CAPFISH Project 2nd Edition by World Maritime University

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CAPFISH Project 2nd Edition: Capacity-Building Project to Progress the Implementation of International Instruments to Combat IUU Fishing Korea Maritime Institute World Maritime University Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Republic of Korea

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2 ND EDITION CAPACITY-BUILDING PROJECT TO PROGRESS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT IUU FISHING Edited by Kathleen Auld Francis Neat Raphael Baumler Deukhoon Peter Han

Not for Sale

ISBN 979-11-6866-130-1 93300 979-11-6866-131-8 (set)

CAPFISH

PROJECT

CAPACITY-BUILDING PROJECT TO PROGRESS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT IUU FISHING

2 ND EDITION

CAPFISH

PROJECT

The CAPFISH project first and foremost has aimed to be transdisciplinary, collaborative, and practical. Of all the themes to emerge as important in fighting IUU fishing, what stood out strongest was the need for better cooperation and sharing of information and resources, be it at national, regional or international scales, across agencies and across disciplines. Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the case of the Western Central Pacific tuna fisheries where regional cooperation between island states has seen not only a significant reduction in IUU fishing, but more sustainable harvesting and a fairer and more equitable relationship with foreign fishing fleets and interests. This shows that the war on IUU fishing can be won, provided there is political will to facilitate better education, improved cooperation, implementation of international instruments, and improvement of regulatory regimes and enforcement capacity.

Edited by Kathleen Auld Francis Neat Raphael Baumler Deukhoon Peter Han

2ND EDITION

Published by The Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea Address: Government Complex-Sejong, 94, Dasom 2-ro, Sejong-si, Republic of Korea (30110) Phone: (Day) +82-44-200-5555, (Night) +82-44-200-5990 Website: https://www.mof.go.kr/en Professor Maximo Q. Mejia, Jr., President World Maritime University Address: Fiskehamnsgatan 1, 211 18 Malmö, Sweden Phone: +46 40 35 63 00 Website: https://www.wmu.se/ Dr. Jong Deog Kim, President Korea Maritime Institute Address: 26, Haeyang-ro 301beon-gil, Yeongdo-gu, Busan, Republic of Korea (49111) Phone: +82 51 797 4800 Website: www.kmi.re.kr/eng ISBN 979-11-6866-130-1 93300 ISBN 979-11-6866-131-8 (set) All rights reserved. ©2023 Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea, World Maritime University, and Korea Maritime Institute. All materials contained in this book are protected by the copyright of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea, World Maritime University, and Korea Maritime Institute. It may not be translated, reproduced, distributed, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any from or by any other means, whether electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The publisher, the institute and the editors cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this book. Photographs are for illustrative purposes only and were not taken in the context of IUU fishing Photographs and bound by The Garden above The Sea Publishing Co.

CAPFISH

PROJECT CAPACITY-BUILDING PROJECT TO PROGRESS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO COMBAT IUU FISHING Edited by Kathleen Auld Francis Neat Raphael Baumler Deukhoon Peter Han

Preface

Since the initiation of CAPFISH in 2021, the Project has offered four capacity-building

WTO, fisher fatality rates and safety, maritime boundary disputes, transshipment,

workshops on illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The first three

and organised crime. Emphasis was placed on the implementation of international

workshops were hosted by the World Maritime University in Malmö, Sweden, and

instruments, with case studies presented from Senegal, South Africa, Norway, Thailand,

the fourth and final workshop, in February 2023, was hosted by the Korea Maritime

Republic of Korea, Guyana, the Philippines, Ghana, and Fiji.

Institute in Busan, Republic of Korea. Much of the content of the first two workshops

The primary aim of CAPFISH is to build capacity to address IUU fishing in

was captured in the first edition of this series. This second edition consolidates and

developing states, by providing knowledge and tools to those government actors

expands on the content of Workshops 3 and 4. With the easing of the COVID-19

on the front line of the fight against IUU fishing. Workshop attendees in Year 2

pandemic, greater in-person attendance was possible at these workshops, and

comprised professionals from national administrations (fishing, maritime, ocean, and

participants could meet and candidly discuss the most pressing issues affecting fisheries

environmental departments), and maritime surveillance and enforcement agencies

and ocean governance today.

(Navies, Coast Guards, and Ministries of Justice). Countries represented included

The second year of the Project brought together actors from the UN Agencies and

Nigeria, Philippines, Ghana, Angola, Republic of Korea, Peru, Ecuador, Kenya, Fiji,

other intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, government

Chile, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Samoa,

administrations, and academia. They shared their experiences in tackling IUU fishing,

Kiribati, Madagascar, and Spain.

discussed challenges, and identified good practices. While the Project remains focused

During its first two years, the Project reached over 100 ocean and maritime

on the common theme of international efforts to tackle IUU fishing, different angles

professionals, mainly from the global south. This has created a strong network, linked

of the problem were explored in this second year. These included IUU fishing and

with leading fisheries experts from around the world. As part of its capacity building

inequality, fisheries access agreements, the role of NGOs, economic subsidies and the

strategy, CAPFISH seeks to transform its attendees into experts who can not only take

knowledge back to their countries, but also contribute to the Project. To this end, several attendees from the first year of the Project were invited to share their expertise through case studies in the second year. This further supports the Project’s aim to showcase knowledge and experiences from all actors involved in tackling IUU fishing, and disseminate this knowledge as widely as possible. These perspectives are reflected in this second edition of the CAPFISH book series. We trust that this will increase awareness of the problem of IUU fishing and the tools available to tackle it at both an international and regional level. The book is written for a non-academic audience, and we hope that it will serve as a useful guide and make a meaningful contribution to tackling the IUU fishing crisis. The CAPFISH team gratefully acknowledges the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Republic of Korea for their ongoing sponsorship of the Project, and the support of the World Maritime University and the Korea Maritime Institute, which jointly administer the project. Further information and resources on IUU fishing are available on our webpage. Yours Sincerely The CAPFISH Project Team

CONTENTS

Preface • 4

Progressing the Implementation of International Instruments to Combat IUU Fishing: The South African Regime Selwyn Bailey

PART 1 Coordinated Responses of the UN

The Implementation of the PSMA in the Philippines Marilyn Jaal

106

Agencies and Implementation of International Instruments 01

IUU Fishing and Equity Laura Osborne and Quentin Hanich

The Hidden Crimes behind Illegal Fishing: Transversal Criminality in the World’s Oceans Dyhia Belhabib

Implementation of the IMO Cape Town Agreement: Spanish Perspective Victor Jimenez Fernandez

Port State Measures by Norway The Importance of Digital Solutions Thord Monsen

FAO Port State Measures Agreement Implementation of Port State Inspection(PSI) in Republic of Korea Minjae Park

PART 2 Gaps in the Fight Against IUU Fishing 08

Uncertain Maritime Limits, Overlapping Maritime Claims and IUU Fishing Clive Schofield

128

Party to the Plunder: Distant Water Fishing Fleets, 148 The Overexploitation of Africa’s Fish Stock, And the Role of Technology in Stemming its Tides Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood

IUU Fishing in the Context of Small-Scale Fisheries: What it Really Means Ratana Chuenpagdee

The Complex Nature of Fisheries Subsidies: 178 Their Contribution to IUU Fishing and the Need to Balance Environmental and Social Priorities Kathleen Auld

160

PART 3 The Relationship between Fishers,

PART 4 Case Studies and Practitioner

National Governments and International Actors 12

Perspectives

Triggering Death Quantifying the True Human Cost of Global Fishing Eric Holliday

198

The Role of the International ITF in Representing the Rights of Fishers Rossen Karavatchev

234

The Pacific Islands’ Approach to Dealing with IUU Fishing: Reality and Challenges Francisco Blaha

250

IUU Fishing and the Management of Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Islands Joeli Veitayaki

264

The Role of NGOs in International Negotiations (FAO, ILO, IMO) and

282

Peru Case Study on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Jesús A. Menacho Piérola

336

Cases of Illegal Fishing Control – Korea Coast Guard Ilsoo Youn

362

Combating IUU Fishing in Thailand: Fishing Fleet Control Decha Chotepanitses

372

Fisheries and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) in Senegal

392

Médina Thiam 23

Identifying Barriers Associated with Unreported Fishing in a Small-Scale Fishery: the Importance of Communication, Participation and Trust within a Complex Value Chain Randy T. Bumbury | Francis C. Neat

their Contribution to Combating IUU Fishing Ari Gudmundsson 17

The Contribution of Ghana’s Fisheries Co-Management Policy to Tackling IUU Fishing in the Artisanal Fisheries Sector Ambrose Yankey

300

Catch Documentation Schemes in Ghana’s Industrial Fisheries and their Role in Deterring IUU Fishing Misornu Yaw Logo

318

Note • 446 About the Editors and Contributors • 494

420

PART 1

The History and Role of the FAO in Combatting IUU Fishing

The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures

oordinated C Theof Global Responses the UN Agencies and of Problem Implementation IUU Fishing and of International the Role of the Instruments

UN Agencies in the Fight Against It

The ILO’s Role in the Fight against IUU Fishing and the Work in Fishing Convention (C188)

The IMO’s Role in the Fight Against IUU Fishing and the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

PART 1

IUU Fishing and Equity

Overview Widely regarded as one of the leading threats to global fish stocks, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and its impacts have been extensively studied from a sustainability perspective. This paper aims to build upon this narrative by discussing IUU activities through the lens of social equity. The paper examines how small-scale fishers are vulnerable to being disproportionately targeted by IUU fishing policies and studies, as a result of ambiguous terminology that conflates the three distinct issues of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Also noted are equity concerns arising from the failure of IUU rhetoric and anti-IUUglobal fish stocks,1 policies to differentiate between fishery sectors. The paper also discusses how generalisations included during attempts to quantify IUU fishing have led to the misrepresentation of local realities, and have led to the development of ineffective and inequitable IUU countermeasures that ignore the specific socio-ecological systems in which IUU fishing occurs.

Laura Osborne and Quentin Hanich

Introduction

University of Wollongong,

IUU fishing is a broad term that captures a range of fishing activities. Despite the

Australia

widespread use of the term IUU, no binding definition exists. It is generally agreed that

IUU fishing refers to activities that undermine national and regional efforts to conserve 2

international law. It has been noted, however, that determining fishing activities that are actually illegal is often complicated.10

and manage fish stocks.

While IUU is a ubiquitous term in both research and policy, it is in fact a

Despite the disproportionate attention received by illegal activities, unreported

homogenisation of three separate issues – ‘illegal fishing’, ‘unreported fishing’, and

and unregulated fishing also represent complex issues that critically threaten the

‘unregulated fishing’. Each component of IUU represents a complex challenge that

sustainability of global fisheries.

undermines global, regional and national efforts to sustainably manage the world’s

Unreported fishing refers to fishing which has not been reported, or has been

marine resources. However, the common practice of conflating the individual elements

misreported, to the relevant national authority. It also refers to fishing in an RFMO

of IUU often masks the distinct drivers and impacts of each issue, and can confuse

area which has not been reported or has been misreported. Unreported and misreported

management objectives, thus undermining the effectiveness of responses.

fishing is often dismissed as a ‘minor violation’ despite the critical importance of accurate

The most commonly cited definitions for ‘illegal fishing’, ‘unreported fishing’, and ‘unregulated fishing’ are those provided in Section 3 of the FAO’s International Plan of 3

reporting to revenue (taxes, licence fees, access fees etc.), science, and management for developing coastal States.

Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU (IPOA-IUU) published in 2001. While

In 2021, a study conducted by FFA and MRAG identified misreporting as the

the different components of IUU are described separately in Section 3 of the IPOA-

biggest IUU risk for Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries. They estimated that, of

the quantified IUU catch volume, 89% was unreported, with only 5% being illegal.11

IUU, the remainder of the document speaks solely of IUU fishing as a whole.

At this scale, misreported and unreported fishing by foreign vessels results in significant losses in government revenue for developing States that rely heavily on access agreements

The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

for economic security. Unregulated fishing refers to fishing in an RFMO area by vessels without nationality, or flying the flag of a State not party to the RFMO, in a manner that is inconsistent

IUU fishing has typically been linked to destructive fishing practices that undermine 5

with or contravenes RFMO regulations. It also refers to fishing in areas or for fish stocks

the long term sustainability of fish stocks, and threaten food and economic security. It

where there are no applicable conservation measures. Unregulated fishing can be a key

has been noted that IUU fishing disproportionately impacts coastal developing States,

critical concern to those targeting adjacent fisheries, due to the impact on shared stocks.

particularly coastal communities that depend on fisheries for their livelihoods and

This is particularly true for small-scale fisheries that rely on species also targeted by

wellbeing. Thus, it impacts those already vulnerable and marginalised within the ocean

unregulated industrial fleets, and for developing coastal states that rely on revenue from

governance context, and further entrenches existing inequalities.

stocks that move between regulated and unregulated areas.12 A recent study by Japan’s

Illegal fishing is the most studied component of IUU.8, 9 It includes domestic or

Fisheries Research and Education Agency, Global Fishing Watch, and the Australian

foreign vessels fishing in national waters without a license or in contravention of

National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS) studied the location

national laws. Illegal fishing also includes vessels flying the flag of State parties to an

and activities of globalized squid fishing vessels through analysis of multiple satellite

RFMO that are fishing in contravention of RFMO regulations or relevant provisions of

datasets. The study correlated this new information with the areas of competence for

national and regional management bodies, thereby determining the extent to which

Social equity refers to the understanding that each person has inalienable rights,17

this fishing activity was unregulated versus regulated, and its level of reporting. Their

and that policies, laws, and regulations should promote equality, fairness, and justice for

study identified global fishing fleets that migrate across multiple oceans, fishing freely

all.18 Whereas equality ensures that each individual or group of people is granted access

between regulated and unregulated spaces, catching huge amounts of squid with little

to the same resources or opportunities, equity recognises the difference in circumstances

to no oversight or data reporting. They found that effort increased 168% over the study

of each person, and allocates resources and opportunities in a manner needed to reach

period from 2017-2020, and that these squid fishing vessels fished largely (86%) in

an equal outcome.19 Social equity aims to identify and eliminate systemic inequalities

unregulated areas.13

that may undermine the ability of individuals or communities to access opportunities.

Cooperation is fundamental to ensure that transboundary fisheries are regulated at

Inequity is typically a product of existing social, historical, and political contexts,

sustainable levels and to avoid gaps or loopholes. However, the study found that out

whereby the ability of stakeholders to access resources, and their benefits, and to

of 17 RFMOs, only two - the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC) and South

participate in decision-making processes, are impacted by existing conditions and power

Pacific Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO) - have a mandate to manage

disparities.

squid fisheries, leaving large gaps in the Indian and Atlantic oceans. Furthermore, States

Building on the general concept of social equity, ocean equity aims to address

must also ensure that RFMOs adopt effective regulations. The IPOA-IUU defines

inequalities and dismantle inequity in how people are affected by ocean governance.20

unregulated fishing (among other things) as that which occurs “in areas or for fish stocks

Ocean equity promotes food security, gender equality, inclusive governance, and

in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or management measures...”

sustainable resource use, while protecting human rights, tenure and access agreements,

However, unregulated fishing is often the most overlooked and misunderstood

and socio-cultural values.21 It aims to remove barriers that may prevent stakeholders

element of IUU. This is due in part to the ambiguous wording of the IPOA-IUU,

from accessing marine resources and their benefits, and from participating in decision-

which includes in subsection 3.4: “Notwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated

making processes.22

fishing may take place in a manner which is not in violation of applicable international

Ocean equity acknowledges that inclusive decision-making is instrumental to

law, and may not require the application of measures envisaged under the International

the long-term success of management decisions, through increasing the legitimacy

Plan of Action.” This provision stipulates that certain forms of unregulated fishing

of decisions and ensuring that policy-makers have valuable local knowledge. 23

are not illegal. Thus, questions exist over whether it is appropriate to deem these legal,

Historically, many developing States and coastal communities have been excluded from

unregulated activities as “IUU”.

decision-making processes, despite their heavy reliance on marine resources and the disproportionate impact that management decisions may have on their livelihoods and wellbeing.24

Social Equity and Ocean Equity Recognising the links between ecological degradation and social injustice, researchers are increasingly calling for a socially equitable approach to environmental issues.16

Ocean Governance and Equity

disproportionately impacts countries that are highly dependent on fisheries for their food and economic security, particularly developing coastal States and SIDS. But

Efforts to address inequalities within ocean governance can be found in international

beyond the direct impacts of IUU fishing on equity, it is important to consider how

agreements for sustainable ocean governance. For example, the UN Fish Stocks

IUU studies and policies may entrench existing inequalities in ocean governance.

Agreement includes important provisions that recognise the special rights and

Firstly, how does the ambiguous IUU terminology, including the conflation of illegal,

aspirations of developing States, including the need to ensure that measures do not

unreported and unregulated fishing, negatively impact small-scale fishers? Secondly, how

result in transferring, whether directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of

does the lack of differentiation between fishery sectors within anti-IUU policies and

conservation action onto these States.

narratives render small-scale fishers disproportionately vulnerable to countermeasures? 26

Similarly, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries addresses issues of

Thirdly, how do growing calls for IUU fishing to be designated a transnational organised

equity, noting the special requirements of developing States. The Voluntary Guidelines

crime pose risks to small-scale fisheries? Finally, how does the conflation of regions

for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and

within IUU fishing studies and policies impact on local stakeholders?

Poverty Eradication advances equity by advocating for the empowerment of small-scale fishers and promoting the equitable distribution of resources.

Conflation of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing as “IUU”

UN Sustainable Development Goal 14.7 (Life Below Water) aims to increase

To ensure that fisheries are managed equitably, the rights, needs and livelihoods of

economic benefits to small island developing States and least developed countries from

small-scale fishers and coastal communities must be taken into account.31 This includes

the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of

ensuring that decisions do not exclude small-scale fishers from accessing resources, and

fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism, by the year 2030.

do not undermine historical tenure, traditional livelihoods, and food security needs of

However, despite the intentions of international agreements, progress in achieving ocean equity has been slow. In many cases, management decisions create inequalities 28

coastal communities.32 In line with the terminology provided in the IPOA-IUU, many of the discussions

or perpetuate existing inequity. Governance discussions are typically driven by actors

and policies concerning IUU fishing fail to differentiate between fishery sectors (i.e.

with conflicting objectives and varying levels of political power and influence, which

industrial vs small-scale, subsistence vs commercial).

undermines efforts to achieve equity. Additionally, key stakeholders are often excluded

Small-scale fisheries are an essential source of food and economic security, accounting for 90% of the fisheries workforce and two-thirds of catches destined for direct human

from decision-making processes.

consumption.33 Small-scale fisheries also play an important role socially and culturally for many coastal communities. However, small-scale fisheries are disproportionately

IUU Fishing and Ocean Inequity

impacted by ambiguous IUU terminology, which in turn renders them more vulnerable to imposed IUU countermeasures.

Ocean equity not only focuses on inequalities in terms of the distribution of benefits, 30

but also on the distribution of harms. It is widely accepted that IUU fishing

Current IUU terminology tends to be more applicable to industrial fisheries, and does not adequately account for the particularities of small-scale fishers and fisheries.

Many small-scale fisheries lack formal reporting mechanisms and may engage in selfgovernance.34 While these activities may be perceived as ‘unreported’ or ‘unregulated’ in the context of IUU, they are not necessarily illegal. In fact, small-scale fisheries are often not regulated by the State through formal regulations, but may have well-functioning rules or community-based management systems in place that promote the sustainable management of targeted stocks.35 Despite their socio-economic importance, the failure to acknowledge alternative forms of management, regulation, and reporting has resulted in small-scale fisheries being disproportionately deemed as “IUU”. For example, a previous study classified 80% of all non-industrial fisheries globally from 1950-2015 as “IUU” due to the lack of reported landings.36 This designation of small-scale fisheries as IUU without proper consideration of the social-ecological systems in which they exist, poses negative implications for local cultures, livelihoods, economies,37 and may also further entrench existing inequalities that exist between fishery sectors.

Conflation of Sectors in IUU Fishing Countermeasures Awareness of the environmental, economic, and social consequences of IUU fishing has made developing effective IUU countermeasures a priority at the global, regional, and national level. In line with the terminology provided by the IPOA-IUU, many antiIUU policies also fail to differentiate between fishery sectors. This conflation of fishery sectors can hold significant consequences for small-scale fishers. While these measures aim to secure sustainable fisheries, this paper argues that, from an equity perspective, they may result in delegitimising and marginalising small-scale

ⒸFrancisco Blaha

fishers. This not only poses a risk to small-scale fishers and coastal communities, but also severely undermines the long-term effectiveness of the mechanisms themselves. For example, international trade-based measures have emerged over time as a mechanism to prevent IUU catch from entering seafood markets. One such tradebased measure is the EU-IUU Regulation (EC Reg. No 1005/2008),38 which entered into force in January 2010. The EU-IUU Regulation restricts imports from exporting

countries that have not shown adequate efforts to prevent and eliminate IUU fishing

to suggest that criminalisation will effectively prevent IUU fishing from occurring.47

conducted in their waters or by their fleets.39

Secondly, framing all IUU activity as a crime directly contradicts the provisions in

While the Regulation does account for capacity constraints of developing countries in the implementation of the certification scheme, it does not differentiate between

Subsection 3.4 of the IPOA-IUU, which explicitly states that not all IUU fishing is necessarily illegal.48

industrial and small-scale fisheries. It has previously been argued that this failure to differentiate between fishery sectors disproportionately impacts small-scale fishers

Conflation of Regions in IUU Fishing Policy and Fishing Studies

and coastal communities, who are vulnerable to being disproportionately penalised.

In order to ensure that conservation and management efforts are equitable and effective,

Research also suggests that policymakers and enforcement officials can sometimes view

it is critical to understand social, economic, environmental, cultural, geopolitical, and

small-scale fishers as an easier target for reform measures than the industrial sector.

historical conditions.49 Failure to consider the specific contexts in which governance

Additionally, when facing sanctions by the EU-IUU Regulation, governments may

takes place often results in pre-existing inequalities and power disparities being ignored

be reluctant to penalise foreign industrial fleets conducting IUU, as these fleets may

and perpetuated. It may also result in the marginalisation of development aspirations

constitute an important source of revenue. Instead, they often opt to target the small-

and may deter participation. For fisheries, governance occurs within a geo-political,

scale sector. This highlights how political influence and power disparities can negatively

institutional, economic, and trade context that has been formed by centuries of

impact local small-scale fisheries, and developing coastal States that rely heavily on access agreements as a source of revenue.

colonialism, capitalism, and power disparities. The extent and nature of IUU varies between regions, while States do not all enjoy equal capacity in their ability to respond to IUU activities. As a result, IUU policies that are effective within a particular region or fishery sector, may not be relevant for others.

IUU fishing as a Transnational Organised Crime

Policies must be developed to reflect specific needs of the social-ecological system in which the activities in question are occurring. Policies that ignore existing inequalities

A growing narrative has emerged calling for IUU fishing to be classified as a form of 43, 44, 45

are likely to be counterproductive.

However, this all-encompassing criminalisation

Similarly, some studies and policies have focused on IUU fishing at a global scale.

of fisheries poses a significant risk to small-scale fishers in particular, who are highly

These large-scale studies may have been effective initially for scoping or advocacy

vulnerable to the implications of being framed as criminals. The Global Initiative

purposes,50 but the conflation of multiple regions within studies may inadvertently

Against Transnational Organised Crime has argued that failure to distinguish between

misrepresent local realities.

transnational organised crime.

those organising and those exercising illegal behaviour has serious consequences for the

For example, the commonly-cited Agnew et al. (2009)51 included all areas within

small-scale sector,46 who are more likely to be classified as conducting “IUU” due to

FAO Statistical Area 71 despite the vast differences within this large area. This meant

ambiguous terminology.

that the Pacific islands region was generalised and included with parts of Indonesia and

Beyond equity concerns, questions also exist surrounding the utility and legitimacy

the Philippines. At the time of the study, there were relatively high levels of IUU fishing

of framing IUU as a transnational organised crime. Firstly, there is limited evidence

in coastal states on the western seaboard of FAO Area 71 which influenced the overall

results. The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency critiqued this in their ‘Quantifying 52

social equity is essential not only to protect the rights, needs, and livelihoods of small-

IUU Report’, commenting that no Pacific islands FFA member EEZs were included

scale fisheries and coastal communities, but also to ensure the long-term success of IUU

in the countries selected to inform the time series data underpinning the regional

responses.

estimates.

Conclusion Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing all represent major threats to sustainable and equitable fisheries management. However, the conflation of these three distinct activities as “IUU” masks the distinct drivers and impacts of each of these issues, and has led to the development of ineffective responses. This conflation of IUU elements threatens ocean equity by disproportionately impacting small-scale fishers, who may have alternative reporting mechanisms in place and may engage in self-governance. Furthermore, the failure of current IUU terminology to differentiate between fishery sectors further places small-scale fishers at risk. Despite their socio-economic importance, small-scale fishers are often the primary target of anti-IUU fishing policies. The conflation of IUU activities and the lack of differentiation between fishery sectors within IUU narratives results in small-scale fishers being more likely to be deemed as “IUU”. The recent call for IUU fishing to be deemed as a transnational organised crime also poses serious risks for small scale fisheries, who are highly vulnerable to being incorrectly classified as criminals. Finally, the conflation of regions in both IUU policies and studies results in the misrepresentation of local realities. Additionally, the introduction of large-scale antiIUU fishing policies can result in pre-existing inequalities and power disparities being ignored and perpetuated. In order for sustainable fisheries management to be achieved, social equity must be considered from the outset. It is essential that history and context are considered and understood when studying IUU fishing and when developing responses. Achieving

The Hidden Crimes behind Illegal Fishing: Transversal Criminality in the World’s Oceans Introduction Global marine fisheries are threatened. Indeed, over 90% of stocks are fully or over exploited,1 jeopardizing the availability of a primary source of animal protein for 3.2 billion people and the jobs of some 260 million people.2 Fish consumption is increasing faster than any other type of animal protein.3 Internationally, fish is among the most valuable traded food commodities on the planet, with over US$157 billion in exports in 2018.4 Fisheries are also among the most detrimentally subsidized sectors, with an estimated US$35 billion reaching the sector5 contributing to over-capacity, overexploitation and illegal fishing. With landings estimated at 110 million tonnes globally, a quarter of which are taken by artisanal and subsistence sectors,6 fisheries provide a vital source of income for 3.5% of the world’s population,7 half of them women working throughout the value chain.8 Fisheries also contribute to household and community resilience, as people experiencing hardships such as armed conflicts or natural disasters are likely to engage or increase their engagement in fisheries, in search of food or to compensate for the loss of income and livelihood.9

Dyhia Belhabib

Faced by competition and overcapacity10 and driven by the search for profits11 or short-term incentives to bring back a catch,12 many individuals, fishing vessels, and

Nautical Crime Investigation Services,

companies are committing fisheries-related offences, including legally criminal practices.

Ecotrust Canada

Illegal fishing is one of the most challenging issues global oceans are facing today.

Estimated a decade ago as inducing annual losses of about US$23 billion,13 illegal

Africa, illegal fishing generates losses of income and jobs to some 300,000 people.30

fishing contributes to the downward trend in stock status,14 with increased risk of stock

In addition to the potential loss of deeply rooted values, such as communities’ social

collapse and species extinction, reshaped marine food webs, and reduction of climate

cohesion and coastal stewardship,31 illegal fishing and other fisheries-related crimes

resilience for both fish stocks and fishing communities.15 Illegal fishing exacerbates

generate international and inter-sectoral maritime conflicts.32 Illegal fishing can also

the impacts of overfishing, which is already responsible for a loss of up to 36% of the

undermine willingness to operate sustainably when faced with competition from illegal

fishing operations.33 Poverty and lack of alternative livelihoods for fishers reinforce

world’s landed catch.

he most notorious fisheries-related offences include illegal fishing, waste dumping,

incentives to engage in criminal activities such as illicit drug trade,34 or increase

and the trafficking of people, weapons, and drugs, but also include slavery and piracy.

vulnerability to predatory practices such as human trafficking and forced labor.35 These

In addition, fraudulent and semi-legal practices such as flags of convenience and

economic and social impacts have ancillary implications linked to reduced public

legal loopholes, enable the flaunting of environmental regulations, abuse of workers,

spending in healthcare, education, infrastructure, and climate resilience, and increased

and evasion of taxation and liabilities. The costs to society and the environment are

risk of conflict and threats to national security.36 Losses are particularly significant in

high, prompting concerns and initiatives that seek to increase awareness, facilitate

low income regions dependent on fish for employment and food security.37

international cooperation, and reduce criminality. Examples include INTERPOL’s

Motivated by high demand for seafood, profit-seeking, and fewer fish,38 illegal

Global Fisheries Enforcement team/Fisheries Crime working group,17 the 2018

fishing accounts for nearly 11 to 26 million tonnes annually, representing a quarter of

Copenhagen Declaration of Ministers on Transnational Organized Crime in the

the annual US$120 billion global landed value of fisheries.39 As a transnational and

Global Fishing Industry,18 the High Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy’s

organized activity,40 illegal fishing potentially lends itself to labor and human rights

report19 on organized crime in fisheries,20 and the Blue Justice Initiative.21

abuses, as well as the trafficking of drugs, migrants, weapons, and wildlife,41 particularly

This article looks into the hidden aspect of transversality22 in fisheries crimes and links illegal fishing to a number of other offences and crimes.

in poorly regulated spaces.42 International attention to maritime crime has increased over the past decade because of growing evidence of the link between illegal fishing and over-exploitation,43 but also because of the success of the operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia,44 and

Impacts of Illegal Fishing and Hidden Fish Crimes

the increased risk of human rights and labor abuse at sea.45 Resolutions by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and the UN Security Council, as well as reports by

As over-exploitation increases fishing costs, poverty among small-scale fishers and 23

the Interpol Fisheries Crime Working Group, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime

Societal

(UNODC), and research institutions,46 have pointed at the co-occurrence of crimes in

and economic losses are far reaching, as illegal fishing results in loss of employment,24

the fishing sector. This concept of transversality embodies the behavior through which

human rights abuses, including slavery aboard ships, become more common. 25

for local communities by

different categories of crimes co-occur in a single event, including fisheries offenses,

which in turn increases fishing costs, and

human rights and labor abuses, and other forms of trafficking and fraudulent practices

In some of the most vulnerable regions of the world, such as West

that provide diversion to detection and sanctioning. These practices include document

economic opportunity,

tax revenue,

and income 28

accentuating over-exploitation of fish stocks, 29

deepens poverty.

forgery, money laundering,47 forced labor, tax fraud, and the use of flags of convenience and tax and regulatory havens.48 Operationally, vessels evade detection and reporting of illegal activities through failing to declare their presence and activities; turning off vessel monitoring systems, radars, and lights; transshipping catch and provisioning at sea; catch misreporting; and fish mislabeling.49 Evasion also frequently includes threats and abuses against official fisheries observers, even cases of murders at sea, with observers lacking adequate protection measures and with abuses being frequently underreported by their own agencies for the sake of protecting vested interests associated with illegal fishing.50 Even when offenses are detected and denounced by mandated agencies, vessel apprehension and accountability are often undermined by bribing and pressure on local authorities, complex corporate ownership networks, multiple jurisdictional layers between vessels and companies, and the acquisition of asset nominees, along with common changes in vessel color, name, and flag state jeopardizing the identification of beneficial owners.51 When enforcement becomes more effective, vessels tend to shift

Fig. 1. Extracted from Belhabib and Le Billon54 - Hotspots of reported fisheriesrelated offenses in the world between 2000 and 2020.

their operations to alternative areas or seek to flaunt regulations - for example, through flagging their vessel and re-registering it or the company as a “domestic” venture, rather than a foreign one, to maintain access to domestic waters,52 or reflagging to a state with lax regulations.53

Transversal Criminality Criminality research has focused in the past decade on the concept of crime linkages in

Data are extracted from the Criminal Record of Fishing Vessels (CRFV), using

investigative contexts of crimes such as sexual assault, burglary, and others, illustrating

exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries. Offenses from the U.S. Pacific Coast and

that accurate crime linkages can help enforcement and surveillance agencies allocate the

Mexico, Northern Russia, and Myanmar were not accessed at the time of this study

proper resources to monitor a sector, deter crime, and save lives.55 Understanding and

because of time constraints or language barriers.

documenting the likelihood of co-occurrence of crimes can improve conceptualization of temporal, geographic, and behavioral patterns. This can lead to better detection and

WCPFC - Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission;

deterrence of crimes. The concept of transversal criminality has broader policy and

IOTC - Indian Ocean Tuna Commission;

practical implications for other sectors. For example, similar behavioral analysis could be

ICCAT - International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas;

used to underpin situations in which illegal logging is linked to corruption and fraud,

IATTC - Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.

which are prevalent in some geographic contexts.56 In the mining sector, the concept of transversal criminality, and its drivers such as profit generation and reduction of costs, can lead to a better understanding of the link between child labor, illegal mining, and

pollution.57

2000 and June 2020 inclusive (thereafter “2020”). Incidents (6853) and associated offenses (7962) involving known fishing vessels (2034), unknown fishing vessels (4019), 58

However,

and fishing companies/individuals not overlapping with the previous vessels (1050) were

regulatory efforts targeting illegal fishing still mostly seek to detect and prosecute

compiled from four main sources: government reports (19%) (e.g. Coast Guards and

fisheries management offenses through vessel monitoring, control, and surveillance

fishery observers), third-party reports (75%) (e.g. Greenpeace and media), automatic

(MCS) and often disregard other types of offenses committed onboard fishing vessels or

identification system (AIS) track overlap analysis (5%) (e.g. Global Fishing Watch),

Many of these offenses have transnational and cross-sectoral dimensions.

In parallel,

and confidential informants (0.3%) (e.g. MCS staff in various countries). Reports were

growing human and drug trafficking interdiction efforts on land and through airports

identified in eight languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Indonesian,

have incentivized criminal logistics networks to turn to the maritime sector, including

Italian, and Portuguese) to reduce an English-bias effect. The study emphasized the

by fishing companies, that are criminal and should be prosecuted as such.

with some small-scale

limitations affecting the identification, reporting, and prosecuting of offenses, such as

fishers being enrolled in illicit drug trade or their boats being bought, stolen, or hijacked

a lack of MCS capacity, confidentiality rules about disclosure (e.g. public reporting

fishing, as a risk-reducing approach to carry out illicit activities, 61

only after successful prosecution), and subjective decisions on the part of enforcement

by drug smuggling cartels.

agencies including as a result of threats (e.g. against fisheries observers), conflicts of interests (e.g. shareholding in company by local officials), or outright bribery. There can be great diversity of reporting level within a government or even specific institutions. For example, in the United States, some National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration programs turn everything over to enforcement, while others make a judgment call at debriefing, with company information often kept confidential, except when cases are finally (though rarely) successfully prosecuted. The study65 also tested the correlation between the level of data reporting (as an indicator of monitoring quality and presence of observers), and the occurrence and origin of offenses, and found no correlation, which further highlights that the

Table 1. Category of crimes and offences – Source: Belhabib and Le Billon62

presence of observers (whose role is to report data) does not necessarily increase crime detection. The authors conducted a regression analysis to see if individual categories of To understand the concept of transversality in fish crimes, and the likelihood of co63

crimes acted differently and affected underreporting practices, and found significant

analyzed

correlations between underreporting and fraud/forgery and fishing-related offenses

which presents a record of observed,

(IUU), indicating a link between low ability to monitor catches with fraud and forgery

interdicted, or absconded events (“incidents”). Each of these events included one or

and fisheries violations. This can be explained by the fact that fisheries observers and

several associated fraudulent or illegal activities (“offenses”), which took place between

their agencies, with the exception of those that fall under regional fisheries management

occurrence of “hidden” crimes in the fishing sector, Belhabib and Le Billion 64

maritime offences extracted from the CRFV,

organization (RFMO) jurisdiction for particular fisheries, do not often report maritime

countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in Southeast Asia. Interviews with Sierra

crimes and illegal fishing because of constraints such as a restriction of their role to

Leone’s officials revealed that the driver of unauthorized fishing by the small-scale

scientific fisheries monitoring, threats of violence by the fishing crew or the company,

sector may be the lack of ability to pay for a fishing licence, the sector remaining mostly

and, in some cases, bribery or pressures from the industry and high-level officials.

The analysis of a sample of 6853 reported offenses linked to fishing vessels and

unregulated. Smuggling, forgery, and fraud constitute less than 3% of all offenses in the artisanal sector.

fishing companies across 18 different offense subcategories falling within three main

Of the 6853 incidents recorded, 6003 incidents (88%) involved fishing vessels

categories (“fishing offenses,” “fraud and diversion offenses,” and “other personal and

caught for a single type of offense: 4954 for illegal fishing; 523 for human rights or

property offenses”; see Table 1), reveals that the most common offenses are:

labor abuse; 309 for smuggling of illicit drugs, arms, or other products; 140 for illegal transshipment; 66 for illegal diversion including noncompliance strategies, forgery, or

• fishing without a license or permit (48% of all offenses);

the illegal use of flags; 12 for violent attacks; and 5 for waste dumping. The remaining

• other fishing offenses (31%) including gear, season- and zone-related,

772 cases of incidents (11%) included at least two types of offenses. Nodes (co-

underreporting, and quota-related offenses;

occurrence of offences) identified from incident reports involved different types of

• human rights and labor abuse (11%);

illegal fishing categories (36% of all existing nodes), co-occurrences of illegal fishing

• illegal transshipment (3%); and

and human rights abuses (38% of all existing nodes) or labor abuses (4% of all existing

• smuggling of drugs, arms, and other goods and products (4%).

nodes). This supports the literature finding strong links between illegal fishing and human rights and labor abuse.67 Illegal fishing is linked to other non–fishing-related

Incidents represent an event where a vessel, company, or individual was caught, and/

offenses in 57% of the cases, with two or more offenses. Illegal fishing events occur

or charged with one or multiple offences. There were 6853 incidents recorded, and

concurrently with non-fishing types of offenses in 12% of incidents involving industrial

nearly 8000 offences. Among offenses for which the sector was disclosed (7166 or 90%

fishing vessels, compared to 2% for artisanal vessels.

of all offenses and 5482 or 80% of all incidents), the artisanal sector ranks first in terms of occurrence with 56% of offenses, followed by the industrial sector with 44%.

The further a flow goes, the higher the interlinkage score, meaning multiple offenses co-occurred in that single incident. Data were extracted from the CRFV. Each black

The industrial sector, however, ranks first in terms of diversity of co-committed

bar is labeled with the corresponding offense category (except for the first bar from

offenses and is dominated by unauthorized fishing offenses (30%) and other fishing

the left relating to the fisheries sectors); the colored flow after each bar documents the

offenses (39%), followed by human rights and labor abuse (13%), fish transshipment

category of that bar. The red shades represent illegal fishing labeled IF and unauthorized

offenses (8%), forgery and fraud (4%), and smuggling (3%), among other offenses. The

offenses; green shades represent transshipment offenses, and purple shades represent

industrial sector also accounted for 91% (789) of the 1300 non–fishing-related offenses

human rights and labor abuse offenses. If a red shade (IF) is followed by a purple shade

identified by sector. Over 90% of all offenses in the artisanal sector are for unauthorized

(human rights and labor abuse), it means that those two offenses were found in a similar

fishing, dominated notably (74%) by a high number of North Korean small-scale

incident.

vessel incursions into the Sea of Japan and small-scale Vietnamese vessels into various

that illegal fishing occurs to maximize benefits, and slavery or slave labor is often driven by the incentive of lowering costs in countries where the monitoring of these activities is limited. The analysis by Belhabib and Le Billon71 shows that cases of slavery on board are notably reported in the territorial waters and EEZs of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, South Africa, and Thailand, with over 291 cases globally where illegal fishing was linked to forced labor. All of these cases occurred on industrial vessels and by their crewing companies, involving either companies or individual recruiters.

Interactions with Smuggling (Drug Trafficking, Weapons Trade, and Other Goods) UNODC has linked illegal fishing to smuggling,72 including drug trafficking.73 The analysis by Belhabib and Le Billon (2022)74 points to 12 co-occurrences, with three main hot spots for drug smuggling, as 23% of all smuggling-related offenses occurred in Fig. 2. Extracted from Belhabib and Le Billion68

- Typology of fisheries offense nodes in the fishing sector between 2000 and 2020 for fishing vessels.

Latin America and the Caribbean (west of FAO area 31), 23% in the Mediterranean Sea [Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) area 37], and 15% in the Arabian Sea and Western Indian Ocean (FAO area 51). We note that co-occurrences

Interactions with Labor Abuses and Slavery at Sea

could be low, as fishers may get involved in both illegal fishing and smuggling but not

Human rights abuses consist of the non observance of human rights, as established

simultaneously (e.g. some Iranian dhows deliver illicit drugs in East Africa and fish

through the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Forced labor

illegally on their way back), MCS may lack the capacity to tackle two different types

is recognized as a type of modern slavery, embedded within a current human rights

of offenses (e.g. narcotics detection), narcotrafficking organizations may use or recruit

crisis. According to the International Labor Organization, forced labor consists of “all

“clean vessels” not involved in fisheries-related offenses to avoid suspicion, and fishers

work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and

trafficking drugs may not illegally fish or avoid it to reduce the risk of getting caught.75

for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”.69 Labor abuses relate

Over 60% of all smuggling offenses were by the artisanal sector, 23% by the industrial

to abuses concerning labor rights and regulations and include all forms of violence,

sector, and the sector for the remaining cases could not be identified.

penalty, excessive overtime, threats, confiscation of documents, sequestration, and other forms of abuse, such as unsafe work conditions. Human rights abuses are linked to

Interactions with Piracy and Violent Attacks

some IUU activities through the drive to maximize profit and minimize costs. Several

Illegal fishing has been linked with piracy but generally in the sense of piracy being the

studies have linked illegal fishing to labor abuses, including slavery.

The hypothesis is

result of illegal fishing76 and possibly reducing illegal (but also legal) fishing through

deterrence,77 rather than illegal fishing vessels also getting involved in piracy and

Interactions with Pollution and Other Environmental Offenses

robbery at sea (including vessel hijacking, kidnapping of crew, and theft). There is

Illegal fishing contributes to environmental degradation in the ocean mostly through

some evidence of opportunistic piracy undertaken by illegal fishing vessels operated by

overfishing and harmful fishing practices, including the use of prohibited gear, as well as

78, 79

especially as vessels involved in both fishing and piracy

“abandoned, lost or otherwise discarded fishing gear”.84 No global study has specifically

extend their range and operate in foreign EEZs without authorization.80 Violent attacks

pointed at the role of illegal fishing in ocean pollution, but considering that illegal

“polycriminal” entrepreneurs

including

fishing accounts for 10% of fishing activities, it could amount to 4.5% of macroplastics

attacks to drive out competing fishing vessels and attacks on enforcement organizations,

at sea.85 The CRFV does not record plastic pollution by fishing vessels, mainly because

such as threats and suspicious disappearances and deaths of fisheries observers.82 Attacks

this form of pollution is not necessarily punishable by law or sanctioned, but waste

involving at least two vessels (one attacker and one attacked) mostly occur off the coast

dumping occurs, including the discharging of oily waste and illegal sewage (six incidents

of East Africa (FAO area 51; 25%), the Gulf of Guinea (FAO area 34; 25%), East and

recorded). Two-thirds of the cases were committed by the industrial sector, and the

Southeast Asia (FAO area 71; 25%), South Mediterranean (17%), and Western Europe

remaining were committed by unknown sectors.

besides piracy are more widely documented and take on different forms,

(8%; FAO area 37). The majority of violent attacks are perpetrated by industrial vessels (83%).

Observer Threats, Harassment, Interference, and Assault

Linkages between Different Categories of Crimes and Offenses

Assault is defined by the International Observer Bill of Rights (IOBR) as any physical or verbal attack and any form of threat to do bodily harm or sexual violence (rape)

Human rights and labor abuse offenses score 1.6 in terms of linkages (meaning that

or attempt to destroy personal or professional property of the observer. The IOBR

vessels reported for these offenses have, on average, 1.6 categories of offenses). Human

defines harassment as an activity (including verbal communication) that “creates an

rights and labor abuse co-occur commonly with transshipment offenses, illegal fishing

intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment, with or without the intention of

offenses, and illegal diversion offenses, such as violent attacks and noncompliance

interfering with the observer’s duties.” This also includes sexual harassment, as defined

offenses. Offenses related to vessels trying to evade sanctioning or interception, such as

by the Alaska Fisheries Science Center (AFSC 2012),

and more subtle forms of

noncompliance, name or identity masking, forgery or fraud, bribery, and corruption,

harassment. Interfering with an observer’s duties includes all physical or nonphysical

occur only 3% of the time; however, they have a linkage score of 2.2 to 2.4. This is not

manipulation that affects the ability of the observer to conduct their duties. It is worth

unexpected given that these types of offenses are committed to evade sanctioning for

noting that this category is difficult to quantify given that many, if not most, observer

another offense. Overall, nearly half of the vessels caught with an offense of human

disappearances and deaths have not been investigated properly and are hence often

rights and labor abuse have committed another offense, typically illegal fishing (86% of

decriminalized with no further actions.

the links) and transshipment (16% of the links), and are also linked to forgery, fraud, smuggling of goods and products, and waste dumping. Only 12% of the vessels listed on CRFV with illegal fishing offenses have links

to other offenses, and 39% of these links are to other fisheries-related illegal fishing

• There should be more systematic collection, sharing, and analysis of offenses

offenses, 34% to human rights and labor abuse, and 4% to transshipment offenses.

among agencies and jurisdictions, while preventing intelligence leaks that could

Over 97% of smuggling offenses are not linked to any other reported offense, which

facilitate offenses.

supports the notion that vessels are either purchased for smuggling purposes, or prefer 86

• Some activities could be decriminalized, particularly in countries with poor

to remain clean to avoid suspicion. Transshipment offenses are linked to other offenses

surveillance and enforcement capacity, to help reduce diversion, facilitate

in 42% of the cases. Transshipment offenses commonly involve reefer vessels; hence,

monitoring, and focus on high-impact offenses.

in 65% of the cases, they do not co-occur with other illegal fishing–related offenses.

• The relative minority of vessels and companies that are currently identified as

However, we find here that in 25% of the cases, illegal transshipment is linked to

responsible for the majority of offenses (20 companies are responsible for 40% of

human rights and labor abuse offenses, including through keeping workers longer at sea

all worldwide offences) should face deeper consequences, including vessel seizures

and preventing them from escaping poor working conditions and/or filing complaints

and jail time for beneficial owners, rather than relatively small fines and sentences

Nearly 20% of transshipment offenses were

only for crew and captains. In addition, accountability mechanisms should be

linked to illegal fishing offenses, by accepting or transshipping illegally caught fish. In 7%

adopted, particularly in cases where third-party individuals and networks are

of the cases, transshipment offenses occurred alongside both illegal fishing and human

involved without the knowledge of the company or the vessel owner.

when reaching nearshore or harbors.

rights or labor abuses at sea.

• Given the overwhelming dominance of industrial fishing vessels associated with transversal criminality, policy and enforcement should direct more effort towards industrial vessels, rather than artisanal fleets. This would help to maximize positive

Conclusions

effects in terms of broad benefits (from healthy fish populations to public revenue and human rights protection), rather than criminalize artisanal fishers at the risk

This short paper summarises how different types of offenses converge, and how fishing

of pushing them further into illegal practices (e.g. drug smuggling).

vessels involved in crime at sea use opportunistic behavior to engage in transversal

• Enforcement agencies should be more transparent about offenses and incriminated

criminality. The types of affinities shown here could be used to enhance technologies

companies (including threats against observers seeking to report offenses), and

meant to detect and predict the occurrence of offenses that are hidden, including illegal

the information should be made available to the public along with stronger

fishing in areas without strong MCS and/or with high human rights and labor abuses.

prosecution to foster greater accountability.

Eight policy implications arise from the study of Belhabib and Le Billon: • Fisheries-related offenses should be addressed in relation to a broader set of criminal practices rather than as an isolated domain, and practices facilitating offenses, such as corruption and diversion, should be more severely sanctioned to make criminal practices harder to perform and more financially risky.

Implementation of the IMO Cape Town Agreement: Spanish Perspective Introduction The CAPFISH project aligns with The Government of Spain’s views, that a joint approach by UN bodies and other stakeholders is necessary to increase the safety of fishing vessels and to prevent illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Furthermore, it fully supports the idea that the entry into force of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 2012 Cape Town Agreement1 will fill a critical gap in the global regulatory framework by mandating minimum safety measures for fishing vessels, and creating a more robust IMO regulatory framework for the safety of fishers and fishing vessels. There is therefore an urgent need for IMO Member States to consider ratifying the Cape Town Agreement as soon as possible. This key international treaty is applicable to large industrial fishing vessels and aims to provide safety standards, just as the SOLAS Convention does for merchant ships. Despite extensive efforts by IMO Member States, other UN agencies, observers, and the IMO Secretariat, the Agreement is not yet in force. As a result, there are as yet no globally mandatory requirements for the design, construction, and equipment of fishing vessels, including lifesaving, fire protection and

Victor Jimenez Fernandez

radio-communications equipment to be carried on board.

Alternate Permanent Representative of Spain to the IMO

Main Features of the Spanish Fishing Industry

largest fishing vessel conference held in the history of IMO, attended by some 125 States, 70 ministerial-level representatives, 30 international organizations, and over 500

In Spain, the fisheries industry is considered a high-profile, highly competitive sector,

delegates. During the Conference, the Torremolinos Declaration4 was signed by 48

with potential for future development, as demonstrated by indicators that have been

States (now 51 States), publicly indicating their determination to ratify the Agreement

developed by PYMAR on the construction of state-of-the-art fishing vessels. Spain is

by 11 October 2022 – the 10th anniversary of its adoption – to enable its entry into

committed to adopting sustainable fishing practices and improvements introduced in

force one year later. As well as taking action to ensure entry into force, States signing

the new EU fisheries policy.

the Torremolinos Declaration pledged to promote the Agreement, recognizing that

The Spanish fisheries industry interacts with a multitude of economic sectors: naval

the ultimate effectiveness of the instrument depends upon widespread adoption by

construction, processing, and commercialization; manufacture of tackle and equipment;

States, in their capacities as flag States, port States and coastal States. By signing the

technological development; stowage; and port activity. Spain is one of the leading

Declaration, the States also denounced the proliferation of IUU fishing, recognizing

producer countries of fish products in the European Union. It is ranked first in the EU

that international safety standards for fishing vessels will provide port States with

in terms of number of jobs and gross added value in the fishing sector. With its long-

a mandatory instrument to carry out safety inspections of fishing vessels, thereby

standing tradition of fishing, Spain is one of the main international actors in the fishing

increasing control and transparency of fishing activities.

and seafood sector.

The Conference further adopted the Torremolinos Statement,5 which highlights the importance of the Cape Town Agreement and the contribution of improved

Spain’s Accession to the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

safety standards to combatting IUU fishing. It calls on States to ratify the Cape Town

Spain acceded to the Cape Town Agreement on fishing vessel safety in February

Agreement; urges States to take action to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing;

2019, significantly boosting the number of vessels needed for its entry into force. The

encourages States to ratify and promote the International Convention on Standards of

accession by Spain to the Cape Town Agreement marked a new period in the drive to

Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F)6 ;

ratify the Agreement, as IMO and Spain agreed at that time to host a conference on

calls upon FAO, ILO, and IMO to continue to work together in the fishing sector; and

fishing vessel safety and IUU fishing. The purpose of the conference was to promote the

requests IMO to continue to provide technical assistance to States who request it in

ratification of the Cape Town Agreement and to deter the proliferation of IUU fishing

order to accede to and implement the Cape Town Agreement.

by establishing international safety standards for fishing vessels.

Joint Efforts towards the Ratification: Guidance to Assist Governments Joint Efforts Towards Ratification of the Cape Town Agreement

In order to promote ratification and uptake of the Cape Town Agreement, it was

The Torremolinos Ministerial Conference on Fishing Vessel Safety and IUU Fishing

recognised by Spain and other relevant stakeholders, such as the Pew Charitable Trusts,

(the Conference) took place in October 2019 and was co-hosted by IMO and the

that States would benefit from a set of guidelines that address issues related to the

Government of Spain, with the kind support of the Food and Agriculture Organization

implementation of the Agreement. Thus, Spain has assumed the coordination of a

of the United Nations (FAO) and the Pew Charitable Trusts. The Conference was the

group of interested parties to develop draft guidance to assist competent authorities in

the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement. The group of interested parties was

competent authorities in the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement, together

working towards the adoption of the above-mentioned guidance by the 106th session

with a work plan to address issues related to the implementation of the Agreement.

of the Maritime Safety Committee in the last quarter of 2022. However, because of the time constraints imposed on IMO meetings by the pandemic, this issue has not been finalised yet.

During the ensuing discussion, the Committee noted the overwhelming support for the proposal to develop guidance, as well as declarations of intent by several delegations

The main tasks of this group are as follows:

regarding accession to the Cape Town Agreement. In this connection, the Committee also noted a statement by the observer from Pew, strongly supporting the development

• Drafting guidance to assist Governments in developing and enacting domestic laws to implement the Cape Town Agreement.

of guidance on the implementation of the Agreement. Consequently, the Committee agreed to include in the biennial agenda of the IMO

• Adopting the guiding principles of the IMO’s III Code and a wide approach

III Sub-Committee for 2022-2023 and the provisional agenda for III 9, an output on

when drafting the guidance, in order to cover all aspects of the implementation of

“development of guidance to assist competent authorities in the implementation of the

the Agreement (Flag State, Coastal State and Port State responsibilities).

Cape Town Agreement of 2012”, with a target completion year of 2024. However, it

• With regards to the scope of the draft guidance, including a description of general aspects, the legal status of the Agreement, and a list of sections and technical

did note that the scope of the guidance should be limited to matters under the purview of the IMO only.

annexes that allow for a better understanding of the Agreement. It is important to highlight that the Cape Town Agreement offers flexibility in terms of implementation, and the draft guidance provides information on those options -

Joint Efforts towards the Ratification: Assembly Resolution A.1161(32).

in particular, those related to progressive implementation, exemptions, surveys, and certification. In this first stage, the draft guidance has been focused on developing

The IMO Assembly met for its 32nd session in December 2021, in remote session,

aspects of the CTA applicable to existing fishing vessels, as this segment of the fishing

and adopted a number of important resolutions, including those covering fishing vessel

fleet requires the most consideration prior to ratification by interested States.

safety. Resolution A.1161(32) on the entry into force and implementation of the 2012 Cape Town Agreement on fishing vessel safety urged Governments that had not yet become parties to the Cape Town Agreement to consider doing so by 11 October 2022,

Development of Guidance to Assist Competent Authorities in the Implementation of the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

the tenth anniversary of the Agreement’s adoption. This was the date for ratification agreed to by those States which had signed the Torremolinos Declaration in 2019. The resolution invited Governments experiencing difficulties in the process of

The 106th session of the Maritime Safety Committee was held from 2 to 11 November

becoming Parties to the Agreement to inform the IMO of the circumstances thereof, so

2022. The Committee considered the proposal to develop guidance in order to assist

that consideration could be given to taking appropriate action in this respect, including

providing necessary technical and legal assistance. It also encouraged Member States with technical and legal expertise on matters relating to fishing vessel safety to provide their expertise to States seeking such assistance. Finally, the resolution recognized the efforts and contributions made by Member States, FAO, ILO, and The Pew Charitable Trusts to support the regional and national seminars and webinars held in all regions of the globe since 2014, on the implementation and ratification of the Agreement, including webinars held during 2020-2021.

Implementation of the 2012 Cape Town Agreement in Spain The forerunners of the Cape Town Agreement – the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels of 1977, and the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol relating to the 1977 Convention – were both complex instruments to implement. The Cape Town Agreement, prepared and adopted under the auspices of IMO following intensive discussions over a five-year period, replaces both the 1977 Torremolinos Convention and the 1993 Protocol with updated provisions that address previously encountered technical and legal difficulties. This paves the way for the entry into force of the Cape Town Agreement. Only minor administrative issues related to certification will have to be addressed by Spain in order to implement the Cape Town Agreement. As a member State of the European Union, Spain has already incorporated and implemented more stringent safety requirements than those in the Cape Town Agreement through national legislation, which brought into force regulations to comply with European Directive 97/10/EC of 11 December 1997. This Directive sets up a harmonized safety regime for fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over. The purpose of the Directive is to lay down safety standards for seagoing fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over, both new and existing, insofar as the Annex to the Torremolinos Protocol (which the Directive is

based upon) applies to the latter. The Directive also applies to vessels flying the flag of a

2012. Online training programmes represent a means of assisting Member States

Member State and registered in the Community, or operating in the internal waters or

in the execution of their obligations and responsibilities under the mandatory IMO

territorial sea of a Member State, or landing their catch in the port of a Member State.

instruments, within the scope of the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme of

However, the uptake and implementation of the Cape Town Agreement remains

the IMO. In this context, the development of these new online training programmes

important to Spain (and States in a similar position), as it will contribute to improved

would provide Member States with more specific support for implementing and

global safety in the fishing industry once it comes into force, including for Spanish

enforcing the requirements of the mandatory IMO instruments.

nationals working on vessels flagged to other States.

The provisional distance training programme for the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement, as set out in Annex 1, is addressed to staff of administrations with management, operational, and inspection responsibilities for fishing vessels. Its objective

Capacity Building Activities: Online Training Programs on the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

is to enable the participants to establish the necessary policies and tools to implement the Agreement and ensure compliance. The online training programmes are supported by the use of the virtual campus of the

The memorandum of understanding on technical cooperation activities signed in

Jovellanos Centre belonging to the Maritime Rescue and Safety Agency.8 This Centre

October 2019 between the Directorate-General of the Merchant Navy of the Kingdom

is a tool that facilitates a real teaching-learning process utilising the distance training

of Spain and the International Maritime Organization (the Memorandum) recognizes

mode. The staff include experts in the subjects being studied, and professionals in

the importance of continuing to support IMO technical cooperation activities through

adult training and distance training (teacher and technical/technological support staff).

developing bilateral knowledge partnership agreements. This is in line with the IMO

The virtual campus is open for extended periods of time, allowing for daily dedicated

Long-term Resource Mobilization Strategy to explore new forms and new areas of

training of one hour, with the possibility of benefitting from one of the advantages of

technical cooperation. At the same time, it establishes the commitment to assisting

distance training – student autonomy and individual learning pace – always under the

governments that lack the technical know-how, experience, and resources to implement

guidance of the expert staff.

IMO standards safely, sustainably, and efficiently. The objectives of the Memorandum are to help countries that need assistance in implementing IMO standards safely, sustainably, and efficiently, and to improve the

Conclusion

implementation of capacity-building activities in order to increase the efficiency of technical cooperation - thus raising awareness of the role played by IMO. During the thirty-first session of the Assembly held in 2019, Spain announced its intention to promote throughout the present biennium, the establishment of a specific

To conclude, it is important to recall the message of IMO secretary General Mr. Kitack Lim on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Cape Town Agreement in October 2022:

training module providing technical and legal assistance to requesting Member States, in order to fulfil their task of ratifying and implementing the Cape Town Agreement

We cannot afford to be complacent when it comes to addressing the safety of fishers and

fishing vessels. To bring this voyage that started over 45 years ago to a successful conclusion, IMO Member States are strongly encouraged to consider ratifying the Agreement as soon as possible. Not only will this finally bring into force an internationally binding safety regime for fishing vessels, it will also contribute to a significant reduction of the exploitation 9

of both the oceans and the people who depend on them”.

SPECIFIC MODULE FOR OPERATIONAL PROFILE MODULE 4. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT 4.1 New and existing ships. Analysis of the application of each chapter. 4.2 Plans, certificates, and documents 4.3 Quickwork, hull and structure. 4.4 Elements and equipment on deck. 4.5 Navigation bridge. 4.6 Engine-room.

ANNEX 1 ONLINE TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CAPE TOWN AGREEMENT 2012 COMMON MODULES FOR AND MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL PROFILES INTRODUCTION: IMO TECHNICAL COOPERATION 1. IMO Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme. 2. Memorandum of understanding on technical cooperation activities between the Kingdom of Spain and IMO. MODULE 1. TECHNICAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES FOR THE RATIFICATION OF THE CAPE TOWN AGREEMENT 2012 1.1 Torremolinos Ministerial Conference 2019. 1.2 Regional training seminars. MODULE 2. CAPE TOWN AGREEMENT 2012. GENERAL 2.1 Status of the Agreement, ratification and entry into force. 2.2 Tools to facilitate its implementation. 2.3 Accident investigation. 2.4 Application: equivalents and progressive implementation. Use of length (L) or tonnage (GT). 2.5 Exemptions, repairs, alterations, modifications. 2.6 Inspection and survey. MODULE 3. STATES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT 3.1 FLAG STATE. 3.1.1 Survey and certification. 3.1.2 Flag State inspectors. 3.1.3 Special control campaigns. 3.2 PORT STATE. 3.2.1 Benefits of the Memorandum in the port State region. 3.2.2 Inspection, no more favourable treatment, corrective action and detention. 3.2.3 Qualification of surveyors. 3.3 COASTAL STATE 3.3.1 Bilateral agreements. Access by foreign vessels to fishery resources. 3.3.2 Responsibilities with international instruments.

Port State Measures by Norway The Importance of Digital Solutions

Introduction Norway considers the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) 1 a milestone achievement in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as this was the first binding international agreement to specifically target IUU fishing by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing from using ports and landing their catches. Following the adoption of the PSMA by the FAO Council in 2009, Norway assessed its national legislation to ensure that the basis for implementation was sufficient and thereafter ratified the Agreement in 2011. At that time, Norway had already been operating a port state control regime within the framework of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) since 2005 and within the frameworks of other RFMOs.

Why was the PSMA Welcomed by Norway? Thord Monsen

Historically vessels flying different flags have operated in marine areas that, as of 1 January 1977, became Norwegian waters by the entry into force of the Norwegian

Head of Strategic Fisheries Compliance Section, Directorate of

Exclusive Economic Zone. This included, from 29 May 1980, the Fisheries Zone

Fisheries Norway

around Jan Mayen, and, from 15 June 1977, the Fisheries Protection Zone around

Svalbard (see map). The tradition of foreign fishing vessels operating in the Norwegian marine areas has been upheld through a series of bilateral and multilateral fisheries agreements that include sharing, access, and exchange arrangements for different joint and exclusive stocks. However, as management measures to reduce overexploitation were introduced, Norway saw an increase in illegal and unreported fisheries in its waters, in particular for cod and haddock in the Barents Sea. In the period from 1990 to 2005 it was calculated that unreported catches of cod reached on average 100 000 tonnes each year and, in some years, up to 150 000 tonnes. This resulted in catches up to 50% above the total allowable catch (TAC). The illegal and unreported activity in Norwegian waters was attributed to foreign vessels, and was often transshipped at sea and thereafter landed in ports in Europe or Africa, making it very difficult to monitor and control this activity in an efficient way. Norway recognized that measures to combat IUU fishing were needed to avoid overexploitation and achieve sustainable management of the wild living marine resources in our waters. To combat IUU fishing, Norway followed different strategies. With the available tools, such as vessel monitoring systems, AIS, presence at sea by the Norwegian Coast Guard, and collecting data during inspections, we monitored, and tried to prevent, illegal activity. However, we soon recognized that we needed more data to succeed. Therefore, we entered bilateral control arrangements with several countries to exchange data on landings of fish caught in Norwegian waters, allowing us to better understand the illegal activity taking place. This made us realize that not only flag States, but also port States, play a vital role in the fight against IUU fishing and that the measures needed could only be achieved through international cooperation. Therefore, we made the strategic choice to actively take part in the international development of port state measures. Norway has been a key player in developing international standards for control in ports as a means of combatting IUU fishing, and thus played an active role in the establishment of the PSMA - politically, technically,

and financially. Norway has also actively contributed to the implementation of the PSMA through participation in relevant RFMOs and has entered into bilateral MCS agreements. At the global level, Norway takes part in the ongoing processes set up by the States parties to the PSMA.

The Legal Framework for Port State Control in Norway The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)2 imposes a duty on port States to take measures to promote the effectiveness of sub-regional, regional, and global conservation and management measures. Although UNFSA applies specifically to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, Norway argues that this duty is a common standard that applies to all fish stocks. Norway considers this a general obligation, independent of whether the port State is a member of a relevant regional fisheries management organization (RFMO) or not. Relevant measures include inspections of documents, fishing gear, and catch on board the vessel. UNFSA further suggests that port States should prohibit landings and transshipments where measures established by an RFMO have been undermined. The Norwegian Marine Resources Act3 provides the legal basis to fulfill the

Figure 2: Pillars of a comprehensive fisheries management regime.

obligations established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)4 and UNFSA, including the authority to control foreign vessels in Norwegian ports and the legal basis to implement the PSMA in Norway. The Marine Resources Act provides a comprehensive regulatory framework for the 5

management of wild living marine resources built on four pillars: research to achieve

The scope of the Act covers the complete value chain, including harvesting of wild living marine resources, transshipment activities, landing of catches, trade, storage, production, and export to the market, and applies to foreign vessels operating in Norwegian waters and calling at Norwegian ports.

knowledge-based management; regulatory measures to manage fishing effort of the

The Directorate of Fisheries, the Norwegian Coast Guard, and sales organizations6

available wild living marine resources; monitoring, control, and surveillance to make

are charged with the authority to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Act, and

sure that the regulatory measures are complied with; and efficient enforcement and

other legislation adopted under the Act. This includes the authority to inspect foreign

sanction measures to deter illegal activity and to give the regulatory measures legitimacy

and national fishing vessels while in port.

(see Figure 2).

The relevant regulations adopted under the Marine Resources Act with regard to port

state measures include:

The Norwegian IUU Regulation lists a number of grounds for which landings and other use of port services in Norwegian ports shall be denied. This includes situations 7

• Regulation of 13 May 1977 No. 2 on foreigners fishing or hunting etc.

where the vessel:

(The Foreign Fishing Regulation) - is carrying catches composed of fish taken in contravention of regulations of • Regulation of 6 August 1993 No. 802 on prohibition on landing of fish and 8

other measures to combat IUU fishing (The IUU Regulation)

RFMOs, including catches taken by citizens from States not party to such organizations; - has engaged in fishing activities substantially in contravention of bilateral fisheries

• Regulation of 31 August 2010 No. 1231 on electronic reporting by foreign fishing vessels operating in the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone,

agreements; - is listed as an IUU-vessel by an RFMO.

territorial waters, fisheries zone around Jan Mayen and fisheries protection zone around Svalbard9 (ERS regulation for foreign fishing vessels) The Marine Resources Act provides the legal basis for measures to combat IUU According to these regulations it is prohibited to land catches in Norwegian ports unless:

fishing: Section 50: Gives the power to prohibit landing of catches from foreign vessels taken in areas beyond Norwegian fishery jurisdiction. This includes prohibiting

- the flag State has confirmed the information provided by the vessel operator;

landing of catches where the flag State on request cannot confirm that the catch

- the Directorate of Fisheries has approved the confirmation by the flag State; and

is taken consistently with a desired harvesting or fishing pattern, or that the

- the estimated time of arrival declared on the port state control form has passed.

catches are not in contravention of rules for fishing activities that have been agreed with another country.

How this works in practice is described in Sections 4 and 5 of the paper.

Section 51: Gives the power to prohibit landings, transshipments, processing,

Norway does not allow transshipments in port as we consider this a landing of catch

provision of port, supply, and support services in Norwegian ports when the

and the procedures, including a requirement to weigh catches and to provide a landing

foreign vessel or its owners or operators have been involved in IUU fishing or the

declaration or sales note, must be followed.

foreign vessel is on the IUU list of an RFMO.

