Digital Learning Kit

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The Globe: How China Reset Its Global Acquisition Agenda by Peter J. Williamson and Anand P. Raman China Inc. sometimes seems unstoppable. The perception is understandable; no other nationhas come close to matching the economic strides China has made since the late 1970s. The changes in the country have been so rapid and dazzling, however, that they often blind observers to the fact China has had its share of failure, too. The cross-border mergers-and-acquisitions spree that Chinese companies went on in the past decade bears ample testimony to that. In 2000, shortly before China acceded to the World Trade Organization, its government realized that local companies would need to be globally competitive to survive and announced a zou chuqu (which loosely translates as “swarm out”) policy that permitted local companies to make acquisitions abroad for the first time. Numerous state-owned enterprises, as well as private corporations, jumped at the opportunity. The value of Chinese M&A shot from $1.6 billion in 2003 to $18.2 billion by 2006, triggering worldwide unease about the China takeover threat. Yet it’s worth looking back at that first wave of takeovers. Many of those mergers—which included TCL’s acquisition of France’s Thomson Electronics, SAIC’s takeover of South Korea’s Ssangyong Motor Company, Ping An’s investment in the Belgian-Dutch financial services group Fortis, Ningbo Bird’s strategic partnership with France’s Sagem, and the D’Long Group’s purchase of America’s Murray Inc.—ended in utter failure, with Chinese companies having to pull out of or sell off their acquisitions. Unlike other developing nations, however, China wasn’t paralyzed by failure, and it has quickly—and quietly— changed course to take another shot at its goals. The Chinese, especially the older generation, believe that failure is not about falling down but about refusing to get up. “If you get up one more time than you fall, you will make it through,” runs an old Chinese saying. In short order, China’s policy makers and executives have refashioned their M&A approach and altered both the kinds of targets they pursue and their rationale for global takeovers. Instead of buying global brands, sales networks, or goodwill, Chinese companies now mainly try to acquire concrete assets, such as mineral deposits, or state-of-the-art technologies and R&D facilities. In addition, Chinese companies no longer use their overseas takeovers to gain market share abroad; they deploy them to strengthen their positions in the Chinese market. It’s too soon to say whether the new approach is working, but the initial results, which we will describe in the following pages, are encouraging. Wisdom comes from good judgment; good judgment comes from experience, and—say the Chinese—experience comes from all the times you use bad judgment. By failing spectacularly and early, China’s takeover artists could well have discovered how to succeed in the future.


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A Race off a Cliff China’s global M&A strategy has evolved rapidly over the past decade. In the 1990s, when the government swapped access to China’s markets for technologies from abroad, it mostly allowed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to buy small equity stakes in overseas energy companies and natural resource producers. Beijing preferred that other companies use a yinjin lai (or “pull in”) strategy, entering into joint ventures, partnerships, and technology-licensing deals with foreign companies. That approach changed in October 2000, 15 months before China signed the WTO agreement, partly because the government became convinced that Chinese companies would forever play second fiddle if they depended on technology transfers from multinational companies. Over the next three years, Beijing dismantled several hurdles to cross-border investments that it had erected in the 1990s. In late 2004, Premier Wen Jiabao formally announced, “The Chinese government encourages more enterprises to go global,” and the race to buy companies overseas began in earnest. The number of foreign acquisitions made by Chinese companies rose rapidly: They doubled from 40 in 2003 to 82 in 2006 and reached a peak of 298 in 2008. China Inc.’s Buying Binge (Located at the end of this article) However, many takeovers, especially those executed by China’s private sector groups, ended quickly and badly. Some acquirers had to sell off their investments, some scaled back their ambitions radically, and some even went broke. To understand why things went wrong, we studied three big headline-grabbing acquisitions of the time—one by an SOE, one by a private company, and one by a joint venture. Together they provide a comprehensive picture of Chinese acquirers’ mistakes.

The SAIC–Ssangyong Motor Company saga. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation’s short-lived attempt to run the South Korean automaker Ssangyong demonstrated that Chinese companies weren’t ready to deal with changes in the global marketplace. One of China’s biggest and oldest automobile manufacturers, SAIC picked up a 49% equity stake in Ssangyong for $500 million in October 2004, beating out many bidders, including General Motors. Ssangyong was then struggling under the weight of its debt burden, but it had launched some smart sports utility and recreational vehicles. As South Korea’s fourthlargest automaker, it had a 10% share of its home market as well as a growing export business. Buying Ssangyong, SAIC thought, would allow it to improve its automobile development capabilities and make headway in markets such as the United States. After the deal an SAIC-Ssangyong joint management team drew up plans to swiftly expand manufacturing capacity in South Korea and launch five new models worldwide. However, things did not go as planned. Rising gasoline prices in 2006 and stringent new emissions standards in Europe and North America sent SUV sales tumbling. During this crisis, SAIC’s relations with Ssangyong’s powerful trade unions grew strained, culminating in a seven-week strike, and because of cultural reasons, Chinese and Korean executives couldn’t agree on how to improve performance. Once the global recession started in December 2007, automobile demand collapsed. Sales of SUVs were particularly hard hit, and Ssangyong’s sales fell by 53% in December 2008 compared with the previous December.


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SAIC initially supported its subsidiary, buying $4.5 million worth of Ssangyong’s vehicles in late 2008 to sell in the Chinese market. When the situation worsened, however, SAIC unveiled a restructuring plan that included an overhaul of work practices to improve productivity and a 36% reduction in the workforce. Those were its conditions for pumping $200 million more into the Korean company. Ssangyong’s unions refused to endorse the plan, protested, and initiated legal action against SAIC for allegedly transferring to China SUV designs and technologies developed with South Korean government funding—a charge SAIC denies. Left with no alternative, Ssangyong filed for bankruptcy protection in January 2009. That spring, angry workers went on strike again, barricading themselves inside the automaker’s plant near Seoul for 77 days. Even as Ssangyong struggled, SAIC wrote off most of its original investment, blamed the losses for a 26% drop in its firsthalf profits for 2009, and in mid-July 2010 diluted its holdings to just 3.79%. In the five years that SAIC controlled Ssangyong, it invested $618 million in the company—and earned virtually nothing. The D’Long Group–Murray disaster. The first overseas takeovers by China’s private sector companies also went badly. One of the first to push into North America was the $4 billion D’Long Group, a new-style conglomerate with businesses ranging from tomato paste to automobile parts. In 2000 it entered the lawn mower and garden equipment business by acquiring Murray Inc., in a deal backed by GE Capital, which provided $400 million in financing. Murray, based in Brentwood, Tennessee, was then one of the leading brands of outdoor power equipment in the West. Its profits had been falling steadily because of price-based competition from overseas (read: China). After the acquisition, D’Long integrated its Chinese manufacturing facilities with Murray’s, identified lower-cost sources of components, and restructured the organization to reduce overhead. Soon after the integration began, the American company suffered from a series of quality issues and product recalls. In 2004, for instance, it had to recall nearly 100,000 lawn tractors because their fuel tanks were prone to developing large cracks. These problems dented the brand, made it difficult for Murray to raise money, and caused sales to slide. Meanwhile, after the Chinese government hiked interest rates and reduced money supply to cool down the overheated economy, D’Long found itself running out of resources. With its options becoming limited, the group raised capital by pledging the shares of its listed companies as collateral for loans, making rights issues, and providing guarantees for loans. To keep the cycle going, it illegally started using funds from its trusts and finance companies to prop up its share prices. In 2004 the house of D’Long collapsed, after the China Banking Regulatory Commission named it among the country’s highest-risk companies and banks refused to extend it any more loans. Murray Inc. filed for bankruptcy in November 2004. Its operations were shut down, and Britain’s Briggs & Stratton bought its brands.


