Refuting ibn arrushd on the eternity of the world

REFUTING IBN ARRUSHD ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD De aeternitate mundi DE AETERNITATE MUNDI by Thomas Aquinas On the Eternity of the World[1] English translation ďż˝ 1991, 1997 by Robert T. Miller[2] From http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/aquinas-eternity.html reformated by Joseph Kenny, O.P. Supposito, secundum fidem Catholicam, quod mundus durationis initium habuit, dubitatio mota est, utrum potuerit semper fuisse. Cuius dubitationis ut veritas explicetur, prius distinguendum est in quo cum adversariis convenimus, et quid est illud in quo ab eis differimus. Si enim intelligatur quod aliquid praeter Deum potuit semper fuisse, quasi possit esse aliquid tamen ab eo non factum: error abominabilis est non solum in fide, sed etiam apud philosophos, qui confitentur et probant omne quod est quocumque modo, esse non posse nisi sit causatum ab eo qui maxime et verissime esse habet. Si autem intelligatur aliquid semper fuisse, et tamen causatum fuisse a Deo secundum totum id quod in eo est, videndum est utrum hoc possit stare.

Let us assume, in accordance with the Catholic faith, that the world had a beginning in time. The question still arises whether the world could have always existed, and to explain the truth of this matter, we should first distinguish where we agree with our opponents from where we disagree with them.

If someone holds that something besides God could have always existed, in the sense that there could be something always existing and yet not made by God, then we differ with him: such an abominable error is contrary not only to the faith but also to the teachings of the philosophers, who confess and prove that everything that in any way exists cannot exist unless it be caused by him who supremely and most truly has existence. However, someone may hold that there has always existed something that, nevertheless, had been wholly caused by God, and thus we ought to

determine whether this position is tenable.

Si autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, vel hoc dicetur quia Deus non potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi Deus posset facere. In prima autem parte omnes consentiunt: in hoc scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam.

Restat igitur videre, utrum sit possibile aliquid fieri quod semper fuerit.

If it be impossible that something caused by God has always existed, it will be so either because God could not make something that has always existed or because such a thing could not be made, regardless of God's ability to make it. [3] As to the first, all parties agree that, in view of his infinite power, God could have made something that has always existed.

[4] It remains to be seen, therefore, whether something that has always existed can be made.

Si autem dicatur quod hoc non potest fieri, hoc non potest intelligi nisi duobus modis, vel duas causas veritatis habere: vel propter remotionem potentiae passivae, vel propter repugnantiam intellectuum. Primo modo posset dici, antequam Angelus sit factus, non potest Angelus fieri, quia non praeexistit ad eius esse aliqua potentia passiva, cum non sit factus ex materia praeiacente; tamen Deus poterat facere Angelum, poterat etiam facere ut Angelus fieret, quia fecit, et factus est. Sic ergo intelligendo, simpliciter concedendum est secundum fidem quod non potest creatum semper esse: quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam passivam semper fuisse: quod haereticum est. Tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non possit facere ut fiat aliquid semper ens.

If such a thing cannot be made, the impossibility will arise for one of two reasons: either because of an absence of a passive potentiality or because of some contradiction between the ideas involved. [5] In regard to the first, notice that before an angel is made, we may say, in a certain manner of speaking, that the angel cannot be made, [6] since no passive potentiality precedes its being, for an angel is not made from pre-existing matter.

Nevertheless, God was able to make the angel, and he was able to cause the angel to be made, for God made it, and it was made. Therefore, if we understand "being made" or "being caused" as implying the pre-existence of a passive potentiality, then it should to be conceded, according to faith, that something caused cannot always exist, for it would then follow that a passive potentiality has always existed, and this is heretical. But since a passive potentiality need not precede in time whatever God may make, it does not follow that God could not have made something that has always existed.

Secundo modo dicitur propter repugnantiam intellectuum aliquid non posse fieri, sicut quod non potest fieri ut affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera; quamvis Deus hoc possit facere, ut quidam dicunt. Quidam vero dicunt, quod nec

In regard to the second, someone may hold that something that has always existed cannot be made because such a thing is selfcontradictory, just as an affirmation and a denial cannot be made simultaneously true.

Deus hoc posset facere, quia hoc nihil est.

Tamen manifestum est quod non potest facere ut hoc fiat, quia positio qua ponitur esse, destruit se ipsam. Si tamen ponatur quod Deus huiusmodi potest facere ut fiant, positio non est haeretica, quamvis, ut credo, sit falsa; sicut quod praeteritum non fuerit, includit in se contradictionem. Unde Augustinus in libro contra Faustum: quisquis ita dicit: si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint: non videt hoc se dicere: si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt, falsa sint. Et tamen quidam magni pie dixerunt Deum posse facere de praeterito quod non fuerit praeteritum; nec fuit reputatum haereticum.

Still, some people say that God can even make self-contradictories things, while others say God cannot make such things, for such things are actually nothing. Clearly, God cannot make such things come to be, for the assumption that such a thing exists immediately refutes itself. Nevertheless, if we allow that God can make such things come to be, the position is not heretical, though I believe it is false, just as the proposition that the past did not occur is false, about which Augustine says (XXVI Contra Faustum cap.

5), "Anyone who says, 'If God is omnipotent, let him make what has happened not to have happened,' does not realize that he is saying, 'If God is omnipotent, let him make true things false insofar as they are true.'" [PL 42, 481.] Nevertheless, certain great men have piously maintained that God can make past events not to have happened, and this was not reputed to be heretical.

Videndum est ergo utrum in his duobus repugnantia sit intellectuum, quod aliquid sit creatum a Deo, et tamen semper fuerit. Et quidquid de hoc verum sit, non erit haereticum dicere quod hoc potest fieri a Deo ut aliquid creatum a Deo semper fuerit. Tamen credo quod, si esset repugnantia intellectuum, esset falsum. Si autem non est repugnantia intellectuum, non solum non est falsum, sed etiam impossibile: aliter esset erroneum, si aliter dicatur. Cum enim ad omnipotentiam Dei pertineat ut omnem intellectum et virtutem excedat, expresse omnipotentiae Dei derogat qui dicit aliquid posse intelligi in creaturis quod a Deo fieri non possit. Nec est instantia de peccatis, quae inquantum huiusmodi nihil sunt. In hoc ergo tota consistit quaestio, utrum esse creatum a Deo secundum totam substantiam, et non habere durationis principium, repugnent ad invicem, vel non.

We thus ought to determine whether there is any contradiction between these two ideas, namely, to be made by God and to have always existed. And, whatever may be the truth of this matter, it will not be heretical to say that God can make something created by him to have always existed, though I believe that if there were a contradiction involved in asserting this, the assertion would be false.

