Acuns newsletter, 2018 issue 2 by Wilfrid Laurier University

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QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER ISSUE 2 > 2018

IS THE UK’S

NEW DEVELOPMENT AID STRATEGY A PRODUCT OF THE RISING POPULISM?

PLUS

HOW THE LAW ENABLES STATE TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SYRIA AND IRAN

Introducing ACUNS Secretariat’s new host institution: Coventry University and its Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations

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Q > CONTENTS QUARTERLY

FEATURE ONE

IS THE UK’S NEW DEVELOPMENT AID STRATEGY A PRODUCT OF THE RISING POPULISM? | 3 ¸ | Director, Interactivi Denisa Meirosu

SPECIAL FEATURE

HOW THE LAW ENABLES STATE TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SYRIA AND IRAN | 5 Michael Opondo | CVE Strategy and Policy Consultant based in Nairobi, Kenya

FEATURE TWO

INTRODUCING ACUNS SECRETARIAT’S NEW HOST: COVENTRY UNIVERSITY AND ITS CENTRE FOR TRUST, PEACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS | 7 Math Noortmann | Incoming Executive Director, ACUNS (July 2018) Professor of Transnational Law and Non-state Actors, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR), Coventry University

Photo: www.luiss.edu

AM18 KEYNOTE SP EAKER

Leonel Fernández Leonel Fernández is a renowned Dominican politician, lawyer, professor and writer who has played a prominent role in the promotion of political and ideological matters, both at the national and the international level. He is currently the president of the official Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (Dominican Liberation’s Party); of the Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo (FUNGLODE) and its sister organization in the United States, the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development (GFDD); the EU-LAC Foundation and; the United Nations Association of the Dominican Republic. View his full biography at acuns.org

HUMAN RIGHTS, MIGRATION, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2018 ACUNS ANNUAL MEETING

THURSDAY – SATURDAY > JULY 12–14, 2018 LUISS University, Rome, Italy Hosted by Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli

WELCOME TO ACUNS

STARTING POINT

up2date news & opinions

AS WE EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE, WE MUST NEVER FORGET THAT THE HIGHEST APPRECIATION IS NOT TO UTTER WORDS, BUT TO LIVE BY THEM. John F. Kennedy

SECRETARIAT STAFF

It takes a village... and a global network

Alistair Edgar, Executive Director, ACUNS Associate Professor, Wilfrid Laurier University

Dr. Alistair Edgar, ACUNS

T > 226.772.3167

This is my final piece for the Newsletter, as Executive Director of ACUNS—so I am giving myself a little leeway to make some personal ‘thank-you’ notes to those with whom I have worked most closely over the past 15 years (and the ‘preparatory year’ before that). Of course, that will leave out many names, so let me start by saying that I have worked with a lot of amazing board members, and even more individual ACUNS members, over this time: thanks to all of you, and I will hope to stay in touch with many of you in my new, post-ACUNS role as Associate Dean at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (balsillieschool.ca).

E > aedgar@wlu.ca

Brenda Burns, Co-ordinator T > 226.772.3142 F > 226.772.0016 E > bburns@wlu.ca

Gwenith Cross, Program Support T > 226.772.3121 E > gcross@acuns.org

BOARD MEMBERS 2017-2018

ACUNS is governed by an international Board of Directors: Chair: Lorraine Elliott, Australian National University Chair Elect: Roger Coate, Georgia College Vice Chair: Charlotte Ku, Texas A&M University School of Law Vice Chair: Kurt Mills, University of Dundee Ingvild Bode, University of Kent Stephen Browne, Graduate Institute, Geneva Eunsook Chung, Sejong Institute Annalisa Ciampi, University of Verona Cristián Gimenez Corte, Universidad Nacional del Litoral Mary Farrell, University of Plymouth Otto Spijkers, Utrecht University