Vessels carrying tuna and tuna-like species are subject to specific port state measures of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). For

Section 52: Gives the power to prohibit activities that undermine national measures or measures adopted through RFMOs to combat IUU fishing.

these vessels, it is prohibited to land, receive, or otherwise use Norwegian ports unless the Directorate of Fisheries has approved the confirmation, and the estimated time of arrival declared on the ICCAT port state control form has passed.

Port State Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels Established by NEAFC In general, and in relation to port state control, NEAFC is by far the most important regional fisheries management organization for Norway as, in practical terms, all foreign fishing vessels seeking access to Norwegian ports are flying the flag of contracting parties (CP) or cooperating non-contracting parties (CNCP) to NEAFC. Hence, CPs, CNCPs, and vessels flying their flag are obliged to comply with the NEAFC port state control measures. Therefore, the NEAFC port state control measures are a significant part of the Norwegian effort to comply with the PSMA and, for practical purposes, the Norwegian port state control system has been tailored mainly to deal with landings and other use of ports from vessels operating in this area. Nevertheless, the Norwegian regime also covers port state control measures in other relevant RFMOs, as well as the PSMA. If a foreign vessel carrying the flag of another flag State is seeking the use of a Norwegian port, those vessels are covered by the Norwegian regulations and will have to fulfill the port state measures. In practice this rarely occurs.

NEAFC Port State Control Measures The NEAFC port state control measures are included in the NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement,10 and the measures apply to all catches taken in the Convention Area (see map) that have previously not been landed. The Convention Area includes both national waters of the contracting parties and the high seas (regulatory area). The NEAFC Scheme is in conformity with the PSMA and, in some regards, the NEAFC port state measures are even stricter. One example is that a flag State confirmation is also required under the NEAFC Scheme before ports can be used and catches landed. However, regarding contracting parties’ vessels, the NEAFC requirements are limited to vessels with catch on board. This means that use of

ports to refuel, for example, or to visit a shipyard due to technical problems, will not trigger

The Electronic Port State Control System for NEAFC

the NEAFC port state measures if the vessel has no catch on board. It should be noted that

The NEAFC port state measures require prior notification of entry into port within set

some European port States also require prior notifications in these cases.

time limits,13 confirmation by the flag State of the vessel,14 and authorization by the

NEAFC allows CNCPs to participate in fishing-related activities (transshipment

port State,15 before catches can be landed or ports used.

activities) in the NEAFC Regulatory Area. The CNCPs must undertake to respect the

To facilitate the handling of these measures, NEAFC has developed an Electronic

provisions of the NEAFC Scheme, and all other recommendations established under

Port State Control System (EPSC). The NEAFC EPSC has been electronic and fully

the Convention, including the port state control measures. They must further confirm

automated since 2013. All vessel operators are required to register online and provide

that they have the means to monitor vessels flying their flag. This is part of an annual

requests for port entry through the electronic system.16 The procedures of the EPSC are

evaluation and application process run by NEAFC. Mirroring this process within

shown in Figure 3.

NEAFC regarding CNCPs, under the Marine Resources Act only vessels flying the flag of CPs or the current CNCPs are allowed to conduct transshipment activities in the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone. Furthermore, the NEAFC measures require the contracting parties to designate ports11 to be used by foreign fishing vessels,12 including information about the minimum notification period. This information is available on the NEAFC website for each of the contracting parties. An example of listing of designated port and notification periods for Norway on the NEAFC website is provided below:

Figure 3: Schematic illustration of the NEAFC EPSC

The EPCS includes the use of a specific port state control form containing three parts: - the prior notification provided by the vessel operator (PSC 1 or 2, Part A) - the flag State Confirmation (PSC 1 or 2, Part B)

- the port State Authorization (PSC 1 or 2, Part C)

The following is an example of a completed Port State Control form (PSC 1), including flag State confirmation and port State authorization PSC 1 form parts A, B

PSC 1 forms are used when fishing vessels seek to use, or land catches in, port, while PSC 2 forms are used by vessels carrying catches transshipped from fishing vessels or other transportation vessels.

and C: All the RFMOs to which Norway is a party have established minimum notification periods. Some RFMOs, like NEAFC, allow for contracting parties to set individual

The complete PSC form is delivered, replied to, and available in the EPSC. All contracting parties can access the PSC 1 and 2 forms for all vessels seeking to utilize the ports of any contracting party. This provides full transparency and traceability of the activity covered by the NEAFC port state measures. When the vessel operator has requested port entry by completing the port state control form (PSC 1 or 2, part A), the Fisheries Monitoring Center (FMC) of the port State is automatically notified that a foreign fishing vessel is seeking entry into its port. At the same time, the FMC of the flag State is notified that the port state control form needs to be confirmed, ensuring that: • the fishing vessel that has declared to have caught the fish had sufficient quota for the species declared; • the quantities on board have been duly reported and taken into account for the calculation of any catch or effort limitations that may be applicable; • the fishing vessel declared to have caught the fish had authorization to fish in the area declared; and • the presence of the fishing vessel in the area where the catch has been declared has been verified according to position data provided by the vessel (VMS data). The port State will assess the information provided by the vessel operator and await the confirmation from the flag State before a final decision is made on whether to authorize or deny the entry of the vessel into its port. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) has established a similar system, but this system is not electronic. NEAFC uses an email system as back-up if the NEAFC website is offline.

notification periods, considering inter alia catch product type, or the distance between the fishing grounds and their ports.

Norway can establish additional conditions for allowing landing and other use of ports. Procedures for how the Directorate of Fisheries shall respond in cases of force majeure

For vessels flagged to a NEAFC CP or CNCP operating in the NEAFC Convention

are described in the MCS manual (see Section 4.4 below). In cases of force majeure,

Area, Norway has established a notification period of 24 hours for vessels carrying frozen

vessels may be exempted from the terms of arrival of the port. The incident must be

catches and four hours for vessels carrying fresh catches. For other vessels, the prior

beyond the control of the fishing vessel. Furthermore, it is required that anyone affected

notification of entry into a Norwegian port must be provided at least three working

by a force majeure situation could not have anticipated the incident and could not

days before the estimated time of arrival. The Norwegian notification periods are set out

reasonably have avoided or overcome the obstacle and its consequences. Fishing vessels

in the Foreign Fishing Regulation. Information on notification periods is published on

affected by force majeure must notify this to the Directorate of Fisheries in due time.

the website of the Directorate of Fisheries, on the website of the relevant RFMOs, and will be provided on request by the FMC.

Inspections As part of the NEAFC regime, inspections can be conducted by authorized contracting

Authorization or Denial

party officials (inspectors) when the vessel is using the port facilities or landing catches

The decision to authorize or deny the entry of a foreign vessel into a Norwegian port is

(see Figure 4).17 In any case, the Marine Resources Act gives the Directorate of Fisheries

made by the Norwegian FMC (open 24/7). When the FMC has authorized an entry

the authority to control foreign fishing vessels when using Norwegian ports.

into port, the inspection service will immediately be informed by receiving a copy of

To secure a level playing field between the NEAFC CPs, it has been agreed that each

the confirmation on e-mail. The vessel operator is notified of the decision made by the

CP shall carry out risk-based inspections of at least 5% of landings or transshipments of

FMC through the NEAFC EPSC.

fresh fish, and at least 7.5% of frozen fish, in its ports during each reporting year. Vessels

If the decision is to deny entry into port, the flag State is automatically notified. Furthermore, if Norway finds that the vessel does not have a valid and applicable

from NEAFC CNCPs are subject to the same port state control measures as the CPs and are also subject to the same inspection benchmarks.

authorization, or receives clear evidence that the fish on board is taken in contravention

The number of landings and inspections is reported annually by each CP in NEAFC,

of applicable requirements of a coastal State, in respect of areas under the national

and the NEAFC Permanent Committee on Monitoring and Compliance (PECMAC)

jurisdiction of that State, the Directorate of Fisheries will contact that coastal State and

provides an annual compliance report where the efforts of the CPs are evaluated.

take appropriate action. In this regard, Norway has entered into several bilateral MCS

Levels of inspections have also been adopted in ICCAT and NAFO - 5% and 15%

agreements that outline the responsibility to share information between the parties.

respectively.

According to Norwegian regulations, the Directorate of Fisheries may, in special

A Norwegian national strategic risk assessment plan for fisheries MCS is adopted

circumstances, allow vessels entry into Norwegian ports even if they do not fulfill the

every year and identifies key priority areas for inspections. This national strategic risk

requirements of the port state measures. It will be under the discretion of the Directorate

assessment includes a chapter on international obligations, where it is established

of Fisheries to consider whether it would be appropriate to allow port entry. In these

that port state control shall be carried out in accordance with applicable international

cases, a follow up or inspection of the vessel will take place in port. Furthermore,

requirements.

In accordance with relevant RFMO schemes, Norwegian authorities may ask a port

the regulations.

State to conduct inspections of Norwegian vessels. Furthermore, most of the bilateral

The MCS manual describes how the port state inspections shall be carried out and

MCS agreements that Norway has with other States provide the opportunity to require

how to enforce certain regulations, such as misreporting of catches, deviation from

inspections of Norwegian vessels if they come into their ports and vice versa.

the prior notification requirement, and deviation from estimated time of arrival. In

Following inspection of a vessel that is subject to NEAFC port state control, a copy 18

of each inspection report (PSC 3 form ) is transmitted without delay to NEAFC and to the flag State of the inspected vessel. Similar procedures for transmitting inspection results have been established in NAFO.

addition, the MCS manual establishes routines for communication and information exchange. These procedures have been developed in conformity with PSMA Annex B, with some exceptions. For example, in port, inspectors do not have the necessary expertise or opportunity to examine fishing gear, due to features of the relevant fishing gear used. Nevertheless, the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Sea Surveillance Service of the Directorate of Fisheries conduct inspections of vessels and their fishing gears at sea. The Directorate of Fisheries has developed an electronic system to fill in the PSC 3 form, and to provide information about findings during inspections to NEAFC and the flag State. This improves the data quality and ensures that the relevant parties are notified about inspections and possible infringements. All inspectors in the Directorate of Fisheries undergo a mandatory training program upon appointment, which makes them qualified to conduct port state inspections. In addition, regular meetings and seminars are held for inspectors for professional updating and exchange of experiences. Furthermore, all inspectors in the Directorate of Fisheries are equipped with ID cards. The card is marked with the logo of the Directorate of Fisheries and contains a

Figure 4: NEAFC EPSC inspections

photo of the inspector, title, name, employee number, and period of validity. According to the MCS manual the inspector shall, prior to inspection, present this ID-card to the

In fulfilling its control and enforcement authority and duties under the Marine

master of the vessel.

Resources Act, the Directorate of Fisheries has created a manual that includes procedures

In accordance with Section 46 of the Marine Resources Act, inspectors shall have

related to port state control (the MCS manual). The purpose of the MCS manual is to

unimpeded and direct access to vessels in the execution of control, and to all relevant

ensure adequate conduct of controls as well as equal treatment. It contains descriptions

documents etc. The inspection always includes a check of the relevant documents and

and explanations of the regulations, definitions of relevant terms, instructions and

areas of the vessel, including to determine any quantity retained, specified by species.

procedures for port state inspections, and guidelines for actions related to violations of

Box 1. Summary of Norwegian Ports to which foreign vessels may request entry.

Norwegian vessels. The Norwegian sanctioning system is designed according to the type and seriousness of the violation, ranging from administrative sanctions, such as

In total Norway has designated 45 ports to which foreign vessels may request

infringement fines, to criminal sanctions, including imprisonment of up to a maximum

entry.

of six years for serious violations.

For 13 of the ports, the Directorate of Fisheries has inspection expertise on the

To deprive offenders of benefits accruing from their illegal activities, catches may be

premises (office).

confiscated. The same applies to gear, objects, property, facilities, or vessels that were

For 31 of the ports, the travel time for inspectors is less than 4 hours. For one of

used in the contravention. Instead of an object, its value may be confiscated wholly or in

the ports, travel time exceeds 4 hours: (6-8 hours).

part from the offender or from those on whose behalf he has acted, or from the owner.

In 2021, about 700 foreign vessels requested entry to Norwegian ports. As

If lawful and unlawful catches have been mixed, the entire catch may be confiscated.

the vessels are required to send a request for port entry and their flag State must confirm the legality of the catch, the entrance of these vessels is closely monitored by Norwegian fisheries authorities. Furthermore, vessels are selected

Other PSMA Requirements

for inspection based on risk assessments. The Directorate of Fisheries has performed NEAFC port state control since

Integration with the Broader System of Port State Controls

2007. Based on resources, experience, incorporated routines, prior notification

In addition to using the EPSC, foreign vessels seeking to enter a Norwegian port

period of entry into port, and a comprehensive risk assessment system, it is

are required to provide notifications to Norwegian government authorities using the

considered that the capacity to conduct inspections pursuant to the PSMA is

internet-based maritime single window reporting system, called SafeSeaNet Norway.19

sufficient.

The system is run by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, and vessels register

Although there is sufficient inspection capacity in place, there have been some

mandatory arrival and departure information, including port arrival notification,

instances where agreed levels of inspections of vessels with frozen fish on board

crew lists, notification of landing of waste, maritime security notification, customs

have not been met.

declarations etc. The relevant information is automatically forwarded to various Norwegian authorities, such as Customs, Defense, Police, and maritime authorities. Furthermore,

Investigation and Sanctions

the Norwegian Maritime Authority has established a regulation on port state control,

Norway only authorizes vessels to operate in areas managed by an RFMO to which it is

which implements relevant IMO requirements. This regulation requires vessels other

a contracting party. Those RFMOs have in place monitoring, control, and surveillance

than fishing vessels to send a declaration of actual time of arrival in port, no later than

requirements, as well as port control measures. Any serious violation by Norwegian

one hour after arrival in port, and actual time of exit, no later than one hour after

vessels will be acted upon expeditiously.

leaving port. This information is shared in the SafeSeaNet system. The Directorate of

Both administrative and criminal sanctions are applicable to non-compliance by

Fisheries can access the system to seek information regarding vessels and use the system

to monitor carrier vessels. Furthermore, Norway is a party to the European Economic Area (EEA) and has implemented the food safety requirements of the European Union, including the system of veterinary border inspection posts (BIP). The purpose of this system is to prevent the spread of contagious animal diseases to the EEA and ensure that imported foods are safe for human consumption. This system requires that food of animal origin, including frozen fish, is controlled at one of the designated BIPs before import into the EEA. Hence, when designating ports for foreign landings, this is considered by Norwegian authorities. Consequently, vessels flagged to a State which is not part of this system are only permitted to land frozen catch in designated BIP ports.

Integration with Other PSMA Measures Following a fishing conflict in the Barents Sea, Norway established a system of blacklisting fishing vessels as early as 1994, and this is still in operation. It was amended in 1999 to include vessels on IUU vessel lists of RFMOs. All blacklisted vessels are perpetually prohibited from entering Norwegian ports, operating in Norwegian waters, and will not be entitled to fly the Norwegian flag, irrespective of changes in ownership. Furthermore, the port state measures are integrated with the electronic catch and activity data reporting requirements, which are applicable when a foreign fishing vessel carrying fish is requesting access to a Norwegian port or transshipping in Norwegian waters (see the ERS regulation for foreign fishing vessels).

National Information Exchange Regarding exchange of information, Section 49 of the Marine Resources Act provides that, notwithstanding confidentiality requirements, personnel from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, and the Directorate of Fisheries may provide other supervisory authorities, the Police, or the Prosecuting Authority, with any information naturally relating to their duties under that Act. Furthermore, the duty of confidentiality that applies to personnel in other supervisory authorities, the Police Authority, and the

Prosecuting Authority, does not prevent them from disclosing such information to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, or to the Directorate of Fisheries. There is close cooperation between the Directorate of Fisheries, the Coast Guard, and

PSMA Article 6.1 also requires Parties to exchange information with FAO. Information regarding the Norwegian contact point and a list of designated ports have been submitted to FAO.

the fishermen’s sales organizations, which have been delegated public authority by law to carry out MCS activities in close cooperation with other control authorities. Each year a National Strategic Risk Assessment Plan is developed in cooperation between the three

Conclusion

authorities, which also cooperate on operational risk assessments. There is also close cooperation between the Directorate of Fisheries and the tax and

The introduction of port state measures in Norway and, in particular, within the

customs authorities. Furthermore, there is cooperation between the fisheries authorities

framework of NEAFC, has proven to be a success. The most important lesson we bring

and the Food Safety Authorities, the Norwegian Coastal Administration, the Norwegian

forward is that, to combat illegal fishing and crime in the fisheries sector, international

Metrology Services, the Police, the Public Prosecutor, and several other government

cooperation is required.

agencies.

External Information Exchange All RFMOs to which Norway is a member have adopted port state measures. Norway has actively contributed, and continues to contribute, to the development and improvement of these measures, through participation in the RFMOs. Information relevant for the functioning of the port state measures is exchanged through the information mechanisms set up by the respective RFMOs and published on their websites. This includes information on designated ports, national contact points, and information on minimum notification periods. In addition, Norway has entered into several bilateral MCS agreements that, amongst other benefits, provide the opportunity to exchange landing data and conduct coordinated inspections of Norwegian vessels in foreign ports. Such agreements have been concluded with Canada, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Morocco, and Russia. In addition, Norway has a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Union, and several agreements have been made with Member States in the European Union in accordance with the MoU. These are Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

FAO Port State Measures Agreement Implementation of Port State Inspection (PSI) in Republic of Korea Over View of PSI The IPOA-IUU (International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing)1 was adopted in 2001 to effectively deal with illegal fishing worldwide, leading to the creation of NPOAs (National Plans of Action) by many countries around the world. The Republic of Korea started developing its NPOA in 2005, in accordance with the IPOA-IUU. After going through a number of revisions, Korea’s NPOA was finalized in 2016 and the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)2 was ratified in the same year. The National Fishery Products Quality Management Service (NFQS) of the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) of the Republic of Korea requires vessels which load fish overseas and enter Korean ports, to submit entry notification 48 hours before coming into port. NFQS inspectors then conduct inspections on selected vessels among them.

Minjae Park

Implementation Status of PSI

Implementation of Port State Inspection (PSI) in the Republic of

The NFQS has performed port inspections on vessels carrying some fish species

Korea

managed by regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) since 2010 –

specifically toothfish, which is under the management of CCAMLR. Since 2014,

High

Risk

Low

however, every vessel that has fish on it should be inspected under Korea’s port inspection regime, which means that Korea has become a country that implements

Risk Level

complete port inspection for species managed by RFMOs.

Flag State

3 over

2.99~2.8

2.79~2.6

2.59~2.4

2.39~2.1

2.09~2

2under

Species

Tooth fish BFT SBT Shark

Kill King Crab Snow Crab

Giant Squid Longneck BET croaker YFT Bobo croaker Billfish Saury

Mackerel

Others

Fishing area

CCAMLR CCSBT ICCAT

WCPFC IATTC IOTC

SPRFMO

Russia

Western Africa

NPFC

Other High Seas

Vessel type

Carrier

Others

Record of entry & inspection

Record of inspection denial

No record of entry & inspection

Record of entry/No inspection

Record of entry & inspection

Year

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Port Entry

2125

2134

2229

2504

2109

PSI

165 (4)

178 (5)

178

207 (1)

198 (1)

(Container)

PSI rate

7.8

8.3

(-)

7.9

8.3

9.4

In the past, only 5% of the fishing vessels coming into Korean ports were inspected. However, we are now aiming for a 50% vessel inspection rate. Currently, 36% of the vessels entering Korean ports are from Russia. Under the Agreement Between the

Shrimp (from

Russia) Horse Mackerel

Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Preventing IUU Fishing of Living Marine Resources, 3 Korea’s

As a result, the NFQS demands catch certificates for containers that carry eight fish

inspection powers were strengthened for Russian vessels loading king crab and snow

species - including Russian snow crab, king crab, Southern bluefin tuna, bluefin tuna,

crab. Thus, 65% of inspected vessels are Russian vessels. In the interim, Korea’s

toothfish, longneck croaker, Bobo croaker, and pacific saury - 48 hours before entry into

competent authorities realized that not just specific countries’ vessels but also high-risk

port.

vessels (in terms of IUU fishing) should be focused on for inspection purposes. Hence,

Once the vessel comes into port, NFQS inspectors board it and check the vessel’s

we put in place an evaluation scheme that prioritizes vessels to be inspected. The scheme

catch certificate. If the vessel does not have a catch certificate or its certificate has

identifies IUU fishing-prone vessels following an IUU fishing risk assessment, based

problems, the inspectors check and send back the containers.

on information of entry notification. In contrast to many other countries, the Korean

Thus, domestic regulations in Korea are much stricter than CMM measures in the

government also carries out port inspection on containers. In fact, conservation and

PSMA. This shows the effort the government of Korea is making to prevent the inflow

management measures (CMMs) in the PSMA and RFMO management schemes do

of illegal vessels and illegally-caught fish.

not include inspection of containers. However, illegally-caught fish often enter countries through containers, and the international community has pointed out that this is an oversight and a problem when seeking to tackle IUU fishing effectively.

Conclusion and Prospects for PSI As mentioned, Korea has plans to increase the inspection rate for vessels coming into our ports from 5% to 50%. As a leader in the fight against IUU fishing, Korea also works hand-in-hand with FAO to implement the PSMA and deter IUU fishing. We are working to establish training centers for port inspectors from developing countries in order to share our experience and know-how on port inspection. Korea is trying its best to be exemplary when it comes to port inspection, which is an effective management measure aimed at the sustainable use and conservation of marine resources on Earth.

Progressing the Implementation of International Instruments to Combat IUU Fishing: The South African Regime

Introduction South Africa is bordered by the ocean on three sides - east, south and west. The South African coastline is vast, covering over 3000 KM. The country has more ocean space than land. Yet, despite having this massive ocean space, the country has not benefitted from it economically as it should. The South African government has embarked on a mission to rectify that, by unlocking the country’s ocean economy through initiatives such as Operation Phakisa1 and the Comprehensive Maritime Transport Policy.2 South Africa has indicated that it wants to position itself as a major maritime Authority by 2030 and has endeavoured to ratify international Conventions and become a leader in the maritime sphere in Africa. To achieve this 2030 target, South Africa has ratified and become a party to the ILO Work in Fishing Convention No. 188 (C188),3 the IMO Cape Town Agreement (CTA),4 the IMO International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F),5 and the FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA).6 This paper will unpack the South African efforts to give effect to these Conventions,

Selwyn Bailey

in an effort to contribute towards the global fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

Fishing Unit (Southern Region), SAMSA, Republic of South Africa

fide fishers are removed by IUU fishing, which can lead to the collapse of local fisheries, with small-scale fisheries in developing countries proving particularly vulnerable. Products derived from IUU fishing can find their way into overseas trade markets thus throttling local food supply. IUU fishing therefore threatens livelihoods, exacerbates poverty, and 7

augments food insecurity.

IUU fishing vessels and their operational activities are usually associated with:

South Africa hosting nations from Southeast Asia

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Sub-standard vessel construction

Poor Living Conditions

IUU fishing is a significant problem. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO): Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains one of the greatest threats to marine ecosystems due to its potent ability to undermine national and regional efforts to manage fisheries sustainably as well as endeavours to conserve marine biodiversity. IUU fishing takes advantage of corrupt administrations and exploits weak management regimes, in particular those of developing countries lacking the capacity and resources for effective monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS). IUU fishing is found in all types and dimensions of fisheries; it occurs both on the high seas and in areas within national

Illegal Fishing Practices

jurisdiction, it concerns all aspects and stages of the capture and utilisation of fish, and it may sometimes be associated with organized crime. Fisheries resources available to bona

Unsafe Working Conditions

It is therefore in the interest of all fishing nations to join efforts in combatting this scourge, and ratify and effectively implement the United Nations Agencies’ international instruments.

United Nations Agency Collaboration to Combat IUU Fishing The safety of fishermen and fishing vessels forms an integral part of the UN’s mandate, and the IMO, FAO, and ILO collaborate on these issues. These Agencies have adopted four mandatory main instruments and several non-mandatory instruments to address IUU fishing and related matters, including poor safety and working conditions

FAO – PSMA to prevent illegally caught fish entering markets;

on fishing vessels.

ILO – C188 for decent working and living conditions for all fishers.

• The safety of fishermen and fishing vessels forms an integral part of the UN’s mandate.

Wider ratification of the above instruments will effectively minimise the opportunities available to errant operators, and will lead to the UN Agencies better

• IMO, FAO and ILO collaborate to combat IUU fishing.

achieving their individual and collective mandates to ensure safer vessels, protected

• The Agencies have adopted four mandatory main instruments and several non-

ecosystems, and decent labour conditions for all fishers.

mandatory instruments. Mandatory instruments adopted by the UN Agencies to combat IUU fishing

South African Mandates

include: The South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) was established on the 1st of

IMO – CTA for the safety of fishing vessels;

April 1998 under the SAMSA Act 5 of 1998.8 SAMSA’s mandate includes: ensuring

IMO – STCW-F for standards of training for fishing personnel;

safety of life and property at sea, preventing and combatting pollution from ships in the

International Instruments: Safety of Fishing Vessels

marine environment, and promoting the Republic’s maritime interests. SAMSA has also been charged with responsibility for executing the following:

The CTA includes mandatory international requirements for stability, construction, • Administration of the Merchant Shipping (National Small Vessel Safety) 9

and associated seaworthiness of fishing vessels of 24 metres in length and over, as well as

Regulations (the Regulations). The Regulations extend SAMSA’s core mandate

requirements for life-saving appliances, communications equipment and fire protection.

to include inland waterways within the Republic. This mandate covers only

In order for the CTA to enter into force, it must be ratified by at least 22 countries

waterways accessible to the public to ensure boating safety. SAMSA is charged

with a combined fleet of 3,600 fishing vessels of 24 metres in length or over. Once that

with ensuring the effective implementation of the Regulations countrywide.

happens, fishers would be legally entitled to the same level of protection at sea that is

• Implementing and executing the Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of vessels along the South African coastline. This long-range vessel monitoring

enjoyed by merchant seafarers. To date, the CTA has been ratified by 17 states with 1,925 fishing vessels declared.11

system assists in securing South Africa’s coastal waters in the midst of rising

South Africa ratified the CTA in 2012. At the same time, it set out to draft

lawlessness at sea, with particular reference to the worrying scourge of pirate

regulations to give full effect to Articles 25-28 and ANNEX III of the C188

attacks along the east coast of Africa.

Convention, which deal primarily with crew accommodation. It is important to give effect to these Conventions simultaneously, as both deal with construction of fishing

Section 23 of the South African Constitution reads “Everyone has the right to

vessels. While the CTA requires that a vessel be built according to certain specifications

fair labour practices. Every worker has the right to form and join a trade union; to

for safety purposes, C188 requires that vessels have sufficient space to accommodate

participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and to strike.”

In line with these mandates, and recognising the benefits of the United Nations

decent living and working conditions onboard. Both of these issues should be dealt with when constructing new vessels.

Agencies’ mandatory instruments for their local fishing industry, as well as the

Ratifying the CTA thus gave South Africa the opportunity to modify the outdated

protection they offer to visiting fishers working onboard foreign flagged vessels, South

Regulations for Crew Accommodation and bring the inspection regime into the 21st

Africa set out to ratify or become a party to all four instruments and introduce measures

Century. South Africa currently uses the Construction Regulations, 1968 and the Crew

to effectively carry out the associated responsibilities.

Accommodation Regulations, 1968 to give interim effect to the requirements of the

In this regard, the administration of the safety of small commercial fishing vessels under the Regulations, plays an important role in the overall protection of fisher’s rights to decent work. Furthermore, the promotion and constant monitoring of safety in boating in South Africa remains one of the critical developmental aspects of the

CTA, until such time as it enters into force and the new Regulations (discussed below) are promulgated. South Africa drafted two new sets of regulations to comply with the CTA once it enters into force:

country’s marine and maritime environments, with the 2020 launch of the Regulations underscoring this effort.

1. Construction and Safety Equipment of Fishing Vessels over 24m. 2. Construction and Safety Equipment of Fishing Vessels under 24m but over 25

Gross Tons. Both sets of Regulations were reviewed by a SAMSA Workgroup in May/June 2022, before being published for a 30-day public comment period in October 2022. Thereafter, SAMSA workshopped the proposed Regulations with the fishing industry in November 2022 and allowed an additional 60 days for comments from the industry. Once the Regulations are promulgated, SAMSA will amend its safety survey checklist to reflect these Regulations, and the fishing industry will be expected to comply with the new provisions.

International Instruments: Safe Manning The STCW-F was adopted by IMO in 1995. The 1995 STCW-F Convention is a binding treaty that sets certification and minimum training requirements for crews

Minimum manning standards set with issuing of Minimum Manning Documents

of seagoing fishing vessels with the aim of promoting the safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine environment, taking into account the unique nature of the fishing industry and the fishing working environment.

International Instruments: Regulated Fishing

South Africa ratified the STCW-F Convention in 2015, although Regulations to give effect to the Convention were promulgated in 2013. These Regulations12 were amended

The PSMA entered into force on 5 June 2016. The PSMA is the first binding

in 2021 to correct some inconsistencies and incorrect references.

international agreement to target illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

South African fishers holding Certificates of Qualifications or Certificates of

According to the FAO, the PSMA’s objective is to:

Proficiencies, are currently converting their previous qualifications into STCW-F aligned qualifications. South Africa either needs to amend the principal Act or wait

prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing

for the Merchant Shipping Amendment Bill to be promulgated to give effect to

from using ports and landing their catches. In this way, the PSMA reduces the incentive of

the STCW-F Convention, in order to issue STCW-F qualifications. The Merchant

such vessels to continue to operate while it also blocks fishery products derived from IUU

Shipping Amendment Bill was passed by the South African Cabinet and the responsible

fishing from reaching national and international markets.

minister published his intention to introduce the Bill to parliament in the 2022/2023 period via Merchant Shipping Notice 1373.13

The South African Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Environment (DFFE) is

the department responsible for implementing the PSMA in South Africa and is the focal point for all permissions and inspections of foreign flagged vessels wishing to enter South African ports. The DFFE is an active participant in the FAO’s Global Record system,15 which compiles information on vessels involved in fishing operations, and has provided data on all South African fishing vessels over 25 Gross Tons to this system. DFFE can access the Global Record and available data on all fishing vessels in the system in order to make informed decisions when contemplating permission to enter South African ports.

International Instruments: Decent Work Labour inspections on fishing vessels

C188 came into force on 16 November 2017 after being ratified by ten ILO member states. It is applicable to all types of commercial fishing and establishes minimum standards that protect fishers in all aspects of their work. Broadly, it sets international standards for:

It also aims to ensure that fishing vessels are constructed and maintained so that fishers have decent living conditions on board. South Africa has workshopped the requirements of the Convention with all social partners during stakeholder engagements since 2012. The SAMSA Fishing Unit chairs

• Safety on board fishing vessels;

the National Fishing Forum, which is attended by industry representatives from all

• Food, accommodation and medical care at sea;

sectors of the fishing industry, as well as other relevant stakeholders. This forum seeks to

• Employment practices, insurance and liability.

identify industry challenges and to facilitate dialogue between role-players. In 2013, South Africa’s Minister of Labour ratified the Convention and appointed

The Convention aims to ensure that fishers:

SAMSA as the Competent Authority to carry out labour inspections of flag state fishing vessels. In 2014 South Africa presented a Gap Analysis to the ILO, and in 2015 set out

• Have improved occupational safety, and health and medical care at sea, and that sick or injured fishers receive care ashore;

to amend the Merchant Shipping Act16 to close regulatory gaps identified. In addition to the Regulations created to give effect to the CTA, which also cover

• Receive sufficient rest for their health and safety;

Articles 25-28 and Annex III of C188, two sets of regulations were subsequently drafted

• Have the protection of a written work agreement;

to ensure that South Africa implemented the requirements of C188 fully, namely:

• Have the same social security protection as other workers.

1. Seafarer Insurance Regulations. 2. Small Vessel Medical Examination Regulations. South Africa also introduced labour inspection items that will be inspected during mandatory safety surveys. It then set about training all the SAMSA Technical Surveyors to effectively carry out C188 labour inspections. The training of our surveyors is an ongoing process, which is evident in the below report published on the SAMSA website17 : South Africa’s fight against forced labour in the country’s fishing sector is entering an entirely new sharp-edged phase, featuring a broad front of several government departments, all with the goal of eliminating poor employment practices that denude fishermen of their

An onboard fishing vessel C188 convention inspection being conducted by SAMSA surveyors on a foreign vessel in Cape Town.

basic right to dignity of employment. This is according to the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) on review of

the fight is shaping up neatly for a broad sweep in the country’s commercial fishing sector

its performance to date with the implementation of the International Labour Organisation

to spot and eliminate poor labour practices, but particularly forced labour.

(ILO) Work-In-Fishing Convention, 2007 (C188) which South Africa ratified in 2013

In sharpening the edge of the weaponry in the battle against forced labour, SAMSA is being

and put into effect eight years later – in the process becoming the first country globally to

joined by several other State departments, among them the Department of Employment

implement Port State Control Inspections of Foreign Flagged vessels under Convention

and Labour, the Department of Fisheries, Forestry and Environment, Home Affairs

188.

(Immigration), the South African Revenue Services and other agencies.

The news comes in the wake of a July 2022 training session in Cape Town involving

The battle is focused on not only South African fishing vessels, as international vessels

SAMSA, the ILO, several South African State departments and other agencies, as well as

operating on South African waters will also be thoroughly scanned and inspected consistent

private sector law practitioners.

with the ILO C188 convention and related international and domestic instruments.

The training session was to both evaluate the country’s progress and discuss challenges associated with the implementation of the C188 convention, as well as to extend ILO

Despite the fact that training is an ongoing process, South Africa had established a

training to both SAMSA surveyors and other State officials on identification of forced

flag state regime complying with safety standards, as well as the C188 requirements,

labour practices in the fishing sector.

by early 2017. At this stage, inspectors were already being trained on aspects of port

According to SAMSA, now with an army of about a dozen fully trained surveyors on Port

state control under C188 in preparation for the Convention entering into force. The

State Control and the ILO C188 convention’s Forced Labour Indicators, as well as a set of

Convention entered into force in November 2017 and South Africa carried out its first

three new regulations about to be passed, to bring to full effect related domestic legislation,

port state control inspection of a foreign flagged fishing vessel on 17th December 2017.

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with regard to the payment of fees and taking out of loans, obtaining appropriate training or certifications and obtaining the appropriate travel or identity documentation. Once on board, migrant fishers may find that the conditions of employment are vastly different to what they had expected, or that their employment contract is not respected or substituted. Migrant fishers are vulnerable to trafficking and forced labour, due to the relative isolation 18

of their workplace and the transnational nature of commercial fishing operations.

SAMSA inspectors on the bridge of a Japanese vessel / Inspection of accommodation.

Trafficking of workers into fishing has emerged as an issue in Southeast Asia’s fishing and seafood industry in recent years. This is particularly true for major seafood and fish exporting nations, including Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and the

International Collaboration

Philippines. The need to ensure decent work for fishers has thus become a regional concern for Southeast Asia. In this regard, Thailand ratified C188 in 2019, and

South Africa has ratified and effectively implemented the requirements of C188. It

Indonesia and the Philippines have initiated national processes as a precursor to the

is also a signatory to the PSMA, which strengthens port controls to prevent illegally-

ratification of C188.19

caught fish from entering the global market, and the CTA, which outlines safety

As South Africa has ratified C188, and was the first country in the world to

standards for fishing vessels and details regulations that Parties to the Agreement must

commence port state control inspections and the first country to implement port state

adopt to protect fishing crews. South Africa is therefore strategically positioned as a

control inspections of foreign flagged fishing vessels, SAMSA was requested to host

source of information and a guide to our counterparts both on the continent and, in

a workshop for these three Southeast Asian Administrations to supply guidance and

some cases, globally. As South Africa has effectively implemented a flag State regime as

demonstrate the implementation of the Convention.

well as a port State inspection regime for C188 compliance, it is often called on by the

The participants were as follows:

ILO to share its experiences with other states. According to the ILO:

• South Africa (SAMSA); • Labour Inspectorates from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines;

Fishing is recognized as a hazardous occupation. Working and living conditions on board

• Apostleship of the Sea;

fishing vessels can be dangerous, and capture fisheries have a relatively high incidence of

• Fishing Industry Bargaining Council;

occupational injuries and fatalities. Workers in commercial fishing operations commonly

• Food and Allied Workers Union;

face long working hours, dangerous weather conditions, limited protection from

• International Labour Organisation;

occupational hazards, cramped living quarters, and are remote from help. Migrant fishers

• Fishing industry employers (Irvin and Johnson, Blue Continent Products, Sea

face additional challenges, including during the recruitment and placement process, such as

102

Harvest and Lucky Star).

103

SAMSA presented and discussed the road to ratification and implementation of C188, including practical demonstrations of flag State inspections and assisting the visiting delegation with suggestions on how to address their respective challenges for practical implementation of the requirements of the Convention. The Southeast Asian delegations left South Africa armed with practical examples of the implementation of C188. C188 came into force in Thailand on 30th January 2020, and the Philippines and Indonesia are in the process of aligning their national regulations and inspection regimes to move towards ratification of the Convention. On their departure from South Africa, the delegates – among them senior government officials at ministerial and director level, as well as ILO officials – stated that they had learned much about the implementation of the ILO’s C188. They also felt that South Africa’s leadership in this regard, and partnership going forward, were crucial to the success of their own endeavours to ensure the implementation of C188 in their own countries, and the safety and security of their fishers. SHARING KNOWLEDGE: Some of the international delegates from three Southeast Asian countries who visited South Africa for a workshop on the C188, conducted by SAMSA at the request of the ILO in Cape Town. The photo was taken during their visit to fishing group I&J at the port of Cape Town on Wednesday 28 August 2019.

Conclusion The paper has discussed the South African contribution to the fight against IUU fishing, by explaining efforts to ratify and give effect to the four mandatory international instruments set up to address this problem. It also shares practical examples for State Parties that are in the process of either ratifying these agreements or seeking examples of good implementation practices.

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The Implementation of the PSMA in the Philippines

Introduction In the Philippines, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains one of the most serious barriers to sustainable fisheries. The Philippines has enacted the Fisheries Code of 1998 (as amended by Republic Act No. 10654), entitled, “An Act to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing”.1 According to this code, Illegal fishing refers to fishing practices that violate applicable rules and regulations, including international treaties and conventions. Unreported fishing, on the other hand, refers to actions that have not been reported or have been misreported to the relevant national authority or regional organization in violation of applicable rules and regulations. Unregulated fishing implies fishing in areas or for fish species where conservation or management procedures do not exist. The United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has developed international instruments to address IUU fishing. In 2009, the FAO approved The Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) as the world’s first legally binding international treaty specifically aimed at preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing.2 The PSMA came into force on June 5, 2016 and has since been ratified by over 74 States.

Marilyn Jaal Philippine Coast Guard and World Maritime University

Its main goal is to stop IUU fishing by making it impossible for illegal fishing vessels to use ports and bring in their catch. Effective implementation of the PSMA will help fight illegal fishing cost-effectively and efficiently, protect the livelihoods of legal

107

fishers, strengthen flag states’ control over their fishing vessels, encourage practical cooperation and information sharing between coastal states, flag states, and regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements (RFMO/As), stop “ports of noncompliance”, and contribute to more sustainable fisheries. In 2018, the Philippines acceded to the PSMA, but so far there is little information on how the PSMA is being implemented in the Philippines. This article aims to fill this gap in the literature. It outlines the maritime context and importance of fisheries to the Philippines prior to examining the challenges that IUU fishing poses for the Philippines, as well as the Philippines’ efforts to combat IUU fishing. In particular, the paper undertakes an evaluation of the critical provisions of the PSMA and examines how prepared the Philippines is to implement it in practice, including challenges the country faces. The research draws on primary data collected from informants from government agencies in the Philippines, including the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, the Philippine Coast Guard, and the Philippine Fisheries Development Authority.

Figure 1. Major Fish Ports in the Philippines Source: http://www.seafdec.org/country-fisheries-trade-philippines/ (PFDA website, 2019)

Case Study: the Philippines

households.6 With an estimated yearly fish catch of 4.65 million metric tons, it is one of the top fishing nations in the world, contributing about $4.33 billion to the country’s

The Philippine Geographical and Marine Features

GDP.7

The Philippines is a Southeast Asian archipelago positioned between the South China

The eight major fish ports in the Philippines overseen by the Philippine Fisheries

Sea and the larger Pacific Ocean. It is made up of 7,641 islands, with a coastline length

Development Authority (PFDA) are shown in Figure 1. Only the General Santos Fish

of 36,289 kilometers, a land area of 300,000 square kilometers, and a total marine

Port Complex (GSFPC) and the Davao Fish Port Complex (DFPC) serve international

area of 2,200,000 square kilometers, including the Exclusive Economic Zone. The Philippines is also located within the coral triangle, which has been identified as the 4

fishing vessels. According to the PFDA, the GSFPC is the second largest fish port in the Philippines,

world’s center of tropical marine biodiversity. The country’s fishing industry brings

and known as the “Tuna Capital of the Philippines”, due to its continued leadership in

in between 1.5 and 1.7 percent of the country’s GDP and employs about 1.6 million

fish landing volume - where yellowfin tuna and tuna-like species are dominant. It is also

people.

Fisheries are important to food security in the Philippines, accounting for an average of 13% of food expenditure and 39% of protein consumption among Filipino

108

home to six tuna canning operations in the Philippines, as General Santos City is close to tuna-rich fishing regions in the Sulu Sea, Moro Gulf, and the Celebes Sea. The DFPC is the second major fish port complex established and located in the

109

Mindanao area, next to the General Santos Fish Port Complex (Figure 1). Based on

Management Plan. In addition to developing national policy, BFAR has the authority

the PFDA reports, DFPC serves as a center for the collection, processing, storage, and

to use specific powers that could help fight IUU fishing, such as outlawing IUU fishing

packaging of fishery and other marine products for distribution to domestic and export

practices, implementing all laws and guidelines on the preservation and management

markets, and is an alternative transshipment port in the Asia-Pacific Region, especially

of fisheries resources, and imposing administrative fines against fisheries violations. The

for long-line foreign fishing vessels.

Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, as updated by Republic Act No. 10654, gives BFAR

IUU fishing represents both a major global challenge and a high priority for the Philippines specifically. It is one of the government’s primary concerns at present. Based

the power to do several things to close legal and policy gaps in the Philippines and fight IUU fishing effectively.

on a joint report of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), USAID,

The Philippine government has made a long-standing commitment to fighting

and the University of Rhode Island, the impacts of IUU fishing in the Philippines have

IUU fishing. The Philippine Fisheries Code serves as the legislative framework for the

been estimated as follows:

government since its approval on February 27, 2015. This Code aims to stop IUU fishing in Philippine waters, including waterways over which the Philippines has

a) Illegal fishing by both municipal and commercial fisheries was estimated to be 27-

sovereignty and jurisdiction; namely the country’s 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic

40% of Philippine capture fisheries production in 2019, with an estimated value

Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf; all aquatic and fishing resources (whether in inland,

of 42-63 billion Philippine Pesos.

coastal, or offshore fishing regions, including, but not limited to, fishponds, fish pens/

b) Unreported catch by commercial fishers ranges from 274,000 to 422,000 metric

cages); and all land designated for aquaculture.

tons per year. c) Unregistered fishing vessels are estimated to be as many as 1,600 to 2,700.

The Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) The PDFA is a government organization that works directly with the Department of Agriculture (DA). It was established to support the expansion of the fishing sector

Government Agencies with a Role in Tackling IUU Fishing

by offering post-harvest infrastructure facilities, such as fish ports, fish markets, and necessary services that facilitate the handling, distribution, and improvement of the

Several key government agencies in the Philippines have various direct responsibilities for combatting IUU fishing. Three of these agencies are considered crucially important organizations - the BFAR, PFDA, and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).

quality of fish and fishery products.8 Currently, the PFDA operates three fundamental programs: Regional Fish Ports (RFPP), Municipal Fish Ports (MFPP), and the Ice Plants and Cold Storage Programme (IPCSP). The RFPP mandates the establishment and operation of fish port complexes

The Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)

in strategic fish landing centers throughout the Philippines. Breakwaters, landing quays,

The BFAR, which is part of the Department of Agriculture, may adopt policies

market halls, refrigeration and processing facilities, slipways, and other structures are

and regulations required to carry out its objectives, such as Fisheries Administrative

present in these ports. The MFPP, on the other hand, addresses the post-harvest needs

Orders, the Draft Philippine National Plan of Action-IUU, and the Philippine Tuna

of subsistence fishermen, which include smaller fish landings and market facilities in

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selected fishing zones. Additionally, several fishing centers provide ice plants and cold 9

storage.

If implemented properly, the agreement has the potential to aid in the long-term preservation and sustainable use of the marine ecosystem. However, for the agreement

The PFDA in charge of port facilities may also provide BFAR with information

to be effective, it must be accompanied by a thorough implementation toolkit that

on suspected IUU fishing vessels in ports. In addition, through its legal duties and

recognizes and addresses the capacity requirements of the implementing states. Under

programs, the PFDA can raise awareness among producers, brokers, processors, retailers,

the terms of the agreement, states should conduct routine inspections, international

fishing vessels need special docking clearance, and networks for exchanging information

and consumers about the problems of doing business with illegal fishermen.

should be built.14

The Philippine Coast Guard

Port state measures are instruments or requirements enacted by port states that

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has the mandate (in coordination with the BFAR),

foreign fishing vessels must adhere to in order to access their ports. These typically

to enforce fishing and other related laws within the Philippines’ maritime jurisdiction.

include provisions for advance port entry notification, the use of designated ports, limits

Accordingly, the PCG helps prevent and suppress illegal fishing or violations of fishing

on fish landing and transshipment, rules about supplies, documentation requirements,

regulations, unlawful harvesting of corals and other marine products, illegal entry, and

and port inspections, in addition to actions such as listing IUU vessels and imposing

violations of other maritime laws that may occur within the maritime jurisdiction of the

trade-related sanctions.15

Philippines.11

Under the PSMA, the role of the port state in curbing IUU fishing is as follows:’

In this regard, the BFAR has an existing agreement with the PCG to provide the manning needed for BFAR vessels engaged in anti-illegal fishing operations and patrols

• Port officials evaluate the vessel’s report and all other available information to

within the Philippine maritime jurisdiction. This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

assess if the vessel may have engaged in IUU fishing or fishing-related activities

improves, and makes more efficient and effective, fishing and marine regulations,

supporting IUU fishing, before deciding whether to permit or deny the vessel’s

especially those that deal with the management, conservation, development, and

admission into port.

preservation of the country’s maritime environment, fisheries, and aquatic resources.

• If the vessel is permitted to enter the port, the port state will have authority over it. • A vessel shall not be allowed to land or transship its catch or use the port’s facilities

THE PSMA

if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel has engaged in IUU fishing when it arrives.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization approved the PSMA in 2009

• The vessel must be denied permission to land or transship its catch and use the

as the first binding agreement to combat IUU fishing. The Agreement came into force

port under the following circumstances:

on June 5, 2016, and its primary objective is to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU

1) If the port state determines that a vessel does not have a valid flag state or

fishing by stopping illegal fishing vessels from using ports and landing their catch.

12 13

By doing so, it aims to prevent unlawfully caught fish from reaching global markets.

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coastal state permit to engage in fishing or fishing-related activities. 2) If the port state receives evidence that the fish onboard was taken in violation of

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coastal state requirements. 3) If the flag state does not confirm that the fish onboard was caught legally within

2022 in English and Filipino (Tagalog dialect), and typically ran from 45 minutes to one hour.

a reasonable time. • When the crew’s health or the safety of the vessel is in danger, a vessel cannot be denied access to port services.

Results

Human resource capacity requirements are also critical for effective PSMA implementation, including a sufficiently staffed, well-trained, and well-informed inspectorate operationally integrated with other MCS components; systematic exchange of information and intelligence amongst national agencies involved in various elements of MCS, such as port inspections; and regional and worldwide information-sharing platforms.16

Aims and Scope This paper assesses the Philippine government’s preparation for implementing the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The author conducted semi-structured online interviews with relevant respondents, with the objective of analyzing the Philippine government’s readiness to implement the PSMA and provide recommendations on how to improve implementation. The researcher interviewed seventeen members of the Philippine Coast Guard assigned to the Maritime Safety units in Manila, Davao, and General Santos. The senior administrative Officer and the PSMA focal person represented the PFDA, while the Fisheries Regulatory Management and Enforcement Officers, legal advisor, and the PSMA focal person represented the BFAR. The respondents were chosen based on their competence in their respective roles and their close involvement in the development and execution of the PSMA in the Philippines. By examining and evaluating these government institutions, the author confirmed the existence of gaps and obstacles in preparation for the PSMA’s implementation. The interviews were held in July-August

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After all interviews were transcribed, the following recurring themes emerged.

Agency Roles, Regulations, and Legal Obligations Respondents recognized and acknowledged the government’s efforts to combat IUU

• Awareness of the existence of IUU fishing;

fishing in the Philippines. The current policy is outlined in the Philippine Fishery Law

• Agency roles, regulations and legal obligations;

of 1998, as revised by Republic Act Number 10654. It directs the BFAR to protect all

• Education and training (capacity building program);

fisheries and aquatic resources, as well as to prevent, detect, and eliminate IUU fishing

• Readiness evaluation;

(R4). Since the PSMA is a fishery matter, the BFAR is the designated government lead

• Benefits of implementing PSMA.

agency responsible for the implementation of this agreement, in collaboration with other government agencies. In addition to this, R2 mentioned the creation of the One

Awareness of the Existence of IUU Fishing

Stop Action Center (OSAC) to effectively implement the provisions of the PSMA.

All 17 respondents were aware that IUU fishing occurs in the Philippines. Specifically,

OSAC will be a multi-agency government center where the main jobs are boarding

R2 acknowledged the efforts made by the Philippine government to suppress

and inspection, processing documents for fishery products that will be landed in the

illegal fishing and its existence in the country. However, the harm caused by illegal,

Philippines and shipped to foreign markets, and processing other necessary documents

unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is frightening not only for the environment

for foreign fishing vessels coming into and leaving the country. OSAC will mainly focus

but also for the socioeconomic aspect of the community (R6). Additionally, R3 stated

on implementing the PSMA.

that, “Identifying the exact data of IUU fishing is difficult to crack because even the

Moreover, as stated by R14, “the PCG’s role is to assist in the enforcement of

entire world finds it challenging.” However, because the activity is clandestine, it isn’t

fisheries and other laws on the marine jurisdiction of the Philippines based on RA

easy to assess, and you must investigate the entire supply chain. ”

9993.” R7 also mentioned that, “the PCG maintains its role in combating IUU fishing

While the actual scope and scale of IUU fishing in the Philippines is difficult to

by conducting continuous Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MSC) operations

evaluate, it can be estimated based on submitted records of fishing vessel apprehensions.

onboard PCG and BFAR vessels. ” As mentioned, the PCG and BFAR have signed

IUU fishing impacts fish stocks, and contributes to the destruction of the marine

an MOA to improve the enforcement of maritime and fisheries laws, including the

ecosystem. As R5 stated, “I cannot provide specific data on IUU fishing in the

manning of BFAR vessels by PCG personnel.

Philippines, but I have personally witnessed the devastation caused by poachers, such as

Similarly, fishing ports are essential to the requirements mentioned in the PSMA

the destruction of coral reefs and the capturing of huge clams, particularly in the West

implementation provision. The PFDA will play a big part in providing standard

Philippine Sea or the South China Sea. I had the opportunity to board a Philippine

fishing ports for this purpose. As mentioned by R1, “the wharves that are intended

Coast Guard vessel and undertake patrol in the aforementioned area. ” Furthermore, and

for foreign fishing vessels are International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) accredited

based on the author’s personal experience as a member of the Philippine Coast Guard,

ports ”. The PFDA is the port authority in charge of the Davao and General Santos

Philippine commercial fishing vessels have been caught fishing in regions designated

Fish Port Complexes and the Philippines’ other six major ports. These two ports were

as protected zones and during closed fishing seasons (e.g. Sardine Closed Season in the

initially considered potential destinations for foreign fishing vessels. According to R3,

Zamboanga Peninsula).

Davao and General Santos City are crucial locations since the fishing grounds are in

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the southern Philippines, Papua New Guinea, and the Central and Western Pacific Areas. Furthermore, the PFDA will be in charge of providing the office for OSAC that will be established for the designated agencies participating in PSMA implementation. However, funding for this purpose is yet to be provided. On the other hand, the BFAR, as the lead agency responsible for implementing the PSMA, initiated an MOA to establish a shared understanding and effective coordination with all government agencies engaged in executing the PSMA. R4 has been waiting for the acceptance of this MOA to have easy collaborative activities with other agencies, but it is yet to be signed off. He said, “The challenge right now is for the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be signed and approved by the various government agencies engaged in the execution of PSMA, and the preparations will be placed on hold for the time being, but we will be resolved sooner or later.”

Education and Training (Capacity Building Program) The PSMA is a new policy implemented in the Philippines acceded to in 2018. FAOPhilippines has been providing technical support to implement related instruments and tools with other international partners, including the EU Commission, Singapore ABA, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in Bangkok under the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), and the United States Department of State - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (US-INL). As discussed by R1 and R4, the capacity building provided includes courses on Fisheries Enforcement and Prosecution, and Boarding Inspections, which are a necessary and important part of human resources capacity. However, the above trainings focus on legal aspects or formulating rules and regulations. These trainings are significant but it is also necessary to conduct training on actual boarding procedures. Additionally, eight of the seventeen individuals interviewed stated that they had not yet received any PSMA-related training or capacitybuilding efforts. Some of the reasons stated by respondents included the unanticipated

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Coronavirus Disease (COVID) 19 outbreak, a change in administration, and the fact

new to their respective workplaces and that no PSMA briefing has been provided.

that implementation of the PSMA is still in its early stages, making it a less immediate priority for the government. As R6 and R15 mentioned, “PSMA is less a government

priority for now, especially given that all department heads are going through transitions

Discussion

as a result of the new administration. There are more issues that require immediate attention, such as internal problems”, and “most PSMA planning is being delayed due

The primary purpose in undertaking this research was to ascertain the preparedness

to the COVID-19 outbreak ”.

of the government of the Philippines to implement the PSMA to curb IUU fishing. Accordingly, the paper has focused on the three government agencies responsible for

Readiness Evaluation

executing the provisions of the PSMA, namely the BFAR, the PDFA, and the PCG.

Readiness evaluation in implementing the PSMA was one of the themes highlighted in

Key themes were identified in the preceding section and these themes provide the

the interviews. R5 and R6 mentioned the importance of creating a manual of operations

framework for analysis in the sections that follow.

to provide guidance for each agency in performing their functions correctly, as well as the development of a standard operating procedure that specifies the detailed procedures

Awareness of the Existence of IUU Fishing

that must be followed to implement the PSMA, in order to assist personnel in carrying

In the Philippines, the threat posed by IUU fishing is clear. There are reports of

out routine operations. It was also suggested that each agency concerned should form a

foreign-flagged fishing vessels that have landed illegal catches in the Philippines.17

committee focusing on the implementation of the PSMA, so that nothing is overlooked

This is a concern not only for the fishing industry, but also for the economy and the

prior to implementation; similarly, if anything needs to change or develop during

environment. Everyone who took part in the interviews acknowledged that illegal

implementation, this committee would make the required adjustments.

fishing activities exist in the country and cause harm. As mentioned by a number of respondents, there are severe identifiable impacts on the environment, and that if these

Benefits of Implementing the PSMA

activities are not addressed, the environment will not recover and the marine ecosystem

The PSMA has not yet been fully implemented in the Philippines, but some respondents

as a whole will be degraded. With this clear understanding, the concerned organizations

stated their strong support for the legislation and provided specifics on the benefits they

can strengthen existing policies to curb, if not completely stop, these illegal activities.

anticipate if it is effectively implemented. “The successful execution of the PSMA may

Awareness is also crucial and directly related to education and communicating the value

secure the livelihoods of our legal fishermen,” said R10, and “the implementation of the

of a conservation approach.18

PSMA will stimulate effective cooperation with other RFMOs,” said R5. However, the majority of respondents are unsure of their position because gaps and

Agency roles, Regulations, and Legal Obligations

difficulties cannot be identified until the PSMA is put into practice. In addition, seven

The BFAR, the lead agency, initiated a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to

respondents said that they learnt about the PSMA for the first time while taking the

facilitate sharing of information amongst the various government entities involved in

online survey. Two respondents claimed that the PSMA is new to them because they are

the implementation of the PSMA. As of the time that the interviews were conducted,

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however, the MOA had not yet been executed and was pending approval from the

the concerned agencies. R6 mentioned that, “due to COVID Pandemic, most of the

agencies involved. The approval of this MOA can be regarded as one of the key initial

preparation slow down. The SOPs are still in the process ”.

steps required to build internal cooperation to prevent duplication of effort, avoid 19

conflicts, and mitigate risk between parties.

The government has already designated dedicated fishing ports intended for foreign fishing vessels – the DFPC and the GSFPC. This is an important step, meeting one of

A further development designed to enhance inter-agency cooperation, as mentioned

the requirements of implementing the PSMA.

by R2, is that the government plans to create a One-Stop-Action Center (OSAC)

Lastly, capacity building is essential to the personnel enforcing the laws. Based on the

comprised of the different agencies involved in implementing PSMA, and headed by

interviews, half of the respondents have yet to receive important training while others

the BFAR. This issue was supported under Section 8, Chapter II of the Philippine

who attended such training will need refresher courses. It also appears that the level of

National Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) 267. However, the funding to be used is

capacity varies between agencies. Based on the statement of R6, “on BFAR side, we are

still awaiting approval and, thus, the OSAC is still in the planning stage.

ready. Our inspectors are trained but we are still in the process of collaborating with other agencies. ”

Education and Training (Capacity Building Program)

Based on the PEW Report on Capacity Needs Assessment, (2017), implementing

Capacity building entails enhancing human resource capabilities, improving technology, 20

the PSMA requires specific training for senior fisheries and port-management staff, as

Fisheries

well as legal drafters, fisheries inspectors, MCS personnel and lawyers/judges (human

Enforcement and Prosecution, and Boarding Inspections are two of the training courses

resources capacity). Institutional capacity specifically requires the establishment of

provided by international entities to the personnel involved in implementing PSMA.

adequately implemented port state measures, trained inspectors, information exchange

providing financial resources, and administrative and management capacity.

and monitoring systems, and appropriate management measures that are tailored to

Readiness Evaluation

international and domestic laws.

PSMA adoption in the Philippines is still in its early stages. Thus, interviewing the

Requirements for the effective and successful implementation of the PSMA must be

involved individuals or organizations is one of the processes necessary to assess their

properly identified. For example, the specific functions of all concerned government

preparedness, based on regulatory documents, laws, and capacity building (training), as

entities must be understood to prevent duplication of tasks. Similarly, documentation

well as the strong rapport between the implementing agencies. A lack of evaluation or

required to prove legal compliance should be identified. In summary, the Philippines

insufficient coordination is likely to result in confusion and poor implementation.

Based on the data provided by respondents, the Philippine government agencies

needs to invest more time and resources in many aspects of PSMA implementation if this is to be effective.

appear to be partially prepared to implement the PSMA. First, there are already laws in place, like the Fisheries Administrative Order No. 26722 and the Philippine Fishery

Benefits of Implementing the PSMA

Code of 1998. However, some national legal documents, such as a manual of operations

During the interviews, some respondents identified benefits of implementing the

indicating the functions of each government agency, and a standard operating procedure

PSMA. Firstly, it can serve as a deterrent to IUU fishing. Apart from its obligation as

(SOP) setting out day-to-day activities, will need to be formulated in coordination with

a port State to turn away vessels involved in IUU fishing, the Philippines also bears

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responsibility as a flag State for its fishing vessels that land catches in other nations

preparedness. The government should therefore increase its organizational capacity,

who are also parties to the PSMA. Secondly, it will encourage effective cooperation

which includes human resource capacity and institutional capacity.

and collaboration with RFMOs in denying illegal fishing vessel actions. Thirdly, it

Human resource capacity consists of senior fisheries, port management, and legal

will protect the livelihoods of legal fishermen. Finally, it is important to recognize that

drafting personnel who understand the provisions of international fishing agreements

the PSMA is a tool to combat IUU fishing that will contribute to the development of

and can incorporate them into national laws and regulations. Fisheries inspectors should

national fishery laws.

be acquainted with pertinent PSMA rules and trained in boarding and inspection

Strengthening the efforts of the agencies concerned is necessary to achieve these ideals, as IUU fishing activities will continue unless good governance is established.

procedures. Additionally, training to keep up with the latest information technology trends is vital.

However, seven respondents honestly acknowledged that they had no awareness of the

Institutional capacity emphasizes the legal authority of a state to establish explicit

PSMA, and two of them mentioned that they had only recently been appointed to their

instructions consistent with applicable domestic and international law; it includes

current positions and that there had not yet been a PSMA briefing.

the formulation of a manual of operations, which is based on the PSMA provisions that establish implementation guidelines and protocols, as well as SOPs that outline the specific guidelines, instructions, and routine tasks of each agency involved in the

Conclusion

implementation of the PSMA. The creation of these legal documents would enhance cooperation, reduce confusion, and prevent duplication of roles and obligations among

In the Philippines, PSMA implementation has remained in its infancy since accession

agencies implementing the PSMA.

on May 18, 2018. Although the government acted immediately after its accession,

In short, the implementation of the PSMA in the Philippines requires leadership

unexpected events, like the COVID-19 outbreak and a change of administration, have

stability at this early stage, as well as the establishment of an environment for

delayed the government’s readiness.

collaboration and cooperation among the government entities involved, knowledge

Appropriate regulation, supervision, and evaluation are essential for the long-

management, and organizational learning.

term viability of the PSMA in the Philippines. However, compliance with PSMA implementation standards has proved to be a challenge. In order to successfully implement the PSMA and contribute to global efforts to address the problem of IUU fishing, there is an urgent need to foster good coordination and shared understanding among government institutions. Furthermore, and as this paper has shown, there should be more emphasis on developing agency capability and creating the necessary legal documents. In regard to readiness evaluation, capacity building was determined to have a modest level of

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PART 2

The History and Role of the FAO in Combatting IUU Fishing

The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures

Gaps in the Fight The Global Against IUU Fishing

Problem of IUU Fishing and the Role of the UN Agencies in the Fight Against It

The ILO’s Role in the Fight against IUU Fishing and the Work in Fishing Convention (C188)

The IMO’s Role in the Fight Against IUU Fishing and the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

PART 1

Uncertain Maritime Limits, Overlapping Maritime Claims and IUU Fishing Introduction In recent decades, claims to maritime jurisdiction have advanced significantly offshore. These expansive maritime claims are constrained by the zonal framework for maritime jurisdiction laid out under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 However, the proximity of coastal States to one another has led to a proliferation of overlapping maritime claims, many of which have yet to be resolved. The precise limits of maritime claims of coastal States with respect to their maritime neighbours is often left unclear, meaning that extent of areas of overlapping maritime claims and potential disputed waters is also left uncertain. This is despite States parties to UNCLOS being under a series of obligations to deposit geographical information with the United Nations Secretary-General to clarify the location of their baselines, the outer limits to their maritime zones, and maritime boundaries. Such lack of transparency and certainty over the limits of national claims to maritime jurisdiction, and thus overlapping maritime claims is highly problematic in the context of the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In particular, this lack of maritime jurisdictional clarity raises doubts over the first ‘I’ in IUU, that is,

Clive Schofield Professor, World Maritime University

in which coastal State’s maritime zone fishing activity is taking place and whether such fishing is illegal or not. This undermines and frustrates efforts to combat IUU fishing. For example, it has been observed that the international plan of action against IUU

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fishing (IPOA-IUU)2 “presupposes that the boundaries of all coastal states’ waters are

series of national zones of maritime jurisdiction, each with a distinct balance of rights

clearly defined and given due publicity to other states and fishers” and this is clearly

and obligations related to them, measured offshore from baselines along the coast. Here

not the case. Further, uncertainty over the legality or otherwise of fishing activity

it should be recalled that, prior to the advent of UNCLOS, consensus was lacking on

tends to lead to unregulated and unreported fishing. This scenario also compromises

the breadth of the territorial sea and the limits of the continental shelf were profoundly

joint enforcement efforts between coastal States and flag States or port States, as well as

unclear, whilst the concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) had yet to be

complicating cooperative efforts to manage and conserve transboundary stocks.

introduced.

This paper first explores the extension of maritime claims under the international law

In accordance with UNCLOS, coastal States can claim a territorial sea out to

of the sea and the increasing number and scope of areas of overlapping maritime claims,

a maximum limit of 12 nautical miles (M), a contiguous zone out to 24 M, and

frequently of uncertain dimensions. Consequently, the paper outlines the obligations

an EEZ out to 200 M – all measured from baselines along the coast. Additionally,

of States Parties to UNCLOS regarding the location of their baselines, limits, and

the provisions for the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf were

boundaries. Progress in the division of such overlapping maritime claims through

substantially amended, providing a complex formula for determining such limits where

maritime boundary delimitation is then summarised and the obligations of States in areas of overlapping maritime claims assessed. Concluding thoughts are then offered.

The Law of the Sea and Maritime Claims UNCLOS provides the international legal framework governing claims to maritime jurisdiction. UNCLOS has achieved near universal acceptance with, at the time of writing, 168 parties, comprising 167 States plus the European Union. This is especially impressive when we recall that only 152 of the 193 United Nations member States are coastal States. Accordingly, UNCLOS can be viewed as representative of customary international law applicable to baselines, the delineation of maritime zones and limits, and the delimitation of maritime boundaries between coastal States. On this point it is pertinent to note that the United States, which is the primary maritime State that is not a party to UNCLOS, has taken the view that “the general practice of States reflects acceptance as international law of the non-seabed parts of the LOS Convention.”5 A key achievement of UNCLOS was the realisation of a clear spatial framework for the limits to national claims to maritime jurisdiction. The Convention provides for a

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Figure 1. Schematic of Baselines and Maritime Claims of a Coastal State 6 Source : Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana

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the continental shelf extends beyond 200 M from baselines along the coast (Figure 1). The introduction of the EEZ concept, in particular, represented an enormous extension of coastal State jurisdiction over fishing activity. Indeed, the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated in 1984, shortly after UNCLOS was opened for signature, that fully 90% of marine fish and shellfish were caught within 200 M of the coast.7

Overlapping Maritime Claims and Progress in Maritime Delimitation Coastal States have not been slow to advance expansive claims to maritime jurisdiction. The vast majority of coastal States claim the full breadth of maritime claims provided for under UNCLOS. The advance of such broad yet ill-defined claims to maritime

Figure 2. Key Elements in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries8 Source : Clive Schofield and I Made Andi Arsana

jurisdiction, coupled with the proximity of coastal States to one another, has the practical consequence of a proliferation of overlapping maritime claims and, inevitably,

these agreements which are actually in force is 240 (52.8 percent of the number of

disputes.

potential maritime boundaries).9

Wherever the maritime claims of neighbouring States overlap, a potential maritime

There are, however, important caveats related to these figures. For example, many of

boundary situation exists. Thus, countries whose coastlines are up to 400 M apart from

these existing delimitation lines are partial, either in terms of their length, or because

one another may now require an EEZ boundary to be delimited between them (see

they predate the advent of the EEZ, or the delimitation line has been agreed in a

Figure 2). Further, with respect to extended continental shelf rights, states sharing a

piecemeal fashion and resolved one sector or step at a time.

potential boundary may be even further separated from each other. Further, regarding

Further, these figures do not include boundaries in the Caspian Sea or potential

progress in maritime boundary delimitation globally, each inter-State maritime

maritime delimitations with respect to extended continental shelf rights. Submissions

boundary relationship can be viewed as one potential maritime boundary, even if it

to the relevant UN scientific and technical body, the Commission on the Limits of

may be composed of multiple distinct segments. That is, for example, Canada and the

the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding delineation of outer continental shelf limits

United States of America are considered as one maritime boundary rather than four

seawards of 200 M EEZ areas, are estimated to encompass vast areas of continental

geographically distinct maritime boundaries. On this basis, the number of potential

shelf, of the order of 37 million km2.10 Around 3.3 million km2 of this area is subject to

maritime boundaries within 200 M limits globally has been calculated to be 454, of

overlapping submissions, and therefore large overlapping claims areas located seawards

which 277 (61 per cent) have been at least partially agreed. However, the number of

of 200 M limits.11

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Maritime Boundary Delimitation

In order to achieve delimitation of the continental shelf and/or EEZ in accordance with UNCLOS, a theoretically limitless list of potentially relevant circumstances needs

As noted above, the vast majority of coastal States are parties to UNCLOS, which

to be taken into consideration in the delimitation equation in order to reach the goal

therefore represents the international law applicable to the delineation of maritime

of an equitable result. Nonetheless, it has become abundantly clear from the practice of

claims and delimitation of maritime boundaries between States, where such claims

coastal States, allied to the rulings of international courts and tribunals, that geography,

overlap with one another. Thus, if there is less than 24 M of opposing coastlines

and particularly coastal geography, has a critical role in the delimitation of maritime

a potential territorial sea boundary will exist, while if coastal States coastlines are

boundaries. Aspects of coastal geography that have proved especially influential include:

within 400 M of one another a potential EEZ boundary will arise. In relation to the

the configuration of the coasts under consideration, the relative coastal length, and the

delimitation of the territorial sea, Article 15 of UNCLOS applies and offers a clear

potential impact of outstanding geographical features, notably islands.14

preference for the use of an equidistance or median line. This does not apply, however,

Despite, as noted above, the lack of clear guidance for the delimitation of,

if the states concerned agree to the contrary or there exists an “historic title or other

particularly, continental shelf and EEZ boundaries under UNCLOS, it is notable

special circumstances” in the area to be delimited, which justify a departure from the

that equidistance has found enduring popularity as a method of delimitation in State

equidistance line.

practice.15 Further, there has been a distinct shift in recent jurisprudence towards the

Under the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, delimitation was also to be effected by the use of median lines unless, similarly, an agreement to the contrary

of an equidistance-based line as a provisional delimitation line.