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The TCL-Thomson debacle. If one deal epitomized the inability of Chinese companies to assimilate foreign corporations, it would be TCL’s acquisition of France’s Thomson. China’s largest maker of color televisions and second-largest maker of mobile telephones, TCL started promoting its brand internationally in 2000. Emboldened by its early successes, in January 2004 it struck a $560 million deal to merge its TV and DVD operations with those of consumer electronics giant Thomson. The new company, TCL–Thomson Electronics (TTE), in which TCL held a 67% equity stake, went into operation that July. By 2006, it was clear that TCL had bitten off more than it could chew. TCL hadn’t examined Thomson’s balance sheet carefully before investing in the venture. It had refused to hire M&A experts to perform due diligence, and when a Boston Consulting Group analysis suggested that too much risk was involved, TCL’s chairperson, Li Dongsheng, ignored the “pessimistic” report. TCL just hadn’t realized that the Thomson brand in Europe and Thomson’s RCA brand in America were both old and tired. In fact, the French manufacturer’s TV and DVD operations had lost more than $100 million in 2003, which is why the company had been looking for an investor. The deal was a complex one, which didn’t help. For instance, TCL had to negotiate separate contracts to access those parts of the business that weren’t transferred to TTE, such as the sales division and critical intellectual property. Above all, TCL lacked the capabilities to assimilate Thomson’s people. The shortage of Chinese managers with international experience and expertise in global marketing proved to be a major constraint. The new company was dysfunctional because people came from different cultures and had different routines. When TCL imposed its practices on the venture, culture clashes erupted. For example, Chinese executives were shocked to find that if they tried to schedule meetings on weekends—a regular occurrence in China—their French counterparts would turn off their phones and be unavailable. TCL also had been expanding so rapidly that it didn’t have the bandwidth to cope with Thomson. Because of its troubles in Europe, TCL suffered a combined loss of RMB 5.07 billion ($680 million) in 2005 and 2006. In May 2007, TCL declared the European operations insolvent and overhauled them by doing away with Thomson’s business model and distribution channels— and even the brand. It closed five of its seven European centers and terminated a large number of employees. The grand alliance between TCL and Thomson had taken just three years to unravel. As these cases and others show, the first wave of Chinese acquirers bought foreign companies mainly to grow their global sales. Their logic seemed impeccable: Take low-cost Chinese manufacturing capacity and connect it to the global brands and distribution relationships of a Western company hampered by high costs. What sounded like a dream marriage of Chinese manufacturing with American or European marketing proved to be a nightmare, however, because of the errors committed by the acquirers. (See the box “China’s M&A Mistakes.”) China’s M&A Mistakes (Located at the end of this article)


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Beijing Gets Cold Feet By 2007 the Chinese government was concerned about the problems its companies were facing overseas. The last straw was probably the troubles that Lenovo—the poster child for Chinese M&A after its acquisition of IBM’s PC division for $1.75 billion in December 2004—ran into with its global push. Although the merger made the Chinese company the world’s thirdlargest PC maker, after HP and Dell, a year later it slipped to fourth place behind Taiwan’s Acer. As Lenovo struggled with integration issues, the exodus of technical employees, and substandard service, its market share and profitability slid further. For instance, its net profits from July through September 2008 fell to $23.4 million—a 78% decline year-on-year. Word then went out from Beijing that only SOEs and private companies with adequate managerial capabilities and merger integration skills should attempt takeovers. The government also signaled that as far as possible, Chinese companies should pursue profitable targets. A line had been drawn—and no one would be allowed to cross it. When the unknown Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial Machinery wanted to acquire General Motors’ Hummer division in June 2009, the National Development and Reform Commission refused to endorse the bid, even though China’s Ministry of Commerce didn’t think it was a bad idea. The deal fell through— one of the first takeover attempts that the Chinese government publicly shot down. However, with China’s foreign exchange reserves crossing $2 trillion in 2009, diversification beyond U.S. Treasury bonds into physical assets that didn’t run the risk of having their value decimated by inflation looked more appealing. The stock market crash also made overseas company valuations attractive. The government and its agencies, like the State- Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, keen to ensure that Chinese companies became globally competitive before they allowed the renminbi to appreciate, began to rethink their policies on M&A. The Revamped Approach An analysis of half a dozen recent takeovers by Chinese companies suggests that a new three-pronged strategy is helping China Inc. make its global acquisitions perform better. China’s New M&A Approach (Located at the end of this article) A shift to hard assets. Instead of purchasing brands and distribution relationships, Chinese companies are increasingly buying tangible assets such as mineral deposits and oil reserves. Performing due diligence on hard assets is relatively straightforward; they can be objectively assessed by engineers and don’t require evaluations of variables such as corporate culture or brand essence. Integration is simpler because companies with tangible assets have proven supply chains, and the acquirers can leave their operations more or less alone. Besides, there’s a strong demand in China for these companies’ output. By 2009 more than 70% of Chinese deals involved either energy or natural resources. Among them: Yanzhou Coal’s $2.8 billion takeover of Australia’s Felix Resources, and Sinopec’s $7.2 billion acquisition of the Swiss-registered oil and gas company Addax.

A quest for high tech. The Chinese are also targeting organizations that can deliver emerging and new technologies and possess offshore R&D facilities. Their value lies in their intellectual property, knowledge, and research and design processes. Although integrating those assets is a bit more difficult, it’s less complicated and risky than assimilating


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an entire organization. Patents and blueprints can be beamed to China, where an engineer can easily interpret them. R&D centers have relatively small staffs, although they do need a lot of motivation. Given the acquirers’ willingness to invest in R&D and the prospect of adapting and selling their innovations to the Chinese market, most researchers are excited about takeovers by Chinese companies. Interfaces with the Chinese organization are simple: Foreign engineers come up with ideas for new products and processes, and the Chinese use their skills to scale up the inventions and drive down their manufacturing costs. One company attempting this kind of takeover is Xi’an Aircraft Industry Corporation (XAC), a subsidiary of the state-owned Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). AVIC’s first several attempts to buy aircraft manufacturers met with failure, so it was a surprise to industry experts when, in October 2009, XAC announced that it had reached an agreement to buy 91.25% of Austria’s Fischer Advanced Composite Components. FACC is one of the leading suppliers of the composites used in everything from airplane wings to engine nacelles and cabins. However, it had invested heavily in supporting the new generations of the Boeing Dreamliner and Airbus A350 XWB, and when those programs stumbled, FACC found itself struggling with losses and depleted cash reserves. The Chinese company agreed to invest $60 million in FACC as part of an undisclosed purchase price estimated to be near $135 million. FACC’s management thus secured the company’s financial future, obtained capital for expansion, and got access to the booming Chinese market through AVIC. In turn, XAC gained leading-edge composite materials technology and a large pool of engineers that its parent, AVIC, could use in China’s aircraft programs, including the development of the ARJ21 regional jet and the C919, which will compete with the Airbus A320 and Boeing 737. Meng Xiangkai, XAC’s vice chairman, doesn’t wish to change FACC into a Chinese company in Europe. He wants to retain the management culture that underpins FACC’s success in hightech R&D.

