Running head: THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATO EXPANSION
The Consequences of NATO Expansion: China’s Inevitable Rise and an Unforeseen Sino-Russian Alliance Zachary J. Adams Norwich University
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Introduction: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian leadership consented to U.S. presence in Europe and accepted that NATO would remain unscathed; an agreement that assumed Germany’s reunification as a neutral state. Post-Cold War liberal logic assumed that realist geopolitics was no longer of concern and that international politics were eager for reconfiguration. During the late 1990s, NATO began its first wave of expansion leaving Russia defenseless against eastern expansion due to their recent economic and military failures caused by Soviet-ideological deterioration. Presently led by U.S. interest, NATO’s current path is headed for potential failure. Many security challenges of the twenty-first century depend on the stability of NATO and its presence in Eastern Europe. This presence does not include further NATO expansion. NATO’s primary initiative has always been stabilization, but in more recent times the alliance has lost sight of its objective by asserting influence over Ukraine’s internal discord. This in effect has forced Russia to seize Crimea as a last resort measure of defense against the West. “Many Russians see an extended NATO as a direct threat against them. This threat risks reviving old Russian fears of the West, strengthening Russian militarists and nationalists, and inducing greater instability in Russian domestic politics and foreign policy” (Russett & Stam, 1998, p. 362). The unintended consequences of NATO’s current course could antagonize Russia to form an alliance with China; a global counterbalancing coalition of this kind is larger than anything the West can envision. If NATO continues its Eastern European conquest, Russia itself will not become the West’s ultimate security problem, but a Sino-Russian alliance will. NATO and the West must
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do two things to prevent a Sino-Russian alliance: First, NATO must deescalate alreadyapparent Russian-Western tensions by assuring that the Baltic States, including Ukraine, remain as a neutral buffer zone. And second, the West must ensure that American relations with Russia and China are better than they are both bilaterally. NATO must adopt a reductionist approach towards eastern expansion. In doing so, it relieves Russia of isolation and takes away any possible incentive that China may have gained from forming an alliance. After Russia adopts a neutralized stance towards Chinese and NATO policy and rejects formidable alliance with either country, the West can turn its attention towards containing an aggressive China by revamping its Asian ally’s defensive capabilities. Russia’s Option: If NATO continues down its current path, Russia will have no choice but to look eastward for partnership, or better yet alliance from pressurizing Western influence. An unintentional Sino-Russian rapprochement is likely to occur given the circumstances. Russett and Stam (1998) suggest that “There has been a long history of trouble in RussianChinese relations, and such an alliance would experience real friction; but it would not be a type of alliance without precedent” (p. 364). It is understood that states coinciding in the international system must find support by any means necessary and in many cases, through forming alliances. Furthermore, Mearsheimer (2001) claims that “today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner” (p. 33). Alliance-building is not only used for generating cooperative means, but as a mechanism for fulfilling state security goals. When states are threatened, they must react in order to survive by all means necessary. And as history has depicted, Russia does not favor fighting adversaries on two different fronts. “A Russo-Sino alliance would vitiate the single
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and most effective foreign policy initiative of the Cold War” (Russett & Stam, 1998) which was effectively maneuvered by the Nixon Administration after sparking Sino-U.S. relations that disintegrated any possibility for Russia to side with China. A Sino-Russian alliance would geopolitically engorge a vast amount of the Eastern hemisphere and would likely generate substantial benefits for both sides including water port access, military technological advancement, and overall economic growth. It is understood that all states prefer mutual interests stabilizing their borders. What is more, both Russia and China are interested in restraining Western influence throughout Eurasia and are also concerned with stabilizing political environments in those states. As a result, first steps in relations have already begun through a negotiated thirty-year gas pipeline worth $400 billion. This Sino-Russian gas deal, the largest in natural gas history, can be blamed partly by Western sanctions placed on Russia after the internal crisis that ignited in Ukraine as punishment for their persuasive