However,

This approach was clearly articulated in the 2009 Judgment in the Black Sea Case16

the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, Articles 74 and 83 dealing with delimitation

between Romania and Ukraine. At the first stage, a provisional delimitation line should

of the continental shelf and EEZ respectively, merely provide, in identical general

be established using geometrically objective methods, “unless there are compelling

terms, that agreements should be reached on the basis of international law in order to

reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular case”.17 At the second stage, an

achieve “an equitable solution”, with no preferred method of delimitation indicated.

assessment should be made as to “whether there are factors calling for the adjustment

While this provides for substantial flexibility in ocean boundary-making, the lack of

or shifting of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result”.18

guidance offered by the provisions of UNCLOS dealing with EEZ and continental

At the third stage, verification of the resulting potential delimitation line is undertaken

shelf boundary delimitation also affords great scope for conflicting interpretation and

through what the Court termed a “disproportionality test”.19

or “special circumstances” existed that justified an alternative approach.

application of a three-stage approach, the first stage of which involves the construction

dispute. Here it can be observed that the delimitation provisions of UNCLOS were

All subsequent international cases involving maritime boundary delimitation have

among the last elements of the package deal to be agreed on, and the general wording

similarly applied this three-stage approach to maritime delimitation. These have

used was a means to overcome disagreement on a contentious issue. Indeed, as the

included cases before the ICJ, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),

Arbitral Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration noted in reference to the drafting of

and international arbitral tribunals.20 Efforts towards the settlement of overlapping

Article 83, this was “a last minute endeavour…to get agreement on a very controversial

claims to maritime space through the delimitation of maritime boundaries before an

matter”, and therefore, “consciously designed to decide as little as possible.”

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international arbitral tribunal, ITLOS, or the ICJ are therefore highly likely to involve

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the three-step approach to ocean boundary-making.

coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (emphasis added).

Determining and Publicising the Location of Baselines, Maritime Limits and Maritime Boundaries and IUU Fishing

Here it can be observed that, while there is no equivalent requirement to publicise the location of normal baselines coinciding with the low-water line along the coast. However, this arguably occurs when the coastal State officially recognizes relevant charts

The delineation of the outer limits of zones of maritime jurisdiction and, where

in keeping with UNCLOS, Article 5.

such claims overlap with those of a neighbouring State, the delimitation of maritime

Similarly, Article 47(7) of UNCLOS, which deals with archipelagic baselines,

boundaries, delivers clarity and transparency to marine users, including fishers. Put

states in analogous terms that, where archipelagic baselines are drawn in accordance

another way, if the coastal State clarifies the extent of its maritime jurisdiction, it follows

with Article 47 of UNCLOS, such baselines “shall be shown on charts of a scale or

that fishers can determine whether their fishing activities are located within claimed

scales adequate for ascertaining their position” of, alternatively, “lists of geographical

national maritime jurisdiction or not. Similarly, the coastal State can readily determine

coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted.” UNCLOS

whether fishing activity is being undertaken without a licence in its claimed maritime

Article 47(8) then goes on to state that:

zones, and thus whether illegal fishing is occurring. States parties to UNCLOS are under clear obligations to give due publicity to

The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical

the location of baselines, maritime limits, and maritime boundaries. With respect to

coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of

“baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea”, for example, Article 16(1)

the United Nations (emphasis added).

of the Convention provides that straight baselines (Article 7), river closing lines (Article 9), and bays (Article 10), “or the limits derived therefrom, and the lines of delimitation” determined in accordance with Articles 12 and 15 of the UNCLOS concerning

Further, with respect to the outer limits of the territorial sea, UNCLOS Article 16(2) provides, in near identical terms, that:

delimitation of the territorial sea: The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates …shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position.

and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United

Alternatively, a list of geographical coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum,

Nations (emphasis added).

may be substituted.

Moreover, UNCLOS Article 75(2) and 84(2), concerning the outer limits of the Article 16(2) of UNCLOS then states that: The coastal State shall give due publicity to such lists of charts or lists of geographical

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Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone respectively, state in identical terms: The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates

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and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (emphasis added).

It is therefore clear that coastal States are under a series of obligations to provide clarity and due publicity regarding the location of their baselines, outer limits to their maritime zones, and their settled maritime boundaries. Unfortunately, relatively few do so. Indeed, of 152 coastal States, only 82 have deposited information on their baselines, limits, and boundaries with the UN Secretary-General through the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS).21 Moreover, many of these deposits of information with DOALOS on the part of coastal States are incomplete - for example, many cover only agreed maritime boundary lines but not the outer limits to claimed maritime zones elsewhere. Despite this relatively poor fulfilment of the due publicity obligations for baselines, limits, and boundaries under UNCLOS, there are some signs of changing State practice. In particular, Pacific small island developing States (SIDS) have collectively and cooperatively taken action to declare and fix their baselines, limits, and boundaries. This developing regional State practice is, however, largely driven by concerns over sea level rise impacts on baselines along the coast, and consequent potential losses not only to land territory but to the scope of their maritime claims, and thus sovereign rights over valuable marine resources within these threatened maritime spaces. This coordinated action on the part of the Pacific SIDS aims not only to provide maritime jurisdictional clarity and certainty to all marine users, but also to declare and preserve maritime entitlements. This is consistent with the Pacific Oceanscape regional Action 1B “to Ensure the Impact of Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise does not result in reduced jurisdiction” of Pacific SIDS.22 Indeed, multiple declarations on the part of Pacific leaders have made it abundantly clear that the intention of these efforts is to ensure that maritime baselines, limits, and boundaries should be fixed in perpetuity regardless of sea level rise.23 This culminated in 2021 with the South Pacific Forum Leaders Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change ⒸFrancisco Blaha

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related Sea-Level Rise. 24 The unilateral fixing of the limits to maritime jurisdictions

In any case, where States have overlapping claims to maritime space, they are bound

has been achieved through the deposit of information with the UN Secretary General

by UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3), which establish a general framework for the

via DOALOS, in fulfilment of the above-mentioned due publicity obligations under

provisional management of maritime spaces subject to overlapping EEZ and continental

UNCLOS. This has been accompanied by significant progress in regional maritime

shelf claims. These provisions were drafted in an attempt to fulfil two aims: the first to

boundary delimitation, featuring a doubling of agreements in the 2005-2015 period.

encourage efforts aimed at the management of areas of overlapping maritime claims

Also of note are developments in the international legal field. For instance, the

on an interim basis; and the second to limit activity within an area of overlapping

International Law Association (ILA) Committee on International Law and Sea Level

maritime claims from having a detrimental impact on negotiation of a final delimitation

Rise proposed a Resolution which was adopted by the ILA in 2018 that:

agreement.26 Thus, in accordance with Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of UNCLOS, pending agreement on a continental shelf or EEZ boundary respectively, the States concerned:

on the grounds of legal certainty and stability, provided that the baselines and the outer limits of maritime zones of a coastal or an archipelagic State have been properly determined

…shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature

in accordance with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, these baselines and limits should

and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final

not be required to be recalculated should sea level change affect the geographical reality of

agreement.

the coastline.

While there is a clear obligation to “make every effort” to seek such provisional Additionally, in 2019, the International Law Commission (ILC) established a Study

arrangements of a practical nature, there is no obligation to actually reach agreement

Group on “Sea-level rise in relation to international law.” The debates in the UN

on them, making this an obligation regarding the conduct of States rather than one of

Sixth Committee on the two reports issued to date by the ILC Study group indicated

result. While these provisions can be viewed as an obligation of restraint applying to

widespread support among UN Members for the position taken by the ILA.

areas of overlapping maritime claims, they do not prescribe what form of provisional arrangement of a practical nature might be involved, or require agreement on such arrangement to be achieved. Whilst the word “provisional” indicates that the

Obligations within Areas Subject to Overlapping Maritime Claims

arrangement in question is not final in character, nonetheless, no particular timeframe is imposed, nor, indeed, any restriction on the arrangement’s level of formality or binding nature.

Where overlapping maritime claims exist, this does not mean that these disputed

The meaning of UNCLOS Article 74(3) was analysed in detail by the Arbitral

waters are necessarily lawless ‘black holes’ where nefarious activities such as IUU fishing

Tribunal tasked with resolving certain legal aspects of a long running maritime boundary

can occur in an unfettered fashion. Ironically, these disputed maritime spaces may

dispute between Guyana and Suriname.27 A flashpoint of this dispute was the so-called

well be the areas prioritised by the contending parties for maritime surveillance and

‘CGX incident’ of June 2000 which involved a confrontation between Suriname naval

enforcement activities.

vessels and the C.E. Thornton, a mobile drilling rig operated by CGX Resources Inc.

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(CGX), a Canadian company. In 1998, Guyana granted an oil exploration concession

Guyana’s planned exploratory activities, as well as its failure to engage in a last-minute

to CGX, part of which was located in an area subject to overlapping continental shelf

dialogue proposed by Guyana prior the CGX incident.30 Guyana was likewise found

and EEZ claims promulgated by Guyana and Suriname.

to have breached its obligation by failing to inform and notify Suriname directly of the

In 1999, CGX arranged for seismic testing and exploratory drilling to be conducted

planned exploratory drilling in the area of overlapping maritime claims, failing to seek

in the concession area and, in May 2000, Suriname demanded that Guyana and CGX

Suriname’s cooperation in undertaking these activities, and not offering to share the

cease all oil exploration activities in the area of overlapping maritime claims. On 3 June

results of the exploration activities or the financial benefits resulting from them.31

2000, two Suriname naval vessels approached the C.E. Thornton, which at the time

The Tribunal found that Article 74(3) and 83(3) prohibit unilateral provisional

was operating within the portion of the concession area subject to overlapping claims,

management of an area of overlapping maritime claims, unless active and continuous

and ordered the rig and its service vessels to leave “Suriname waters” within twelve

steps are taken to inform the other claimant State of proposed actions, and efforts are

hours. The C.E. Thornton subsequently halted work and quit the area of dispute.

a consequence of these developments, both Guyana and Suriname argued that the other

made to engage that State in discussions concerning the proposed actions. Concerning the second obligation set out in UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3), concerning actions that may jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement,

had breached its obligations under Articles 74(3) and 83(3). In relation to the first obligation set out in UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3),

the Tribunal noted that this:

concerning provisional arrangements of a practical nature, the Tribunal observed that: …is an important aspect of the Convention’s objective of strengthening peace and friendly Although the language “every effort” leaves “some room for interpretation by the States

relations between nations and of settling disputes peacefully. However, it is important to

concerned, or by any dispute settlement body”, it is the opinion of the Tribunal that the

note that this obligation was not intended to preclude all activities in a disputed maritime

language in which the obligation is framed imposes on the Parties a duty to negotiate

area.

in good faith. Indeed, the inclusion of the phrase “in a spirit of understanding and cooperation” indicates the drafters’ intent to require of the parties a conciliatory approach

The Tribunal therefore sought to strike a balance between the desirability of economic

to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be prepared to make concessions in the

development and the preservation of States’ rights. Accordingly, the Tribunal found

pursuit of a provisional arrangement. Such an approach is particularly to be expected of

that permissible conduct would include activities undertaken pursuant to provisional

the parties in view of the fact that any provisional arrangements arrived at are by definition

arrangements of a practical nature, and unilateral acts not having a permanent physical

temporary and will be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

impact on the marine environment.33 In contrast, impermissible conduct would be unilateral acts having a permanent physical impact on the marine environment, such

The Tribunal found that both Guyana and Suriname had breached their respective

as the exploitation of oil and gas reserves. The Tribunal thus found that there is a

obligations to negotiate in good faith concerning the establishment of provisional

substantive legal difference between certain oil exploration activities, notably seismic

arrangements of a practical nature. Suriname was found to have breached its obligation

testing which was not viewed as causing permanent damage to the marine environment,

by failing to negotiate in good faith with regard to the overlapping claim area and

and exploratory drilling. The latter activity was, in contrast, viewed as potentially

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causing permanent damage to the marine environment, and thus Guyana’s unilateral

as fisheries. Indeed, of the 23 examples of maritime joint development zones globally,37

authorisation of exploratory drilling in the absence of a provisional arrangement violated

10 include a fisheries dimension or are explicitly oriented towards the management of

its obligation.

The Tribunal likewise concluded that Suriname violated its obligation

fishery resources. These joint zones involving fisheries are even divided between those

not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement when it

agreed in conjunction with a maritime boundary, and those established in lieu of a

expelled the concession holder from the disputed area, which constituted an unlawful

maritime boundary.

threat of force.

Joint zones defined in conjunction with, and often straddling, a maritime boundary

What remains unclear is whether fishing activity would be treated in this context.

are those between Argentina and Uruguay concerning the Rio de la Plata in 1973,38

It is conceivable that limited fishing in an area of overlapping maritime claims might

Colombia and the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean Sea in 1978,39 Australia

be deemed lawful whereas intense levels of fishing liable to cause the collapse of the

and Papua New Guinea (PNG) of 1978,40 Denmark (Faroe Islands) and the United

fish stock concerned would be considered to breach the above-mentioned obligations

Kingdom in the north Atlantic Ocean of 1999,41 and China and Vietnam in the Gulf

under UNCLOS. Were such an issue to come before an international court or tribunal,

of Tonkin of 2000.42

a key issue which the court would have to determine is whether fishing activity

The joint zones involving fisheries established in lieu of maritime boundary

was unsustainable and therefore likely to cause permanent damage to the marine

delimitation are those between Nigeria and Sao Tomé and Príncipe of 2001, joint

environment. This, in turn, would likely require the court to assess whether the fishing

fishing zones in the East China Sea between China and Japan in 1997, between Japan

undertaken was unsustainable in the context of the particular fish stock in question.

and Korea in 2000, China and Korea in 2001, and Japan and Taiwan in 2013.43 It is fair to observe that the practical utility of such mechanisms has been decidedly mixed. At one end of the scale, the Australia-PNG agreement successfully established

Provisional Arrangements of a Practical Nature and Fisheries

a protection zone to safeguard traditional fishing activities and the free movement of traditional inhabitants, regulate commercial fisheries, and protect the marine

As noted above, UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3) encourage agreement on

environment. Consequently, a moratorium was placed on oil and gas exploration within

“provisional arrangements of a practical nature”, to be applied to areas of overlapping

the protected zone.44 In contrast, the existence of a joint fishing zone between China

maritime claims, pending maritime delimitation. Such provisional arrangements could

and Korea has not prevented significant illegal fishing issues, predominantly of Chinese

take the form of a provisional maritime boundary line, although these are relatively

fishers in Korean waters, leading to thousands of incidents featuring violence and loss of

rare as States are often concerned that a provisional line has the potential to take on

life.45 Provisional arrangements of a practical nature, including those aimed at managing

more permanent characteristics. Instead, the majority of provisional arrangements of a

and conserving fisheries resources, therefore require strong and ongoing cooperation

practical nature take the form of maritime joint development zones (as they tend to be

and commitment between the parties concerned and cannot be regarded as a panacea.46

referred to), oriented towards cooperative resource development and management.36 Such maritime joint zones have most frequently been applied to seabed energy resources. However, such arrangements can also involve other marine resources, such

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Conclusions

Additionally, even if unilateral activities do not permanently damage the marine environment, they may jeopardize or hamper the reaching of an agreement. Similarly,

It is clear that as claims to maritime jurisdiction have progressed further offshore, so

enforcement actions, particularly assertive ones, could also jeopardize reaching

there has been a substantial proliferation of overlapping maritime claims globally. By no

agreement and should be avoided.

means have all of these areas of overlapping maritime claims been settled through the

As yet, it is untested whether conducting fisheries activities in disputed waters would

delimitation of maritime boundaries, with only a little over half of potential maritime

constitute a breach of these obligations. Much will likely depend on the degree of

boundaries being even partially settled with agreements in force.

communication and cooperation concerning the fishing activity with the other State or

Although States Parties to UNCLOS are under obligations to clarify and provide

States involved, as well as the scale of the activity and status of the fish stock involved.

due publicity for the location of their baselines, the outer limits to their maritime zones,

Finally, although multiple examples of maritime joint zones exist, including joint fishing

and their delimited boundaries, fulfilment of these obligations has been limited. The

zones, such joint arrangements, for all their evident attractions, should not be entered

resulting uncertainty in the locations of the limits to maritime entitlements and extent

into lightly, as they require strong and ongoing cooperation and commitment between

of overlapping maritime claims fundamentally hampers the identification of illegal

State parties to be effective.48

fishing activities, and thus the fight against IUU fishing. Accordingly, clarifying the limit of maritime claims/boundaries is an essential prerequisite to determining whether fishing activity is illegal or not. While there has been recent progress in this regard, driven by concerns over climate change-induced sea level rise on the location of baselines and the extent of maritime claims, State practice remains far from comprehensive. It has been suggested that clarifying the location of baselines, maritime limits, and maritime boundaries represents a “low-hanging fruit in the fight against IUU Fishing”.47 However, this view may underestimate technical capacity issues as well as geopolitical sensitivities. In maritime areas subject to competing and overlapping claims, during the transitional period between the emergence of a dispute and its settlement, there are affirmative obligations on the States concerned to, first, make “every effort” to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, although they are not obliged to reach agreement; and second, not to “jeopardize or hamper reaching a final agreement”. Moreover, while the absence of dispute settlement does not preclude all economic activity in disputed waters, coastal States should exercise caution, particularly in regard to authorising activities likely to permanently damage the marine environment.

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Party to the Plunder: Distant Water Fishing Fleets, the Overexploitation of Africa’s Fish Stock, and the Role of Technology in Stemming its Tides

Introduction Fish plays a vital role in the food and economic security of Africa’s coastal and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). It is an important source of animal protein and contributes to the food security of over 200 million Africans.1 The fisheries sector generates revenue for coastal states and SIDS throughout the continent, estimated at US$ 24 billion annually.2 The two main sectors in Africa’s fisheries are the artisanal or small-scale fisheries (SSF) and industrial sectors. The SSF sector comprises local fishers mainly in traditional mechanised boats and contributes significantly to millions of Africans’ food and economic security. This sector is highly gendered in that, whilst men dominate fishing activities at sea, women dominate the post-harvest sectors as processors and traders and, in many regions, such as West Africa, also finance the fishing activities of men.3 The industrial sector comprises large trawlers/vessels, many of which are linked to distant water nations (DWNs) through licensing, joint ventures, ownerships, and flags of convenience or non-compliance, whilst their catch and revenue generated therefrom are destined for countries outside the continent.4 West Africa exemplifies the

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood

disparity between the contribution of the SSF and the industrial sectors to food security in the continent. Specifically, in the Fisheries Committee for West Central Gulf of

Lecturer in Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews,

Guinea (FCWC) states – Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Togo – the

Scotland

fisheries sector directly supports the livelihoods of over 20 million people. An estimated

149

70% of the region’s 1,293,000 tons of fish produced each year are produced by 200,000

are working to address these threats, emphasising the use of technology and its impact.

artisanal canoes operating in these countries. By contrast, as of 2021, 523 industrial and

Following the discussion are the implications and conclusions.

semi-industrial vessels were licensed to operate in the six FCWC states.

The sustainability of the benefits accruable from the fisheries sector in Africa is threatened by depleting fish stock, resulting from factors such as marine pollution, the

Flags of Convenience/Flags of Non-Compliance

impact of climate change, expansion of the Blue Economy (BE) sector through port infrastructure, offshore oil exploration, coastal tourism, and overexploitation through 6

Flags of Convenience (FoC), also known as Flags of Non-Compliance (FoNC), refers to

legal and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The depletion of fish stock

flags issued by a state that consistently fails to comply with its international obligations.14

undermines coastal livelihoods. It pushes millions of people who depend on fisheries

There are currently nine FoC/FoNC in Africa – Cameroon, Comoros, Equatorial

for livelihoods further into poverty, to the extent that the incomes of artisanal fishers

Guinea, Liberia, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania (Zanzibar)

have been reduced by 40% in the last decade. The women that dominate the post-

and Togo.15 FoC/FoNC exist because flag states are unable, unwilling or neglectful in

harvest sector are equally affected as the reduced catch for the fishermen implies less fish

controlling trawlers flying their flag.16 They make millions of dollars doing this at the

available for the women to process and sell.8

expense of sustainable fisheries. The nature of FoC/FoNC promotes IUU fishing, in

Scholars, policymakers and implementers have written about the impact of IUU 9

fishing on depleting fish stock in Africa and elsewhere. For instance, the economic 10

that the regulation of compliance is left to states that are either unable to, because they have limited capacity, or unwilling to, enforce compliance of regional or international

and

regulations.17 Apart from this link with IUU fishing, FoC/FoNC also contribute to

as part of the global effort to stem its tide, action plans and measures such as the

overfishing as vessels with such flags enjoy the same benefits as local vessels, which gives

International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and

them access to local fisheries species.18

cost of IUU fishing in Africa has been estimated at US$10 billion annually,

Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)11 and Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) have 12

There is a link between global efforts to ensure fisheries sustainability and the

Though the extent to which these measures have been effective in

increase in the use of FoC/FoNC in Africa and elsewhere. For instance, fish caught by

combating IUU fishing in Africa and across the globe is debatable, one thing is clear:

EU vessels on the African continent reduced drastically, from 3 to 0.5 tonnes between

vessels are finding more creative ways to legalise their once-illegal activities.

1990 and 2017, due to the gradual withdrawal of fleets from Spain, France and Italy in

been introduced.

Focusing on examples from West Africa, this chapter explores how African fish stocks 13

the same period, and the transfer of vessels from some EU states to FoC/FoNC. As a

Specifically, it explores the role of

result, the catch by Caribbean countries acting as FoC/FoNCs for these vessels increased

vessels linked to DWFNs in overexploiting fish stocks on the continent using flags of

to about 500,000 tonnes in the late 2000s and the beginning of the next decade.19

convenience or non-compliance to legalise their activities, and beneficial ownership to

Further, a recent report by the Associated Press found that vessels owned or managed

circumvent local laws and engage in IUU fishing, including through transhipment at sea

by companies in countries in the European Union – Belgium, Cyprus, Latvia and

using “dark vessels” - which switch off their Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to

Malta – and previously implicated for IUU fishing-related activities, were reflagging in

avoid detection. The chapter then explores some of the ways countries on the continent

Cameroon. The Trondheim is an example of a vessel that has either reflagged, changed

are overexploited through legal and illegal means.

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names, or previously been implicated in IUU fishing-related activities.20

Name of Vessel

Number of Vessels with the Same Name

Flag State

Dak940

Senegal

Recent research found that most

Fu Hai Yu 555

China

vessels flagged by states on the African continent are linked to owners or companies

Fu Yuan Yu 381

China

Guo Ji

China

Han Sen 5

The Gambia

prohibiting foreign ownership of trawlers in Ghana, it is estimated that over 90% of

Long Tai

China and Ghana

the trawlers operating in its waters are linked to beneficial owners from Asia – the vast

Long Xing 622

China

majority are from China, while others are from South Korea.24 For example, the Panof

Lu Qing Yuan Yu 051

China

vessels –Discoverer, Master, Frontier Path Finder, Commander, Fore Runner, and

Lu Yuan Kai Yuan Yu 877

China

Volunteer , are all Ghana-flagged and owned by a Ghanaian company. However, the true

The Gambia 4

The Gambia

Wang 6

The Gambia

Yi Fen 26

China

Yi Feng 30

China

FoC/FoNC vessels are also often linked to beneficial owners.21 The fronted or legally identified vessel owners are often different from those who ultimately own, control, and 22

enjoy the financial benefits of the vessel’s activities.

from Asia and Europe – China, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Russia, Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey-and the overwhelming majority of these vessels have known or suspected foreign ownership originating from China.23 Despite laws

owners are the Silla Company based in South Korea.

Beyond utilising FoC/FoNC to continue the plunder of fish stock in Africa, some criminally-minded vessels also utilise the same name for multiple vessels and, in some instances, share the same Mobile Maritime Services Identity (MMSI) number. 26 Between September 2019 and September 2020, twenty-seven vessels, many of which are linked to China, shared 13 names – see Table 1.

The problem with operating

Table 1: list of vessels that shared the same names in the West African region between September 2019 and September 2020.28

with multiple vessels with identical names is that they can get away with IUU fishing and other illicit acts without detection, especially when one of the vessels has legal

especially problematic in the shipping industry (the installation of AIS is increasingly

authorisation to operate in the country.

common on commercial fishing vessels) where, under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, AIS is not to be switched off or disabled at any time other than for specific safety and security reasons, such as threats of piracy.29 On

Dark Vessels

the African continent, in particular the waters of West and Central African countries, one can argue that the caveat in SOLAS has allowed vessels to potentially get away with

The proliferation of AIS has created a weak point in maritime technology, whereby

engaging in IUU fishing and other illicit activities as they often go dark in these waters,

vessels cannot be tracked if they switch off their Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) and/

especially in the inshore areas, which researchers have shown to be the most common

or AIS, thus making it difficult for their presence at sea to be detected. This has been

area for switching off/disabling AIS.30

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In a recent meta-analysis, Welch et al. showed that between 2017 and 2019, up to 6% of global fishing vessel activity was obscured by AIS disabling, which roughly equates to 4.9 million hours of fishing activity. They note that the key driver of AIS disabling was proximity to shore. A substantial portion of AIS disabling occurs at exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries, indicating unauthorised cross-boundary fishing.31 There are many examples of such cross-boundary unauthorised fishing throughout West Africa, as discussed below. In a 2018 report, Oceana found that the Releixo , a Spanish-flagged trawler, disabled its AIS 19 times between January 2014 and July 2015, in all instances while approaching the EEZ of The Gambia. In each instance, the AIS was disabled for an average of 16 days, resulting in over 8,000 hours of obscured activity. While the vessel claimed to have been broadcasting VMS data at the time, in addition to having a Gambian observer onboard while in Gambian waters, it is worthy of note that this vessel had been fined in 2011 by the Gambian government for fishing in unauthorised areas, and as such had a history of contravening the law. Moreover, the lack of data transparency means these claims cannot be verified, nor can the legality of their activity, whilst the AIS was switched off, be ascertained.32 Vessels from Asian DWNs, such as China and South Korea, have been implicated in IUU fishing activities through transhipment at sea by switching off their AIS. In an analysis of all the vessels transmitting AIS in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of West African states, Ralby (2021) found that between September 1, 2019, and September 1, 2020, a total of 527 vessels engaged in fishing activities; of these 527 vessels, over 75% (396) at some point in this period had their AIS turned off. One vessel,Hai Lu Feng 11 , which was attacked by pirates on the 14th of May 2020 when ⒸFrancisco Blaha

it was fishing, does not appear in the list of 527 vessels transmitting AIS between those periods, including the day it was pirated.33 While there might have been justifiable reasons for switching off its AIS, including safety reasons as specified by SOLAS, in June 2020, Hai Lu Feng 11 was fined by the Nigerian government for switching off its AIS in Nigeria’s EEZ.34

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Vessels have also been noted to go dark during unauthorised transhipment at sea.

July 2022, the Maritime Operational Centre (MBC) in Conakry, using the Yaoundé

Despite a law prohibiting transhipment at sea being introduced in Guinea-Bissau in

Architecture Regional Information Systems (YARIS)38 and Seavision39 platforms to

2015, in March 2017, Greenpeace found the Saly Reefer , a vessel flagged by Comoros

monitor the activities of the vessels operating in its waters, found an Egyptian-flagged

and operated by a company based in the Canary Islands in Spain, engaging in illegal

vessel, FADH Aleslam , with a Sierra Leonean licence, fishing in its waters. The vessel

transhipment by transferring fish from the vessels Flipper 3, Flipper 4, and Flipper 5 ,

was monitored for three days, and an operation to intercept, board and divert the vessel

all of which are flagged by Comoros, with their AIS turned off to avoid detection. The

to the harbour followed. The vessel was fined €800,000 for unauthorised fishing in

government of Guinea-Bissau fined the three Flippe r vessels. However, in line with

Guinean waters, fishing during a biological rest period (during the fishing ban), and its

how some vessels try to legalise their illegal activities in the fishing industry, the vessels

cargo size.40

changed their flag state from Comoros to Guinea-Bissau.35

Another example from Guinea, specific to suspected illegal oil bunkering, highlights the positive use of technology in combatting crime in the fisheries sector. In November 2022, the West Africa Regional Maritime Security Centre (CRESMAO) reported in

Stemming the Tides of IUU Fishing: Technology to the Rescue

their newsletter that a chemical cargo vessel, MT Desna Star, which Liberia flags, was engaged in an illegal ship-to-ship transfer with three Chinese-flagged fishing vessels –

Fu Yuan Yu 368, Sheng Hai 17 and Meng Xing 22 – off Guinea’s EEZ. The illegal shipLimited Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) capabilities have been blamed 36

to-ship transfer was observed using the YARIS system. Specifically, the correlated AIS

and whilst this remains a

and VMS data gathered using the YARIS system were analysed to find that the three

challenge, countries in the region are improving their MCS capabilities by signing up

fishing vessels were almost in the same position as the tanker. The authorities presented

to international conventions on IUU fishing, such as PSMA, increased information

this evidence to fine the three fishing vessels licensed to fish in Guinea. As this incident

happened outside Guinea’s EEZ, the perpetrating vessel MT Desna Star could not

Although some of these measures are in their nascent stage, there is evidence that some

be penalised by the Guinean authorities. However, for the fishing vessels licensed to

yield positive outcomes. In particular, the use of technology has greatly contributed

fish in Guinea, their engagement in illegal ship-to-ship transfer off Guinea’s EEZ was

to the improvement of fisheries governance and safety and security in West Africa, as

seen as a concerted effort to evade Guinean laws, where unauthorised oil bunkering is

it allows law enforcement to monitor the movement and positions of vessels and the

prohibited.41 The link between oil bunkering and IUU fishing in international waters

behaviour of ships. It also allows for quick and efficient sharing of maritime information

was also highlighted, as vessels engaging in IUU fishing-related activities need to refuel

at the national, regional and international levels. This section focuses on the role of

their vessels without detection by authorities; hence, illegal ship-to-ship transfers are

technology in improving fisheries governance, particularly combating IUU fishing and

seen as one of the factors sustaining IUU fishing in West Africa and other regions within

other illicit activities at sea in West Africa.

the African continent.42 Although no evidence of IUU fishing activity was identified in

for the overexploitation of fish stock in West Africa,

sharing, and relying on technologies to bridge some of the gaps in monitoring.

The example from Guinea provides a recent example of technology and interagency

this instance, one of the vessels involved in the illegal ship-to-ship transfer, the Fu Yuan

cooperation and collaboration in improving fisheries governance in West Africa. In

Yu 368, belongs to a company whose fleets had previously been implicated for engaging

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in IUU fishing off the Southern Indian Ocean in 2016.43

of the technology used is managed by entities outside the region/continent, such as YARIS, Seavision, Skylight and others. Duplication of their application could result in distributing time and human resources across various monitoring platforms, when

Implications and Conclusion

one would be sufficient. However, this can be avoided with increased cooperation and collaboration between regional governments and their agencies.

IUU fishing exacerbates the depletion of fish stock, and as such requires attention.

Finally, fisherfolk throughout the West African region and the African continent

However, focusing on it alone abrogates policymakers and implementers from

are already exposed to poverty resulting from reduced catch. As such, efforts aimed at

addressing other equally important factors that contribute to depleting fish stock, such

sustaining fish stock must consider how they, too, are affected by policies, as it is easy

as the legal overexploitation of fish stock which the use of a flag of convenience or non-

for such policies to expose them to further vulnerabilities.45 The government must,

compliance has allowed to proliferate throughout Africa. Provisions of international

therefore, consider the role of fisheries licenses and agreements in contributing to

law, such as SOLAS, might have also provided criminally-minded vessels with a useful

overexploitation, and work with their international partners to ensure that only surplus

excuse to engage in IUU fishing-related activities by switching off their AIS, hiding

species are considered for such licensing and agreements. Relatedly, there is a need for

this activity under safety concerns. As such, a broader objective based on ensuring

investment in modern technology and assets that regional states can manage, rather

sustainable fisheries should be at the core of fisheries governance in Africa, rather than

than relying only on those controlled by entities outside the continent. Importantly,

just a limited focus on fighting IUU fishing.

given the link between flags of convenience or noncompliance and overexploitation of

Although technology is helping agencies in West Africa to improve fisheries governance, transparency and willingness to share information is necessary for the

fish stock, including IUU fishing, there is a need for greater collaboration between port and flag states to close the existing loopholes in the system.

effective use of such technology. Further, technology needs humans with requisite knowledge and assets to analyse and investigate the data that has been captured; furthermore, data needs to be seen to be used equitably.44 Relatedly, fisheries laws need to be updated so that the evidence captured by technology can be used effectively to prosecute and, by extension, deter those with criminal intent. These issues remain a challenge throughout West Africa and the African continent at large. Improving in these areas requires commitment from policymakers and their partners to support the relevant law enforcement agencies to do their jobs effectively, in the long-term interest of securing the livelihoods of fisherfolk in Africa and the ocean environment at large. Technology also brings risk, however, and there are concerns related to the use of technology that regional agencies have to be mindful of, such as exposure to cybercrime or hacking and the duplication of effort. These things are especially relevant since most

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IUU Fishing in the Context of Small-Scale Fisheries: What it Really Means Introduction Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing has long been a concern for fisheries governance, as one of the factors of unsustainability. Efforts to eliminate IUU fishing are generally intended for high seas fisheries where the problem is most prominent. It is only recently, and for various reasons, that IUU fishing is pressed upon countries as a problem within their territorial seas, including in coastal waters where smallscale fisheries operate. There is no denying that IUU fishing is associated with major losses, especially in terms of incomes and revenue; thus an elimination of IUU fishing is desirable. Yet, measures and tools to eliminate IUU fishing in the high seas are not directly transferable to combating domestic fisheries problems, and not necessarily suitable for small-scale fisheries. Addressing IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries would require, in the first instance, careful deliberation about whether it is happening, how, why, and to what consequence. Measures to eliminate IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries would then be designed based on the understanding of the nature of the problem in this context. Following the Interactive Governance Theory, IUU fishing

Ratana Chuenpagdee

problems, as well as solutions, can be articulated based on the modes, orders, and elements of fisheries governance. Through this lens, in addition to addressing IUU

Science Director, TBTI Global Foundation, Thailand

fishing problems, the performance and outcomes of fisheries governance would also be

University Research Professor, Memorial University, Canada

enhanced.

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IUU as Defined

those conducted by vessels without nationality or by those flying the flag of a State not party to a relevant regional fisheries management organization. It also refers to fishing

Overfishing, detrimental fishing practices, and environmental degradation are

activities that are not consistent either with the conservation and management measures

among key concerns in fisheries governance. They provide rationale and impetus

of that organization, or with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine

for the development of several major international legal instruments, such as the

resources under international law.6

1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the 1995 United Nations Fish

These definitions clearly speak to concerns about activities of large-scale,

Stocks Agreement, the International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing

industrialized fisheries that take place in the high seas, or in areas overseen by

Capacity, and the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,

intergovernmental and regional fisheries management organizations. Concerns about

Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). IPOA-IUU was developed as

unsustainable fishing practices are not exclusive to large-scale fisheries, however, and

a voluntary instrument, in alignment with the Code of Conduct for Responsible

efforts to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing should, in principle, also be directed

Fisheries, and was adopted by the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) of the Food and

at small-scale fisheries. An important question relates to what measures to use in the

Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) in 2001 after two years of

context of small-scale fisheries. In order to answer this question, it is imperative to

consultation. While it is noted in the IPOA-IUU that “IUU fishing undermines efforts

examine the extent to which IUU fishing as defined is applicable to small-scale fisheries,

to conserve and manage fish stocks in all capture fisheries” (emphasis by the author),

and whether the concerns and problems in small-scale fisheries are similar to those in

concerns about IUU fishing were initially directed at fishing vessels flying “flags of

large-scale, industrialized fisheries or in the high seas.

convenience,” which were increasing in number. The IPOA-IUU thus refers to illegal

In the next sections, problems and concerns in small-scale fisheries are presented,

fishing activities as “conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a

followed by discussion about the nature of IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries. The

relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the

paper ends by considering how to look at IUU fishing problems and solutions from the

conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the

Interactive Governance perspective.

States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law”. However, illegal fishing also includes activities that are conducted “by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or 4

IUU Fishing as a Wicked Problem

in contravention of its laws and regulations”, and “in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant

Fisheries governance is full of examples and lessons about technical fixes and wicked

problems. In Degnbol et al’s7 paper, “Painting the floor with a hammer”, they refer to

With respect to unreported fishing, Paragraph 3.2 in the IPOA-IUU refers to fishing

three management tools – marine protected areas (MPAs), individual transferable quotas

activities that have not been reported, or have been misreported to the relevant national

(ITQs), and community-based management (CBM) – as technical fixes to address

authority, as stipulated by national laws and regulations, as well as to the relevant

fisheries problems. They represent three domains of knowledge - ecological, economic,

regional fisheries management organization. Similarly, unregulated fishing activities are

and social, respectively, promoted through disciplinary research and practical training

regional fisheries management organization”.

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that aim at pragmatic problem solving. Fisheries problems are, however, complex and 8

can be considered ‘wicked problems’, following Rittel and Webber, as articulated in 9

actors as appropriate and promoting participatory arrangements within the context of comanagement. States should ensure effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to

Jentoft and Chuenpagdee. Among other issues, these problems are social in nature,

deter, prevent and eliminate all forms of illegal and/or destructive fishing practices having

difficult to define, and hard to disentangle and differentiate from other problems.

a negative effect on marine and inland ecosystems. States should endeavour to improve

Further, there may not be a simple or a single solution to address them, and efforts to

registration of the fishing activity. Small-scale fishers should support the MCS systems and

solve the problem may lead to bigger and more complex situations. The characterization

provide to the State fisheries authorities the information required for the management of

of Rittel and Webber’s wicked problems resembles many of today’s fisheries problems,

the activity”.

including IUU fishing. Specifically, if IUU fishing is treated as a technical problem that can be easily fixed by broadly applying tools that may have worked only in a

The text in this paragraph recognizes that IUU fishing can be a problem in small-

few circumstances, the problem is likely to escalate and can become more difficult to

scale fisheries but emphasizes the need for developing measures and mechanisms that

address. Without a proper examination of the nature of the IUU fishing problem in

are appropriate and suitable for the sector. This is a key point demonstrated by Song et

a specific context, it is not possible to figure out appropriate measures to address the

al14 in their paper about “collateral damage” to small-scale fisheries caused by policy and

problem.10

actions to eliminate IUU fishing in various parts of the world. The first step to avoid

Issues and concerns in small-scale fisheries are not only those related to overfishing and environmental sustainability. Food security, poverty, wellbeing, social justice, 11

and gender equity have all been raised.

such damage is to look closely at what small-scale fisheries are and the extent to which IUU fishing as defined is applicable to the sector.

For these reasons, the Voluntary Guidelines

for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries (SSF Guidelines), adopted by FAO Member States in 2014, include a broad set of principles. These range from human

The Nature of IUU Fishing in Small-Scale Fisheries

rights and dignity, respect of cultures, and gender equity, to holistic approaches, social responsibility, and social and economic viability.12 As with the IPOA-IUU, the SSF

Small-scale fisheries are diverse, complex and dynamic by nature. They also have a wide

Guidelines follow the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in recommending

range in terms of size and capacity, such that there is no one definition that is globally

member States take actions that lead to responsible and sustainable use of aquatic

applicable. As such, they are not defined in the SSF Guidelines. For management

biodiversity and fisheries resources, keeping in mind the needs and requirements of both

purposes, many countries include, in their fisheries policy and management, certain

present and future generations. In the context of IUU fishing, Paragraph 5.16 states the

characteristics about small-scale fisheries, in order to differentiate them from large-

following:

scale fisheries. The common characteristics used to define small-scale fisheries are boat size and type, use of engine and engine power, and gears. Small-scale fisheries are also

“States should ensure the establishment of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS)

characterized by the nature of their activities; for instance, fishing done by family or

systems or promote the application of existing ones applicable to and suitable for small-

household members, who operate and own the fishing vessel, and with the majority

scale fisheries. They should provide support to such systems, involving small-scale fisheries

of the catch destined for local and domestic markets, although a small portion may

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be retained for household consumption. Unlike in large-scale fisheries, members

it is the informality of the sector that enables them to contribute to local food security,

of small-scale fisheries households often participate in the whole value chain - pre-

job creation, and social cohesion. This characteristic also makes it possible for them to

harvest, harvest, and post-harvest. The latter could involve preliminary or rudimentary

maintain their ‘occupational pluralism’ tradition, which is a key part of their livelihood

processing of fish, such as salting and drying of fish, or other preservation methods,

portfolio. As argued by Onyango,16 small-scale fishing is not just a job or a profession,

which extend the shelf life and can be part of value addition for better prices. Women

but a way of life that gives them satisfaction. Thus, small-scale fishers do not need to

are active participants in small-scale fisheries, including taking part in fishing and

become professionalized. Instead, they need the flexibility and the freedom to decide on

shellfish gathering. They also play a major role in marketing and trading of small-scale

a daily basis about what species to fish, with what gear, and where. While their practices

fisheries products, including direct selling to regular customers and tourists.

need to fall within certain rules and regulations, they have their own informal rules

In addition to their heterogeneity, small-scale fisheries take place in all waters,

and norms, traditional practices, and customary rights, which make fishing livelihoods

whether in freshwater systems like ponds, rivers, and lakes, or in estuaries, coastal

unique. This informality is implicit and should be respected without the need for

areas, and open seas. Fishing can occur near urban centres or in remote areas. Small-

documentation.

scale fisheries are big in their numbers and their value. They are recognized for their

Informality applies also to post-harvest activities, where catches and processed

contribution to several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 1 on

products from small-scale fisheries are informally traded. Part of the catches can be kept

poverty and SDG 2 on food security. As shown in the rationale for the UN declaration

for household consumption, given away to neighbours (sometimes in exchange for other

goods), or sold directly to customers at the landing sites. Catch can also be retained for

small-scale fisheries are associated with big numbers, such as 40% of global catch,

processing at home and kept for household consumption, or sold to customers directly

90% of people employed in the capture fisheries value chain, and 500 million people

from the processing facilities. The distribution of small-scale fisheries catch through

depending on small-scale fisheries livelihoods; with 45 million women participating.

the informal value chain helps fishers and their families and local communities meet

All these characteristics make management and governance of small-scale fisheries

basic food and nutritional requirements. Efforts to formalize the process, or to treat it as

challenging, and further understanding about this sector is required for the development

illegal, will have direct impacts on local food security.

of 2022 as the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture (IYAFA),

of appropriate IUU fishing policy. Below are specific contexts around small-scale fisheries that need to be articulated and considered.

Unaccounted is not the Same as Unreported Data about catch and fishing activities are collected and reported for sustainable

Informal does not mean Illegal

fisheries management. Data collection may be done through various means, like self-

The issue of informality in small-scale fisheries was hotly debated during the technical

reporting by fishers using logbooks, dockside monitoring by government, or through at-

negotiations of the Zero Draft of the SSF Guidelines. The term informality can be

sea observation, using observers onboard or electronic vessel monitoring systems. These,

associated with illegality, which is, in principle, not desirable. Some member states

as well as data from fishery-independent surveys, help inform management decisions,

supported a strong insertion of the language about IUU fishing in the guidelines text,

like catch quota and allocation, and are used for other regulatory purposes, such as

while others argued that many aspects of small-scale fisheries are informal by nature, and

seasonal and area closures. Reporting of fisheries data is therefore considered essential

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for sustainable fisheries management.

Self-Regulated does not mean Unregulated

There is, however, always a certain portion of catch that is not accounted for. In some

Large-scale fishing vessels operate in the open sea, far from shore, while small-scale

countries (like Norway), fishing industries use the concept ‘big hundreds’ to record the

fisheries take place close to shore, but can be in remote areas. In both cases, their fishing

catch, using the same rule applicable to significant numbers. This implies that after a

activities are difficult to regulate. Yet, relatively speaking, it is still easier to regulate large-

certain amount, a precise figure is no longer relevant. Thus, there is always a certain

scale fisheries, due to a small number of vessels, a large volume of catch, the corporate

level of catch that is not reported, and the acceptable level is something that can be set,

structure of the enterprises, and well-defined post-harvest activities. Fish are landed at

based on what is feasible and reasonable to capture, and the purpose for reporting. Data

specific sites and sold through certain trading and marketing systems, with a pricing

collection and reporting systems are designed primarily to manage large-scale, industrial

scheme that is either pre-negotiated or determined through an auction. A regulatory

fleets, which dominate catch in most countries. There are a lot less vessels in large-scale

framework for management of large-scale fisheries normally includes measures that

fisheries, compared to small-scale fisheries; thus their catch can be properly recorded and

restrict use of certain gears and prohibit fishing in certain areas, or at a certain time.

reported. A system can also be set up to enhance compliance and to deter non-reporting

Licenses and permits are also required. Throughout the value chain, a system of tracing

or under-reporting in large-scale fisheries, which are the main targets of the IPOA-IUU

and tracking can be implemented, to ensure compliance.

Agreement.

The same cannot be said about small-scale fisheries. While their practices follow

Catch from small-scale fisheries is difficult to estimate but it cannot be regarded as

certain patterns, fishing decisions take place on a daily basis, depending on weather,

insignificant. Given that small-scale fisheries catch can be as high as 40% of the total

sea, and resource conditions. Thus, small-scale fishers need the flexibility to bring gears

catch, concerns about poor reporting of small-scale fisheries catch are legitimate. Yet, it

that they feel are appropriate for the day, and employ gears as appropriate, in order to

is reasonable to ask questions about what should be reported, and for what reasons, as

take advantage of the available resources. This daily decision-making is part of the self-

well as what could be reported and how. The first question, about what to report and

regulation that is inherent in small-scale fisheries, and that enables them to maintain

why, is not specific to small-scale fisheries. It reflects how fisheries data are collected

fishing livelihoods and be viable.

but not necessarily used to inform management and policies. Information is also not

Like in large-scale fisheries, destructive fishing gear should not be allowed, and

always transparent and shared, and it is not always clear why it is collected in the first

thus prohibition of certain gears and fishing methods is acceptable. It might not be

place. The second question, as to what could be reported and how, invites careful

reasonable to regulate bycatch in small-scale fisheries, however, since fish that does not

deliberation about data collection, reporting and monitoring systems that are able to

fetch high prices is often kept for home consumption, and very little is discarded. Area

capture important information about small-scale fisheries, and that are suitable to deal

and seasonal restrictions may also not be necessary to impose on small-scale fisheries,

with the diversity, complexity, and dynamics in the sector. It is also about designing a

since they are often part of the self-regulation based on traditional knowledge that

data collection system to account for the values and importance of small-scale fisheries,

has been passed on for generations. Small-scale fisheries, whether indigenous or non-

recognizing that not everything is countable, and not everything that is countable is

indigenous, are known to have a relationship with their surroundings, and through

worth reporting.

rituals, norms, or taboos, they fish with respect. Small-scale fisheries are also known for their conservation and stewardship efforts, for instance, through community-

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based MPAs that are found around the world, many of which are self-motivated or co-

well as in the design of institutions that enable them. It further posits that governance

implemented by small-scale fishers.

challenges may lie in natural, social, and political systems, and through holistic

However, this is not the case in all small-scale fisheries, especially in fisheries involving

examinations, options and possibilities for innovative solutions may be found. As an

migrant or seasonal fishers. Even for community-based MPAs, not everyone complies.

analytical framework, interactive governance invites an examination of all aspects of

Thus, certain regulations are still required to manage small-scale fisheries.

the governance system, from the governing mode, to governing orders and governing elements, as shown in Figure 1 and further explained.

Addressing IUU Fishing Using Interactive Governance

Governing Mode Fisheries governance can be organized using three main modes - hierarchical

As previously stated, IUU fishing is not a technical problem that can be easily fixed.

governance, co-governance, and self-governance. Hierarchical governance dominates

Like other problems in fisheries, ‘management’ is not the solution, but ‘governance.’

the way fisheries around the world are governed, but governance transformation

Generally speaking, it is about broadening the way problems are identified and

has recently taken place, with one of the main shifts being from top-down, state-

examined, and widening the involvement of actors in the governing process, including

driven, governance to co-governance, where fishers, fishers’ organizations, and other

in making key decisions and in exploring and implementing solutions. Interactive

key fisheries stakeholders participate in policy formulation and decision-making.18

governance, as defined by Kooiman et al,17 emphasizes the role of both the public

There is ample evidence suggesting that fishers’ participation in management and

and private sectors and the need to understand how they interact, in the formulation

governance leads to better outcomes, and that community-based monitoring, control,

and application of principles guiding interactions between all governing actors, as

and surveillance (MCS) can be more effective than when performed by the authorities. Given the diversity, complexity and dynamics of small-scale fisheries, in terms of target species, gears, landing sites, and utilization of catch, getting fishers to help make, and enforce, rules might be the only feasible option. Top-down regulations are part of the hierarchical mode of governance. This may work fine in large-scale fisheries where the number of vessels is known, and the sector is largely homogenous. Co-governance works better in small-scale fisheries where the specificity of the sector can be incorporated in the regulatory framework. Further, with participation of fishers in the discussion about rules and regulations, co-governance can foster collaboration and compliance in the fisheries, deterring IUU practices and minimizing the need for MCS. Small-scale fisheries are not entirely self-governing, but certain decisions should be made at the local level, by fishers and government actors

Figure 1 - Key components of interactive governance

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through the co-governance system, following the subsidiarity principle, among others.19

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Incorporating aspects of co-governance and self-governance in the governing system is

and practitioners. From the organizational perspective, institutional reform would

possible, and desirable, even in the hierarchical governing mode. It is the ‘soft’ form of

include broadening skills and knowledge of all governing actors, from conventional

participation and collaborative decision-making that can be initiated and implemented

fisheries management to interdisciplinary approaches, in order to properly integrate

by the government. This speaks to the connectivity and the dynamic between the three

social and human dimensions of fisheries in science, policy, and decision-making.

governing modes (shown as arrows in Figure 1), and forms part of the governance

This can also be taken to the next level - i.e. a transdisciplinary perspective21 - where

transition observed in many fisheries around the world.

fishers and non-scientific knowledge holders can be part of the process, contributing to defining the problems and crafting solutions. Doing so in the context of IUU fishing in

Governing Order

small-scale fisheries would help not only to reduce the burden on governments, but also

IUU fishing is mostly seen as a first-order problem, associated with how fishers make

to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation.

decisions and take actions that are against the rules and regulations. Measures to prevent,

Meta-order governance is often not explicitly discussed in fisheries governance.

deter, and eliminate IUU fishing are thus performed as part of the management routine.

Principles, values, and underlying governing images are meta-order elements of a

First-order governance is not only about daily operations and day-to-day decision-

governance system that are difficult to articulate. They are abstract concepts on which

making, however. It is also about exchanging and sharing information and enabling the

it is not easy to deliberate and find consensus. According to Kooiman and Jentoft,22

flow of knowledge, to improve information and understanding about the nature and

meta-order elements are critical in guiding how institutions are designed and arranged,

characteristics of the fisheries. This aspect should be emphasized in the design of the

and how organizations are structured and function at the second-order. They also help

data collection system and of the MCS program.

bring alignment to first-order governance, improving the overall quality of the fisheries

Second-order governance is related mainly to institutions, how they are designed

governance system. In the context of small-scale fisheries, it is imperative for an agreement

and arranged. These include rules and regulations, as well as organizations responsible

to be reached about the underlying principles for IUU fishing policy and intervention,

for implementing them. The IUU fishing problem at the second-order is about the

and the values associated with small-scale fisheries that need to be maintained and

appropriateness of the legal system and the effectiveness of the regulatory framework for

promoted. It is equally important to avoid IUU fishing policy becoming part of the

preventing and deterring IUU fishing practices. As shown in Nakamura et al,

several

regulatory injustice impacting small-scale fisheries.

countries are undergoing policy and regulatory reform, making changes to out-dated

The three orders of governance are strongly connected and feedback loops are

fisheries acts and laws, to better align with current situations in fisheries. This includes

expected between them. No matter which governing order the discussion and

stronger emphasis on the ecosystem-based approach and precautionary principle,

intervention take place within, the other orders should be regularly checked for their

collaborative decision-making and participatory management, and equity and justice.

alignment with each other. Through this iterative process, governing performance and

Strengthening fishers’ organizations to encourage strong representation in fisheries

governance outcomes would be enhanced.

governance, as well as to enable their meaningful and active participation in fisheries governance, is also an integral part of second-order governance. Capacity building is

Governing Elements

imperative, through training programs that target fishers, as well as government officials

As shown in Figure 1, there are three related elements in the governance system, playing

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key roles in how the system performs. Image associated with meta-order governance is connected to principles and values. When small-scale fisheries’ value and contributions are recognized, their image is positive, and principles to protect their rights and to secure their livelihood are constituted. On the other hand, if small-scale fisheries are seen as too many and too unruly to govern, and are considered a problem for sustainability, they invoke a negative image. This leads to policies that aim to restrict and control. The rationale for the Too Big To Ignore (TBTI)23 Global Partnership for SmallScale Fisheries is to address the marginalization of small-scale fisheries in policies and governance, by making them more visible, better understood, and highly valued. At the second-order, government agencies may be seen as incapable of regulating small-scale fisheries, thus requiring more investment to improve their capacity, but mainly to perform first-order duties like MCS. With weak institutions, it is possible that violations may rise, but this might also lead to bottom-up initiatives, driven by fishers and local communities, like the community-based conservation programs mentioned above. As shown in the case studies in South Korea,24 and Spain,25 learning about image can reveal key insights that help improve governance. Legal instruments may be the first aspect that comes to mind when dealing with IUU fishing. International agreements that have legal effect may be necessary in some instances, but non-binding agreements may also work. Nakamura26 argues, for instance, that even though the SSF Guidelines are ‘voluntary’, they have normative significance and legal force, and are the key instrument in providing a global safety net for small-scale fisheries when implemented. Since the SSF Guidelines have been globally endorsed, it might be useful to assess the compatibility between them and IUU fishing policy, to see where the latter can improve. Given the strong focus on human rights, justice, and equity in the SSF Guidelines, such an alignment can help avoid unintended consequences of IUU fishing policy and intervention, to small-scale fisheries. Another key tool to help improve understanding about IUU fishing, and how to address the problem, is information. Similar to what has been said so far about IUU fishing, data collection systems used in large-scale fisheries are not readily applicable to

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small-scale fisheries. As suggested by Chuenpagdee et al,27 an information system needs

through technical fixes. IUU fishing, as defined in the IPOA-IUU, mostly targets high

to be specifically designed to capture key characteristics about the sector, in order to

sea fisheries and large-scale fisheries. Policies and interventions designed to prevent

provide meaningful and useful data. The Information System on Small-Scale Fisheries

and deter IUU fishing practices in large-scale fisheries are thus not readily applicable

(ISSF),

for instance, consists of 20 profile questions about the sector, including those

to small-scale fisheries. Otherwise, they risk being considered ‘eco-harassment,’ as

related to ecology, economics, social-cultural issues, and governance. Not all attributes

observed by Arias Schreiber et al,29 where actions taken against small-scale fisheries are

in ISSF are directly relevant to IUU fishing, but they provide a holistic picture about

justified as necessary to protect the environment, but they cause anxiety and harm to

small-scale fisheries that should be considered when designing IUU fishing policies and

the fishers. As noted in the SSF Guidelines, combatting IUU fishing using technical

interventions. As earlier noted, some characteristics of small-scale fisheries are difficult to

fixes like MCS and other observation systems, may not work in small-scale fisheries.

define and account for. Learning from data collected from small-scale fisheries in various

Careful consideration is necessary to establish appropriate measures and mechanisms to

locations around the world will help ground the data, and improve data efficiency and

deter, prevent, and illuminate IUU fishing in small-scale fisheries, preferably through

the data collection system.

participation and collaboration from fishers and key fisheries stakeholders. Rules and

The final governing element is action, which is related to all orders of governance.

regulations should be made to correspond with the nature and the characteristics of the

By default, IUU fishing policies and interventions often pit fishers against government

system that they aim to govern. They should not restrict fishers’ activities, but enable

authorities. To make such policies work in small-scale fisheries, the focus should be on

them and help secure their sustainable livelihoods, following key principles endorsed in

improving interactions and building trustful relationships among fisheries stakeholders

the SSF Guidelines. Changing images about small-scale fisheries - from seeing them as

(first-order), establishing mechanisms and an enabling environment for co-governance

an IUU fishing problem to considering them as partners and contributors in addressing

(second-order), and addressing power issues and influences that may bias decisions

the IUU fishing problem - is a good starting point.

and create unfair opportunities (meta-order). Conducting transdisciplinary research to enhance understanding about IUU fishing in the context of small-scale fisheries, is another key action that can be performed collaboratively by fisheries stakeholders. Through this lens, the problem of IUU fishing may be defined differently, with solutions that are co-created by small-scale fishers.

Concluding Thoughts IUU fishing problems look different in small-scale fisheries, when compared with largescale fisheries. Even within small-scale fisheries, IUU fishing is diverse, complex, and dynamic, like the sector itself. The problem is social in nature, and cannot be addressed

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The Complex Nature of Fisheries Subsidies: Their Contribution to IUU Fishing and the Need to Balance Environmental and Social Priorities

Introduction For many years, capacity-enhancing fisheries subsidies have been a significant contributor to global overfishing. By increasing capacity in the industry, subsidising input costs, and making distant water fishing profitable, these subsidies lead to the decline of fish stocks, destruction of aquatic ecosystems, and facilitate illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in a number of ways. Not all subsidies are problematic, however, and the spectrum of fisheries subsidies is a wide and varied one, covering the majority of payments made to the fishing industry – whether this be for improved management, for fuel, or for rural development of fishing communities. Recognising this spectrum of subsidies, a number of trade agreements, most notably the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) recently adopted Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (AFS),1 have sought to ban harmful fisheries subsidies, while including appropriate exemptions for beneficial subsidies. Special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries and small-scale fishers has also been discussed in these processes, but this issue remains unresolved for now. This is somewhat

Kathleen Auld

ironic given that the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations were initially touted as a ‘triple win’ for trade, environment, and development,2 and included in the Doha

Research Associate and Project Officer of the CAPFISH Project

Development Round – a series of trade talks meant to focus on developing country

World Maritime University

priorities.

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The paper unpacks these issues by discussing the contribution of fisheries subsidies

even fisheries management and research. Given the wide range of fisheries subsidies

to overfishing and IUU fishing, and efforts to better regulate these subsidies at

that fall under the definition and the equally wide-ranging effects of these subsidies, a

international level. It considers how effective these attempts have been and what may be

classification system has been developed in the literature.

included in the AFS once (or if) it is eventually completed. With so many in developing

Under this classification system, subsidies are grouped into capacity-enhancing,

coastal States relying on fisheries for food security and livelihoods, it is imperative that

beneficial, and ambiguous,8 as illustrated in Table 1. Capacity-enhancing subsidies are

the eventual Agreement provide appropriate S&DT for these groups. Thus, the final

those that increase capacity in the fishing industry to the point where fishing becomes

part of the paper focuses specifically on the effects of the AFS on developing countries

unsustainable. This category includes any subsidy that makes fishing easier, cheaper, or

and small-scale fisheries.

more profitable, and includes boat-building and modernisation subsidies, fishing inputs, and fishing infrastructure, amongst others. Beneficial subsidies attempt to improve management and conservation of fish stocks. This primarily encompasses payments to

The Nature and Scope of Fisheries Subsidies

improve fisheries management, such as monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS), or stock assessment. The third category – ambiguous subsidies – may impact positively

A subsidy is defined in the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing

or negatively on sustainability, depending on how these subsidies are structured.

Measures (ASCM) as ‘a financial contribution by a government or public body within

One example of this is vessel buyback programmes. These programmes are often

the territory of a Member’. This financial contribution must further confer a benefit

implemented to decrease capacity in the fishing industry. However, if the programme

and must be specific in the sense that it is provided to a particular industry or a particular region.4 Subsidies are therefore considered to cover a wide variety of ‘payment’

Subsidy Category

Subsidy Type

Beneficial

Research and Development

types, including loans, grants, tax incentives, purchases, and so on. Provided these financial contributions have a quantifiable market value5 and are given by a public body

Fisheries Management Marine Protected Areas

(or a private body carrying out government functions6), they are seen as subsidies under

Boat Construction and Renovation

the ASCM.

Fisheries Development Projects

While different organisations classify subsidies differently, Sumaila et al. note that in their component parts, these definitions are largely the same when it comes to fisheries

Fishing Port Development Capacity-enhancing

Market and Storage Infrastructure Fishing Access

- namely that a subsidy constitutes ‘a direct or indirect financial transfer from public

Fuel

entities that creates a benefit for the fisheries sector’.7

Tax Exemptions

This broad definition covers many different types of payments to the fisheries sector, including modernisation and building of boats, fishing inputs (fuel, ice, fishing gear), fisheries infrastructure (processing plants, fishing harbours), fisher assistance (retraining, unemployment insurance), improvements to vessel safety, rural development, and

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Fisher Assistance Ambiguous

Vessel Buybacks Rural Fisher Communities

Table 1: Examples of Fisheries Subsidies by Category. 9

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does not permanently remove capacity (i.e. by retiring fishing licenses and/or putting a moratorium on further boat-building for fishing purposes), a fisher may simply use the

Overfishing, IUU Fishing, and Unfair Competition: The Global Effects of Fisheries Subsidies

money given for the old boat and buy a new one. This categorisation of subsidies, or more accurately the ideas behind it, has been

Some fisheries subsidies may enhance the sustainability of fish stocks, while others may

broadly accepted, and formed the basis for discussions on subsidies that have taken place

contribute to development and improved safety in the industry. However, the majority

in trade bodies at international level. This has contributed to problems in agreeing on

of subsidies provided globally are capacity-enhancing,16 and there is significant disparity

S&DT provisions, as the environmental impact of subsidies is the main focus, with little

in the way that these subsidies are distributed. This leads to a number of problems.

attention paid to their social aspects. This is problematic, as fisheries make a significant

First, fisheries subsidies have created overcapacity in the global fishing fleet and

contribution to food, livelihoods, and development in many parts of the world. Fishing

unsustainable levels of fishing effort. Capacity-enhancing subsidies increase the number

is also the most dangerous profession in the world, with a recent study estimating that

of boats on the water, and keep those boats fishing through subsidisation of costs.

more than 100,000 fishers die each year.

These issues, and the impacts of agreements

This promotes overfishing and the depletion of fish stocks. Creating excessive capacity

like the AFS on developing countries and small-scale fisheries, are discussed further

through boatbuilding and modernisation subsidies may also lead to lobbying for input

below.

subsidies to reduce costs, as a dwindling resource and the need to share quotas among

Latest global estimates put fisheries subsidies at approximately US$ 35 billion annually, with fuel subsidies forming 22% of the total.11 Capacity-enhancing subsidies, 12

a bloated fleet make fishing an unprofitable profession.17 This perpetuates a damaging cycle.

This differs

Second, overcapacity in the fishing industry can lead to IUU fishing. There is a great

between countries and regions, however. Asia (the largest subsidising region in the

deal of competition in the fishing industry and, as resources dwindle, this only becomes

world at around US$ 18 billion annually) and Europe (just over US$ 6 billion) provide

more fierce. Furthermore, when subsidies are provided in the form of loans, fishers often

more capacity-enhancing than beneficial subsidies, while the opposite is true for North

cannot exit the fishing industry as they need to recoup expenses and pay off debts.18

America (between US$ 4-5 billion) and Oceania (less than US$ 1 billion).13 Developing

Vessel owners are, thus, incentivised to cut corners and bend the rules, engaging in

regions such as Africa and South, Central America, and the Caribbean provide more

illegal fishing and under- or misreporting of catch. This problem becomes particularly

capacity-enhancing than beneficial subsidies but these amount to only around US$ 2

acute when fisheries regulations and MCS are insufficient to properly control vessels.

including fuel, form the bulk of these subsidies, at over US$ 22 billion.

Subsidies, particularly fuel subsidies, also allow vessels to travel further from home,

billion each.

The disparity between developed and emerging regions, and less-developed regions,

potentially leading to unregulated fishing in high seas areas not managed by a regional

is clear from these numbers. Those who can afford subsidies provide them, while those

fisheries management organisation (RFMO). There have even been instances where

that cannot are put at a significant disadvantage when it comes to competition for

vessels have been caught engaging in IUU fishing, but subsidisation of the vessels has

fisheries resources. This is also clear from the disparity between large-scale industrial

continued.19 This fosters the notion that there are no consequences for engaging in

fisheries and small-scale fisheries. The former are provided with 81% of global subsidies,

IUU fishing.

while the latter receive just 19%.

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Third, without subsidies, many distant water fishing fleets would not be profitable.20

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These are fleets that fish on the high seas and in the waters of third countries through

subsidies needed to happen at international level – so all states could simultaneously

access agreements. Fuel and access subsidies (when payments are made by the

reduce their subsidies, leaving no fishing fleet at a disadvantage. Furthermore, cutting

government on behalf of its fleet to access third country waters) make this possible,

subsidy programmes is likely to lead to displeasure from the fishing fleet, jeopardising

with the subsidisation of other fishing inputs and vessel costs also playing a role.

political careers if the fishing industry is powerful enough.

