Conclusion
171
problems. It stresses that a concern with solving the problem at hand should lead researchers in their choice of methods, rather than the other way around, and that, within limits, any method of inquiry that can help us solve an important problem is a legitimate method.74 It is neither necessary nor desirable that the study of international relations and foreign policy proceed without the use of empirical theory or methods. While Winch’s characterization of the objects of inquiry of the social sciences may well be correct, the very use of the term object of analysis indicates that even self-interpreting actors and their linguistically constructed understandings have to be “objectified” if we are to so much as speak about them. Karl Popper has defended the need for a conceptual detachment of scientific knowledge from the person of the scientist and for the criticism of such knowledge independent of its creator.75 It is important to understand that the idea of the objectification of knowledge is legitimized not by its empirical content but by its usefulness as a guiding principle in the development and judgment of knowledge. It is problematic insofar as it may be abused to bolster the position of the scientist vis-à-vis his or her objects of inquiry, for political or other reasons. However, such abuse is not an integral part of the approach and thus may not be a sufficient reason to reject it. The strategy of basing the authorit y of the scientist on the hierarchy of observation does not have to and should not remain a prerogative of positivist science. Finding the third way requires not only that criticism be regarded as a constructive endeavor rather than as an invitation to fortify one’s own points of view at all cost, it demands that a critical attitude toward the data, methods, and findings that comprise our own analyses be considered an integral part of our own efforts. The divisions created by the three great debates can only be overcome by the identification of standards of judgment that both sides can accept as valid. Such standards cannot be “discovered.” They have to be created and confirmed in praxis. Perhaps the norm of healthy skepticism toward the pronouncements of experts is as much common ground as is left to us. The only way to demonstrate that we share this common ground, if we do, is through a self-critical attitude. If we do not, the prospects for our mutual education are indeed bleak. New approaches should be developed based on a concern with problem solving and the human relevance of our research efforts. Finding the third way requires the realization that “understanding” means more than pointing out relations bet ween causes and effects. It means creating the preconditions for judgment. While this does not mean that observation and measurement should proceed simultaneously with judgment, or that we should officially allow personal preferences to affect the results of our analyses, it does mean that it is part of the analyst’s responsibilit y to conduct such investigations that might be useful to human ends. The acceptance of the responsibilit y of science to contribute toward human ends must be motivated by a minimum of optimism. If we do not believe that human affairs can be improved, it is unclear what role science should play at all. To reject even minimal optimism out of hand as naiveté, as realist political theory frequently does, seems difficult to justify.