I have had a lot of fun working with, and also learned much from, the ACUNS Chairs over the years—Craig Murphy (2002–2004), Michael Doyle (2004–2006), Tom Weiss (2006–2009 although I was not in the e.d. role for some of that period), Christer Jönsson (2009–2012), Abiodun Williams (2012–2015), and currently Lorraine Elliott (2015–2018). Each one is unique, but all have put in a great deal of time and effort to provide guidance and leadership for the Council and for me. Throughout this time, Charlotte Ku and Roger Coate have been more or less continuously involved in supporting me in various board-related roles; and Jean Krasno, Jacques Fomerand, Michael Platzer, Lee Gordenker, Ramesh Thakur, Sukehiro Hasegawa, Randall Harbour, Subhash Birla, Joe Schwartzberg, Vesselin Popovski, Nancy Okada, and Melissa Labonte have given important advice and assistance. I am sure I have missed too many, and I apologize! I would have failed miserably every year with the Annual Meetings and Workshops without the critical support—personal, financial, material, and institutional—of host partners, sponsors, and “negotiation guides”. That list includes individuals, government bodies, NGOs and private sector companies in Geneva, Rio de Janeiro, Bonn, New York, Lund, Istanbul, Seoul, Oslo, Tokyo, New Delhi and Sonipat, Santo Domingo, Vienna, Ghent and Brussels, Denver, The Hague… It may be true that it takes a village to raise a child; it definitely takes a global network of willing colleagues and institutions to raise and support our association. At my home institution, Wilfrid Laurier University, I have benefitted from the strong support of our senior administration—who also saw the considerable value to the university of being the ‘home’ of the ACUNS Secretariat since 2003. For several years, the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) provided core funding, through the generosity of Jim Balsillie. In addition, John English, Andrew Cooper, John Allison, and Rowland Smith were critical to the first bid to win the Secretariat hosting role. Our undergraduate student interns have been lively, hard working, and reliable; I hope they also enjoyed their time with us, and are now busy building their careers. Last, but not in any way least: Brenda, Gwenith, Andrew, Sarah, Dawn, Anastasia, Katherine, Lucy and Denoja are names you all will have had some interactions with when you have registered for events or meetings, sought our support for your work, read our newsletters or E-Updates, or had questions about your ACUNS memberships. For me, they have been my lifelines. I look forward to seeing all of you who will be taking part in the Annual Meeting at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome, on the theme Human Rights, Migration, and Global Governance. As always, you can find details on the website, at acuns.org/am2018/. Over to you, Math Noortmann and the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University. Cheers!

A C U N S Q UA R T E R LY N E W S L E T T E R > I S S U E 2 > 2 0 1 8

A C U N S . O R G 2

EVALUATING AID SPENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION

FEATURE ONE

> DENISA MEIROȘU DIRECTOR, INTERACTIVI

FEATURE STORY

IS THE UK’S NEW

DEVELOPMENTA PRODUCT AID STRATEGY OF THE

RISING POPUL SM? The United Kingdom was the largest multilateral provider

of development aid in 2013 and amongst the few EU Member States who met the 0.7% ODA/GNI target—the commitment to dedicate a percentage of Gross National Income to Official Development Assistance—endorsed by the UN (OECD report Highlights Multilateral Aid, 2015). The commitment to 0.7% of GNI to ODA was renewed in November 2015, with the launch of DFID strategy: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest.

The strategy comes out in a sensitive political and social context in the UK. The upward populist trend in Europe was well-infused in the British right-wing political discourse and increased the electorate’s appetite for a Brexit scenario. This trend was well-reflected in the way the electorate voted in the general elections of 2015, where UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) gained 12.6% of the electorate, an astonishing 9.5% increase since the general elections of 2010.

The narrative of the new strategy, placing at its core the national interest, follows the right-wing traditional position on aid. It has been criticized by left-wing supporters, who saw in both language and objectives of the strategy, risks of failure to fulfil the main function of development aid: poverty reduction. But is this strategy the product of the extreme right’s rising populism? Looking at the history of the UK’s development aid, one may conclude it is not the first time the aid strategy exudes populism. It is just that this time populism is dressed in right-wing clothing; yet with very limited to no influence from the extreme right.

WHILE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT (LEFT-WING) PUT EMPHASIS ON THE MORALITY OF AID (HELPING THE POOR),

THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS (RIGHT-WING) LOOKED AT AID FROM A NATIONAL INTEREST PERSPECTIVE.

Looking at the history of the UK’s development aid, one may conclude it is not the first time the aid strategy exudes populism.