However, if there is no contradiction involved, then it is neither false nor impossible that God could have made something that has always existed, and it will be an error to say otherwise. For, if there is no contradiction, we ought to admit that God could have made something that has always existed, for it would be clearly derogatory to the divine omnipotence, which exceeds every thought and power, to say that we creatures can conceive of something that God is unable to make. (Nor are sins an instance to the contrary, for, considered in themselves, they are nothing.) In this, therefore, the entire

question consists: whether to be wholly created by God and not to have a beginning in time are contradictory terms.

Quod autem non repugnent ad invicem, sic ostenditur. Si enim repugnant, hoc non est nisi propter alterum duorum, vel propter utrumque: aut quia oportet ut causa agens praecedat duratione; aut quia oportet quod non esse praecedat duratione; propter hoc quod dicitur creatum a Deo ex nihilo fieri.

That they are not contradictory can be shown as follows. If they are contradictory, this is for one or both of these two reasons: either because the agent cause must precede the effect in time, or because non-being must precede the effect in time, for we say that what God creates comes to be out of nothing.

Primo ostendam, quod non est necesse ut causa agens, scilicet Deus, praecedat duratione suum causatum, si ipse voluisset. Primo sic. Nulla causa producens suum effectum subito, necessario praecedit duratione suum effectum.

Sed Deus est causa producens effectum suum non per motum, sed subito. Ergo non est necessarium quod duratione praecedat effectum suum. Prima per inductionem patet in omnibus mutationibus subitis, sicut est illuminatio et huiusmodi. Nihilominus tamen potest probari per rationem sic.

First, we should show that it is not necessary that an agent cause, in this case God, precede in time that which he causes, if he should so will. This can be shown in several ways. First, no cause instantaneously producing its effect necessarily precedes the effect in time. God, however, is a cause that produces effects not through motion but instantaneously.

Therefore, it is not necessary that he precede his effects in time. The first premise is proved inductively from all instantaneous changes, as, for example, with illumination and other such things. But the premise may be proved by reason as well.

In quocumque instanti ponitur res esse, potest poni principium actionis eius, ut patet in omnibus generabilibus, quia in illo instanti in quo incipit ignis esse, calefacit. Sed in operatione subita, simul, immo idem est principium et finis eius, sicut in omnibus indivisibilibus. Ergo in quocumque instanti ponitur agens producens effectum suum subito, potest poni terminus actionis suae. Sed terminus actionis simul est cum ipso facto.

Ergo non repugnat intellectui si ponatur causa producens effectum suum subito non praecedere duratione causatum suum.

Repugnat autem in causis producentibus per motum effectus suos, quia oportet quod principium motus praecedat finem eius. Et quia homines sunt assueti considerare huiusmodi

For, at whatever instant a thing exists, at that instant it can begin to act, as is clear in the case of all things that come to be by generation: in the very instant at which there is fire, the fire heats. But in an instantaneous action, the beginning and the end of the action are simultaneous, indeed identical, as is clear in the case of all indivisible things. Hence, at whatever moment an agent instantaneously producing an effect exists, the end of its action can exist as well. The end of the action, however, is simultaneous with the thing made.

Therefore, there is no contradiction if we suppose that a cause instantaneously producing an effect does not precede its effect in time. A contradiction does obtain if the cause involved is one that produces its effects

factiones quae sunt per motus, ideo non facile capiunt quod causa agens duratione effectum suum non praecedat. Et inde est quod multorum inexperti ad pauca respicientes facile enuntiant.

through motion, for the beginning of the motion precedes in time the end of the motion.

Since people are accustomed to considering the type of cause that produces effects through motion, they do not easily grasp that an agent cause may fail to precede its effect in time, and so, having limited experience, they easily make a false generalization.

Nec potest huic rationi obviare quod Deus est causa agens per voluntatem: quia etiam voluntas non est necessarium quod praecedat duratione effectum suum; nec agens per voluntatem, nisi per hoc quod agit ex deliberatione; quod absit ut in Deo ponamus.

Praeterea.

Nor can the conclusion be avoided by saying that God is an agent cause that acts voluntarily, for neither the will nor the voluntary agent need precede its effect in time, unless the agent cause acts from deliberation, which we take to be absent in God.

Causa producens totam rei substantiam non minus potest in producendo totam substantiam, quam causa producens formam in productione formae; immo multo magis: quia non producit educendo de potentia materiae, sicut est in eo qui producit formam. Sed aliquod agens quod producit solum formam, potest in hoc quod forma ab eo producta sit quandocumque ipsum est, ut patet in sole illuminante. Ergo multo fortius Deus, qui producit totam rei substantiam, potest facere ut causatum suum sit quandocumque ipse est.

Further, a cause that produces the whole substance of a thing does not, in producing a whole substance, act in a less perfect way than does a cause that produces just a form in producing the form. On the contrary, it acts in a much more perfect way, since it does not act by educing from the potentiality of matter, as do causes that merely produce forms.

However, some causes that produce just forms are such that, whenever the cause exists, the form produced by it exists as well, as is clear in the case of illumination by the sun.

Therefore, much more can God, who produces the whole substance of things, make something caused by him exist whenever he himself exists.

Praeterea. Si aliqua causa sit qua posita in aliquo instanti non possit poni effectus eius ab ea procedens in eodem instanti, hoc non est nisi quia causae deest aliquid de complemento: causa enim completa et causatum sunt simul.

Sed Deo nunquam defuit aliquid de complemento. Ergo causatum eius potest poni semper eo posito; et ita non est necessarium quod duratione praecedat.

Further, if, granted a cause, its effect does not immediately exist as well, this can only be because something complementary to that cause is lacking: the complete cause and the thing caused are simultaneous. God, however, never lacks any kind of complementary cause in order to produce an effect. Therefore, at any instant at which God exists, so too can his effects, and thus God need not precede his effects in time.

Praeterea. Voluntas volentis nihil diminuit de virtute eius, et praecipue in Deo. Sed omnes solventes ad rationes Aristotelis, quibus probatur res semper fuisse a Deo per hoc quod idem semper facit idem, dicunt quod hoc sequeretur si non esset agens per voluntatem.

Ergo et si ponatur agens per voluntatem, nihilominus sequitur quod potest facere ut causatum ab eo nunquam non sit. Et ita patet quod non repugnat intellectui, quod dicitur agens non praecedere effectum suum duratione; quia in illis quae repugnant intellectui, Deus non potest facere ut illud sit.

