Africa's Pulse, No. 25, April 2022

Page 44

the poverty line. Taken together, Russia and 5 Ukraine represent less than 4 2 percent of world trade, which suggests that the 3 direct impact through trade 2 linkages is expected to be limited. Nevertheless, the 1 indirect impact is expected 0 to be substantial, but it -1 will affect the subregions in Sub-Saharan Africa -2 differently. The Russia-3 Ukraine conflict poses 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021e additional challenges to the Government consumption Private consumption Real GDP growth recovery of net commodity Gross fixed investment Net exports importing countries but Source: World Bank staff projections. Note: Change in inventories and statistical discrepancy are not displayed. e=estimate; offers opportunities for GDP = gross domestic product. net exporters. Resourcerich countries could benefit from rising commodity prices to replenish reserves that were exhausted during the 2020 recession. However, negative terms of trade will pose a threat to net importers of oil and food commodities, due to the further rise in inflation. FIGURE 1.25: Contribution to GDP Growth, Demand Side (% points)

Percent

On the expenditure side, the recovery was supported by private consumption and weak investment growth; it was held back by the performance of net exports.

As a result of negative supply shocks that predated the Russia-Ukraine war, stagflation is posing challenges to monetary policy making. Central banks are facing a trade-off between accommodating the weak economy with the risk of exacerbating inflationary prospects and fighting inflation at the high cost of triggering a recession. Many central banks in the region have chosen the second policy option so far and embarked on a tightening cycle, but others have maintained a more dovish stance. The number of the central banks hiking policy rates is on the rise as a reaction to monetary policy normalization in advanced economies, specifically in the United States. Attempting to curb inflation arising from supply shocks with monetary policy might be ineffective, especially in the case of most African countries, which are characterized by underdeveloped financial sectors and important informal sectors. Inflation will more likely remain elevated while output will contract. Elevated inflation adds uncertainty above the lingering effects of the COVID-19 crisis, which the region is struggling to mitigate, exacerbating inequality between rich and poor countries. In addition, rising insecurity and conflicts in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and northeastern Nigeria) could hamper the strong recovery seen in most West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, while creating instability in the entire subregion. The scarring effects induced by the COVID-19 pandemic combined with climate-related issues present long-term risks to the outlook for Sub-Saharan African economies, constraining the region from reaching the twin goals of ending poverty and achieving shared prosperity. Yet, the region can seize this opportunity of rising commodity prices to strengthen resilience to 36

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A F R I C A’ S P U L S E


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2.11 Disaster Risk Financing Framework for Adaptive Social Safety Nets

4min
pages 118-119

2.7 Layering Risk Financing Instruments for Adaptive Social Protection: The Case of Kenya

4min
pages 120-122

2.5 Novissi’s Leapfrogging Delivery Model for Shock-Responsive Social Assistance

7min
pages 109-111

2.6 Growing Domestic Safety Net Commitments: The Case of Senegal

2min
page 116

2.10 Share of Connected and Nonconnected Individuals, by Urban and Rural Location

10min
pages 112-115

2.7 Three Emerging Directions for Strengthening Social Protection in Africa

4min
pages 104-105

across the Income Spectrum

2min
page 106

2.9 Social Protection Delivery Chain

3min
pages 107-108

2.6 Three Emerging Insights from the Social Protection Pandemic Response in Africa

1min
page 101

2.3 COVID-19 Fiscal Policy Responses in Support of Workers and Firms in Africa

5min
pages 99-100

2.2 Sierra Leone’s Emergency Cash Transfers in Response to COVID-19

3min
page 98

The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

3min
pages 102-103

Evidence on Impacts of Productive Inclusion Programs in the Sahel

2min
page 93

to Promote Inclusion, Opportunity, and Resilience

2min
page 92

A.4 Public Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Resource Abundance

10min
pages 83-87

2.2 New Poor at the US$1.90-a-Day Poverty Line in 2020

1min
page 91

A.2 Output Deviation from Pre-Pandemic Trend

4min
pages 80-81

1.35 Eurobond Issuances as of December 2022

1min
page 57

1.40 Food Price Index in Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa

8min
pages 60-62

1.44 GDP Growth Forecasts for West and Central Africa

31min
pages 66-78

A.1 Natural Resource Revenues Share of GDP, 2004-14

2min
page 79

1.32 Fiscal Balance in Sub-Saharan Africa

5min
pages 53-54

1.31 Evolution of the Current Account

2min
page 52

1.10 Population with at Least One Dose of the COVID-19 Vaccine

8min
pages 27-29

1.18 Food Share in Households’ Budget across Sub-Saharan African Countries

2min
page 38

1.1 Global Shares of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Food Staples, 2020/21

5min
pages 30-31

1.27 GDP Growth in Nigeria, by Sector

1min
page 46

1.25 Contribution to GDP Growth, Demand Side

2min
page 44

1.26 Output Deviation from Pre-Pandemic Trend

2min
page 45

1.1 The Resurgence of Inflation in Advanced Economies

3min
page 20

1.7 Purchasing Managers’ Composite Index in Sub-Saharan Africa

2min
page 25
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Africa's Pulse, No. 25, April 2022 by World Bank Publications - Issuu