Improving Effective Coverage in Health

Page 188

IMPROVING EFFECTIVE COVERAGE IN HEALTH

Box 6.2 In Focus: Demand-side interventions and incentives for increasing preventive screening for noncommunicable diseases in Armenia More people around the world are dying from noncommunicable diseases than ever before. These diseases, which include cancer, chronic respiratory diseases, diabetes, and heart disease, prematurely kill more than 15 million people between ages 30 and 69 each year. The largest disease burden of noncommunicable diseases is in low- and middleincome countries, where 85 percent of related deaths now occur (WHO 2020), putting an extra strain on governments’ health budgets—and families—due to medical expenditures, productivity losses, disability, and deaths. Although early screenings can lead to life-saving treatment, screening rates tend to be low, and discovery of these diseases thus often occurs too late for effective and efficient treatment. Many countries, such as Armenia, have made efforts in recent years to tackle noncommunicable diseases by launching mass media campaigns and equipping medical providers to detect and treat these diseases. Despite these efforts, most people are still not getting tested. Policy makers are therefore looking for cost-effective approaches to motivate people to go to the doctor and get screened, and they are teaming up with behavioral scientists to answer key questions such as the following: Are people more compelled to get tested if they know how many of their peers have done so? Do they respond to a personal invitation? What about a small financial incentive? In an individually randomized controlled trial designed to shed light on these questions, researchers tested the impact of four approaches: (1) a personal invitation for patients to come in for screening, (2) a personal invitation that also conveyed statistics on how many of the patient’s peers

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have been screened, (3) a personal invitation with an unconditional pharmacy voucher labeled as an encouragement to get screened, and (4) a personal invitation and conditional pharmacy voucher that could only be used after the patient went for screening (de Walque, Chukwuma et al. 2022). The study participants were individuals ages 35–68 who had not been screened in the past 12 months. After five months, people in the control group had very low screening rates: a mere 3.5 percent of people got screened for diabetes and hypertension. The personal invitation increased this rate to about 18.5 percent, with no additional impact from the unconditional voucher or the statistics about peers’ screening. The pharmacy voucher that was conditional on screening, however, was the most effective, nearly doubling the percentage of people who got screened, to 34.7 percent. Since it was more expensive to implement, however, the conditional voucher and the personal invitation alone were equally cost-effective. Overall, the findings suggest that very simple personalized invitations and conditional financial incentives can lead to more lifesaving health screenings in Armenia. This research finds that conditional incentives and personalized invitations can substantially increase screening for diabetes and hypertension for those who have not been screened recently. Adding a conditional incentive to the personal invitation doubled its effectiveness. The two approaches were equally cost-effective. It is likely that these interventions would also be effective in other settings where screening rates are low and people have not responded to the usual mass communication campaigns encouraging them to go for preventive health screenings.


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References

2min
pages 288-291

Building a forward-looking research agenda

1min
page 287

strategic purchasing

2min
page 286

Message 2: Support the four facility financing tenets Message 3: Understand PBF incentives in a broader health

5min
pages 281-283

Message 1: Recognize that sustainability is about more than just money

3min
pages 279-280

at the clinic

10min
pages 258-262

antenatal care

5min
pages 263-265

Conclusion

2min
page 269

PBF as a health system reform

6min
pages 266-268

7.3 Efficiency of effective coverage provision

7min
pages 254-257

coverage tree

5min
pages 250-252

financial incentives

3min
pages 248-249

Introduction Provision of nonindicated treatment in the context of

1min
page 247

6A.2 PBF and DFF interventions, by country, in the five countries in the pooled analysis of PBF versus DFF (Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe): Comparison of alternative financing approaches

10min
pages 229-236

Results from the meta-analysis

2min
page 213

PBF, DFF, and baseline effort

4min
pages 210-211

PBF, DFF, and institutional deliveries

2min
page 208

Discussion and conclusions

7min
pages 217-220

6.7 In Focus: PBF and equity

2min
page 206

consultations in Cameroon and Nigeria B6.7.1 Patient socioeconomic status, PBF, DFF, and know-can-do gaps

1min
page 205

6.2 Description of the PBF and DFF arms in Nigeria

1min
page 203

6.1 Geographic coverage of studies included in the meta-analysis

1min
page 195

interventions

3min
pages 189-190

6.1 Inclusion criteria for the systematic review and meta-analysis

4min
pages 191-192

preventive screening for noncommunicable diseases in Armenia

2min
page 188

Systematic review and meta-analysis of demand- and supply-side financial incentives

1min
page 187

6.1 In Focus: Kyrgyz Republic PBF pilot

2min
page 186

Introduction

1min
page 185

Conclusions

1min
page 178

know-can-do gap—in Cameroon and Nigeria

1min
page 177

5.3 In Focus: Measurement of worker motivation and satisfaction

2min
page 170

Results

1min
page 171

PBF, quality of care, and idle capacity

1min
page 176

paying for performance

6min
pages 167-169

six countries

1min
page 166

performance-based financing: The case of Argentina and Plan Nacer and Programa Sumar

6min
pages 163-165

Cameroon and Nigeria

1min
page 162

PBF, health system performance, and health worker effort in theory

1min
page 155

Evidence of the impact of PBF on the quality and quantity of health service delivery in LMICs Impact of PBF on health worker motivation and satisfaction in

2min
page 161

Introduction

7min
pages 151-154

health: An illustration

8min
pages 156-160

References

7min
pages 146-150

4A.3 Correlates of the know-can-do gap

2min
pages 137-138

Conclusions

6min
pages 132-134

4.2 In Focus: Does discrimination contribute to poor effort?

2min
page 130

of care

2min
page 123

countries

3min
pages 127-128

Why antenatal care?

1min
page 113

Results

3min
pages 117-118

Introduction

1min
page 111

Conclusions

1min
page 103

Mali case study

6min
pages 98-100

and maternal care

3min
page 97

Conclusions

1min
page 86

3.1 Summarizing the three gaps

1min
page 94

Theoretical framework for assessing quality of care

6min
pages 91-93

Introduction

3min
pages 89-90

effective coverage

1min
page 85

coverage and quality

1min
page 71

Empirical applications Expanding the work on effective coverage by using data collected in

1min
page 73

1 In Focus: Combining technological innovations to facilitate

2min
page 62

medical conditions

1min
page 74

References

4min
pages 64-66

Conclusions

1min
page 63

2.2 Coverage, quality, effective coverage, and the care cascade

1min
page 69

Introduction

1min
page 67
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