The pursuit of growth at home. In a reversal of strategy, some Chinese companies are no longer using takeovers to gain market share abroad. Instead, their goal is to strengthen their positions at home. This fits in with the Chinese government’s desire to boost domestic consumption in the aftermath of the global recession. After its $1.8 billion acquisition of Volvo in 2010, Geely announced that its first goal would be to integrate Volvo’s technology and design know-how into three new manufacturing facilities— in Shanghai, Chengdu, and Daqing— to serve the Chinese market. The plan is to ramp up Volvo’s sales in China from 24,000 to 300,000 cars a year—and nearly double Volvo’s worldwide sales. The new strategy has distinct advantages over the old approach. One, the Chinese market is a good environment in which to test and understand an acquired company’s assets and capabilities. Two, rather than trying to wrest share from entrenched rivals abroad, the acquirer can reap a deal’s benefits quickly in the fast-growing local market. Three, integrating new technologies, products, and know-how is easier at home, where the parent’s executives know the terrain well. Finally, since the deal provides the employees of the acquired company an opportunity to apply their skills to the world’s most promising market, it helps them see the takeover in a positive


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light. Another company that has deployed this approach successfully is China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina), which took over a French manufacturer of animal nutrition additives, Adisseo, in January 2006. The world’s second-largest producer of methionine, a key additive used in the poultry industry, Adisseo had a global market share of 29%, but it had failed to make any headway in China’s rapidly growing poultry sector and couldn’t expand on its own because of a weak balance sheet that bore the scars of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003. By buying the French company for $480 million, ChemChina obtained methionine production technologies that were then nonexistent in China. As one of the country’s largest chemical producers, it already had the distribution channels and ground organization needed to rapidly ramp up sales. ChemChina’s chairperson, Ren Jianxin, aptly calls the M&A strategy “going out” and “bringing in.” He sold the idea to Adisseo’s top management, which recommended the ChemChina bid to shareholders mainly because it would open the door to the Chinese market. So far, no one has been disappointed. Given the responsibility of growing the methionine business in China, Adisseo’s managers and engineers have made ChemChina the country’s largest supplier of poultry additives. In keeping with the partnership approach to M&A that other emerging giants have used, Chinese companies are increasingly leaving incumbent managements in place. (See “Don’t Integrate Your Acquisitions, Partner with Them,” by Prashant Kale, Harbir Singh, and Anand P. Raman, HBR December 2009.) Some even task the acquired teams with running the Chinese operations as well. After ChemChina acquired Adisseo and Rhodia’s silicone unit, it made their CEOs responsible for those businesses both globally and in China. Once they grow profits in the booming Chinese market, it’s easy for acquirers to set off that elusive postmerger cycle of growth. Wanxiang, China’s $10 billion automotive components powerhouse, is deploying this two-step plan. After buying more than a dozen companies in the developed world and integrating their technologies and know-how into its Chinese operations, Wanxiang is now aiming to build global market share by investing in several overseas subsidiaries. Knowing when to walk away from a deal is usually the hallmark of M&A sophistication. At least some Chinese acquirers are finally doing it. For instance, Bright Food, a leading food company based in Shanghai, wasted more than a year trying to buy Sucrogen before losing out to Singapore’s Wilmar last July. In December 2010 it came close to acquiring GNC, the American health products retailer, but just a month later Bright Food dropped out of the negotiations, apparently because the price was too high. Ten years ago, Chinese companies would have insisted on clinching a deal at any price. That they no longer do so is perhaps the brightest sign that China Inc. is learning from its M&A mistakes. China Inc.’s Buying Binge After the government declared its support for overseas takeovers, China’s corporations rushed abroad. The value of foreign acquisitions rose dramatically after 2004, before slowing down during the global recession. In 2010, however, Chinese companies hit the takeover trail again.


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Click here for a larger image of the graphic.

China’s M&A Mistakes 1. Pursuing inexpensive deals and unprofitable businesses. Such targets usually require large investments of time and money to turn around. 2. Focusing on the financials and ignoring intangibles such as systems, people, processes, and brand values while evaluating targets. 3. Skipping key steps in the M&A process. 4. Picking up companies whose value consisted mostly of brands, systems, people, and culture, which are difficult to integrate across borders. 5. Failing to figure out in advance how to use acquisitions’ products and services in the Chinese market. 6. Trying to handle knotty integration issues without the right capabilities or people. China’s New M&A Approach 1. Buying physical assets such as oil fields and natural resources rather than intangible ones such as brands. 2. Looking for companies or organizations that possess state-of-the-art technologies and global R&D facilities. 3. Using overseas takeovers to strengthen the company’s position in the Chinese market rather than in foreign markets. Peter J. Williamson (pwilliamson@jbs.cam.ac.uk) is a professor at the University of Cambridge’s Judge Business School. Anand P. Raman (araman@hbr.org) is an editor at large at the HBR Group.