UK’s

development aid started in the ’60s under Harold Wilson’s Labour government, when the first Independent Ministry of Overseas Development was created. The scope of development aid was decided by the government or specialized structures which, at least at discourse level, generally followed lines of political ideology. While a labour government (left-wing) put emphasis on the morality of aid (helping the poor), the conservative governments (right-wing) looked at aid from a national interest perspective. Since the topic was considered too technical by the Parliament, it received limited attention from politicians until the early 2000s, as reflected in Table 1 (see page 9).

The UK’s modern development aid took off in 2000, following the Millennium Declaration, the new milestone in development aid at global level in terms of donors’ commitments and aid objectives. Since then, the UK has committed to spend 0.7% of GNI for ODA, a target that was maintained by both left and right-wing governments. Significantly different messages are conveyed by their strategies. However, looking at aid disbursements per sector and throughout the decades of left/right governance, the following conclusion can be drawn: the UK’s development aid decisions are shaped by the international context more than by ideology. A review of budgets and sectors’ allocation in both right-wing and left-wing governments throughout the last couple of decades support the conclusion (Figure 2).

FIGURE 1: UK Aid as a Share of National Income

0.80% –

CONSERVATIVE

LABOUR

0.70%–

0.50%– 0.40%– 0.30%– 0.20%– 0.10%– 0.00%–

SOURCE: DAC Database (http://stats.oecd.org) plus DFID press release

FIGURE 2: Budget and Sector Allocation (right and left governments)

30000 25000 20000 15000

Labour 1964 - 1970

10000

Conservative 1970 - 1974

5000

Labour 1974 - 1979 Conservative 1979 - 1997 Labour 1997 -2010 Conservative 2010-2015

Ec o

I. So cia

l In fr a no str m ic uc In fra ture str & uc Se rv tu ice re I IV . M I I. P & V. s ro Se Co ul du rv tim ice ct Se m io od s cto n ity Se r/ ct Ai C or d / G ross s -C VI ut . A e ne tin ra ct l io g n R Pro g. el As at VI VI i s n I . I I. .H gt Un o um De all an oc bt ita at ria ed /U nA id ns pe cif ied

II .

The volume of aid channelled by Blair’s government to the social sector are unparalleled. However, the shares for economic infrastructure and services and the production sectors, associated with the British investments in developing country, in a period of 13 years amounts to approximately 80% of the total amount invested by the previous conservative government in 18 years. This reconfirms the importance of the national interests in Blair’s time as well, even though at the time was disguised under the left rhetoric “eliminating world’s poverty” (Figure 2).

0.60%–

It is difficult to correlate the conservatives’ rhetoric of national interest with the low ODA commitments three decades ago (Figure 2). Therefore, I argue that, at the time, the decline in spending reflects in fact the limited interest of politicians in a relatively young sector whose political potential was still unclear. The ambitious agenda of the Tony Blair government on the topic of development aid comes within the widespread enthusiasm around the Millennium Declaration. Blair framed UK’s aid in three White Papers published by the labour party mandate and reiterated by the corresponding budget allocation: 0.7% of GNI to ODA, a first in the UK’s history of development aid. It is to be noted though that apart from building on the labour party’s traditional take on aid, Blair’s White Papers are a faithful reflection of the international momentum on development aid: the commitment of the rich countries to help the poor countries as moral obligation.

– 1960 – 1961 – 1962 – 1963 – 1964 – 1965 – 1966 – 1967 – 1968 – 1969 – 1970 – 1971 – 1972 – 1973 – 1974 – 1975 – 1976 – 1977 – 1978 – 1979 – 1980 – 1981 – 1982 – 1983 – 1984 – 1985 – 1986 – 1987 – 1988 – 1989 – 1990 – 1991 – 1992 – 1993 – 1994 – 1995 – 1996 – 1997 – 1998 – 1999 – 2000 – 2001 – 2002 – 2003 – 2004 – 2005 – 2006 – 2007 – 2008 – 2009 – 2010 – 2011 – 2012 – 2013 – 2014 – –

Budget wise, the aid volumes ranged from 0.2 % to 0.5% of GNI, with ups and downs in both left-wing and right-wing governments, yet with a steady decline under the Conservatives, from 1980 until the 2000s (Figure 1).