This includes crew costs. In some parts of the world (e.g. the Pacific) these fleets are well-managed, and generally do not engage in excessive IUU fishing.22 However, in other regions (e.g. West Africa), distant water fleets are notorious for IUU fishing and overfishing, and regularly conflict with local fishers.23 The depletion of fish stocks in

Action (and Inaction) to Reduce Fisheries Subsidies

developing regions damages not only local ecosystems but also the food security and

For decades, there have been concerns raised over the negative effects of fisheries

stability of these regions.

subsidies. In 2001, this led to the WTO including this issue in the agenda for its latest

Fourth, inequities in the distribution of subsidies negatively affect the small-scale

round of trade negotiations – the Doha Development Round. This negotiating Round

sector and developing regions. Most subsidies are market-distorting. They allow for

has largely been seen as a failure, with only two agreements coming out of it in the last

some producers to sell their goods at a lower price than others, as the former have a large

two decades. The slow pace of negotiations in the WTO created a lot of frustration in

portion of their costs covered. This has been a significant bone of contention in WTO

the global community, as fish stocks continued to deplete during this period. In 2015,

negotiations in relation to agriculture subsidies, as smaller developing country producers

this led to the creation of SDG target 14.6 which provides that States should:

are not able to compete on international markets against producers from the United States and Europe.

By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity

Fisheries subsidies not only affect markets, but also the ability of fishers to catch

and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated

fish in the first place (the production of fish). This is because fisheries subsidies allow

fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and

for the purchase of better equipment, more time at sea, and longer fishing trips. The

effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries

disparity is particularly evident between small-scale fishers, who tend to use low-

should be an integral part of the World Trade Organization fisheries subsidies negotiation.

technology, traditional boats and gears, and industrial fishers, who may have all the latest modifications and equipment. The result of this disparity, and the consequent

During the long negotiating period, certain WTO Members also became exasperated.

overfishing and IUU fishing created by subsidies, is that the catch of small-scale fishers

Those who were invested in the conclusion of the Agreement resolved to pass some

in certain parts of the world has seen significant reductions in recent years.

measures on fisheries subsidies in the regional trade agreements (RTAs) they were

Finally, because of their market-distorting nature, it is very difficult for governments

in the process of negotiating. This included the very large (at the time) Trans-Pacific

to discontinue subsidy programmes. Much of the time, they do not want to do so

Partnership (TPP) Agreement, which covered around 40% of world trade and focused

because their fleets are then put at a competitive disadvantage against those fleets which

on the Asia-Pacific region. After the United States indicated that it would withdraw

remain heavily subsidised.

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This was the primary reason that trade negotiations on

from the TPP in 2017, the newly agreed Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement

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for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)27 covered around 13% of trade and 14% of fisheries and aquaculture production globally.28 However, it remains one of the largest regional trade agreements, and major fishing powers, including China and the United Kingdom (UK), are currently seeking accession (China) or have acceded (UK) to the Agreement. Shortly after the CPTPP was promulgated, the United States-MexicoCanada Agreement (USMCA)29 was adopted, which duplicated the CPTPP provisions on fisheries subsidies almost word-for-word. Finally, at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference in 2022, the AFS was adopted. Although Members were not able to agree on everything in the draft text, there was immense pressure to adopt the Agreement at this conference. The compromise was an unfinished Agreement that dealt only with issues that were relatively non-contentious, and a sunset clause providing that if Members are not able to ‘adopt comprehensive disciplines’ (i.e. finalise outstanding issues) within four years after entry into force, the Agreement will terminate.30 WTO Agreements need to be formally accepted by at least two-thirds (and preferably all) Members before they can come into force, and with only three acceptances currently on the books,31 this ticking clock may not start for some time yet. However, it remains to be seen whether WTO Members will be able to finalise the AFS, as the outstanding issues are some of the most contentious. These are the bans on subsidies contributing to overfishing and overcapacity and associated special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries and small-scale fisheries.

The Current Subsidy Prohibitions – Watered-down Provisions and Narrow bans The bans on fisheries subsidies in the CPTPP and USMCA, while novel at the time of adoption, are not particularly comprehensive. They cover similar issues to the current WTO Agreement, including bans on subsidies to overfished stocks and IUU fishing.32 Given that certain countries continue to subsidise their vessels even after they have been

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found engaging in IUU fishing, these provisions are beneficial. However, the coverage

escape sanctions for IUU fishing, and the use of flags of convenience or flags of non-

of the provision is potentially limited, as it relies on determinations of IUU fishing by a

compliance. In previous draft texts, however, this provision was a lot stronger – in

flag state or an RFMO.

The listing of vessels on RFMO IUU lists is a highly political

and bureaucratic process, and these vessels cover only a fraction of the vessels engaged in 34

IUU fishing.

effect an outright ban.41 It is unfortunate then, that it has been downgraded to a nonmandatory provision to which Members are unlikely to adhere.

Similarly, the AFS relies on determinations by an RFMO, flag State, or

coastal State. Although this goes further than the two RTAs in including coastal states, it also includes processes that states must follow before making an IUU declaration.35 Naturally, procedural fairness is important, but, as with RFMOs, these provisions are

The Promised Subsidy Prohibitions – Broader Bans and Special and Differential Treatment

likely to slow down and politicise the process. In both the RTAs and the AFS, the ban on subsidies to overfished stocks requires

Issues remaining for negotiation under the WTO Agreement are not stated in the

that States utilise best scientific evidence to determine whether a stock is overfished.

text. However, these can be inferred from a statement released by the Chair of the

Subsidies to unassessed stocks are not dealt with in the RTAs or covered by the AFS ban,

Negotiating Rules Group in September 2022,42 which highlights areas where Members

but are included in the AFS through a non-mandatory provision asking Members to use

could not agree. The primary outstanding issue is the adoption of a ban on fisheries

‘due restraint’ in providing subsidies to stocks whose status is unknown.

Although this

subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing, and exemptions to this provision,

issue is somewhat nuanced, as many stocks in developing country waters are unassessed,

which provide special and differential treatment for developing countries and ‘low

particularly those fished by small-scale fishers (because of their low value),

the fact

income, resource-poor and livelihood fishing’ (hereafter small-scale fisheries).43

that many developing countries sell the rights to these stocks means that distant water

The controversy surrounding the ban on ‘subsidies contributing to overcapacity and

nations can easily circumvent the ban on subsidies to overfished stocks when subsidising

overfishing’ relates to the potentially far-reaching nature of this category. Essentially, the

these fleets.

ban covers a closed list of subsidies which states may not provide, unless they fall under

The WTO adds a couple of additional bans and due restraint provisions to those

one of the exemptions. In previous drafts, this provision provided a fairly extensive list

provided in the RTAs. These include a ban on subsidies for fleets fishing in high seas

of subsidies, including those for construction, acquisition, modernisation, renovation,

While there is very little of the ocean that is not

and upgrading of vessels; vessel machinery and equipment (including fishing gear);

covered by RFMOs of one sort or another, this ban has the potential to do some good.

fishing inputs such as fuel, ice, or bait; costs of personnel, social charges, and insurance;

It is challenging to regulate the vast area that makes up the high seas, which is home to

and income, price, and at-sea support.44 Access subsidies are not included in these bans

many vulnerable, slow-growing species. As distant water fishing is often not possible

because of significant dissent on this point by a number of Members throughout the

without the aid of subsidies, this ban may provide some protection for these areas.

negotiations.

areas not regulated by an RFMO.

A final due restraint provision in the AFS that is worth mentioning, requests

Exemptions to these bans fell into two major categories. Firstly, a Member could

Members to take special care when granting subsidies to vessels not flying the

continue to provide these subsidies if it could show that there were measures in place to

Member’s flag.

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This provision may help to address problems around reflagging to

maintain the stocks at a biologically sustainable level in the relevant fishery.45 Secondly,

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all developing country Members could maintain these subsidies for a period of time, 46

and could provide them indefinitely to their small-scale fisheries.

Providing subsidies to the latter could have far-reaching consequences for sustainability.

Certain developing

This fear is certainly why the latest draft texts opted for language emphasising the

country Members (those with less than 0.7% of global marine capture) could also

subsistence and low-income aspects of the fishery. However, this exemption is narrow,

provide these subsidies to their fishers as long as they remained below the 0.7%

particularly as it further limits this to fishers that stay within the 12nm zone.53

threshold.47

Certainly, not all Members would have agreed to this provision.

While we do not know exactly what went on in the final days of negotiating at MC12, the far-reaching nature of these bans, and the specific categories included in the provision, are likely two of the reasons that Members could not agree on this category. It takes time to negotiate even simple provisions in an organisation with 161 Members,

Effects of Subsidy Bans on Developing Countries and SmallScale Fisheries

and this provision was certainly the most complex of the bans. Furthermore, special and differential treatment provisions have always been challenging to negotiate in the WTO,

Fisheries are an important source of food security and livelihood, and their absence can

and have become more so with the rise of powerful emerging economies like those

lead to national and regional insecurity.54 This is particularly true in coastal developing

in the BRICS alliance. These Members claim developing country status in the WTO

countries and small-scale fisheries. While current bans on fisheries subsidies at regional

fisheries subsidies negotiations,

while maintaining some of the largest fishing fleets

and international level are unlikely to have far-reaching effects, a more comprehensive

Granting wide-ranging S&DT exemptions to these countries would,

AFS will certainly impact these groups. It is important to consider what these effects

therefore, undermine the purpose of the Agreement. The global marine capture limit

may be and how social issues can be balanced appropriately with sustainability concerns,

was included as the answer to this dilemma, but pushback from large and powerful

so as not to undermine the benefits of fisheries for social stability. In truth, these issues

in the world.

developing countries, as has occurred in the past,

was likely another reason why the

cannot be separated, as the sustainability of fish stocks is an important driver of stability and food security.

negotiations failed on this point. Exemptions for small-scale fishing are also a thorny issue. While there were many

A robust AFS has been touted as a win for small-scale fisheries.55 As this group

exemptions proposed for this group in the first ten years of the negotiations – from

receives so little in the way of subsidies, an overall reduction in subsidies should reduce

fishing inputs to development of fishing communities

– it soon became clear that

unfair competition for resources. The same is true of those countries that do not or

there was a significant problem. Small-scale fisheries are a highly diverse group, which

cannot provide significant subsidies to their own fleets (if these exist) to render them

defies definition. No generally accepted definition existed at international level and

internationally competitive.56 As subsidies also affect the production of fish, their

national definitions differed tremendously. This raised problems. A narrow definition

continued use threatens food insecurity for all those who rely on fisheries.

would exclude many small-scale fisheries from its ambit, while a wide definition could 52

undermine sustainability.

As the AFS stands currently, this idea of reducing unfair competition and protecting

The very diversity of small-scale fisheries makes this a real

stocks for current and future generations has not come to fruition. The current

threat. While some are indeed the traditional, subsistence fisheries we generally associate

Agreement includes some provisions that may be helpful to developing countries,

with the image of this group, others can take the form of small commercial fleets.

including a grace period of two years to implement bans on subsidies to IUU fishing

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and overfished stocks (within their EEZs only)57, and the creation of a funding

claiming developing status in the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. These countries

mechanism to assist developing country Members to implement the Agreement.

have argued that developing countries should be given the same opportunity to expand

Although a voluntary fund, the WTO has been pushing for a robust mechanism to

their fleets as developed countries, and to use subsidies to meet their development

However, while

priorities.63 While this argument is not without merit in the case of some developing

these provisions may go some way to addressing problems of stock depletion and unfair

countries, it falls flat on several points. Firstly, large emerging economies already have

competition, the Agreement still largely fails to address these issues in its current form.

some of the largest fishing fleets in the world. Secondly, smaller developing countries

ensure that technical assistance is provided to developing countries.

When it comes to an expanded AFS, it is possible to speculate, based on previous 60

draft texts, how this might affect developing countries.

often do not have the resources to build fishing fleets and end up selling fishing rights not only to developed countries, but the same emerging economies claiming that they

If the ban on subsidies to overcapacity and overfishing was to be adopted in its

should be able to expand their fleets further. Thirdly, the dire state of fish stocks and

current form, it would be safe to assume that many developing countries and small-scale

marine ecosystems require that the global fishing fleet be immediately reduced, rather

fisheries would not be able to take advantage of the first exemption relating to fisheries

than expanded. In short, without limits on developing country exemptions, the AFS

management. As discussed, their stocks are often not assessed, nor are there sufficient

would be all but worthless.

measures in place to conserve these stocks, given resource deficiencies. Of course, the

Exemptions for subsidies going to small-scale fisheries have been extended to all

one benefit of this provision is that distant water fleets wishing to fish in the waters of

developing countries. This displays some understanding of the social benefits of fisheries.

developing countries would be forced to contribute significant resources to fisheries

However, the narrow nature of this exemption does exclude many fishers classed as

management to ensure that the stocks are maintained at a biologically sustainable level.

small-scale – fishers that make significant contributions to food security in their families

This would likely not assist small-scale fishers going after low-value stocks, however.

and communities. Thus, while it is good that there is some form of exemption for

The second exemption specifically targets developing countries and small-scale

small-scale fishers in this Agreement, it does not display sufficient concern for the social

fisheries. Countries with low marine capture generally do not have industrial fleets, nor

benefits of fisheries, and should be expanded. It is also unlikely to be accepted by many

do they have the resources to build them. However, they may provide small subsidies

developing countries,64 especially if the 0.7% marine capture limit is maintained in the

to their fishers (particularly small-scale fishers) to maintain food security and add

final Agreement.

value to the fisheries products (e.g. through processing).

Taking subsidies away from

Apart from affecting food security, the narrow exemption proposed also endangers

these countries would likely undermine food security and social stability with very

the lives of small-scale fishers. This is part of a larger problem in the AFS – that there

little tangible benefit to the sustainability of fish stocks. As a result, the creation of an

are no current or proposed exemptions allowing for fishing boats to be renovated or

exemption for developing countries based on a low contribution to marine capture, is

modernised to improve safety of fishers. As mentioned, an enormous number of fishers

eminently reasonable and necessary.

are lost at sea each year, and exemptions for their safety are imperative. Furthermore,

The situation becomes more complicated when it comes to larger developing

while providing an exemption for relief for natural disasters, the Agreement does not

countries. Indeed, Sumaila and his colleagues have treated China, Russia and others as

provide for economic or financial disasters, like the COVID-19 pandemic.65 Given

developed countries when estimating global fisheries subsidies,62 despite these countries

the deleterious mental, physical, and economic effects on fishers and disruptions to the

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fish supply chain caused by the pandemic,66 this is a significant oversight and provides

off East and West Africa, pay a fraction of what the fish is worth,72 while engaging in

further evidence that the Agreement prioritises sustainability over socioeconomic

extensive overfishing and IUU fishing. These agreements are often not publicly available,

concerns.

which increases the potential for corruption.73 This jeopardises the long-term viability

Another issue that may affect small-scale fisheries, is that over 50% of small-scale fisheries operate inland,

while the WTO Agreement (and indeed the RTAs) covers

of developing coastal State fisheries. The WTO Agreement thus presents an opportunity. As these fleets are not viable without subsidies, why not allow access subsidies only

On the one hand, this means that the majority of

under certain conditions?74 These might relate to transparency, fair compensation for

small-scale fishers can continue receiving subsidies from public entities. Given that

the resources, and contributions to fisheries management. This would provide at least

the majority of subsidies go to industrial fleets, however, the benefits to the small-scale

some basic safeguards to protect the marine resources of developing countries.

only marine capture fishing.

sector of an overall reduction in subsidies will not materialise. Instead, an unequitable status quo is likely to be maintained. Finally, when it comes to developing countries, it is important to talk about access

Conclusion

agreements. Access agreements are negotiated between governments and allow one State (the accessing State) to fish in the waters of another State (the coastal State).

Fisheries subsidies cover a wide range of payments to the fishing industry, not all of

The payments that are made for this access are government-to-government payments

which are problematic. However, the majority of global subsidies provided today

and, thus, do not fall under the definition of a subsidy. However, in many cases, the

contribute to the depletion of fish stocks and the deterioration of aquatic ecosystems, by

access rights are passed onto the accessing State’s fleet without any requirement for

building excessive capacity in the fishing industry, and continuing to finance overfishing

compensation. When this happens, a financial contribution is made to the fishing

and, in some cases, IUU fishing. Trade agreements, such as the AFS and several RTAs,

industry by a public entity, and an access subsidy arises.

were created to address these problems. When it comes to the protection of fish stocks

There has been a great deal of debate in the WTO as to whether these payments

and marine ecosystems, however, these agreements are currently not comprehensive

should fall under the ban on subsidies contributing to overfishing and overcapacity.

enough to make a tangible difference. They are also not sufficiently nuanced to protect

The current Agreement specifically excludes the government-to-government payments

vulnerable coastal states and small-scale fisheries.

but as these are not subsidies anyway, this provision is simply included

WTO Members are currently negotiating a comprehensive AFS, which has the

for clarification. Given that nothing about access subsidies has been included in recent

potential to provide robust protections. Naturally, it is extremely challenging to

drafts, however, it is probably safe to assume that the ongoing controversy over these

negotiate a nuanced agreement with 161 States all pushing their national interests, but

subsidies means that they will not be dealt with in the final Agreement.

WTO Members should make a concerted effort to reach a final Agreement that protects

discussed,

As with much of the AFS, this position lacks nuance. The issue of access subsidies is a nuanced one, however. On the one hand, certain distant water fleets are relatively well-

not only the sustainability of fish stocks, but also the lives of fishers and the contribution of fisheries to food security and livelihoods.

managed, and in areas like the Pacific Islands, access payments can make up over 50% of a country’s GDP.71 On the other hand, distant water fleets like those which operate

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PART 3

The History and Role of the FAO in Combatting IUU Fishing

The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures

The Relationship The Global between Fishers, National of Problem Governments and IUU Fishing and International Actors

the Role of the UN Agencies in the Fight Against It

The ILO’s Role in the Fight against IUU Fishing and the Work in Fishing Convention (C188)

The IMO’s Role in the Fight Against IUU Fishing and the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

PART 1

Triggering Death Quantifying the True Human Cost of Global Fishing

Introduction Fishing has long been acknowledged as one of the most hazardous occupations in the world. What hasn’t always been explicitly recognised is just how dangerous it was. The FISH Safety Foundation (FSF) recently undertook research to confirm or update the 1999 estimate of 24,000 fisher fatalities per year, and if possible, identify any contributing drivers to these fatalities. Ultimately, after 18 months of in-depth research, the FSF was left with two crucial findings: one, the number of annual fatalities in the global fishing sector was significantly higher than previously thought, and two, the exact number of fatalities per year was still unknown! We need better data. This paper highlights some of the results of our latest and, in many ways, our most difficult research project yet. It has been challenging for two reasons – firstly, sourcing the information. In most cases, there was simply no official data available from the

Eric Holliday FISH Safety Foundation

appropriate local Government departments, and where there was, this data was often at odds with the information we gleaned from other sources. Secondly, we realized our findings would come as a shock to the fishing sector – the death toll is simply so much

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contributions to society. Resulting data discrepancies exist through all realms of fisheries data, from employment numbers and reported catch volumes, to the occurrence rates of accidents and fatalities. Key management decisions are based on these statistics, which are wildly variable, potentially undermining the effectiveness of the policies designed around them. It’s worth repeating…we need better data!

Research Background The figure of 24,000 fatalities1 per year had originally been estimated through work carried out by FAO in 1987, which was later confirmed through a study done by ILO and published in the document Safety and health in the fishing industry. Report for

discussion at the Tripartite Meeting on Safety and Health in the Fishing Industry, Geneva, 1999. The ILO figure was determined using a compilation of data provided by a selection of countries which had accident reporting and data analysis systems in higher than what we had previously thought. As we will show, we’ve ended up with a global fisher fatality number of more than 100,000 people per year. There will no doubt be much debate about this number. And

place. This data produced an average fatality rate of 80 deaths per 100,000 fishers. This was multiplied by the estimated number of fishermen at the time – 30 million – and resulted in an estimate of 24,000 fatalities.

there should be! After all, our research shows the annual death toll to be some three to

In December 1999, the ILO published their findings in a press release stating that

four times higher than the numbers we’ve worked with for the past two decades. But

“As many as 24,000 fishermen and persons engaged in fish farming and processing are

an important point needs to be highlighted in this debate: There are still massive data

killed every year putting fishing and related occupations among the most dangerous of

gaps, which have a direct impact on determining the true severity of the fishing safety

all professions”.

problem, as well as on the interventions needed to try and improve this situation. Our work clearly showed the depth of the challenge the FAO and ILO were (and continue to be) up against. Undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges in this project

The ILO were clear from the onset that their figure was a tentative calculation, with the Safety and health in the fishing industry report outlining the concern that “fatality statistics may only be partially representative” due to several factors which included:

has been the unavailability of accurate and comprehensive data. Small-scale and inland fisheries can be – and often are – ignored in data collection, despite their key

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• Only using a small sample size from a global industry;

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• Lack of consistency in reporting requirements (including both number of fishers and occupational injury or fatality information); • Definitions of terms – such as fisher or fishermen – differed between countries; • Sources of information tended to only include the formal sector, so the informal sector activities were excluded;

justification behind the statement that in excess of 100,000 fishers are dying each year. Without careful consideration of the parameters of statements within this paper, it would be easy to take results out of context. We want to be clear that we are well aware of the data challenges and the uncertainty in this work – in fact, the need for data and consistent reporting is a fundamental

• Coverage of small businesses or the self-employed was deemed “partial, at best”;

finding of our work and one of our most important messages. We strongly recommend

• ILO statistics covered between 50 and 90 percent of total employment for most

avoiding focusing on the individual numbers within the paper, and instead considering

countries, and as little as 10 percent for some others.

the results as part of the bigger picture. In addition, while we may speak more about certain geographical regions, this is not

It is therefore, in some ways rather unfortunate that the resulting fatalities estimate

due to the fact that these areas are any worse or more dangerous than other regions. It

became the accepted industry figure for the next 20 years. In 2022, the FISH Safety

is critical to recognize this more likely indicates that this region had more information

Foundation (FSF) – in a project funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts – undertook

available. This is demonstrated in our particular focus on African fisheries, where fatality

research to confirm (or update) the 1999 ILO estimate of fisher fatalities per year, and if

rates in some communities are devastatingly high. Given this, it must be clearly stated

possible, identify any contributing drivers to these fatalities.

that individual countries should not be penalised for providing data, as it indicates a

Analysing thousands of pieces of information from all available sources revealed that

willingness to look at these problems directly and be part of the solution. Given the

the formal information on fatalities currently available is often inconsistent or missing,

similarity of the drivers explored throughout the investigation, it is likely that we would

with existing recording systems seriously fragmented. There are currently no statutory

see similar challenges in many other fishing communities around the globe.

requirements to report accidents and fatalities in most countries, with little or no

Instead, a greater focus should be on the sheer lack of information available – from

recording or formal investigations of these events taking place. We ultimately shed light

high- and low-income countries. In order to collectively move forward to find solutions

on why it was so difficult to estimate the number of fisher fatalities globally and propose

to this global challenge, it is essential that we are able to quantify it.

what should be done to improve the situation. We need more data.

Caveat

Data Gathering

With a complex topic such as this – attempting to quantify fatalities in fishing communities – context is essential. The information in our report is sobering and

Our Approach

often confronting. We present the “numbers” portion of a much larger investigation,

All data collected was from between the years 2000 and 2020, but in some rare cases,

including both the background and the analysis of our research, and clearly outline the

older information was used if no later information was available, and if nothing

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203

indicated any dramatic changes in that country or fishing industry. In addition, we also

and social and print media sources from almost all countries, but it proved to be one of

included some articles published since 2020 for discussion purposes.

our most significant sources of data.

It became clear early on in our work that if we only used typical industry and

In many cases, news articles from local media allowed us to confirm or update the

academic data in our searches, our results may not include all fishers due to the

fatality number provided by that country’s regulatory authority. We were also able to

limitations in available data. In many parts of Africa, for example, insufficient human

demonstrate that even some high-income countries, with the best reporting systems

and financial resources for data collection has often resulted in poor quality information

in place, may use a limited set of recording criteria which seemingly excludes some

which has limited statistical use. FAO reported that, for their 2009 statistical inquiry, “21

fatalities from its records.

(39%) out of 54 African countries were unable to provide national fisheries statistics, and for another 12 countries (22%), the data submitted was considered inadequate in 2

Another impediment in gathering accurate data was the different methodologies used by some Administrations. A case in point is a high-income country in the Pacific that reported maritime

relation to the relative importance of fisheries in the countries”.

We initiated our search for data by attempting to directly approach all fisheries and

fatalities and notifiable injuries or illness rates as a function of this nations’ overall

maritime authorities worldwide, outlining our project, and asking for fisher fatality data.

national population (using “annual rate of maritime fatalities …. per 100 000 country

While we had some responses to our request, many countries simply stated that they were

population”), and not the maritime / fishing industry population. Seemingly all that was

unable to assist as they did not collect the information sought by us. Other countries only

necessary for the fatality rate to go down was an increase in the nations’ population! To

provided information after repeated requests, and in some cases, this information was of

illustrate, assume that the participants in that country’s fishing sector remain constant

little value, and did not match the data found by us using other methods.

(say 10,000), and the number of fishing fatalities stays constant (say 10 fatalities per

The issue of data availability, reliability, and consistency became a greater concern

year), then the annual fatality rate for that industry would be 100 per 100,000. If this

as this project progressed, and ultimately changed the direction of our research. It

rate was now calculated against the overall population of the country using the 100,000

quickly became apparent that official information did not necessarily mean accurate

country population calculation (for a population of say 4 million in year 1), then the

information, and therefore, should not be the only information source considered.

rate would be 0.25. If the country’s population increased over the next 5 years to say 4.5

One of the fundamental problems with data in this industry is lack of consistency.

million, but the numbers of fishing fatalities remained constant at 10, then the fatality

Each country has its own reporting methods, requirements, and inclusions for reporting,

rate (measured against total population in year 5) would drop to 0.22 per 100,000

with even fundamental terminology varying between countries, limiting the accuracy

country population. Clearly there has been no decrease in fisher fatalities for a constant

of analysis within the industry.

fisher population. The accident rate has remained the same. The only thing that has

To address these limitations, we expanded our research to include news articles, investigative journalism, social media posts, and private communications from

changed is that the country’s population has increased. This method of fatality rate calculation is unique and misleading.

individuals and organisations across the globe. The information reported through the media proved to be particularly useful. Not only has it become increasingly easy to access information from ‘grey literature’

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Further Methodology For our work, we also had to establish clear thresholds and definitions on what to

205

include in this study. We expanded our definition of fisher to include aquaculture

some issues finding figures that fit within the parameters we had set for a “fisher,” which

workers. While wild catch and farmed fisheries may be two very different sectors in

was not unexpected given discrepancies in how this is defined.

some high-income countries, this is not the case in other regions. In many fisheries

Following this, we expanded our search to include further sources and collated

across Asia, South America and Africa, the interplay between the two sectors is

that information in targeted spreadsheets. As we did so, we found several substantial

significant and they cannot be separated.

inconsistencies in this process. For example, Madagascar recorded five different number

We ended up by defining fishers as:

of fisher figures, ranging from 40,000 to 400,000 fishers.5, 6 In India, we saw numbers between 900,000 and 25,000,000, and Nigeria ranged from 1,490,0007 to over

All artisanal, small-scale, industrial, commercial, municipal, diving, inshore, shore based (including shellfish or crustacean gathering), inland or riverine fishing, as well as aquaculture workers are included under the blanket term of fisher.

Note: Processors and recreational fishers are excluded from this data set.

6,000,000.8 To further complicate this process, the reasons behind these inconsistencies also varied. Examples included: • Differing figures within a singular document due to a mistype – with no clarity on which was correct.

Following our agreed definition of fisher, we attempted to categorise each country’s

• Figures cited from reports published by different departments or members of the

fishers by general subsector. This was yet another data challenge – the lack of consistency

same organisation, with vastly different quantities – likely due to the inclusion

between industry definitions of each subsector across the world made this almost

criteria or source of data used in each report.

impossible to do based off one singular definition. Instead, we were guided by each

• Varying definitions and interplay between fishing communities. For example,

country’s own definitions and classifications. To compare across countries, we assigned

there is often a dynamic relationship between marine fisheries and aquaculture, for

fishers to one of the following categories (when possible):

example in low-income countries where larvae or juvenile wild-caught fish are used to populate fish farms, making it almost impossible to distinguish between marine

• Marine Commercial / Industrial

fishers and fish farmers without a clear and inclusive definition. Similarly, brackish

• Marine Small-Scale / Artisanal / Subsistence

water fishers could fall into the category of both marine and inland fishers. Once

• Inland

we made the decision to include aquaculture workers, we had to again try and

• Aquaculture

calculate the estimated number of fishers around the world. This was a challenging

• Total (where sector breakdown wasn’t available)

task due to lack of consistency in methodology and fragmented data. The FAO State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (SOFIA) 2020 publication9 provided

Fisher Numbers: Data Selection Justifications

the latest (at the time of the study) estimate on industry participation numbers at

Our initial figures on the number of fishers were gathered from the FAO Fishery and

59,509,000. However, our research suggests that this is likely an underestimate.

Aquaculture Country Profiles. While this is considered a reliable source, we did have

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• Due to inconsistent and often unavailable fisher number statistics, many fishers

207

are then excluded from official figures, the implications of which are discussed in detail throughout the report.

impact on legislation and some of the key drivers of risk should not be underestimated. This will be addressed in further work by the FISH Safety Foundation.

In the cases where we had multiple figures for a country, we conducted further research into the source and methodology behind the numbers to decide which data

Research Results

source would provide the most accurate figure for our dataset. Work on this project remains ongoing due to our constantly expanding information

Challenges

database. While we have chosen not to attempt to determine a global fisher fatality rate,

Some issues were raised internally as we conducted our work and needed to be addressed

our work is already shedding critical light on how many fishers die around the world

and managed as the project progressed.

each year. By exploring more than 30 regional and national sector examples across the

Firstly, while it could be argued that producing an exact number of fishermen would

globe, our calculations suggest in excess of 100,000 fishers die annually.

be helpful, this is clearly something that cannot be produced with the available data.

Yet, this estimate excludes some of the world’s most populous fishing communities

Due to this lack of consistent information, we have purposely excluded from our results

where we were unable to quantify fatalities due to lack of data. That is, much of the

a figure for the total number of fishers as it holds no benefit to the context of this paper.

world is not counted in that number at all.

The second issue presents a greater challenge – the misinterpretation of data.

The information has been sourced through both public resources and private

Fundamentally, the issue is that data quality and availability can potentially produce

communications from numerous industry contacts. At this time, country names have

skewed comparisons of greater or lesser risk, concerns that apply to fisher fatalities as

been removed for privacy reasons and to encourage the consideration of results on a

well, which is the focus of the remainder of this report.

global scale.

For example, if Country A provides all its fatalities data, we may end up with a high,

A reminder that these numbers are estimates with large uncertainties and that

but accurate, rate of fisher death. Country B then provides a lower rate of death, but

while they appear precise, they should not be considered as such. All facts, figures and

with high uncertainty – and we know from other sources that Country B is not safer

calculations have been through a full independent fact-check process for verification

than Country A. Instead, it is simply that the information we have from Country B is

before final results were determined.

misleading. Regardless, providing both statistics as the best available gives the impression that the

Despite significant uncertainties, the fact that our estimate here is for only selected countries is evidence that even the 100,000 deaths is likely a significant underestimate.

fisheries sector in Country B is significantly safer than in Country A – which we know is not the case. Instead, we need to make clear it is a difference in data quality.

The Collection, Categorisation and Use of Data

Finally, we found significant data inconsistencies among other divisions of the

In our research, we attempted to record national statistics by a general category of

industry, such as capture statistics and fish consumption levels as we outline in the

fishing sector, e.g., commercial, small-scale, inland or aquaculture where possible. The

report. While these may not reflect directly on fatality numbers, their contribution or

rationale for this is that we began to identify significant differences in both the risks

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209

and fatality rates for subsectors within each country’s overall fishery sector. In many

Country 5

All Marine

Asia

141,000

107

151

Country 6

Commercial

Americas

40,000

112

Country 7

Artisanal

Africa

8,250

182

We have been able to do this on a regional or national basis for some countries, either

Country 8

All Marine

Africa

45,000

549

247

for the whole industry or partial subsectors. In these cases, we have ensured that we only

Country 9

All Marine

Americas

102,000

296

302

apply a fatality rate to the number of fishers it directly applies to.

Country 10

All Marine

Asia

404,000

146

In essence, if we have a fatality rate and number of fishers for a country’s small-scale

Country 11

All Marine

Asia

420,000

140

588

sector, then the number of fatalities has been calculated based only on the number of

Country 12

Marine

Asia

2,241,800

140

3,139

Country 13

Small Scale

Asia

20,000

140

Country 14

Aquaculture

Asia

500

380

we have fatality rates developed on a regional basis (i.e., across multiple countries),

Country 15

All Marine

Europe

1,870

139

which resulted in the fatality rate being applied across that region.

Country 16

Artisanal

Africa

1,810

cases, the variation of numbers of fishers between these subsectors was significant. If this information is available, it is essential it be considered.

small-scale fishers and not across the entire country’s number of fishers. In some cases, we have a “blanket rate” which encompasses all sectors, which is the only time we include all fishers in that calculation. Additionally, we have examples where

The following tables demonstrate the global and industry breakdown of a selection of our gathered data.

Total Fatalities

27,452

Table 1: Subsectors (Refers to a country with only partial sector information)

1: Subsector breakdowns were used in all cases where we were able to identify two 2: Regional Breakdowns were used where this information was available.

key pieces of information for a specific fishery in a particular country: 1. The number of fishers in that individual subsector 2. The fatality rate specific to the subsector

Location

Subsector

Continent

Fisher Numbers

Fatality rate / 100,000

Number of fatalities

Country 1

All Marine

Africa

165,000

155

256

Country 2

All Marine

Africa

600,000

522

Country 3

Artisanal

Asia

900,000

190

1710

Country 4

All Marine

Asia

9,484,000

214

20,296

Location

Subsector

Continent

Fisher Numbers

Fatality rate / 100,000

Number of fatalities

Region 1

Artisanal

Africa

3,500,000

1,000

35,000

Region 1

Commercial

Africa

47,000

1,000

470

Region 2

All Marine

Europe

106,000

Region 3

Inland

Africa

3,500,000

1,800

63,000

Total Fatalities

98,560

Table 2: Regional* Calculations (*Regions do not include countries from Table 1)

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211

An explanatory note is necessary here. Africa was the only region where we felt

Country 22

Blanket Rate

Americas

8,000

242

and predict the number of

Country 23

Blanket Rate

Americas

39,000

114

fatalities occurring in the inland sector. We chose to include these figures for inland

Country 24

Blanket Rate

Americas

3,400

134

fisheries, and for Africa as a region, for two reasons. Firstly, we had an estimated number

Country 25

Blanket Rate

Oceania

9,700

of inland fishers for the continent as a whole11 and information for the individual

Country 26

Blanket Rate

Oceania

42,000

105

Country 27

Blanket Rate

Oceania

3,000

288

Country 28

Blanket Rate

Oceania

4,000

159

Country 29

Blanket Rate

Europe

7,000

we potentially had enough information to extrapolate,

nations within this region was difficult to find. Secondly, we were able to calculate an estimation for the number of fatalities on Lake Victoria, which came to approximately 1,800 fatalities per 100,000 fishers on the lake. We explored the drivers of the fatalities for Lake Victoria as well as other fatalities across inland Africa to see if the drivers were comparable, and if we could justify

Total Fatalities

486

Table 3: Blanket Rates (refers to all fishing sectors within a particular country)

the extrapolation of the 1,800 fatalities per 100,000 fishers across all inland African

And to add to the overall confusion on accurate data, consider just one subsection

fisheries. Ultimately, we decided that the qualitative data supported the extrapolation. A

of the fishing industry – dive fisheries. Research by Bassett12 identified 118 diving

full case study on Africa’s inland fisheries can be found in the body of the Report.

communities across 60 countries, highlighting the global spread of dive fisheries. While the exact number of dive fishers is unknown, previous investigations in the 1990s

3: Blanket rates were provided to specific fisheries where a generic rate was provided

indicated some 33,000 to be operating in Central and South America, 10,000 in the

or supplied for an entire country’s fisheries sector. Typically, we found these rates were

Philippines and thousands more across Indonesia.13 Modern-day numbers of fishers are

only available for nations with smaller sectors. It may be noted that the number of

likely to be considerably higher.

fatalities that are mentioned in some of the case studies outlined in this report are not included within these results tables. This is an intentional omission as we are not able to

Marinduque, Philippines

Fatality rate of 5,000 per 100,000

confidently verify that we have not already included these fatalities or results in previous

Thai Urak Lawoi people

Fatality rate of 3,000 per 100,000 97.9% of divers experiencing symptoms consistent with decompression illness

numbers. Grenada, lobster and conch Location

Subsector

Continent

Fisher Numbers

Fatality rate / 100,000

Number of fatalities

Country 17

Blanket Rate

Africa

28,000

Country 18

Blanket Rate

Asia

195,000

Sri Lanka, sea cucumber

Country 19

Blanket Rate

Asia

314,000

236

Tuvalu

Country 20

Blanket Rate

Americas

54,500

Tanzania, sea cucumber

Country 21

Blanket Rate

Americas

2,500

212

Miskito Keys Taiwan dive fishery

Fatality rate of 2,700 per 100,000 Decompression illness – 128 incidents from 123 divers interviewed Decompression Sickness incidence up to 72.6% As divers increased submersion distances, accidents became more frequent, however morbidity and mortality rates are not quantified. Deaths led to closure of fishery Several serious cases of paralysis; death not uncommon

Table 4: International Incident and Fatality Rates14

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Summary Figures, information and extracts for Bangladesh included: Considering the limited data and additional uncertainties of key information such as the total number of fishers, we are unable to produce a global fatality rate as there are

• The fishing sector in Bangladesh is considered the most vulnerable to

simply too many variables. As stated previously, the fact that a country or region has

climate change in the whole world due to its height above sea level, rising

more information available (as shown for example in the case of both marine and inland

waters and increasing number of storms. Over the past 20 years, at least

fisheries in West Africa) does not necessarily mean that Africa has a higher fatality rate

3,500 fishers have died and 10,000 are missing here (Trawler Owners’

than Asia, for example. It simply means that more information is available in Africa at

Association of Barguna).

this time. The FAO

estimates that 85 percent of the world’s fishers come from Asia.

• In the Boga community (Bagerhat District), 27 fishermen were lost in cyclones in 2016. As a country, the total (not just fishermen) death toll

Yet, publically available, credible information from this region is limited. The secondary challenge we recognised was the serious lack of accuracy in what has

from Cyclone Bulbul was reported to be 12, with an additional five

typically been considered the primary industry data. Fundamental information – such

fishermen missing. However, a study indicates that two villages alone

as the number of fishermen – is based on fragmented data and sometimes questionable

reported 25 fisher fatalities from the event, demonstrating significant

methodology. This is not limited to just the fishing industry, but the drivers of risk as

under-reporting of fatalities in these communities. • Pirate attacks are another serious threat to fishermen in the region. Boats,

well.

equipment and catches are often stolen; fishermen are held for massive ransoms and in some cases killed.

There is simply too much we do not know.

• A single pirate attack in 2013 saw 32 fishermen killed, while in another report a local described that at least 70 fishermen from the Chittagong

Case Study: The difficulty with numbers – Bangladesh

district had been killed by pirates in the last two years.

The number of fishers was difficult to determine in Bangladesh, with the FAO Fishery and Aquaculture Profile stating that in 2010 there were 2,180,000 fishers, yet in 2005 a Bangladesh Department of Fisheries report stated that the sector provided employment for about 1.3 million full-time professional fishermen and 12 million part-time fisherfolk, corresponding to about 10 16

percent of the total population.

In 2016, the Department of Forest

Multiple sources indicate that there is a reluctance to report pirate attacks to law enforcement due to inaction and corruption. The bottom line is that we don’t know how many fishers there are in Bangladesh, nor do we know how many die each year.

stated

that the sector employed more that 17 million people (full time and part time), which corresponded to around 11 percent of the total population.

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Case Study: The complexity of the problem – The Lakes of Africa

• 2017 – Two fishermen died after the boat capsized on Lake Naivasha – likely due to weather conditions. • 2020 – Four fishermen were killed by hippopotamuses in January, with the

Lake Victoria According to local officials, 5,000 people (some reports said ‘fishers’) died on the Lake each year.

According to the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization, 19

there are approximately 220,000 fishers on the Lake.

A second study specified 20

death toll reaching nine by March. • 2020 – Multiple fishermen died in less than a month in various incidents after their boats capsized. Beach management appealed to fishermen to

that 5 fishers drown every day in the Tanzanian sector of Lake Victoria. When

ensure they used protective gear whilst fishing.

we applied the rate of 5 fatalities per day to the estimated number of fishermen

• 2020 – At least 10 illegal fishermen went missing after their boat capsized.

in the Tanzanian sector, it produced a fatality rate of approximately 1,800 per 100,000 fishers.

Lake Edward

When we applied this fatality rate to the total number of fishers on the Lake,

• 2018 – The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accused Uganda of

it suggested just over 4,000 fatalities per year. While this was below the initial

killing four fishermen on the shared lake, after their bodies were found

statement of 5,000 fatalities, we felt it was justified to use this number due to the

bound and bullet riddled.

lack of clarity over whether the deaths were exclusively fishing-related or applied

• 2020 – Ugandan Fisheries Protection Unit shot two people, killing one, and

to the general population.

arrested five others for fishing with illegal nets on Lake Edward.

Our research has highlighted a concerning trend regarding the frequency of fatalities occurring on and around the other inland lakes in Africa, and the

Lake Albert

similarities these had with obstacles faced in the Lake Victoria region.

• 2017 – One fisher killed, another injured. Attacks by hippos are common –

The following examples show the impact of weather, wild animals, boundary 21

disputes and illegal fishing on some of the other lakes in Africa.

in a previous year, increased attacks stopped fishing at some landing sites. • 2018 – Over several months, attempts to address illegal fishing, driven by declining fish stocks, increased tensions in lakes between the Democratic

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Lake Naivasha

Republic of Congo and Uganda. Uganda deployed its military; hundreds of

• 2015 – The local government explored options to ban night fishing on

fishers from the DRC were arrested, and the Congolese militia shot seven

Lake Naivasha after five fishermen died in one week. Officials attributed

fishers from Uganda. Armed DRC groups also robbed fishermen on their

the deaths to ignorance and failure to obey set rules and regulations, such

boats, stealing engines and catches.

as wearing life jackets, while a rescued fisherman blamed strong winds and

• 2 018 – 12 fishers were killed in one week, including seven shot by

currents.

Congolese militia.

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The Drivers Lake Chad • 2014 – 48 fishers were killed by Boko Haram militants.

As our research has shown, each fisheries

• 2015 – 19 fishers were killed in a region on Lake Chad, 10 during a Boko

sector and region faces its own unique set of

Haram attack on three villages.

challenges, yet the central drivers are often

• 2017 – A Nigerian military ban on fishing on the Nigerian side of the lake

similar, if not the same.

was lifted, and 31 fishers were killed by Boko Haram. The ban had been in

While we explored the facets of each

place because of accusations that Boko Haram was using fishing profits to

driver individually, we also demonstrated the

fund its campaign.

interconnectivity of the drivers, and how in

• 2018 – Boko Haram increased attacks on fishermen and farms, killing 10

many cases there is no singular cause. Each

fishers after accusing them of leaking information to the military. Locals

driver is connected and amplified by the

reported farming and fishing to be near impossible in the region out of fear

next, resulting in a cumulative impact that

of Boko Haram.

results in the current status of each of these fisheries. In each situation, the impact and

Lake Volta

weight of each driver differs, as each driver in itself is formed through the accumulation

Lake Volta (Ghana, West Africa) is one of the world’s largest human-made

of many individual inputs.

lakes. It is also considered one of Africa’s most dangerous — especially for children. At one point, almost 50,000 child slaves, most under the age of 10, are

The Drivers

estimated to have worked on the lake. Driven by desperation, poor families from

As part of this discussion, we chose to explore the topics which we felt to be the

around Ghana sell their children to human traffickers, or directly to fishermen.

most relevant to the safety of fishers – both directly and indirectly – and support our

The children are sought after for a number of reasons; they are small and take

discussion with examples gathered from fishing communities, organisations, and

up less room in the boats, they are less likely to resist when treated badly, and

intergovernmental bodies. While the links between these drivers and fisher fatalities

most importantly, they have small and nimble hands. Despite not knowing how

may not be immediately clear, these issues need to be considered in a macro sense as all

to swim, these children are tasked with the deadly role of diving overboard and

contribute to the safety of fishers in one or more ways.

untangling fishing gear when it gets entangled in the submerged tree branches of the forest that once stood here before the creation of the lake.

In our report, we reiterated that this is by no means a complete collation of all the influential governing factors, rather an excerpt of particularly relevant issues. And while we delve into a number of drivers as shown in the diagram above, for this article, a brief overview of only two of the most relevant drivers is provided below:

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219

Governance

management measures will continue to be compromised, and the fishers’ lives and

Weakness in governance is a factor that acts individually as well as collectively,

livelihoods will remain at risk. Examples we have found include:

and underpins all other primary drivers. Ineffective governance, poor policies, and unenforced legal frameworks have resulted in increased fatalities, widespread

• Political leaders from numerous locations have been involved in financial ventures

environmental degradation and the depletion of resources – driving poverty and

with foreign fishing companies, allowing international industrial fleets access to

reducing food security for millions of people.

national resources with minimal management — directly reducing food security

The governance of fisheries, including inland fisheries, is extraordinarily complex due to the interaction of multiple drivers and multiple stakeholders.

and driving poverty of those reliant on the resource.22 • Due to the cost of fuel in Madagascar, the two organisations responsible for search

Governance (or lack of governance) embraces many facets, including data collection,

and rescue operations, the Coast Guard and Navy, rarely send vessels out on rescue

analysis, legislation and regulations, resource management, enforcement, corruption,

missions. This is particularly relevant to small-scale fishers, as there is very little

and unintended consequences. Low income countries (LICs) often have particular issues

chance of rescue from one of these authorities unless they are close to one of the

like lack of infrastructure, capacity limitations, and decreased investment in search and

relevant bases.23

rescue operations, safety training, etc.

• In Cameroon,24 fisheries inspectors are aware that they don’t have the power or capacity to control the industrial fisheries occurring offshore, and therefore turn their attention to the already vulnerable artisanal fishers. Through a combination of marginalization and corruption, these fishers are harassed by all levels of authority in the ports, including the fisheries officers, customs officers, and merchant mariners. It is not unusual for them to be coerced to give bribes before being able to licence their vessel or process their catch. • In 2015, the Brazilian government cancelled nearly all monitoring programmes for artisanal fisheries in its Amazon region.25 • On Lake Albert, there are rules regarding net sizes, which remain unenforced due to insufficient resources of the fisheries department – and corrupt fisheries

In many nations, lack of trained regulatory personnel and lack of resources is a

officers.26

serious constraint to fishing safety. Despite the crucial role of small-scale fisheries in

• Indonesian government officials made no effort to enforce laws against blast

global food security, national policies are often skewed, providing inadequate protection

fishing or cyanide fishing on coral reefs despite the clearly devastating impact on

to the people and resources in this often-invisible industry.

both the environment and fish stocks.27

Challenges with climate change, overfishing, poverty and safety are compounded by weak governance. Without adequate funding or resources, any new or existing

220

• In Vietnam, patrols happen too infrequently to pose any threat to illegal fishers, as they simply move their vessels during the patrols.28

221

• Indonesia stated that lack of resources to patrol coastal waters hindered the state’s 29

ability to tackle piracy and associated crimes.

organisation or government, making it exceptionally challenging to address. Our research uncovered evidence of corruption, or potential corruption, at all levels of industry. The sheer scale of this meant it was impossible to discuss the subject in

Unintended consequences

full in our report – but we provide numerous examples of the practice throughout

In any industry as complex as fisheries, there will always be risks of unintended

the report. At an international level, corruption can occur through bribery, obscure

consequences with new guidelines, approaches, or legislation. The FAO alluded to this

contracts and access arrangements between high- and low-income countries, and failure

challenge in a report called International Commercial Fishing Management Regime

to meet a nation’s obligations under international agreements.33 On a national or policy

Safety Study: Synthesis of Case Reports, 30 which explored potential outcomes of

level, corruption occurs in politics and throughout the vessel / fisher licencing systems,

management policies, or changes in them, for safety at sea.

with registration of vessels at the incorrect size, the acceptance of bribes, human tracking, and intentionally altered statistical submissions.

“Multiple studies suggest that although fisheries management policies are not meant 31

to regulate safety at sea, they do sometimes contribute to safety problems”

When intercepting fishers-turned-people smugglers, the coast guard can often be 34

persuaded to turn a blind eye for the right price.

Case Study: Lake Kyoga

Finally, at the level of the fishers, corruption frequently involves the use of bribes,

A two-year fishing ban on the lake to help replenish fish stocks resulted in over

illegal fishing (including catching banned species or exceeding quotas), fake licences,

2,500 fishermen turning to charcoal burning as an alternative source of income.

mislabelling, and the procurement of cheap labour.35

This practice involves the cutting down of trees and burning them to form charcoal, a practice that has significant environmental impacts. At the same time,

Boundary Disputes and Geopolitical Conflict

locals reported the forces manning the operations on the lake were involved in

Boundary disputes have the potential to impact on the driver categories of IUU,

both torture and illegal fishing activities themselves.

climate change and governance depending on the situation. Usually, it is a combination of the three drivers. As fish stocks diminish across the globe, fishers travel further afield to secure fish. Not only does this further travel increase the risks associated with ill-

Corruption

equipped vessels, changeable weather patterns and collisions with industrial vessels, but

Arguably, no discussion of fisheries governance would be complete without including

it increases the risks of human violence.

corruption. Corruption is a challenging issue to tackle, as by its very nature, it is mostly

In South America, industrial marine vessels clash with small-scale fishermen,

hidden and, thus, unquantifiable. It is deeply intertwined with all the primary drivers

generating territorial conflicts which directly impact the safety and food security of local

and undermines the effectiveness of any safety, social, economic or environmental

communities. At the same time, small-scale fishers are facing further conflicts with the

initiatives developed. It can occur in multiple forms, and within any level of

state, as the development of marine protected areas effectively prohibits their access to

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traditional fishing grounds. In many cases, governing bodies have created these protected areas without consulting local communities or encouraging their participation.36 In the inland fisheries, conflicts occur between fishers trying to take advantage of better sale prices and fish stocks in neighbouring countries. Bolivian and Brazilian fishers have been involved in several arguments as Bolivian fishers sell their fish in

As a result, many Senegalese fishers crossed the boundary into the rich Mauritanian waters. In 2016, the Mauritanian government put an end to this and banned international vessels from fishing in their waters. Armed warships began patrolling the water with a clear message: Keep out.

Brazilian markets for a lower price, thus lowering the value of the Brazilian fishers’ catch. Simultaneously, Bolivian fishers resent Brazilian fishers encroaching into their waters as they are better equipped and able to catch more fish.37

Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

Thousands of fishers are also facing the dangers of political disputes between

We make it clear in our report that the blanket term “Illegal, Unreported and

neighbouring countries. Ongoing conflict between Israel and Gaza has had dire effects

Unregulated (IUU) fishing” should be used with caution given the risk of further

on Gaza’s fishers. Between 2000 and 2019, fishers were only permitted to fish up to

marginalization of small-scale fishers. Through no fault of their own, small-scale

6 nautical miles (NM) off the Gaza coast, which was eventually increased to 15NM

fisheries are generally not included in national reporting or regulatory frameworks, thus

in April 2019. In the 6 months following, changes to the fishing limits were made 14

technically including them in the all-encompassing criminality of IUU and yet again

times. Not only has this resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of fishers in the area,

undermining their critical role in global food security.

but their catch volume has dropped significantly. The situation remains precarious, with

Not only can one not compare the industrial fleets fishing off the coasts of Africa or

the Israeli navy enforcing the bans using live fire and injuring – sometimes fatally –

South America to a family trying to sustain themselves in the rivers of the Amazon, but

the drivers and resulting impacts of these activities are vastly different and need to be

fishers and their children.

addressed individually. In order to provide some context here, we chose to distinguish IUU activities by

Case Study: Senegal 39

In Senegal,

three distinct categories in order to address each issue more clearly.

this issue is at the forefront of the fishers’ challenges. Overfishing,

by both local and international fishers, has resulted in a dramatic decline in

Organised Industrial IUU

stocks. This has serious implications for food security in the region, where

Industrial IUU refers to the type of illegal fishing typically seen in the distant water fleets.

climate change not only contributes to a decline in fish stocks but also reduces

These are vessels which take deliberate steps to avoid detection, disregarding local and

the amount of food that is grown on land.

international requirements to make a profit.

“Stick to Senegalese waters and risk coming back empty-handed, or trespass into 40

Mauritanian waters and risk getting shot?”

Organised Small-Scale IUU

This refers to organised illegal, unrecorded or unreported fishing activities occurring between multiple parties in small-scale or artisanal networks, often involving intentional

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“There are different solutions to each problem. If these were three illnesses, there must be different treatments, because if you compound [them] and think of these fisheries issues only as illegal fishing, you won’t cure the problem.” 41

Nygiel Armada, Fish Right Program

All components of IUU are more likely to happen in countries that have weak governance and lack the capacity to police their waters. This is usually in lower-income countries, where poor socio-economic conditions, lack of employment options, and food insecurity increase both the impact of IUU and the likelihood of it occurring.42 As violations of a country’s laws, transhipments of catch with industrial fleets illegally

IUU has been discussed extensively elsewhere, we simply provide the following extracts

operating in an area, and the catch of prohibited fish for illegal export.

for further consideration:

IUU by Necessity

‘IUU by necessity’ occurs when small-scale fishers participate in intentional illegal activities out of desperation. Driven by the impacts of poverty, industrial-scale illegal fishing, reduced fish stocks, climate change, lack of food security and the absence of any other livelihood alternative, millions of fishers rely on their local resources to survive.

• Illegal fishing activities account for an estimated 40 percent of all catches off West 43

Africa.

• Lake Kivu has seen a 28 percent drop in fish production over two years as illegal fishing 44

rates continue to increase.

• It has been argued that in Africa, the main forms of illegal activities are licenced vessels underreporting their catches, fishers using banned fishing methods, and substantial

The Cause

fraud in the misreporting of vessel sizes.

IUU fishing activity is widespread enough to affect the whole industry, but it affects

• Penalties on companies are often minimal or ineffective. To deter illegal activities, studies

each individual fisherman in a unique way. Understanding the contributing factors that

suggest punishments need to be drastically increased, with penalties as much as 24 times

drive the behaviour of fishers is essential for effective fisheries management.

more required in some areas.

The reasons behind IUU are hard to isolate as there are so many variables behind the behaviour and the activity itself. Industrial fleets operating in foreign waters are not comparable to a fisher sustaining his family and not reporting his catch to the relevant authority, yet technically they are both involved in IUU fishing activities and therefore

• Lack of enforcement means 93 percent of fishing off the coast of Somalia is in the area 47

reserved for artisanal fishers.

• 76 percent of fish species (including shrimp and crab) in Lake Victoria currently face 48

extinction due to IUU fishing.

get covered by the blanket term and associated criminality. In order to be addressed effectively, each component of IUU — the illegal, the unreported, and the unregulated — needs to be considered individually.

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The Next Steps

The approach to safety in the fisheries sector, and its related activities, has historically been fragmented at a local level between different administrative departments and

The fishing industry is facing a significant number of challenges.

bodies (e.g., fisheries, agriculture, coast guard, etc.), seriously hampering a coordinated

Our research clearly demonstrates that the dangers and fatalities associated with

effort to improve the situation. At an international level, organisations such as the FAO,

fishing are considerably worse than previously thought, yet fishing remains a vital

ILO and IMO, while following their mandates, replicate this disjunction, which affects

component of the global food chain. Providing meaningful, targeted interventions to

coordination in legislative / standards development and effective implementation.

simultaneously safeguard both the people involved and this critical food source requires

In short – responsibilities for safety in the fisheries sector are spread at national and

evidence.

international levels, which affects the effectiveness of safety and fisheries management.

The collection and analysis of data and a functioning legislative framework are closely

For real change to current global fisher accident and mortality rates, there is a clear

intertwined. There is currently a lack of reliable data on the true human cost of fishing –

need to develop and promote proper legal standards and remits by which national

and this data is essential for driving regulatory reform.

authorities can operate and make governance and policy shifts toward a safer world for fishers. There is a need to investigate country- (and fishery-) specific regulations

Addressing the Data Gaps

to better understand which gaps are adding to non-compliance with safety measures,

There are several facets of this data challenge that need to be addressed, including

non-reporting of incidents and other such regulatory and reporting deficiencies, or

definitions of key terms, identifying the true number of fishers, and the reporting,

breaches which lead to a lack of both data and action, but where policy measures can be

recording and analysis of accidents.

reasonably applied. Further, the development of local or national legislation should have clear industry

There are currently no statutory requirements to report and record fishing accidents and fatalities in most countries.

input from local fishers and communities to address the specific needs of these subsectors and mitigate the risk of unintended consequences of these regulations. In order to reduce the unacceptably high fatality rate in this sector, it is argued that

There is an urgent need for work in these areas, including the need to establish a consistent data collection system and repository on fisher accidents and mortality.

specific emphasis should be focused on those best placed to improve safety standards in the fishing sector (Port State regulators, Maritime / Fisheries Departments, and Compliance and Enforcement officials). They have the most direct contact with fishers,

Regulatory Reforms

vessel owners, associations, etc., and are therefore an important link in this work.

Our research clearly shows problems with reporting, recording, investigation and

As we pointed out in the Foreword, after 18 months of in-depth research, the FSF

analysis of fishing accidents at both the national and international levels. Much of

was left with two crucial findings: one, the number of annual fatalities in the global

this stems from the lack of a formal regulatory framework. Despite the integral role

fishing sector was significantly higher than previously thought, and two, the exact

these fishers play in maintaining global food security, there is very little international

number of fatalities per year was still unknown.

legislation aimed at keeping fishers safe.

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We need data. And we need to act on that data. Additional Resources The Project Website www.the-human-cost-of-fishing.org has the following resources available for download: • The full report “Triggering Death: Quantifying the true human cost of global fishing” • • • •

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Pew Issue Brief Pew Press Release IMarEST Interview: “The human cost of fishing is higher than you think” Marine Policy Paper: “The human cost of fishing”

The Role of the ITF in Representing the Rights of Fishers

Introduction The International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) is a democratic, affiliateled federation recognised as the world’s leading transport authority. The ITF fights passionately to improve working lives, connecting more than 700 affiliated trade unions from 153 countries that may otherwise be isolated, and helping their members to secure rights, equality and justice. We are the voice for nearly 20 million working men and women across the world. The following goals form part of ITF’s constitution and inspire everything we do: • Promote respect for trade unions and human rights worldwide • Work for peace based on social justice and economic progress • Help our affiliated unions defend the interests of their members • Provide research and information services to our affiliates • Provide general assistance to transport workers in difficulty The ITF represents nearly 130,000 fishers, working at sea and organised in 90

Rossen Karavatchev International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), London, UK

affiliates, as part of the seafood supply chain. We campaign for better working conditions in an industry that can be harsh and oppressive to those working outside regulation.

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The fisheries sector is a global industry with a complex international supply chain

and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the ILO Constitution,3 the

that requires a series of legal and practical steps to be taken at international, regional,

principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of the ILO‘s Core

and national level to improve conditions for fishers and seafood workers, and for the

Conventions, namely:

sustainable and equitable management of marine resources. The ITF actively participates in the development and improvement of international instruments for the benefit of

(a) Freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective

fishers, their local communities, and the marine environment, based on the principles

bargaining:

contained in this paper.

• Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).4 • Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).5

International Regulatory Framework

(b) Th e elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour: • Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (and its 2014 Protocol).6

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have developed

• Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105).7 (c) The effective abolition of child labour:

and adopted a range of international instruments that provide a strong legal framework

• Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138).8

for responsible fisheries, the safety of fishing vessels and fishers, and decent working and

• Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182).9

living conditions in fisheries. The ITF actively supports the development, ratification

(d) The elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation: • Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100).10

and consequent implementation of these instruments. As part of this, the ITF supports the FAO Declaration for Sustainable Fisheries and

• Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111).11

Aquaculture (COFI, 2021), which aims to: Promote the attainment of safe, healthy and fair working conditions for all in the sector,

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)12 Article 99

support efforts to prevent and halt forced labour, facilitate access to social protection

(Prohibition of the Transport of Slaves), ILO Work in Fishing Convention No. 188

programmes for fishers and aquaculture producers and their communities, support

(C188),13 the IMO Cape Town Agreement of 2012 (Cape Town Agreement),14 and

measures to improve safety at sea, and work towards enhancing the standards of living for

the FAO Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA),15 provide complementary means for

all in the sector, in cooperation with other relevant international organizations, including

tackling violations of labour and working conditions in global fisheries.

the International Labour Organization and the International Maritime Organization.

The ITF fully subscribes to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work, 2 based on the obligation of States to respect, to promote,

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The Role of the ITF

the fisheries resources, but also provides fishers with safe workplaces and decent work. The ITF also believes that the sustainable utilisation of all living marine resources creates

The ITF works alongside the ILO as the workers’ representative, to secure decent

a stable basis for the employment of fishers on decent terms and conditions, as well as

working conditions for all fishers, and as observers at the IMO, to ensure the safety of

making a valuable contribution to the world’s food supply and coastal communities.

fishers, and the FAO, which governs the sustainable management of fisheries. The ITF considers that the fishing industry should be run on a sustainable basis and in a socially and environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, the industry should, in addition to complying with the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries16 and

ITF Principle and Objectives

other applicable international instruments, also be run in a manner consistent with the

The ITF supports the enforcement of the highest possible labour and social standards

three pillars of sustainable development – environmental, social and economic – and as

for those working in fishing and the seafood supply chain. These standards include

articulated in the UN 2030 Agenda and the associated Sustainable Development Goals

international human and fundamental labour rights, international safety standards and

(SDGs). A sustainable fishing industry should be considered one that not only manages

international maritime labour standards, now underpinned by C188. The ITF further promotes and supports trade union rights for fishers and demands full enforcement of these standards on board fishing vessels. It supports the growth of union density and collective bargaining coverage in fisheries and the cooperation and coordination of democratic and independent trade unions globally. It takes the position that fishing vessel owners should facilitate and contribute to the ongoing training and career development of those working on their vessels, and opposes unfair wage competition. It is also important to highlight that the ITF opposes owners seeking to minimise their operational costs by, inter alia, tax avoidance, trade union avoidance, exploitation of migrant fishers on very low wages, failing to provide welfare and social security for their crews, and avoiding proper application of labour, safety, and environmental standards. These issues are often associated with IUU fishing. In order to give effect to these principles, the ITF campaigns to protect and improve the conditions of employment of fishers and to ensure that all fishers are protected from exploitation regardless of race, nationality, immigration status, sex, religion, sexual orientation or gender identity. It seeks to prevent substandard employment in fishing and promote acceptable standards on all vessels, irrespective of vessel and crew nationality, using all the political, industrial and legal means available.

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One way to do this is to strengthen affiliated unions. This also helps to maximise

based on a total allowable catch that is distributed to the fishing industry according to

international solidarity in support of ITF campaigns worldwide, and achieve universal

nationally determined social, economic, and environmental criteria, in a time-bound

ratification and effective implementation of C188. Another means is to apply pressure to

manner; (4) the ITF supports marine protected areas (MPAs) designated in consultation

governmental and intergovernmental organisations to raise standards within the fishing

with the fishing sector, as well as the development of selective and fuel-efficient fishing

industry. Apart from these actions, the ITF campaigns to secure acceptable minimum

gear.

wages and working conditions for fishers by engaging in international, national, regional, and local collective bargaining with vessel owners and other employers. It also seeks to eliminate the Flags of Non-Compliance (FoNC) system through political

Combatting IUU Fishing

activities, industrial actions, and active co-operation with all interested parties. Overall, therefore, it aims to eliminate exploitation and ensure social protections for all fishers.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing imposes significant losses in tax revenues that could be spent on other urgently needed social programmes. IUU fishing undermines the ability for the sector to fish sustainably; is detrimental to accurate data

Sustainable Fisheries and Fisheries Management

collection and the development of sustainable fisheries management; limits the ability of Unions / ITF affiliates to negotiate and agree collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

Sustainable and precautionary fisheries management measures are vital to ensure the

with fishing companies; and is a threat to the UN Sustainable Development Goals

livelihoods of fishers and the sustainability of the fishing industry. Fisheries management

(SDGs) and food security. Furthermore, IUU fishing and overfishing mean that vessel

objectives must consider the impacts on labour and the social dimension, and the

owners tend to cut operational costs (for example labour, food, life-saving equipment,

ITF supports action on reducing fishing capacity in a socially just manner. It further

insurance) at the expense of crew safety.

supports the FAO in ending overfishing, curtailing harmful subsidies, encouraging non-

The ITF is firmly opposed to IUU fishing, whether it occurs on the high seas or

harmful subsidies, increasing economic benefits from sustainable fisheries, and ensuring

within the EEZ of a coastal State. Part of its support to governments, RFMOs, IGOs,

access to resources and markets for small-scale fishers.

and NGOs includes supporting the implementation of the PSMA. The PSMA is the

The primary stances of the ITF in regard to sustainable fisheries management are

only binding international agreement to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated

as follows: (1) vessel decommissioning schemes should be based on the principles

(IUU) fishing by preventing vessels engaged in IUU fishing from using ports and

of a just transition and ensure enhanced worker compensation (in addition to vessel

landing their catches.

owner compensation); (2) the ITF is firmly opposed to IUU fishing, wherever it takes

The ITF is actively lobbying the FAO, IMO, and ILO to introduce and implement

place, and supports action against IUU fishing by governments, regional fisheries

effective inspection and enforcement mechanisms, building on experience gained

management organizations (RFMOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and

through port state control (PSC) in merchant shipping. Such inspection regimes should

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide; (3) the ITF is of the position

include effective PSC on working and living conditions for fishers, as required by C188.

that fishing rights must remain the property of the state and local fishing communities,

The ITF further lobbies for greater cooperation and coordination between the three UN

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agencies (FAO, IMO and ILO) at international, regional, and national level, and is an active participant in the work of the Joint FAO/IMO/ILO Working Group on IUU fishing and related matters, as an observer and representative of workers. The ITF also believes that transhipment at sea (the process of moving catch, crew, or parts from one fishing vessel to another) should be considered an IUU fishing practice as it risks crew being kept at sea longer than contracted, thereby risking the health and safety of crew. Finally, it is important that vessel owners forcing workers to engage in IUU fishing are held accountable for their actions. The ITF is providing assistance to fishers in distress worldwide through the inspectorate ITF Fish Support Network, and pursuing action as appropriate to penalise companies mistreating their crew. As mentioned above, companies mistreating their fishers are, in most cases, found to be involved in IUU fishing activities. Actions may include publications, media campaigns, providing legal representation to fishers, or becoming involved in high profile legal cases against companies.

Labour Conditions and Social Dimension The fisheries sector is a global industry with a complex international supply chain that requires a series of legal and practical steps to be taken to improve conditions for fishers and seafood workers. To this end, the ITF actively participates in the development and improvement of international instruments for the benefit of fishers and their local communities, fully subscribes to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at work, and supports corporate accountability legislation that would hold lead firms at the top of global supply chains responsible for ensuring decent work for fishers. The ITF further advocates for the ratification and proper implementation of C188 globally, as fishers should enjoy equal treatment to shore based workers. The working

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conditions of fishers should be comparable to seafarers (MLC, 2006), with adequate

and requirements for the use of various types of fishing gear and procedures on-board

consideration being given to addressing the unique conditions that apply to fisheries.