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rdkufu,f(vf) bvl;(rf)bgh(*f) Michael Bloomberg tydkif; (2) ]]jynf w G i f ; a&;tjrif } } ao'gPfay;jcif;udk ' Bloomberg ' qefUusifonf/ ]] Oya' taeeJU tjrifhqHk;cGifhjyKoifhwmu vlwpfa,mufudkaomhcyfjyD; tJ'aD omhwu H v kd w T jf ypfvu kd af ygh? tvkyMf urf;ygcdik ;f xm; awmfjyDaygh ao'gPfay;wmawmh r½So d ifb h ;l }}[kqo kd nf/ oljrdKU0eftjzpf½pdS Of usnfxdk;xm;aomaoewfudk w&m;r0ifudkifaqmifrItwGuf ay;onft h edrq hf ;kH tjypf'Pfukd wd;k jr§ichf o hJ nf/ ]] usKyfwUkd jrdKUawmf&UJ vrf;awGay:rSm w&m;r0ifaoewfawG r½Sdap&bl;qdkwmudk jywf j ywf o m;om; us,f u s,f a vmif a vmif a jymcsif w ,f ? w&m;r0if a &mif ; ol a &m ud k i f a qmif o l y g oH w d k i f a emuf r S m MuD;av;pGm ay;qyfap&r,fqdkwm usKyfwdkUoEédXmefcsxm;w,f[k ajymcJhonf/ ynma&;wGif q&mrsm;\vpmudk 15%wdk;jr§ifhay;vdkuf&m ausmif;om;rsm;\&rSwfa&matmifcsufyg ydkaumif;vmonf/ t&nftcsif;r½SdbJ grate wpfqifhckefíwifay;onfudk vufrcHacs/ pmrvdkufEdkifaom uav;rsm;udk tcsdefydkoifay;onfudkum; tm;ay;onf/ ausmif;wGif; cell-phone toHk;jyKjcif;udk wm;jrpfonf/ urÇmMuD;ylaEG;vmonfu h pd Eö iS hf ygwfoufí NewYork jrdKUudk ydrk pkd rd ;f vef;us,jf yefUaom jrdKUawmf ( A Greener Grater NewYork ) jzpfap&ef ( PLa NYC ) pDrHudef;udkcsrSwfum ygwf0ef;usifumuG,f h wGuf MudKwifjyifqifa&; apmifah ½Smufa&;? 2030ckEpS f NY wGiaf emufxyfvOl ;D a&wpfoef;ausmf wd;k vmrnft ponfrsm;udk aqmif½Gufonf/ tjcm;jrdKUMuD;rsm;yg yg0ifvmatmifvIHUaqmfonf/ ]] urÇmMuD;ylaEG;vmw,f qdkwmtrSefyJ? b,fvdkvkyfMurvJ qdkwJhar;cGef;udk usKyfwdkUtm;vHk;0dkif;tajzay;Mu&r,f}}/ Carbon dioxides xkwfvTwfjcif;udk avQmhcs&efESifh vlxkoGm;vma&;? o,f,lydkUaqmifa&;twGuf xda&mufaomavmifpm ypönf;udkoHk;&ef vIHUaqmfonf/ jynfwGif;vHkjcHKa&;ESifh ygwfoufívl0ifrIMuD;Muyfa&;\ wif;Muyfaomrl0g'udk olqefUusifonf/ ]]usKyfwdkUvl 12oef;udk jyefydkUjypfvdkUrjzpfEdkifbl;? rjzpfEdkifwmawGudk pdwful;,Ofaewmudk&yfjyD; olwdkUudk D ;l onfh enf;ynmudo k ;kH í jrdKUawmfaejynfot l m;vH;k udk tjrJaexdik cf iG ahf y;&r,f}}/ DNA ESihf vufaAG&maumfyu rSww f rf;wifxm;&ef tm;ay;onf/ w&m;r0ifaexdik o f rl sm;udk Edik if o H m;cH,cl iG ahf y;oifo h nf[k ' Bloomberg' ,HkMunfonf/ e,fpyfvHkjcHKa&;twGuf 2007 ckESpfu ]a*smfefrufudef;} ( John Mc Cain ) ESifh uG,fvGefol


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]wufuae'D} ( Ted Kennedy ) wdkU vl0ifrIjyKjyifajymif;vJa&;twGuf vTwfawmfwGifMudK;yrf;cJhonfudk olaxmufcHonf/ ]] vl&JUobm0uswJh vGyfajrmufjcif;? ydkrdkaumif;rGefwJh tcGifhtvrf;udk½SmcsifwJhqE´udk ESdyfuGyfzdkUqdkwm urf;ajcrSmyufvufukvm;xdkifeJUxdkifMunfhjyD; wufvmwJh 'DvdIif;udk rvmeJUvdkUwm;r&ovdk jzpfvdrfhr,f}} tar&duefjynfaxmifpk taeeJU ]] vltm;vHk;[m tnDtrQzefqif;xm;w,f ( all men are created equal ) qdkwJh zGGJUpnf;yHk&nfnTef;csufeJU &yfwnfaeorQ &yfeD;&yfa0;uvlawG[m EdkifiHxJ 0ifvmzdkUenf;vrf;udk quf½SmazGaeMurSmyJ}} 9 ^11 udpö( pufwifbm 11&uf? 2011 World Trade Certre wdkufckdufrI ) rsdK; aemufxyfrvmEdkifawmhbl; oabmxm;írjzpfwm ' Bloomberg ' em;vnf onf/ ol½;kH xdik o f nfEiS hf wefjyeftMurf;zufajcrIe;f a&;Xmeudk xlaxmifí NYPD e,l;a,m(cf) ykvdyfXme axmufvSrf;a&;ESifhwGJí rsufajcrjywfowif; axmufvrS ;f pkaqmif;jcif;udk jyKvkyo f nf/ NewYork Police Reportment Intelligence Division jynfaxmifpkrsdK;cspf tufOya' ( USA PATRIOT ACT ) udk ' Bloomberg ' u av;pm;onf/ ]]pD ; yG m ;a&;tjrif } } jrdKUawmf\ toHk;p&dyfxGufaiG a':vm 6 bDvsHudk ydkvQHaiG 3 bDvsHjzpfatmifolvkyfcJhaomfvnf; þonfrSm tdrfjcHajrESifhtoHk;p&dwftcGefudk ' Bloomberg ' wdk;jr§ifhaumufcHcJhíjzpfonf[k a0zefcH&onf/ ' Bloomberg ' u olUudk,fol b@maiGaMu;udkraysmufysufatmif xdef;odrf;ol Fiscal Conservative [k qdkavh½Sdonf/ ]]b@maiGaMu;udk xdef;odrf;w,fqdkwm qif;&JEGrf;yg;olawGudk ulnDzdkU? usef;rma&; apmifah ½SmufraI wGvyk zf Ukd ? vlrv I jkH cHKatmif tumtuG,v f yk zf Ukd tpDtpOfqw JG mr[kwb f ;l &nfreS ;f csuftwdik ;f xdxda&mufa&muf wu,fvdktyfwJhvlawG&JU vufxJudka&mufzdkUjzpfw,f/ ruk e f o if h w mruk e f ravvG i f h r zd w f p if a tmif ud k i f w G , f o H k ; pG J & ef j zpf w ,f ? b@maiG a Mu; apmifha½Smufxdef;odrf;olawGvJ oem;wwfwJh pdwfESvHk;½SdwmyJ 'gayrJh usKyfwdkU[mOD;aESmufudkoHk;&r,f? rqifrjcift&rf;vkyfvdkUr&bl;/ qdkvkdwmu wu,fvdktyfwJhae&meJUtcsdefrSm tpdk;&[m½SdwmeJUqHk;jzwf aqmif½Gufay;&rJhwm0ef½Sdw,f/}} ]]usKyftwGufawmh b@maiGxdef;odrf;w,fqdkwm 0ifaiGeJUtoHk;p&dyfudk rQrQww[efcsufnDatmif apmifha½SmufwmyJ 0ifaiGeJUrrQatmif oHk;csifwdkif;oHk;jyD; aemufrsdK;qufrSmbmrSrvkyfEdkifbJ oGm;jyD; 'ku©a&mufwmrsdK; rjzpfap&bl;? aqmif½GufcsufawGudk aiGukefaMu;Muenf;jyD; ydkjyD;xda&mufwJhenf;vrf; awG½SmjyD; vkyf&r,f? tajr§mftjrif½Sd ½SdeJU tcGeftaumufudk jzpfEdkif&ifodyfrvdktyfwJhtcgawGrSm avQmhcsjzwfawmufxm;jyD; EdkifiHtoHk;p&dwfvdkwJhtcgrSom aumufcHoifhw,f/