Further, the will of the voluntary agent in no way diminishes his power, and this is especially true with God. But all those who try to answer the arguments of Aristotle (who held that something caused by God had always existed, since like always makes like) [7] say that the conclusion would follow if God were not a voluntary agent. Therefore, allowing that God is a voluntary agent, it still follows that he can make something that he has made never fail to exist. Thus, although God cannot make contradictories true, we have shown that there is no contradiction in saying that an agent cause does not precede its effect in time.

Nunc restat videre an repugnet intellectui aliquod factum nunquam non fuisse, propter quod necessarium sit non esse eius duratione praecedere, propter hoc quod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse. Sed quod hoc in nullo repugnet, ostenditur per dictum Anselmi in Monologio, 8 cap., exponentis quomodo creatura dicatur facta ex nihilo. Tertia, inquit, interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non esse aliquid unde sit factum. Per similem significationem dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa, dicitur contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur hunc sensum, si intelligatur quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam essentiam cuncta quae sunt ab eadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, idest non ex aliquo; nihil inconveniens sequetur. Unde patet quod secundum hanc expositionem non ponitur aliquis ordo eius quod factum est ad nihil, quasi oportuerit illud quod factum est, nihil fuisse, et postmodum aliquid esse.

It remains to be seen, then, whether there is a contradiction in saying that something made has always existed, on the grounds that it may be necessary that its non-being precede it in time, for we say that it is made out of nothing.

But that there is no contradiction here is shown by Anselm in his explanation of what it means to say that a creature is made out of nothing. He says (Monologion cap. 8), "The third sense in which we can say that something is made out of nothing is this: we understand that something is made, but that there is not something from which it is made.

In a similar way, we say that someone who is sad without reason is sad about nothing. We can thus say that all things, except the Supreme Being, are made by him out of nothing in the sense that they are not made out of anything, and no absurdity results." On this understanding of the phrase "out of nothing," therefore, no temporal priority of non-being to being is posited, as there would be if there were first nothing and then later something.

Praeterea, supponatur quod ordo ad nihil in praepositione importatus remaneat affirmatus, ut sit sensus: creatura facta est ex nihilo, idest facta est post nihil: haec dictio post ordinem importat absolute. Sed ordo multiplex est:

Further, let us even suppose that the preposition "out of" imports some affirmative order of non-being to being, as if the proposition that the creature is made out of nothing meant that the creature is made after

scilicet durationis et naturae. Si igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et particulare, non esset necessarium ut propter hoc quod creatura dicitur esse post nihil, prius duratione fuerit nihil, et postea fuerit aliquid: sed sufficit, si prius natura sit nihil quam ens; prius enim naturaliter inest unicuique quod convenit sibi in se, quam quod ex alio habetur.

Esse autem non habet creatura nisi ab alio; sibi autem relicta in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi nihilum quam esse.

Nec oportet quod propter hoc sit simul nihil et ens, quia duratione non praecedit: non enim ponitur, si creatura semper fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nihil sit: sed ponitur quod natura eius talis esset quod esset nihil, si sibi relinqueretur; ut si dicamus aerem semper illuminatum fuisse a sole, oportebit dicere, quod aer factus est lucidus a sole. Et quia omne quod fit, ex incontingenti fit, idest ex eo quod non contingit simul esse cum eo quod dicitur fieri; oportebit dicere quod sit factus lucidus ex non lucido, vel ex tenebroso; non ita quod umquam fuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus, sed quia esset talis, si eum sibi sol relinqueret. Et hoc expressius patet in stellis et orbibus quae semper illuminantur a sole.

nothing. Then this expression "after" certainly implies order, but order is of two kinds: order of time and order of nature. If, therefore, the proper and the particular does not follow from the common and the universal, it will not necessarily follow that, because the creature is made after nothing, non-being is temporally prior to the being of the creature. Rather, it suffices that non-being be prior to being by nature. Now, whatever naturally pertains to something in itself is prior to what that thing only receives from another. A creature does not have being, however, except from another, for, considered in itself, every creature is nothing, and thus, with respect to the creature, non-being is prior to being by nature. Nor does it follow from the creature's always having existed that its being and non-being are ever simultaneous, as if the creature always existed but at some time nothing existed, for the priority is not one of time. Rather, the argument merely requires that the nature of the creature is such that, if the creature were left to itself, it would be nothing. For example, if we should say that the air has always been illuminated by the sun, it would be right to say that the air has always been made lucid by the sun. Thus, since anything that comes to be such-and-such comes to be such-and-such from being not such-and-such, we say that the air is made lucid from being non-lucid, or opaque, not because the air was once nonlucid or opaque, but because the air would be opaque if the sun did not illuminate it. This is clearly the case with the stars and those celestial bodies that are always illuminated by the sun.

Sic ergo patet quod in hoc quod dicitur, aliquid esse factum et nunquam non fuisse, non est intellectus aliqua repugnantia. Si enim esset aliqua, mirum est quomodo Augustinus eam non vidit: quia hoc esset efficacissima via ad improbandum aeternitatem mundi, cum tamen ipse multis rationibus impugnet aeternitatem

Thus it is clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed. Indeed, if there were some contradiction, it would be amazing that Augustine failed to see it, for exposing such a contradiction would be a most effective way of proving that the world is not eternal, and

mundi in undecimo et duodecimo de Civ. Dei, hanc etiam viam omnino praetermittit?

Quinimmo videtur innuere quod non sit ibi repugnantia intellectuum: unde dicit decimo de Civ. Dei, 31 cap., de Platonicis loquens: id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt non esse hoc, scilicet temporis, sed substitutionis initium. Sic enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium, quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: sic, inquiunt, et mundus et dii in illo creati semper fuerunt, semper existente qui fecit; et tamen facti sunt. Nec unquam dicit hoc non posse intelligi: sed alio modo procedit contra eos. Item dicit undecimo Lib., 4 cap.: qui autem a Deo quidem mundum factum fatentur, non tamen eum temporis sed suae creationis initium habere, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus; dicunt quidem aliquid et cetera. Causa autem quare est vix intelligibile, tacta est in prima ratione.

although Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in XI and XII De Civitate Dei, he never argues that his opponents' view is contradictory. On the contrary, Augustine seems to hint that there is no contradiction involved. Thus, speaking of the Platonists, he says (X De Civitate Dei cap.

31), "They somehow contemplate a beginning in causation rather than a beginning in time.

Imagine, they say, a foot that has been in dust since eternity: a footprint has always been beneath it, and nobody would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot.

Though neither is prior in time to the other, yet one is made by the other. Likewise, they say, the world and the gods in it have always existed, just as he who made them always existed; yet nevertheless, they were made."