(e.g. working patterns), there is also a need to address the human element and how it

The conditions of work for fishers should, as a general rule, be the result of collective

contributes to accidents.

agreements and negotiations between vessel owners and the appropriate fishers’ trade

One of the major causal factors in accidents on board fishing vessels is fatigue. It

unions, meet core labour standards adopted by the ILO, and reflect the principles set

is therefore essential that regulations addressing working hours and rest periods are

out in the ILO’s Decent Work Programme, C188, and other international treaties and

established and strictly enforced. Crewing levels on board fishing vessels should be

standards. National law should, depending on national labour market conditions and

established at the national level to ensure the safe navigation and operation of the vessel,

customs, supplement the conditions set out in such agreements.

taking into account the area of operation and type of fishery.

Finally, the development of a safety culture amongst fishers should be a priority

In 2014, the ITF Fisheries Section adopted a detailed and comprehensive

for all those involved in the fishing industry. A safety culture requires the adoption

occupational safety and health policy. The objective of this policy is to provide practical

of a holistic approach, taking into account social and labour conditions, as discussed

guidance to ITF fisheries affiliates, their shop stewards, representatives, and members,

further below.

on safety and health on board fishing vessels as well as on shore with a view to: • Creating a safety culture throughout the fishing industry;

Occupational Safety and Health Policy

• Preventing accidents, diseases, and other harmful health impacts on the health of fishers, arising from employment on board fishing vessels;

Fishing is without a doubt one of the most hazardous occupations in the world and has

• Ensuring that responsibility for safety and health is understood and remains a

been formally designated as a hazardous industry by the ILO. Numerous lives are lost

priority for all concerned, including governments, fishing vessel owners, fishers,

every year, causing great sorrow and often leaving families in financial hardship. There is

and their representatives;

clear evidence that the nature of fishing operations is a significant cause of many of the injuries and accidents affecting fishers. As mentioned, the development of a safety culture amongst fishers should be a priority for all those involved in the fishing industry. A safety culture is something that

• Promoting consultation and cooperation with governments and fisheries employers’ organisations at national, local, and company levels to improve safety and health on board fishing vessels; • Securing proper representation of fishers to improve safety and health on board.

cannot be created through regulation alone and requires a holistic approach. It also requires zero tolerance of dangerous practices and recognition that most accidents can and should be prevented. Fishing vessels should be designed and equipped in a manner which prevents, as far as possible, traditional occupational diseases and accidents among fishers. In

The policy takes into account and incorporates the provisions of C188, and the advice provided in the ILO Work in Fishing Recommendation No. 199,17 as well as other relevant documents and guidance on health and safety for fishers from the ILO, IMO, and FAO.

addition to the adoption of appropriate technical standards for the fishing industry

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The Safety Aspects

ITF strongly supports inspection and enforcement of safety measures as per the Cape Town Agreement and C188, through effective flag and port state control worldwide.

Fishing is one of the most dangerous occupations, with high accident and fatality

The ITF calls for setting out minimum global standards in line with these Conventions

rates. The annual fatality rate in the fishing sector has been estimated at 80 lives lost

for the design, construction, and control of fishing vessels and equipment, as well as

per 100,000 fishers. 19

However, recent estimates suggest that this number may be far

procedures and requirements for inspection of fishing vessels.

This means four fishers lose their lives every hour. Those injured or suffering

Furthermore, the promotion and development of alternative fuels for fishing to

from work-related illnesses are higher still. This has major impacts on fishers’ families,

deal with the climate crisis must include consideration of how these alternatives affect

fishing crews, fishing communities, and maritime search and rescue activities.

workers. They must be developed with the safety of workers in mind from the outset,

higher.

Safety and working conditions are interlinked with fisheries management and the

rather than as an afterthought.

health of fisheries resources. As stocks decline, fishing effort increases. This in turn increases the distance travelled, hours worked, and risks taken to find fish. These are serious issues for those who make their living fishing. Many small-scale coastal fishing vessels are not suited for offshore fishing, but are forced to fish further afield as a result

Industrial Campaign/ Flags of Non-Compliance and ITF Enforcement

of overfishing of coastal resources by industrial fishing fleets. Large-scale industrial fishing vessels can stay at sea for weeks or months, meaning that living and working

The ITF believes that the only way to secure proper enforcement and implementation

conditions are often poor. Therefore, safety standards also receive less attention than is

of decent conditions onboard fishing vessels is through an international or national

needed to ensure decent work on board these vessels. Living space and hours of rest are

ITF-approved Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) or a national CBA with better

frequently compromised, especially when working at night or in difficult conditions at

conditions. An effective inspection and enforcement mechanism should be established

sea.

involving ITF inspectors and contacts as appropriate. Moreover, the introduction of a

Occupational health and safety and accident protection are generally lacking for

regime for Flags of Non-Compliance (FoNC) is critical in order to overcome abuses and

fishing crews globally. Where vessels are involved in illegal, unreported and unregulated

bring about the necessary improvements for fishers. An FoNC enables flag-hopping to

(IUU) fishing, labour and welfare issues are also more frequent, as vessel owners tend to

avoid scrutiny and/or to access fishing rights. Flags that are largely non-cooperative with

cut operational costs at the expense of crew safety.

international sustainability efforts and the prevention of IUU fishing are selected by

As a result, safety on board fishing vessels is a matter of significant concern to the

these operators, as FoNC countries use their registries as commercial enterprises.

ITF. While a number of safety initiatives, including the IMO Convention on Standards

The ITF defines a flag as an FoNC when any of the following criteria are met:

of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F),

have reduced losses of life, fishing is still the most hazardous occupation at sea. ITF

• The flag State does not prevent IUU and labour abuses, and does not have proper

believes it is fundamental and essential that fishers are adequately trained and certified

measures for safety and welfare of fishers. In this case, the flag will be considered as

before they work at sea.

a FoNC regardless of where the beneficial ownership of that vessel is located;

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• The flag State denies or fails to protect fundamental labour and human rights of fishers;

campaigns, industrial partners, global agencies, and other organisations of common cause.

• The flag State fails to prevent IUU fishing, and thereby exposes fishers, especially migrant fishers, to forced labour, human trafficking, and slavery; • The beneficial ownership of a vessel is found to be in a different country to the flag

Conclusion

that the vessel is flying; • The flag State fails to implement and enforce proper measures to secure safety and welfare of fishers on board.

This paper has provided an overview of the ITF’s work to make the fishing industry a safer, fairer, and more sustainable working environment for the millions of fishers operating across the world. For more information about the ITF’s work and values, please visit:

Fisher Organising, Campaigning, and Communications

https://www.itfglobal.org/en/sector/fisheries

A better future for fishers is best achieved through collective action and trade union

ITF can be contacted at:

organising. As an affiliate-led global union federation, the ITF supports building and renewing democratic trade unions and assisting affiliates with modern, effective

fisheries@itf.org.uk

approaches to organising and campaigning. There are several ways in which organising and campaigning can be made more

OR for assistance for fishers in distress, please contact:

effective. This includes the development of in-person and online network-building opportunities and platforms for fishers to share their experiences, along with strategic

fishsupprt@itf.org.uk

knowledge to grow fishers’ power within and across regions. Other means include multistakeholder initiatives by the ILO and others to work with unions to address regional issues throughout the seafood supply chain. The ITF is committed to supporting these efforts, as well as efforts to organise migrant fishers into collective organisations and collective bargaining agreements, to support the vision of global fisher solidarity and improved industry conditions. It also encourages fisheries affiliates to engage with other maritime, logistics, and fisheries-related supply chain workers and their unions at the national level, to support organising efforts and develop joint leverage. Finally, the ITF engages in strategic campaigning to assist existing fisheries affiliates and organizing

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The Pacific Islands’ Approach to Dealing with IUU Fishing: Reality and Challenges Introduction The independent Pacific Island Countries (PICs) comprise 14 small island developing states (SIDs) in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). The small population size, limited land areas and lack of terrestrial resources of many of these countries present substantial challenges to their sustainable economic development. However, their combined EEZ encompasses 20 million square kilometres of ocean.1 As such, the WCPO supports the world’s largest fishery for tropical tuna, comprising the four main species: albacore, bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin, accounting for between 53% and 58% of the global catch over the past decade.2 The Pacific Islands region has relatively low estimates of IUU activity, compared to many other parts of the world. This is practical evidence of the effectiveness of regionally integrated MCS frameworks as a critical prerequisite for success against IUU fishing. This article explores the regional tools that support these results, as well as the unique

Francisco Blaha

challenges faced by the region.

Independent Expert, Argentina and New Zealand Photographs by Francisco Blaha Photographs are for illustrative purposes only and were not taken in the context of IUU fishing

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Regional Organisations for Sustainable Management

and a thriving industry; • Monitor, control, and survey the fishery to stop illegal fishing, and make sure

The shared nature of the tropical tuna fishery, the extent of the scientific and technical

fishing benefits go towards fishers who follow the rules of development and

resources needed, and the shared compliance and geopolitical issues faced in managing

management set by governments.

and developing such a fishery, have resulted in the establishment of four regional organisations to assist countries in cooperating in the management and development of this vital resource. In order of increasing geographical extent, these organisations are:

• The Pacific Community (SPC), initially established in 1947, is an agency that provides technical advice, assistance, training, and research to address economic, biological, medical, educational, and social problems to the people of the Pacific.

• The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA), was developed and executed in

For fisheries, the role is with SPC’s Division of Fisheries, Aquaculture and Marine

1982 as a platform for the Parties to collaborate more closely to develop common

Ecosystems (FAME). Its main’s objective is to provide the 22 SPC member

fishery management approaches and increase their level of participation and

countries and territories with the information they need to make informed

economic benefit from tropical tuna fisheries in the WCPO. It operates in a

decisions on the management and development of their aquatic resources and

complex management and institutional environment through numerous binding

help to provide the tools and strengthen the capacity needed to implement

and non-binding legal instruments, many of which have governance arrangements

these decisions. Under FAME, the Oceanic Fisheries Programme (OFP) is the

that need to be fine-tuned for efficiency and to meet the collective interests of the

regional centre for tuna fisheries research, fishery monitoring, stock assessment

Parties.

and data management. providing scientific services relating to oceanic (primarily tuna) fisheries management to its membership. These services include fishery

• The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was established in 1979 to

monitoring, data management, ecosystem and biological research relevant to the

help countries sustainably manage their fishery resources that fall within their

fisheries, and stock assessment and evaluation of species- and ecosystem-based

200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). FFA is an advisory body providing

management options.

expertise, technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna resources and participate in regional decision-

• The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) is an

making on tuna management through agencies such as the WCPFC. The FFA’s

RFMO established by the Convention on the Conservation and Management

purpose is to maximise the economic and social benefits of fisheries and it supports

of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean

its countries and territories in three broad tasks:

(WCPF Convention),3 which entered into force on 19 June 2004. The WCPF Convention draws on many of the provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement

• Manage the fishery to ensure sustainable use and the availability of tuna now and in the future; • Develop the fishery to harvest, process, and market tuna to create jobs, income,

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(UNFSA)4 while, at the same time, reflecting the special political, socioeconomic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the WCPO region. It seeks to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries resulting from

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unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation for conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. The Commission supports three subsidiary bodies; the Scientific Committee, the Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee, which each meet once each year. A full session of the Commission follows the meetings of the subsidiary bodies.

The Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessel Access (MTCS) The challenge for PICS in policing fishing operations in their large EEZs is considerable. This has required regional cooperation and coordination, mainly driven by the programmes of the FFA. These range from initiatives that are agreed at the regional level, but are mainly implemented through national programmes or legislation, to initiatives such as the regional surveillance picture, which is maintained at FFA Headquarters and made available to national fisheries administrations to guide their enforcement activities. Enforcement and arrest of illegal vessels is always a national responsibility, but even so there are innovative and cooperative arrangements to support national enforcement and compliance efforts, such as through the sharing of patrol assets. Key to regional cooperation are FFA’s harmonised minimum terms and conditions for foreign fishing vessel access (MTCS), initially developed in 1983 and updated regularly since then. The MTCS provide a framework of rules within which all foreign vessels must operate. The legal status of the MTCS is that of a regionally agreed policy. They are made enforceable on distant water fishing nations (DWFN) through incorporation into the PICs’ national legislation.5 Some key elements of the MTCS are as follows:

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• Common Regional Licence Form

do not carry observers due to the duration of trips and poor living conditions on board.

• Good Standing on the FFA Vessel Register Control and Monitoring of Transhipment

Reporting Requirements - the region imposes standardised requirements for

• Maintenance and Submission of Catch Logs in Zones and on High Seas

reporting by all commercial licensed vessels. These include submission of vessel log

• Vessel Reporting Requirements

sheets recording catches and operational data, on forms which all FFA members use;

• Observers and Observer Coverage

reporting of entry and exit from EEZs; and pre-entry reports for vessels intending to

• Foreign Fishing Vessels in Transit

use ports in the region, among others. Operational data is sent electronically from the

• Application of MTCS in Port / Port State Measures

vessels to the national authorities and SPC for inclusion in the regional database. This

• Enforcement

data is used for stock assessments and provides the scientific basis for management

• Vessel Monitoring System

recommendations.

• Identification and Marking of Fish Aggregating Devices • Pre-fishing Inspections • Crewing Employment Conditions

Vessel Monitoring System - the region was one of the first in the world to introduce a satellite-based VMS in 1999. Commercial tuna vessels licensed to fish in an FFA member’s EEZ must carry an automatic location communicator, which reports the

Each of these key elements can be considered as a tool for either monitoring, or

vessel’s position not only in the EEZ but also ‘port to port’ for any trip, including fishing

control or surveillance and, although not an exhaustive list, the main elements are

in an FFA member’s EEZ. The VMS is closely linked to the FFA regional register (see

described briefly below.

below). All vessels on the register must be reporting to the VMS, and the registration fees cover the communication and management costs of the system. All FFA VMS data

Fisheries observers - are government-nominated officers placed on board fishing

is provided to the regional fisheries surveillance centre, and to member countries. At a

vessels to record details of the fishing operation. While, historically, their main function

minimum, countries receive the positions of vessels in their own EEZs, but all agree to

has been to collect scientific data used in stock assessments (fish species and size), in

share data with neighbouring countries, which allows them to see vessels approaching

the WCPO they also have a compliance role through independent monitoring of

from their neighbours.

fishing activity. This is achieved by cross-checking reports of the vessel’s catch and recording any activity that may be contrary to fishing regulations. While they do not

Regional Register of Fishing Vessels - as a licensing condition, the operator of any

have an enforcement role, the presence of an observer on board generally leads to

foreign fishing vessel that requires a licence to operate in any FFA member EEZ must

improved compliance, and observer evidence has been used in the region in successful

provide detailed particulars of the vessel for inclusion on the regional register. This

prosecutions. Purse seine vessels operating in Pacific Islands waters now carry an

serves three main purposes: a) it provides a central repository of data on all foreign

observer at all times (100% coverage). Observer coverage in the longline fishery is

(and domestic) vessels operating in the region; b) it provides a means of ensuring that

subject to a target of 5% of trips, as set by the RFMO, yet many distant water longliners

all licensed vessels report on VMS, and that registration fees provide the cost recovery

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mechanism for this system; and c) it serves as a ‘white list’ for vessels that members may

between labour standards and the right to fish.

license through the mechanism of ‘good standing’. Good standing for a vessel may be withdrawn if it is on the IUU vessel list of an RFMO and, more importantly, if it has

Data Sharing - sharing of data between FFA members is a core strength of regional

failed to submit to the jurisdiction of an FFA member for suspected offences against

surveillance efforts. The Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law

national law.

Enforcement in the South Pacific Region signed in 1992 (Niue Treaty) makes broad provision for data sharing.

Control of Transhipments - transhipment at sea by foreign vessels has been prohibited under the MTCS since 2005. Vessels must proceed to a designated port,

Regional Surveillance Picture (RSP) - the RSP is hosted at the Regional Fisheries

notify the authorities 72 hours before arrival, and submit to monitoring of the transfer

Surveillance Centre (RFSC) in FFA HQ and is at the heart of regional cooperation in

of fish to a carrier vessel if required. While this requirement is rigorously enforced for

the fight against IUU fishing. It brings together in real time the positions of all vessels

the purse seine fleet, it has proven more difficult to enforce for foreign longline vessels

reporting to the FFA and WCPFC systems, as well as vessels reporting to the Automatic

in some EEZs, as these vessels can simply transfer their operations to the high seas.

Identification System (AIS). Different symbols are used to depict vessels reporting

In addition to providing an opportunity to monitor and record catches, and allowing

through each of these three systems. These symbols are shown on a Google Earth image

regular embarkation and disembarkation of observers, requiring transhipment in port

of the region, on which maritime boundaries and the boundaries of any closed areas are

also creates some economic spin-off benefits for the coastal States.

delineated. The picture can be received and displayed on any computer with a secure internet connection. Behind the picture is an array of shared data, ranging from vessel

Port State Measures (PSMs) - although most FFA members are not signatories to

particulars and photographs from the FFA and WCPFC vessel registers, to national

the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement, the MTCS require all members to enact

licence lists, observer reports, and reports of sightings, boarding, and inspection. These

legislation that provides powers of boarding and inspection for fishing vessels in port,

can be displayed in a series of windows brought up by clicking on the symbol for the

aligned to PSMA principles. This legislation is also in line with UNFSA provisions and

vessel. Together with observation and analysis of the movement of vessels, this allows for

applies whether or not the vessels are authorised to fish in a country’s EEZ. FFA runs a

the development of a compliance index for each vessel, with the symbol colour-coded

PSM framework to align best practices among all members.

accordingly. Fisheries patrol boats also report through VMS to the surveillance picture, allowing national authorities to monitor their movements relative to the fishing fleet.

Crewing Employment Conditions - since 2020, the MTCS has included a

FFA staff at the RFSC provide continuous monitoring and analysis of the regional

minimum set of requirements based on the ILO’s Work in Fishing Convention (C188).

surveillance picture seven days a week. As well as providing the national picture to

These form part of the requirements for vessels to be allowed to fish in coastal State

each member, including data shared with neighbouring countries, staff are available to

waters. If a vessel does not uphold those labour rights and conditions as part of its

advise on national surveillance operations. These include reports on vessels of interest,

licensing, its right to fish can be removed, and the vessel would not be in good standing.

email alerts to members of any potential violations in their EEZs, and case packages

This is the only example to date of a coalition of coastal States creating a direct link

to support prosecutions. Twelve PICs operate between one and three Patrol Boats each

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and also request additional support from vessels, or for aerial surveillance, from the

contribution to the overall IUU volume was by misreporting, accounting for 89%

Quadrilateral Defence Coordination Group (Australia, New Zealand, France, and US

of the total volume. Importantly, much of this volume was driven by misreporting

defence and security agencies). While aerial surveillance currently seems to provide the

and misidentifying target species in the purse seine sector, for which challenges exist

most cost-effective means of detecting illegal vessels, FFA itself and some PICs also use

in making accurate estimates of catch at sea. The various types of unlicensed fishing

other electronic imagery from satellites to search for ‘dark targets’.

collectively accounted for 5% of the overall estimated IUU volume, while noncompliance with license conditions and post-harvest offences accounted for 3% each.

Quantification of IUU fishing in the PICs - quantifying an activity that is, by definition, illegal and/or unreported is always challenging. Nevertheless, the first attempt at quantifying the value and volume of IUU fishing in tuna fisheries within the PICs 8

Conclusion

was undertaken in 2016 using data from 2010-2015. That study estimated that the total volume of the product either harvested or transhipped involving IUU activity in

The relatively low incidence of IUU activity in the FFA region is practical evidence of

Pacific tuna fisheries was 306,440t, with an ex-vessel value of $616.11m. Nevertheless,

the MTCS framework’s success and the value of cooperation. Cooperation is particularly

the authors noted that the data and information underlying many of the estimates were

important amongst SIDS like the Pacific Islands, which are required to police ocean

highly uncertain and that the outputs should be seen as a ‘first cut’. In order to assess

areas significantly larger than their states with relatively few resources.

changes in the nature and extent of IUU fishing since that time, a further study was commissioned to undertake a ‘2020 update’ of the original estimates. The update estimated that total annual volume of product either harvested or transhipped involving IUU activity in Pacific tuna fisheries during the 2017-19 period was 192,186t, with 90% confidence that the actual figure lies within a range of 183,809t to 200,884t.9 Based on the expected species composition and markets, the ex-vessel value of the best estimate figure is $333.49m. The 90% confidence range is between $312.24m and $358.17m. For context, the estimated IUU volume figure is around 6.5% of the total WCPFC Convention Area (WCPFC-CA) catch in 2019. This result is a considerable reduction from the ‘first cut’ estimates in the 2016 study of 306,440t (276,546t to 338,475t) with the best estimate value of $616.11m ($517.91m to $740.17m). The substantial decrease was primarily driven by the reduction in estimates for illegal transhipping and FAD fishing during the closure period (in turn, driven by the use of better and different information, respectively). Overall figures were also influenced by changes in fishery dynamics (e.g. catch, effort, price). The largest

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IUU Fishing and the Management of Coastal Fisheries in the Pacific Islands Introduction Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a menace to the sustainable management of coastal fisheries in Pacific Island Countries (PICs). It is the biggest threat to the sustainability of coastal fisheries because it affects the lives of people, the health of the marine environment and its resources, international relations and international trade. IUU fishing also includes transhipment and the unauthorised transfer of fish from fishing grounds in the PICs to international markets, either at sea or in specified ports where the fishing vessel operators falsify data on their fishing activities, the species or amounts caught or transferred, and the catch locations. The problem needs to be effectively addressed at all levels of fisheries management, to ensure that the people involved in these activities do not unfairly benefit, while local partners and governments are robbed of their rightful return from the use of their coastal fisheries resources. IUU fishing includes three different problems that make it complex to comprehend and address effectively. Illegal fishing undermines the formulation of management plans, fisheries regulations, and enforcement methods. Unreported fishing distorts the information required for analysing accurately the state of fisheries, while unregulated

Joeli Veitayaki Independent Expert, Fiji

fishing undermines fisheries regulations such as the catch and effort controls needed to manage the fisheries.1 IUU fishing occurs in all fisheries, in all waters and in all places, particularly where there are poor and weak management systems and corrupt officials.

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By its nature, IUU fishing threatens marine ecosystems, undermines governance and the

The State of IUU Fishing in Coastal Fisheries in the PICs

sustainability of fisheries, and weakens the conservation of marine biodiversity. Coastal fisheries in Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) are important

IUU fishing is complex and difficult to manage in multispecies fisheries, with their

for supporting livelihoods, local employment, food security and the attainment of the

finfish, shellfish, invertebrates, coral reefs, and marine plants. IUU is also difficult

peoples’ and their governments’ rural development aspirations. Pursuing and promoting

to detect, monitor, and address in multi-sector fisheries, where there are subsistence,

the successful development of coastal fisheries is critical, while the successful articulation

artisanal, commercial, industrial, recreational, aquaculture and mariculture operators,

of integrated management that enhances the resilience of these communities to climate

and many stakeholders, including resource owners, fishers, tourism, transport,

change should be shared and replicated wherever possible.

industries, companies, government, and civil society organisations.

Coastal communities and countries must ensure that the development of their coastal

IUU fishing is practised in inland and coastal waters by local people and foreign

fisheries is not compromised by the negative impacts of subsidies. Subsidies include all

fishers using a mixture of customary, traditional, and modern fishing methods.3 The

forms of financial assistance provided by governments to promote new development,

health and the sustained productivity of coastal fisheries is critical because the sector

or prop up a struggling industry or sector. By their nature, subsidies can result in

feeds coastal communities, is the main source of livelihood for the majority of coastal

inefficiencies that foster overcapacity, overfishing, and pollution. They can also lead to

dwellers, and is the basis of social and economic development activities. In many PICs,

the introduction of new subsidies to address these inefficiencies. An example is when

there is limited capacity and resources for monitoring, surveillance, control, research,

overcapacity in the fishing industry is made possible by boat-building subsidies. With

data gathering, data analysis, and resource management, which distorts the problems

too many boats in the industry, overfishing and resource depletion ensues, requiring

of IUU fishing activities in coastal fisheries. These problems threaten the well-being of

further subsidies to reduce the costs of fishing and continue to prop up the industry.

coastal communities as well as the viability and sustainability of coastal fisheries.

The use of subsidies for commercial fisheries development remains a concern because

The management of IUU fishing in coastal fisheries is difficult because of its hidden

of the negative effects on resource sustainability. Harmful fisheries subsidies must not

nature. It is therefore important that people are constantly reminded of the IUU threat

be supported under exemptions to subsidy bans set up to protect the sustainability of

to their livelihood and environmental resources. It is critical to address the problem

fisheries resources.

effectively at national and regional levels to avoid ecological, economic, social, and

This chapter discusses issues of IUU fishing in coastal fisheries under the following

cultural disasters in local communities. This requires the use of an integrated process

four sections. Firstly, the paper will outline the complex features of IUU fishing in

to gather, analyse, plan, consult, make decisions, allocate resources, and formulate,

coastal fisheries and the threats this poses. The second part will focus on coastal fisheries

implement, and enforce regulations to effectively govern coastal fisheries activities. This

and the Sustainable Development Goals, while the third section will discuss how IUU

will improve the productivity of the resources and the attainment of sustainable fisheries

fishing in coastal fisheries can be remedied in the PICs. The fourth part will consider

objectives.4 PICs that properly control IUU fishing are likely to manage their coastal

unfinished tasks that must be undertaken to ensure that IUU fishing is effectively

fisheries resources effectively.

controlled in coastal fisheries.

IUU fishing is exacerbated by warming seas and other contemporary challenges that cause biodiversity loss, coral bleaching, and acidification, and threaten food security

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and livelihoods in coastal communities. In addition, polluted fisheries such as Takitumu

The catching and selling of endangered charismatic species, such as humphead parrot

Lagoon (Cook Islands), Fa’gauta Lagoon (Tonga), Fly River (PNG), and the Suva

fish, coral trout, turtles, sharks, and dugongs – which are listed under the Convention

Lagoon, Nabukalou Creek (Suva), Qawa River (Labasa), and Nasivi River (Vatukoula)

on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora7 – is detrimental

in Fiji illustrate the extent of the problem. The use of stolen dynamite and explosives

to the sustainable use of stocks that are threatened with collapse and extinction. While

is widespread in the Ra, Tavua, and Ba areas in Fiji, and other mining and road

the indiscriminate use of herbal and artificial toxins to stun, stupefy, and kill finfish and

construction sites across the country and region.

non-finfish (including freshwater species) is not as widespread as it used to be, because

In recent years, Vietnamese fishing boats have been sighted in the western Pacific,

of improved public awareness, the problem still persists in some remote areas. Although

searching for reef resources such as sea cucumber, giant clams, trochus, lobster, and

management measures have been introduced in many PICs, the IUU problem must

finfish. These ‘blue boats’, which have been used in incursions into the waters of

be eliminated to reduce the destruction of fisheries resources and fishing grounds, and

PICs, were nearly undetectable at sea but were arrested in Palau, the Federated States

promote the well-being of coastal communities.8

of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and New 6

Illegal use and the reclamation of mangrove areas by private companies and families

Caledonia. These activities were not authorised and were not part of any national

living near mangrove forests in Vatuwaqa, Laucala Beach Estate, Nadawa, Lami,

production or management calculations, or planning.

Veisari in Suva, and in the areas around Denarau in Nadi (in Fiji) are damaging to

The illegal catch of slow-breeding charismatic species such as sea turtles, sharks,

coastal fisheries resources. In addition, the destruction and alteration of the natural

and dugongs, and threatened species such as Maori wrasse and rock cod, undermines

environment results in the destruction of spawning grounds and nursery sites of many

management activities undertaken within the PICs and needs to be properly controlled

fish and marine species. Pollution and the introduction of chemicals into the coastal

using effective monitoring, control and surveillance measures. The use of small mesh

environment from the sewage treatment plants and factories in urban centres, also

nets to catch all sizes of fish must be stopped, while the enforcement of national fisheries

undermine the sustainability of coastal fisheries resources.

laws and regulations must be improved. The catching of undersized crabs, crayfish and finfish must be strictly monitored and prosecuted under national fisheries laws.

The beche de mer, or sea cucumber, trade in the PICs is a multi-million dollar capture coastal fishery that is second only to the offshore tuna trade.9 Unfortunately,

Other illegal activities within coastal fisheries, including poaching and fishing without

beche de mer resources are under serious threat because of persistent overexploitation,

licenses, the unauthorised use of qoliqoli (customary fishing rights areas) because of

lack of management, and IUU fishing and trading activities. Rampant corruption

unclear and disputed boundaries, and the improper and inaccurate documentation

has demanded increased resources that governments have to deploy to control illegal

of catch must be carefully addressed. Proven and suspected violations of Locally

activities.10 In Fiji, beche de mer harvesting practices are dangerous and unsustainable,

Managed Marine Areas (LMMAs) and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) by artisanal and

with disproportionately unfair reward for the indigenous communities that take the risks

commercial fishers, including night divers and urban-based subsistence and commercial

to harvest these communally-owned resources. Tragically, the illegal use of underwater

fishers, must be prosecuted by the Fisheries Officers and the Police. Every successful,

breathing apparatus supplied by middlemen had led to the death and disability of many

high-profile prosecution may deter those engaged in IUU fishing and encourage fishers

untrained indigenous men from coastal communities across Fiji.

to practice responsible fishing.

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Convincing fishers to be responsible for their fishing activities is crucial to minimise

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IUU fishing and boost the sustainable management of coastal fisheries. Many of

marine life.12

the customary custodians do not have boats or engines, or the capacity to monitor

Educational programs and legislation for all stakeholders need to be implemented at

the designated areas under their control. Innovative arrangements to engage local

the national and international levels to prevent marine plastic pollution, as well as guide

communities in more effective monitoring, control, and enforcement activities are

research on alternative fishing materials and fishing practices, because marine and coastal

required throughout the Pacific Islands.

ecosystems need to be protected, restored (SDG 14.2), and conserved, based on the best available scientific information (SDG 14.5). The input and output controls used in fisheries management and marine protected areas (MPAs) are significant contributions

Coastal Fisheries and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

to biodiversity conservation.13 PICs, such as Palau, Cook Islands, and New Caledonia, and local communities throughout the region are designating huge proportions of their maritime areas as managed areas because they believe in the effectiveness of MPAs.

Coastal fisheries support food security, livelihoods, revenue generation, employment,

Palau, for instance, has designated about 80% of the nation’s maritime territory as a

and social and economic development in coastal communities, and are of critical

marine sanctuary, making the tiny country the home of the sixth largest protected area

importance for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Coastal

in the world.14 The reserve is spatially disaggregated, with an exploitable area dedicated

fisheries are essential to fight poverty (SDG 1), contribute to zero hunger (SDG

to local fishers and small-scale commercial fishers. This type of precautionary measure

2), maintain good health for the ocean (SDG 3), and support the direct or indirect

is called bul (no take area) in Palau, because it is part of their customary fisheries

employment of a significant number of people (SDG 8). However, coastal fisheries are

management system.

under serious threat because they are overexploited, polluted, damaged, and/or altered

Coastal fisheries resources continue to decline because of the increasing demand for

by anthropogenic and natural factors, including climate change, which endangers

fish throughout the PICs and the level of use. This is why overfishing, IUU fishing,

riverine and coastal environments and biodiversity. In addition, the failure of governance

and destructive fishing practices must be effectively addressed to enhance sustainable

systems to cope with human population growth and technological development has

fishing (SDG 14.4). All stakeholders must be involved in the management of the

resulted in resource depletion.

The current poor state of coastal resources is a multi-dimensional problem that the different SDG 14 targets address. SDG 14.1 aims to reduce marine pollution of

fisheries because of the importance of the fisheries sector in the region and the laxity of fisheries management, stock enhancement, and mariculture, which lag behind fisheries development.

all kinds, particularly from land-based activities that are damaging inland and coastal

The Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)15 is the first binding international

fisheries. PICs are taking action to reduce the use of plastic, and many have banned

agreement specifically targeting the prevention, determent and elimination of IUU

and imposed rules and regulations on certain single use plastics (plastic bags, straws,

fishing. The Agreement entered into force in 2016, and currently has 74 members,

and boxes). Sadly, marine pollution is continuing through intentional and accidental

including Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Palau, Tonga, and Vanuatu.16 However, the

discards on land and in the sea. Ghost fishing gear, such as old mono-filament gillnets

Agreement’s current focus on industrial fishing has been detrimental to the sustainable

that now litter the fishing grounds, continue to entrap, entangle, and cause the death of

management of coastal fisheries, because it implies that the problem is non-existent in

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coastal fisheries where local people and operations dominate. The PSMA sets minimum standard measures that the Parties can apply when foreign vessels seek entry into their 17

ports or while they are in their ports

but does not cover the activities of fishers that do

to rural fishers throughout the PICs.20 The SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway that was agreed to in Samoa was adopted at the UN General Assembly in 2014 and added to the long list of UN and Regional Agreements and Plans for sustainable development.21 The lack

not use these ports. In addition, States should review and eliminate subsidies that contribute to

of tangible results since the first SIDS meeting in Barbados in 1994 raises questions

overcapacity, overfishing, and IUU fishing. It is important that special treatment for

about the ability of the PICs to achieve sustainable development. Like other UN-

developing and least developed countries remains an integral part of the WTO’s fisheries

endorsed strategies agreed to over the last 44 years, the SAMOA Pathway provides goals

subsidies negotiations (SDG 14.6), to remind WTO Members of the dependence of

that national governments need to localize, and work with their partners to achieve.

many coastal states on development assistance to advance their artisanal and subsistence

The limited action taken by PICs to address issues such as climate change, worsening

fisheries.

Trade Ministers of the Organisation for African, Caribbean and Pacific

poverty, depleting resources, and environmental degradation, remains a serious concern.

States (OACPS) also recognised the importance of formulating appropriate fishing

It is also important to realign coastal fisheries management in the Pacific Islands to

capacity policies under the developing and least developed countries’ (LDC) special

accurately reflect the important role of women22 and changes taking place within the

and differential treatment principle in SDG 14.6, while preserving small-scale artisanal

coastal fisheries sector. The income of women and subsistence fishers in Fiji, for instance,

fishing and facilitating technical assistance and capacity building.

increased by 33% between 2002 and 2008.23 Thomas et al24 identified fisheries as a

Moreover, there is a need to increase economic benefits from the sustainable use of

key source of livelihood in the Pacific,25 and highlighted women’s contribution to food

marine resources in small island developing states and LDCs (SDG 14.7). This Goal

and nutritional security. In the PICs, women constitute 25% of small-scale fishers,26

is still not realised and supports the need for PICs to collaborate in implementing

and account for 56% of small-scale fisheries landing that include invertebrates such as

measures to curb IUU fishing in their territories. They must improve their scientific

shellfish and holothurians.27 Unfortunately, small-scale fisheries resources in the Pacific

knowledge, research capacity, enforcement arrangements and measures, and their

continue to decline, with projections that only six of the 22 Pacific Island Countries will

marine technology transfer arrangements, to improve ocean health and to enhance

meet their recommended or current per capita fish consumption by 2030.

the contribution of marine biodiversity to their development (SDG 14.A). Capacity

While women have multiple motivations for fishing, subsistence is the main

development is important for relevant fisheries research, aquaculture and mariculture

reason (99%), followed by cultural events (64%), social activities (48%), and church

development, the exploration and exploitation of new marine resources and uses, and

obligations (3%).28 Women mostly fish in soft bottom areas (64%) and coral reefs

the transformation of fish marketing. Improved fish marketing will greatly increase

(62%), and fish in coral reefs (19%), and mangroves and mudflats (18%) to supplement

the return to the fishers, and allow for better data gathering and monitoring, and the

their household income. Women rarely fish in the open ocean (<5%) as they focus on

effective management of fish stocks. Target SDG 14.B advocates for better access to

habitats closer to shore - harvesting invertebrates in the shallow waters and fishing for

marine resources and markets for small-scale artisanal fishers. This has been a persistent

finfish and invertebrates in the coral reefs.29

challenge in the Pacific Islands, despite the existence of many regional and national

Conserving and sustainably using and managing the ocean and its resources, by

arrangements to address it, such as the provision of Fisheries Centres and solar freezers

implementing international law such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of

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the Sea (UNCLOS)30 (SDG 14.C), must be pursued as a priority. Regional cooperation

and strengthening of its capacity, so that the country is effective, resilient, and adaptive

is the logical approach to address shared issues such as IUU fishing, resource depletion,

to change. Under this Policy, the Ministry of Fisheries and Regional Development will

environment management, community-based fisheries management, innovative new

guide the pursuit of Kiribati’s national interests and will collaborate and coordinate

methods such as aerial surveillance programs, data collection, and analysis and validation

with all partners, and adopt and implement sustainable and equitable measures, for all

for developing scientific, and evidence-based, economic and social impact assessments

the people of Kiribati. The Policy also emphasises the promotion of gender equality.

for informing management responses to fisheries.

Kiribati should further strengthen the governance of its fisheries management, and build sustainability and climate resilience of its marine resources. At the same time, it must also balance food security considerations and the need to maximise economic growth

Addressing IUU Fishing in Coastal Fisheries through Regulation

and employment based on the use of the nation’s fisheries resources.36 To do so, Kiribati’s Policy has short-term (2013–2017), and medium to long-term priority strategic actions (2016–2025). These are to: identify stakeholders, review and

Global and Regional Conventions and Treaties abound and must be taken advantage of

establish effective consultation processes for fisheries management and development;

and used for the effective management and sustainability of coastal fisheries resources.

develop and implement a communication and education strategy to improve I-Kiribati

There are several notable examples of this in the Pacific Islands, including the Noumea

engagement in sustainable fisheries practices, management issues, climate change

adaptation, and ciguatera outbreaks; review aquaculture activities and develop an

Coastal Fisheries Strategy: Pathways to Change.

The Noumea Strategy emphasises co-management with “informed, empowered

aquaculture development strategy to maximise food security and livelihood benefits;

coastal communities with clearly defined user rights”; enhanced capacity within

develop a transhipment and secondary services business plan (including baitfish, local

provincial and local governments to support fishing communities; and supports the

machine shops, and salt); and develop national conservation measures for harvesting

Melanesian Spearhead Group’s (MSG) Coastal Fisheries Road Map and the FAO

sharks and establishing bait-catching units (Bagans) at relevant locations in lagoonal

Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries.

The Strategy

is used by fisheries agencies, NGOs, local communities, and donors in Melanesian

islands, to provide bait for small-scale artisanal fishers targeting skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna.37

countries, such as PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, to

Similarly, Vanuatu launched its National Ocean Policy: Our Ocean, Our Culture,

promote their subregional initiatives and attract funding for the sustainable management

Our People in 2016. 38 This Policy is aligned to the subregional, regional and

of their coastal fisheries resources.34

international treaties, policies, and strategies to which the country is a party. These

At national level, too, there are several examples of fisheries policies and regulations

include the MSG’s Coastal Fisheries Roadmap (2015-2024), the Forum Fisheries

in the PICs that seek to promote sustainable fisheries management in coastal fisheries.

Agency (FFA) Regional Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) Strategy (2010-

For example, the vision of Kiribati’s National Fisheries Policy

is for a healthy marine

environment and sustainable fisheries development, that provides food security and revenue for future generations of I-Kiribati. The Policy guides Kiribati’s development

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2015), the SAMOA Pathway (2014), the SDGs (2014), and the Noumea Strategy (2015). The Policy’s Vision is for a healthy and sustainable fisheries sector, to meet the

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long-term economic, social, and food security priorities of the Republic of Vanuatu.

turn of the millennium. The situation became so bad that the Vanuatu Government

Its Mission is to provide effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable service

banned the fishing of green snail in 2005. The project transplanted parental green snail

delivery through a participatory approach, to ensure long-term, sustainable fisheries

in customary taboo areas (where the local community traditionally banned fish and

management, conservation, and development. This includes (1) the establishment

shellfish collection), because converging parental green snail in one place enhances

of a voluntary artisanal vessel registry, with free compulsory training programmes in

reproduction and the offspring grow better around the transplantation place.41 After

certain skills, including safety at-sea and seafood handling; (2) the implementation of

ecological surveys showed the recovery of the green snail population, the “Grace of the

Community-Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) in three pilot communities/islands

Sea Project Phase 3” was undertaken to confirm that parental green snail transplantation

to improve coastal fisheries management by increasing oceanic fisheries’ contribution to

contributes to resource propagation, and that having the transplantation site in the

domestic food supplies and employment, without impacting the livelihoods of small-

taboo area enhances resource propagation. Based on the positive results of this third

scale fishers; (3) the creation of a nearshore FADs (fish aggregating devices) network

phase, further transplantation will be undertaken (moving some of the green snail from

to support artisanal fisheries on all islands, and develop management plans for FAD

areas where numbers have recovered, to areas where it has been depleted by overfishing).

sustainability; and (4) the review of all licenses and export fees for coastal fisheries,

Finally, when it comes to addressing IUU fishing and fisheries sustainability in the

to increase the benefits to the people, strengthen regulatory structures, and develop

PICs through regulation, enforcement of regional and national laws is paramount

Fisheries Management Plans for key commercial species.

to deter offenders. For example, seven fishing vessels were found guilty by the High

To help give effect to this Policy, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Court of Fiji of illegally fishing in Fiji’s waters by 2006.42 One of the high-profile cases

collaborated with the Vanuatu Fisheries Department to develop the Grace of the Sea

involved a forfeiture order against the “Lian Chi Sheng”, a Belize flagged longliner, for

Project. This Project uses a participatory approach to ensure an effective, efficient,

fishing illegally in Fiji’s archipelagic waters and territorial sea over three months in 2004.

transparent, and accountable programme that will enhance long-term sustainable

The “Lian Cehi Sheng” was licensed to catch ‘tuna and tuna-like species’ in the EEZ

fisheries management, conservation, and development.

The short-term priorities for

but was caught fishing for sharks in the archipelagic waters. During the sentencing,

the Project included the establishment of a voluntary artisanal vessel registry with a

the Judge warned that “captains, charters and owners must conduct themselves with

free compulsory training programme in safety of life at sea and seafood handling. The

care and prudence when harvesting our Pacific Ocean. They are deemed to know the

Project also focused on the implementation of CBFM in pilot communities, to improve

law. The burden of compliance is on them and not on poor States that cannot police

coastal fisheries resource management, domestic food supply, and employment.

the pirates. There is a legitimate expectation that those engaged in foreign fleet fishing

JICA and the Vanuatu Fisheries Department are currently implementing the “Grace of the Sea Project Phase 3 (2017 to 2021)”, after the success of Phase 1 (2006-2009)

should take care to comply with the rules. There is a legitimate expectation that noncompliance will result in high penalties and forfeiture”.43

and Phase 2 (2011-2014) in promoting coastal fisheries resource management in partnership with certain coastal communities. Phases 1 and 2 of the Grace of the Sea Project focused on the propagation of green snail, which was once abundant in coastal areas in Vanuatu but had become almost extinct because of overexploitation by the

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Unfinished Tasks in Addressing IUU Fishing in Coastal Fisheries

While closing MC12, Director-General of the WTO, Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, stressed that the Agreement prohibits support for IUU fishing and the fishing of overfished stocks, and proposes the reduction of subsidies for overcapacity and

The most important unfinished task when it comes to IUU fishing in coastal fisheries is

overfishing. She stressed that these changes are expected to benefit the millions of people

the issue of subsidies, which are relied on to enhance much needed and desired fisheries

(such as those in the PICs) who depend on marine fisheries for their livelihood.48

development. The challenge is the use of development assistance to prop up inefficient

The last unfinished task to be addressed is how the WTO Agreement, which up until

and unsustainable fisheries operations. These harmful subsidies particularly threaten the

now has focused mostly on subsidies for industrial fisheries, can formulate effective

sustainability of coastal fisheries in developing countries.

measures to address overfishing and IUU fishing by domestic fisheries operators in

At the Special Ministerial Meeting of the Pacific ACP States in 2021, Ministers from

coastal fisheries. Until the WTO Agreement covers both offshore and coastal fisheries,

the Solomon Islands, Fiji, PNG, and senior officials from Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu

the problem of harmful subsidies will continue to threaten the sustainability of fisheries

discussed the proposed new WTO rules on harmful fisheries subsidies, and how the

throughout the world, and particularly in developing and LDC countries.

new rules support the global effort to eliminate IUU fishing activities and reduce overcapacity, overfishing, and other exploitative and destructive fishing practices.44 The meeting agreed that the prohibition of harmful fisheries subsidies would enhance the

Conclusion

health and resilience of coastal fisheries resources and the sustainability of fish stocks. WTO Members, at the 12th Ministerial Committee (MC12) meeting on the 17th

IUU fishing with its many manifestations poses a serious threat to the sustainability

of June 2022, passed the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies delivering new global rules

of coastal fisheries resources in developing states. In the Pacific Islands, with their vast

to control harmful subsidies and save global fish stocks, while addressing to some extent

maritime areas, far-flung islands, and limited capacity and resources, the challenge

the aspirations of fishers in developing and least-developed countries (LDCs).

The

is huge. However, all coastal states are obligated to properly manage their fisheries

WTO Agreement is the first to place environmental sustainability at its core as it battles

resources for their own interests. Given the threat posed by IUU fishing to coastal

the detrimental impacts of fisheries subsidies, that have allowed many fishing fleets to

fisheries in the PICs, these countries must continue to collaborate and unite in their

operate longer and farther at sea, to the detriment of marine life.

commitment to address IUU fishing at all levels of governance. IUU fishing in coastal

The meeting also discussed the special position of developing and LDC Members,

fisheries threatens the lives of people, particularly those dependent on fisheries, the

that expect to benefit from the provisions specific to them in the Agreement, and from

health of the environment, food security, development, and international relations and

technical assistance and capacity building to be made available through the new WTO

trade. These are the reasons why we have to eliminate IUU. This is our calling and we

Fisheries Funding Mechanism created by the Agreement. The meeting agreed that the

cannot afford to fail.

Negotiating Group on Rules on Fisheries Subsidies should continue its discussions on how to appropriately accommodate developing and LDC Members’ interests and how to curtail subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.47

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The Role of NGOs in International Negotiations (FAO, ILO, IMO) and their Contribution to Combating IUU Fishing

Introduction It is widely recognized that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a significant influence on fisheries policy and negotiations at international level. The following offers some insight and information on the role of NGOs in these processes, with a focus on the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). NGOs may become observers in these organizations, where they are granted consultative or similar status. Although the requirements for obtaining this status are slightly different for the three organizations, there is a common set of principles that these NGOs must satisfy. After considering these principles, the paper discusses how NGOs contribute to tackling IUU fishing within international organizations, utilizing the example of The Pew Charitable Trusts, which is very active in these processes.

NGOs – What they are and What they do Ari Gudmundsson Independent expert, Iceland.

An NGO is any organization that is not established by a government agreement. NGOs are also referred to as the “third sector” of modern society. The other two are the public sector and the private sector.12 They are usually nonprofit entities, and many are active

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on humanitarianism or social issues. The term “NGO” is sometimes used synonymously

resources to provide goods and services to people who have been affected by a natural

with the term “civil society organization (CSO)”, which is any association founded by

disaster. Hereafter, the focus will mainly be their role as partners (i.e. when they partner

citizens. In the FAO Strategy for Partnership with CSOs , for example, the term “CSO”

with UN organizations to tackle problems that are within the mandate of the respective

is used as an overarching term to include those non-state actors that fit within three

organizations).

main categories: member-based organizations (MBOs); social movements (SMs); and NGOs when the actors work in areas related to FAO’s mandate.3 The term “NGO”, as it is used today, was first introduced in Article 71 of the newly formed United Nations’ Charter in 1945.4 According to the UN Department

International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

of Public Information (DPI), an NGO is “a not-for-profit, voluntary citizen’s group

An international non-governmental organization (INGO) is an NGO which is

that is organized on a local, national or international level to address issues in support

independent of government involvement but operates at international level.6 An

of the public good. Task-oriented and made up of people with a common interest,

NGO is defined as “any international organization which is not established by inter-

NGOs perform a variety of services and humanitarian functions, bring citizen’s

governmental agreement”.7 Therefore, except for incorporation under national laws,

concerns to Governments, monitor policy and program implementation, and encourage

no current formal legal status exists for INGOs, which can lead to complications in

participation of civil society stakeholders at the community level”.

NGOs act as implementers, catalysts, and partners. They mobilize, for example,

international law. Examples of a few INGOs are provided in Figure 2. The number of INGOs has grown considerably over the last decades. Their number was estimated to be approximately 6,000 in 1990, 26,000 in 1999, and 40,000 in 2013.8

Figure 1. A fishing vessel on top of a house in Banda Aceh, Indonesia, after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. © Ari Gudmundsson

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Figure 2. Examples of a few INGOs.8

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International Organizations (IOs) and Intergovernmental Organizations

Benefits to FAO, ILO, and IMO in Cooperating with NGOs There is great interest by both INGOs and IOs in working together. As the three

The technical terms “international organizations (IOs)” and “intergovernmental

international organizations (FAO, ILO and IMO) generally refer to international non-

organizations (IGOs) describe organizations that are established by a treaty among

governmental organizations just as “NGOs”, instead of “INGOs”, the former term is

sovereign states or by an instrument governed by international law, and possess

also used here in the context of cooperation between the IOs and the INGOs.

their own legal personality. Examples of IOs are international organizations like the United Nations (UN), FAO, ILO, and IMO. Examples of IGOs are the International

The common benefits for the IOs in cooperating with NGOs can be summarized as follows:

Hydrographic Organization (IHO), European Commission (EC) and Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Tokyo MoU) (see Figure 3).

• Closer association with NGOs enhances the validity of decision-making under the auspices of the organizations, by ensuring consideration of the interests of all social sectors and building consensus among stakeholders in development. • Cooperation also attracts substantive input into normative activities and achieving the overarching goals of the IOs, and increases the effectiveness of the IOs’ field programmes by drawing on the expertise, experience, and insight of the NGOs. • M o r e o v e r, i n c r e a s e d awareness of the work of the IOs makes this work better known and available to a wider public.

Figure 3. Examples of international organizations (IOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)

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Figure 4. Cooperation between FAO, ILO, and IMO with NGOs

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Benefits to NGOs in Cooperating with FAO, ILO, and IMO

Food and Agriculture Organization The general legal framework concerning participation of CSOs (which include NGOs)

NGOs may become observers in the three organizations. Although the requirements

in meetings and activities of FAO is set forth in the FAO Basic Texts from 1957.10 In

for obtaining consultative or similar status are slightly different for the three IOs,

addition, FAO has provided practical guidance - the FAO Strategy for Partnerships

there is a common set of principles that the NGOs must satisfy. They must operate

with Civil Society Organizations 11 - on how to develop partnerships with civil society

at international level (i.e. they must be INGOs), and they must be able to make a

organizations.

substantial contribution to the work of the respective IO. The main benefits for the NGOs that are granted consultative or similar status can be summarized as follows:

The Basic Texts provide that formal relations with an INGO may take one of three forms, according to the importance of its field of activity in relation to FAO activities and the level of cooperation envisaged – consultative status; specialized consultative

• The IOs provide access to a neutral forum for discussions vis-à-vis private sector, Member States and other stakeholders; • NGOs that are accredited with FAO, ILO and IMO can: 1. participate in a number of events, including, but not limited to, regular

status; and liaison status. Each status reflects a different level of involvement. However, there is a common set of prerequisites, which must be satisfied regardless of status. These prerequisites may be summarized as follows:

sessions of their governing bodies and subsidiary bodies; 2. submit written statements prior to sessions;

• The INGO must be international in structure and scope of activity; representative

3. make oral statements;

in its field of interest; and have a permanent directing body, authorized

4. participate in debates, interactive dialogues, panel discussions, and informal

representatives, and systematic procedures.

meetings; 5. meet official government delegations and other NGO representatives; and

• The INGO’s aims and activities must be consistent with FAO’s mandate and Constitution.

6. organize and attend parallel events that take place during a session. Upon request by the interested INGO, consultative status may be granted by the Conference (the highest governing body of FAO), on the proposal of the Council or

Rules and Practices for NGO Participation at IO Meetings

directly by the Council during inter-sessional periods. On the other hand, both the specialized consultative status and the liaison status are granted by the Director-General.

In addition to the above-mentioned common set of principles, NGOs that apply for

Formal status granted by FAO to an INGO is kept under review and may be terminated

a consultative or similar status with an IO must meet certain requirements that may

or maintained, as appropriate.

be slightly different from one organization to another. The following sections describe briefly the rules and practices applicable to NGOs that apply for consultative or similar

International Labour Organization

status with FAO, ILO, and IMO, respectively.

ILO engages in cooperation and consultation with INGOs both in its standard setting

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mechanisms and in the implementation of its development cooperation programmes.

of competence, to the work of IMO.

Each year, between 60 and 80 INGOs are invited to participate in the International

In addition, the INGO must clarify that it has no means of access to the work

Labour Conference on issues in which they have a special interest, and where they can

of IMO through other INGOs already in consultative status and that it is “truly

make a contribution to the technical discussions. ILO has registered more than 150

international” in its membership (i.e. that it has a range of members covering a broad

INGOs in its “Special List”, covering a wide variety of fields, such as the promotion

geographical scope and, usually, more than one region).

of human rights, poverty alleviation, social security, professional rehabilitation, gender 12

To date, there are more than 80 INGOs which have been granted consultative status with IMO.15

issues, and youth matters.

As a tripartite organization, ILO does not simply collaborate with non-governmental organizations, but actually integrates sectors of civil society into its structure.13 Tripartite means that representatives of workers’ and employers’ organizations participate, on an equal basis, with governments in the ILO’s governance structures. ILO maintains a close

INGOs’ Cooperation with FAO, ILO and IMO in Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

relationship with the non-governmental sector, which involves the following: There is ongoing cooperation between IMO, ILO, and FAO that started in the early 1. The integration of non-governmental social partners in the identity of the Organization itself (i.e. through the above-mentioned tripartite structure).

1960s. This cooperation is carried out by each organization within the context of its mandate:

2. Granting consultative status to INGOs that meet certain criteria (that are similar to the FAO criteria highlighted above).

• IMO for safety at sea and protection of the marine environment;

3. Collaboration at the operational level with a variety of international, regional, national, and local organizations.

• ILO for work on labour standards and working conditions in the fishing industry; and • FAO for fisheries in general and fishing operations in particular.

Therefore, at ILO, the participation of INGOs in international negotiations with Member Governments is accomplished through workers’ and employers’ organizations.

Even though this cooperation did, in the beginning, mainly focus on safety and health in the fisheries sector, it has in the last two decades been expanded to other areas,

International Maritime Organization The latest rules for consultative status of INGOs with IMO are from 2019.

such as abandoned, lost, or otherwise discarded fishing gear (ALDFG); forced labour in 14

NGOs

that have the capability to make a substantial contribution to the work of IMO may be granted consultative status by the Council with the approval of the Assembly.

fisheries; and IUU fishing. In 1999, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) considered IUU fishing to be a matter of high priority and recommended that FAO obtain assistance from IMO,

As with FAO and ILO, any INGO seeking consultative status with IMO must

with regard to fishing vessels flying flags of convenience and general concerns about re-

demonstrate considerable expertise, as well as the capacity to contribute, within its field

flagging and IUU fishing. Earlier the same year the United Nations Commission on

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Sustainable Development highlighted the issues of flag and port State responsibilities and the need for FAO and IMO to cooperate on solving problems relating to IUU fishing. As a result, the Joint FAO/IMO ad hoc Working Group on IUU fishing and related matters (JWG) was established in October 2000. Shortly after the COFI meeting in 1999, an FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries declared that FAO would develop an international plan of action (IPOA) to deal effectively with all forms of IUU fishing, including fishing vessels flying “flags of convenience”. This would be done through coordinated efforts by States, the FAO, relevant regional fisheries management bodies and other relevant international agencies such as IMO, as provided for in Article IV of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF).16 Article 4 of the CCRF states, for example, that all members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities and relevant subregional, regional, and global organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental, should actively cooperate with FAO in this work. It was, therefore, expected that some INGOs would be interested in cooperating with FAO and IMO in combating IUU fishing. So far, four meetings of the JWG have been held - in 2000, 2007, 2015, and 2019. The participation of NGOs has increased from just two INGOs at JWG 1 in 2000, to 12 INGOs and one invited expert at JWG 4 in 2019 (see Figure 5). This demonstrates that there is a growing interest amongst INGOs in cooperating to combat IUU fishing worldwide. ILO, which has participated actively in all meetings of the JWG, became a formal partner of the group at JWG 4 in 2019. At that meeting, the name of the group was changed to the Joint FAO/ILO/IMO Working Group on IUU fishing and related matters.

Figure 5. NGOs’ participation at JWG meetings in 2000, 2007, 2015, and 2019

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An Example of an INGO Supporting IOs in Combating IUU Fishing - The Pew Charitable Trusts

due diligence by seafood buyers, and ensuring that authorities have the tools they need to crack down on this activity. Pew’s objective is to build a global system to combat illegal fishing by working with governments, fisheries management bodies, enforcement

The Pew Charitable Trusts (Pew), which was established in 1948, is a global NGO that

authorities, and the seafood industry to adopt and implement international agreements

seeks to improve public policy, inform the public, and invigorate civic life. Pew’s work

and regulations, and form multi-State coalitions that will safeguard and protect their

follows the principle that knowledge can solve today’s most challenging problems.

waters.

Pew operates across a large range of projects, related to healthcare, social issues, and environment.

How IUU Fishing Threatens the Safety of Crews Over the last few years, Pew has provided support to measures aimed at combating IUU

Pew’s Contribution to the Fight against IUU Fishing

fishing worldwide. For example, assistance was given to FAO, when the organization

Recognizing the growing threats to our oceans, Pew has developed an international

was working on bringing the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA)18 into force.

conservation program aimed at ensuring a sustainable ocean legacy for generations.

The link between safety at sea in the fisheries sector, decent conditions onboard

Pew’s Ending Illegal Fishing project is a significant piece of this program. The project

fishing vessels, and IUU fishing was first recognized in 2014 by the Committee on

is working around the world to develop an international fisheries enforcement regime,

Fisheries (COFI), one of the governing bodies of FAO. Later, these links were also

with the aim of significantly reducing IUU fishing. This work focuses on industrial-

recognized by ILO and IMO. Even though the objectives of the IMO Cape Town

scale fishing, cooperation among key partners for policy change and implementation,

Agreement (CTA)19 and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188)20 were mainly to improve safety and health in the fisheries sector, the Members of COFI also recognized that these legally binding instruments would be useful tools in combating IUU fishing and thereby contribute to the PSMA, in particular when all these treaties are in force. It is expected that the IMO Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel (STCW-F)21 will also be a useful tool in this regard. Of these four legally binding instruments, the CTA is the only instrument that has not yet entered into force. In 2016, when the PSMA had entered into force, it was a logical step for Pew to expand its efforts in combating IUU fishing by supporting IMO in bringing the CTA into force. After participating in several IMO regional and national seminars on the implementation and ratification of the CTA, Pew applied for consultative status with IMO. In 2017, the IMO Council decided to grant Pew consultative status with the

Figure 6. The Main Hall of IMO

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organization.

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Examples of Pew’s Work after its Consultative Status was granted

• The Cape Town Agreement Explained (issue brief).24

After consultative status was granted by IMO, Pew participated in many IMO meetings, including those of the Assembly, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), and the Sub-

Furthermore, Pew is currently participating, together with other INGOs, IOs,

Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III). Pew provided support to the

and Member States, in the development of a new IMO guidance document to assist

Ministerial Conference on Fishing Vessel Safety and IUU Fishing that was organized

competent authorities in the implementation of the CTA.25

by IMO and the Government of Spain in Torremolinos in October 2019. It was one

Under its Ending Illegal Fishing project, Pew has prepared a data visualization with a

of the largest fishing vessel conferences held in the history of IMO. In addition to co-

world map that shows all the States that have ratified one or more of the three treaties to

sponsoring all IMO events related to the CTA since 2018, Pew has also prepared some

end illegal fishing; namely the PSMA, CTA, and C188:26

promotional material on the CTA, including the following: • Safe seas (video).22 • The Cape Town Agreement Explained (video).23

An Important Group of Stakeholders not yet Represented at International Level There remains an important group of stakeholders in the sector that is not yet represented at international level. These are the fishing vessel owners and operators. There are many NGOs representing fishing vessel owners and operators at national and regional level but, so far, they do not exist at international level. This is surprising, as the fishing industry is truly international. When we compare the fisheries sector to the merchant shipping sector, we see that more than 10% of the INGOs which have been granted consultative status with IMO, represent ship owners and operators. This indicates that merchant ship owners and operators recognize the importance of being part of negotiations on international instruments concerning merchant ships, through INGOs. It seems that there is a growing interest in the seafood industry in tackling challenges facing the fisheries sector. Recently, an article was published with the title “Seafood industry partnerships push for improved fisher safety”.27 The article states that five groups, which include members from over 150 companies across the seafood supply chain, have released a joint statement calling for action to improve the safety of the

Figure 7. Data visualization of the three treaties to end illegal fishing25

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global fishing industry. The groups, which also include fishing vessel owners and

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operators, stated that: “As a coalition of seafood entities, we are committed to ensuring

the industry in the work of the FAO, ILO, and IMO in combating IUU fishing and

that the seafood we catch, grow, buy, and sell is responsibly produced without activities

related matters.

such as IUU fishing or modern slavery. As part of these commitments, we recognize that IUU fishing and modern slavery expose fishers to unsafe and harmful working conditions”. The article also highlights new research that was carried out by the Fish Safety Foundation with funds from The Pew Charitable Trusts. According to this research, the estimated global fisher mortality rate is three or four times higher than seen in previous assessments.28

Concluding Remarks There is a longstanding relationship between INGOs and IGOs in combating IUU fishing, specifically through the JWG. INGO participation in JWG meetings has grown over the years, from just 2 NGOs in 2000, to 12 NGOs in 2019. INGOs have also supported the fight against IUU fishing by promoting the uptake of key instruments that tackle IUU fishing, including the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, the IMO Cape Town Agreement, the ILO Work in Fishing Convention, and the IMO Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel. There is one important group of stakeholders that is not yet represented by any INGO in these processes – the fishing vessel owners and operators. This can lead to problems implementing these treaties, as this group may not be familiar with many of the benefits of these international instruments, such as a level playing field for all, and may thus be less willing to take on board perceived costs to comply with new laws and regulations. However, there seems to be a growing interest among the seafood industry, part of which includes fishing vessel owners and operators, in tackling the challenges facing the fisheries sector. This may in the near future result in active participation by

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The Contribution of Ghana’s Fisheries CoManagement Policy to Tackling IUU Fishing in the Artisanal Fisheries Sector

Introduction Ghana is a coastal nation in West Africa with a population of about 30 million, of which an estimated 40% now dwells in coastal areas.1 The marine fishing industry in Ghana comprises the small-scale or artisanal, semi-industrial, and industrial sub-sectors.2 With about 10% of the population relying solely on fisheries resources for a living, the industry is crucial to the Ghanaian economy, accounting for approximately 1.5 percent of the national GDP.3 Furthermore, the sector is estimated to generate more than $1 billion in revenue each year through various fishing agreements, permits, and exports,4 and contributes to women's empowerment through markets and supply chains. Fish is the preferred and relatively cheap source of protein for the populace, playing an essential role in the nation’s nutrition and food security. Like many developing coastal nations, illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing is widespread in Ghana. IUU fishing is an acute problem for Ghana, causing socioeconomic depression and environmental damage, and is a risk for food security of coastal communities. IUU fishing is a problem for both industrial and artisanal fisheries and failure to properly tackle it has resulted in the European Commission twice warning

Ambrose Yankey Ghana Navy and WMU

Ghana within the last decade5 with a yellow card, which indicates that a country's attempts to prevent and deter IUU fishing are insufficient. Scientific data has shown that Ghana’s marine fisheries are in crisis because of the

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decline in fish landings over the last decade.6 As a result, Ghana has become a net

to the fisheries resources and marine ecosystem because the fishers used simple

importer of about 40% of the nation’s fish requirements, which is likely to increase

traditional fishing techniques to exploit fisheries resources, mainly for subsistence

due to the growing population. Combating IUU fishing is therefore imperative if the

purposes. Legislative instruments and enforcement efforts therefore did not largely

fisheries resource is to be sustainable. The government of Ghana has recognised the need

target this sector. For instance, the artisanal fleet has not been effectively licensed to

to create and manage marine protected areas (MPAs). This was not only to meet Aichi

date, although required by law, giving them unrestricted access to fishery resources.15

target 11,8 to have at least 10% of coastal and marine areas designated as protected

Open access to the fisheries resources, a high unemployment rate, rivalry between

areas by 2020, but also to protect fish nursery areas and spawning grounds as a strategic

artisanal fishers and the growing industrial fleet, increased demand for fish protein, and

measure to sustainably develop declining fisheries resources, as outlined in its National

lack of alternative livelihood options constitute the main drivers of IUU fishing in the

artisanal sector. Some artisanal fishers use undersized nets, explosives, chemicals such as

Fisheries Management Plan.

DDT, and unapproved fish aggregating devices (FADs) to attract, immobilize, or kill fish (including fingerlings) for easy capture.16 These practices do not only render fish

Ghana’s Artisanal Fishing Industry

dangerous for human consumption, but also lead to the depletion of the fish stock and

Artisanal fishers in Ghana employ traditional fishing techniques and small traditional

because, unlike industrial fisheries, landing sites are widely dispersed, vessels are

fishing boats for both commercial and subsistence reasons. The canoes used are either

small and numerous, and their catches are not frequently included in national stock

motorized or non-motorized, with fishing gear such as purse seines, gillnets, beach

assessment and management approaches.18

the degradation of the marine ecosystem.17 Artisanal fisheries are often underreported

seines, set nets, and hook and line. The major species landed by these fishers include

The government of Ghana manages the fisheries industry through the Ministry of

sardinellas, anchovies, herrings, mackerels, and other species of important economic

Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (MoFAD) and the Fisheries Commission (FC).

value.

There are an estimated 13,000 canoes in operation in the exclusive economic 11

the local resource users in decision-making. Ghana has laws and regulations to govern

zone (EEZ) of Ghana.

The total annual catch of the canoe fleet was estimated at 254,000 metric tonnes 12

Their management style has been a top-down approach, with limited engagement of the activities of the fishing industry. The fisheries legislation is a blend of customary

but has seen a downward trend due to negative impacts on fish spawning

regulations and statutory enactments. The Fisheries Act19 outlines the legal framework

and breeding arising from increased fishing effort and a rise in IUU fishing activities.13

within which fisheries are to be managed, and provides comprehensive directives for the

About 180 coastal villages are situated along the stretch of the Ghanaian coast

sustainable management of the fisheries. The Fisheries Regulations20 supplement the

mainly characterized by a relatively high rate of unemployment, poverty, illiteracy,

Act by providing detailed guidelines on prohibited fishing, as well as licensing of fishing

and population density. The absence of alternative sources of income has potentially

vessels, importation of fish, fishing in foreign waters, marks on fishing gear, and many

increased the rate of exploitation of the fisheries resources. Over the years, the average

other topics.

in 2014,

annual income per artisanal canoe has dropped by as much as 40%.