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wpfzufrSmxGufaiGudkvnf; avQmhcs&r,f? cifAsm;rSmydkvQHaiG ( SurPlus ) ½Sdw,fqdkwm cifAsm;pkaqmif;vdkU? rvdktyfyJ cifAsm;oHk;jzKef; rjypf v d k U yJ ? ta&;MuD ; qH k ; u b@maiG u d k x d e f ; od r f ; w,f q d k w m a½S m if v T J v d k U r&wJ h Ed k i f i H & J U pD ; yG m ;qk w f , k w f u sqif ; wJ h t cgrS m MuHUMuHUcHEdkifzdkU MudKwifjyifqifxm;jcif;yJ? t&dyft,mifMunfh& cefUrSef; &wJh twdkif;uawmh wpfckawmhvmaewmtrSefyJ/}} ( September 30, 2007 UK Conservative Party wGif ' Michael Bloomberg' ajymMum;cJhaom rdefUcGef;jzpfonf ) tcGeftwkyfaumufcHjcif;udk ' Bloomberg ' oabmrawGUay? ]]tcGefqdkwm wu,fawmhaumif;wJh [mawGr[kwfygbl; 0efaqmifrIwpfckudk cifAsm;vdktyfw,fqdk&if wpfa,mufuawmh 'gtwGuf ay;qyf&rSmyJ? 'gaMumifh tcGef[mr½SdvJrjzpf ? ½SdvJraumif;wJh raumif;qdk;0g; ( necessary evil ) yJ}} [k 'Bloomberg ' u qdo k nf/ jrdKUawmf0efoufwrf;wGif wu,fvJ Projects rsm;twGuf tcGeu f o kd w l ;kd jr§ichf o hJ nf/ odkUaomf 2007 Zefe0g&DwGif tdrfjcHajrcGefudk 5%avQmhcscJhjyD; ukefa&mif;cGefrsm;vJ jzwfawmuf jypfco hJ nf/ t0wftxnfEiS hf zdeyfrsm;wGit f cGeaf umufcjH cif;udk vH;k 0zsuo f rd ;f vdu k o f nf/ NewYork jrdKUawmf½dS aiGaMu; Stock exchange wdkUudka&mif;0,f&m tcsuftcsmjzpfaom Wall street \ tjrwftpGef;rsm;ESifh tdrfajraps;uGufudkaxmufjyí jrdKUawmf\pD;yGm;a&; wdk;wufaumif;rGefaeonfjzpfí tcGefaumufcHjcif;udk &yfem;xm;rnfjzpfaMumif; ' Bloomberg ' u ajymMum;cJhonf/ ajymonfhtwdkif;vJ oljrdKU0efjzpfvmonfhtcg 0ifaiGxuftoHk;p&dyfrsm;jyD; vkdaiGa':vm 6 bDvsHjyaeonfudk csufcsif;udkifwG,fpm&if;½Sif;jypfonf/ NY \tdrfjcHajrcGefrsm;udk wdk;jr§ifhjyD; ykvdyfESifh rD;owfXmetygt0if tpdk;&Xmersm;udk toHk;p&dwfrsm;avQmhcsjzwfawmufjcif;jzifh jrdKUawmf\b@maiG ( Budget ) udk nDrQatmifjyefwnfhrwfay;cJhonf/ vkyfief;½Sif ( Businessman ) wpfa,muftaejzifh pD;yGm;a&;vkyfief;rsm;udk apmifha½SmuftumuG,fay; aomaMumifh ' Bloomberg ' udk pD;yGm;a&;todkif;0dkif;u av;pm;MunfndKMuonf/ aumfydka&;½Sif;MuD;rsm;udk tcGefvGwfjidrf;cGifhay;onf/ jrdKU0eftaeESifh Goldman Sachs Corp \ CEO udk tcGef1.65bDvsHa':vm uif;vGwfcGifhuwdjyKí Ground Zero ( 5/11 uwdkufcdkufcH&aom WTO ae&m ) wpfavQmuf XmecsKyftaqmuf tOD;rsm; aqmufvkyfcGifhjyKcJhonf/ þtay;t,lESifhywfoufí ]]'Dae&m ( NY City ) [m tawmfqHk;vlawG aexdkiftvkyfvkyfcsifwJh ae&mjzpfw,f? olUudkuRefawmfulnDr,f tcGefudktenf;qHk;jzpfatmif iSm;&rf;cudkvnf; toufomqHk;jzpfatmifeJU? vHkjcHKa&;udk ydkaumif;atmifvkyfay;r,fvdkU ajymvkdufw,f? tqHk;rSmawmh tm;vHk;uvlawGyJav}} /


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jrdKUawmf0ef ' Bloomberg ' rSm tvkyo f rm;tpnf;t½H;k ( Labour Union ) ESihf &if;&if;ES;D ES;D aEG;aEG;axG;axG; f rm;rsm; oydwaf rSmufrnf[k jcdr;f ajcmufaomtcg ' Bloomberg' r½Sad jc? 2002u NY City ydUk aqmifa&;tvkyo u jrdKUwGif;ü Mountain bike pufbD;udkpD;jyí jrdKUtaeESifhoydwfudk rnfuJhodkUwkefUjyef&rnfudk jycJh\/ Union ESifh ajyvnfatmifaphpyfn§dEdIif;jcif; wpHkw&mr½SdcJhacs/ aemufoHk;ESpfcefUMumaomf ' Bloomberg' ESifh ( NY City Transit Authority ) ydkUaqmifa&;wm0ef½Sdolrsm;tMum; vpmEIef;xm;ESifhygwfoufí qufqHa&; rajyrvnfjzpf&mrS (3)&ufwdkiftMuD;pm;oydwfMuD;udk Union rSOD;aqmifcJhonf/ aphpyfn§dEdIif;rIrsm;vkyfí oydwfrSm tqHk;owfcJhaomfvnf; ' Bloomberg ' udkifwG,fyHkr[kwfaomaMumifh jzpf&aMumif;pum;rsm; xGufvmcJhonf/ ' Bloomberg ' rS m vG y f v yf p G m uk e f o G , f c G i f h u d k t wd t vif ; axmuf c H o l j zpf \ / w½k w f E d k i f i H MuD;xGm;vmjcif;? tar&duefjynfaxmifpkESifh tjcm;EdkifiHrsm;Mum;uGm[rIenf;vmjcif;udk olpdk;&drfonf/ ]]þurÇmMuD;[m usKyfwdkUudktrSDvdkufaeMuw,f? usKyfwdkU[mtckxd tajctaeaumif;qJyJvdkU xifwJhvlawG[m rSefw,f? odkUaomf 'Dudpöudkckcsufcsif; udkifwG,fzdkUawmh tcsdefusjyD}}/ vlxkusef;rma&; zlvHka&;? rQwaomrl0g'rsm;ay:xGufa&;rsm;udk zdzdpD;pD;olvkyfcJhonf/ HIV ? qD;csdK ( diabets ) ESifh aoG;wdk; ( hypertension ) a&m*grsm;udk OD;pm;ay;udkifwG,fcJhonf/ jrdKUawmf\aq;vdyfraomuf&e,fajrudk pD;yGm;a&; tcsuftcsmae&mrsm;? aps;uGufrsm;txd wdk;csJUowfrSwfonf/ pm;aomufqdkifrsm;wGif Trans Fat [kac:aomtqDrsm;udk "gwkaA'enf;jzifh cJatmifjyKvkyfxm;aom ]rm*s&if;} ( Margarine ) uJhodkU axmywfcJrsm;udk wm;jrpfydwfyifonf/ taMumif;rSm 4if;wdkUonf vlut kd EÅ&m,fjzpfapaom Cholesterol udk yGm;rsm;apaomaMumifjh zpf\/ jrdKUawmf0ef ' Bloomberg ' rSm NewYork City Health and Hospitals Corporation udk tpOfaxmufcHyHhydk;cJholjzpf\/ 4if;rSmtar&duefjynfaxmifpk\ tMuD;qHk;jrdKUjyqdkif&m usef;rma&;aqmif½GufrI at*sifpDjzpfí ]e,l;a,m(cf)jrdKUoljrdKUom; ( NewYorkers ) 1.3oef;ausmfudk owif;tcsuftvuf enf;ynmrsm; tultnDtjyif Electronic enf;ynmrsm;jzifh vlemrsm;\usef;rma&;rSwfwrf;rsm; ( Electronic Health Records ) jyKpkxm;um ydkrdkxda&mufaumif;rGefaom apmifha½SmufukorIESifh usef;rma&;0efaqmifrIrsm;udk ay;aeaom Corporation MuD;jzpf\/ ' Bloomberg ' rS ]e,l;a,m(cf)tcGit hf vrf;jrdKUawmf} ( Opportunity NYC ) ac: e,l;a,m(cf)jrdKUom;rsm;udk qif;&Jjcif;oHo&mrS vGwfajrmufap&efulnDrnf/ aiGvufiif;ajc&efrvdkonfh EdkifiH\yxrqHk;jzpfonfh ,if;tpDtrHudkazmfaqmifcJhonf/ ,if;rSma':vm 7.5 bDvsHtukeftuscHwnfaqmufonfh wefzdk;enf; pnfyifom,mtdrf,mpDrHudef; ( Municipal affordable housing plan ) jzpfjyD; ]e,l;a,m(cf)}jrdKUoljrdKUom; 500.000 cefUaeEdkifrnfh EdkifiHwGiftMuD;qHk; Housing Plan MuD;jzpf\/


