwer Kft., 2016. 257.

Anna Szołucha: The EU and ‘Enlargement Fatigue’: Why Has the European Union Not Been Able to Counter ‘Enlargement Fatigue’? Journal of Contemporary European Research. 2010/1. 2, 5.

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31 Standard Eurobarometer 90—Autumn 2018. Public opinion in the European Union. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/finland/sites/finland/files/eb90_fir_en.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E Initially, the Bush administration only supported European efforts by political means to stop the conflicts. However, when it turned out the European integration was not capable of stopping the armed conflicts, the Clinton administration decided to take action. Richard Holbrooke wrote that, in 1995, President Bill Clinton recognised that the United States could not avoid being involved in the Bosnian War.32 In 1995, the United States changed its disengagement policy and decided to support military intervention. This decision ultimately led to the Dayton Accords, signed at the end of 1995.33 This manifestly demonstrates that the United States showed clear commitment and support towards the region in the 1990s.

American regional presence significantly declined in the period after the end of the wars, following the successful stabilisation of the region.

Washington was mainly present through NATO missions and focused more on security issues. Despite this reduced presence, Washington kept showing interest in the region, and its security-oriented approach was in line with the EU’s integration policy. In the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the American foreign policy was divided on how to deal with the region. Although US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bryan Hoyt Yee was involved as a mediator in the Macedonian political crises in 2017, such mediation could not be observed in crucial moments—for example, during the political crisis in Albania or the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue—until very recently.34 The nomination of Matthew Palmer as Special Envoy to the Western Balkans and Richard Grenell as Special Presidential Envoy for Serbia and Kosovo Peace Negotiations shows that the United States might have increasing commitment to and reengagement with the region. The main question is whether the new American policy and the EU’s enlargement policy will be in synch again as it used to be at the beginning of the decade. That would be especially desirable, since persisting regional conflicts might destabilise the region anew, and, in the meantime, external powers, such as Russia, Turkey, China, or even the Gulf countries, might challenge the Euro-Atlantic commitment of the Western Balkan candidates.

Looking at the concerns of the United States, one may say that recent foreign policy actions might predict the return of the Western Balkans to the centre of American foreign policy. Besides, Washington can rely on the currently existing framework with NATO and also with

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32 Richard Holbrooke: Foreword. In: Derek Chollet: The Road to the Dayton Accords. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. xi.

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Derek Chollet: The Road to the Dayton Accords. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 1–4.

Florian Bieber: Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans. BiEPAG Policy Brief.

2019/August. 6–8. <https://biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Leadership-Adrift_fin-2. pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the EU, meaning that there is no need to establish new institutions or financial instruments.35 An analysis, published in 2018, summarised the following security aspects that might serve as a common ground for the transatlantic interests:36 Finding a solution to the status of Kosovo Committing Serbia decisively to the West Integration North Macedonia into NATO Consolidating Montenegro’s and Albania’s membership in the Alliance 5) Containing the interference by Russia in the region 6) Assessing the role of China and Turkey in the region 7) Combatting extremism 1) 2) 3) 4)

The possible danger factors: the destabilisation of the region and the role of external powers Regional challenges Since the launch of the Thessaloniki Agenda, the EU had a more than important role in initiating dialogues in order to solve the remaining regional problems. Despite some significant achievements, it is clear that further assistance and mediation are still needed to make a proper regional breakthrough. As the slow enlargement process was combined with a democratic decline in all countries, fears of regional destabilisation and the continuance of frozen conflicts arose. This unpleasant status quo not only can further delay the accession process of the candidates, but, in the meantime, it might risk undermining the credibility of the EU’s transformative power.

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The most persisting challenges in the region are the dispute between Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo, the constant political crises that might end up in state capture, and the problematic coexistence of varied ethnic groups. The different institutions of the European Union, such as the Parliament, the Commission, and the External Action Service, had an invaluable role in mediating political crises. Normalisation talks 35 Thomas E. Graham [et al.]: Time for Action in the Western Balkans. Policy Prescriptions for American Diplomacy. National Committee on American Foreign Policy – East West Institute. 2018/ May. 19. <https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/Time-for-Action-in-the-WesternBalkans.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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Graham [et al.], 12–17.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E initiated by the High Representative of the European Union in 201337 reached fundamental agreements between Belgrade and Pristina; however, a final solution has to be found to the status of Kosovo. The EU representatives also had an important role in mediating between the parties during the political crisis in Montenegro or the Republic of Macedonia38 or, even more recently, in Albania. The freshly elected new European Commission will certainly have a decisive role in contributing to the resolution of political disputes. Another crucial political duty of the EU and other Western powers is to facilitate the political dialogue between the constituent nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and help political leaders find an appropriate, preferably bottom-up way to reform the Dayton constitution, which ultimately institutionalised the frozen conflicts between the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.39 From a security perspective on regional relations, it is crucial to highlight that NATO has to continue its committed efforts to maintain and further improve the security situation. As Albania and Montenegro are already members, and North Macedonia will accede very soon, there is a need to develop a clear accession path for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, whilst it is also important to maintain the partnership with Serbia. From a security perspective, it also means that, until the resolution of the Kosovo question, NATO forces are unlikely to retreat from the region.40