Previously, artisanal fishing in Ghana was deemed sustainable and non-destructive

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Over the last decade, the MoFAD has worked to enhance inter-agency cooperation to improve enforcement of fisheries laws by establishing a marine police unit, a

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fisheries enforcement unit with personnel drawn from the Ghana Navy and the FC, and retooling the FC with monitoring, control, and surveillance capacity. Despite the successes of these traditional regulatory mechanisms, the problem of IUU persists. Collaboration among stakeholders has shown to be critical for policy implementation and strengthening ocean governance.21 Since the establishment of the Ghana Navy in 1959, it has collaborated with other maritime stakeholder institutions such as the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), and Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GPHA).22 These collaborations - mostly around information sharing and technical cooperation have ensured a relatively safe maritime domain to promote not only national economic growth but also the UN SDGs 2030. For example, the FC partners with the Ghana Navy to conduct fisheries patrols within the nation’s EEZ. There is good technical cooperation and information sharing through the Navy’s Maritime Operations Centres (MOCs) and the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance division of the FC and the GMA, to identify and sweep hot spot areas of IUU fishing and smuggling of narcotics using fishing vessels.23 A special Marine Police Unit was inaugurated in June 2013 within the Ghana Police Service, to augment fisheries law enforcement efforts. Several fishers associations also contribute to fishery management. The National Fisheries Association of Ghana is the principal representative organisation for artisanal fishermen and is represented on the Fisheries Committee. Other organisations representing fishers, such as the Canoe and Fishing Gear Owners Association of Ghana, the Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council (GNCFC), the Ghana Marine Fishing Officers Association, and the National Fisheries Association of Ghana, are also represented on the Fisheries Committee. Additional members include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Environmental Justice Foundation, Hen Mpo Ano (our own shores), and the Fisheries Alliance. Regulation under Ghana’s fisheries management includes issuance of permits or licenses, although this has largely targeted semi-industrial and industrial fishing. This is partly because artisanal fishing was deemed sustainable and seen as a livelihood and heritage for coastal dwellers. However, as the dynamics of artisanal fishing have shifted

304

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from sustenance to aggressive attempts to maximise profit by investing in modern gear

specific resource and area they are entitled to manage.

and motorised vessels, there is a need to regulate the sector and access to the fisheries

2. Match rules governing the use of common goods to local needs and conditions:

resources. In particular, the numerous canoes across the widely dispersed landing sites

regulations should be dictated by the local people and fit their peculiar need. Thus, rules

along the coast of the nation, coupled with inadequate staffing of the FC, has made

should not be a one-size-fits-all approach.

regulation of the sector ineffective. Furthermore, artisanal fishermen have been ardent

3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules:

in their opposition to any new regulations that might restrict access to the fisheries

stakeholder engagement and participation in decision making must be encouraged to

resources on which their livelihoods depend. Introducing permits and licences is a

improve compliance.

crucial step towards effective management and regulation of the sector. However,

4. Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside

because poverty, which is strongly linked to IUU fishing, has not been effectively

authorities: this involves having a system in place to check for compliance of the rules.

addressed in most coastal communities through provision of alternative livelihoods and

5. Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’

other government interventions, previous governments have avoided taking this critical

behaviour: this empowers the local resource users to run an effective monitoring system

step to restrict access to the fisheries. This lack of political will to issue permits/licenses

and control the use of the resources.

in an effort to clean up the sector has further aggravated the challenge of IUU fishing.

6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators: there should be an adaptive system of warnings and fines to correct offenders without breeding resentment. 7. Provide an accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution: a cost-effective system for

Co-Management Approaches

mediation and resolution of disputes amongst resource users should be available. 8. Build responsibility for governing the common resource into nested tiers: this implies

Co-management approaches in artisanal fisheries management can be an effective

devolution of power and decentralization of decision making.

way to combat IUU fishing in the sector. The FAO defines co-management as “a partnership arrangement between government and the local community of resource

However, as fisheries management has evolved, and experience has grown, new

users, sometimes also connected with agents such as NGOs, research institutions, and

ideas have been introduced to make co-management systems more successful. These

other resource stakeholders, to share the responsibility and authority for management

additional elements include fisher empowerment, strong leadership, incentivization,

of a resource.”

This governance approach is particularly useful for artisanal fisheries,

as it provides the basis for more localized management and strengthens the pillars of 25

enforcement, decentralization, and devolution of authority.27 Like many West African coastal nations, the government of Ghana has been unable

to successfully manage fisheries resources through a traditional regulatory approach,

proposed eight principles for sustainable and equitable governance of fisheries resources

resulting in over-exploitation and IUU fishing. The primary focus of fisheries

that are foundational to co-management. They include:

management should be on the resource users and not the resource itself, since the main

fisheries sustainability.

It has also been successful in many parts of the world. Ostrom

causes of IUU fishing and over-exploitation are usually of socio-economic, institutional, 1. Define clear group boundaries: this involves delegation of power to groups on what

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and political origin.28 This inspired the adoption of a co-management approach,

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promoted by the FC in the form of Community-Based Fisheries Management

resources by entrusting control to both the central government and local communities.

Committees (CBFMCs) which were implemented in 1997 and the early 2000s. The

By delegating responsibilities to communities and fisher folk associations, the capacity

CBFMCs brought together government-supported community-based groups, including

for management and achieving the Fisheries Commission's mandate will be expanded.

local resource users, key stakeholders in the fisheries sector, IGOs, NGOs, academia,

It is also expected that IUU fishing activities will be better regulated at the local level

and others to collectively manage the fisheries. The CBFMCs showed some success

with the involvement of trained community-based committees and fisheries associations

and were a significant step toward integrated community-based resource management.

working in collaboration with the Fisheries Enforcement Unit (FEU) of the Fisheries

However, the concept failed to meet its objectives due to challenges, including lack

Commission.

of a clear legislative framework and definition of authority or jurisdiction; lack of

The new policy seeks to undertake an extensive education and awareness programme,

administrative clarity to attract the interest of key stakeholders; inadequate capacity

although it does not include awareness tools such as community-based social marketing.

development; and inadequate technical and logistical resources.

Most fishers regard the sea as a reservoir of inexhaustible fisheries resources and

Since this time, Ghana has managed its fishery resources using formal and informal

therefore feel that there should be minimal or no management interventions. The

co-management approaches. Government-supported community-based groups and

strategy to empower these fishers with mandates for management and control of access

other collaborative arrangements involving government, resource users, and other key

will potentially increase levels of awareness and interest in how their actions affect their

stakeholders in the fisheries sector for fisheries management, have been established with

catches and income.

varying degrees of success. The current Co-Management Policy was developed based on the experiences and successes of traditional management, government supported community-based

Aim and Methods of the Paper

groups, and other collaborative management arrangements between the government and stakeholders. The policy is intended to transform the top-down consultative

The paper aims to investigate how certain elements inherent in Ostrom’s principles for

management framework into a pluralistic approach to improve delegation of authority

managing common pool resources for sustainable and equitable fisheries governance,

to key stakeholders in the decision-making processes, to help achieve fisheries

could be harnessed and or improved in the new Ghana fisheries Co-Management Policy

development and management objectives. These objectives include:

to effectively tackle the menace of IUU fishing in the artisanal sector. To this end, the author sought to assess which of the five chosen elements could be utilised and/or

• Controlling fishing access in all sectors to ensure sustainable fisheries; • Ensuring harvest control strategies to enhance sustainable fishing;

improved to make the co-management model effective in tackling IUU fishing. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with strategically selected state officials,

• Preventing overfishing and rebuilding overfished stocks;

fisheries officers, and chief fishers at selected fishing communities. Interviews were

• Restoring and maintaining profitability in the fisheries sector.

conducted in English and, when necessary, translated into a local language. The respondents included chief fishers who had vast experience and years of fishing, as well

The new policy strives to address the fundamental challenge of open access fisheries

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as state officials with various appointments at the FC, which is the apex institution

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Work experience (No. of years)

Code

Statistics, and Information Management)

8 years

GNCFC

Acting President

35 years

Fisheries Commission

(Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Division)

9 years

Fisheries Commission

Regional Director, Western North Region

14 years

Fisheries Commission

Assistant Manager, Fish health, post-harvest, and extension (FPE)

9 years

Fisheries Commission

11 years

Fisher

16 years

Serial

Institution

MoFAD

Designation Deputy-Director (Research,

Fisheries manager,

Senior Fisheries manager, (Zonal Level)

Chief Fisherman Elmina, Centra Region

of the perspectives of fishers and state officials on IUU fishing and co-management approaches. Some of the interviews were conducted by virtual means (Zoom and WhatsApp) while others were conducted in-person. Overall, twelve people were interviewed (see Table 1 below):

Applying Co-Management Principles in Ghana’s Artisanal Sector The findings presented in Table 2 below focus on evaluating how some essential elements of co-management could be harnessed and/or improved to combat IUU fishing in the artisanal sector. Five essential themes inherent in Ostrom’s eight principles for sustainable and equitable management of common pool resources were considered, with special reference to the peculiarity of the Ghana artisanal fisheries sector. They include the following:

Fisher

Chief Fisherman, Tema Newtown

21 years

1. Influence/power sharing in the co-management arrangement; 2. Stakeholder participation;

Fisher

Canoe owner/Fisherman

16 years

3. Issues of trust between resource users and state officials;

Fisher

Canoe owner/Fisherman

17 years

4. Level of compliance;

Fisher

Canoe owner/ Fisherman

17 years

5. Level of education/awareness with respect to IUU fishing and co-management.

Fisheries Commission

Fisheries Manager, Marine Division

10 years

Table 1: List of interviewees by institution, designation, and work experience.

Influence/ Power sharing The fishers indicated that they were not treated fairly or with sufficient respect by the government authorities (Table 2, quote 1). All six chief fishers interviewed expressed that

at the operational level of fisheries management in Ghana. This included a director

they were only invited to participate in workshops and normally receive instructions

at the MoFAD as well as the acting president of the GNCFC. Through this process,

and directives from state officials. Although there appeared to be cooperation over

the author collected first-hand information, and developed a greater understanding

certain management issues such as the implementation of closed seasons (Table 2,

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quote 2), the fishers generally felt that their opinions and ideas are not taken into

a challenge to effective enforcement (Table 2, quote 12).

consideration (Table 2, quote 3). The fishers implied that the government wields all power. Interestingly, however, state officials claimed that fishers have well-organized

Level of Education/Awareness

associations with significant influence in fisheries management, and do have a say and a

From the interviews, the local fishers appeared very knowledgeable on the consequences

share in responsibility (Table 2, quote 4).

of IUU fishing. They recognised it as a leading factor in the decline of the fisheries (Table 2, quote 13). It was also established that IUU fishing was more prevalent on the western

Stakeholder Participation

shores than on the eastern shores of Ghana (Table 2, quote 18). Some went on to state

From the interviews, all state officials acknowledged that stakeholder engagement had not been adequate in the past, but currently stakeholder involvement or participation

Theme

Examples of supporting quotes

Influence/ Power sharing

1. “ They see we fishermen as third class citizens, they do not regard us much.” B1 2. “We worked together to agree on the closed season regime.” A2 3. ‘There is some level of engagement with fishers, but it is one thing being consulted and another having your views acted upon.” B1 4. “Fishermen are well organized at the national, regional and district level. They were able to prevent the closed season from being rolled out in 2018.” A1

Stakeholder Participation

5. “We based on failed past experiences to include more stakeholders in the comanagement arrangement. For instance, women were included in this current structure.” A2 & A5 6. “After attending workshops, some of the chief fishers are not able to organise their local fishers to relay information.” B1

Issues of Trust

7. “Under their watch, the Chinese are invading our fisheries in broad daylight. We have lost faith in the system.” B1 8. “ The artisanal fishers think we are not being fair to them. We are gradually building the trust.” A3 9. “We trust the local fishers to do the right thing. We continue to engage them in discussions on how best to manage the fisheries resources.” A2

Level of Compliance

10. “ The fines given to culprits must be harsh enough to deter them and others from engaging in IUU.” A2 11. “If a police post is established at the landing sites, compliance would improve.” B3 & B4 12. “Budgetary constraint has made monitoring, control and surveillance ineffective.” A2, A3 & A4

Level of education/ Awareness

13. “We used to have plenty catch with little effort before than now.” B2 14. “Catching fish with chemicals can cause cancer in the consumers.” B3 & B4 15. “About 70-80% are aware of the benefits of Co-management.” A2 16. “ The fishers are very aware of the benefits of co-management, only that they only think of what they can get today and not tomorrow.” A3 17. “In fact, they (fishers) are calling for the implementation of the co-management and wish to be given enough authority to effect arrest of culprits of IUU fishing.” A1 18. “IUU fishing occurs more at the western shores than here in Tema.” B4

was broad and adequate (Table 2, quote 5). Notably, women in the fisheries supply chain are now acknowledged and included (Table 2, quote 5). This view was also expressed by 5 out of 6 chief fishers.

Issues of Trust From the interviews conducted, there appears to be little trust between local resource users and state officials. The fishers indicated that the authorities had allowed foreign owned vessels to overfish (Table 2, quote 7), and thereby lost faith in the government to act in their interest. However, while the local fishers do not trust that the state officials have their interests in mind, the state officials were of the view that the level of trust is satisfactory and that their attempts to engage and communicate with the fishers had been successful (Table 2, quote 8). There was also a positive view from one official who intimated that the level of trust is gradually increasing under the new political administration (Table 2, quote 9).

Level of Compliance Most respondents believed that IUU fishing persists because punitive measures are not harsh enough (Table 2, quote 10). All respondents were of the view that additional enforcement was required to improve compliance (Table 2, quote 11). Financial constraints and inadequate enforcement personnel, according to all state officials, poses

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Table 2. Results from the interviews

313

that there are health implications of consuming fish that is caught using explosives and

government authorities as third-class citizens. Such concerns and misunderstandings

chemicals (Table 2, quote 14). Furthermore, the benefits of co-management have been

need to be addressed if the new Co-Management Policy is to succeed.

widely communicated to the local resource users through workshops, festivals, games,

For effective co-management, participatory engagement of stakeholders is needed.

and other community-based social marketing methods (Table 2, quotes 15 and 16). The

This can be achieved through workshops and seminars. Ghana’s new Co-Management

fishers therefore anticipate more authority and leverage under the new Co-Management

Policy appears to have broad and adequate stakeholder participation, including the

Policy for the management of the fisheries (Table 2, quote 17).

office of the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice, academia, the National Fish Processors and Traders Association (NAFPTA), cold store operators, and gear importers. Transparency and accountability are also essential to the success of co-management.

Discussion

Building trust usually takes time and requires dedicated effort by partners. Fishers

Effective co-management can help achieve sustainable fisheries and stamp out IUU

stakeholders must be well informed through effective communication channels, in

fishing. For co-management to be effective, however, it must build on certain principles

order to understand their contribution to the larger objectives of the co-management

for sustainable and equitable management of common pool resources. The paper used

policy. Information should be easily accessible to not only empower them to make

insights from key stakeholders on five essential co-management principles, to evaluate

better decisions and stronger contributions, but also to avert any resentment. Frequent

if Ghana’s artisanal fisheries are on a pathway to effective co-management and the

meetings to build consensus and discuss common solutions are also very important to

reduction of IUU fishing.

build trust. This paper suggests that greater trust between fishers and state officials is

often have a low level of trust when it comes to government.33 To improve trust,

Co-management requires that people who rely on a natural resource should be 30

needed in Ghana. The fishers strongly feel that their interests are not protected by the

Another important

government. Some chief fishers were of the view that some artisanal fishermen engage

element is the presence of a vertical link between the local resource users (fishers)

in IUU fishing because the industrial trawlers violate the fishing laws by fishing in the

and the government (state officials), including formal arrangements for sharing

30-meter zone, with no punitive action taken against them. On the other hand, some

central to decisions about how that resource is used and managed.

Thus, it is imperative that there

state officials were of the view that industrial trawlers fishing in the 30-meter zone is

be a mechanism which gives local resource users a chance to influence the management

not a problem. One of the officials intimated that the industrial fleet is well managed

responsibilities and authority based on collaboration. 32

of the fisheries, if true co-management is to exist.

because of their small numbers, and a regular gear audit is conducted on the industrial

From the results, a disconnect was apparent in the issues of influence and power

fleet with support from the Norwegian government. This disconnect on the issues of

sharing. While the fishers were convinced that they are not empowered enough,

trust must be diffused through transparency and effective communication. The new

the state officials think that the fishers wield significant power in decision-making

Co-Management Policy must therefore seek to build and improve on trust, to not only

for the management of the fisheries. For example, fisher groups, from the district to

increase the sense of co-responsibility, but also improve compliance and encourage

the national level, were able to mobilize and successfully resisted the closed season

responsible fishing by the artisanal fishers.

measures introduced in 2018. Many local fishers hold the view that they are seen by the

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Nonetheless, while co-management has been shown to potentially improve

315

compliance in the long term, enforcement of the regulations, whether by the authorities

consuming fish that is caught using explosives and chemicals. Most of the respondents

or jointly, is necessary to achieve high level of compliance in the short term. In many

agreed that the benefits of co-management have been widely publicized through

cases, however, stringent enforcement usually results in poor relations and conflict

community-based social marketing methods. Because of the strong understanding

between authorities and local resource users.

From the interviews, all the respondents

of the benefits of co-management, the fishers are eagerly looking forward to the

agreed that additional enforcement was required to improve compliance. According to

implementation of the new Policy, and anticipate greater influence and authority in the

some informants, establishing a police post at landing sites would improve compliance.

management of the fisheries.

Another issue raised by some officials was that punitive measures are insufficient to deter perpetrators of IUU fishing. Increasing fines or penalties for violations could be one way of rectifying this issue. Since IUU is a low-risk but high-gain activity, governments can

Conclusion

impose stringent sanctions to reduce the gains and make the activity less attractive to perpetrators.35

Co-management should include a formal policy for the devolution of both power and

The research revealed local variation in compliance. For example, fishers from the

responsibility from the authorities to the stakeholders. Greater attention needs to be

eastern coast of Ghana had good compliance, reflecting well defined and regulated

paid to garnering trust amongst stakeholders, as this is essential if the outcomes of the

fishing harbours. In the western coastal areas, however, where there are numerous

co-management policy are to be achieved. It is also imperative to improve the level of

undefined and poorly regulated landing sites, compliance is far worse, especially

compliance with laws and regulations governing the fisheries. It is clear from this that

with respect to fishing with high powered light bulbs and lighting accessories which

the value of education and awareness-building cannot be overstated, as it empowers

are used as fish aggregating devices. It is expected that IUU fishing activities will be

stakeholders and fosters mutual respect between managers and resource users.

better regulated at the local level with the involvement of trained community-based committees and fisheries associations, in collaboration with the Fisheries Enforcement Unit (FEU) of the FC, as stipulated in the new Co-Management Policy. Education and capacity building can enhance people’s attitudes and understanding of co-management. Education programs can address specific resource management issues, help achieve management objectives, and promote other essential services such as research, monitoring, and enforcement.36 Under this theme, the study sought to find out whether local fishermen were aware of the consequences of IUU and if they had a good understanding of the benefits of co-management, because it is one thing to act unknowingly and another to act with understanding. The study revealed that most fishers are aware of the implications of IUU fishing and affirmed that it was a lead cause of decline in the fish stocks. Some went on to state that there are health implications of

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Catch Documentation Schemes in Ghana’s Industrial Fisheries and their Role in Deterring IUU Fishing Introduction IUU fishing is a persistent challenge that raises serious concerns about the sustainability of world fisheries.1 The cost to the global economy is estimated between US$ 1023 billion per annum and West Africa alone is responsible for US$ 7.15 billion of the global loss.2 Some estimates suggest that as much as 30% of global marine fish production could be derived from IUU fishing.3 The former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described IUU fishing as ‘organized theft disguised as commerce.’4 It has proved difficult to find effective solutions to IUU fishing because of its complex nature and ability to circumvent regulations and management measures put in place by national, regional, and global organizations to manage fisheries in a sustainable manner. It exploits the weaknesses of corrupt officials, especially those in developing countries that lack the technology, logistics, and manpower for a coordinated and comprehensive monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) program.5 There is a strong correlation between the prevalence of IUU fishing and poor governance indicators of developing states. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the hardest hit areas are the waters controlled by developing countries, where legislation is not robust and enforcement is weak at

Misornu Yaw Logo Ghana Fisheries Commission and World Maritime University

best.6 West Africa, the Caribbean, and the Coral Triangle region of Southeast Asia have been identified as hotspots for this unscrupulous activity, which is increasingly eroding the fisheries resources of the world.7

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Catch documentation schemes (CDSs) are an important tool in tackling IUU fishing. A CDS is officially defined by the FAO as “a system that tracks and traces fish 8

collection for many decades. Some of these advantages are highlighted in the Results Section below, and include reliability, time efficiency, and easy retrieval of data.

from the point of capture through unloading and throughout the supply chain”. A

A number of RFMOs have implemented CDSs. Perhaps the best example is

CDS documents and validates the source of the harvested fish, and ensures that fish

CCAMLR in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic region. IUU fishing related to

is caught in a way that complies with local, national, and international regulations.

Toothfish was believed to be approximately twice the official catch data in the 1990s,

CDSs are a trade-based governance mechanism, which can be used by individual

before the CCAMLR CDS was adopted. The introduction of this CDS in 1999,

States, Regional Communities, and Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

combined with continuous action by the fishing industry and NGOs, has led to a

(RFMOs).

The primary aim of a CDS is to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing, 11

by preventing IUU-caught fish from reaching legitimate seafood markets.

For a CDS to meet the standard set out in the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes (VGCDS), it needs to encompass four key elements: coverage, 12

digitization, traceability, documentation, and validation.

significant reduction in IUU fishing of Toothfish. IUU fishing now represents less than 1% of total global Toothfish catch, according to the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators.13 Ghana, like many other countries in West Africa, has been one of the countries

CDSs established across the

hardest hit by IUU fishing. While there are no official figures and limited literature on

world are essentially defined by the type, number of species, or fishery they encompass,

the impact of IUU fishing on the economy of Ghana, conservative estimates indicate

as well as the end market destination (be it international export only, domestic market,

that it runs into millions of dollars.14 IUU fishing in Ghana in the industrial sector

or both). Documentation and validation in a CDS often involve recording all activities in

largely occurs through transhipment of fish catch at sea within and outside the Exclusive

the supply chain (both catch and trade documentation) for the purposes of monitoring,

Economic Zone. Other prohibited methods such as light fishing, and use of explosives

stock assessment, or eliminating IUU fishing. Under best practices, documentation

and chemicals, including Dichloro-Diphenyl Trichloroethane (DDT), are also used,

provided by fishers or exporters is audited and authenticated by a government authority

particularly in the artisanal sector.

independent of the parties. This authority is directly involved in filling out the forms to

Ghana has been warned twice by the EU for exporting IUU fish and products in the

ascertain the validity of the data. A CDS should prevent any fish export consignment

last 10 years.15 In response, Ghana has taken the necessary steps, in concert with the

without the required documentation from being landed or traded.

EU, to reform its fisheries management strategy and adopt measures to address IUU

Key data elements (KDEs), such as location, gear type, date of catch, species caught,

fishing, including the introduction of a CDS. The tuna and demersal fishery CDSs are

are central to a CDS and ensure that fishing activities are consistent with domestic and

in line with International Commission for Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and

international law. A CDS should also provide accurate records of fish weight/volume

national requirements respectively. Both schemes require fisheries observers on board the

estimates, to ensure that additional product is not added at any stage of the value chain.

vessel to observe and document activities at sea. These activities include documenting

The use of electronic means to collect and document data has increasingly become

transhipment activities and catch sampling (length-weight analysis, number and type of

best practice in recent years. It has been adopted by almost all RFMOs and many

fish species).

unilateral schemes are also introducing it. Digitized systems have many advantages

Upon completion of fishing operations, the vessel sends a landing request to

over the traditional paper-based methods that have characterized marine fisheries data

compliance officials. Once the request is approved, the vessel comes into a dock and

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is then inspected by both compliance and Fisheries Scientific Survey Division (FSSD)

Methodology

officials. In these inspections, the officials check licenses, catch records, and log book information. The catch information is then checked against the data from both the

A stakeholder mapping exercise was carried out to identify relevant stakeholders within

onboard observers and the Vessel Monitoring System to ensure accuracy and prevent

government fisheries agencies. 19 key informants were interviewed, using an open

underreporting. If it is a foreign vessel, officers run a background check with the flag

ended, semi-structured interview process. 15 of these respondents were functionaries

state to determine if the vessel is duly registered or whether the vessel has any history

within the Ghana fisheries governmental structure (see Table 1 below). Four government

of IUU fishing. If nothing illegal is found, the vessel proceeds to offload its catch, and

officials from Namibia were also interviewed. 11 of the 15 interviews in Ghana were

officials subsequently authorize it to prepare a landing certificate.

through Zoom meetings and four were conducted through phone calls. All four

Landing certificates from tuna vessels are sent to the Compliance Unit and FSSD

interviews with Namibian officials were conducted face-to-face.

for further checks for data accuracy and compliance with national and international regulations. If nothing untoward is identified, officials of the Compliance and FSSD

Informants

Gender

Organization

Position

Date

office send a Memo of Approval concerning the consignment to the Catch Certification

FC (MCS)

Fisheries Manager

25/07/2022

FC (Central Region)

Senior Fisheries Manager

22/08/2022

Ministry of Fisheries

Deputy Director

27/07/2022

FC (MCS)

Deputy Director

27/07/2022

FC (MCS)

Fisheries Observer

03/08/2022

FC (Greater Accra)

Senior Fisheries Manager

19/08/2022

FC (MCS)

Fisheries Observer

04/08/2022

FC (MCS)

Fisheries Observer

17/08/2022

Unit (CCU) to confirm that all due diligence has been carried out after auditing the documentation. At the CCU, the tuna vessel must complete the EU Community Catch Certificate form, as virtually all tuna catch from Ghana goes to the EU market. The demersal trawler operators, however, proceed differently and report directly to the Catch Certification Unit of the Fisheries Commission to get their consignment ready for export. Since Ghana introduced its CDSs, there has been little formal assessment of their effectiveness. This paper assesses and evaluates their performance in relation to the FAO’s VGCDS, as well as CDSs implemented by Namibia. Namibia was chosen as

FC (Western North)

Regional Director

23/07/2022

W 10

FC (Head Office)

Director, Marine Division

07/08/2022

a comparator because its fisheries are generally considered to be well-managed, with

W 11

FC (FSSD)

Fisheries Manager

14/08/2022

a number recently achieving certification by the Marine Stewardship Council. The

W 12

FC (FSSD)

Assistant Fisheries Manager

12/08/2022

research is based on a combination of document review and analysis, and interviews

W 13

FC (FSSD)

Assistant Fisheries Manager

09/08/2022

W 14

Ghana Tuna Industrial Tuna Association (GITA)

Secretary

15/08/2022

W 15

FC(PHU)

Director

29/08/2022

with key government representatives and fisheries stakeholders.

Table 1. List of informants from Ghana (FC = Fisheries Commission)

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Results

with you, I do not have a science background so identification of the various fish in the catch and recording the right thing is a big problem for me.” The remaining three

All but three participants indicated that Ghana’s CDSs are in alignment with

respondents who happened to be senior government officials thought they did not need

international best practice. For example, according to the Deputy Director in charge

immediate training to exercise their duties successfully. W10 said: “I have been part of

of Statistics at the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (MoFaD), “our

the Government delegation to ICCAT meetings since 2013, I do not think I need any

laws are consistent with the ICCAT recommendation 97-10 and largely the VLGCDS.

special training to do my work”.

This was done I think in 2013 or 2014 in response to our first issues with the EU on IUU fishing”.

There was general consensus among informants that the tuna fishery has a more effective CDS and less challenges with IUU fishing, compared to the demersal trawler

However, two respondents noted that they do not believe the scheme aligns with

sector. All 14 informants said that the government places more value on protecting the

international best practice. W5 noted that “with the many problems I am seeing with

integrity, transparency and legitimacy of tuna stocks because of their economic value on

this scheme, it is hard for me to believe it aligns with international regulations”. Only

the international market and ability to generate revenue through exports, foreign direct

one participant said he had no idea if the CDSs align or not. W7 took the view that

investment, and taxes. For example, the secretary of GITA said that: “Tuna is a premium

“honestly, I do not know much about the international laws. Those things are handled

fish and generates lots of revenue for government through licensing and export fees.

at the Ministry or FC Head office.”

Government is very much aware of its value on the international market and are keen to

The CDSs in Ghana are paper-based. There was a general awareness of the need for,

adhere to ICCAT regulations to avoid sanctions.”

and value of, digital systems, with 13 out of 15 respondents indicating that they would

The tuna fishery has a dedicated office and personnel to manage the CDS. However,

be willing to transition to digital CDSs in the future. For example, W1 said: “Let’s say

no such equivalent is available for the demersal fleet. For example, respondent W12

if you input your data collection into an electronic system it is automatically updated

noted that “my office only focuses on tuna species like Yellowfin, Bigeye and Skipjack.

into a server, you understand. It is time efficient and it’s more reliable and more flexible

We do not work on fish caught from the trawler vessels.” The informants suggested that

when it comes to data collection. It makes data easy to retrieve.” However, more can

fishers and vessel operators are not motivated to cheat the system, as they recognize the

be done to raise awareness of the value of digital CDSs, as two respondents did not

economic value of exporting their catch to the international market and do not wish to

know enough about electronic or digitized CDSs to make substantive comments on the

risk being sanctioned for engaging in IUU fishing. For example, the Secretary of GITA

matter. W8 said: “I have been working at FSSD for the past two years. All we have been

said: “The latest EU sanctions on IUU fishing has nothing to do with us. It was caused

trained to use is the paper form. I do not know much about the electronic CDS but will

by the trawler vessels. We attend ICCAT meetings and adhere to its regulations. No

be willing to learn if it will improve our work here”.

member of us has been identified as engaging in IUU fishing”. W6 said: “Boss, I will

An important issue raised by respondents in Ghana is lack of training: 11 out of

not mince words, we have many logistical problems just like all developing countries,

14 respondents said they needed training on fish identification, port state measures,

but the over-reliance on the tuna sector is allowing IUU fishing in the trawler sector to

estimating catch-in-hold, and international laws on CDSs. W7 stated that: “I have

rise”.

been doing this work since 2015, I have not had any training since then. To be sincere

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10 out of 15 interviewees revealed logistical and financial challenges hampering the

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efforts of officials to exercise their duties effectively. They complained about challenges

stock certified because of its current issues with IUU fishing. However, the Fisheries

with the VMS, irregular boat patrols, breakdown of computers, and lack of vehicles

Commission in partnership with USAID, Environmental Justice Foundation, and

for easy mobility. They say that these logistical challenges compromise productivity,

the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development are educating fishers, vessel

efficiency and accuracy of data collected. For example, informant W11 said: “You may

operators etc. on the negative impact of IUU fishing. The commission is also serious

not have an official vehicle to do your work or the computer system in the office may

about enforcing sanctions in the Fisheries Act to deter both fishers and officials from

fail at a particular time and so may need to wait after the repair works to do your work”.

flouting processes of the CDS. This is the only way Ghana marine fisheries can meet the

The Director of the Marine Division (FC) further added that: “Since the end of the

standards of these certification firms”. Others were more optimistic and believed fixing

West Africa Regional Fisheries Programme in 2018, Fisheries Commission have not had

the challenges with the CDSs will reduce IUU fishing in the demersal fleets and put

funds on a consistent basis to provide fuel for regular boat patrols, internet data to run

Ghana fisheries on the path to sustainability. One said: “We are currently not in a good

the VMS and monies to pay fisheries observers”.

place but I am hoping that the current measures in the Ghana marine fisheries plan

All but two of the informants from Ghana indicated that salaries are poor and failure

2019-2024 can solve many of the issues with the CDS and sustainable fishing”.

to pay on time causes staff to be unmotivated to perform duties and inspections. For

Lastly, conflict and duplication of functions among key stakeholders was one critical

instance, respondent W8 said: “Let me make a vivid example, the last time I went to

issue raised in the course of the interviews. There appeared to be a certain level of

sea was in January or March, I think March and for about 6 months I never got my

disconnect between key stakeholders in the CDS implementation process. The director

allowance. It was only last month or early this month that I got my January allowance

of the post-harvest unit (PHU) of FC said: “Typically, the vetting and authorization of

and so I still have arrears of two trips that they still have to pay me. If you tell your

fish exports should be done by my office but this is being done by the CCU. Clearly, I

people you went to work, they still expect you to come back with something because

think they are doing our job. There is no office called Catch Certification Unit under

you went to work”. Some informants were not comfortable stating their views for fear

the Fisheries Commission scheme of service.”

of future victimization in the event that details of the interviews were leaked.

It is interesting to compare the situation in Ghana with that of Namibia. All four

The respondents revealed that observers were not permanent employees of the

Namibian fisheries officials said that both their tuna and trawl fisheries are compatible

Fisheries Commission and did not have an insurance package in the event of injury

with the provisions of the VLGCDS, ICCAT and CCAMLR CDSs. For instance,

or death at sea. W7, who is an observer, said: “Sir, our job with the government is

informant P3 indicated that: “Namibia’s CDS follows both the processes of CCAMLR

a contract. Sir, will you believe there is no insurance for us? I sometimes get scared

and ICCAT. I am inclined to believe that these RFMOs follow international best

because two of our colleagues went to sea and never came back and we do not know

practices”. In Namibia the CDSs are already digitized. For example, P3 said that: “The

what happened to them. I think if I die now, I have died in vain”.

digitization process is very effective and it makes data collection much easier”. The

Eight out of 14 respondents did not think that Ghana’s marine fisheries are managed

Namibian informants said that the government recognizes the importance of the tuna

well enough to pass any certification scrutiny from a recognized global certification

sector and implementing the ICCAT CDS down to the smallest detail. For example,

organization such as the Marine Stewardship Council. For example, the Director of the

P3 said: “For proper documentation and traceability purposes, the tuna sector is

Catch Certification Unit of FC said: “Ghana is a long way from getting any of its fish

governed by an international body, a well-structured body. They aid in the traceability

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but also marketing purposes. Because of proper documentation of ICCAT log book, for

a lot of IUU fishing cases but it has gone down.”

instance, it is easier for the EU to determine the exact location of the fish, where the fish was caught”. The Namibian government also prioritises the demersal trawler fleet and it is well

Discussion

managed. The hake, monkfish and horse mackerel fisheries contribute hugely to the economy and the government ensures that there is transparency in the chain of custody

A major issue hindering the effectiveness of Ghana’s CDSs is data collection and

of the landed fish.

technical capacity. Another issue is practical and logistical challenges caused by

Namibia does share some of Ghana’s problems and issues, however. For example,

budgetary/economic constraints. Issues raised during interviews ranged from logistical

respondents complained of poor salaries. Respondent P2 said: “Our salaries are not

and practical problems such as broken computers and paltry salaries, to no vehicles for

good at all. Though salaries of observers are better than ours, they keep asking for salary

easy mobility. Historically, the fisheries sector in Ghana has been a marginalized area,

increment. Two weeks ago, I heard they had planned a protest and submit a petition

with focus often directed towards the oil and service sectors. To put this into perspective,

for salary increment”. P2 further added that: “Though I do not work with the Namibia

the annual budget for the fisheries sector in 2022 was US$ 46 million (GHC374m).

Fisheries Observer Agency, I am aware every observer is entitled to a danger allowance

This is less than 3% of the total funds allocated for the fiscal year.16 This often forces the

which is incorporated into their monthly allowance”.

fisheries administration to further prioritize which issues to address. Thus, the demersal

Furthermore, even though the CDSs are considered to be more effective in Namibia,

fishery is pushed down the priority list and the tuna sector is lifted to the top, owing

3 of the 4 respondents raised issues with in-service training. For example, Respondent

to the fact that it generates 88% of total fish exports each year.17 Respondents cite the

P1 said: “The system started long time ago and no proper training is given to the

creation of a dedicated office at FSSD for tuna catch, for additional documentation

staff members to effectively carry out the program implementation”. The remaining

and verification in the tuna sector. This office audits information provided by the VMS,

respondent (P4) had the same views as W10 from Ghana: “I regularly travel to Madrid

observers, port inspectors, and landing certificates to ensure that no illegal tuna fish

for ICCAT meetings and have in-depth knowledge of the CDS process”. However, 3 of

enters the supply chain.

the 4 respondents in Namibia said that, while there are logistical challenges, this has not

Aside from the commitment and focus of the government on the tuna fishery,

stopped effective implementation of its CDSs, as they have regular sea and air patrols,

and as mentioned above, fishers and vessel operators recognize the value of tuna on

a digitized data entry system, and an effective VMS ensuring that all vessels that offload

the international market and so comply with the dictates of the CDS to ensure their

their catch at the Walvis Bay and Lüderitz ports are free from any irregularities. P2 said:

consignments are not seen as coming from illegal sources.

“We sometimes hear that operational funds have not come but Namibia’s MCS network

However, the situation in Namibia is different. Demersal fish contribute a far greater

is quite effective. We have effective sea and air patrols and a VMS that monitors all

proportion of GDP than the tuna sector. About 75% ($US 731 million) of annual

fishing activities all year round”. The Namibian informants concluded that their CDSs

revenue generated from fish exports in 2018 came from the trawler sector.18 According

have been effective in eliminating IUU fishing in Namibian waters. P4 said: “Namibia

to the Namibia Statistical Agency report 2017, while 50.3% of the fish catch is exported

does not have a perfect system but our MCS has helped us a lot. We used to experience

to Spain, it has also identified viable markets in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique,

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and the Democratic Republic of the Congo using the INFOPECHE platform.19 Alignment of Ghana’s CDSs with international best practice is also another issue that featured prominently in the interviews. While Ghana has been successful in

CDSs and how they are administered, at least for the demersal fleet. The current scheme lags behind Namibia’s CDS for demersal fish, in terms of structure, focus, and implementation, and Ghana would do well to follow Namibia’s example.

incorporating international requirements such as fisheries observer programmes, installation of VMS, ICCAT recommendation 97-10 and the VLGCDS into domestic legislation and National Plans, it has been unable to digitize its CDSs. This is contrary to the recommendations of the VLGCDS, which considers digitization to be a fundamental requirement for an effective scheme. These findings should be viewed with caution because of the limited number of informants. Thus, future researchers could replicate this study with a broader pool of stakeholders. For example, views of fishers, crew members, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academics could be sought to provide a broader perspective and a deeper understanding of the challenges in implementing Ghana’s CDSs.

Conclusion In conclusion, it appears that Ghana’s tuna fishery has a CDS that works well, is adequately resourced, and aligns with best practice. Ghana’s trawl fishery, however, tells a different story. Although the trawl fishery CDS appears to have all the relevant paper documentation prescribed in the VLGCDS, it remains ineffective, largely as a result of implementation and logistical challenges. It is evident from the findings that the balance of power and leverage is with the tuna fishery. Therefore, the government needs to broaden its priority scope to encompass the trawler sector. Furthermore, the objectives and mandates of government organizations need to be more clearly defined, to forestall conflicts and eliminate any misunderstandings that might arise because of poor coordination. The fisheries administration in Ghana should also consider how to provide greater economic incentives to its officials to guard against corruption and low motivation. Overall, it is evident that there is much room for improvement in Ghana’s

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ⒸFrancisco Blaha

PART 4

The History and Role of the FAO in Combatting IUU Fishing

The FAO Agreement on Port State Measures

Case Studies The Global and Practitioner Perspectives Problem of

IUU Fishing and the Role of the UN Agencies in the Fight Against It

The ILO’s Role in the Fight against IUU Fishing and the Work in Fishing Convention (C188)

The IMO’s Role in the Fight Against IUU Fishing and the 2012 Cape Town Agreement

PART 1

Peru Case Study on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing

The sea is the natural route of trade that unites peoples, and Peru is favoured for being a country with an extensive coastline facing the largest ocean in the world, the Pacific. Furthermore, this coastline, which constitutes the largest of our borders, is located in the area of most extraordinary productivity and biological richness on the planet.

Introduction The Peruvian sea, which constitutes the Maritime Domain of Peru, is located on the western coast of South America, with around 3,100 km of coastline in the Pacific Ocean. Peru is a leader in marine capture production. On the coasts of Peru, the Pacific Ocean is characterised by intensive oceanic upwelling, which, combined with various environmental and biological factors, makes its waters highly productive. The population of Peru reached 33 million in 2020. The Peruvian people consume

Jesús A. Menacho Piérola Captain, Maritime Authority of Peru

large amounts of seafood, especially compared to neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the fisheries sector in Peru is a significant provider of jobs (about 232,000 in 2014). Consequently, the seafood industry is vital for the country’s economy, contributing 1-1,5% of Peru’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to Peru’s Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), the evolution of GDP for

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the extractive fisheries in Peru (US$ Millions) up to 2021 was significant, as shown in the following graphic:

European Market Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture Products (EUMOFA) states that most of Peru’s seafood production derives from fisheries, with aquaculture accounting for only about 1,4% of total production volume.3 Even though fisheries dominate in volume, the Peruvian aquaculture industry has excellent growth potential. Marine species are the most important for fisheries, whereas freshwater species represent the majority of aquaculture production.4 From a historical point of view, there are significant differences between the development of fisheries and aquaculture in Peru. Output from fisheries fluctuates significantly and is high-volume, whereas aquaculture is more stable but produces smaller volumes. The fluctuating result of fisheries is due to the effects of El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO); namely temperature oscillations that significantly affect

Source: PRODUCE (2022). 1

wild stocks. For instance, the Peruvian anchoveta is sensitive to higher temperatures, and stocks can collapse during El Niño events.

PRODUCE is the regulating body at the national level that promotes, regulates, and controls the development of aquaculture in coordination with other State entities. The upwelling system off Peru’s coast makes the area highly productive for fisheries. The nutrient-rich waters enable Peru to be the third largest fishery nation in the world in terms of volume, mainly due to anchoveta landings, making Peru the world’s largest provider of fishmeal.

Source: NOAA/PMEL/TAO Project Office (2022). 4

Source: NOAA. National Ocean Service website. 2

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Maritime Authority of Peru

in the Convention.

The General Directorate of Captaincies and Coastguards (DICAPI) is responsible

Consequently, the Peruvian Maritime Domain includes the territorial sea (TS),

for administering and enforcing Peru’s National Maritime Administration, and is

contiguous zone (CZ), exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf (CS).

also known as the National Maritime Authority. DICAPI belongs to the Navy and,

The Peruvian fishing law does not exist in isolation. To guarantee its effectiveness,

consequently, to the Ministry of Defence. Peru is not a party to the United Nations

Peruvian fishing law shall comply with the regional and international legal regimes to

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the Peruvian maritime

which Peru is a signatory, and with customary international law. The most relevant

legislation is concurrent with the provisions of UNCLOS. DICAPI assumes the

regimes, which are considered essential in the context of illegal, unreported, and

functions of Flag State, Coastal State and Port State.

unregulated (IUU) fishing, are the following:

DICAPI’s mission is to exercise the Maritime Authority and Administration regulating and ensuring the safety of human life at sea, and the protection of the marine

a) Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission – IATTC.

environment and its natural resources. Furthermore, it is reponsible for repressing all

b) South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization – SPRFMO.

illegal activities within the scope of its jurisdiction, and carrying out the control and

c) FAO Port State Measures Agreement – PSMA.7

surveillance of all activities in the aquatic environment, in compliance with the law and

d) Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

international conventions.

Flora – CITES.8 e) Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals – CMS.9 f ) Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD.10

Peruvian Fishing Law in the International Context

g) IMO Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation of the Provisions of the Torremolinos Protocol of 1993 relating to the Torremolinos International

Peru claims 200 nautical miles of “maritime domain”. During the controversy around

Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 (CTA 2012).11

the delimitation of the boundary between the maritime zones of Peru and Chile in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Peru’s Agent formally declared Peru’s commitment to the modern law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS:

Although Peru is a party to key international marine conservation agreements, it has yet to ratify fundamental international agreements for fisheries management or worker rights and safety in fisheries. This includes UNCLOS, the 1995 United Nations Fish

Peru’s Constitution of 1993, its internal law, and Peru’s practice are in full conformity with

Stocks Agreement,12 and the 2007 ILO Work in Fishing Convention (No. 188).13 The

the contemporary law of the sea. The term “maritime domain” used in our Constitution is

National Plan of Action (NPOA) to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing has yet

applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the 1982 Convention;

to be approved; it is imperative to adopt an NPOA and strengthen monitoring, control,

the Constitution refers expressly to freedom of international communication. In short,

surveillance and enforcement programs to reduce the risk of IUU fishing.

Peru accepts and applies the rules of the customary international law of the sea as reflected

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Domestic law includes provisions to control and supervise fishing activities in

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Peruvian waters. The following laws are the most important:

foreign-flag fishing vessels extract hydrobiological resources without a fishing permit, all resources and products on board the fishing vessel are considered a

a) L aw Decree Nº 25977 (1992) approved the General Law on Fisheries. It established the prohibition of fishing activities without prior authorisation from

catch carried out within Peruvian jurisdictional waters. As a result, all resources may be seized.

the State, as well as extraction, processing, or commercialisation of non-authorized

f ) Supreme Decree Nº 016-2020-PRODUCE (modifies the 016-2020) established

marine resources or transhipment of the product of fishing. Administrative and

that shipowners of foreign flag vessels that carry out fishing of straddling fish

criminal sanctions are provided in the event of non-compliance.

stocks, highly migratory fish stocks, or transboundary fish stocks on the high

b) Supreme Decree Nº 012-2001-PE established the Regulations concerning the

seas, or their legal representatives in the country, have to be authorised to operate

protection of the marine environment. The Ministry of Production is entitled

in Peruvian ports and shipyards. They must also fulfil the following: the flag

to determine policies on environmental protection and conservation of living

State of the fishing vessel shall be a member or mandatory participant of a

marine resources in fishing activities, assess environmental effects caused by fishing

Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO); the fishing vessel shall

activities, and enforce compliance with the Regulations, amongst other functions.

be authorised to operate within the scope of previous regional organisations, if

c) Legislative Decree Nº 1393 (2018) regulates interdiction of illegal fishing

applicable; and the fishing vessel shall not appear in a definitive or final RFMO

activities, in relation to fishing resources and operations of illicit shipyards, among

list of vessels that have engaged in IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, Satellite

others. Those interdiction measures consist of seizing or destroying equipment

Tracking System – SISESAT (VMS) shall be installed on board, as well as the

used by illegal fishers. This Law also modified Article 308-B of the Criminal Code

signal for the Aquatic Traffic Identification and Monitoring System – SIMTRAC

regarding illicit extraction and processing of aquatic species, including prohibiting

(AIS) – and the vessel must have the tracking data of its satellite positioning

extraction using ships built without authorisation or license.

during the last six months before the entrance to port request.

d) Legislative Decree Nº 635 approved the Criminal Code. It was modified in 2018, adding Article 308-B concerning the illegal extraction and processing of aquatic species. This Article provides that anyone extracting species of marine fauna in

It is clear from the above that the domestic legislation of Peru aligns with international customary laws to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.

prohibited seasons, amounts, sizes, or areas; catching or processing marine fauna without authorisation or license; exceeding the catch limit per ship as provided by the competent authority; or fishing using explosives, ships built without a permit,

Peru as a Fishing Country

or any other illicit methods, shall be punished with imprisonment for at least three years and, at most, five years.

FAO14 states that, in 2020, China was a major fisheries producer, with 35% of the total

e) Supreme Decree Nº 017-2017-PRODUCE approved the regulations for

fisheries and aquaculture production of aquatic animals by inland and marine waters,

monitoring and sanctioning fishing and aquaculture activities, and Article 50 –

followed by India (8%), Indonesia (7%), Viet Nam (5%), and Peru (3%). These five

Presumption of Illegal Fishing by Foreign-Flag Vessels – established that, when

countries were responsible for about 58% of worldwide fisheries production.

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The top seven capture producers (China, Indonesia, Peru, India, Russian Federation, United States of America, and Viet Nam) accounted for almost 49% of global capture production. In 2020, global marine capture was 78.8 million tonnes, a decline of 6.8% from its peak of 84.5 million tonnes in 2018, when Peru and Chile reported relatively high anchoveta catches. The graphic shows the top ten global capture producers in 2020:

Source: FAO 2022. 16

In 2020, anchoveta was again the top species caught, at almost 4.9 million tonnes. However, this was still lower than the 2018 peak that exceeded 7 million tonnes. In addition, global catches of jumbo flying squid grew from about 128 000 tonnes in 2000 to 1 million tonnes in 2015, before fluctuating in subsequent years and reaching 880 000 tonnes in 2020.

Source: FAO 2022. 15

In 2020, similar to previous years, the table shows that the top seven producers accounted for over 50% of total marine capture. China alone accounted for 14.9% of the world total, followed by Indonesia (8.2%), Peru (7.1%), Russian Federation (6.1%), United States of America (5.4%), India (4.7%), and Viet Nam (4.2%).

Source: FAO 2022. 17

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According to the Peruvian Institute of the Sea,18 up to three clear periods in the

In line with PRODUCE,20 fishing is the most important of all the forms of use of

development of the jumbo flying squid fishery in Peru can be identified. The first was

Peru’s marine resources. The fishing sector is widely dominated by the extraction of

before 1989 when this species had no directed fishery. Only a few hundred tonnes were

anchovy. For the total landing accumulated in the decade 2008-2017, this resource was

landed, primarily resulting from the bycatch of the high-sea gillnetting fleet fishing for

responsible for about 82%, followed by squid (8.2%), other invertebrates (2%), jack

tunas and sharks, and the artisanal purse-seine fleet, which was more coastal.

mackerel (1.7%), other fish (including demersal and pelagic coastal species) (1.4%),

The second period, between 1990 and 1996, corresponds to the initial growth phase

mackerel (1.4%), bonito (1%), Peruvian hake (1%), Perico (0.9%), and macroalgae

of a local artisanal fishery aimed at fishing for jumbo flying squid, and the beginning of

(0.3%). The following graphic provides a close look at landings in 2017, in percentages

an industrial fishery using foreign industrial jigger vessels under agreements that allowed

based on official data from PRODUCE and segregated by species and groups of fish,

them access to temporary fishing licenses or permits to operate in Peruvian waters.

marine invertebrates and macroalgae. It should be noted that these numbers do not

Together, these two fisheries produced a total catch of 210,000 tonnes in 1994. The

include landings from IUU fishing.

majority (80%) was caught by the foreign industrial fleet (see the graphic above), thus confirming the presence of dense, commercially important concentrations of jumbo flying squid in Peruvian waters. After a brief interval of low catches, associated with a process of revision of the agreements and fishing licenses to the foreign industrial jigger fleet, and the occurrence of the powerful El Niño phenomenon of 1997-98, a third period in the development of this fishery was observed from 1999 onwards. This period was characterised by the rapid growth of the local artisanal fishery for jumbo flying squid, and the gradual elimination and replacement of local industrial fishing with foreign industrial vessels. The total catch in Peruvian jurisdictional waters in this third period reached its first peak of 558,995 tonnes in 2008, of which the local artisanal fleet caught 95.4% (533,000 tonnes). In 2014 a second peak of 556,156 tonnes was reached, all captured by

Source: PRODUCE (2018). 21

the local artisanal fleet. It should also be noted that artisanal fishing, despite having much lower extraction levels than industrial fishing, includes a greater diversity of species captured to satisfy the market for direct human consumption. The graphic below shows the landing of marine hydrobiological resources of Peru (in thousands of tonnes) in 2017. Source: IMARPE (2018). 19

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Source: EUMOFA (2020). 23

Source: PRODUCE (2018) 22

Global Fishing Watch24 affirms that the jumbo squid is the most abundant marine invertebrate of the southeastern Pacific. It is a voracious predator that migrates annually

The International Fishmeal and Fish Oil Organisation (IFFO) states that global

from Mexican waters down to the Chilean coast. Demand for jumbo squid is increasing

fishmeal production peaked in 1994 and has shown a declining trend. Today, fishmeal

because 75% of the animal can be used for food which has high nutritional value.

is mainly used for aquaculture (carnivorous and omnivorous species), followed by pig

Catches of jumbo squid have grown significantly since the early 2000s and are essential

feed, poultry feed, and other sectors. Hence, the demand for fishmeal depends on

to local economies. In Peru, it is the second-largest fishery after anchovy.

these sectors’ needs. Global fishmeal producers must be aware of the implications of

The jumbo squid fishery is managed by the South Pacific Regional Fisheries

such trends, as 75% of fishmeal and 70% of fish oil is used in aquaculture production

Management Organization (SPRFMO), whose Convention area extends from 120º E

globally. Fishmeal and fish oil are highly valuable for carnivorous and omnivorous

to 67º W longitude along the waters of Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Most distant water

aquatic-reared species due to their composition of omega 3 and omega 6 fatty acids.

fleets targeting jumbo squid are Chinese vessels, followed by vessels from the Republic

Several species are used for producing fishmeal and fish oil around the world,

of Korea and Chinese Taipei.

including industrial-grade forage fish (sand eel, menhaden, pout), food-grade forage fish

The following table shows the global capture production for jumbo flying squid

(anchovy, sardinella, capelin, blue whiting, sprat), and food-fish (mackerel, pilchard,

(in tonnes). This demonstrates that the Peruvian and Chinese fleet together caught

herring). In contrast, Peru is less diversified and mainly uses anchoveta as the primary

a significant volume of squid during the last few years, including a global capture of

source of fishmeal and fish oil. Fish oil from Peru is primarily used in salmon and

more than 877 thousand tonnes in 2020 – 97% of total global capture. The difference

shrimp aquaculture production, whereas fishmeal is used for several species, with large

between the two fishing fleets is that, while the Peruvian fleet is mainly artisanal

amounts used for pig rearing. The graphic shows fishmeal and fish oil production

vessels less than 15m in length operating only in Peruvian jurisdictional waters, the

(volume in millions of tonnes).

Chinese fleet is an industrial fishing fleet operating in the high seas, in the SPRFMO

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regimes, particularly those of developing countries lacking the capacity and resources for effective monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS). IUU fishing is found in all types and dimensions of fisheries; it occurs both on the high seas and in areas within national jurisdiction.

Mobility and effort of the foreign fishing fleet are the main threats when it comes to IUU fishing in Peru and the SPRFMO Convention Area. Foreign fishing fleets at a global level are constantly moving on the high seas, following the jumbo flying squid resource, and the presence of this resource in the jurisdictional waters of Peru favours the Source: FAO (2022)25 and SPRFMO (2022)26, own work with previous organisation’s data.

development of illegal activities, with possible effects on the marine ecosystem. If these activities are permanent, the non-straddling resources are affected. In Peru, the jumbo

Convention Area. The jumbo flying squid Dosidicus gigas fishery has developed into one of the

flying squid fishery is the leading source of labour generation, surpassing anchoveta, which has automated processes.

predominantly targeted fisheries in the SPRFMO Convention Area. The fishery is

Nationally, the jumbo flying squid fishery is the second most important in the

primarily carried out by jigging vessels operating in the eastern region of the Convention

country after anchovy in terms of volume and foreign exchange earnings. Most jumbo

Area, outside the Latin American areas of national jurisdiction.

flying squid landings are processed into various frozen products and then exported.

FAO

reported that the high-value catches of jumbo flying squid have grown

significantly since the early 2000s, partially offsetting the decline in captures of other

However, it is also an essential resource for food security and consumption in the domestic market. During 2015-2019, an average of 502 million dollars of jumbo flying squid was

species.

exported, and in 2019 a record high of 847 million

IUU Fishing

dollars was reached. In the following graphic, in

FAO

describes IUU fishing as follows:

addition to appreciating e x p o r t s i n F O B va l u e

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains one of the greatest threats to

(millions of dollars), tonnes

marine ecosystems due to its potent ability to undermine national and regional efforts

exported in the mentioned

to manage fisheries sustainably as well as endeavours to conserve marine biodiversity.

period are shown:

IUU fishing takes advantage of corrupt administrations and exploits weak management

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Source: Mar del Perú (2021). 29

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Jumbo flying squid has a high fertility rate; it is characterised by rapid growth, reproduces only once during its lifetime, and then dies. It has been estimated to live between one and two years, reach more than a meter in length and weigh 50 kg. Around 73% of the global production of jumbo flying squid originates in the Pacific Ocean, followed by the Atlantic Ocean with 16%. The South East Pacific, with 36% of total squid production, was the most relevant fishing area in 2019, according to the following graphic.

Domestic Fleet

Foreign Fleet

• The resource represents the second largest fishery product for national export.

• Resource demanded by the Asian market and captured worldwide.

• Exploitation occurs in areas inside and outside the 200 nautical mile zone, seasonally.

• Exploitation occurs in international waters, outside the regulatory frameworks of States.

• Fishing fleet is made up of artisanal vessels from the Peruvian north coast, constituting the national fishing effort in extracting the resource.

• Fishing fleets consist of medium-sized and larger vessels, with additional vessels for logistics supply and factories.

Vs.

• Moderately long operations are carried out, but these are based on land.

• Sustained actions are performed without return to land.

• Informal activities, which are subject to national regulations. Payment of taxes in favor of the national treasury.

• Operate under the regulations of the high seas and do not pay taxes.

• Landing and processing of resource mainly in the northern zone of Peru.

• Resource is sent to international markets.

• Important source of labour generation in capture and processing.

• For Peru, it does not generate direct or indirect local labour.

Source: Own elaboration.

Interdiction of IUU Fishing Activities On August 1, 1947, through Presidential Decree Nº 781, Peru claimed sovereignty over the high seas, the sea bed, and subsoil adjacent to the coast, to 200 nautical miles out to sea. Source: Sustainable Fisheries Partnership (2022).

Peru has a good reputation for the interdiction of IUU fishing activities, with iconic cases from a long time ago, such as the Onassis whaling fleet discovered operating

The socioeconomic aspects of the jumbo flying squid fishery are demonstrated below,

within waters claimed by Peru as maritime domain, which was intercepted by units of

with a comparison between the domestic fleet (fishing mainly in Peruvian jurisdictional

the Peruvian Navy during November 1954. Four whale catchers and one whale-factory

waters), and the foreign fleet (fishing in the high seas).

ship were captured by the Peruvian Navy and fined three million dollars. In conjunction with three frigates and two submarines, the Peruvian Navy seized nine Chinese squid jigger vessels on November 19th, 2004, fishing illegally six miles

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within Peru’s maritime domain. The fleet was seized and escorted to the port of Callao, and 192 crew members remained on board the arrested vessels until investigations were concluded.

Peruvian Flag Fishing Vessels Coastal Zone

Operational Actions

Seized fisheries (Kgs)

In 2018, the Damanzaihao was a Belize-flagged ship owned by Sustainable Fishing

North

123

26,923

Center

19,000

Resources, a subsidiary of the massive seafood conglomerate, China Fishery Group

South

8,991

(CFG). In 2014, the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Organisation (SPRFMO) included

TOTAL:

207

54,914

Damanzaihao on its IUU fishing vessels list. The world’s largest fishing factory vessel

Source: Coastguard Operations Command – COMOPERGUARD (2022)

was detained on the 30th of May 2018, at the Port of Chimbote in Peru, by agents from the Peruvian Environmental Prosecutor’s Office and the Peruvian Coastguard, as part of a federal criminal investigation based on presumed acts of illegal fishing. This

Foreign Flag Fishing Vessels Coastal Zone

Flag

Number of Vessels

latest criminal case was predicated on the same actions of illegal fishing that led to the

North

Ecuador

imposition of a multi-million dollar fine in 2016. Peruvian authorities also accused the

Center

Damanzaihao of polluting the marine environment by illegally discharging fluids and

South

effluents while anchored in Chimbote port. Originally designed as an oil tanker, 228

TOTAL:

meters in length, the vessel was rebuilt to function as a one-stop-shop fish processor,

Source: Coastguard Operations Command – COMOPERGUARD (2022)

with the ability to store, freeze, process, and transfer fish, and the technical capability to process 547,000 metric tonnes of fish per year. In the legal arena, since 2021, legislation about the “extinction of property” has been

Concerning IUU fishing interdiction operations, in 2022, the Maritime Authority of Peru took several actions, as shown in the aboving tables:

approved. This new legislation is Supreme Decree N° 001-2021-JUS, which approves Guidelines for the administration and disposition of assets under the responsibility of the National Program for Confiscated Assets (PRONABI), within the framework of

Ongoing Actions to Prevent IUU Fishing

Legislative Decree N° 1373. Legislative Decree N° 1373 (2018) regulates sanctions when a Peruvian flag vessel engages in IUU fishing activities. In addition, Legislative

In 2008, the Peruvian Coastguard developed SIMTRAC, a system through which

Decree N° 1393 (2018) regulates the interdiction of illegal fishing activities and

foreign-flag fishing vessels’ positions may be identified and tracked inside and outside

provides that confiscated assets are sent to PRONABI for custody and administration.

Peruvian jurisdictional waters. This system, in conjunction with others provided under

Confiscation is a coercive measure ordered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, through

strategic partnerships worldwide, allows for improved law enforcement and information

which ownership of objects related to a crime is declared in favour of the State. In this

sharing in the maritime spaces, including the capacity to address crimes associated with

respect, in 2022, two Peruvian fishing vessels were confiscated due to IUU fishing

IUU fishing. As an example, the graphic below shows the foreign-flag fishing vessels’

activities.

situation as of 30 January 2023. The system tracks their positions utilising Automatic

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member states of the CPPS, to reduce the impact of this type of fishing capacity and introduce improvements in the region to deal with it. Peru, consistent with its historical maritime vocation, and in line with the priority objectives established in the National Maritime Policy 2019–2030, particularly those linked to the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, participated in the preparation process. This included the active involvement of PRODUCE, DICAPI, the Institute of the Sea of Peru (IMARPE), and the Directorate of Sovereignty, Boundaries and Antarctic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The preparation and approval of the IUU Fishing RAP responds to the deep concern about IUU fishing in the Southeast Pacific region. This concern is embodied in the Source: SIMTRAC (30th of January, 2023).

declarations adopted by the CPPS in 2017 and 2020, respectively. The RAP constitutes an invaluable expression of the commitment and determination of the Member States to continue collaborating to eradicate IUU fishing in the Southeast Pacific region.

Identification Systems (AIS) and Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS). In the area of

DICAPI is working on a project to upgrade SIMTRAC to a Maritime Domain

interest at that moment, the picture shows 245 Chinese flag fishing vessels (91%), and

Awareness System with AIS, LRIT and VMS processing capabilities; satellite

23 other foreign-flag fishing vessels (9%).

imaging (radar and optics); a vessel database to detect suspicious vessels, including

The FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and

lists of sanctions and international black lists; environmental, meteorological and

Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas was approved by Legislative

oceanographic data; dark vessel detection; fleet management; intelligence analysis; open

Resolution Nº 31606 (4th of November, 2022) and ratified by Supreme Decree Nº

source data; search and rescue, oil spill modules; and so on. This will help to increase

003-2023-RE (10th of February, 2023). This is an important measure to establish the

and improve monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) measures under DICAPI’s

principles and international standards of behaviour for responsible practices to ensure

areas of responsibility.

the effective conservation, management, and development of living aquatic resources, with due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity.

In terms of Coastguard ships, the project: “Recovery of the capacity to carry out

prolonged surface coast guard operations in the maritime domain and search and rescue

Within the framework of the XIX Extraordinary Assembly of the Permanent

operations in the SAR area” , was approved by Supreme Decree N° 003-2023-EF dated

Commission of the South Pacific (CPPS), Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru

23rd of January 2023, and authorised the transfer of US$ 100 million to finance the

adopted, on the 2nd of November 2022, the “Regional Action Plan (RAP) to face

construction of the first of three Ocean Patrol Vessels (OPV). In addition, under the

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing”. This RAP constitutes the first regional

same legal framework, the transfer of US$ 35 million was authorised to finance the

instrument whose purpose is to promote, through short, medium, and long-term

construction of two Coastguard Patrol Ships.

objectives, actions, and commitments, cooperation and coordination among the

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International Cooperation Possibilities In the maritime jurisdictional field of Latin American countries, there are different threats to maritime security. These threats are theft and armed robbery at sea, maritime terrorism, maritime incidents, IUU fishing, smuggling and illicit drug trafficking, irregular migration and human trafficking, environmental safety, cyber security, and other unlawful acts. An accurate and effective exchange of information with the principal stakeholders in the maritime sector, such as international organisations, organisations in charge of law enforcement, navies or coastguards in the region, and non-governmental organisations, among others, has yet to be carried out. The Maritime Information Fusion Centre for Latin America (IFC Peru) was created in the Coastguard Operations Command facilities (the operational branch of the

Source: IFC Peru (2023).

Peruvian Maritime Authority) to collect open-source data in the Area of Interest (see map below). This allows for timely and accurate information to be provided to the national and international maritime community. The primary duty of IFC Peru is to provide information on current trends regarding illegal acts and relevant maritime

Conclusion and Recommendations to Reduce the Incidence of IUU Fishing in Peru

incidents in the region, with the fundamental aim of providing greater safety and security to the maritime community. IFC Peru will strengthen ties and build a climate of trust and security at the regional

Based on the author’s experience, some recommendations are offered to improve the fight against IUU fishing activities in Peru:

level, to encourage sharing of information of mutual interest. This will contribute to collaboration on maritime security and safety and create an environment of stability, and

a) Start the process of accession of Peru to UNCLOS as soon as possible.

the confidence-building needed to facilitate the development of countries in the region.

b) Create a National Superintendence of Fisheries and Aquaculture and implement

The map below shows IFC Peru’s Area of Interest (AoI), which covers the maritime area

a National Fisheries and Aquaculture Supervision and Inspection System, to

of Latin American countries. This map is used to analyse information for purposes of

improve the effectiveness of supervision, control, inspection, and sanction in the

situational awareness. This permits maritime information-sharing and interoperability

fishing and aquaculture sector.

with similar national and regional centres, strengthening cooperative participation.

c) Develop and implement an integrated information system, to allow information to be shared in real time between the authorities linked to control and inspection in the fishing sector. d) Incorporate the artisanal fleet into the National Satellite Monitoring System

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(VMS), using appropriate technologies, to significantly increase the control capacity of this fleet, which today has practically no barriers to fishing. e) Increase the coordination between PRODUCE and Regional Governments to complete the transfer of fisheries competencies, and provide them with technical support and financial resources to manage the artisanal fleet effectively. Additionally, it is essential to improve or build the following capacities to enhance results when dealing with IUU fishing activities: a) Law enforcement training; b) Development of legislation to address crimes associated with IUU fishing; c) Implementation of the PSMA; d) Information sharing and capacity building for investigations and prosecution of IUU fishing activities. Finally, for effective combat of IUU fishing activities, it is crucial to have an adequate legal framework and effective interdiction assets, but above all, political will is fundamental.

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Cases of Illegal Fishing Control – Korea Coast Guard

Introduction Several institutions respond to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Korea, including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) and local governments which have ‘general judicial power’, rather than ‘special judicial power’ as specified in the special legislation in Korea. This paper will explain further by highlighting a few cases that the Korea Coast Guard (KCG) has responded to in regards to IUU fishing. In addition, this paper will discuss the problems relating to IUU fishing in the sea around Korea and the countermeasures taken by KCG.

Background In the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, also known as IUU fishing, has been a source of concern to the South Korean government, including the question of which local Agency should be entrusted with enforcing the law.

Ilsoo Youn Cases of Illegal Fishing Control – Korea Coast Guard

The police organization, and not the military, was granted this authority due to a number of factors, including historical matters, and the issue of demarcating the maritime border with China. The MOF and local governments were also granted

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authority to control IUU fishing in Korean waters.

on foreign fishing boats for illegal fishing, in order to protect civil rights and fishery

In contrast to the United States Coast Guard (USCG), Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

resources, and criminal investigations related to domestic maritime and fisheries crime.

and China Coast Guard (CCG), the KCG consists primarily of police officers, and

About 14,000 personnel, 353 ships (including 36 large patrol ships weighing 1,000

crackdown activities could be defined as the process of police activities from arrest to

tons or more, and 6 fixed-wing ships capable of long-distance search and surveillance

investigation and punishment. The crackdown activities carried out by the authorized

activities), and 25 aircraft (including 19 helicopters), are engaged in three-dimensional

agencies are expected to eradicate IUU at the fishing grounds, as IUU is recognized as a

security maintenance activities. China has recently expanded its external influence by

criminal act that can be enforced by police officers and controlled directly by the police

transferring the People’s Liberation Army’s naval ships to its Coast Guard and mass-

force.

producing patrol ships weighing over 1,500 tons. Prior to 2010, the CCG had only

Since the 1980s, the decline in fish catches in the coastal waters of Korea, and the

27 ships weighing 1,500 tons or more, but by 2022, this number had increased to

adjustment of fishing zones in accordance with the fishery agreements between Korea

103 ships. The number of KCG vessels over 1,500 tons increased from 21 in 2010 to

and Japan, and Korea and China, have created a difficult fishing environment.

a total of 27 in 2022. 22 Qingdao-class ships (Type 056 corvettes, 1,500 ton class) of

The Korean government initiated a program to reduce the number of fishing vessels

the Chinese Navy and other large patrol vessels operated by other departments were

in 1944. Due to this strategic fishing boat reduction project, that lasted until after 2020,

transferred to their Coast Guard, resulting in a rapid increase in force. In the case of the

and the modernization of enforcement techniques utilizing advanced IT technology,

USCG, there are approximately forty patrol vessels of 1,200 tons or more.