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qif ; &J c srf ; omuG m [rI MuD ; xG m ;vmonf u d k v nf ; ud k i f w G , f & ef ' Bloomberg 'ta&;w,l ½ S d o nf / ]]ckvq kd if;&Jcsr;f omuGm[rI MuD;onfxufMuD;vmaewJyh pkH eH UJ 'DvUl tzGUJ tpnf;[m a½SUqufomG ;zdUk rjzpfEikd b f ;l }} [k ' Bloomberg ' ajymcJhonf/ Bloomberg

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ta[mif;jzdKcs topfjyifaqmufjcif;udkvnf; oltm;ay;onf/ Supermarket um;&yf&efae&m ( Parking Lot) aqmuf&ef Admiral's Row (,cifa&wyft&m½Sdrsm; toHk;jyKcJhaomjyifopfyHkpH taqmuftOD; ) udkjzdKcszsufodrf;onfudk tm;ay;onf/ odkU&mwGif tMudrfawmfawmfrsm;rsm;rSmvJ rjzdKzsuf&efESifh xd e f ; od r f ; apmif h a ½S m uf & rnf h b uf r S &yf w nf j cif ; rsm;vJ ½ S d o nf / (Mopwif e pf u vyf u k e f a vS m if ½ H k Warehouse ) udk rjzdKzsuf&efwm;jrpfcJh&m ,if;udk Ad o k u mqd k i f & m ord k i f ; ynm½S i f r sm;u tk w f a tmf aomif;eif; Mobmay;cJMh uonf/ xdUk aemuf City Council \ wpfcsufvTwftrdefUjzifh wm;jrpfvdkufavonf/ ]]jrd K Uawmf 0 ef w m0ef r S tem;,l v Qif } } Ekd0ifbm 2008 Oya'rjyif&ao;cif ' Bloomberg ' \ a½S U vmrnf h E d k i f i H a &;tvm;tvmud k cef U rS e f ; Muonf/ ' Bloomberg ' rMumcPajymavh½Sdonfh jrdKU0efwm0efrsm;jyD;qHk;vQif ,cify&[dw vkyfief;rsm;zufodkU jyefvSnfh&efjzpf\/ þ&nfrSef;csufjzifh rl v u]pwd k i f ; Aqif z pf ( ½S f ) ( Stuyvesant Fish ) aqmuf c J h a om ol \ Xme½H k ; csKyf v k y f r nf h a e&mud k a':vm45oef;jzifh 0,fcJhonf/ ]e,l;a,m(cf)jrdKUawmf} ta½SUzufjcrf; tay:bufwGifjzpf\/