involvement. Both Russia and China have become agitated about falling behind Western primacy, and by acting swiftly Putin effectively called on Russia’s neighbor to keep the Russo economy afloat. This deal could be a gateway to more extensive opportunities for both countries. Russia not only offers China valuable natural resources, but exchanges a plethora of military technology as well. Russia’s military technology constitutes a substantial portion of the Russo economy. Since the early 1990s, China has purchased Russian aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and submarines. Russia’s military capabilities act as a growth stimulus which has ranked China as Russia’s largest arms customer. In essence, China’s military complex will continue ascending while decreasing their overall developmental costs through partnering with Russia. A
THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUED NATO EXPANSION consequential result of sustained Western sanctions may further promote Sino-Russian cooperation. Recent events outline that U.S. relations with both China and Russia are ill-fated and on unconditional terms: Sino-U.S. relations have intensified due to cyber-espionage and territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific and U.S.-Russian discord has ignited over Ukraine’s internal dissension. Mearsheimer (2014) has noted that “Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor (Ukraine) turned into a Western bastion” (Para. 2). It is clear that the West should fear and avoid at all costs any potential encouragement of prompting further Sino-Russian relations. Through worst-case scenario (Russett & Stam, 1998), “A Russia-China partnership would place the destiny of much of the Eurasian landmass and the western Pacific in the hands of an antidemocratic alliance” (p. 365). Through such a scenario, cooperative measures between Moscow and Beijing could taunt the idea of a potential ad hoc alliance over the heads of Washington anticipating to score an advantage over their Eurasian influence which in turn could corner the West by playing a game of triangle diplomacy. Consequentially, this places the West in a state of bargain and at a disadvantage of power. Such an alliance would disassociate itself with Western democratic institutions and operate as an autocratic regime by pushing Western influence out of all Eastern hemisphere affairs. Avoiding a Sino-Russian Alliance and the Emergence of China: During the 1990s many scholars rejected NATO expansion eastward (Mearsheimer, 2014) because “a declining great power (Russia) with an aging population and a one-
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dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained” (Para. 21). The international system has revealed that China, not Russia, poses the largest threat to Western interest and international stability. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany, Russia has signified that the country no longer in any form poses a threat to the West. The international system is slowly shifting with China’s ascension and therefore must be globally recognized. By exemplifying that China is ascending and that a transition within international powers will inevitably occur, the West can attempt to prepare. According to Russett and Stam (1998), “The period of transition from one great power system leader to another is marked by tremendous potential for instability and cataclysmic conflict, as a challenger catches up and ultimately surpasses the power base of the previously dominant state” (p. 365). Intentions and capabilities alone are enough to create miscalculations between great international powers. Deterrence by means of military containment is often an effective short-term alternative for stabilizing power only if the dominant state’s capabilities thoroughly exceed those of the ascending state, but this does not thoroughly resolve the conflict. NATO strategy that is entirely based on military aggressiveness only intensifies probable conflict and weakens the likelihood of negotiating terms between involved states. NATO and the U.S. can align Eastern and Western powers by emphasizing shared aspirations between themselves. For example, the U.S. has much to gain with Russian assistance in the Middle East. Mearsheimer (2014) has suggested that:
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“The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three of these issues in the past; in the summer of 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened.” (Para. 41) Deliberate measures taken by both powers to cooperate congruently with one another will generate tremendous relative gains, especially as highlighted regarding Middle Eastern affairs. Through realignment of shared interests or goals, both the East and West could emerge as victorious. The most feasible approach to reduce the power at which China is attaining, the West must adopt a nonaggressive NATO strategy in Eastern Europe; one where the Baltic States remain as a neutral buffer zone separating Eastern and Western powers. By doing so, it effectively eases tensions on Russia (Troush, 1999) because “Russia’s most important problem is the growing proximity of the military infrastructure of NATO to its borders, the dramatic decreasing of “buffer” geopolitical space between Russia and the West” (p. 19). The West must also ensure that the Sino-Russian gas pipeline is the only significant cooperation demonstrated between the two powers and that future cooperative measures are reduced. By easing NATO-Russian tensions and reestablishing China’s trust, the international system’s condition will remain unharmed. As states coexistent of the international system continuously apprehend more power and capabilities through innovation, ascending states will unanimously become more