IUU activity by domestic fishing vessels has largely disappeared. In contrast, the

If illegal fishing crackdowns and surveillance activities are carried out mainly on

illegal fishing behavior of foreign fishing vessels, particularly Chinese fishing vessels, is

vessels, the dependence on large-scale patrol ships capable of ocean voyages and

increasing and becoming more severe, and the climate for enforcing sanctions against

operations in bad weather conditions will increase. The United States and Korea are

them is also shifting.

focusing their efforts on establishing a state-of-the-art maritime security system that has recently implemented Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), and the results are anticipated to be confirmed soon.

IUU Countermeasures The government has entrusted the KCG with numerous responsibilities, including

IUU Response Strategy

protecting the sovereignty of maritime territories, responding to various ship accidents, in addition to accidents in coastal waters, safety management tasks, prevention of

Crackdown on Domestic Fishing Boats

marine incidents, and establishing traffic order for ships at sea. In addition, it is carrying

Domestic Korean laws, regulations, and administrative rules include restrictions on

out its responsibilities as the department responsible for marine pollution control

domestic fishing vessels engaged in fishing activities within Korean territorial waters

policies and maintaining public order at sea. It is clear that addressing illegal fishing

and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the case of these domestic fishing

activities is included among these various maritime security duties, such as crackdowns

vessels, various statistics corroborate findings that illegal fishing activity has decreased

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substantially as a result of the vessel reduction project implemented by the Ministry of

countries that was established in 2000. Together with the maritime security forces of the

Oceans and Fisheries, and the implementation of IT-based management systems. These

United States, Japan, Canada, China, and Russia, we jointly respond to the eradication

include real-time monitoring and surveillance via GPS installed on all fishing vessels,

of IUU in the waters of the North Pacific. In particular, the 20th NPCGF meeting was

the V-PASS system that can automatically report entry and departure, Automatic

successfully hosted in Korea in 2022, with an Expert Meeting in April and High Level

Identification System (AIS), and monitoring activities via aircraft and satellites. Thus,

Meeting in September.

the majority of the measures taken by the KCG to eradicate IUU fishing involve foreign fishing vessels.

The KCG also participated in the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM), which resumed after the COVID-19 pandemic, and is preparing to host the 20th HACGAM meeting in Korea in 2024. By hosting the 20th meeting, we will

Combating Foreign IUU Fishing Boats

make efforts to eradicate IUU more systematically through information exchange and

Korea shares a maritime border with China and Japan, but there is no consensus on the

discussions related to illegal fishing crackdowns, as well as cooperation with maritime

boundary of the overlapping EEZ, and maritime boundary disputes persist. Regulation

security agencies in Asia.

of fishing is maintained by designating zones and borders and regulating the fishing

Secondly, the KCG invites public officials from foreign maritime security agencies to

vessels of both nations. However, illicit fishing outside the accord between the two

Korea and conducts a training program to strengthen enforcement capabilities through

countries is a problem. In waters where Korea has fishing rights, illicit activities by

the Coast Guard Training Academy and boarding ships. We invite approximately ten

Japanese vessels are uncommon, whereas illegal fishing by Chinese vessels is observed in

foreign officials each year. The KCG is planning is to expand the target countries and

all waters. Particularly in the waters of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea,

personnel to include Pacific Island Countries, in addition to South Asian nations.

where South Korea and North Korea engage in armed conflict over the overlap of the

Thirdly, the KCG seeks to enhance the IUU response capability of target nations and

military demarcation line, the illegal Chinese vessels exploit the conflict between South

increase their maritime influence, by transferring decommissioned patrol vessels from

and North Korea to engage in a great deal of intrusion fishing in territorial waters. This

Korea to maritime security agencies in developing nations. In 2012, Korea provided

situation is unique to Korea, so additional investigation on countermeasures is required.

a total of three ships, worth about 50 million won, to the Vietnam Coast Guard, including one 1,000-ton patrol ship (Gunsan 1001) and two 250-ton ships (Pohang

Indirect Countermeasures with Various Countries and International

265, Taean 268). Two 300-ton patrol vessels (Jeju 302 and Jeju 303) were donated to

Organizations

the Ecuadorian Navy in 2020, and they continue to serve as maritime police vessels in

In response to IUU, the KCG plays a significant role in enhancing the maritime security

Galapagos Islands waters.

capabilities of other nations through various cooperative activities with maritime security agencies worldwide.

Efforts of the KCG to improve IUU-response capacity of developing nations continue after the transfer of ships. We promote onsite capacity building through

Firstly, the KCG actively participates in meetings of regional maritime security

invitation-based training for ship operators and dispatch of instructors, and there are

agencies and participates as a member country of the North Pacific Coast Guard

also plans to provide training support for systems and various manuals related to ship

Forum (NPCGF), a consultative body for maritime security forces in six North Pacific

operation.

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As part of this strategy, the KCG is gradually decommissioning small and mediumsized patrol vessels under 100 tons. Consultations are currently underway with the Vietnam Ministry of Public Security and the Kenya Coast Guard Service for the transfer of these vessels, and we intend to expand consultations with countries that wish to acquire ships in the future.

Repression of Illegal Chinese Boats Changes in IUU Fishing Practices of Chinese Vessels The form of illegal fishing by Chinese boats, which account for the majority of illegal foreign fishing boats in the waters around Korea, can be divided into several types based on the location of the fishing area and the enforcement methods of the KCG. The type of illegal activity has changed in tandem with the modification of control methods to prevent the spread of infectious diseases in the maritime area. It is not possible here to cover all types of enforcement methods the KCG implements to combat illegal fishing, due to space constraints. However, the two methods – ‘halt order’ and ‘seize operation’ – are both utilized in accordance with Korean laws, which follow the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Members of the KCG special task force use two high-speed boats to board the fishing vessel and seize control of the helm during a capture operation, which commences after the ship halt order is given. Fishing vessels may resist by installing devices on the hull of the ship, obstructing the helm with double iron plates, and using physical force against the enforcement officers. Moreover, methods of physical violence through collective resistance and hull modification are evolving intelligently, making law enforcement increasingly challenging. In response, the KCG is holding a public contest to develop ideas and new methods to crack down on these vessels, establishing a variety of new plans, and raising public awareness by providing education on these activities.

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The majority of crackdowns on such direct violence occur in the waters governed

also for safeguarding human rights and ensuring the safety of law enforcement officers

by the KCG Central Region, where the countries of Korea and China face each other.

during the crackdown process. In the process of cracking down on illegal foreign fishing

In the case of the southern waters of Jeju Island, illegal activities with relatively weak

vessels, it is necessary for officers to wear protective apparatus and be trained to do so.

penalties, such as quota restrictions or fishing method restrictions, are carried out on

To ensure there are no problems in the process of proving a crime with evidence, officers

fishing vessels operating with permission within the provisional waters of Korea and

should be fully equipped on scene and training of enforcement officers should take

China, which fall outside of the KCG Central Region’s jurisdiction.

place regularly. The video recording of the entire process of capturing an illegal fishing vessel is essential, not optional, and comprehensive education on this topic is a top priority, as

Enhancing Cooperation between Korea Coast Guard and China Coast Guard

video recordings contain crucial information that can eradicate any pretext that could prevent prosecution or lead to diplomatic issues.

Efforts are being made to resume direct exchanges, which were suspended due to the pandemic, as well as the strengthening of cooperation between the maritime security

Conclusion

departments of Korea and China. Mutual efforts are being made to eradicate IUU through the exchange of information on fishing vessels with a history of illicit fishing

This paper has presented the IUU fishing trends of Korean domestic fishing vessels as

and the sharing of enforcement data in a variety of formats.

well as foreign fishing vessels, particularly Chinese vessels, in the waters surrounding

In particular, the fishing boats captured and punished by the KCG are handed over

Korea. In addition, a number of security policies that the KCG implemented to

directly to the CCG, which will punish the IUU fishing vessel again in China, rather

eradicate and punish IUU fishing have been introduced. It is hoped that this will help

than releasing it directly onto the high seas in accordance with international law. This

the maritime officials of various countries in establishing and implementing their

has maximized the effectiveness of combating IUU fishing and the Coast Guards of

own policies, as it is challenging for a single country to create and implement all the

both countries plan to respond to IUU fishing through closer cooperation in the future.

policies necessary to combat and eradicate illegal fishing activities carried out by foreign fishing vessels in their waters. A comprehensive policy further requires active support and interest from international organizations and neighboring countries. In the case

The Significance of Education for Enforcement Officers in the Field

of developing countries, assistance from developed countries that can transfer security capabilities is also essential, and the KCG will continue to actively participate and work in this regard.

Gathering evidence (securing evidence, filming) is the most crucial step in the investigation process following an arrest and enforcement. The photographs and videos captured at the crime site are crucial not only for establishing the facts of the crime, but

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Combating IUU Fishing in Thailand: Fishing Fleet Control

Introduction The Kingdom of Thailand is located in Southeast Asia and surrounded by neighbouring countries along its two ocean coastlines - the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea. It shares a maritime boundary in the Andaman Sea with Myanmar, in the Gulf of Thailand with Cambodia, and in parts of the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea with Malaysia. Thailand covers 513,120 km² of land1 and has a population of 66 million people (National Statistical Office, 2021). Its Exclusive Economic Zone covers 420,280 km2, with 116,280 km2 in the Andaman Sea and 304,000 km2 in the Gulf of Thailand.2 Fish has been a significant source of protein and nutrients for the Thai people for hundreds of years. In the past, it is said that the majority of parents divided their land among their children according to their personalities, to enable them to survive. A hardworking child would receive land for agriculture, because it takes several months to plant and harvest crops, while a lazy child would be given land near the sea because they could survive by catching a fish each day. This suggests that fishing was seen by the Thai people as a subsistence activity and that it takes little effort to catch a fish. Compared

Decha Chotepanitses Ship Standard Bureau, Marine Department, Thailand

to agriculture, fishing requires less investment. The fish grows by itself - there is no watering and fertilizer needed. This tradition of small-scale fishing developed into commercial and industrial fishing

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in the early 1960s, using trawlers to catch pelagic fish.3

IUU Fishing Background

The rise in commercial and industrial fishing led to problems, however. Thailand has a history of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and human rights

Before the Thai government seriously began to tackle IUU fishing, it was unclear how

violations in its fishing industry – issues which it has made significant headway in

many fishermen, fishing vessels, and fishing licenses were operating in Thai waters. How

addressing over the past decade. This article shall elaborate on how Thailand tackles

many fishermen boarded fishing vessels and how many came back safely? How many

IUU fishing, including how it handled receiving a yellow card from the EU in 2015 for

fishing vessels operated in Thai waters and how many outside Thai waters? How many

failing to address IUU fishing in its waters.

vessels had a ship license and how many did not? How many fishing licenses were issued to fishing vessels? Were fishing gears used as licensed? Nobody knew the answers to these questions. Thus, these three components of the industry - fishermen, fishing vessels, and

The Structure of the Thai Government

fishing licenses - were not effectively controlled and recorded. This led to high levels of illegal fishing activities and forced labour in the fishing industry.

Thailand is a democratic country. The Constitution is the fundamental law and Acts

Everyone who has ever eaten fish is involved with, or has experienced, IUU fishing

form the country’s principal legislation. The national law shall not contradict the

in some way. For the author, this experience was highly personal. In 2007, one of the

Constitution and Acts, and secondary laws should be drafted as prescribed by the Acts.

author’s relatives was a victim of human trafficking in the fishing industry. It is normal

This is common practice for civil law in Thailand. However, the drafting process (until

in Thailand to meet and join others for a drink outside, even if the people meeting do

final draft approval and promulgation) is complex and time-consuming. Some drafts

not know each other. A stranger asked the author’s relative if he needed a job, without

may take years before getting final approval. The draft can be questioned many times

explaining in detail. Either due to excessive alcohol consumption or possibly being

on the same issues by different people in different committees, as there are no unified

drugged, he collapsed. When he woke up, he was on a fishing vessel and it was too late

hearings. This can make it challenging to comprehend particular provisions of the

to disembark. He was ordered by a skipper to handle fishing gear – something which

legislation if the record of the amendments is not properly noted, and significantly slows

he had never done in his life. He was hit and fell overboard because he got sick and

down the law enforcement process.

refused to work. Eventually he escaped and reported what had happened to the police.

On 22 May 2014, a new government of Thailand was formed, led by military and police commanders. Known as the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), it

Although he was given money to travel back home, nothing was done to shut down the human trafficking business which had taken him.

continues to rule Thailand to this day. While the NCPO’s administration is debatable

This is just one story of human trafficking in the Thai fishing industry, but there are

in a functioning democratic system, it has issued many Orders which have legal power

many more. Both Thai and migrant labourers working under conditions of modern-

equal to the Acts, and which bypass the unwieldly legal drafting and promulgation

day slavery, have been found on Thai fishing vessels. Murder is also common on these

process.

vessels, with some of these fishermen being killed or thrown overboard.4 Even when fishermen are not outright murdered, many are subjected to such poor conditions that they die from ill-treatment. In 2012, the author met a cook on a

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domestic cargo vessel who had worked on a transshipment vessel. The cook warned the

Department (under the Ministry of Transport), the Department of Employment

author not to eat a big mackerel fish. When asked the reason for that recommendation,

and the Department of Labour and Welfare (under the Ministry of Labour), the

he said it was because that type of big mackerel was not from the Gulf of Thailand. He

Department of Marine and Coastal Resources (under the Ministry of Natural Resources

explained further that on the vessels catching these fish, the dead bodies of fishermen

and Environment), the Department of Provincial Administration (under the Ministry

were wrapped in canvas and frozen in the same cargo hold as the frozen fish, in order

of Interior), and the Marine Police (under the Royal Thai Police). These bodies are key

to take them back to Thailand for religious funerals. Although there was a container

agencies that have legal powers and duties to tackle IUU Fishing. The Department of

for this purpose, there were so many fishermen dying that they would exceed the

Fisheries is the competent authority to handle all fishing matters, including the sale of

container’s capacity. The fishermen became sick and died because they did not have

fish. The Marine Department permits ship usage and controls fishing vessel departure

proper nutrients, and fresh vegetables were rare on fishing vessels. The fishing vessels

and arrival. The Department of Employment is responsible for creating standards

would keep trawling until they couldn’t sail anymore, and this was the only chance to

for employment agreements. It also provides a service as a public broker, matching

get back to shore. Some fishermen also contracted sexually transmitted diseases but did

employers and employees. The Department of Labour Protection and Welfare takes

not receive any treatment.

care of working and living conditions onboard. The Department of Marine and

Although anecdotal, this story accords with many other accounts of poor living and 5

Coastal Resources protects resources in coastal areas where fishing is prohibited. The

working conditions in the Thai fishing industry, conditions which the author has seen

Department of Provincial Administration has personnel information in its database and

himself in his role as a fishing vessel inspector.

shares foreign fishermen’s information with Immigration, which is under the Royal Thai

Clearly change was needed in the Thai fishing industry. However, change sometimes needs to be initiated by someone from outside. If Thailand was a company, the best

Police. The Marine Police has armed forces and other resources for law enforcement, and has the power to arrest anyone involved in illegal activity on the water.

person who could provide feedback would be a customer. As a result, and despite the

As mentioned above, each agency has its own responsibilities and duties. In order to

fact that the Thai people had tried to make their voices heard on this issue, it took

work together on any task, a formal letter has to be circulated. This takes a lot of time

pressure from the global community, in the form of the European Union, to provoke

and impedes swift action to address IUU fishing and related matters like forced labour.

action from the Thai Government.

Authorities Working to Combat IUU Fishing

Appearance to the Global Community The EU approached Thailand regarding IUU fishing before issuing a yellow card as

It is impossible for one department or agency to handle a problem as complex and

an official warning on 21st April 2015. It did so under its IUU Regulation,6 which

multifaceted as IUU fishing alone. Thus, there are several government agencies in

entered into force in 2010.7 At that time, the FAO had also adopted its various

Thailand which work jointly to address IUU fishing. These include the Department

International Plans of Action (IPOAs), set up to address IUU fishing and related issues

of Fisheries (under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives), the Marine

such as bycatch. These include the IPOA for Reducing Incidental Catch of Sea Birds

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in Longline Fisheries (IPOA-Seabirds), the IPOA for Conservation and Management

Measures to Tackle IUU Fishing

of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks), the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOACapacity),8 and the IPOA to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 9

The warning worked quite well in calling the Government’s attention to the issue, and it

Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). The IPOAs set out best practices for countries to

promulgated NPCO Order No. 10/2558 a week later. As mentioned above, this Order

use when addressing these issues. Thailand had not fully implemented the IPOA-IUU

had the power to override existing legislation, so no other legal power could slow down

yet at the time the yellow card was issued.

IUU response measures. The main objective was to form an independent authority

The EU sent representatives to verify that Thailand was in compliance with the IUU Regulation at least three times before issuing the yellow card - in July 2011, October

called the Command Center for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) to control other existing agencies.

2012, and October 2014. The last verification found that the Thai Government was not

The CCCIF consists of 3 major bodies (shown in Figure 1). These are (1) the

putting enough effort into tackling IUU Fishing. The document entitled “Thailand’s

Human Trafficking and IUU Tackling Committee (2) the Thai Maritime Enforcement

Progress in Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing”, prepared

Command Center (Thai-MECC) and (3) the Port In - Port Out Controlling Center

by the Thai Department of Fisheries (DOF), sets out five key problems found by the

(PIPO). The Order also empowered CCCIF to play a crucial role in combatting IUU fishing,

EU:

through the creation of nine responsibilities: • Poor legal framework: DOF and Marine Department (MD) fishing and fleet management policy was based on laws from 1947 and 1938, respectively, which were not sufficient for Thailand’s fisheries of today. • No control of fishing licensing: DOF did not limit fishing effort or fishing gear for any fishing license issued.

1) Establish Thailand’s guidelines and develop a National Plan of Action to combat IUU Fishing (NPOA-IUU), while supervising the implementation of IUU response measures in accordance with the plan. This included explaining the response measures to the European Union.

• No control of fleet size: MD did not limit the number of fishing vessels operating

2) Control, command, supervise, and coordinate all operations of the Ministry

in Thai waters and did not have an accurate figure for the size of the Thai fishing

of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Interior,

fleet.

Ministry of Labour, Royal Thai Police, and other government agencies involved in

• Poor national collaboration between MD and DOF, and little international

addressing IUU Fishing.

cooperation: MD and DOF did not share fisheries related information or work

3) Consider, suggest, improve, revise, amend, and develop laws, rules, and regulations

in collaboration. There was no mechanism to verify vessels sold abroad in foreign

related to solving illegal fishing problems to meet international standards, in

countries.

particular the prevention of illegal fishing and appropriate penalties.

• Ineffective licensing and registration systems: DOF and MD had ineffective and

4) Determine the structure and manpower of the CCCIF. In this structure, there had

partially paper-based systems for managing fishing licenses and vessel registrations

to be a PIPO Controlling Center, as well as a one-stop service for fishing vessels in

(Department of Fisheries, 2018).

each coastal province.

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5) Appoint officials to work in the CCCIF, drawing from civil servants or officials in various government agencies as appropriate. 6) Appoint a committee, sub-committees, and working groups to handle specific matters as appropriate.

The advantages of the newly established body were: (1) a wider range of authority; (2) greater efficiency; and (3) more flexible working methods. However, the results of the CCCIF’s initial work showed that it was not as effective as anticipated. This was due to a lack of understanding of the fishing industry. Essentially, putting CCCIF at

7) Invite experts, civil servants, officials from government agencies or the private

the top of the table was like assigning a new graduate with no experience to work as a

sector, including other relevant agencies and stakeholders, to attend a meeting on

project manager. Furthermore, the majority of CCCIF personnel were appointed from

operational and coordination guidelines, and follow up on the results of operations

the Navy. These personnel were trained for combat operations, but this experience was

as appropriate.

irrelevant to the tasks of the CCCIF.

8) Coordinate with relevant agencies to accelerate cooperation with third countries,

After this initial phase, the CCCIF found that their regulations were not adequate

especially in countries where Thai-flagged vessels fish in the territorial waters of

to combat IUU fishing. Four months later, the second Order, NCPO Order 24/2558,

that country, in order to comply with international obligations.

was promulgated on 6 August 2015. This Order focused on fishing fleet size and some

9) Continuously report results to the Head of the NCOP until the European Union

types of fishing gears, and new fishing vessel registrations were prohibited. The thinking

has repealed its warning that Thailand is a country that does not have adequate

behind this was that, because the DOF had imposed a maximum sustainable yield (MSY)

measures to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.

for the fish stocks, the more fishing vessels registered, the less fish there would be to go around. Once the catch was found to be insufficient to cover the investment of the fishing owners, there was a high probability that they would find a way to catch more fish, potentially illegally. Stopping registrations prevented existing problems increasing, and this Order seemed to be on the right track. The CCCIF’s third Order, NCPO Order 42/2558, was promulgated three months after the second Order. This Order is still highlighted on fishing vessels and fishing licenses. The second Order prohibiting new fishing vessel registrations had become known in advance among the fishing owners, and a large number of new fishing vessel registration requests were submitted before the second Order became effective (right after promulgation on 6 August). This third Order therefore stated that if registration requests came in later than 6 August 2015, the vessels could not obtain fishing licenses. Moreover, fishing licenses were not allowed to change hands under this Order (they were not transferable), unless the receiver was an immediate relative, such as a parent, spouse, or child, or by court order. This prohibition was intended to prevent a person

Figure 1. The Command Center for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) organization chart

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registering fishing vessels for trading purposes. Fishing vessel modification was also

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banned under this Order - recognizing that it is not only the number of fishing vessels that matters, but also the fact that existing vessels can be made larger or more efficient, increasing effort without increasing the size of the fleet.

proper handling of catch on its way to market. For the second element, a fishing vessel is a vehicle equipped with fishing gear that lets people engage in fishing activities. Without this vehicle, fishing at sea is almost

Additionally, the Order revoked 8,024 fishing vessel licenses through the Marine

impossible. Thus, the authorities can control the number of vessels fishing, and ensure

Department ship registry database system. 5,983 of these revocations were for fishing

that licenses and fishing rights are provided only to those vessels that comply with

vessels that were not commercial size. Revoking ‘paper licenses’ provided a clearer

existing laws, thus helping to eliminate illegal vessels.

picture of how many vessels were actually in the Thai fishing fleet. Revoking of licenses

The last element, humans, is a crucial aspect of fishing activity. Humans catch fish

for vessels that were not considered commercial size also helped to prevent an increase

as a means of subsistence, but when the catch exceeds that personal need, trade begins.

in the Thai fleet through ‘effort creep’ (when fishing capacity increases through the

When fishing becomes commercial, fishermen would like to catch as much as possible,

modernization and expansion of vessels currently in the fleet). This was because the

and less sustainable, but more productive, fishing techniques are invented. However,

size of the vessels in these licenses were often incorrect when surveyed by the appointed

this can lead to the depletion of the resource on which their trade depends. Fishermen

officials, because the fishing vessel owner had expanded the vessel to increase fishing

should therefore be educated on sustainable fishing and the importance of food security.

capacity. At the same time, a new policy limited the number of fishing days per fishing

According to the FAO’s IPOA-IUU, measures of flag, coastal and port States should

license to control the total allowable catch (TAC).

cover these three elements to ensure a sustainable fishery.

Three Aspects Driving IUU Fishing

Verification of Fishing Vessels

If we take a closer look, we will see that there are three major elements needed for

It has already been mentioned that the Marine Department did not know the number

IUU fishing activities to happen. These are (1) fish; (2) vessels; and (3) humans. If we

of fishing vessels operating in Thai waters in 2015. This major failure could be explained

consider each of these elements in turn, we can understand where we should intervene

by the lack of a revocation provision in the legislation. The previous Act provided for

to prevent IUU fishing and related problems.

revocation only when the ship owner informed the Marine Department. If the ship

For the first element, fish is a product that breeds and grows in the natural

owner did not notify the Marine Department, then nothing happened. Therefore, ship

environment. A fisherman does not need to feed or take care of the fish. If we do not

registrations were kept and accumulated in the ship registry system. After the NCPO

consider the cost of a relatively cheap fishing license, fish is a free-of-charge natural

Orders obviated the need to change this legislation through a lengthy legal process, and

resource that fishermen can take advantage of without much investment. A large

with assistance from other government agencies, data cleansing activities started. Several

portion of captured fish is not handled well and not served as food on a table. A lot

years later, these have now been completed, after several attempts to verify the ships and

of fish is caught and wasted, and has to be used for non-food purposes.

Thus, the

collect data.

authorities can step in to control the management of the fish once caught, and ensure

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The First Attempt

addresses and some had passed away many years before. The Marine Department had

The first step in the verification process was ordering all fishing vessels to sail back to

only personal information submitted by fishing vessel owners, and it was not possible

their home port, or a convenient port in Thailand, for verification of the ship’s existence.

to obtain information from another government agency unless an official request letter

Fishing vessel verification was conducted by a working group, established under a

was sent to the civil registration agency on a case-by-case basis. Although procedures

CCCIF Order, which consisted of three representatives. These representatives were

have improved, data access and verification can be difficult even today. This raises an

drawn from the Marine Department, the Department of Fisheries, and the Navy. The

important issue – that information sharing and classification should be transparent

working group had to ensure that all characteristics of the vessel, including the name

among government agencies if we are to tackle IUU fishing effectively.

on both sides of the forward hull, the engine model and serial number, dimensions

When the officials traced and met the fishing vessel owners’ heirs, the heirs did not

of the vessel, and so on, were the same as the record in the ship license registry. The

even know about the loss and existence of the vessels because they were very young

first verification was done in a rush, and the working group was not well prepared

when the vessels were lost – some had been gone for more than twenty years. Many

for the task or for record keeping. This was partially because two members of the

fishing vessel owners or their heirs refused to cooperate because they did not want to get

working group were new to the task and had no idea how to conduct it correctly. Thus,

involved or were afraid of legal processes. Unfortunately, the officials had no legal power

the information collected was not sufficient to create a comprehensive record of the

to enforce current regulations in circumstances where the vessel had been registered and

fishing vessel fleet. Furthermore, some of the data was incorrect, particularly the vessel

lost in the past. The officials had to accept what they could get from the fishing vessel

dimensions, which were important to help the working group identify which fishing

owners, unless there was evidence of wrongdoing. In such a case, a deeper investigation

vessels were the ones listed on the licenses, and which were illegal or fake. Even though

could be conducted.

the Marine Department official was in the working group, this person was also unsure of measurement methodology because of a lack of clarity in the Regulations. Thus, the

The Second Attempt

data collected in the first attempt was almost useless.

After the first survey was conducted, the government created an Order to ensure that

Another issue was that some fishing vessels did not return to port by the deadline,

the Marine Department did not change any information on the surveyed fishing

resulting in the revocation of their fishing licenses. They then became illegal fishing

vessels in the ship registry system. However, because of the failure of the first survey, a

vessels. As a result, many owners decided not to return to port, where they would be

second survey needed to be conducted as a final verification of the dimensions of the

under the control of the authorities, and instead continued to fish illegally.

fishing vessels, in order to record the correct gross tonnage and prevent illegal vessels

After the first fishing vessel survey, there were many fishing vessels absent from the

using issued licenses in the future. The Marine Department had to set up a meeting

list of ship registry records. The Marine Department therefore conducted several vessel

so everyone in the working group could learn how to measure vessel dimensions in

loss verification checks with the fishing vessel owners, who had not reported these losses.

the particular way defined in the Regulation. Even though the measurements were

It proved challenging to track these owners, however. Marine Department officials

agreed upon, there were still many minor misunderstandings at the work sites, such as

struggled to find their addresses because many of the officials were not local to the area.

measuring the vessel in the water and on the dock, edges of measurement to take into

Moreover, a lot of the data was obsolete. Some fishing vessel owners had changed their

account between hull and fender (bumper), unreachable bottom bilge or keel, etc. The

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issues have been solved by an agreed

lifetime of a vessel undergoing annual maintenance, repairs for accidental damage, and

tolerance of measurements.

erosion from time and weather. This has caused problems for the fishing vessel owners,

One more task for the working

as the re-marking procedures were not established in advance, and officials refuse to

group at that time was marking

redo the UVI marking because they have no legal authority.

the vessels with Unique Vessel

Apart from these problems, however, the second survey was largely successful

Identification (UVI) numbers, which

at collecting correct and sufficient data to create a database of fishing vessels. This

are generated from a certain group

information, including fishing vessel dimensions, the engine maker and serial number,

number (e.g. Number 203 for the

the VMS (Vessel Monitoring System) serial number, UVI, and other generic data, has

Nontaburi Marine Office branch),

now been recorded in a web application platform accessible by all government agencies.

and the ship license number. UVIs

Required photos were also taken and included in the database records. This database

were marked on the forward inner hull and wheelhouse structure of wooden

Figure 2: Unique Vessel Identity (UVI) numbers marked on the fishing vessels.

is reliable due to cross-checks being undertaken periodically, especially in regard to the number of fishing vessels in the fleet.

vessels, which form the majority of the Thai fishing fleet, and on the aluminum plate of steel vessels. During the survey, one member of the team did the

Monitoring of Fisherman

marking and then took photos of the marks. The marking process did not use advanced technology, but rather a hammer and a marking punch set. Marking by hand meant

Besides dealing with fishing vessels, the Marine Department also monitors personnel on

that the marking was not neat and orderly, as it would be if made with a machine. This

board. Although the Ministry of Labour has authority over labour control, employment,

helps officials easily identify each fishing vessel, and makes it much harder to counterfeit

and welfare protection, the Marine Department is required to know the number of

these marks. In Figure 2 below, the disparity between UVIs on different vessels can be

persons on board before releasing the vessel, for safety reasons. The Marine Department

seen.

therefore established a fishermen’s record system for verification of the persons on board

When we look closely at the UVI, we will find fluctuations in each letter. This

on departure and arrival. The system has been under continuous development. In the

increases the unique nature of the UVI. To replicate the mark on another fishing vessel,

beginning, paper identification documents were used, but the frontline inspectors had

either (1) a new mark punch set would need to be created, and the vessel would need

a hard time identifying the fishermen in person from their photos in these documents.

to be marked in exactly the same way as the official marking, or (2) the entire piece of

Subsequently, iris and facial scans were brought in to reduce the time spent on identity

wood with the mark on it would need to be transferred to another vessel. If the official

checks, as well as to improve their accuracy.

is in doubt, however, photos of other parts of the ship will be checked. The marking

The iris scan works well when it can be used correctly. However, user experience has

may not be able to totally eradicate spoofing, but at least the use of one ship license for

shown that the iris scan often fails or does not show a high percentage of matching.

twin fishing vessels can be investigated. However, this marking likely will not last for the

This is because the scanner has to be integrated into a computer with internet access in

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order to input information into the database for verification purposes. This means that

head count, and compare this to the number of fishermen in the LR. They may also

the fishermen have to come into the office to have their eyes scanned. Apart from this,

scan some or all of the fishermen’s faces for personal verification.

the actual process takes time and may not be accurate, because of the unfamiliarity of the fishermen with the equipment, and the fact that they have to open their eyes wide enough and blink at the right time.

Conclusion: The Current IUU Fishing Situation in Thailand

The facial scan has been a lot more successful, however. There is no need for complicated equipment when using this scanner at the inspection site, as a tablet or

The EU announced the lifting of the yellow card from Thailand for its efforts to combat

a smartphone with internet access can be used as the scanning device. This makes the

IUU fishing on 8 January 2019.11

process much more flexible and mobile, as inspectors can simply install a facial scan

Relevant agencies and authorities have now been integrated, to ensure an effective

application on their smartphones. Inspectors may still experience some problems,

response to IUU fishing and cooperative operations among government agencies. Port

however (low light conditions, poor internet signal, twin fishermen, change of face

in and port out control for fishing vessels has been formalized through the creation

shape etc.), and the application is still under development to improve accuracy of

of the PIPO Controlling Center, for seamless monitoring in port and at sea. Fishing

verification.

vessels above a specific size are monitored through VMS, which is installed on board

At present, the fishing vessel owners do not need to submit any paperwork to the

by an entity operating under the CCCIF, and sea surveillance is conducted by various

data collector, because information from all government agencies regarding labour

agencies. After the final fishing vessel survey in 2018, an accurate total number of

and employment is shared with the data server. The fishing vessel owners simply bring

fishing vessels has been recorded and is maintained in a transparent manner, with cross

their employees to have their face scanned for input into the database. This scan is

checking allowed by any interested body. Marking the fishing vessels with UVIs has

then verified and becomes part of the personal information on the fisher kept by the

nearly extinguished the use of fake ship licenses and one ship license being used for two

Department of Employment and Department of Provincial Administration. One

vessels.

fishing vessel owner may have a maximum of five fishing vessels operating at one time,

In conclusion, cracking down on IUU fishing is possible but it is not an easy task.

and may register two hundred employees (fishermen). The owners are then able to place

Everyone involved has to sacrifice something. Officials lose time with their families.

these fishermen onto any of their five fishing vessels.

Fishing vessel owners lose their expected profits. Fishermen lose the convenience and

Once the fishermen are added to a vessel, the crew list (Labour Record: LR) for

freedom to fish whenever they wish. Fish consumers have to pay more for fish. However,

departure will be automatically generated for that voyage and be ready for departure

the significant benefit is sustainable food stocks for the future. The world is not ending

inspection. When the fishing vessel comes back, the arrival LR should have the same

tomorrow and we must not consume all our resources today. Our children should not

names as the departure LR. This ensures that nobody is lost during the trip. The

face food insecurity, and should have the chance to experience a variety and abundance

frontline inspectors will randomly check this based on the sailing schedule, which

of fish.

is provided in advance by the fishing vessel owners for port in and port out. At the appointed jetty where the fishing vessel departs for a fishing trip, the inspectors do a

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Fisheries and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF) in Senegal Introduction Bordered by the Atlantic Ocean, the western African waters benefit from exceptional environmental conditions and climate. Belonging to this region, Senegal was part of the historic Ghana and Djolof Kingdoms disputed by France, Portugal, the Netherlands and England before becoming a French colony until 1960.1 The Senegalese country, located in the Gulf of Guinea, shares maritime and terrestrial frontiers with Mauritania, Guinea, Gambia and Cabo Verde. In addition to Sierra Leone, the neighbouring countries have established an intergovernmental organization named the Sub regional Fisheries Commission - SRFC (Commission Sous-Régionale des Pêches - CSRP), whose headquarters are located in Dakar (Senegal). The SRFC mandate is to implement measures for viable fisheries governance and reinforce cooperation for communities’ wellbeing.2 The SRFC countries are abundant in fish and other marine resources, thanks to the Canary current and the upwelling phenomenon ascending nutrient-rich, cold waters.3 Fishing is significant and constitutes a quarter of the economic activity in the SRFC. The surface occupied by the seven (07) member States of the Commission is estimated

Médina Thiam National Agency of Maritime Affairs, Senegal

to be 1,6 million km2, whereas the coastline extends over 3 500 km. Moreover, 2.203 million tons of all types of fish are considered potential species to be harvested. In 2010, the global population of the SRFC-CSRP nations space was composed of 37 million

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inhabitants.4 Senegal is part of the Canary Current large Marine Ecosystem (CCLME), encompassing Morocco, the Canary Islands (Spain), and neighbouring countries, such as Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau and Guinea, with a total coastline of 4 220 km from the north to the south. In 2016, the CCLME States produced more than three million tons of fish annually. Within these various maritime spaces and organizations, Senegalese waters consist of a 718 km coastline and principal rivers known as the Senegal, Casamance, Sine Saloum and Gambia. Its blue economy depends on fisheries, transport, tourism, offshore oil and gas.5 However, the western African fish products, significant since colonialist rule for food security and nutrition, are threatened by overfishing, depletion, and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUUF). Lack of information, and human and operational resources, make illegal fishing possible. Since 1990, Senegal has been threatened by these environmental and security issues. Consequently, this paper will discuss the importance of Senegalese fisheries, analyse the main concerns around illegal fishing affecting the country, and consider responses to tackle the problem. Some recommendations will be given, as measures to be followed and implemented for sustainable fisheries management and development, in order to ensure maritime security, peace and prosperity in blue Senegal and for other maritime nations as well. This Direction is in charge of policy implementation related to artisanal and industrial

Fish: a Cultural Heritage

fisheries. In 2021, thanks to its Statistics Bureau, it published the provisory “general

The Senegalese fishing sector comprises artisanal and industrial fishing. In 2000,

production by the artisanal and industrial fishing sectors corresponded to 459,100 tons,

the government of Senegal decided to organize strategic meetings on fisheries and

for a valued cost of FCFA 224 billion (340 million euros). In 2020, the national fishing

aquaculture, aiming to ensure sustainable management and economic development

production was estimated to be 509,327 tons, worth about FCFA 240 billion (365

of the sector. Thanks to the Senegalese Direction of Maritime Fisheries (DPM), the

million euros). The country’s production has increased thanks to the reduction of the

results of maritime fisheries” (the DPM study).7 In this study, Senegalese fisheries

collection and publication of statistics are available through the Maritime Department.

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COVID-19 pandemic in Senegalese territory and worldwide.

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In the artisanal sector, the harvesting of fish resources was estimated to be 441,000

According to the FAO, near 811

tons for a value of FCFA 194 billion (295 million euros) in 2019. This represented

million individuals experience hunger

83% of the total production of the fisheries industry. The artisanal production estimate

and 3 billion cannot afford nutritious

was nearly 348,378 tons and FCFA 139 billion in 2021. The artisanal fishing sector

food. In 2020, global fish production

consisted of around 72,908 fishermen in 2021. This represented a drop of 1801 fishers

through fishing and aquaculture

from 2020, when 74,709 fishers were counted. 12,864 artisanal fishing boats were in

reached 214 million tons, with a

use in 2018 and 13,009 in 2021.

value of USD 424 billion. 20.2 kg

The industrial fishing sector represented 16% of the national production (93,000

per capita is eaten, doubling the

tons) in 2019, for a value of CFA 79 billion (120 million euros). In 2021, the

individual consumption of the 70s.

fish quantity captured by this segment was estimated to be 110,722 tons, which

Additionally, fish provides 17 percent

corresponded to FCFA 85 billion. The industrial fleet was composed of 197 vessels

of animal protein, and this rises to over 50 percent in Asian and African nations. In

flying the Senegalese flag in 2019, against 177 vessels in 2018. 110 national, and 19

Senegal, 75% of animal proteins are consumed through fish food. Indeed, the national

foreign, shipowners were fishing in 2019. A total of 138 industrial fishing vessels is

and traditional daily meal eaten by the coastal and rural communities is the “Ceebu

mentioned in the latest provisional report of the DPM. In 2019, industrial catches were

Jeen” (Rice with Fish) meal prepared with fresh fish, vegetables and rice. Liked and

estimated to be 81,000 tons. 88% of fish products were landed by Senegalese industrial

cooked by the coastal communities along the Gulf of Guinea, this Senegalese meal was

fishermen and 12% by foreign vessels, equivalent to 11.501 tons. Landings are done by

recognized as part of the UNESCO intangible cultural heritage, on 14th December

trawlers (57,8%), national tuna boats (41,7%), and sardine boats (0,5%). These catches

2021 by the Organization.9, 10

National Meal dish recognized Cultural Heritage Ceebu Jën

are sent to processing units and external markets. In 2019, the quantity of processed fish products was 57,000 tons, with a commercial value of FCFA 53 billion (85 million euros). Artisanal fish processing represents 72% of

IUU Fishing in Senegal

total processing activity in the country, while 28% is done by industry. Providing more than 400,000 tons of fish products, Senegalese fishing plays a great

Over two decades, according to the FAO, IUUF has increased in the CCLME Region.

socioeconomic role in the country. It contributes to GDP and helps to reduce the trade

In some maritime countries, the quantity of illegal catches is similar to the total legal

balance deficit. In 2019, the exports of fish products was estimated to be 312,000 tons,

fish production. The value of illegally caught fish in the north of this region is around

with a commercial value of FCFA 310 billion (472 million euros). The DPM study

USD 2,3 billion.11

indicated that 91% of these exports are made by industrial companies. The destinations

How can the broad term IUUF be defined? What are the impacts of IUUF? Some

of these sea products are Africa, Asia, the USA, Dubai, and Europe. Moreover,

examples of IUUF occurring in the Senegalese maritime sphere and lessons learnt will

Senegalese fishing is socially crucial, as it employs around 600,000 people.

be highlighted.

Globally, fish is extremely significant in food security and communities’ diet.

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The activities associated with IUUF are listed in the voluntary FAO International

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Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUUF:12 Illegal fishing indicates activities: carried out by national or foreign vessels in the waters under jurisdiction of a State, without the authorization of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; carried out by vessels flagged to States that are part of a competent regional fisheries management organization, but who contravene the conservation and management measures adopted by that organization (and which are binding on States), or the provisions in relevant international law; or contravening national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by States cooperating with a relevant regional fisheries management organization. Unreported fishing refers to activities: that have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the competent national authority, thus contravening national laws and regulations; or activities in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that have not been reported, or have been misreported, and thus contravene the reporting procedures of that organization. Unregulated fishing refers to activities: carried out in the area of competence of a competent regional fisheries management organization by vessels with no nationality, or by vessels flying the flag of a State not a Party to that organization, in a manner that is inconsistent with or contrary to the conservation and management measures of that organization; or carried out in areas, or target stocks for which there are no applicable State’s responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources according to international law.

For two decades, IUUF activities have been visible in the SRFC and Senegalese maritime space.13 Intensive in the high seas, illegal fishing is practiced in unauthorized

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Figure 1: Serious offences in the fisheries value chain – What is Fisheries crime (bluejustice.org)

399

areas and can occur along the fisheries value chain. Often IUU fishers use prohibited

fishermen and sets the amount of deposits.

engines and do not declare their catches. Thus, IUUF undermines fisheries conservation, food security of coastal communities, and legal employment of fishermen. It leads to a drop in coastal communities’ wages and collapse of small fishing companies

Cases of IUU Fishing in Senegal

and disrupted commerce. Thus, IUUF actions in national maritime waters provoke negative impacts for the country, local communities, marine ecosystems, and legal

Some examples of IUUF activities occurring in the Senegalese maritime domain are

fishers. Overexploitation of fish products, and the depletion and degradation of marine

described below. The first case is famous for its global character and expansive impacts

habitats, are noted in a ministerial action plan as damaging consequences of IUU fishing

affecting numerous continents and ports.

that need to be taken into consideration and solved.

IUUF activities are a source of

financial profits for criminal actors and often linked to organized crime. Vulnerable

The Kunlun Case – St Vincent & Grenadines

systems and weak management, as well as corruption, are the root causes of these practices. Maritime crimes often connected to IUUF are fraud, corruption, and human, 15

arms, and drugs trafficking (INTERPOL, 2020).

Antarctic Ocean. When it landed in Thailand, the Thai authorities discovered that its fish

Senegal is also confronted with different types of IUUF activities forbidden by 16

Senegalese Law N°2015-18 on 13 July 2015,

The KUNLUN vessel, also called the Asian Warrior, has committed illegal fishing in the products declaration was falsified. They detained the vessel but it escaped. INTERPOL

referring to the Senegalese Maritime

published a purple notice informing of its probable destination - African waters. The ship

Fishing Code. Activities that are illegal in the national EEZ are practised by national

arrived in Dakar on 28 November 2015 under the Asian Warrior name. This name was

artisanal and industrial fleets, as well as foreign industrial fishing vessels. All the

illegally marked on removable plate. After a series of inspections, some similarities were

illustrations of IUUF happening in Senegalese waters are reported by the Direction

detected between the expected vessel KUNLUN in Dakar and the controlled one at the

of Protection and Surveillance (DPSP) of the Fisheries and Maritime Economy

Port of Dakar named Asian Warrior. The detention of the vessel was decided on, and

Ministry. The Maritime department is the authority in charge of the monitoring and

Senegal asked for INTERPOL assistance in order to carry out further investigations. Other

the coordination of all activities in relation to IUUF, in accordance with Article 105

associated crimes were detected, such as fraud through forged documents and false plates.

of the Senegalese Fishing code. Additionally, a decree on the application of the Fishing

The vessel had also engaged in the unauthorized landing of 180 tons of fish products in

Code, referring to Article 105, creates a Commission consultative des Infractions de

seven containers since November 28th, 2015. Those containers were transferred again to

Pêche (Consultative Commission for Infringements) to solve fisheries conflicts.

This

another vessel at Tangier Port (Morocco) on December 13th, and transited to Malaysia

Commission is chaired by the Directors of Maritime Fisheries (DPM), Protection and

on 6 January 2016 for their final destination to the port of Haiphong (Vietnam), where

Surveillance of Fisheries (DPSP), National Agency for Maritime Affairs (ANAM),

the vessel arrived on January 13th. The six crewmembers (5 Spanish and 1 Ukrainian)

representatives of the Armed Forces, Justice, and Finances Ministries, and the Legal

fled to Spain. In March 2019, a Court in Spain condemned the crewmembers to 5 years

Adviser of the Ministry in charge of Fisheries (MPEM). This Commission gives advice

imprisonment and fined each crewmember FCFA 50 million. The vessel owners were fined

to the Minister on investigation results for the violations committed by the industrial

FCFA 200 million, and the ship was confiscated. The ship was sold in March 2022 in

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Dakar.

The KUNLUN case is a perfect example of delay in judicial decision-making (2015-2022). It also raises a problem of insufficient cooperation between all impacted countries to investigate and prosecute illegal fishing activity. Spain made all the decisions regarding the sentencing of the captain of the vessel and the shipowners, and execution of prosecution decisions during the trial, based on the nationality of the majority of the crewmembers. Later the vessel was sold in Senegal without strong lessons learned in multilateral justice cooperation.19

The Praia de Areamilla Case – Spain The Spanish fishing vessel, Praia de Areamilla, was accused of fishing in Senegalese waters without a fishing license, on 10 October 2015 at 23:55 pm. Arrested with wet nets and 122 tons of fresh fish, the Captain deleted the location history. During the control, the log book was lacking. At the trial in January 2016, the Captain argued that he came from Guinea Bissau. The decision of the Court of Dakar released in March 2017 ordered the company to pay a fine of FCFA 700 million.

The Atlantic Navigator Case – Belize Boarded on 15 December 2019, the Belizean fishing vessel, Atlantic Navigator, had a Mauritanian license and was fishing illegally in Senegalese waters. The consignee recognized the IUUF activity and asked for a transactional MOU20 at the Commission. The penalty was fixed at FCFA 500 million.

Senegalese Industrial Vessels Cases – 2020 The Commission observed different modes of IUUF activities practised by Senegalese industrial fishing vessels during the year 2020. Among the cases, the detected violations are classified as follows:

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• Five fishing vessels without any fishing license; • Five fishing vessels in a restricted area; • Four fishing vessels with unauthorised device - fishing gear; • One vessel under concealment of evidence The main challenges in the fight against IUUF have remained exactly the same for decades, despite improvements in equipment and education.21 Lack of knowledge, statistics, and precise economic loss restrain understanding of the threat of illegal fishing. Economic losses, estimated to be 10-30 US$ billion per annum, could be used for the construction of 1450 schools, or a rural hospital, which is estimated to cost FCFA 100 million.22 Additionally, common barriers are the lack of human resources and technological equipment to control the maritime spaces and protect Senegalese waters. As demonstrated in the KUNLUN case, judicial delays and insufficient cooperation between prosecutors relating to the effective sentencing and execution of prosecution decisions in IUUF and related crimes, is also a significant challenge. Moreover, permanent concerns in the fishing sector are the frequent occurrence of accidents, the detention of Senegalese pirogues abroad because of the artisanal fishermen’s illegal activities in Mauritania and Gambia, and smuggling or illegal migration to Europe. Indeed, young Senegalese fishermen in the artisanal sector do not want to fish anymore because of the scarcity of fish and the economic shortfall. Their expressed credo, “Barça wala Barsakh” (Barcelona or death),23 shows their wish to emigrate; preferring to use their pirogues and navigate for a dreamed Eldorado in Europe. They may also convey other illegal migrants towards European coasts.24 A lack of political will25 is still an issue when fisheries-related violations are on the table. In fact, the UNODC has organized different expert group meetings in Vienna and Oslo for the elaboration of the Rotten Fish Guide26 - a guide on tackling corruption in fisheries. Having been invited to participate in those meetings, the author had the chance to organize the first workshop with UNODC and Mr Cheikh Fall from the DPSP27 in November 2019 in Dakar. The second workshop, which was supposed

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to provide capacity building for several agents from different ministries, has not yet taken place.

Furthermore, several national structures are working at a tactical level on different strategic actions plans to combat IUUF. These are listed below: The Direction of Protection and Surveillance of Fisheries (DPSP)28 : The origin

Current Local and Global Responses

of the DPSP relates to an agreement between Canada and Senegal.29 Since 2000, the DPSP has been dedicated to the implementation of policies related to fisheries

The complexity of IUUF activities requires multifaceted organisation and actions.

surveillance and the reinforcement of the artisanal fishing sector. Its missions are

Interagency collaboration at national level is the effective strategic option to tackle

executed with the support of other civil administrations such as the ANAM, DPM, and

fisheries insecurity at sea. Regionally and internationally, efficient and multiform

military structures such as the Navy, Air force, Gendarmerie and Police.30

cooperation is mandatory to succeed in the fight against IUU Fishing. The Navy: The Senegalese Navy is responsible for maritime law enforcement through

National Collaboration

its surveillance operations and continuous presence at sea. Its first objective is to control

As Senegal is facing a multitude of maritime insecurity concerns, institutional

and safeguard the Senegalese maritime sphere. The Navy uses naval bases and coastal

collaboration at national level has been set up to combat illegality at sea. Several

radars, and can board and arrest vessels at sea.31 The Navy has six patrols boats of 16m,

ministries work in the area of

20m, 33m, 45m and 60 m, which are equipped with VMS, AIS and radar systems.

maritime and fisheries sector law

Patrolling missions are not restricted to the country. Indeed, the Navy participates in

enforcement. The main department

joint patrols and diverse operations of law enforcement regionally and internationally to

is the Ministry in Charge of Fisheries

tackle insecurity at sea and IUUF.

and Maritime Economy. However, the departments of Economy, Justice,

The Direction of Maritime Fisheries (DPM): According to the decree32 referring

Environment, Armed Forces, Interior,

to its organization and functions, the DPM is dedicated to the creation and execution

Health, and Trade are working closely

of policy in maritime fisheries and resources conservation. Its main support goes to

and inclusively in the maritime

the fishermen. Fisheries statistics collection and exploitation are undertaken by the

environment for the implementation

DPM, which also grants fishing authorizations and licenses, together with other

of maritime regulations touching

administrations.

health, environment, justice, and conservation of natural resources.

The National Agency for Maritime Affairs (ANAM)33 : As the Maritime Delegated Authority, ANAM represents the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy and the National Port Security Agency (ANSP). Being the Senegalese Maritime Administration

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and in charge of the implementation of the merchant marine policies, its principal

Legal and Operational Frameworks

functions are the execution of Senegal’s Flag, Port, and Coastal State responsibilities

Another important issue when it comes to addressing IUUF is to have a legal and

relative to maritime safety and security, marine pollution prevention, maritime

operational framework allowing for the organization of effective fisheries governance.

transportation, registry and management of vessels and seafarers, fishing licenses, vessels

Senegal is a Member State of IMO, FAO, ILO, and the principal UN agencies. The

detention, accident investigations, adoption of legal frameworks, and implementation

country participates actively in global maritime activities. Having ratified the main and

of international standards related to these themes. ANAM works closely with other

pillar international oceans and maritime Conventions, Senegal has transposed these

national civil and military structures for the protection of Senegalese maritime waters.

instruments into several codes. The Merchant Marine Code (2002) under Law 200222 gives effect to UNCLOS. Senegal has also signed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement

The Port of Dakar: The Port was built in 1857

by French settlers aiming to have

in 1995, as well as the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and

one maritime transit stop on the line France-Brasilia. This Port remains one of the

Eliminate IUUF, the PSMA, and C188. At regional level, Senegal has further signed

most important ports in the West African region. The reception of ships, passenger’s

the Convention on the Determination of the Minimal Conditions for Access and

transportation, and goods delivery are the main services offered by the Port.

Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under Jurisdiction of the Member States of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC). This Convention

The Direction of Industries Transforming fish products (DITP) : The DITP

has been transposed into the Fishing Code (2015) under Law 2015-18 and its decree

inspects the quality of fisheries and aquaculture products, provides sanitary certifications

of 2016. Finally, the Penal Code under the Law 2016-29 (art 159), Drugs Code under

for fish products, facilities and equipment, and promotes fish and the fisheries industry.

the Law 1997-18, and Tax General Code under the Law 2012-31 allow authorities to pursue and sentence the criminals violating national and international regulations.

The Haute Autorité chargée de la Coordination de la sécurité Maritime, de la Sûreté maritime et de la Protection de l’Environnement marin (HASSMAR)36:

Civil Society Responses

The HASSMAR, or High Authority in charge of Maritime Safety, Maritime Security

Responses from civil society in Senegal come from academia, observers on board foreign

and Marine Environmental Protection Coordination, acts as the central emergency

vessels, artisanal actors, NGOs, the media, and Senegalese women working in the

coordinator through its national committee of coordination. Through this committee, it

fisheries sector.

gathers together all the aforementioned agencies and other bodies dealing with marine

Senegal has various schools where fisheries and maritime subjects are taught. These

and maritime issues. The entity regularly organises maritime exercises on different

include the Cheikh Anta DIOP University of Dakar, Gaston Berger University of

topics to reinforce interagency collaboration in case of a maritime disaster in relation

Saint Louis, Bambey University, the National Centre of Education on Fisheries and

to maritime security and safety, or marine pollution. HASSMAR also manages the

Aquaculture for Technicians (CFPTA), the National School of Maritime Training

Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) near the Port of Dakar. Other relevant

(ENFM),38 and the Trainmar centre of Dakar.

administrations37 can join these main actors during State actions at sea to combat the various maritime threats and criminality.

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Often, the DPSP organises workshops on observer education and capacity building. During a 2020 workshop, the author was given the opportunity to deliver courses

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on transparency and the fight against corruption on board foreign fishing vessels to future observers. This included explaining why corruption can undermine their role as impartial actors, and how they should reject corruption for the viability of fisheries stocks. The artisanal fisheries communities and women are also sensitizing and raising awareness on fisheries concerns, including the fisheries security debate, food security, socioeconomic impacts, illegal fishing and related illegal fishmeal. The demand for fishmeal and fish oil is increasing in global markets. Therefore, a fishmeal industry is being developed in Senegal and neighbouring countries like Mauritania and Gambia. According to Beatrice Gorez, Co-ordinator of the Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA) in Brussels (Belgium) and author of the article “West Africa: fishmeal, mealy deal”,39 some factories can work illegally without official recognition. She explains how the fishmeal factories use a large quantity of fresh fish, particularly round sardinella, an abundant small pelagic species present in Mauritania and in Senegal. In Senegal, there are more than 12 fishmeal plants, whereas in Mauritania, there were already 29 plants by the end of 2015. In 2013, Mauritanian fishmeal factories processed more than 300,000 tons of small pelagic fish. As a result, in September 2017, the CONIPAS40 (a Senegalese platform composed of artisanal fishermen), with support 41

of a local Association (APRAPAM),

organized a regional forum with Mauritanian, 42

part of Senegal called Kafountine. In this region, several west African men and women from Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali worked in fish harvesting and processing. The

under

documentary highlighted the overexploitation of fish, poverty, and threat of food and

the supervision of the African Confederation of artisanal fishing organizations, to

unemployment insecurity. In addition to this, toxic waste and air pollution from the

discuss their concerns around the explosion of fishmeal production in the region.

factory were shown as causes of pathologies and population decline in the Kafountine

Gambian and Senegalese fishing communities, environmentalists, and scientists

For the West African coastal population, sardinella, which is rich in proteins, amino

area. On 16 July 2022, at the Place du Souvenir Africain, several women demonstrated

acids and vitamins, constitutes a major food, and is overexploited in the region. This

with Greenpeace support. The aim of this protest was to sensitize populations on the

scarcity has a negative impact on women’s activities processing and selling fish. Indeed,

urgent need to preserve and manage fish for the wellbeing of coastal communities,

they cannot afford the expensive prices offered by fishermen who prefer selling to the

consumers, and women in processing. The President of the Association dedicated to

fishmeal factories, which pay more than the female processors.

Women Processing Fish Products, Mrs Fatou Samba, on 21 November 2021 on the

The documentary entitled “Poisson d’or, Poisson africain”,

discussed different

negative effects of the creation of a fishmeal factory in Casamance, in the southern

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International Day of Fish, argued that “this has to stop” and “factories are stealing our fish”.44, 45

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Regional Cooperation Through the CSRP-SRFC, Senegal plays a vital role in fighting IUUF by organising joint patrols with close neighbouring countries. Furthermore, and as a member State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Senegal has ratified the main treaties related to maritime safety and security. This includes the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy,46 created by the African Union (UA) and the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS).47, 48 This Strategy sets out the main maritime security threats and offers regional integrated responses to fight illicit fishing and maritime criminality, through effective implementation of regional instruments aiming to foster African blue economy. In addition to these regional standards, the Heads of Governments and States at the Yaounde Summit decided to adopt three mechanisms to address illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, including IUUF. These included the Yaoundé Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, the Head of States Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding between regional organisations. This inspired the creation of the Yaounde Architecture, comprising several regional and operational centres in the region, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. These mechanisms allow for information sharing, harmonization of procedures, and regional operations. Furthermore, a 2018 European Union project to improve regional fisheries governance in western Africa (PESCAO) started in 2018 with a budget of €15 million. The Project is running for five years and aims to strengthen the regional approach to the sustainable use and management of fishery resources, including combating IUUF. Overall management of the project lies with ECOWAS, working closely with the Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea (FCWC) and the SubRegional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), with support from the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA).

Greenpeace: Campaign#WhereisMyFish Stolen Fish 16 July 2022, at the Place du Souvenir Africain (Dakar) 412

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Middle East, and Mediterranean members, representing more than half of the States parties to the Agreement. They revealed that 13% of total fish captured globally is from Figure 2: The Yaounde Architecture

these regional spaces. It was recognized that 35% to 63% of the stocks are exploited in an unsustainable manner and the only way to tackle IUUF is to implement the PSMA

UN and other International Responses

effectively.50

As awareness of the negative consequences of illegal fishing has grown, maritime

Senegal is also a Member State of the International Criminal Police Organization

countries and international UN agencies have increased their interest in conserving and

(INTERPOL) fighting global criminality. In 2013, INTERPOL created Project

protecting their fisheries resources. This issue was recognized by the United Nations in

Scale51 to combat fisheries crime and support international police collaboration,

2015 when they adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 2030

interagency synergy, and investigative missions. The KUNLUN case is an illustration of

Agenda includes Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), entitled life below

INTERPOL assistance to Senegal and other members.52

water, which requires the conservation and the sustainable use of marine resources for

Furthermore, the Blue Justice Initiative (BJI), initiated by the Norwegian

sustainable development in general, and particularly aims to end IUUF (14.4) and

Government, has financed the UNDP Blue Resilience project, to raise awareness on

subsidies favouring illegal fishing (14.6). Subsequently, several conferences have focused

fisheries governance and offer guidance on mechanisms to tackle IUUF and fisheries

on fisheries insecurity worldwide, the 5th of June 2018 was declared the International

crime through institutional cooperation, education, and capacity building.

Day for the Fight against IUUF, and the WTO concluded an Agreement on Fisheries 49

Subsidies in June 2022.

Apart from UN initiatives, States can further cooperate to fight IUU fishing at international level through bilateral or multilateral relationships. A good example of

Moreover, the 72 Member States signing and implementing the Food and

multilateral cooperation is the first Conference on Blue Economy (2018) in Kenya.

Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) PSMA show the improved efforts of States to combat

This event was the first international Conference gathering Heads of States and

IUUF. Indeed, in October 2022, a regional meeting was held in Dakar with African,

Governments, and had nearly 4000 participants.

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Another example of multilateral

International Development (USAID), in its COMFISH project, offered a capacity

cooperation to fight fisheries crime

building programme dedicated to artisanal fishermen on action plans against IUUF.55

is the Copenhagen Declaration. This declaration was adopted in 2018 by

Capacity-Building Initiatives

several ministers and is a non-binding

Education through capacity building is the key to building knowledge to fight insecurity

declaration recognizing the existence

at sea, and fisheries violations. As clusters, academia and universities are aware of

of international organized crime in the

maritime issues and often work to develop solutions to these problems.

fisheries industry that must be combated

Apart from the capacity-building initiatives discussed above, it is important to

nationally and internationally. It

highlight the IMO’s dedicated capacity-building university, which has provided

further provides for special assistance to

maritime and oceans education to developing countries globally for many years,

Developing Countries and Large Ocean

including Senegal. As a centre of excellence for maritime administrators and experts,

Nations. The Copenhagen Declaration

the World Maritime University (WMU)56 was settled in 1983 by the International

was recently signed53 on 20 October

Maritime Organization, a United Nations Agency dedicated to the promotion of

2022 by the current Senegalese Minister

safe, efficient, viable, secure and environmentally sound maritime transport, and the

of Fisheries and Maritime Economy, M. Papa Sagna Mbaye, with the Norwegian

implementation of related international maritime standards by States members.

Deputy Minister for International Development, Mrs Bjorg Sandkjaer. A Blue Justice

Offering a series of maritime postgraduate educational programmes, in accordance

Conference was held in March 2023 in Denmark on the global fight against fisheries

with the UN 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, the trained students become

crime.

maritime talents and champions globally. In addition to this, WMU is a research hub,

In terms of bilateral partnerships, the Canadian and Norwegian States have assisted

regularly arranging international workshops and conferences in the maritime and ocean

Senegal and its national entities financially, to allow them to participate in several global

domains. Its mission of education and “technical cooperation assistance on behalf of

projects and external events to deter IUUF. Invited by those countries, the author had

IMO” is recognized in the global maritime community. Thus, Japan, Korea, Germany,

the chance to participate in a debate on IUUF and how to eradicate it.

Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Australia participate financially by providing grants for

Through French-Senegalese bilateral cooperation arrangements, technical assistance is also provided by the Eléments Français (French elements), which undertake air surveillance of Senegalese maritime spaces to deter insecurity at sea.

qualified candidates. As part of this mandate, the Korea Maritime Institute and the World Maritime University, with the support of the Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, have

States can also work with non-government entities to fight IUU fishing. In Senegal,

organized several CAPFISH workshops. These are capacity building workshops

this includes the collaboration between the Maritime Department or related agencies

gathering several experts from universities, institutional structures, and professionals

working closely with NGOs. This kind of cooperation is directed to the national

from the private and public sector, to find effective ways to implement international

structures or associations. As an example, in 2015, the United States Agency for

instruments to combat IUUF57.

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The Way Forward To tackle illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities, fisheries states must be innovative when it comes to criminal justice. Dynamic preventive measures and effective enforcement regulations are the main assets to deter and eradicate IUUF both nationally and globally. In addition, assessing, building or reinforcing, and harmonizing the legal and judicial procedures in the region can close the gaps in prosecution and execution of sentences. Fish is wealth. The fish resources must be protected and preserved. Consequently, raising awareness about fish security culture, or even the creation of a new WMU specialisation on fishing, should be considered, to encourage students to fight against IUUF in their countries and abroad, to prevent food insecurity, poverty and unstable democracy. WMU plays a great role as a centre for excellence, training maritime and oceans leaders. The University must help foster generations of fisheries talents by highlighting the significance of fisheries and law enforcement in the fishing sector as a global challenge for least-developed countries. Fundamentally, a strong political commitment and strong community involvement in addressing the problem, will help to deter IUU fishing. As declared by FAO,58 blue transformation can ensure the achievement of the UN Agenda 2030. In addition to this, incentives for women and youth in fisheries, capacity building, UN Agenda implementation, and sustainable management must be put forward in any strategic plan for combating IUUF and protecting viable fisheries. Co-constructive and inclusive fish security projects are needed for building Sovereignty, Prosperity, Peace, and Safe and Stable Nations among the international community.

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Identifying Barriers Associated with Unreported Fishing in a Small-Scale Fishery: the Importance of Communication, Participation and Trust within a Complex Value Chain

Introduction In 2020, the United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) valued global marine fisheries production above USD 100 billion, from 79 million tonnes of fish.1 A key contributor to global fish production has consistently been small-scale fishing (SSF), which can be found in all parts of the world and is especially important in developing countries.2 SSFs account for approximately 90% of the 51 million fishers worldwide.3 SSFs play a key role in the reduction of poverty, provision of affordable protein and balanced nutrition, development and investment opportunities and improvement of social welfare.4 The UN’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 (Life Below Water) sets an ambitious aim to ensure that we conserve and sustainably use the ocean. One of SDG 14’s targets, 14B, is to “(p)rovide access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets”. This target, however, will not be reached without a holistic

Randy T. Bumbury Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries Department, Cooperative Republic of Guyana

Francis C. Neat World Maritime University, Sweden

approach that draws upon other SDG’s related to no poverty and the eradication of hunger (SDGs 1 and 2), decent work and economic growth (SDG 8), sustainable consumption, production and communities (SDGs 11 and 12), and strong institutions and partnerships (SDGs 16 & 17).5 Thus, SSFs are set to play an important role in achieving SDG 14 and contributing to the UN’s Agenda 2030 more broadly. Sustainable fisheries management requires using the best available scientific evidence.6 A

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key element of this is catch reporting,7 which is the systematic collection of information

Of the many behavioural theories or models used to bring about behavioural change,

from fishers on their catch, including data on dates, location, species, volume, vessel

we explored the use of “Community-Based Social Marketing” or CBSM.18 The CBSM

identity and size. Catch reports may be required by law as part of fishing vessel licence

method draws upon the theory of social norms and how to change them, and is used

agreements and are often organised and collated by government departments or

to effect sustainable, attitudinal and behavioural change.19 CBSM posits that change

agencies. Catch reports provide the basis not only for stock assessment and local fisheries

is most effective if it involves direct contact with people, at the level of the community.

CBSM has been effectively applied to address the barriers and benefits in a variety of

Many SSFs in developing countries are challenged with insufficient capacity for

environmental protection situations.20 To our knowledge CBSM has not been applied

comprehensive and systematic catch reporting, which can result in low quality

widely to fisheries sustainability challenges, although there is one case where it has been

information, unreliable stock assessment and poor advice for fisheries management.

successfully used to encourage fishers to recycle their fishing gear upon return to port.21

management strategies, but also national, regional and global fishery assessments.

Unreported catch is one of the pillars of “Illegal, unreported and unregulated”

The first step in a CBSM approach is to identify the key actors and the behaviour to

(IUU) fishing and defined as “Catches which have not been reported, or have been

change (in this case catch reporting). After this, an interview study or questionnaire can

misreported, to the relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws

be designed to identify barriers to, and benefits from, achieving such change.22

and regulations”.9 While this definition is appropriate for industrial fisheries a more

The aim of this study was to assess the level and means of catch reporting in the

nuanced approach may be required for SSFs, especially for countries that lack the

artisanal small scale fishery of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana. Guyana, situated on

resources, processes and capacity to effectively implement a catch reporting scheme.

the North-Eastern Coast of South America, has a productive small-scale fishery23 that is

There are many reasons why small-scale fisher folk may fail to report their catch, such as

part of the wider shrimp and groundfish fishery of the North Brazil Shelf Large Marine

or a lack of understanding why reporting is necessary.