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2006 aEG&moDwGif Democratic Leadership Council rS ]tJ(vf)za&m(rf)} ( Al From ) ESifhawGUqHkcJhjyD; a½G;aumufyGJtwGuf cefUrSef;wGufcsufrIrsm;udk ajymqdkMuonf/ ' Bloomberg ' ESifh pum;ajymqdkjyD; aemufydkif;wGif ]&DywfAvpfuif}trwf ' Chuck Hagel ' uvJ ' Bloomberg ' ESifhtwlwGJí a½G;aumufyGJ0if&ef jzpfEikd af jc½Sad Mumif; tMuHjyKcJo h nf/ 2007 ZGef 10&uf tywfpOf ( This Week ) owif;wGif owif;wifqufol ( anchorman ) ]a*smh pwufzEdkydk;vm(pf)} ( George Stephanopoulous ) ESifh ( Panelist ) ]a*s;umeD} ( Jay Carney ) wdkUu ' Bloomberg ' rSxdwfwef;0efxrf;rsm;ESifh pum;ajympOf or®wa½G;aumufyGJ0if&eftwGuf rnfrQukefusrnfudk ar;onfudkMum;cJh&aMumif; owif;wifqufonf/ ]0g½Sifwefowif;pmMuD; ( Washk t f & tdrjf zLawmfoUkd 0ifa&muf&ef tppt&mt&m tqifajyacsmacsmarmarm ington Post ) \ aqmif;yg;wpfy' jzpf&eftwGuf ' Bloomberg ' taejzifh a':vmoef;500cefU oHk;&EdkifzG,f½SdaMumif; azmfjyxm;onf/ Mo*kwfv 21&uf 2007wGif xkwfvTifhaom ,cifCBS ( Columbia Broadcasting System ) owif;wifqufol ]'Jef&mom} ( Dan Rather ) ESifh awGUqHkar;jref;cef;wGif ' Bloomberg ' u a½G;aumufyGJ0if&ef rvkyfcJhaMumif;? vkyfvdrfhrnfvJr[kwfaMumif;? vkyf&eftajctaeESifh taetxm;vJr½SdaMumif; taotcsm ajymMum;cJo h nf/ ]]wpfpw kH pfa,mufu uReaf wmh&UJ &yfwnfcsuu f kd ar;vmcJ&h if ta½G;cHzUkd taMumif; r½Sb d ;l vdUk ajym&rSmyJ/ ukefukefajymr,f b,folurSvJ usKyfudktar&duefjynfaxmifpk&JU or®wtjzpfa½G;MurSmvJ r[kwfbl; vkyfcsifwmuawmh pum;ajymwJhtcgxda&mufzdkUyJ? uRefawmf[m EdkifiHom;wpfa,mufyg}} [k ' Bloomberg ' rSajymcJhonf/ rnfrQjiif;qdkapumrl a½G;aumufyGJ0ifEdkifajcrSm Edk0ifbmvNewsWeek rsufESmzHk;owif;tygt0if owif;Xmersm;\ tm½Hkpdkufp&mjzpfcJhonf/ 2007 'DZifbmvwGif vkyfaomol\oD;oefU{nfhcHyGJwGif Bingo yHpk gH amewpfcu k u kd pm;&mwGif {nfo h nfrsm;uCard wpfcak y:wGif a&;om;xm;aom eHygwfrsm;\t"dygÜ ,fukd cefUrSef;Mu&onf/ eHygwf 217 \xl;jcm;csufudk ' Bloomberg ' u ar;aomtcg 2000ckESpfa½G;aumfyGJwGif ' George W Buch ' &cJhaom rJta&twGuf[k {nfhonfwpfa,mufurSefuefpGm ajzEdkifonf/ CNN ( Cable News Network ) \ 2008 Zefe0g&Dv owif;wpfyk'fwGif ' Bloomberg ' ESifh eD;aomowif;&yfuGufrS jrdKUawmf0efrSm or®wa½G;aumufyGJ0ifvQif EdkifacsrnfrQ½Sdonfudk wGufcsuf&efMudK;yrf;rIwpf&yfudk vkyfcJhaMumif; yg½Sdvmonf/ Zefe0g&D 16 &uf 2008wGif ' Bloomberg ' \ ½S,f&mESifht&if;tESD;rsm;udk Blind trust ac: tjcm;ol wpfa,mufa,mufodkUvTJtyfí vkyfudkif&eftyfESHonf[k owif;xGufvmonf/ 4if;rSm EdkifiHa&;orm;rsm; vkyfavh½SdjyD; udk,fydkifpD;yGm;a&;vkyfief;ESifh EdkifiHa&;qHk;jzwfcsufrsm; ra&maxG;ap&efjzpf\/ ' Bloomberg ' \ oli,fcsif;ESifh yl;wGJwnfaxmifol ]pwDAif&wfem} ( Steven Raltner ) \ ]uGm'&Jef*D(vf) ukrÜPD}tkyfpkodkU jzpf\/ vTJtyfonfqdkaomfvnf; tcsKdU&if;ESD;jr§KyfESHrIrsm;wGif ' Bloomberg ' rS qufvufcsKyfudkifEdkifzG,f d nf[k ,lq&onf/ ½So d nf[q k \ dk / þonfwUkd rSm ' Bloomberg ' taejzifh a½G;aumufy0JG if&ef tvm;tvm½So ' Bloomberg ' url ]]usKyfta½G;cHrJhvl r[kwfbl;? 'gudkr½Sif;Muao;bl;vm;? usKyfpum;udkb,fae&mrSm em;rvnfbl;vJ ajym }} [kqdk\/


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]]a½G ; aumuf y G J aumv[vrsm;}} ½Sd Republicans rsm;taeESifh vuf½SdtkyfcsKyfa&;rI; ( Eliot Spitzer ) ]tD;vD;,uf pypfZm} udk 2010a½G;aumufyGJwGif ,SOfjydKif&eftwGuf ' Bloomberg ' udk tao;pdwfMudK;yrf; cefUtyfcJhjcif;jzpfonf/ Edk0ifbm 6&ufxkwf The NewYork Post wGif azmfjyyg½Sdonf/ tapmydkif;rJrsm;t& 'Bloomberg' rS ' Spitzer' udk tJtom&Edkifajc½Sdonf/ odkUaomf Spitzer rSm rwf 17&uf 2008wGif EIwfxGufoGm;cJhonf/ NewYork

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Job Announcement (P009/April/2011) Admin/Finance Officer-Dedaye National (1) position Date: 22nd April 2011 BACKGROUND CARE Myanmar has been operating in Myanmar since 1995, with a program focus on improving the lives of particularly at-risk and vulnerable communities. With a strong emphasis on community engagement, the program currently works in the areas of HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, and primary health care, linked with rural livelihood improvement. Programs have experienced considerable growth over the past two years, with around 500 staff currently operating from 10 field offices across Myanmar, supported by our main office in Yangon. Delta program adopted a three phase approach and has provided assistance through its relief, rehabilitation and recovery efforts. While considerable progress has been made in the 30 months since Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, efforts to stimulate local livelihood opportunities, improve agricultural production and promote sustainable recovery is uneven across sectors and conditions are in some instance lower than pre-Nargis levels. Vulnerable households are facing seasonal economic and food insecurity and labour opportunities for the landless households (an estimated 50-75% of the population) remain weak. Findings to date indicate that the remaining gaps can erode the progress achieved so far and serve to increase the vulnerability of the affected communities if timely, appropriate and targeted assistance is not provided. As a result the Delta program has taken stock of the scale of the outstanding needs and the remaining funds that needed to be programmed and formulated an integrated approach to address the needs in our working villages. As part of this new strategy CARE will engage local partners to implement sustainable recovery efforts in close coordination and collaboration of village based committees and the relevant stakeholders and line agencies. The new Integrated Livelihood project is expected to begin in November 2010 and will be an 18 month project covering approximately 37 villages managed out of one field office and two sub-offices. In light of this CARE Myanmar is seeking a motivated and capable Admin Finance Officer (AFO) to be based in Dedaye Field Office. S/he will be responsible for providing support to two sub offices (Dedaye and Setsan) on Financial and Administrative matters. The AFO will work under the direct supervision of a Field Office Coordinator. This position is also required to support program support staffs based in the field and sub- offices and also act as the safety and security focal point. This position entails 50% traveling to sub-offices. SUMMARY: The Admin Finance Officer is responsible for ensuring that all staff are compliance with CARE Myanmar practices and policies in respect of Finance, HR and admin. This position is required to support the Field Office Coordinator with regard to budgets and the monitoring of those budgets. They are specifically responsible for the custody of the cash held in Field Offices, as well as asset and inventory items in those offices. They should ensure that there


