Hidden Debt

Page 154

128

H IDDEN DEBT

from sales and input values using the sales generating function in equation (3C.3) and taking logs: TFPRit = log(S)it – βK log(K)it – βL log(L)it – βM log(M)it (3C.4) Similarly, the marginal revenue product of an input X can be inferred as MRPXit = log(βX) + log(Sit) – log(Xit) (3C.5) To estimate the revenue production function input coefficients (the βs), Asker et al. (2014) use the first-order condition for the optimal use of a flexible input in a static model with no frictions or distortions. The condition is that the revenue share of the input’s expenditure should equal its revenue function coefficient:

βX =

Pit X it . S it

(3C.6)

Following the procedure in Asker et al. (2014), we use the median expenditure shares of labor and raw materials in every 3-digit industry to estimate βL and βM. The medians are calculated using Prowess data pooled over 2000 and 2016. We limit the sample to the same time period in our revenue productivity regressions to avoid any potential biases arising from potential longterm changes in these input coefficients due to demand or technological trends. We estimate βk as

βK =

 −1 − βL − β M , (3C.7) 

where ∈ is set equal to 4 following Bloom (2009). To compute TFPR and the marginal revenue products of labor and capital, we plug in the estimated input coefficients into equations (3C.4) and (3C.5).

Notes 1. Unfortunately, data on another measure that would be more appropriate than revenues for comparisons of the share of GDP—value added by the SOE sector—are not available for most South Asian countries. 2. See the Solar Energy Corporation of India Ltd site: http://www.seci.co.in/. 3. The idea of coordination failures goes back to Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) theory of a “big push” in industrialization. The technology and skills example is from RodríguezClare (2005). 4. See the Rail India Technical and Economic Service Ltd site: https://www.rites.com/index. php?page=page&id=8&name=Profile& mid=8. 5. See https://www.research.advocata.org/sri​ -lankas-soes-burn-peoples-cash-burden​-­budge ts-undermine-national-savings/, which is based on data from the government of Sri Lanka, Public Enterprises Department. 6. The notion of an implicit government guarantee on SOE debt is not limited to South Asia (see, for example, European Commission 2016). 7. For a review of the global evidence, see Shirley and Walsh (2001). For evidence on India, see Majumdar (1996). For evidence on China, see Li, Lin, and Selover (2014) and Harrison et al. (2019). 8. Similarly, Naveed et al. (2018) suggest that at least in formal terms, SOEs in Pakistan follow clear corporate governance norms related to operational autonomy and financial reporting. 9. It is worth noting that the agency and environmental hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily independent of each other. 10. See, for example, S&P Global Ratings, 2017, “SOE Shake-Up: China’s Support for Its Ailing Enterprises Will Become More Selective.” 11. Our results stay the same if for a given regression we include observations that might be missing other outcome variables but not those relevant to the regression in question. Further, when using Prowess to compute an aggregate statistic for the CPSE sector, we include all observations (except those missing the statistic in question).


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Notes

3min
page 192

Annex 4B. The Kalman Filter

3min
page 189

4.1 Recommendations for Improving Fiscal Reporting and Transparency in Pakistan

6min
pages 186-187

Outcomes in South Asia

5min
pages 184-185

The Promise and Risks of Fiscal Decentralization in South Asia

1min
page 159

following Contingent Liability Shocks

3min
page 179

Debt, India

2min
page 175

Assembly Elections

2min
page 180

Estimating Contingent Liability Shocks, Adjustment Costs, and Mitigating Factors Using Data for India

6min
pages 171-172

Fiscal Rule

2min
page 182

Notes

2min
page 154

Annex 3C. Productivity Estimation

3min
page 153

Describing the Opaque and Complex SOE Sector in South Asia Using Data

6min
pages 129-130

The Importance of Paying More Attention to the Hidden Liabilities of SOEs in South Asia

11min
pages 125-128

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, 2005–17

11min
pages 138-141

Analyzing the Effect of Firms’ Banking with SOCBs Compared with Private Banks

3min
page 101

2.1 Main Findings of the Overall Analysis

3min
page 102

Annex 2A. Methodology for Determining Bank Distress

6min
pages 107-108

Only a Combination of Internal and External Policy Reforms Can Help Better Manage Contingent Liabilities from SOEs in South Asia

9min
pages 143-145

Private Banks Adjust in Times of Distress

8min
pages 98-100

Understanding Bank Distress and Its Main Factors

3min
page 92

2.3 India: Branch Networks and Total Credit, 2018

5min
pages 87-88

The Upsides and Downsides of State-Owned Commercial Banks

4min
pages 83-84

Annex 1D. Imputing the Missing Values for Predictions

2min
page 75

Government from Contingent Liabilities of Public-Private Partnerships

3min
page 64

Improving Government Capacity, Due Diligence, and Contract Design to Better Manage the Fiscal Risks of the Growing PPP Programs in South Asia

2min
page 70

1.5 Distribution of the Percentage of Contract Period Elapsed, 1990–2018

5min
pages 58-59

Features of Contract Design That Matter: Exploring the Link between PPP Contract Design and Early Terminations of Highway PPPs in India

3min
page 68

Balancing the Efficiency Gains from PPPs against Their Risks and Liabilities Booming Infrastructure PPPs, Their Country and Sector Distribution, and Signs

6min
pages 51-52

ES.1 Applying the Purpose, Incentives, Transparency, and Accountability (PITA) Recommendations in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts ...................xvi 1.1 The Hidden Debt of National Highways in India

3min
page 53

in India, 2001–17

2min
page 57

Notes

3min
page 47

The Need to Carefully Manage the Fiscal and Economic Risks of PPPs

5min
pages 49-50

Policy Recommendations

8min
pages 43-45

O.1 Implementing the High-Level Policy Recommendations for Public-Private Partnerships, State-Owned Commercial Banks, State-Owned Enterprises, and Subnational Governments

4min
page 46

O.9 Checks and Balances on Government Executives Help Prevent Distress of Public-Private Partnerships

2min
page 42

O.2 Analytical Framework: Links from Distress to Adjustments to Impacts

8min
pages 32-34

Analytical Framework

2min
page 31

Three Years

2min
page 41
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