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populated as well; this is not the case for Russia. The latter and most current form of Russia (Russett & Stam, 1998) is populated “With but 150 million people and is a fragment of its former self. Even a reconstituted Soviet Union, developing economically once again, could pose no fundamental danger to NATO's roughly 700 million people” (p. 367). The West’s economic predominance subdues any threat that Russia poses. While Russia alone is irrelevant to the West and NATO stability, China’s economic ascendency proposes a potential future threat to Western interest and security. “China can only achieve geostrategic parity by growing its economy to the point at which its income approaches that of the West” (Russett & Stam, 1998, p. 367), but with a partnering economic and militaristic alliance with Russia, a formidably new alliance would emerge contesting the West. There is assurance that China’s rise can be contained or, at minimum, decelerated and that can be fulfilled through mitigation of NATO presence. While, depressurizing NATO influence in Eastern Europe may not be enough alone to relinquish negotiations with Russia, it is undoubtedly the first step that must be taken in order to devise any future opportunity for peaceful accord between the two powers. Easing NATO’s eastern presence could have the effect of drawing Russia away from China. Again, the only reason Russia is accepting SinoRussian cooperation is because of NATO encirclement. The Implausibility of a NATO-Russian Alliance: Many objections stand inclusive for admitting Russia into NATO. Russia may obtain a largely effective military-industrial complex, but fails in the department of modern military technological advances. Revamping Russia’s outdated, yet prestigious military would turn too costly for NATO to imagine. The most substantial objection facing Russia’s acceptance
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into NATO is trust. Since the end of WWII and Germany was divided, trust has been nonexistent exemplifying that there is no area for compromise between the two powers. NATO as an entity demands high expectations and commitment from its members. During cases of conflict, Russian loyalty would always be questioned. As Kitfield (1997) asserts, “NATO cannot rely on the Russians, because their only real interest lies in blocking NATO's expansion, not in actually joining an alliance that would compromise their sovereignty and military secrecy” (p. 1467). Revisiting the partitioning of Germany after WWII, Germany was split because of opposing interests. Both powers believed they were rightful heirs to a defeated Germany. This scenario demonstrates that both powers cannot cooperate as allies and are better off as adversaries. More justification for disallowing Russia to join NATO arises due to their political infrastructure. Russia’s political system is by no means democratic or stable for that matter, especially when Putin is the head authoritative figure governing the country by way of his own ideology which feeds into old Russo-imperial desires. Transparency and diplomatic openness are also two significant features missing from current relations between Russia and the West and more importantly (Russett & Stam, 1998), “Joining NATO imposes significant constraints on a state's ability to exercise privacy rights and sovereignty” (p. 371). It is easy to believe that Russia, if accepted, would have already concocted premeditated motives to obstruct NATO’s agenda, particularly in Eastern Europe. NATO is an organization used as a means of stabilization primarily as a defensive mechanism, and on rare occasions as an offensive arbitrator to settle European and international disputes. The only thing NATO would receive from Russian membership is adamant detraction of NATO’s eastward expansion which, in principle, could severely limit