are sufficient internal controls in place to reduce the risk of loss or damage to CARE property, including cash. This position is also responsible for data entry of vouchers in to the finsuns to record all transactions initiated by the Field office. The AFO also has responsibility for HR practices and processes for field office staff, including leave and salary payments. The AFO is also responsible for supervising Admin/Finance Assistants, drivers, guards and cleaners. RESPONSIBILITIES: Office management Ensure that the field office has appropriate controls in place to ensure that all assets are adequately protected. Ensure that sufficient cash is on hand to allow for all activities to be conducted and paid for at the appropriate time Check the accuracy of coding contained on disbursement vouchers Conduct cash counts to ensure that cash and Finsun balances agree Maintain control of assets, inventory and IEC and other materials ensuring that they are correctly recorded and distributed. Ensure that all HR practices and policies are being followed and provide relevant reports to FOC and Head Office where appropriate. Provide support to Field Office Coordinator -Through maintaining the cash and providing advances to staff as well as accepting acquittals of those advances -Prepare finsuns and conduct daily cash reconciliations. -Maintain asset registers and inventory registers as well as maintaining control over IEC and other materials for distribution -Assist with the preparation of a Field Office budget and project budgets/costed workplans within that location, and assist in the monitoring of expenditures against those budgets. -Ensure that procurement is completed in an efficient manner -Ensure that all logistics are managed effectively Provide support to Coordinators and PQT -Assist in the preparation of reports to PC to ensure that they are able to adequately monitor the activities being conducted. -Provide logistical support to Coordinators during field trips and at other times when required. Working collaboratively with Accountants to: -Ensure that cash projections are submitted in a timely and efficient manner and cash received in a timely manner -Ensure that the financial reports are submitted in a timely manner and reports received are reviewed and adjustments are made. -Ensure good communication to enhance support and understanding of any issues Working collaboratively with the HR to: -Ensure that all information is received in a timely and efficient manner and is accurate -Ensure all HR policies are followed in the field operations -Ensure good communication to enhance support and understanding of any issues


Coordination: Encourage overall program cohesion through communicating and facilitating the submission of financial reports and review of financial reports received. As directed/requested by the FOC ensure all administrative and logistical matters are conducted in an efficient manner. Safety and Security Promote a safe and secure work environment; foster a safety and security culture; and ensure consistent application of, and compliance with, CARE Myanmar safety and security policies and procedures LOCATION: The position will be based in Dedaye, with some travel to CARE sub-offices. EXPERIENCE/SKILLS: - At least 1 years experience in an accounting position with good knowledge of handling cash and/or data entry. - Sound judgment, planning, and interpersonal skills. - Good oral and written English communication skills. - Competence in using information technology, word-processing, spreadsheets and power point software - Willingness and capacity to work in field offices outside of Yangon. - Proven track record of quality performance in highly pressured environments. - Exposure to NGO work is an advantage Application process: Interested persons should send an application letter outlining their claims against the matching indicators, along with a current C.V., passport sized photograph, clearance certificate from police station – original (½Jpcef;ax mu fcHpm ? rl&if;) and copies of any references or testimonials to the address below not later than 6th May 2011. Note: Application will not be successful if applied position is not mentioned correctly, the application does not mention about the specific position. Human Resources Manager CARE International in Myanmar 17A, Pyi Htaung Su Street, Sayarsan Road, Sayarsan north-west ward, Bahan Towhship, Yangon. Email: recruitment@care.org.mm Please note that only short listed candidates will be contacted for interview.


Job Announcement (P011/April/2011) Senior Program Officer-WATSAN National (1) position Date: 28th April 2011 BACKGROUND CARE Myanmar has been operating in Myanmar since 1995, with a program focus on improving the lives of particularly at-risk and vulnerable communities. With a strong emphasis on community engagement, the program currently works in the areas of HIV/AIDS, reproductive health, and primary health care, linked with rural livelihood improvement. Programs have experienced considerable growth over the past two years, with around 500 staff currently operating from 10 field offices across Myanmar, supported by our main office in Yangon. In 2010 CARE Myanmar commences an integrated Women’s Empowerment Project based in Muse and Nam Khan Townships based on lessons learnt through other CARE Myanmar programs. This project will focus on a range of women’s needs, identifying and supporting the engagement of women beneficiaries, enhancing women’s participation and identifying ways to overcome the barriers that prevent women from being the active drivers of the development process, from design through to delivery. CARE Myanmar is looking for dynamic candidates for the Senior Program Officer- WATSAN for its office in Muse-Shan State. RESPONSIBILITIES: The overall responsibility of the Senior Program Officer is to ensure the project implementation achieves its objective/outputs according to the project documents and within the contracted project period. This is achieved by ensuring the technical quality of the project (WATSAN) and supporting the day to day management of project activity implementation in the assigned project locations. Technical Conduct water system assessments, design the water system (in coordination with the community), prepare the bill or quantities, provide technical advice during procurement and facilitate construction of the water systems Assist in formation of the water management committees and training of committee members on water system maintenance with a specific focus on ensuring women’s participation Human Resources Management Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) in the recruitment of national project staff in the project area and supervise the staff


Staff development through coaching and assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) to assess and identify the capacity and training needs of project staff; Promotion of team work through team building, empowerment and motivational activities. Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) in application of National Staff Policy in staff management Actively participate in Project Senior Management Team (SMT) Financial Management Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC), Assistant Program Coordinator (APC) and Program Coordinator (PC) in the management of the project budget and costed work plans. Submission of timely fund requests and, where delegated, the approval of requisitions, advances and expenses Supervise procurement, supplies and condition of the commodities in assigned project townships Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) by establishing an asset register for all assets purchased by or provided to the field in line with standard CARE Myanmar policies Project Cycle Management Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) and Assistant Program Coordinator (APC) in activity planning and M&E activities to ensure the achievement of project outputs in accordance with donor agreements Contribute in development, use and regular review of key project management tools for efficient and transparent project management, including log frames, activity schedules, risk management matrices, etc. Support to donor monitoring visits and technical support teams and participation in program and project review activities Coordination and Liaison Assist Field Office Coordinator (FOC) in coordination with and advocacy to relevant Government authorities, other international organizations and non government organizations Coordination and collaboration with other stakeholders in the area Other duties as may be determined by and in consultation with Program Coordinators Safety and Security Promote a safe and secure work environment; foster a safety and security culture; and ensure consistent application of, and compliance with, CARE Myanmar safety and security policies and procedures LOCATION: The position will be based in Muse-Shan State with regular travel in the project areas.


EXPERIENCE/SKILLS: University graduate, with relevant technical qualification (eg. Degree related in Constructionsuch as B.E (Civil) or A.G.T.I (Civil). At least 2 years experience managing integrated humanitarian programs in Myanmar, including experience in finance and resource management. At least 1 year experience in supervising staff. Demonstrated community mobilization, participatory techniques, planning, training and facilitating skills. Strong interpersonal skills, sound judgment and team building skills. Highly developed analytical and communication skills, including excellent oral and written English communication skills. Local language skills an asset. Competence in using information technology including experience with word processing, spreadsheets and database software. Willingness and capacity to travel in project areas regularly. Sense of humor, flexibility and patience. Knowledge of local culture, context and customs preferred. Proven track record of quality performance in remote locations and high pressure environments. DESIRABLE Have participated in gender awareness training and/or experience in women’s engagement in WATSAN projects Application process: Interested persons should send an application letter outlining their claims against the matching indicators, along with a current C.V., passport sized photograph, clearance certificate from police station – original (½Jpcef;axmufcHpm –rl&if;) and copies of any references or testimonials to the address below not later than 12th May 2011. Note: Application will not be successful if applied position is not mentioned correctly, the application does not mention about the specific position. Human Resources Manager CARE International in Myanmar 17A, Pyi Htaung Su Street, Sayarsan Road, Sayarsan north-west ward, Bahan Towhship, Yangon. Email: recruitment@care.org.mm Please note that only short listed candidates will be contacted for interview.



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