Without trying to dilute the importance of Blair’s contribution to the reform of the UK’s development aid, I argue that the outburst of enthusiasm around the Millennium Declaration, the perspectives of economic growth, and a stable global balance of power were pivotal in shaping up UK’s new approach to aid. Continued on page 9 > A C U N S Q UA R T E R LY N E W S L E T T E R > I S S U E 2 > 2 0 1 8

A C U N S . O R G 4

H O W T H E L AW E N A B L E S

STATE TERRORISM in the

MIDDLE EAST:

SYRIA and IRAN

SPECIAL FEATURE

INTRODUCTION: Even as it is considered by some as the geopolitical heart of the world, the Middle East represents a phased and gradual breakdown of political, social and civilization command over the last decade. The governments in the region face profound crises affecting even the model of the state.1 Economically, the region is also still considered strategic with diverse opportunities for trade and investments, primarily due to the large reserves of oil and natural gases.2 This model exists despite the various attempts by the governments in the Middle East to transform the region into information and service-based economies by reviving their economic dependency on oil revenues.3 THE REGION IS ALSO ASSOCIATED with state terrorism, in the guise of ‘maintenance of law and order.’ This has had multiple adverse effects on regional security. State terrorism, is the active involvement of a government/state through its personnel and agencies in acts of violence against its own citizens.4 The acts are either within the territorial boundaries of the state targetted against real or perceived domestic enemies, or outside of the territorial boundaries and directed against perceived foreign adversaries. In maintenance of its position, the state involved seeks to handle these operations with a shrewd policy of secrecy that allows for a claim of gainsay and deniability. There is reason to believe that many instances of state terrorism occurred during the Arab Spring in the MENA region, but these went “unnoticed” or at least unchallenged for their “legitimacy”. Very few of the United Nations’ initiatives on the subject of terrorism have directly interrogated the issue of state terrorism. Instead, terrorism has been handled, or mentioned, only in a general bracket in the condemnations by the UN Security Council. “Reaffirming that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the most serious threats to peace and security.” 5 In contrast, law is validated by social criteria and should therefore recognize the social needs of the society; however, this is lacking in the area of state terrorism for four key reasons:6 a) Poor understanding of the subject as a whole; b) Under-development of the theoretical understanding or framing of the subject; c) Weakness and absence of sufficient empirical data; d) Lack of focus in terms of the wider research of the terrorism phenomenon. These reasons represent the current state of legal study on state terrorism and point to a desperate need to critically assess the existing definition and associated legal systems to help remedy the brutality of state terrorism.7 Continued on next page > 1 The emergence of Islamic State is a symptom of a deep crisis in the regional political order, comparable at least to

the collapse of the Ottoman Empire or the period of decolonization. At the same time, it is a social crisis and a crisis for the Middle East’s security architecture, and it has been engendering deep revaluation and growing conflicts. 2 World International Law Journal, John H. Donboli. 3 Iran’s President presents his last budget to Majlis, 10 January, 2005. 4 Jenkins, B. M. (1986), “Defense against Terrorism,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5: 589. 5 Resolution 1566 (2004) - adopted by the UN Security Council at its 5053rd meeting on 8 October, 2004. 6 Ratnapala, S. (2010), Jurisprudence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p199-200. 7 Wardlaw, G.,”Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport

(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 254–255.

ACUNS.ORG

> MICHAEL OPONDO CVE STRATEGY AND POLICY CONSULTANT BASED IN NAIROBI, KENYA

Reaffirming that terrorism, in all of its forms and manifestations, constitutes one of the

most serious threats to peace and security.

MEMBER PUBLICATIONS

MPub

Domestic Homicides and Death Reviews: An International Perspective Myrna Dawson | Palgrave Macmillan, 2017

OV ERVIE W O F S TAT E LEGI S LAT I O N ON STAT E T E R R O RI S M : SY R I A A N D IR A N By standard practice, the constitution is universally agreed to be the supreme law of States, superseding all the other statutes and laws of the land. I have selected 2 countries to focus on, by virtue of the major position they currently hold in the regional geopolitics.