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NATO’s future plans. Essentially, the two powers are their own worst enemies and through ideological opposition are there to balance and deter each other. The West cannot trust Russia’s intentions nor can it take the risk to do so. Fortunately, despite all the blunder and turmoil, the West may find Russia of use. Constructing NATO-Russian Neutrality and Decelerating China’s Rise: China is undoubtedly a rising power and is in contention for Asian geopolitical dominance by both militaristic and economic means. The growth of both China's economy and military has now made the country a prominent world power aligned with the United States, Russia, Japan, and Germany. Regarding economics (Kliman, 2014), "speed is where China stands out. In 30 years of ascent, starting from a low base, it has come farther, faster than any of the other rising powers (Para. 5). According to the World Bank (Kliman, 2014) "China has expanded its share of world GDP faster than any other rising state from 1870 to today" (Para. 6). The challenge of containing China will be the West’s largest endeavor to date. With or without the cooperation of Russian intervention, China has demonstrated their determination for regional hegemony throughout the Asia Pacific Rim. For instance, China’s involvement over territorial disputes in areas such as the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands and their influence in Hong Kong’s democratic protests depicts Chinese interest spanning across Asia. The international system should expect a rising China to emulate the West through attempts displaying regional hegemony. According to John Mearsheimer (Keck, 2014): “Given that China has a population size over four times larger than America’s, should it reach a GDP per capita that is comparable to Taiwan or Hong Kong today, it will be
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a greater potential threat to the United States than anything America has previously dealt with” (Para. 10). It is evident that relations between China and the West have long been misinterpreted. Economic cooperation cannot last indefinitely and both countries’ stances on foreign policy and foreign intervention have been lost in translation. It is evident that the Ukraine crisis has caused serious damage to Russian-Western relations which have triggered Russia to seek a new alliance. Subsequently, Russia has vehemently expressed enthusiasm towards binding a modern strategic partnership with China. Both countries have found necessity and mutual strategic gains from a new stage of cooperation. Russia and China feel subjugated by Western presence throughout Eurasia and are now obligated to transition the international system into a world of multipolarity. A significant chance of China conquering maritime disputes with Japan relies on ensuring formal relations with Russia who controls a prime geopolitical region. NATO expansion has unintentionally sparked new relations which could cause a Western-opposition alliance constructed on mutual interests of maritime trade and national security. Russia’s capabilities and world influence may be restricted and inadequate to those of the West; however, the integration of a new strategic Sino-Russian alliance might be enough to contest Western primacy. As China continues attaining economic dominance, Chinese dependency on Taiwanese water routes will become of vital interest and a deciding factor towards continued economic growth. This issue reiterates China’s necessity to develop military capabilities, primarily its navy to ensure that maritime trade routes will not be obstructed, thus Chinese cooperation with Russia over arms purchasing is imperative. China still claims rights to
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Taiwan even though the two countries split because of civil war over six decades ago. Taiwan has become a crucial actor part of the anti-Sino alliance and of vital interest, especially for the West. The West has worked meticulously since the Cold War-era attempting to revamp its outdated relations with allies in Asia such as: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines and to refurbish relations with India and Vietnam. The West’s Asian allies which it has attempted to modernize all have a factor in common: each Eastern Asian country holds hostile assumptions towards a rising China and believe that their security may be in jeopardy. It seems as though the West is attempting to weave a web of western allies surrounding a rising China; this in essence is a mix of geopolitical containment and alliance engagement. It is uncertain whether the West believes it has cleverly deceived the Chinese into thinking their policy is nonaggressive or in actuality China has rebutted Western influence. Unfortunately, the West cannot ultimately stall China’s rise, but it can ensure that China’s neighbors do so as well in an attempt to counterbalance Chinese geopolitical desires. Western policymakers need to question whether it is rational for a nation so far away to meddle in Asian affairs. East Asian countries must relinquish their authority and gradually become more assertive venturing to counterbalance a destined China because challenging American primacy is the only option China finds requisite to achieve hegemonic status in Asia. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is driven by leveraging its power throughout Eastern Asia. The CCP is nonobservant of Western ideals and democratic liberalization and instead prioritizes preserving the security of its own autocratic regime. The United States can decelerate China’s rise by incentivizing these countries to increase their own defensive capabilities and lessen their dependency on Western security.
