T
he vulnerabilit y ofboth new nations was nakedly exposed by the disloca-
tions ofPar tition: the refugee crisis,economic uncer tainties and contestations
over borders,twinned with the v iolent events in Kashmir,explain the intense
paranoia that set in instantaneously regarding the relative strengths and
motives of the other country.The Pakistani leadership – owing to the inherent
limitations caused by their country’s position as the seceding state and its
smaller size – felt exposed to the risk of collapse or invasion.Indian intelli-
gence written in purple prose warned that the Pakistani government was
training ordinary people with arms and encouraging the ‘war-minded’, while
in Pakistan,the official talk was of enemies attempting to paralyse the new
nation.The Prime Minister spoke freely in broadcasts of‘the enemies of
Pakistan’who ‘indulged in their black hatred to the full’. 37
Both national governments remained acutely awareof their shor tcomings:
theirpoorbalancesheets,the lossof senior officers,theshor tfalls inavailable
bureaucratictalent and theurgent imperativeof securing hundredsof miles
of newly acquiredborderland.Lack of supplies hampered Indian forces in
Kashmirwhiletroopsairliftedfrom low-lyingareas were exosed tothealti-
tudeandicy conditions. Pakistanturned to militiasand v igilantes while its
weak armywasstillbeingconsolidatedinthemidstof the first war over
Kashmir.Armyranks hadbeenseriouslydepletedby the depar tureofBritish
senior officers; before Par tition 13,500of 22,000officers inthearmywere
British.A fewhundred,atthe requestof theundermannedPakistani army, stayed ontotrain Pakistani soldiers butthemajorit y swapped their uniforms for civ ilian positions in Br itainorhunteddow n roles inotherpar tsof the
British empire.Tothenewlyindependentgovernmentsthesolutiontothis strategicvulnerabilit y, par ticularly theapparent weakness of thenew armies, appeared to lie inspendingmoney.Theoriginsofhabitually stratospheric defencespendingcan be foundintheseearlydaysof Independenceand such spending wasa productofdefensive weakness rather than hubristicswagger.
Only Gandhi had anticipated this.In July 1947, he said ‘he v isualised a definite increase in military expenditure’which would be ‘ all for fig hting among ourselves ’ . 38 It was a prophetic statement.Within a year Indian and Pakistani soldiers would be fig hting the first war over Kashmir and soon scientists in both countries would be racing to develop nuclear missiles, with their noses
pointing towards the foreign border. But all this was in the future.Needless to say, little ofit was in the original Par tition plan.
Acute anxieties have beleaguered Pakistan’ s military establishment ever
since.The ability to defend the new nation was in serious doubt,and there
was a constant fear that it would be swallowed up by its larger neig hbour.The