46. WDR 2022 team calculations; Asonuma and Trebesch (2016). 47. Defined as a default on private external creditors. 48. Based on restructurings of defaults since the end of World War II. Farah-Yacoub, Graf von Luckner, and Reinhart (2021); Graf von Luckner et al. (2021). 49. Benjamin and Wright (2009). 50. WDR 2022 team calculations, based on Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) and Farah-Yacoub, Graf von Luckner, and Reinhart (2021). Using a subset of default spells for which the reported default spell end dates in both studies match and restructuring deal details are available, 41 of 68 spell-ending restructurings had a face value reduction. Using only Asonuma and Trebesch (2016) data, 51 of 94 spell-ending restructurings involved a face value reduction. 51. Fang, Schumacher, and Trebesch (2021); Pitchford and Wright (2012); Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein (2021). 52. Friedman (1983). 53. Reinhart and Trebesch (2016). 54. Arslanalp and Henry (2005). 55. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015). 56. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015). 57. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015). 58. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015); Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). 59. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2015); Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). 60. Calice, Diaz Kalan, and Masetti (2020). 61. Easterly (1989); Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994). 62. International Centre for Tax and Development, ICTD Government Revenue Dataset, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK, http://www.ictd.ac/data sets/the-ictd-government-revenue-dataset. 63. Janetsky (2021). 64. Jensen (2019). 65. Pigato (2019). 66. Bachas, Gadenne, and Jensen (2020). 67. Phillips et al. (2018).
68. OECD (2021). 69. See World Bank (2021a) for a more complete discussion on the debt transparency framework. 70. Gelpern et al. (2021). 71. Aytekin Balibek (2021). 72. For a consideration of issues of sovereign authorization, see Lienau (2008, 2014). Through debt management performance assessments, the World Bank measures several relevant aspects of a well-designed legal framework for debt management. See World Bank, DeMPA (Debt Management Performance Assessment) (dashboard), https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs /debt-toolkit/dempa. 73. Cision PR Newswire (2020); Duran and John (2018). 74. IMF (2020a). 75. Fang, Schumacher, and Trebesch (2021). 76. IMF (2020a). 77. Graf von Luckner et al. (2021). 78. See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 79. Graf von Luckner et al. (2021). 80. IMF (2020a). 81. The debtor argued that it could amend the contracts to oblige the pool of voting creditors to redesignation using a voting threshold of 50.00 percent of the principal of each series, as opposed to the 66.67 percent aggregate and 50.00 percent of principal per series, or 75.00 percent of aggregate principal, necessary to amend reserved matters. Under the proposed amendment, Argentina would have been able to pool creditors amenable to its offer even after the votes had been cast and launch a subsequent exchange offer, including to the holders of new exchange bonds and the holders of old bonds who rejected the offer. Creditors argued that, by doing this, Argentina could have forced creditors to gang up and dilute their individual rights. This was dubbed the Pac-Man strategy. The creditors initially demanded a reversion to pre-2014 CAC verbiage as a response. See de la Cruz and Lagos (2020). 82. de la Cruz and Lagos (2020). 83. IMF (2020a).
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