[PL 41, 311] Nor does Augustine ever say that this cannot be understood; rather, he proceeds against the Platonists in a totally different way.

He says (XI De Civitate Dei cap. 4), "Those, however, who admit that the world was made

by God but nevertheless want to hold that the world has a beginning in creation but not in time, so that, in some scarcely intelligible way, it has always been made by God, think that they are defending God against a charge of casual rashness." [PL 41, 319][8] Their position is difficult to understand, however, only for the reason given above in the first argument.

Mirum est etiam quomodo nobilissimi philosophorum hanc repugnantiam non viderunt. Dicit enim Augustinus in eodem Lib. cap. 5, contra illos loquens de quibus in praecedenti auctoritate facta est mentio: cum his agimus qui et Deum corporum et omnium naturarum quae non sunt quod ipse, creatorem nobiscum sentiunt; de quibus postea subdit: isti philosophos ceteros nobilitate et auctoritate vicerunt. Et hoc etiam patet diligenter consideranti dictum eorum qui posuerunt mundum semper fuisse, quia nihilominus

How remarkable it would be that even the most noble of philosophers failed to see a contradiction in the idea that something made

by God has always existed. Speaking against the Platonists, Augustine says (XI De Civitate Dei cap. 5), "Here we are contending with those who agree with us that God is the Creator of all bodies and all natures except himself," [PL 41, 320] and then, again about the Platonists, he adds (XI De Civitate Dei cap. 5), "These philosophers surpassed the rest in nobility and authority." [PL 41, 321]

ponunt eum a Deo factum, nihil de hac repugnantia intellectuum percipientes. Ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt, soli sunt homines, et cum illis oritur sapientia.

Augustine said this even after diligently considering their position that the world has always existed, for they nevertheless thought that it was made by God, and they saw no contradiction between these two ideas.

Therefore, those who so subtly perceive the contradiction are solitary men, and with these does wisdom arise. [9]

Sed quia quaedam auctoritates videntur pro eis facere, ideo ostendendum est quod praestant eis debile fulcimentum.

Dicit enim Damascenus I Lib. 8 cap.: non aptum natum est quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur coaeternum esse ei quod sine principio est et semper est. Item Hugo de sancto Victore in principio Lib. sui de sacramentis dicit: ineffabilis omnipotentiae virtus non potuit aliud praeter se habere coaeternum, quo faciendo iuvaretur.

Still, since certain authorities seem to argue on the side of such men, we ought to show that they base themselves on a weak foundation.

Damascene says (I De Fide Orthodoxa cap.

8), "What is made out of nothing is by nature not such that it is coeternal to what has no causal principle and always exists." [PG 94, 814B] Likewise, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacramentis I-1 cap. 1), "The ineffable omnipotent power could not have anything coeternal beyond itself that would help it in making." [PL 176, 187B]

Sed harum auctoritatum et similium intellectus patet per hoc quod dicit Boetius in ult. de consolatione: non recte quidam, cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coaeternum putant. Aliud enim est per interminabilem vitam duci, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitae totam pariter complexam esse praesentiam, quod divinae mentis esse proprium manifestum est. Unde patet quod etiam non sequitur quod quidam obiiciunt, scilicet quod creatura aequaretur Deo in duratione; et quod per hunc modum dicatur, quod nullo modo potest esse aliquid coaeternum Deo, quia scilicet nihil potest esse immutabile nisi solus Deus, patet per hoc quod dicit Augustinus, in libro XII de Civ. Dei, cap. 15: tempus, quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Ac per hoc etiam si immortalitas Angelorum non transit in tempore, nec praeterita est quasi iam non sit,

But the position of these and similar authorities is made clear by Boethius, who says (V De Consolatione prosa 6), "When some people hear that Plato thought this world neither had a beginning in time nor will ever have an end, they mistakenly conclude that the created world is coeternal with the Creator.

However, to be led through the endless life Plato attributes to the world is one thing; to embrace simultaneously the whole presence of endless life is quite another, and it is this latter that is proper to the divine mind." [PL 63, 859B] Thus it does not follow, as some people object, that a creature, even if it had always existed, would be equal to God in duration.

For, if "eternal" be understood in this sense, nothing can in any way be coeternal with God, for nothing but God is immutable. As Augustine says (XII De Civitate Dei cap. 15), [10] "Time, since it passes away by its mutability, cannot be coeternal with immutable eternity. Thus, even if the immortality of the angels does not pass away

nec futura quasi nondum sit; tamen eorum motus, quibus tempora peraguntur, ex futuro in praeteritum transeunt. Et ideo creatori, in cuius motu dicendum non est vel fuisse quod iam non sit, vel futurum esse quod nondum sit, coaeterni esse non possunt. Similiter etiam dicit octavo super Gen.: quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita aeterna est ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. Consimilia verba dicit in undecimo confessionum.

in time (it is neither past, as if it did not exist now; nor is it future, as if it did not yet exist), nevertheless, the angels' motions, by which moments of time are carried along from the future into the past, pass away. Therefore, angels cannot be coeternal with the Creator, in whose motion there is nothing which has been that is not now, nor anything which will later be that is not already." [PL 41, 364-365] Likewise, Augustine says (VIII Super Genesis ad Litteram cap. 23), "Since the nature of the Trinity is wholly unchangeable, it is eternal in such a way that nothing can be coeternal with it," [PL 34, 389] and he uses words to the same effect in XI Confessionum as well. [11]

Addunt etiam pro se rationes quas etiam philosophi tetigerunt et eas solverunt; inter quas illa est difficilior quae est de infinitate animarum: quia si mundus semper fuit, necesse est modo infinitas animas esse. Sed haec ratio non est ad propositum, quia Deus mundum facere potuit sine hominibus et animabus, vel tunc homines facere quando fecit, etiam si totum mundum fecisset ab aeterno; et sic non remanerent post corpora animae infinitae. Et praeterea non est adhuc demonstratum, quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu.

Those who try to prove that the world could not have always existed even adduce arguments that the philosophers have considered and solved. Chief among these is the argument from the infinity of souls: if the world had always existed, these people argue, there would necessarily be an infinite number of souls. But this argument is not to the point, for God could have made the world without making men or creatures with souls, or he could have made men when in fact he did make them, even if he had made the rest of the world from eternity. In either case, an infinite number of souls would not remain after the bodies had passed away. Furthermore, it has not yet been demonstrated that God cannot cause an infinite number of things to exist simultaneously.

Aliae etiam rationes sunt a quarum responsione supersedeo ad praesens, tum quia eis alibi responsum est, tum quia quaedam earum sunt adeo debiles quod sua debilitate contrariae parti videntur probabilitatem afferre.