Ecosystem.24 This fishery makes for an interesting case study because it is typical of

Often there are problems associated with a failure to engage fishers in management

many SSFs in developing countries and lends itself to a study of the barriers to catch

a lack of trust in authorities, 13

plans,

One way

reporting in the SSF sector using the CBSM approach. To this end we sought to; 1) Use

involving fishers together

data from the Guyana Fisheries Department (GFD) to assess the level of catch reporting

with other actors in the fishery value chain. For example, there may be opportunities to

in the SSF sector; 2) To map key actors and stakeholders across the value chain of

acquire data at various stages in the value chain, for example from fisheries cooperatives

the SSF sector. 3) To undertake interviews of key actors to understand the barriers to

who work directly with fishers. In developing countries, however, SSFs are often

reporting and evaluate motivational factors that may lead to improved catch reporting.

and there may be resistance to top-down regulatory approaches. 15

to improve this is by taking a community-based approach

associated with informal value chains as the fish are sold from fisher to middle business actors and cooperatives and eventually to the consumer.16 This can present challenges to reliable catch reporting as original catches are split and sold depending on market

Material and Methods

demand and dynamics. Battista et al suggest it is necessary to understand motivating factors for undesired behaviour in fishers, such as non-reporting, and identify social/ 17

cultural barriers that contribute to it.

422

Case Study Guyana has four distinct marine fisheries sub-sectors: small-scale or artisanal (commercial

423

and subsistence), industrial (prawn and seabob), and semi-industrial (snapper and deep-

Catch Statistics and Reporting

slope (mainly tuna)). More than 15,000 people (10,000 directly and 5,000 processing

Information on total fish production and catch reports were made available by the

and marketing) are employed by the fisheries sector. The sector contributes around

GFD. These data were summarised to produce time series plots of total production over

US$40 million to national gross domestic product (just less than 1 percent) annually.

Guyana’s SSF sector is the largest of four marine fisheries sub-sectors in Guyana, with 1,315 vessels counted in 2017, benefiting 4,500 fishers and 5,000 processing workers

the period 2000 - 2020. The GFD collected catch reports from small-scale artisanal fishers between 2002 and 2015, although there was a 3-year gap in reporting between 2006 and 2008 due to administration problems.

(information provided by Guyana Fisheries Department). The fishery captures a variety of species using wooden vessels of varying sizes (6-19m in length) equipped with

Stakeholder Mapping, Interviews and Focus Group

engine capacities from 15 – 120hp. It is predominantly a gill net fishery that targets the

Participants for this research were targeted from 5 coastal regions (Figure 1) in which

following species; Bangamary (Macrodon ancylodon ), Sea trout (Cynoscion virescens ),

catch data are collected, and where the majority of SSF activities are carried out - (2)

Butterfish (Nebris microps ), Grey snapper (Cynoscion acoupa ), Gillbacker (Sciades

Pomeroon-Supernnam (Charity, Sparenaam); (3) Essequibo Islands-West Demerara

parkeri ), and Cuirass (Sciades props ). Around half of all vessels are issued with fishing

(Zeeburg), (4) Demerara-Mahaica (Georgetown, Annadale, Providence); (5) Mahaica-

licences, but the remainder are unlicensed, especially in remote areas.

Berbice (Rosignol, D’Edward Village); (6) East Berbice-Corentyne (Coop #66, New

Fisheries catch data derive from several sources and actors. First, the Guyana Fisheries Department (GFD), within the Ministry of Agriculture, is responsible for managing, regulating and promoting the sustainable development of Guyana’s fishery resources. The GFD has a statistical unit that directly collects data from quay side inspections and interviews with fishers. This generates detailed catch data, including species by weight, length, catch location, days at sea etc. Second, there are multiple processors and exporters who are obliged to report total volume processed and exported to the GFD. This is used to provide annual production figures, but is not resolved in detail by species, area etc. Third, some cooperatives collect catch data from their member fishers. These data are detailed with respect to species, area etc., but are not necessarily as complete and accurate as those collected on the quayside by the GFD, since fishers may only sell part of their catch through the cooperative. It is not mandatory that such data be shared with the GFD. However, in many cases it can be valuable to supplement the GFD’s quayside sampling program. It is on detailed catch reporting (rather than total production) that this study is mainly focused, since such data is most useful to inform fisheries management.

424

Figure 1. The location of the regions where the fishers, cooperatives, fisheries department and processors are to be found in Guyana.

425

Amsterdam, Albion).

they were the common/central connection between all other stakeholders (Figure 2).

Five key actor groups (fishers, cooperatives, processors, middle business persons

Interviews (in English) had to be conducted remotely (online) due to the COVID-19

and the Fisheries Department) were identified on the basis of the first author’s detailed

Pandemic that restricted travel at the time. Twenty-five individuals were contacted via

knowledge of the fishery acquired in his professional capacity as an officer within

WhatsApp or e-mail and a total of 20 participants agreed to be interviewed between

the GFD. Officials from GFD were personal contacts of the lead author and it was

July 12, 2021 and August 18, 2021 (Table 1). All participants gave consent to be part of

through their connections to fishers, processors and cooperatives that interviewees

the study (anonymised details provided in Supplementary Material Table S1). The study

were recruited for the study. The relationships between actors were described across the

was approved by the World Maritime University ethics review committee. Four fishers

value chain together with the flow of information related to catch reporting. We then

were interviewed individually from sites along the coast (Figure 1). Five fishers were

interviewed in a focus group (details provided in Table 2) facilitated by an individual

provided a framework for understanding barriers to behavioural change (in this case

from the fisheries company Guyana Fisheries Ltd. Focus groups can generate different

catch reporting) and, as such, we designed interview questions with a view to four

results from individual interviews,28 but are considered an appropriate method in

major themes that a review of the SSF literature suggested were important, and that we

CBSM studies.29 To build confidence among participants, they were first encouraged

hypothesised could be potential barriers to catch reporting. The themes were:

to share their experiences about the fishery in general. Reminders were given of the

developed a series of interview questions for each actor group. The CBSM approach

confidentiality at various stages of the interview. Individual interviews typically took 1. Awareness – communication, reporting

between 15-20 minutes. Interviews were recorded and later transcribed. Key quotes

2. Barriers – trust, process, communication, beliefs

were extracted and entered to MS Excel and coded in relation to the 4 themes of interest

3. Motivations – reward and opportunity

described above. This was then summarised and qualitatively interpreted.

4. Participation – communication, reporting A semi-structured interview approach was chosen for this study27 with questions

Results

designed around the themes hypothesised as being important to catch reporting. We sought to establish the experience and role of the actor, their relationship with other

Catch Statistics

stakeholders and their perceptions of catch reporting in the context of its need and

The estimated total annual production of Guyana’s fishing fleet from 2000 to 2020 is

purpose. Questions were mostly focused on the process of catch reporting, attitudes to

shown in Figure 2. Historically the SSF sector accounted for the majority of the annual

catch reporting, the relationship between actors and any concerns they had (see details

production, although industrial fishing was higher between 2010 and 2018. Annual

in Supplementary Materials and Methods S1). Similar questions were asked to all actor

production from SSF increased in the most recent years and currently represents the

groups, but were tailored to suit the specific circumstances of the actors in the value

largest share of total annual production of Guyana’s fisheries sector.

chain. We aimed to have around 10-12 questions for each group with the exception of

Catch reports for the SSF sector were available from 2690 fishing trips, accounting

the fishers, to whom we felt the need to put further questions (a total of 19) because

for 669 metric tonnes (MT) of catch. This equates to approximately 0.25 % of the

426

427

Figure 2. A summary of Guyana’s total fisheries annual production (metric tonnes - MT) between 2000 – 2020 (Source: Guyana Fisheries Department). SSF = small scale fishery sector.

Figure 3. Relationship, interaction and information exchange between actors across the SSF value chain.

267016 MT of annual production for the period 2002 – 2015. In the most recent

fisheries management plans. Fourth, the processors and export companies who buy their

years there has been an increase in data collection by the GFD (Table 3). Sampling by

catch mainly from middle business persons. Processors are required to report volume of

the Fisheries Department takes place across various landing sites and the frequency of

fish processed by fishing sector to the GFD. Finally, the middle business persons who

data collected varies by region from weekly to monthly. There is a notable gap in data

buy from fishers and cooperatives and sell it to the processors and local markets. These

collection attributable to administrative disruption between 2006 and 2008.

middle business persons proved difficult to identify, contact and recruit for interviews. There are other stakeholders in the SSF, including NGOs and Fisherfolk associations. As

Stakeholder Mapping

neither have a direct role in catch landing, selling or reporting, however, they were not

There are several key actors in Guyana’s SSF (Figure 3), directly involved in landing,

included in this study.

selling and catch reporting. First, the fishers who are found in communities along Guyana’s coastline and who land their daily catches into multiple sites. Second, the

Interviews

Guyana Fisheries Department (GFD), who are responsible for managing, regulating and promoting the sustainable development of Guyana’s fishery resources. Third, the

Actor 1: The Fisheries Department (GFD)

fisheries cooperatives - there are five of these and they serve primarily as a site to facilitate

The GFD officers indicated that all vessels are targeted regardless of their license

the sale of catch by fishers, as well provide services such as ice, fuel, gear and storage.

status, and that it is usually the captain who provides information on their catch and

The cooperatives form an important link with the GFD, providing data and developing

activities. They explained that a variety of data are collected during the quay-side

428

429

interview, which lasts around 15 minutes - total catch weight, species caught, vessel

that they engaged in providing feedback to the fishers at a later stage during workshops

name, length of the trip, cost of fuel, location, weather, depth, and engine type. The

or meetings. Trust and communication came through repeatedly as barriers to catch

GFD indicated that the data collection process is effective and efficient, but were

reporting from the perspective of the GFD.

concerned that sometimes fishers failed to provide truthful data. In the words of one interviewee;

Actor 2: The Cooperatives

Chair persons from two cooperatives were interviewed in this study. These “Data accuracy and reliability depends on the fisher being interviewed. Some fishers don’t

cooperatives accounted for over 200 vessels, with 171 active members with licenced

understand why you are collecting the data. So observations would have to be made. There

vessels. Fishers who are members of the cooperative generally use the cooperative’s

was an occasion where the fisher showed his books, however, what was said and what was

facilities to sell their catch to a middle-business person. One interviewee indicated that

in the books did not match up.”

95 per cent of the catch is sold to the middle-business person and the remainder sold to locals in the community. The cooperatives collect data from the fishers using a modified

The GFD officers recognised the need to make the data collection process as short as

log book which includes information of specific relevance to marketing, to suit the

possible and highlighted the importance of being polite and working with fishers they

cooperative. One cooperative conducts daily data collection from fishers voluntarily.

know to be reliable. An officer from the GFD stated that the attitude and willingness

One cooperative chairperson stated that the data collected is fairly accurate, as their data

to cooperate of fishers varied regionally and depended on the landing site. For example,

collectors are always on site. They indicated that the data are reported at the monthly

the office furthest from the head office (see Figure 1) found fishers were very willing to

statutory meeting of their executive body and subsequently shared with the GFD. One

share their data. The GFD officers also indicated that catch reporting often depended

cooperative chairperson indicated that some fishers are reluctant to share data as they do

on the individual characters, with one reporting that:

not trust for what purpose it will be used, stating:

“The attitude of the fisher is often negative and at times they can be disrespectful”.

“…the reluctance to report stemmed from the fact that the fishers were of the view that the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA) would be taxing them”.

Four out of the 5 GFD officers indicated that they shared no form of feedback with the fishers when out in the field collecting data, with one interviewee admitting:

A cooperative chairperson also mentioned that the spatial resolution of the data is a concern to fishers; sharing a precise GPS location of where the catch came from is not

“There is a lack of feedback from the Fisheries Department and we don’t communicate

something the fishers are keen to do, although they were willing to provide local name

with the fishers as we should”.

places. One cooperative chairperson was of the view that despite having useful data, not much use is actually made of it for scientific purposes, stating:

All the GFD officers recognised this as problematic and acknowledged that a greater effort to communicate is required to build trust with fishers. The officers mentioned

430

“There is no feedback from data. We are presently sitting on 2 years’ worth of data.

431

However, so far, no one has approached us to do anything with the data, such as indicating

from whom they purchase, the condition of the fish, total weight, and weight by species

which locations are the best to fish or to help improve data accuracy.”

and price. All processors showed strong awareness of the need for traceability and that reporting is important in demonstrating sustainable practices by the fishers:

Recognizing the importance of catch reporting, both cooperatives stated that they would use their platform to encourage more reporting, by hosting meetings to inform

“Reporting is the heart and soul of sustainable fisheries. Traceability is a desire that we

the fishers of the benefits and importance of reporting. The cooperative representatives

would like to have but we do not have the infrastructure and we need the investment.”

mentioned several ways to deter non-reporting. For example, for boats failing to report, the data collectors report to the cooperative executive, who will then discuss

However, some complications and challenges were evident from the responses. One

with the boat owner. One cooperative stated that they try to keep the fishers motivated

interviewee pointed out that they often only purchase a portion of the catch, thus it

by recognizing their efforts and best practice during a National Fisherfolk Day. They

may not be representative of the total catch. The processors expressed the view that any

suggest that having the data analysed and returned to fishers in the form of trends

action outside of purchasing and negotiating with fishers is a financial burden and that

or information flyers would help them feel appreciated and understand better the

requesting all fishers to report could see them lose business, as the burden reporting

importance of accurate catch reporting.

entails could cause fishers to seek another buyer. For example,

Actor 3: The Processors and/or Exporters

“We have to teach them, they think they have to pay taxes and some are challenged by

Within the value chain, the processors transact business directly with fishers, middle-

education. If I ask them to do a little more (reporting) they would leave and go look for

business persons and other processors to supply seafood to local and international

another processor.”

markets. The three processors interviewed indicated that they all sourced fish directly from fishers as well as from middle business persons. Two processors indicated that they

Actor 4: The Middle-Business Person (Value Chain Trader)

only purchase from licensed boats, and the other indicated it did not matter if the boat

It proved difficult to identify and find middle business persons who were prepared

was licensed or not for the purchase to be made. One indicated that the cooperatives are

to be interviewed. The single interviewee was a woman who buys from fishers and

influential in whether catch reports are made available:

occasionally purchases from other middle-business persons. The interviewee indicated that license status of the boat from which the purchase comes does not matter; rather

“The only arrangement I know where there is a structure in reporting is from the

they were concerned with the best price:

cooperatives. Those that are not from a cooperative would tend to report less.” “Where the price is right, that’s where you will go. This is because it is not I alone buying,

The processors emphasized the importance of reporting from fishers and the middle-

there are many buyers”.

business persons for their company and the sector, as it helps them know who provided the fish and where it came from. They collect information on the name of the person

432

When engaging fishers, the middle business person said they do record the weight

433

and species of the catch, vessel name, and length of the trip as this determines the

sharing data. However, one fisher did share their concern about giving away precise

quality and price of the fish. They indicated that this data helps to identify reliable

details of their fishing ground.

fishers and builds trust with them. The data collected is used for their own business insight. However, they did indicate that sharing data with an agency such as the GFD

All fishers were concerned that their future in fisheries was in doubt due to declining

would be considered if requested. As someone who shares a close connection to the

catches, and expressed the view that something needs to be done urgently. Fishers from

fishers and vested business interests, the interviewee expressed the view that recent oil

both groups highlighted three main reasons why they think the fish stocks are declining:

and gas activities have resulted in a decline in catch production.

1) The fishing gear used is too small and larger “eyes” (net mesh size) are required; 2) Overfishing by other sectors; 3) Oil exploration activities (notably the presence of the

Actor 5: The Fishers

floating production storage and offloading, oil rigs and support/survey vessels):

All fishers interviewed were men and licensed boat owners, with an average of fifteen years’ experience utilizing drift seine vessels. There was not much difference in overall

“Recently there has been a very big decline since the ExxonMobil seismic survey. In my

findings between the focus group and the individual interviews. However, there was

opinion, there is a 70% decline in catch.”

more variation in the responses of the individual interviews and more conformity from the focus group reflecting the dominant voice of the fishing leader who had gathered

Fishers indicated that they were interested in receiving feedback from the GFD with

the four other fishers. The fishers indicated that they sell their catch to middle-business

respect to which species were more marketable, the total annual production, stock

persons at cooperatives, various markets or landing sites. Fishers are informed by the GFD during data collection what information they are required to share. The captain is responsible for filling out a notebook on the trip’s harvest (total catch by species), fuel used, general location, and fishing depth. Records are usually completed upon landing as conditions are much more conducive for writing than when done out at sea. One interviewee was of the view that the frequency of GFD data collection was insufficient. Fishers indicated that they were willing to share their details with the GFD, processors, middle-person and NGOs. However, one fisher indicated that sharing depends on what the data is being used for. That individual pointed out that, once confidentiality assurances are provided, and provided the data are to be used for research, they would be more open to sharing. The individual interviews suggest the fishers were concerned that sharing would give away their fishing grounds or result in increased taxes. They also complained that there was no feedback on what the data means. The focus groups had a more uniform response that they had no concerns about

434

Figure 4. Fishers’ responses to what they think is important feedback. Fishers were allowed to select multiple options to not limit the choices. The scale represents the number of selections.

435

status, and helping them understand the environmental impact (Figure 4).

even middle-business persons all collect catch data. This could be a valuable means of

The fishers were primarily interested in knowing what species are in demand and how

supplementing the GFD’s sampling program. However, the data risks being incomplete

much is being harvested, with only two expressing an interest in environmental impact.

and unreliable due to the complex and, in places, informal value chain. There are clear

There was a desire to have engagement with the GFD but there was also the perception

opportunities to improve and increase catch reporting and we ask; why is this not

of limited support for topics of interest such as the impact of the oil and gas sector:

happening more and how might it improve? Using CBSM theory and method30 helped to identify barriers to reporting and

“All fishers would provide adequate data once you are sure that you can get something out

motivators required for behaviour change across the complex value chain of the fishery,

of it. The fishers have lost total trust in the GFD because they are the ones that should

from fishers, cooperatives, middle-business persons, processors and the GFD. Trust was

protect us and they are doing nothing at the moment nor representing our interest.

identified as one of the main barriers to catch reporting. Fishers thought that the GFD

That is the reason why we started the Guyana National Fisherfolk Organization to help

failed to respect the confidentiality of their data and did not have their best interests

fishermen.”

at heart. This study also suggests that poor communication, and particularly limited sharing of results, leads to a lack of trust between the GFD and fishers. Failure to

The fishers were of the opinion that having a fully documented, transparent and

reciprocally share information has been suggested as a reason for a breakdown in trust

sustainable fishery can open the door to new market possibilities and better prices.

between fishers and the management authorities of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine

Those from the individual interviews were of the opinion that if the fishery was to

Park,31 and it may be a common problem in fisheries management.32 It is interesting

ever become certified, they would benefit from better prices for their catch. The focus

to contrast the GFD’s practices with the approach of one of the cooperatives, which

group in contrast did not believe that they would benefit, rather that the exporters

does give its fishers regular feedback. By providing market information (e.g. daily prices)

and processors would reap the rewards. Overall, there was consensus that data sharing

that is directly useful to the fishers, trust and legitimacy is strengthened. The fishers

between cooperatives, processors and authorities can be improved, and that key

were clearly interested in receiving feedback on market demand for species, stock status

barriers to reporting were a lack of trust between fishers and authorities and a lack of

and, to a lesser extent, environmental impact. The GFD might consider increasing

communication about how the data is used.

their efforts to provide information - for example, through newsletters, information pamphlets and workshops. Some GFD officers did not think the fishers were providing accurate data on the

Discussion

catch and other aspects of their trip. The GFD needs to trust that fishers will provide reliable data, and that if they do, they will be rewarded with a reciprocal exchange

This study shows that the GFD’s detailed data collection of catch at landing sites is

of information that is useful to them. Fishers indicated they are open to sharing

limited (representing less than 1 percent of total annual production volume) and could

information and that they see the visits by the GFD as an opportunity. The more

be improved if better and more trusting relationships are established between the GFD

knowledge that can be shared with fishers, the more they improve their understanding33

and the fishers. In addition, the study reveals that the cooperatives, processors and

and the more trusting they become. The cooperatives are crucial in this respect and can

436

437

help establish a more trusting relationship between government and fishers. Beyond their data-providing role, the cooperatives could be given a greater say in developing management plans, leading to more community participation and co-management, as is seen in other SSFs.34 Fishers’ beliefs influence their approach to compliance.35 For example, some fishers expressed concerns that sharing their data would give away their fishing grounds, while others believed it would result in taxes being increased. These fishers need to be provided with reassurances that there is no basis for this assumption. There was uniformity among fishers that oil and gas exploration had been the cause of the fish stocks dropping. It is important to recognize the fishers’ need for education and awareness about such issues, especially with respect to the need for scientific evidence - an important part of which comes from catch reporting. Fishers and middle-business persons are motivated primarily by current income and must sell fast to retain quality. Competition between middle-business persons could be a barrier to the exchange of information, given that the self-interest of each group is financially driven.36 To overcome this there may be a need to provide market incentives to reward reporting. This could be part of a fisheries improvement program that may in turn act as a precursor for certification, leading eventually to new markets and price premiums. Sánchez et al37 found that certification by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) of an artisanal octopus fishery, and the increased bargaining power that it created, resulted in a price premium of between 15.2% - 24.6%. However, it must be recognized that MSC certification is a lengthy and costly business, and overall ⒸFrancisco Blaha

has low SSF representation.38 Interestingly, even though the fishers in the focus group recognized that sustainable practices could result in financial gains, they did not believe they themselves would receive any benefits from certification. The sample size of the various target groups used in this study is recognized as small and we cannot generalize to the whole of Guyana’s SSF sector or other countries. Nevertheless, some insights are novel and worthy of further discussion. The cooperatives indicated that the majority of the catch passes through the middle-business persons.

439

The role of middle-business persons is often overlooked in small scale fisheries

Individual Interviews (n = 4)

management.39 The presence of middle business persons (who generally do not declare their trade in detail to the authorities) in the value chain complicates data flow, may introduce errors, and creates an informal value chain with few checks and balances with respect to unsustainable practices, non-reporting or even illegal fishing. In this study and elsewhere,40 middle-persons can account for the majority of the first sales. It proved

Average years of experience.

17.5

28.5

Catch supplied to

Middle-person, market

Middle-person

Average license period of the current boat.

6 – 10 years

11 – 15 years

Education level.

Secondary (4)

Primary (4), Secondary (1)

Responsible for recording catch

Captain (4)

difficult to connect with and gain insight into the role of the middle-business persons in Guyana. This may be because, as Pedroza41 describes for the middle-business persons in the port of Progreso in Mexico, they prefer to remain underground and informal to maximize profits. In Guyana, quick cash transactions are available to the boat with the best price and not those that are necessarily carrying out responsible fishing practices.42

Focus Group (n = 5)

Table 2 Summary of information for the fishers interviewed individually and as a focus group.

In Zanzibar, Tanzania, middle-business persons are linked to the fishers through loan and debt repayment that can cause fishers to fish harder, undermining sustainable

Target Group

Fishers

Participant

Captain or Crew

Guyana Fisheries Fisheries Officer Dept. Cooperatives

Chairperson

Value Chain Trader

“Middlebusiness person”

Processor and/or Exporter

Managers

Interviewed Sample

Description of actor

Gillnet Fishers from the SSF community. All were men. Four were interviewed individually. Five were part of a focus group facilitated by a community leader and the interviewer.

MT total catch reported

2002

383

579

2003

383

664

2004

102

118

2005

(interviews)

N species reports

Fisheries Officers in the GFD. Those interviewed were directly responsible for conducting data collection with small-scale fishers. Three were men, two were women.

2009

140

289

2010

534

Chairpersons of two fisheries cooperatives (#66, Three Door). One was a man, the other was a woman.

2011

278

447

2012

282

492

Value chain traders who buy from fishers and cooperatives and sell to processors and markets. The interviewee was a woman.

2013

203

341

2014

165

455

851

Small or medium-scale processors who buy from middle business persons and cooperatives and sell to national or international markets. Two were men, one was a woman.

2015

117

349

576

Total

669

2690

4919

Table 1: Details of interviewees and focus group.

440

N trip reports

Year

Table 3 Official quayside catch reports collected by the GFD from the SSF fleet 2002 – 2015. Source: Guyana Fisheries Department.

441

fishing practices. These informal aspects of the supply chain could also be problematic

(Co‑operative Republic of Guyana) for providing data and supporting and facilitating

for aspirations to seek certification, and we suggest that this is an area in need of further

the study. The Government of the Netherlands provided a scholarship to RTB to

research.

undertake his Masters at WMU. FCN thanks the Nippon Foundation for supporting his Chair at WMU. We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Dr Meinhard Doelle who provided valuable input to discussions and comments on the paper.

Conclusion and Recommendations This study shows the need to understand the perspective of all actors in the complex data and value chain43 of an SSF. It also highlights the importance of fisher participation when seeking to implement catch reporting. Similar to the findings of Battista et al,44 the interviews suggested there are barriers relating to trust, belief and communication that stand in the way of improved catch reporting. Having identified these barriers, government-supported interactions with fishers, such as dedicated information-sharing events, should be considered. In particular the role of the cooperatives should be encouraged, as they have direct daily access to the fishers, are trusted by the fishers, and can assist in offsetting costs by disseminating information directly to the fishers about the benefits of reporting and sustainable fishing.45 This study also shows that there are opportunities to make use of catch data acquired by processors, cooperatives and middle-business persons, but further research is needed to evaluate how this information can be useful from a scientific perspective as well as providing insight solely for buying and selling. In conclusion, while value chain complexity and the informal business surrounding the SSF sector makes sustainable management very challenging, as a priority the GFD should increase efforts to communicate and build trust with the fishers. Working through the cooperatives is likely to be the best way to achieve this. The GFD and the cooperatives should work together to harmonize their catch reporting to provide better data and science to underpin sustainable co-management of the SSF sector in Guyana. Acknowledgements: RTB thanks the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries Department

442

443

444

The unregulated nature of global squid fisheries.” Science Advances 9(10). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.

NOTE

add8125. 13

Ibid.

FAO (2001) note 3.

Theilen (2013) note 10.

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IMO. 2019. “Torremolinos Declaration on the Cape Town Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation of the

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Joanna Toole. 2017. “FAO Effort on Combatting Abandoned, Lost or Otherwise Discarded Fishing Gear (ALDFG),” (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Rome). Available at https://wedocs.unep.org/

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Belhabib and Le Billon (2020) note 29.

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Hochberg, David Kroodsma, Tracey Mangin, Kyle C Meng, and Oliver Zahn. 2021. “Satellites Can

Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) 2167 UNTS 3. 3

Norway. 2008. “The Act of 6 June 2008 no. 5 relating to the management of wild living marine resources (the

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Wild living marine resources are defined to include fish, marine mammals, and other marine organisms.

There are 5 sales organizations in Norway, privately owned by the fishermen. The sales organizations handle

Transshipment Practices in Fisheries.” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 24(1): 3. Available at: https:// digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/oclj/vol24/iss1/3.

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Reveal Global Extent of Forced Labor in the World’s Fishing Fleet.” PNAS 118(3): e2016238117. https:// doi.org/10.1073/pnas.20162381; Chelsey F Marto. 2019. “Human Rights Violations Consequent to

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all first-hand sales of fish in Norway, and they also run the electronic system for sales notes. The sales notes

Implementation of the IMO Cape Town Agreement: Spanish Perspective

represent both the sales contract between the fisherman and the buyer of fish and are the official documents from which quotas are deducted. All payments go through the sales organizations, providing the fishermen a 1

Protocol relating to the 1977 International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels.” London. 2

Norway. 1977. “Regulation of 13 May 1977 No. 2 on foreigners fishing or hunting etc.” Available at https:// lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/1977-05-13-2.

Norway. 1993. “Regulation of 6 August 1993 No. 802 on prohibition on landing of fish and other measures to combat IUU fishing.” Available at https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/forskrift/1993-08-06-802.

These indicators can be found in the following report: PYMAR. 2021. “Informe de Actividad 2021: Sector de la Construcción Naval. Available at https://pymar.com/Informe-de-actividad-2021/ at 60-61, 105-113 and

454

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guarantee that they will be paid.

IMO. 2012. Cape Town Agreement on the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1993 Torremolinos

Norway. 2010. “Regulation of 31 August 2010 No. 1231 on electronic reporting by foreign fishing

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vessels operating in the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone, territorial waters, fisheries zone around

Jan Mayen and fisheries protection zone around Svalbard.” Available at https://lovdata.no/dokument/SF/ forskrift/2010-08-31-1231. 10

Personnel (1995) UNTS 56216. 6

FAO. 2009. “Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Rome.

NEAFC. 2023. “NEAFC Scheme of Control and Enforcement.” Retrieved on 17 April 2023. Available at https://www.neafc.org/scheme/contents at Chapter V: Port State Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels.

International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel

FAO. 2023. “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing.” Available at https://www.fao.org/iuu-

NEAFC. n.d. “Designated Ports and Contacts.” Available at https://psc.neafc.org/designated-contacts.

fishing/en/.

NEAFC (2023) note 10 art 21.

South African Maritime Safety Authority Act 5 of 1998.

Ibid art 22.

Merchant Shipping (National Small Vessel Safety) Regulations 2007, as amended. Government Gazette 30151

Ibid art 23.

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No. 108 of 1996.

See https://psc.neafc.org/welcome.

IMO. 2022. “Ratification of the Cape Town Agreement of 2012 – Communication from the Secretary-

NEAFC (2023) note 10 arts 24-25.

General.” Available at https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/

Ibid Annex XVI: Form PSC 3.

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Of%20The%20Cape%20Town%20Agreement%20Of%202012%20-%20CommunicationFrom%20

(No. R705). Available at https://cdn.revolutionise.com.au/cups/sas/files/g4kgwhnkorvs0slp.pdf.

The%20Secretary-General%20(Secretary-General).pdf. 12

training-and-certification-23-apr-2021-0000.

Republic of Korea 13 1 2

Department of Transport. 2022. “Notice of Intention to Introduce the Merchant Shipping Bill into

FAO. 2001. “International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and

Parliament in terms of Rule 241(1)(b) of the National Assembly.” Government Gazette 47409 (Notice 1373).

Unregulated Fishing.” Rome.

Available at https://www.greengazette.co.za/notices/transport-department-of-departement-van-vervoer-

FAO. 2009. “Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and

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Unregulated Fishing.” Rome. 3

Merchant Shipping (Training, Certification and Safe Manning) Regulations, 2021. Government Gazette 44469 (Notice 219). Available at https://www.gov.za/documents/merchant-shipping-act-regulations-safe-manning-

FAO Port State Measures Agreement_Implementation of Port State Inspection(PSI) in

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FAO. 2023. “Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA).” Available at https://www.fao.org/port-state-

See FAO. 2023. “Global Record of Fishing Vessels, Refrigerated Transport Vessels and Supply Vessels.”

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on Cooperation in Preventing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of Living Marine Resources. 2009. Available at https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-104100E.pdf.

Available at https://www.fao.org/global-record/information-system/en/. 06

Progressing the Implementation of International Instruments to Combat IUU Fishing: The

Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951, as amended.

SAMSA. 2022. “Battle against forced labour in fishing entering a sharp-edge phase in South Africa: SAMSA.” Available at https://blog.samsa.org.za/2022/09/26/battle-against-forced-labour-in-fishing-entering-a-sharp-

South African Regime

edged-phase-in-south-africa-samsa/. 1

Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment. n.d. “Operation Phakisa – Oceans Economy.”

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ILO. 2019. “Inaugural Plenary Meeting of the SEA Forum for Fishers.” Available at https://www.ilo.org/ jakarta/whatwedo/eventsandmeetings/WCMS_718351/lang--ja/index.htm.

Available at https://www.dffe.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/operationphakisa/oceanseconomy. 19

Ibid.

Available at https://www.transport.gov.za/documents/11623/44313/MaritimeTransportPolicyMay2017FI NAL.pdf/4fc1b8b8-37d3-4ad0-8862-313a6637104c#:~:text=The%20CMTP%20recognises%20the%20 need,maritime%20industry%20in%20the%20country. 3

ILO. 2007. “Convention (No. 188) Concerning Work in the Fishing Sector.” Geneva.

IMO. 2012. “Cape Town Agreement on the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1993 Torremolinos Protocol relating to the 1977 International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels.” London.

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07 1

The Implementation of the PSMA in the Philippines

Philippines. 2014. “The Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 as Amended by Republic Act No. 10654.” Republic Act No. 10654 (PSMA).

457

Food and Agriculture Organization. 2009. “Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Rome.

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3154-4.

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Edwina D Garchitorena, and Caterina Maria Po. (2022). “As food security issues weigh on the Philippines:

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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS).

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FAO. 2001. “International Plan of Action against IUU fishing (IPOA-IUU),” (Committee on Fisheries (COFI) of

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Chloe Gouache. 2021. “Proposed Guidelines on Pre-Arrival Risk Assessments of Foreign Vessels: Using

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Lens: Low-hanging Fruit in the Fight Against IUU Fishing.” KIMS Periscope 293.

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on-preserving-maritime-zones-in-the-face-of-climate-change-related-sea-level-rise, Annex 1. 25 26

H Schofield, and Leonardo Bernard. 2020. “Disputes Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 M,” in Tomas Heidar (Ed) New Knowledge and Changing Circumstances in the Law of the Sea . Ibid at 163.

Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958) 499 UNTS 311, art 6. Arbitration between Eritrea and Yemen, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of Dispute) of 9 October 1998 and Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) , Award of 17 December 1999. Both awards available at http://www.pcacpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160, para 116. JR Victor Prescott, and Clive H Schofield. 2005. “The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World: Second Edition.” Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden/Boston, at 221-222. Prescott and Schofield (ibid) at 238-239; Léonard H Legault, and Blair Hankey. 1993. “Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Proportionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation,” in Jonathan I Charney and Lewis M Alexander (Eds) International Maritime Boundaries. Vols. I and II. Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht. 203-242, at 233 and 214. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine). Judgment of 3 February 2009, [2009] ICJ Rep 61 [the Black Sea case]. Ibid para 116 [emphasis added]. Ibid para 120. At this point the Court cited its earlier Judgment in the Cameroon/Nigeria Case in support of its ruling. See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea intervening). 2002. ICJ Reports 303, para 288. Ibid para 122, and 210-216. See, for example, Malcolm D Evans. 2015. “Maritime Boundary Delimitation,” in D Rothwell, A Oude Elferink, K Scott, T Stephens (Eds) Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press: Oxford) at 254 and 259-261. See UN DOALOS website at www.un.org. Cristele Pratt and Hugh Govan. 2010. “Our Sea of Islands, Our Livelihoods, Our Oceania. Framework for A Pacific Oceanscape: A catalyst for implementation of ocean policy,” (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat). Available at http://www.forumsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Framework-for-a-Pacific-Oceanscape-2010.pdf. See, for example, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 2018. “Boe Declaration on Regional Security.” Available at https://www.forumsec.org/boe-declaration-on-regional-security/. See also Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. 2018. “Communiqué of the Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum, Yaren, Nauru, 3–6 September, 2018.” Doc. PIFS(18)10. Available at https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2018/09/05/1FINAL_49PIFLM_Communique_for_ unofficial_release_rev.pdf.

14 15

16 17 18

19 20

21 22

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Brill: Leiden/Boston. 157-182, at 162. 11

Robyn Frost, Paul Hibbard, Masio Nidung, Emily Artack, and Marie Bourrel. 2018. “Redrawing the map of the Pacific.” Marine Policy 95. 302–310. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.06.003.

information. It should be noted that four submissions of preliminary information to the CLCS give no indication as to the area beyond 200 M that they relate to and so are not included in this estimate. See Clive

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28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38

See Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and in Accordance with Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the Matter of an Arbitration Between Guyana and Suriname . Award of 17 September 2007 (Guyana–Suriname Award). Available at the website of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at www.pca-cpa.org. Ibid paras 137-156. Ibid para 461 (footnotes omitted). Ibid paras 475-476. Ibid para 477. Ibid para 465. Ibid para 470. Ibid paras 479-481. Ibid paras 483-484. See, for example, Clive H Schofield. 2009. “Blurring the Lines: Maritime Joint Development and the Cooperative Management of Ocean Resources.” Issues in Legal Scholarship: Frontier Issues in Ocean Law: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundaries, and the Law of the Sea Article 3. Ibid. Agreement between the Government of Argentina and the Government of Uruguay Relating to the Delimitation of the River Plate and the Maritime Boundary Between Argentina and Uruguay . 1973. Available at www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/URY-ARG1973MB. PDF. Agreement on the Delimitation of the Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Colombia . 1978. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/COL.htm. Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the area between the two countries, including the area known as Torres Strait, and related matters . 1978. Available at www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ TREATIES/AUS-PNG1978TS.PDF. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark together with the Home Government of the Faroe Islands on the one hand and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the other hand relating to the Maritime Delimitation in the area between the Faroe Islands and the United Kingdom . 1999. Available at www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/ TREATIES/DNK-GBR1999MD.PDF. Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the

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Circular . Rome. Available at http://www.globalbioenergy.org/uploads/media/Value_of_African_Fisheries.pdf. Ifesinachi Marybenedette Okafor-Yarwood, Sayra Van Den Berg, Yolanda Ariadne Collins, and Clement Sefa-Nyarko. 2022. ““Ocean Optimism” and Resilience: Learning From Women’s Responses to Disruptions Caused by COVID-19 to Small-Scale Fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea.” Frontiers in Marine Science 9: 862780. 1–16. https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2022.862780; Mari-Lise Du Preez. 2018. “Gender and SmallScale Fisheries in Africa,” (SAIIA Policy Briefing, South African Institute of International Affairs: Johannesburg). Available at https://www.africaportal.org/publications/gender-and-small-scale-fisheries-africa/. Ben Freitas. 2021. “Beneficial Ownership in the Fishing Sector and Links to Corruption,” (World Wildlife

ANRC. 2022. “The Future of Marine Fisheries in the African Blue Economy,” (African Development Bank: Abidjan). Available at https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/future-marine-fisheries-african-blue-economy.

FAO. 2001. “International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Rome.

FAO. 2009. “Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Rome.

Since most vessels from DWFNs operate on the continent with the support of their governments, which provide subsidies to them, this chapter argues that the plunder of Africa’s fisheries is sponsored and overseen by the government of DWFNs who provide subsidies to these vessels.

Dana D Miller, and U Rashid Sumaila. 2014. “Flag Use Behavior and IUU Activity within the International

463

Fishing Fleet: Refining Definitions and Identifying Areas of Concern.” Marine Policy 44. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.08.027. 15

www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-africa-stateless/2018/10/7cf01664-7cf01664-hopeinwestafricashiptour_ finalbriefing.pdf.

Copeland and Ralby (2022) note 5. The European Commission recently red-carded Cameroon for failing to address IUU fishing in its waters; a yellow card, which serves as a warning to countries not doing enough

Ceesay, Assane Guèye, Diène Ndiaye, Ely Beibou, Allan Padilla, and Dyhia Belhabib. 2017. “Assessing the

be imported into the EU. Similarly, Sierra Leone and Liberia were issued yellow cards in 2016 and 2017,

Effectiveness of Monitoring Control and Surveillance of Illegal Fishing: The Case of West Africa.” Frontiers in Marine Science 4 (March). https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2017.00050. FCWC. 2020. “The FCWC Regional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Centre,” (The Fisheries Committee for the West Central Gulf of Guinea: Tema, Ghana). Available at https://fcwc-fish.org/what-we-do/fight-illegalfishing/regional-vessel-monitoring-centre; FCWC. 2022. “Nigeria Approves Ratification of Port State Measures Agreement,” (FCWC: News). https://fcwc-fish.org/our-news/nigeria-approves-ratification-of-portstate-measures-agreement; FCWC, Stop Illegal Fishing, Trygg Mat Tracking, and NFDS. 2015. “West Africa Task Force: Cooperation. Collaboration. Communication.” Available at https://stopillegalfishing.com/ publications/west-africa-task-force-cooperation-collaboration-communication/. Available at https://www.gogin.eu/en/yaris-platform/. Available at https://seavision.volpe.dot.gov/login. Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network. 2022. “Guinea Fights Illegal Fishing Thanks to YARIS.” Available at https://www.gogin.eu/en/project-news/information-sharing/guinea-fights-illegal-fishing-thanks-to-yaris/. CRESMAO. 2022. “CRESMAO Monthly Bulletin: November,” (Centre Régional de Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique de l’Oues: Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire). Ibid. IUU Risk Intelligence. 2016. “The Fu Yuan Yu Fleet - Illegal Chinese Driftnet Activities on the High Seas.” Available at https://iuuriskintelligence.com/fu-yuan-yu-fleet-illegal-chinese-driftnet-activities-high-seas/. Lucas de Oliveira Paes. 2022. “The Challenges of IUU Fishing in West Africa and the Potential Technology Solutions: An Analysis of International Cooperation Projects in Ghana and Guinea-Bissau,” (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) . Available at https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/thechallenge-of-iuu-fishing-in-west-africa-and-the-potentialtechnology-solutions-an-analysis-of-internationalcooperationprojects-in-ghana-and-gu. Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, Nelly I Kadagi, Dyhia Belhabib, and Edward H Allison. 2022. “Survival of the Richest, Not the Fittest: How Attempts to Improve Governance Impact African Small-Scale Marine Fisheries.” Marine Policy 135: 104847. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104847.

Identifies Cameroon as a Non-Cooperating Country.” Available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/

en/ip_22_7890; EU IUU Fishing Coalition. 2022. “Analysis of the EU Fishing Fleet’s Implementation of the SMEFF Regulation: Reflagging Behaviours.” Available at http://www.iuuwatch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EU-IUUCoalition-Reflagging-Study-EN.pdf).

17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34

464

Alkaly Doumbouya, Ousmane T Camara, Jesophus Manie, Jeremias F Intchama, Abdoulie Jarra, Salifu

to combat IUU fishing, was issued in 2021. The red card implies that fish products from Cameroon cannot respectively, which are still in place (European Commission. 2023. “Fight Against Illegal Fishing: Commission

GreenPeace. 2017. “Hope in West Africa Ship Tour, 2017 Summary of Findings.” Available at https://

Don Liddick. 2014. “The Dimensions of a Transnational Crime Problem: The Case of IUU Fishing.” Trends

in Organized Crime 17(4). 290–312. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-014-9228-6. Ibid. Copeland and Ralby (2022) note 5. ANRC (2022) note 11. Richa Syal, and Grace Ekpu. 2022. “Cameroon Becomes a Go-to Country for Foreign Fishing Vessels,” (Associated Press: Online). Available at https://apnews.com/article/abridged-content-f93d41e26051caa25ff8356 cc94c4618. Ibid. Freitas (2021) note 5. Copeland and Ralby (2022) note 5. Ian Ralby. (2021). “Looking Past Gulf of Guinea Piracy: Chinese Twins “Ghanaian” Fishing and Domain Awareness,” (Center for International Maritime Security). Available at https://cimsec.org/looking-past-gulf-ofguinea-piracy-chinese-twins-ghanaian-fishing-and-domain-awareness/. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Extracted from Ralby 2021 (ibid). International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) 1184 UNTS 2. Doherty et al. (2021) note 10. Welch et al. (2022) note 2. Lacey Malarky, and Beth Lowell. 2018. “Avoiding Detection: Global Case Studies of Possible AIS Avoidance,” (OCEANA: USA). Available at https://usa.oceana.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/ais_onoff_report_final_5. pdf. Ralby (2021) note 25. Godwin Oritse. 2020. “Arrested Chinese Vessel Slammed N3million Fine,” (Vanguard: Online) . Available at https://www.vanguardngr.com/2020/06/arrested-chinese-vessel-slammed-n3millionfine/#:%7E:text=THE%20recently%20arrested%20and%20released%20Chinese%20fishing%20 vessel,Maritime%20Administration%20and%20Safety%20Agency%2C%20NIMASA%2C%20has%20said.

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

10 1

IUU Fishing in the Context of Small-Scale Fisheries: What it Really Means

FAO. 2005. “Overcoming factors of unsustainability and overexploitation in fisheries: selected papers on issues and approaches.” FAO Fisheries Report No. 782: Rome. Available at https://www.fao.org/3/a0312e/ A0312E00.htm.

FAO. 2001. “International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.” Rome at 1.

465

Ibid para 3.1.2.

Ibid para 3.1.1.

Ibid para 3.1.3.

Ibid.

frameworks: A step ahead for implementing the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines.” Marine Policy 129:

P Degnbol, Henrik Gislason, S Hanna, S Jentoft, J Raakjær Nielsen, S Sverdrup-Jensen, and DC Wilson.

104568. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104568.

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Chuenpagdee (Ed) Contemporary Visions for World Small-Scale Fisheries . Eburon. 20

543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2005.07.002. 8 9 10

12 13 14

15 16 17 18

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Jan Kooiman, and Svein Jentoft. 2009. “Meta-governance: Values, Norms and Principles, and the Making of Hard Choices.” Public Administration 87(4). 818-836. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01780.x.

Svein Jentoft, and Ratana Chuenpagdee. 2009. “Fisheries and coastal governance as a wicked problem.”

Marine Policy 33(4). 553-560. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2008.12.002. Joseph Luomba, Ratana Chuenpagdee, Andrew M Song. 2016. “A Bottom-Up Understanding of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Lake Victoria.” Sustainability 8(10): 1062. https://doi.org/10.3390/ su8101062. Ratana Chuenpagdee, Poul Degnbol, Maarten Bavinck, Svein Jentoft, Derek Stephen Johnson, R Pullin, and Stella B Williams. 2005. “Challenges and Concerns in Fisheries and Aquaculture,” in Kooiman, Bavinck, Jentoft, and Pullin (Eds) Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries . Amsterdam University Press: The Netherlands; Derek S Johnson, Tim G Acott, Natasha Stacey, and Julie Urquhart (Eds). 2017. “Social Wellbeing and the Values of Small-Scale Fisheries.” Springer: Switzerland; Katia Frangoudes, and Siri Gerrard. 2018. “Gender Perspective in Fisheries: Examples from the South and the North,” in Chuenpagdee and Jentoft (Eds). Transdisciplinarity for Small-Scale Fisheries Governance: Analysis and Practice . MARE Publication Series 21, Springer: Switzerland; Philippa J Cohen, Edward H Allison, Neil A Andrew, Joshua Cinner, Louisa S Evans, Michael Fabinyi, Len R Garces, Stephen J Hall, Christina C Hicks, Terry P Hughes, Svein Jentoft, David J Mills, Rosalie Masu, Emmanuel K Mbaru, and Blake D Ratner. 2019. “Securing a Just Space for Small-Scale Fisheries in the Blue Economy.” Frontiers in Marine Science 6(171). https://doi. org/10.3389/fmars.2019.00171 FAO. 2015. “Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication.” Rome. Ibid at 14. Andrew M Song, Joeri Scholtens, Kate Barclay, Simon R Bush, Michael Fabinyi, Dedi S Adhuri, and Milton Haughton. 2020. “Collateral damage? Small-scale fisheries in the global fight against IUU fishing.” Fish and Fisheries 21(4). 831-843. https://doi.org/10.1111/faf.12462. FAO. 2022. “International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture 2022.” Available at https://www.fao. org/artisanal-fisheries-aquaculture-2022/home/en/. Paul O Onyango. 2011. “Occupation of Last Resort? Small-Scale Fishing in Lake Victoria, Tanzania,” in Jentoft and Eide (Eds) Poverty Mosaics: Realities and Prospects in Small-Scale Fisheries . Springer: Dordrecht. Jan Kooiman, Svein Jentoft, Maarten Bavinck, Roger Pullin. 2005. “Fish for Life. Interactive Governance for Fisheries.” Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam. Ratana Chuenpagdee, and Svein Jentoft. 2018. “Transforming the governance of small-scale fisheries.” Maritime Studies 17. 101-115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40152-018-0087-7.

Julia Nakamura, Ratana Chuenpagdee, and Mostafa El Halimi. 2021. “Unpacking legal and policy

Swilling, and Christopher J Thomas. 2012. “Transdisciplinary research in sustainability science: practice,

Horst WJ Rittel, and Melvin M Webber. 1973. “Dilemmas in a general theory of planning.” Policy Sciences 4. 155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730.

Maarten Bavinck, and Svein Jentoft. 2011. “Subsidiarity as a guiding principle for small-scale fisheries” in

See toobigtoignore.net.

Andrew M Song, and Ratana Chuenpagdee. 2014. “Exploring stakeholders’ images of coastal fisheries: A case study from South Korea.” Ocean and Coastal Management 100. 10–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.ocecoaman.2014.07.002.

Ratana Chuenpagdee, Raquel De La Cruz-Modino, Mariá José Barragán-Paladines, Jenny Anne Glikman, Julia Fraga, Svein Jentoft, and José J Pascual-Fernández. 2019. “Governing from images: Marine protected areas as case illustrations.” Journal for Nature Conservation 53: 125756. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jnc.2019.125756.

Julia N Nakamura. 2022. “Legal Reflections on the Small-Scale Fisheries Guidelines: Building a Global Safety Net for Small-Scale Fisheries.” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 37. 31–72. https://doi. org/10.1163/15718085-bja10081.

Ratana Chuenpagdee, Delphine Rocklin, David Bishop, Matthew Hynes, Randal Greene, Miguel R Lorenzi, and Rodolphe Devillers. 2017. “The global information system on small-scale fisheries (ISSF): A crowdsourced knowledge platform.” Marine Policy 101. 158-166 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.06.018.

See https://issfcloud.toobigtoignore.net/.

Milena Arias Schreiber, Ratana Chuenpagdee, and Svein Jentoft. 2022. “Blue Justice and the co-production of hermeneutical resources for small- scale fisheries.” Marine Policy 137: 104959. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.marpol.2022.104959.

The Complex Nature of Fisheries Subsidies: Their Contribution to IUU Fishing and the Need to Balance Environmental and Social Priorities

WTO. 2022. “Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (WT/MIN(22)/W/22).” Available at https://docs.wto.org/

Pascal Lamy. 2010. “Trade Opening Has Much to Contribute to the Protection of the Environment.”

dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/MIN22/W22.pdf&Open=True (AFS). Retrieved on 13 August 2020. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dgpl_05jun10_ e.htm; Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice. 2013. “Mainstreaming Environment and Development at the World Trade Organization? Fisheries Subsidies, the Politics of Rule-Making, and the Elusive ‘Triple Win’.” Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 45(4). https://doi.org/10.1068/a45138.

467

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994) Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World

See the paper by Francisco Blaha in this volume.

Trade Organization, Annex 1A 1994, 1869 UNTS 14 (ASCM) art 1.

Dyhia Belhabib, U Rashid Sumaila, Vicky WY Lam, Dirk Zeller, Philippe Le Billon, Elimane Abou Kane,

Ibid art 2.

In WTO jurisprudence, a benefit is seen as an advantage to the recipient which can be determined by reference to the relevant market in which the recipient competes – WTO. 2013. “Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector (WT/DS412/AB/R; WT/DS426/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body adopted on 24 May 2013,” paras 5.164-5.169; WTO. 2012. “United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint) (WT/DS353/AB/R) Report of the Appellate Body

adopted on 23 March 2012,” at 635-636.

ASCM (1994) note 3 art 1.1(a)(1)(iv).

U Rashid Sumaila, Naazia Ebrahim, Anna Schuhbauer, Daniel Skerritt, Yang Li, Hong Sik Kim, Tabitha

Grace Mallory, Vicky WL Lam, and Daniel Pauly. 2019. “Updated Estimates and Analysis of Global Fisheries Subsidies.” Marine Policy 109: 103695. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2019.103695 at 1. 8

Ibid at 2.

Extracted from Sumaila et al. (ibid).

See the paper by Eric Holliday in this volume.

Sumaila et al. (2019) note 7 at 2.

Ibid at 2.

Ibid at 7.

Anna Schuhbauer, Daniel J Skerritt, Naazia Ebrahim, Frédéric Le Manach, and U Rashid Sumaila. 2020. “The

Global Fisheries Subsidies Divide Between Small- and Large-Scale Fisheries.” Frontiers in Marine Science 7. 16

https://doi.org/10.3389/fmars.2020.539214.

Subsidies to increase safety of fishers may also be considered capacity-enhancing if they require modernisation

of the vessel. This raises the need for nuanced exemptions in fisheries subsidies agreements, as discussed further

below.

See, for example, Kate Willson, Mar Cabra, and Marcos Garcia Rey. 2011. “Nearly €6 billion in subsidies fuel Spain’s ravenous fleet,” (The Center for Public Integrity). Available at https://publicintegrity.org/environment/

nearly-e6-billion-in-subsidies-fuel-spains-ravenous-fleet/. 18

Edward Allison, and Frank Ellis. 2001. “The Livelihoods Approach and Management of Small-Scale Fisheries.” Marine Policy 25. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(01)00023-9 at 282-283.

468

Willson et al. (2011) note 17; Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, and Dyhia Belhabib. 2020. “The duplicity of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy in third countries: Evidence from the Gulf of Guinea.” Ocean &

Coastal Management 184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.104953 at 6. David Tickler, Jessica J Meeuwig, Maria-Lourdes Palomares, Daniel Pauly, and Dirk Zeller. 2018. “Far from Home: Distance Patterns of Global Fishing Fleets.” Science Advances 4(8). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv. aar3279 at 3; Anna Schuhbauer, Ratana Chuenpagdee, William WL Cheung, Krista Greer, and U Rashid Sumaila. 2017. “How Subsidies Affect the Economic Viability of Small-Scale Fisheries.” Marine Policy 82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.05.013 at 17-18. Tickler et al. (ibid) at 3.

36 37 38

and Daniel Pauly. 2015. “Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa.” PLOS ONE 10(3). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118351; Okafor-Yarwood and Belhabib (2020) note 19; Stephen Mbithi Mwikya. 2006. “Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and Development Issues,” (ICTSD: Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development Series). Available at http://www.ictsd. org/sites/default/files/downloads/2008/04/mbithi_2006.pdf. See, for example, the paper by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood in this volume. Anja von Moltke (Ed). 2011. “Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development and the WTO,” (UNEP). Earthscan: London, Washington DC at 138-139 and Ch 3; Campling and Havice (2013) note 2 at 845-848. UN SDGs. 2015. “Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.” Retrieved on 29 March 2023. Available at https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/. New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2016. “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership text and resources.” Retrieved on 3 April 2023. Available at https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/ free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-fortrans-pacific-partnership-text-and-resources/ (CPTPP). Committee on Fisheries (COFI). 2019. “Recent Trade Agreements and Market Access for Fish and Fishery Products (FT/XVII/2019/10),” (Food and Agriculture Organization). Available at http://www.fao.org/3/nb388en/ nb388en.pdf. Office of the United State Trade Representative. 2019. “Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada.” Retrieved on 13 August 2020. Available at https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between (USMCA). AFS (2022) note 1 art 12. As of 4 April 2023. CPTPP (2017) note 27 art 20.16.5; USMCA (2019) note 29 art 24.20.1. CPTPP (ibid) art 20.16.5(b); USMCA (ibid) art 24.20.1(a). USMCA also refers to IUU listing by the subsidising party. Zoe Scanlon, 2019. “Safeguarding the legitimacy of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing vessel listings.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 68(2). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589319000022 at 380; Trygg Mat Tracking. 2022. “Are RFMO IUU lists useful? A User Evaluation of the Combined IUU Vessel List.” Available at https://www.tm-tracking.org/post/are-rfmo-iuu-lists-useful-a-user-evaluation-of-thecombined-iuu-vessel-list. AFS (2022) note 1 art 3. CPTPP (2017) note 27 art 20.16.5(a); USMCA (2019) note 29 art 24.20.1(b); AFS (2022) note 1 art 4.2. AFS (ibid) art 5.3. Ray Hilborn, Ricardo Oscar Amoroso, Christopher M Anderson, Julia K Baum, Trevor A Branch, Christopher Costello, Carryn L de Moor, Abdelmalek Faraj, Daniel Hively, Olaf P Jensen, Hiroyuki Kurota, L Richard Little, Pamela Mace, Tim McClanahan, Michael C Melnychuk, Cóilín Minto, Giacomo Chato Osio, Ana M Parma, Maite Pons, Susana Segurado, Cody S Szuwalski, Jono R Wilson, and Yimin Ye. 2020. “Effective fisheries management instrumental in improving fish stock status.” PNAS 117(4). https://doi.org/https://

469

doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1909726116 at 2219; Kevern L Cochrane, Neil L Andrew, and Ana M Parma. 2011.

Ibid.

“Primary Fisheries Management: A Minimum Requirement for Provision of Sustainable Human Benefits in

AFS (2022) note 1 arts 3.8 and 4.4.

Small‐Scale Fisheries.” Fish and Fisheries 12(3). https://doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.1467-2979.2010.00392.x at

Ibid art 7.

279.

WTO. 2022. “WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism now operational to assist developing countries

AFS (2022) note 1 art 5.1.

and LDCs.” Retrieved on 4 April 2023. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/

Ibid art 5.2.

fish_08nov22_e.htm.

WTO. 2021. “Negotiating Group on Rules - Fisheries Subsidies Revised Draft Text (TN/RL/W/276/Rev.2),” (8

However, it is impossible to know at this stage what the final AFS will look like, and we can only take the

November 2021) art 5.3. 42

proposed texts as they currently stand.

WTO, “Negotiating Group on Rules - Fisheries Subsidies: Report by the Chair, H.E. Mr Santiago Wills to the Negotiating Group on Rules (TN/RL/35),” (29 September 2022).

Ibid para 17.

WTO (2021) note 41 art 5.

Ibid art 5.1.1.

Ibid art 5.4.

Ibid art 5.4.b(i).

This includes Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, and Thailand – Wu Yingying.

See, for example, submissions from the small and vulnerable economies (SVE) negotiating group - WTO, “Fisheries Subsidies, Communication from Barbados (TN/RL/W/242),” (7 October 2009) at 2; SVE submission (2003) note 51.

U Rashid Sumaila, Ahmed S Khan, Andrew J Dyck, Reg Watson, Gordon Munro, Peter Tydemers, and Daniel Pauly. 2014. “A Bottom-Up Re-Estimation of Global Fisheries Subsidies.” Journal of Bioeconomics 12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-010-9091-8 at 208.

2017. “Negotiation on Fisheries Subsidies within the Framework of the WTO – Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Members.” China Oceans Law Review at 38.

The final agreement is likely to be less comprehensive than the drafts, as compromises will need to be struck.

WTO. 2010. “Fisheries Subsidies: Special and Differential Treatment, Communication from Brazil, China, India and Mexico (TN/RL/GEN/163),” (11 February 2010); Campling and Havice (2013) note 2 at 846-848.

A number of developing countries have argued for a definition in line with the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines

China, for example, has the largest fishing fleet in the world, including the largest distant water fishing fleet.

on Small-Scale Fisheries; namely that small-scale fisheries be defined by each country at national level – see,

Campling and Havice (2013) note 2 at 846-848.

for example, WTO. 2017. “ACP Group Text Proposal, Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines: Submission by Guyana

See, for example, WTO. 2007. “Fisheries Subsidies: Framework for Disciplines, Communication from Japan;

on behalf of the ACP Group (TN/RL/GEN/192),” (14 July 2017) at 2; WTO. 2017. “LDC Group Fisheries

the Republic of Korea; and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (TN/RL/

Subsidies Text Proposal, Submission by Cambodia on Behalf of the LDC Group (TN/RL/GEN/193),” (17 July

GEN/114/Rev.2),” (5 June 2007) at 7; WTO. 2006. “Fisheries Subsidies, Exhaustive List of Non-Prohibited

2017) at 2; WTO. 2017. “Proposal for Disciplines on Fisheries Subsidies, Communication from Argentina,

Fisheries Subsidies: Paper from New Zealand (TN/RL/GEN/141),” (6 June 2006) at 3-4; WTO. 2003. “Fisheries

Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay (TN/RL/GEN/187),” (29 May 2017) at 3.

Subsidies, Communication from Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Fiji Islands, Guyana, the Maldives, Papua New

AFS (2022) note 1 art 11.1.

Guinea, Solomon Islands, St Kitts and Nevis (TN/RL/W/136),” (14 July 2003) at 3.

Peter Vandergeest, Melissa Marschke, and Mallory MacDonnell. 2021. “Seafarers in Fishing: A Year into the

For a full discussion on the problems around defining small-scale fisheries in the WTO fisheries subsidies

COVID-19 Pandemic.” Marine Policy 134. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2021.104796;

negotiations, see Kathleen Auld. 2021. “Sustainable Development of Small-Scale Fisheries and the Need for

FAO. 2020. “Q&A: COVID-19 Pandemic - Impact on Fisheries and Aquaculture.” Retrieved on 13 August

Strong Measures to Protect Small-Scale Fisheries in International Trade Law,” (Doctoral Thesis, University of Cape Town). Available at http://hdl.handle.net/11427/33429 at 144-145 and 150-152.

2020. Available at http://www.fao.org/2019-ncov/q-and-a/impact-on-fisheries-and-aquaculture/en/. 67

WTO (2021) note 41 art 5.4(b)(ii).

Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood. 2019. “Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the complexities of the

sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea.” Marine Policy 99. https://doi.

org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.016; Judy-Ann Neil. 2022. “IUU Fishing and Crimes in the Caribbean,” in

Francis Neat, Raphael Baumler, Kathleen Auld, and Deukhoon Peter Han (Eds) CAPFISH Project: Capacity-

Building Project to Progress the Implementation of International Instruments to Combat IUU Fishing . Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea, World Maritime University, Korea Maritime Institute: Busan, Republic of Korea. Alice Tipping and Tristan Irschlinger. 2020. “25 Reasons Why the WTO Must End Subsidies That Drive Overfishing,” (IISD). Available at https://www.iisd.org/articles/25-reasons-wto-stop-funding-overfishing.

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About the Editors and Contributors

About the Editors

Kathleen Auld Research Associate and CAPFISH Project Officer, World Maritime University Dr. Kathleen Auld is a Research Associate at the World Maritime University and the Project Officer for the CAPFISH project. In this role, she has overseen the running of four successful workshops and the creation of Project books, reports, and other materials that advance the Project’s mission to build capacity to address IUU fishing in developing countries. Before joining WMU, Dr. Auld held Research Assistant positions in the field of environment and trade at the University of Melbourne and University of Cape Town, while completing her LLM and PhD degrees. Kathleen’s LLM research focused on the use of port state measures as a tool to prevent IUU fishing, while her doctorate considered how the needs of small-scale fishers and fishing communities could be better addressed in international trade agreements. Prior to starting her LLM, she completed legal articles in Cape Town and is an admitted Attorney, Notary and Conveyancer of the High Court of South Africa. Dr. Auld’s research focuses primarily on sustainable fisheries and oceans as well as the relationship between trade and fisheries. Her particular research interests include IUU fishing, socio-economic aspects of fishing and ocean governance, and fisheries subsidies. Francis Neat Professor, Sustainable Fisheries Management, Ocean Biodiversity and Marine Spatial Planning, World Maritime University, Nippon Foundation Chair Professor Neat joined WMU in 2019 where he is currently Head of Specialization for Ocean Sustainability, Governance and Management in WMU’s Masters in Maritime Affairs. From Scotland, he has a broad research background in freshwater and marine ecosystems and management. Prior to joining WMU he was a principal researcher at the Scottish Government’s Marine Laboratory and then Head of Strategic Research at the Marine Stewardship Council. His past research focused on deepwater marine ecosystems, the migration of fish and the impacts of fishing on the marine environment. His research has been applied to fisheries management and marine policy development, including the implementation of a network of Marine Protected Areas and the EU policy on deepwater fishing regulations. He has a particular interest in the marine ecosystems, fisheries and management of the High Seas. He has published around 90 peer review papers and undertaken extensive science advisory work for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, IUCN, FAO and the European Commission at the UN. His teaching experience has been mainly at Masters level and includes fish ecology (Aberdeen University) and global fisheries (Imperial College, London). He currently teaches the “Ocean Processes and Human Impacts” course at WMU. He has supervised

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numerous post-graduate students, many to PhD level. His current students’ research is focused on fishing and IUU fishing, marine debris and Sargassum, gender equality in ocean science and the progressing the sustainable development goals. Raphael Baumler Professor, Head of Maritime Safety and Environmental Administration, World Maritime University Raphael Baumler holds a PhD in Risk Management and focuses his academic work on the impact of the vessel’s socioeconomical environment on safety and environment. Primarily educated as a dual officer, he has worked on various types of vessels. Dr. Baumler spent 20 years in a seafaring career. He ended this occupation after six years as Master on a large container ship. His sea life drove him to work as Staff Captain on a cruise ship, and he completed various assignments as dual Junior Officer on board container ships, ferries, VLCC and supply vessels. He participates in or leads IMO national and regional workshops on MARPOL Annex VI and Ballast Water Management Convention. He conducts various IMO projects and participates in several other research projects. Deukhoon Peter Han Director General and Research Fellow, International Cooperation Division, Korea Maritime Institute Dr. Deukhoon Peter Han has been serving as the Director General and Research Fellow for the International Cooperation Division at the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI), Busan, Korea since 2010. In his current role, he handles various aspects of comprehensive international development cooperation, including planning, development, research and implementation of the Korean Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the ocean and fisheries sectors. Since KMI was designated by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries as a specialized agency for the Ministry’s ODA program in 2020, Dr, Han is particularly interested in expanding and enhancing this program. His primary research areas encompass the legal analysis of maritime and fisheries regulations, IUU fishing, international trade, labor and human rights issues, as well as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and ODA in the ocean and fisheries field. For many years, Dr. Han has been a frequent legal advisor to the delegation of the Republic of Korea in FAO and UN informal consultation meetings on sustainable fisheries. Prior to joining KMI, he practiced international commerce and trade law, business law and handled various legal matters for years as a licensed attorney in New York and Washington, D.C. He obtained his Bachelor of Law and Master of Law degrees from the Korea University College of Law. He also holds a Juris Doctor degree from the University of Kansas and a Master of Law degree from Indiana University-Bloomington in the United States Contributors and Collaborators

Laura Osborne, The University of Wollongong Quentin Hanich, The University of Wollongong Dyhia Belhabib, Nautical Crime Investigation Services Victor Jimenez Fernandez, Alternate Permanent Representative of Spain to the IMO Thord Monsen, Head of Strategic Fisheries Compliance Section Minjae Park, Quality Management Service (NFQS) Selwyn Bailey, SAMSA Marilyn Jaal, Philippine Coast Guard and World Maritime University Clive Schofield, World Maritime University Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood, University of St Andrew

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Ratana Chuenpagdee, TBTI Global Foundation Eric Holliday, FISH Safety Foundation Rossen Karavatchev, International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) Francisco Blaha, Independent Expert Joeli Veitayaki, Independent Expert Ari Gudmundsson, Independent expert Ambrose Yankey, Ghana Navy and World Maritime University Misornu Yaw Logo, Ghana Fisheries Commission and World Maritime University Jesús A. Menacho Piérola, Captain, Maritime Authority of Peru Ilsoo Youn, Korea Coast Guard Decha Chotepaitses, Marine Department of Thailand. Médina Thiam, National Agency of Maritime Affairs, Senegal Randy T. Bumburry, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Guyana Deukhoon Peter Han, Korea Maritime Institute Junghee Cho, Korea Maritime Institute Francis Neat, World Maritime University Raphael Baumler, World Maritime University Kathleen Auld, World Maritime University Wonhee Kim, Interpreter/Translator Haeeun Jeon, Korea Maritime Institute Jiin Lee, Korea Maritime Institute Minjung Lee, Korea Maritime Institute Organising Committee

World Maritime University Francis Neat Raphael Baumler Kathleen Auld Sonia Santangelo Korea Maritime Institute Junghee Cho Deukhoon Peter Han Haeeun Jeon Jiin Lee Minjung Lee This CAPFISH project is primarily sponsored by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea.

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