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Russian motive for tightening its relations with China (Troush, 1999) is considered to be a “"strong" Russian counter-play against the West” (p. 16). This type of counterbalancing strategy could entrap Russia into a foreign policy disaster. If NATO lessens its influence in Eastern Europe and Russia continues developing its relations with China through revengeful spite of the West’s past actions, a new Eastern Bloc alliance could engage a new international confrontation between global hemispherical powers. Such a scenario is an obvious foreign policy trap for Russia, leading to a new global confrontation; one in which forcibly transforms the international system to a world of multipolarity. If the West can ease Russo tensions by any means then Russia no longer becomes a potential ally with China which decelerates the unavoidable Chinese power-ascension. If NATO plays its cards right, the West has much to gain, including Russia’s assistance in Middle Eastern affairs. Conclusion: The West and NATO’s current members have constructed a status quo-consented alliance which incentivizes avoiding defeat and protecting its members at all costs. The ultimate goal of NATO is preserving their global dominance in a way that does not threaten its existence. Each and every policy should be analyzed with the underlying assumption that their decisions could generate an antagonistic coalition. “There is a deficit of global trust in American willpower these days that needs to inform U.S. thinking about the consequences of Putin's strategy. At the same time, if the United States is seeking to avoid a new Cold War and to find off ramps from the current Ukraine crisis, it may well find that Asia is where it and others can eventually
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work best with Russia as Chinese hard power begins to look a lot more important to Moscow than Putin's ideological confrontation with the West.” (Green, 2014, Para. 6) Enlarging NATO is a disastrous option. Rather than patch the scars caused during the Cold War, NATO expansion threatens to manufacture an opposing coalition within Eurasia which places the West’s security commitments in a dangerous position. “Expanding NATO as currently planned may ultimately create from Russia a threat that is now absent” (Russett & Stam, p. 362) which is an unforeseen and highly unfavorable Sino-Russian alliance. In effect, the current application of tactics used by NATO could potentially force Russia to partner with China. The emergence of a Sino-Russian alliance would be the West’s worst nightmare. China is checking the integrity of Western pledges which highlights the prospect that the West’s Eurasian allies must consider, in all seriousness, defining and refining their own security mechanisms to contain or, at minimum, hinder China’s ascension to power. If Washington considers using deft diplomatic tactics such as: encouraging its Eurasian allies to reconstruct their own defensive mechanisms, maintaining Western interests and democratic principles, and reformulating economic leadership roles, Chinese aggression will deescalate and also weaken their current path of geopolitical belligerency. If Washington emerges victorious, Western policy will retain its primacy throughout Asia and more over, will force China to abide to Westernized democratic doctrine. Predominately, inquiring whether Western principles will transform its Eurasian allies into a source of continuous power and overall primacy is of Washington’s most crucial concerns. With the ability to neutralize Russia by withdrawing Eastern European NATO presence and
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by galvanizing its Eurasian ally’s security forces, the West will prevail twice over. Containing China and neutralizing Russia will effectively stabilize the West’s primacy as a global hegemon. By lessening international stalemate and decreasing the emergence of a counterbalancing global coalition, Western foreign policy should emphasize the rewards that such a scenario could fabricate.
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References: Green, J. M. (August, 2014). Should America fear a new Sino-Russian alliance? Foreign Policy Magazine, paragraph 6. Keck, Z. (January, 2014). US-China rivalry more dangerous than Cold War? The Diplomat Magazine, paragraph 10. Kitfield, A. J. (1997). A larger NATO means bigger headaches? National Journal, 29, pp. 1467-1469. Kliman, M. D. (2014). Is China the fastest-rising power in history? Foreign Policy Magazine, paragraphs 5-6. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). Anarchy and the struggle for power: The tragedy of great power politics. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, p. 33. Mearsheimer, J. J. (September, 2014). Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin. Foreign Affairs Magazine, paragraphs 2-41. Russett, B., & Stam, C. A. (1998). Courting disaster: An expanded NATO vs. Russia and China. Political Science Quarterly, 113(3), 362-371. Troush, S. (1999). Russia’s response to the NATO expansion: China factor. NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowships 1997-1999, pp. 15-19.