There are other arguments adduced as well, but I refrain from answering them at present, either because they have been suitably answered elsewhere, or because they are so weak that their very weakness lends probability to the opposing view.

NOTES:

[1] This translation follows the Leonine Edition of Aquinas's works, vol. 43 Sancti Thomae De Aquino Opera Omnia 85-89 (Rome 1976).

[2] All persons are licensed to reproduce this translation and the footnotes hereto for personal or educational purposes, provided that the notice of copyright above and this notice are included in their respective entireties in all copies. This license includes reproduction by a commercial entity engaged in the business of providing copying services if such reproduction is made at the behest of a person who would otherwise be licensed under the preceding sentence to reproduce this translation for personal or educational purposes.

[3] Aquinas means that the impossibility may be thought to arise either on the part of God, as if he were unable to make such a thing for lack of power, or on the part of the thing, as if such a thing could not be made because it lacks a pre-existing passive potentiality or because it is self-contradictory.

[4] That is, on the condition that such a thing can be made. In other words, all sides agree that the impossibility of something having always existed, if such there be, does not arise from some lack of power in God. [5] That is, between "always having existed" and "having been made."

[6] In the sense that there was nothing existing before the angel that would become the angel, as the brass to be made into a statue exists before the statue and becomes the statue.

[7] See II De Generatione et Corruptione cap. 10, 336a 27-28.

[8] PL 41, 319. In the Leonine Edition, Aquinas does not quote the predicate of the independent clause; it does appear in the Parma Edition, and I have chosen to supply it.

[9] Said ironically, the sentence is quite out of character for Aquinas, who courteously conducted the bitterest disputations. Here he is probably alluding to the Vulgate text of Job 12:2, in which Job says, "You are solitary men, and with you wisdom shall die." The difference between "arises" (oritur) and "shall die" (morietur) is small.

[10] So in Aquinas. The chapter divisions in De Civitate Dei are, at this point, somewhat unclear, and, as the editors of the Leonine Edition suggest, the quoted text is probably from cap. 16. In any event, the quoted material appears at PL 41, 364-365.

[11] See XI Confessionum cap. 30. PL 32, 826.

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A Place To Stand δῶς μοι πᾶ στῶ καὶ τὰν γᾶν κινάσω May 1, 2004

Thomas Aquinas and the Eternity of the World: An Exercise of Faith and Reason The eternity-of-the-world controversy which raged in Europe`s universities during the thirteenth century provided Saint Thomas Aquinas with one of his most dramatic opportunities to assert his view of the harmonious relationship between faith and reason.

In applying and developing his faith-reason synthesis to this particular question, Thomas found himself fighting against the new radical Aristotelian thinkers of his generation as well as a multitude of conservative theologians, contemporary and past.

To a greater extent than anyone else in the thirteenth century, Thomas upheld the authority of both the pagan philosophy of the Greco-Arabic corpus as well as the infallible Revelation of the Christian Church, in a way that was rationally coherent to a great extent. This was the Thomistic synthesis of reason and revelation.

Although this dual and integrated allegiance produced a profoundly creative impulse in the work of Thomas which achieved an unprecedented harmony between pagan philosophy and the Catholic faith, it also set Thomas up for an occasional inconsistency, an example of which we will examine in Thomas` arguments against the rational necessity of the world`s beginning.

I will trace the development of Thomas` position concerning the eternity of the world, both with respect to the radical Aristotelian contention for the necessary eternalness of the world and also with respect to the conservative theologian`s case for the rational necessity of the world`s beginning. Before pursuing this analysis, however, I will review Thomas` celebrated position on the relationship between faith and reason in order that I may show how zealously he applied this position to the explosive arguments surrounding the issue of the eternity or finitude of the world.

Furthermore, when reviewing Thomas` writings on the eternity-of-the-world question (ca. 1256 – ca. 1271), I will highlight those arguments which impinge upon the study of natural philosophy in the late Middle Ages. (A set of events to keep in the background while reading this essay is collectively known as the “Condemnations of 1277� despite an earlier occurrence in 1270. What relationship did Aquinas have to this set of events which helped to breakdown some of the stronghold of Aristotelian thinking in theology and science).

Thirteenth-century schoolmen were forced to come to terms with the vast legacy of Greek and Islamic philosophy that had been newly translated into Latin during the previous century. One of the more significant pieces of historical data to support this generalization is the March 9, 1255 statute of the Paris arts faculty which placed all the known writings of Aristotle on the lecture program. We may infer from this that even before 1255, Aristotle`s writings were increasingly lectured upon and that the statute only legitimized an already-growing trend. In fact, by the time of Aquinas, the seven liberal arts were largely reduced to Aristotelian logic and philosophy. That Thomas received most of his training in the arts outside the university (he was trained by his own

Dominican order after a short time at the University of Naples), is evidence that even the mendicant orders were caught up in the mass-appropriation of Aristotle which produced not only creative speculation, but also dangerously heterodox attitudes toward theology.

Not long after the famous 1255 Paris arts statute, a new group of philosophers emerged who pursued pagan philosophy to its heterodox conclusions without attempting to reconcile their philosophy with the faith. These philosophers are referred to as Latin Averroists, radical Aristotelians, or heterodox Aristotelians. A number of these philosophical radicals were probably sincere Christians, including the prominent Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. These Latin Averroists lived with the tension of holding a vast network of rational demonstrations which could not be absolutely true because they did not harmonize with the sacred Scriptures. Still other Latin Averroists did not encounter this problem since they had rejected the Christian faith altogether.

Near the other end of the thirteenth-century intellectual spectrum, a large group of conservative theologians, Augustinian in outlook, bravely, and sometimes inadequately, defended the faith by bringing forth rational demonstrations to prove the statements of divine revelation. One of the most prominent conservative attempts to rationally demonstrate an item of faith was the set of arguments which were claimed as proof that the world necessarily had a beginning. Saint Bonaventure and John Pecham were two outstanding representatives of this bold attempt. Saint Thomas most likely had one or both of these thinkers in mind when he composed his various rebuttals of the conservative position on the eternity of the world.

For the purposes of understanding Thomas` application of his faith-reason synthesis to the question of the eternity of the world, we may characterize Thomas as a moderate Aristotelian. He rejected the alleged rational necessity of both the world`s eternity (the radical Aristotelian view) and its finitude (the conservative theological position). His concept of faith and reason and his three categories of human knowledge helped prepare Thomas to embrace a moderate and agnostic position on the issue of the world`s eternity. To have faith, for Thomas, is to assent to something because it has been revealed by God. To have science (rational knowledge), on the other hand, is to assent to something because we perceive it as true in the natural light of reason.