External power’s growing interests41

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Another significant change compared to the 1990s is that Western powers are not anymore the only players in the region. The American retreat and the slow Euro-Atlantic integration process left a political vacuum, which attracted external powers to the region. Russia and Turkey have had a long-standing traditional relation with the Balkans, but new players like China or the Gulf countries have also shown increased interests in it. Great powers’ growing interest, on the other hand, has had several impacts on American foreign policy, which Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. European Union External Action Service. 15 June 2016. <https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eu-facilitated-dialogue-belgrade-pristina-relations/349/dialogue-between-belgrade-and-pristina_en > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

37

38

Since February 2019, the official name of the country is the Republic of North Macedonia.

39

Graham [et al.], 10–11.

40

Graham [et al.], 14.

On the topic see Arlinda Rrustemi [et al.]: Geopolitical Influences of External Powers in the Western Balkans. The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. 30 September 2019. <https://hcss.nl/ sites/default/files/files/reports/Geopolitical%20Influences%20of%20External%20Powers%20 in%20the%20Western%20Balkans_0.pdf > Accessed. 13 December 2019.; Lars Hänsel – Florian C. Feyerabend: The influence of external actors in the Western Balkans. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 2018.

41

H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu

A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E ultimately contributed to their increased presence in the region.42 As Western Balkan candidates are surrounded by EU and NATO member states, the foothold of external powers such as Russia, Turkey, or China and the Gulf states might challenge not only the normative aim of the EU but also the security commitment of the wider region. Unlike the EU and NATO, which have a region-wide strategy and aim to integrate the Western Balkans into the same Western type of integration, external players have different visions for the territory. As none of them can be considered as a democracy, the impact made by them might strengthen ethnic and political polarisation and further delay the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans.43 At the moment, these external forces are unable to offer real alternatives to the region.44 However, if the Euro-Atlantic Alliance fails to redevelop or even unify its regional policy in a proper way, the European Union and even the United States might risk the ability to respond to external challenges properly. In that case, the European Union must prepare for a more intensified influence from external powers in the Western Balkans, which can also change the rules of the game.

Conclusions In the past two decades, both NATO and the European Union had a more than important role in the stabilisation of the Western Balkan region. In that sense, their engagement was successful, even though some problems are still challenging regional security. For that reason, NATO enlargement should not pause in the Western Balkans.45 Seemingly, the candidates have to prepare for a long EU accession process, and there is a lack of commitment amongst the member states towards their integration. Moreover, twenty years after the end of the Kosovo War, the integration process failed to give answers to crucial regional problems, such as economic growth or youth unemployment. In these circumstances, it is crucial to preserve the credibility of enlargement-related reforms in the pre-accession period.

To strengthen their position, the transatlantic allies have to identify their common regional interests. The European Union and NATO have to bring back credibility and predictability in the enlargement process, whilst the 42

15

Bieber.

Gordana Delić: Essential element towards Euro-Atlantic Institutions. In: The Western Balkans at a Crossroads, organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation. NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome, 2018. 69.

43

44 Florian Bieber – Nikolaos Tzifakis: The Western Balkans as a Geopolitical Chessboard? Myths, Realities and Policy Options. BiEPAG Policy Brief. 2019/June. <http://biepag.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2019/08/The_Western_Balkans_as_a_Geopolitical_Chessboard.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

45

Graham [et al.], 8–9.

H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu

A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E United States has to continue showing more interest in regional issues. The coordination and harmonisation of their policies are especially vital, since other, external players has shown increasing interest in the region. New priorities should include accelerating the Euro-Atlantic integration process, finding a solution for regional disputes, and contributing to the socioeconomic reforms in region.

Therefore, there is a strong need for a comprehensive and synchronised transatlantic strategy that will be able to assist the region with the complicated political, economic, and security-related problems. That will require stronger American–European cooperation and, hopefully, these efforts will strengthen the transatlantic alliance again and help to regain the dynamism of the integration process.46 The Balkans cannot be considered the “powder keg” of Europe anymore. However, until there is no unity amongst the transatlantic allies on the future of the region, the Western Balkans will remain the Achilles’ heel of European security.

16

46

Graham [et al.], 8–9.

H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu