Running head: INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1
International Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Lessons Learned and a Generic Model for Future Conflict Scenarios Zachary J. Adams Norwich University
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Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia caused by ethno-political discord, war consequently shook Bosnia four years later. The international community declined to immediately partake in mitigating the conflict. Thereafter, strenuous efforts were made from all levels including: deployment of NATO military forces, UN peacekeeping and negotiations, nation-state influence, and humanitarian NGO response units. These institutions attempted to subdue the intensifying conflict, but were initiated only after the conflict in Bosnia had surpassed a manageable threshold. Although international intervention did put an end to Bosnia’s internal aggressions, such initial hesitation only worsened the scenario on the ground as the aftermath can still be felt today. Past lessons from Sarajevo and the Balkans exemplify the reluctance of western powers to intervene this time around. Fortunately, by revisiting the Bosnian conflict the international community can learn that each scenario should be assessed and addressed from specific angles. In conflict-riddled areas timing and proper preparation mean everything for peacekeeping mission success. The essence of this paper will first provide a general synopsis of international intervention in Bosnia, and in retrospect, the latter portion will focus on how the international community should have responded differently. Furthermore, the overarching goal of this paper is to provide a generic framework emphasizing prevention, mediation, and containment strategies for future conflict scenarios by analyzing the Bosnian War. Part I: The International Response in Bosnia: When the European community fell unsuccessful in mitigating Bosnia’s conflict which precipitated by ethnic disparity in mid-1991, (Fox & Roth, 2000) “it was unclear whether Bosnia would break apart, with Bosnian Serbs territory merging with Serbia and
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Bosnian Croat territory merging with Croatia” (p. 137). No matter the fact, “The prospect of giving up on Bosnia, leaving the belligerents to fight indefinitely so long as they both had access to weapons, offered no promise of a just solution” (Freedman, 1995) which prompted the United Nations to enter Bosnia’s crisis. On 21 February 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 743 establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The creation of such a force was deemed necessary because cooperation between parties worsened and the propensity of violence only magnified. UNPROFOR’s main role was to protect the Bosnian civilians and to deliver humanitarian relief to refugees until the war was over. Month by month, the UNSC passed resolution after resolution attempting relentlessly to contain the pursuant hostilities. No fly zones, naval blockades, and sanctions were all used against Serbian forces, but had little to no effect. Not until Serbian forces attacked designated UN safe zones was it that the UNSC finally authorized the use of force for UN peacekeepers. To no avail, the violence continued and UN peacekeepers were confined to Serbian attacks. That was when the UNSC finally requested assistance from NATO forces passing resolution 816 on 31 March 1993; this resolution authorized (UNSC, 1993) “all necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban of flights…and proportionate to the specific circumstances and nature of the flights” (p. 151). On 28 February 1994, NATO involvement in Bosnia amplified. The enforced no-fly zone rule was repeatedly broken (Carey et al., 2004) and that was when “NATO attacked six Serbian aircraft, its first military engagement ever” (p. 151). From this point on, the UN and NATO formulized an agreement regarding continued Bosnian aggression. The core of the agreement focused on retaliatory measures against Bosnian
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attacks on designated “safe zones”, air bases, and attacks on civilians in the western portion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With everything NATO had thrown at the Serbian forces, a ceasefire was still far from sight. Months of fighting passed on; what came next was unimaginable. For two days, 11 July to 13 July 1995, Bosnian Serbs invaded an established UN “safe zone” lightly-guarded by UNPROFOR and massacred more than 8,000 Muslim Bosniaks in the town of Srebrenica (the Srebrenica Genocide). NATO had to excel its air campaign by launching Operation Deliberate Force. Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Carey et al., 2004) was left no alternative but to “grant temporary permission to punish and induce the Bosnian Serbian regime into negotiations…These were by far the largest attacks since World War II” (p. 152). NATO’s tactical initiative comprised of forceful shuttle diplomacy successfully constrained further Bosnian attacks. The magnitude of Operation Deliberate Force diminished all Serbian means of reprisal. The airstrike campaign was suspended allowing the beginning of an agreement with the Serbs to develop. Bosnian Serbs consented to a ceasefire and to terms of withdrawing heavy weapons from Sarajevo’s exclusion zone. The significance of Operation Deliberate Force cannot be accurately defined. Without the potency of NATO’s air campaign, the Bosnian War may have relentlessly carried on. Alongside pressure from members of the Contact Group, Operation Deliberate Force was the determining factor which assisted in fabricating the framework of a formal armistice. Negotiations began 1 November 1995, near Dayton, Ohio at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. An unusual location for dialogue, but the base was chosen as a neutral ground and to remove each party’s connection to the media. The Presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and several key international diplomats had
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now entered the negotiations process. After twenty-one aggravating days, a general framework had been agreed ending the merciless war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With each President’s signature, validity of such an accord had been authorized. The next step towards peace was the implementation phase. The U.S., under President Clinton, called peace in the Balkans a vital American interest and the international community agreed to supply 60,000 troops, a third of which were American. The Dayton Accords: The general framework of the Dayton Accords included 11 annexes, and mandated that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fully honor the sovereignty of each state including the rights and human rights of all citizens, refugees, and displaced persons. Dayton also instructed that each nation fully cooperate with the United Nations in establishing peace in the region and that each nation abide to an international investigation into war crimes and any violations of international humanitarian law which may have occurred. From the determinant perspective of the framework, establishing peace seemed definitive in nature. The international community’s responsibilities (Kaplan, 2010) led by the “Security Council were continued—even expanded—as a result of the General Framework Agreement…” (p. 164). Certain language such as the UN’s request to facilitate an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to advise and train local law enforcement personnel and to monitor activities on the ground. The agreement did contain particular ambiguities concerning the requirements and active roles of international organizations following the post-phase of the peace agreement’s implementation. Areas of dispute such as the disarmament of Bosnian Serb forces and administering and operating post-conflict
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supervision were left unresolved. The Security Council designated the transfer of UNPROFOR duties to the Implementation Force (IFOR), NATO’s multinational peace enforcement unit. Although UNPROFOR was disbanded, several thousand of its “blue helmet” peacekeepers were absorbed into IFOR to meet the post-agreement requirements, thus the beginning of Bosnia’s post-conflict reconstruction was under way. As they projected the news to the world, western interventionists chalked up their participation in the Balkans as a win. How long a general framework of this nature could endure peace was duly unknown. Bosnia after Dayton: Implications and vast perplexity emerged from Dayton’s General Framework Agreement as peacekeeping oversight transitioned from UN to NATO command. Likewise, tensions between regional ethnicities remained. The next peacekeeping phase included NATO dispatching IFOR a 60,000 peacekeeping unit into Bosnia attempting to ensure stability in a region plagued by belligerent ethno-political factions. Further indecisiveness by the international community continued to hamper peace operations when in December 1996 NATO replaced IFOR with SFOR (Stabilization Force), a smaller force meant to operate for eight years. By this point, “…17 different foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations, and about 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) not to mention tens of thousands of troops from across the globe-were involved in reconstruction efforts” (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 69). NATO’s SFOR lasted up until December 2004 until it was replaced with a regional peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping operations oversight transferred from NATO to EUFOR as an attempt to regionally contain post-conflict hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA transition, the European Union implemented EUFOR, a rapid reaction force, comprised of military personnel and applications from all member-states. Operation ALTHEA was EUFOR’s first military contribution toward stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has helped the country’s defense integrate and align with EU security standards. In December 2004, EUFOR deployed an initial 7,000 troops ensuring conflict was mitigated and that mediation efforts continued. The core objective of ALTHEA has been to provide capabilities training to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s military branches, thus preserving the environment and national sovereignty. Although Bosnia has not yet become an EU member and remains a “potential candidate country”, operation ALTHEA has further integrated the nation into the EU’s overall security structure. To name a few missions, EUFOR has also operated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, and the Central African Republic. Principally, EUFOR’s ongoing operations have assisted in facilitating police training, developing judicial infrastructure in unstable nations, providing humanitarian aid and relief, and protecting UN and other civilian personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. EUFOR has truly made remarkable efforts in identifying and resolving NATO’s prior ambiguities. The Dayton Peace Accords were thought to have contained conflict from reemerging in the Balkans, yet Bosnians are again tempted with aggression. In past decades, it was touted by the West that only under favorable conditions could the international community build and re-build instable and distraught nations, especially in Europe. The reconstruction of post-WWII Germany was quite remarkable whereas the revitalization of Bosnia is incomparable. The Dayton Accords subdued immediate conflict between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, but basic negotiations failed to provide a blueprint for long-term stability in a region where ethno-political principles flourish rampantly. Since the conflict has subsided,
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Bosnia and Herzegovina has been immersed with over (McMahon & Western, 2009) “$14 billion in international aid, making it a laboratory for what was arguably the most extensive and innovative democratization experiment in history” (p. 69). Looking back onto 1995 and the events taken shape in Bosnia, American-led NATO strikes swiftly dealt a decisive blow to Bosnian Serb forces. These strikes may have compelled Serbian President Milosevic into negotiations, but “As successful as Dayton was at ending the violence, it also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state's authority” (McMahon & Western, 2009, p. 70). The agreement had stopped the fighting, but “nationalist parties - Muslim, Serb and Croat alike - gained sweeping control of state-run enterprises, government jobs and the issuing of lucrative state contracts. These new political elites now function as mafia-like economic syndicates, tightly controlling companies, cash and jobs” (Rohde, 2014). Dayton was an exceptional case and no other agreement is quite comparable in terms of negotiating a tripartite peace treaty, yet it did contain a few misappropriations. “The deep compromises and flaws in Dayton are sharper than ever…and that is especially true for the country's minorities, the smaller ethnic groups such as Roma and Jews, who were excluded from the Dayton talks and overlooked in the settlement” (Gall, Nov., 2012). Bosnia’s newly rectified constitution drafted with the assistance of American and European legal experts failed to allocate legislative powers to minorities; only ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats shall be elected as representatives. As of late, regional organizations such as EUFOR and several NGOs are attempting to address these issues in a coalescent manner. Where the UN and NATO stalled, regional peacekeepers have stepped in. Part II: The Negotiations Process:
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From the inception point of Bosnia’s conflict, several elements of intervention should have been utilized. For negotiation to even begin, all actors involved must welcome the process, and thereafter, facilitation of negotiation commences. This in itself must be executed in a prompt fashion because timing intervention during pre-conflict scenarios is imperative in containing the provocation of antagonism. This is where the volatility of the Bosnian conflict magnified to a level un-proportionate to containment. Actors must agree to enter the negotiations process for common ground between the antagonist parties to be established. Mitchell (2005, p. 13) states that “…changes amounting to a reversal of each of the exacerbating dynamics need to be started. Other parties and interests that have become involved in the original conflict need to be disentangled (disengagement)…and contact (appropriately managed) needs to be restored.” Uncovering the basis of a tacit agreement enters the parties into the negotiation process. Regarding pre-conflict assessment, Schelling (1966, p. 220) states that “The crisis that precedes the war would be an opportune time to get certain understanding across. Once war became an imminent possibility, governments might take seriously a “strategic dialogue” that could powerfully influence the war itself.” From this point on, the most quintessential element of successful and lasting negotiation is discovered between the balance of risk and reward. Because most actors, and third-party interventionists alike enter the negotiation process for something to gain out of self-interest, leverage plays a crucial role, especially since Milosevic and Bosnian Serb forces were most-dominant. Beardsley (2013, p. 57-8) posits that“…mediators must especially tailor the level of leverage—the extent to which the third party uses positive and negative inducements, either explicit or implicit, to move negotiations forward—to the needs of the situation. In international dispute mediation, a
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one-size-fits-all view of mediation may actually inhibit effective conflict resolution.” In this instance, third-party leveraging is commonly found operating as a tool to mediate conflict between antagonists. Opposing actors generally seek an intermediary actor because of their neutral stance or impartiality to the situation at hand. In this case, only two of the three parties agreed to foreign intervention leaving Bosnian Serbs in a state of discontent. Likewise, third-party mediators like the UN and NATO have much to gain as do the opposing actors. For absolute success, outside interventionists must remain clear and concise regarding the framework of any pending agreement. Fisher (2010, p. 13) explains that, “…for each dynamic that exacerbates conflict there should be another which ameliorates or mitigates it…” After antagonist actors consent and enter the negotiation phase …“ways have to be found to reverse entrapment processes and to enable policy decisions to be made with an eye to realistic future opportunities and limitations” (Fisher, 2010, p. 13). Implicit and feasible goals become vital. All parties must acknowledge and respect the aspirations of the opposing side for real negotiation preparation to materialize. “Talks provide legitimacy to the other side…” (Byman, 2009) which reaffirm the actors’ stances on the situation at hand (p. 128). This sense of reciprocity between parties is imperative to keep negotiations and any terms of agreement intact. All actors involved must endorse these terms as they feel are satisfactory and sufficient. Lastly, repercussions for breaking the terms of agreement must be enforced; this is typically where a third-party mediator or enforcer is sought such as EUFOR. Sustenance of a treaty or agreement is attainable as long as the risks and rewards are equivalent in terms of their impact. This is why the war continued on for as long as it did without international intervention; Milosevic had surpassed the threshold offering no
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peaceful alternative of resorting back to diplomacy. Beardsley (2013, p. 58-9) claims that “…it is often critical that international dispute mediators employ positive and negative inducements in a way that creates sufficient leverage to incentivize the disputing parties to reach an agreement.” Beardsley also (2013, p. 65) attests that “Too much leverage, especially when the leverage is difficult to sustain indefinitely, can risk promoting artificial incentives that lead to fragile terms of peace. Too little leverage in the face of ongoing and imminent bloodshed carries obvious humanitarian risks.” In review of the international community’s intervention methods in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN used far too little leverage at the initial stages of conflict, and NATO under UN guidance applied excessive force which compelled negotiations to occur. The success of third-party intervention is found between a balance and application of leverage, more importantly when and how much thus revealing successful third-party mediation as a certain kind of diplomatic artistry. Learning from Bosnia and Conflict Peacekeeping and Enforcement Strategies: The UN is best prepared to deal with an intrastate conflict like Bosnia’s either by identifying it before it occurs or by bringing international awareness to the brokerage of a treaty after conflict has subsided. Because the UN does not obtain a standing military, it takes far too long for it to prepare and launch during times of conflict which is affected primarily by given authorization by the host-nation. Instead, the UN can either prevent or resolve conflicts before or after they've emerged; for instance: humanitarian responses to natural disasters, and acting as a treaty or negotiation intermediary. A regional organization like NATO is primed and prepared to handle intrastate conflict. NATO attains the manpower and military capabilities to mitigate hostility and aggression that threaten member-state sovereignty and security. NATO’s core prerogative is to act as a stabilizing deterrent against
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non-member states and to also act on as a defense mechanism on behalf of vulnerable members as well. In this regard, third generational peace operations should be considered in today’s modern-age of international relations. “Peace enforcement operations, states Kenkel (2013, p. 129), “…are characterized by increased permission to use force to impose the aims of a mission’s mandate.” This generational transcendence has emerged primarily from the failures during peacekeeping endeavors during the 1990s: Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia. In particular, the third generation is aimed at undertaking peacekeeping missions mandated by the UN for humanitarian purposes during ongoing hostilities. In effect, Kenkel (2013, p. 130) proclaims that “The UN response to the lessons from these (Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia) failures would center around the use of force…Initially this was due to the increasing realization of the role played by spoilers (factions refusing to collaborate with the implementation of the UN mandate).” This new generation of peacekeeping has been solely focused on forcibly intervening in times when inaction is deemed irrational or unethical. Learning from Bosnia, the West and primary international actors should strive to develop both second and third generation capabilities. The United Nation’s overall peace operations costs are extravagant to say the least, and maintaining the managerial system is also complex. Relinquishing certain duties by developing specific generational capabilities such as forming partnerships with regional organizations will lessen exorbitant costs because the response and launch of peace operations are not always immediate. Variables such as communications, planning and personnel impact the overall success of any peace operation. By developing greater second and third generation capabilities regional actors reduce timepreparedness required to launch operations with limited affect of the situation. Lastly,
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developed second and third generation capabilities assign regional actors a greater role of accountability becomes decisive in not only geographical terms but in overall operational success as well. Developed regional peacekeepers can reduce the UN’s unpredictability and improve operational efficiency all the while slashing wasteful top-down spending. Clement and Smith (2009, p. 2) state that: Success depends on the UN’s ability to leverage its partnerships with other organizations and groups, coordinate activities among them, bring spoilers into the political process, and enable and strengthen host governments. For this to happen, a common strategic vision is required, developed in coordination with all key stakeholders. Also, improving second generation capabilities can also subdue conflict from spreading because regional organizations obtain a better understanding of the political environment and are geographically-centralized to the nature of crisis. Regional actors may obtain a more natural aptitude or instinct for such conflict and can respond to the situation with their inherited skill set. Essentially, UN cooperation with regional organizations may also permit access to specific areas where organizations may not have been allowed to otherwise. Although a successful peace operation may be unquantifiable due to the subjectivity of what constitutes success, the roots of the initial conflict can be evaluated and assessed. Augmenting the role of third generation capabilities for regional organizations increases the performance of peace enforcement in times of duress when inaction is simply an impracticable option. Particularly, developed regional organizations have the potential to play vital roles because they assist in the transition from initial plan implementation to exit
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strategy, thus conflict can be contained as a proper exit strategy is positioned. “To manage a successful exit, the handover of all activities to the host government must be anticipated from the first entry of the UN” (Clement & Smith, 2009, p. 2). Exit strategy is imperative in the process of peacekeeping and should be anticipated and prioritized from the beginning of all operations. Clement and Smith (2009, p. 12) maintain that “Developing host governments’ capacities to transition from being the focus of international efforts to being the driver of their own efforts is a process the UN has not yet perfected.” Consequently, third generation capabilities need to be revamped and reinforced in order to quell the recurrence of conflict. Having independent regional organizations not only establishes ready-to-launch peace operations, but it reduces the threshold of hostility and significantly minimizes the proliferation of conflict. Non-combative sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS (the Economic Community for African States) are valuable assets in destabilized and undeveloped areas, emergency responses to natural disasters, and in intrastate conflicts when forcible foreign intervention is highly unwelcomed. Certainly, sub-regional organizations have the potential to found a premise for peace built by economic means because sub-regional actors hold an advantage in alleviating internal discord through economic guidance and assistance. Non-combat actors retain this leverage in hostile areas because they are voluntarily providing assistance, mainly for humanitarian reasons as mentioned above. Non-combat NGOs and diplomatic intervention are highly effective if timed correctly. Rapid response and preparedness are insurmountable for conflict prevention. Unlike Bosnia’s conflict where international intervention of any kind had been disregarded, the UN had ample opportunities to intervene. Recently, NGOS have gained greater traction into the
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international arena of policymaking primarily concerned with the affairs regarding the Security Council, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. Because of UN budget and leadership concerns, NGOs and sub-regional actors of all types are gaining greater traction into global affairs due to the UN’s inability to react and respond to worldwide conflicts. Bosnia’s Future of Redevelopment Following Post-Conflict: The European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS) which is orchestrated as a peace building, conflict prevention, and mediation instruments division has recently designed and implemented a new program called the Conflict Early Warning System (EWS). This EU division has instituted EWS and seeks to identify and target crises before they occur. The EU’s EWS is a modernized approach necessitating a strong shift from crisis reaction to ultimate conflict prevention. To paraphrase (EWS, 2014), “EWS is indispensible. It is about systematically provides the right information to the right people at the right time – connecting the dots across relevant actors in the field and at EU headquarters.” By collecting and analyzing vital information, given scenarios are managed and prioritized, and rational strategic responses are developed in accordance. EWS is solely concerned with identifying the underlying and structural factors and flaws that instigates conflict. EWS promotes communication and awareness to staff members across the EU diagnosing and evaluating long-term risks that induce nation and regional deterioration. Furthermore, EWS stimulates early preventative measures and actions in order to address risks before they emerge. Alongside the EU’s program of taking preventative action, NGOs in Bosnia are making headway in educating the regional populous about their diverse cultures. The International Forum Bosnia (IFB) is an active non-governmental organization that was
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founded in 1997 in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital. The IFB’s mission is to connect both individuals and institutions from Bosnia and Herzegovina and internationallyabroad to create a better future for Eastern Europe. The IFB focuses primarily on constructing harmonious relationships based on dialogue, trust, and respect by working in the fields of human rights protection and advocacy, the rule of law, and democracy. Members of the IFB adhere to the principles of sustainability regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina as a plural society that includes diverse ethnic, political, and cultural heritages. Their initiative is executed in a two-fold manner: The first path involves deconstructing divisive political and social ideologies found within Bosnia and Herzegovina which have been the root-cause of mistrust, intolerance, social exclusion, and major generators of social tension and conflict for decades. The second path involves systematically developing and promoting a new synthesis which entails a vision of social development free from fear, hostility, and cultural tension. By organizing intellectual gatherings such as workshops, panels, symposia, conferences, public lectures, and exhibitions, the IFB has made prominent strides in mediating regional tensions. Conclusion: By assessing the Bosnian conflict and the modernization of future peacekeeping ambitions, the international system seems to be becoming less state-centric regarding peace operations. Due to budget cuts and economic volatility, conflicts have only worsened international stability. States are shifting focus onto their national rather than international and humanitarian securities. With the apparent decline in peace operations from dominant world powers, rising nations such as Brazil and China are procuring their worldly influences by supplying more troops than ever before to peacekeeping operations. With this global shift
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the UN is steadily losing its crown of supreme international peacekeeper whereas the EU continues to provide oversight and delegation of peacekeeping responsibilities to subregional organizations such as EUFOR, EEAS, OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). From this point on, regional and sub-regional organizations will further administer and conduct a substantial portion of peacekeeping operations in the near to immediate future. The Bosnian War should serve as an exemplary model for future conflict scenarios. Although the UN has failed to respond in an effective manner, the international community does not have to continue down this path of mediocrity. “Solutions to the world's security problems can be reached only when citizens, politicians, diplomats, and international civil servants dedicate themselves to the creation of the necessary political framework� (Morrison, 1994, p. 84). What occurred in Bosnia is undoubtedly tragic in every sense, but with every failure comes success. To conclude, the international peacekeeping community has the ability and the authority to rectify their position in international affairs, and the Bosnian model should be analyzed and applied for future conflict scenarios.
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Kaplan, L S. (Feb., 2010). NATO and the UN: A peculiar relationship. University of Missouri, pp. 164-184. Kenkel, K. M. (2013). Five generations of peace operations: From the “thin blue line” to “painting a country blue”. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 56(1), pp. 122-143. McMahon, P. C., & Western, J. (fall, 2009). The death of Dayton: How to stop Bosnia from falling apart. Foreign Affairs, 88(5), pp. 69-83. Mitchell, R., C. (Nov., 2005). Conflict, social change and conflict resolution: An enquiry. Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Berghof Handbook Dialogue, 5, pp.1-23. Morrison, A. (1994). The fiction of a UN standing army. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 18(1), pp. 84-96. Rohde, D. (Feb., 2014). In Bosnia, are outsiders the answer, or the problem? Reuters. Schelling, T. (1966). Arms and influence. Yale University Press, pp. 1-286. United Nations Security Council. (Mar., 1993). Resolution 816.