These two different kinds of assent are mutually exclusive although the objects of their content overlap considerably. For example, many people have faith in a revealed proposition like the existence of God which can also be rationally demonstrated by those thinkers who have the time and capacity to do so. Hence, the masses assent to God`s existence by faith, whereas a number of philosophers assent to the same proposition, but by an entirely different means–reason. Once a thinker works through a rational demonstration for the existence of God, he can no longer hold to that proposition by faith since his rational assent entirely displaces assent by means of faith.

The Thomistic synthesis contains three classes of knowledge based on how that knowledge may potentially command assent. First, we have articles of faith properly said. This kind of knowledge can be attained only through faith in the propositions revealed by God and thus are entirely beyond scope of rational demonstration. As we shall see, Thomas put the world`s beginning into this category along with doctrines of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption.

Then, there is that class of knowledge which, although revealed by God, is also potentially known by means of rational demonstration. Members of this class include God`s existence, his

essential attributes, the existence of the human soul as well as the soul`s immortality. Although Thomas conceived of these as necessary presuppositions to matters of faith, he denied that they were articles of faith properly said. As alluded to earlier, any given person assents to the knowledge of this category either by faith or by reason and never by both simultaneously. The final class of knowledge consists of propositions which can only be known by rational demonstration since divine revelation makes no truth claims concerning such knowledge.

Although Etienne Gilson does not explicate this third class of knowledge in his presentation of the Thomistic synthesis in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (1938), its existence in Thomas` system is evident from the following statement Thomas made in the Summa Theologica: “. . . those things were said to be seen which of themselves move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Therefore it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the sense or by the intellect.”

Before the advent of Neoplatonism, the Greeks did not conceive of a universal cause of the totality of existence, but instead remained at the level of thought governed by the Presocratic dictum that “nothing can come from what is not.” The world was considered eternal because it is uncaused. The work of Plotinus (ca. 205-270) changed all of this. He introduced the idea of metaphysical causality for the first time in his doctrine of emanation. According to this doctrine, the world is eternal because it necessarily emanates from the One in an eternal dependency relationship. Because Avicenna and Averroes–the two greatest thinkers of Islam–perpetuated the emanation view of the world along with its eternalist stance, it was inevitable that the scholars of the Latin West would have to take note of the Greek and Islamic consensus on the eternity of the world. In fact, Siger of Brabant unhesitatingly accepted the world`s eternity at the beginning of his teaching career before 1270.

Saint Thomas contributed to scholarly dialogue on the eternity of the world throughout his career. In addition to the special polemical treatise De aeternitate mundi (ca. 1270), Thomas dealt with the issue at length in six other works: Scriptum super IV libros Sententiarium magistri Petri Lombardi, II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 5 (ca. 1256); Summa contra Gentiles, II, cc. 31-38 (ca. 1262); De Potentia Dei (1265,66), q. 3, aa. 14, 17; Summa theologica, Ia, q. 46 (ca. 1265); Quodlibetum III, q. 14 (ca. 1270); and the Compendium theologica, cc. 98, 99 (ca. 1271). The Sententiarium, Summa contra Gentiles, and Summa theologica attack both the radical Aristotelian and conservative theologian positions; De Potentia and Compendium theologica confront only the radical Aristotelians; and only one work, De aeternitate, is exclusively devoted to refuting the conservative theologians (and probably John Pecham in particular).

Near the beginning of his theological career, in commenting on the second book of the Sentences (ca. 1256), Thomas refuted the eternalist arguments but also maintained (in response to St. Bonaventure who commented on the Sentences a few years before Thomas) that the notion of an eternal creation is not contradictory and that no arguments for the world`s beginning are truly demonstrable. Thomas placed the world`s finitude, to which in fact he did assent, into the class of knowledge that is composed of articles of faith properly said, that is revealed knowledge which is beyond rational demonstration. Thomas repeated this same basic strategy six years later in the Summa contra Gentiles (ca. 1262), although this time around he devoted most of his attention to refuting the radical Aristotelians who had burst forth in full activity during the 1260s.

Chapters 31-38 of the Summa contra Gentiles address the eternity-of-the-world debate. In the first of these chapters Thomas shows that the alleged necessary existence of creatures rests either on the creature itself or on some other being. The first option is false because earlier he had demonstrated that being only proceeds from the first Being. Or, as Thomas expressed himself later in the Summa theologica, “There is nothing that is not from Deo, qui est cause universalis totius esse (God, who is the universal cause of the totality of being).” If creatures did exist necessarily, then the cause of this necessity (both efficient and final) would have to be God. But since God`s will is not dictated by any necessity, creatures themselves do not exist necessarily.

Hence creatures have not necessarily existed eternally.

Chapters 32, 33, and 34 present, respectively, the arguments for the eternity of the world from the standpoint of God, from the consideration of creatures, and from the consideration of the creative action itself. Thomas refutes every point in the three chapters that follow. I will now summarize the prominent arguments and rebuttals, most of which are repeated in a more concise form in the Summa theologica. A perfect will achieves its desire immediately. Since such is the case with God, he must have always created the world. Thomas reminds us here that God`s will determined not only the existence of its effect (the world), but also its duration of existence.

However, the radical Aristotelians would reply, God would have no reason to create the world at one moment rather than another and so would have to always or never create the world. Here, Thomas argues that no duration exists outside the created universe and so God would never encounter the problem just proposed. With the creation of the world, time itself came into existence. In elaborating this point, Thomas draws a parallel between time and place that touches on foundational issues in natural philosophy. To ask why God created the world in its present place rather than in another place is meaningless since beyond our universe there can be no place because “the entire place for all things was produced along with [the world].” Similarly, outside the created universe no time exists since time itself was created with the universe. In the responsio of De potentia Thomas states more boldly that the quantity of the duration and dimensions of the universe depend exclusively on God`s will. Thomas also stresses that both time and place are extraneous to things.

The topic of motion, likewise important in medieval natural philosophy, also entered into discussions about the world`s eternity. Thomas argued that every motion must either be eternal or must have some other motion preceding it. Since God is immovable, creatures must have always existed. Implicit here is the routine pre-modern assumption that motion requires an efficient cause in the form of a constantly and directly-applied mover. Thomas responds by stating that God can cause a new and temporal thing that has motion and yet not undergo any change himself. When considering the nature of the creative action itself, Thomas notes that ordinarily when something comes from something motion is involved. But in the ex nihilo creation of something, no motion or change of any kind takes place, except in a metaphorical sense.

The incorruptibility of the heavens, an essential part of the Aristotle`s cosmology, played a role in the eternity controversy. In one of Thomas` academic disputations in Rome, De potentia (1265, 66), the incorruptibility of the heavens was linked to their power of eternal existence. The power of existing (or acting), Thomas argues, pertains to the present or future and not to the past.

The power of incorruptibility which the heavens now possess thus had no necessary effect on the past history of the heavens. It appears that since the radical Aristotelians used the incorruptibility

of the heavens to support their eternalist position, the conservative theologians argued for a peculiar notion of corruptibility to bolster their own convictions. Thomas reports the dialogue on this issue and includes the corruptibility argument which invokes the sustaining power of God which could be removed to cause the heavens to collapse into nothingness. The radical Aristotelian`s response to this argument was that the corruptibility of the heavens should not be judged possible on the grounds that the heavens could be destroyed by the removal of some consequent fact which in this case was God`s sustaining power (this argument is not very clear).

At this point Thomas steps in to arbitrate and largely sides with the conservative theologian`s position by maintaining that the divine will would have to be supposed to have unchangeably decreed the preservation of the heavens in order to maintain their absolute incorruptibility.

Although none of the parties fully departed from the incorruptibility feature of the Aristotelian cosmos, we see here the beginnings of fresh non-Aristotelian departures. God`s will and power are called upon to at least question the incorruptibility dogma. The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 helped to accelerate this kind of hypothetical thinking (secundum imaginationum) which has contributed greatly to the development of science in the Western tradition.

Thus far we have examined the main arguments for the eternity of the world and the systematic rejection offered by Thomas. At the end of the rebuttals of the radical Aristotelian`s arguments in each of the works mentioned above, Thomas provides a few summary remarks that tie each discourse back into the faith-reason synthesis. In the Summa contra Gentiles Thomas concludes that those who claim rational demonstration of the world`s eternity contradict the Catholic faith which reserves for God alone the status of eternity. However, Thomas` confidence in the harmony of reason and revelation still holds as he finally concludes that “nothing prevents us from maintaining that the world has not always existed. And this is what the Catholic faith teaches: `In the beginning God created heaven and earth.`” In the De potentia Thomas states even more strongly that we must hold that the world is not eternal in order to accord with the faith. He then states that “this truth cannot be effectively attacked by any demonstration based on physics.” God`s unlimited power and will guarantee that nothing in the world is necessary except logical consistency.” (But one could also argue that logic itself is dependent upon God for its character and compelling status–I don`t thing Thomas advances this point). Finally, in the Summa theologica we discover that absolutely speaking, God need not will anything except himself. So, it is not necessary for God to have eternally created the universe. It is possible (i.e. philosophically, but not according to actual revelation) that the world is eternal, but only if God so willed it. Hence, no demonstrative proof is possible for the eternity of the world.

If no demonstration is possible, how then did Thomas reconcile this with the great respect that he had for the authority of Aristotle? Thomas articulates his finest defense of Aristotle in the Summa theologica where he enumerates three reasons for the non-demonstrative status of Aristotle`s comments on the world`s eternity. First, it is clear that Aristotle is only arguing as a correction to his predecessors in that he directly opposes his statement to the arguments of thinkers like Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato. Also, his technique of reporting the testimony of Plato and the Presocratics is in concert with a probabilistic mode of discourse, not a demonstrative one. (Of course, modern philosophy of science has shown that all science falls short of an idealistic demonstrative form and thus all science is probabilistic or tentative in character). Finally, Aristotle explicitly states in Book I of the Topics that one of the unsolvable dialectical problems is whether the world is eternal. Thomas, the moderate Aristotelian, seems to have been only

moderately successful in saving Aristotle from his pagan and eternalist context. Here, we at least see the invigorating effect that the Christian Revelation had on the minds of the philosophically astute of the thirteenth century.

Up to this stage in our discussion of the texts of Thomas Aquinas we have limited ourselves to the arguments for the eternity of the world, the corresponding rebuttals offered by Thomas, and the integration of all this into the Thomistic faith-reason synthesis. Next, we will turn to the conservative theologian`s case for the rational necessity of the world`s beginnings as reported by Thomas and the series of rebuttals which attempt to negate this position. To do this I will focus upon the special polemical treatise, De aeternitate, which Thomas wrote in order to thoroughly refute the claim that one can demonstrate that the world necessarily had a beginning. On the whole, as I shall show, Thomas was less convincing on this side of the eternity question which constituted a debate among the orthodox, than on the other side, the encounter with the heterodox.

The first clue that the De aeternitate is addressed to an orthodox and conservative audience comes from the opening sentence: “If we suppose, in accord with Catholic faith, that the world has not existed from eternity but had a beginning of its duration, the question arises whether it could have existed forever.” If the answer is yes, the world could have always existed, then this constitutes the negation of the conservative theologian`s contention that the world must have had a beginning. Thomas` strategy, then, is to show that neither the world`s eternity nor its finitude can be rationally demonstrated and then to invoke faith in revelation as the only means for knowing the world`s temporal boundaries.

Thomas begins by defending his own orthodoxy in questioning the world`s beginning. To ask whether the world could have existed forever is not contrary to the faith, Thomas maintains, but to ask whether something could exist forever totally independent of God is “an abominable error against the faith.” In other words, to question the world`s beginning is within the bounds of orthodoxy, but to question its createdness is clearly heretical. I find it interesting that Thomas employs an implicit hierarchy of revealed truths in which the world`s createdness ranks in a class higher than that of the world`s beginning and that orthodox thinkers may legitimately debate a second-class revealed truth, but not a first-class one.

Next, Thomas presents us with the core of his argument in De aeternitate: Are the following two concepts logically incompatible? 1. The createdness of the world. 2. The possible eternalness of the world. Even more penetrating is the statement Thomas makes in anticipation of his alleged victory over the conservative theologians: “Since God`s omnipotence surpasses all understanding and power, anyone who asserts that something which is intelligible among creatures cannot be made by God, openly disparages God`s omnipotence.” We see here a foreshadowing of Thomas` conclusion, namely that the logical compatibility of the eternity and createdness of the world can be clearly established and therefore it is certainly true that God could have created the world eternally had he so willed. To claim otherwise would degrade the absolute power and free will of God (this kind of use of the Christian doctrine of God`s absolute power and free will was bolstered by the Condemnations of 1270 and 1277). Thomas` annoyance toward his conservative opponents surfaces as he turns the tables of the debate so as to make his opponents appear more deviant from orthodoxy than himself.

According to Thomas the possible eternity of the world and its creation would be contradictory if an efficient cause must precede its effect in duration or if non-existence must precede existence in duration. In answer to the first possible occasion for contradiction, Thomas notes that an efficient cause which instantaneously produces its effect does not necessarily precede its effect in duration. God is that kind of cause. Furthermore, God, the efficient cause of the world, can be distinguished from natural causes which produce their effects by way of motion. Causes that entail motion must precede their effects in duration. Hence, God, the instantaneous and motionless creator, could have created the world without preceding it in duration. In other words, an eternally-created world is a possible world.

To overcome the second possible contradiction, that non-existence must precede existence in duration, Thomas marshals the support of Saint Anselm. Creation ex nihilo (out of nothing) can also be equated with creation not out of something, Saint Anselm once remarked. Accordingly, the world was not necessarily nothing before it was something. Instead we must say that the world would be nothing if it were left to itself. If effect, Thomas brings out the possibility of reducing the creating and sustaining operations of God into one homogeneous and eternal operation of God`s will and power. The result: “Thus it is evident that the statement that something was made by God and nevertheless was never without existence, does not involve any logical contradiction.”

If the non-contradictory status of an eternal creation is so evident, why did so many theologians up through the time of Thomas not recognized this? Thomas claims that the finest theologians and philosophers have either agreed with him or have at least have failed to point out any definite contradiction. Saint Augustine, Thomas argues, fits into the second category. Thomas quotes Augustine`s De civitate Dei (Book XI, chapter 4): They who admit that the world was made by God, yet do not wish it to have a beginning in time but only a beginning of its creation, so that it was always made in some sense that is scarcely intelligible, indeed say something.

Because Thomas had an extraordinary confidence in the durability of his own views as well as an assurance of the inadequacy of the views of his conservative opponents, he could poke fun at his theological contemporaries. For example, he stated that those who allegedly find evident contradictions in the notion of an eternal creation “with their hawk-like vision are the only rational beings, and wisdom was born with them!”

Near the end of the De aeternitate, Thomas resumes his defense of the orthodoxy of his own position by assuring the reader that although it is possible for the world to have been without a beginning this would not mean that it is co-eternal with God. The strict sense of eternity entails the attribute of immutability which God alone possesses.

Finally, Thomas mentions an argument commonly made in the thirteenth-century discussions on the eternity of the world which invokes the impossibility of God producing an actually infinite multitude (see Craig). If the world is eternal then an infinite number of immortal souls would exist which constitutes an actually infinite multitude. Such a condition was impossible according to the conventional wisdom of the day. Thomas objects initially by asserting the possibility of

God creating man in time rather than from eternity. The last response Thomas offers to this “fairly difficult� problem simply indicates that no one has yet demonstrated that God cannot produce a multitude that is actually infinite. Hence, Thomas ends this special treatise on the eternity of the world by reaffirming and bolstering his philosophically agnostic position on the question while retaining his assent to the answer provided by the Catholic faith.

Although De aeternitate constitutes Thomas` most complete challenge to the conservative theologian`s position on the eternity-of-the-world debate, a few important features on this side of the debate are found only in earlier works, the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa theologica. In particular the following argument is found in these two earlier works but is curiously omitted in Thomas` definitive polemical treatise: If the world is eternal then an infinite number of days (or solar revolutions) would have occurred by now and regular additions to this infinite number would continue to take place. Since it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite series, the world cannot be eternal. In the Summa contra Gentiles Thomas responds by claiming that it is possible for an infinite series to exist successively although not all at once. If an infinite series is understood as existing successively, then we have reduced a formerly infinite entity into a series of finite ones. A similarly weak response is offered in the Summa theologica: Passage is always understood as proceeding from one term to another. No matter what past day may be designated, a finite number of days has elapsed between it and the present day, and these days can be traversed. The objection is based on the supposition that infinite intervals lie between given extremes.

Several scholars have noted the unsatisfactory status of this reply. Thomas establishes an arbitrary point of departure to talk about successive existence, but to solve this philosophical problem one must refrain from assigning an initial day since this is precisely the point being questioned. Fernand Van Steenberghen maintains that while Thomas glossed over the contradictions of an realized infinite series of events when disputing the eternity-of-the-world question, he more candidly voiced the inherent contradictions at issue here in question 7 of the Summa theologica. Question 7 deals with the eternity of God and article 4 of this question proves the impossibility of an actually infinite multitude, whether absolute or accidental. Only a potentially infinite multitude is possible which results from indefinitely dividing a finite magnitude or by indefinitely adding to a finite multitude. Van Steenberghen reproaches Thomas for abandoning the sound argument of the question 7 of Summa theologica in his response to the conservative theologians` argument for the world`s necessary beginning. Only in the context of the eternity-of-the-world debate did Thomas shift to the inadequate Aristotelian argument that an infinite succession is really an infinite in potency and thus possible. The towering authoritative presence of Aristotle in the mind of Thomas seems to have caused Thomas to refrain from consistently applying his own precepts on the contradictions of an actually infinite multitude and an infinite series of past events. (Does Thomas follow Aristotle in elevating human logic above God himself, which is idolatry?)

Up through the thirteenth century virtually all of the great doctors of the Church firmly maintained that the world`s temporal beginning was susceptible to rational demonstration. As the foremost European philosopher-theologian since Augustine, Thomas helped to alter this climate of opinion. Thomas established the fact that creation primarily means a dependence in being so

that an eternally created world would not entail a logical contradiction. Thomas was most polemical in his confrontation with conservative theologians, mainly because he perceived himself as protecting the Catholic faith from the possible occasion for “unbelievers to laugh, and to think that such are the grounds on which we believe things that are of faith.” Etienne Gilson quotes the above portion of the Summa theologica as well as a similar statement from the Summa contra Gentiles to establish Thomas` over-arching teaching that mere rational probability cannot form the basis for Christian faith since “when something is rationally probable, its contrary also is rationally probable.” What Gilson does not mention is that one of the most important occasions that Thomas had to voice his general teachings on faith and reason was the debate over the possibility of an eternal creation (monopsychism was probably of similar, but slightly less importance). Even so, both passages Gilson cites in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages to illustrate Thomas` teaching on the faith-reason synthesis come from sections in Thomas` writings that deal with the world`s possible eternity (contra the conservative theologians).

Finally, we may note that on both sides of the eternity-of-the-world debate–the radical Aristotelian and conservative theologian sides–Thomas maintained a philosophically agnostic position that was bolstered by a repeated usage of the absolute power and free will of God. In De aeternitate Thomas even attempted to negate the impossibility of an actually infinite multitude by invoking God`s absolute power. Thomas had confidence that once the philosophical landscape was cleared of all its clutter of inadequate demonstrations, the higher ground of divine revelation could be grasped with a faith that does not conflict with reason. Hence, Thomas used the debate over the world`s eternity to showcase his vision of the harmony of faith and reason.

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