SYRIA Years into the conflict, with little sign of resolution, the Syrian civil war has become more widespread posing a greater crisis and threatening the peace and stability of the region. The Syrian conflict is a perfect (in the worst sense) depiction of a government’s use of violence justified in the interest of state security, as President Bashir Al-Assad’s forces used more severe armed force. “…The Government relied upon its security forces to shoot down protestors and systematically 850 Syrians were killed by mid-May as the death toll continued to rise”.8 What informed and probably “justified” the Syrian government’s increasingly violent measures during the worsening civil conflict were the constitutionally granted powers claimed by the President and Government as a whole. As article 101, Syrian Arab Republic’s Constitution of 2012 notes, “The President of the Republic shall pass decrees, decisions and orders in accordance with the Laws”. Further, Article 102 grants the President the power to declare war, call for general mobilization, and conclude peace agreements after getting the approval of the People’s Assembly. Even though this limits his/her exercise of power to the approval of the assembly, Article 125 gives the President the absolute power to exercise his/ her authority as the commander in chief of the army and the armed forces. This wording puts the use of all forms of arms of the Government formally within the President’s reach, with Article 106 giving him the absolute power to hire and fire military employees. The Syrian constitution further provides for emergency provisions, in Article 114, which gives the president Continued on page 10 > 8 UN officials warn of escalating Human Rights Violation

across Middle East,” UN News, 13 May 2011, available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/05/374962-un-officials warn-escalating-human-rights-violations-across-middle-east

A C U N S Q UA R T E R LY N E W S L E T T E R > I S S U E 2 > 2 0 1 8

Domestic/family violence death reviews (D/FVDRs) are a relatively new prevention initiative that have developed internationally during the past couple decades. While these initiatives have been developed in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, there is limited research comparing the various models, methods and practices that have developed in each of the countries where the initiatives operate. As such, the edited collection, Domestic Homicides and Death Reviews: An International Perspective, edited by Myrna Dawson (University of Guelph, Canada), provides crucial insights from international experts on the development, functions, impacts and implications of domestic homicide death review committees. Divided into two sections, the collection begins by comparing and highlighting the current state of D/FVDRs in the five countries where they currently operate. The first section introduces readers to the review processes in each country contributing to a better understanding of similarities and differences in the formation, review processes, and outcomes in each jurisdiction. In the second section, the focus shifts to the benefits and challenges that have emerged or have been identified as D/FVDRs have evolved internationally over time including how to define domestic homicide, ethical issues, the role played by surviving family members, implications for Indigenous communities, responding to domestic violence related child homicides, and the potential for policy transfer to other countries. Domestic Homicides and Death Reviews: An International Perspective addresses the gap in knowledge on the work of domestic violence death review initiatives by discussing international death review models and the various challenges they face, which allows this text to serve as a resource for both academics and policy markers.

The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship Manuel Fröhlich and Abiodun Williams (Editors) Oxford University Press, 2018 The United Nations Secretary-General and the United Nations Security Council spend significant amounts of time on their relationship with each other. They rely on each other for such important activities as peacekeeping, international mediation, and the formulation and application of normative standards in defense of international peace and security – in other words, the executive aspects of the UN’s work. The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council fills an important lacuna in the scholarship on the UN system. Although there exists today an impressive body of literature on the development and significance of the Secretariat and the Security Council as separate organs, an important gap remains in our understanding of the interactions between them. Bringing together some of the most prominent authorities on the subject, this volume is the first book-length treatment of this topic. It studies the UN from an innovative angle, creating new insights on the (autonomous) policy-making of international organizations, and adds to our understanding of the dynamics of intra-organizational relationships. Within the book, the contributors examine how each Secretary-General interacted with the Security Council, touching upon such issues as the role of personality, the formal and informal infrastructure of the relationship, the selection and appointment processes, as well as the Secretary-General’s threefold role as a crisis manager, administrative manager, and manager of ideas.

Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017 What is humanitarianism? This authoritative book provides a comprehensive analysis of the original idea and its evolution, exploring its triangulation with war and politics. Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss trace the origins of humanitarianism, its social movement, and the institutions (international humanitarian law) and organizations (providers of assistance and protection) that comprise it. They consider the international humanitarian system’s ability to regulate the conduct of war, to improve the wellbeing of its victims, and to prosecute war criminals. Probing the profound changes in the culture and capacities that underpin the sector and alter the meaning of humanitarianism, they assess the reinventions that constitute “revolutions in humanitarian affairs.” The book begins with traditions and perspectives—ranging from classic international relations approaches to “Critical Humanitarian Studies”—and reviews seminal wartime emergencies and the creation and development of humanitarian agencies in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors then examine the rise of “new humanitarianisms” after the Cold War’s end and contemporary cases after 9/11. The authors continue by unpacking the most recent “revolutions”—the International Criminal Court and the “Responsibility to Protect”—as well as such core challenges as displacement camps, infectious diseases, eco-refugees, and marketization. They conclude by evaluating the contemporary system and the prospects for further transformations, identifying scholarly puzzles and the acute operational problems faced by practitioners.

See more Books by Members at ACUNS.ORG

A C U N S . O R G 6

IMPACTFUL AND TRANSFORMATIVE

FEATURE TWO

FEATURE STORY > M AT H N O O R T M A N N INCOMING EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ACUNS (JULY 2018) PROFESSOR OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND NON-STATE ACTORS CENTRE FOR TRUST, PEACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, COVENTRY UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCING ACUNS S E C R E T A R I A T ’ S N E W H O S T:

COVENTRYUNIVERSITY AND ITS CENTRE FOR

ACUNS has chosen Coventry University’s flagship research Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) to host its Secretariat for the next five years. These years are going to be challenging ones in terms of the defining ideals of CTPSR: “trust”, “peace” and “social relations.” According to United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres:

TRUST, PEACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 1.

WE ARE ENCOUNTERING A “TERRIBLE LACK OF TRUST... IN GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS”;

WE MUST “RESOLVE TO PUT PEACE FIRST”; AND

WE MUST “RECONSTRUCT RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND LEADERS – NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL.”1 1 “Secretary-General’s remarks at the World Government Summit” (13 February 2017);

“New UN chief Guterres pledges to make 2017 ‘a year for peace’” (1 January 2017); “Secretary-General-designate António Guterres’ remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office” (12 December 2016).

the Centre, we believe that trust, peace and social relations are the intrinsic building blocks of a future in which we should all enjoy the freedom from fear, the freedom from want, and the freedom to live in dignity. That compelling idea of human security informs most of CTPSR’s research, which revolves around such issues as (in)tolerance, reconciliation and dialogue, security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, vulnerability, justice, and democracy. CTPSR is aspirational in that we want our research to inform and transform the policies and practices of the people and institutions that we work with. But we also want our work on such issues as security governance, institutional trust, integrated peace operations and social cohesion to be informed by the participants in our research. It is that inclusive cooperation between academics, practitioners, and stakeholders in both research and teaching that CTPSR values, and was a key factor in the decision to award the hosting of the ACUNS Secretariat to Coventry.

THE CENTRE FOR TRUST, PEACE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS joined ACUNS as an institutional member in 2015, after the Annual Meeting in The Hague. It was felt within CTPSR that our projects with UN institutions, our diverse researches on the United Nations and its policies and practices, and our engagement with questions of the interlinkages of the global and the local warranted an institutional membership of an “international association of educational and research institutions and individual scholars, teachers, practitioners, and others who are active in the work and study of international organizations and have a professional interest in encouraging and supporting education and research which deepen and broaden our understanding of international cooperation.” At the CTPSR we believe that such “broadening and understanding of international cooperation” should benefit people on the ground and the organisations that work with and for them; such as the UN. Since its inception in 2014, CTPSR has become a community of around 70 staff members and 50 PhD students who share the idea that we have to work for and with individuals, communities and organisations, and that our research and teaching must be impactful and transformative. Our research is concentrated in 7 research groups which broadly focus on: trust, peacebuilding, communities, faith, migration, security and development. We research and publish on such diverse themes as maritime security, religion and education,

and peace operations. In order to achieve the highest research impact, we work with and within communities, academia, and a range of non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations around the globe. Our research approach is inter-disciplinary and change-oriented. Examples of our approach are our research projects with local fishing communities in Indonesia, gangs in the Caribbean, IDPs in the DRC and migrants in Greece. Our academic partnerships are with institutes of higher education in such countries as China, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Palestine, Jamaica, South-Africa, Australia, Japan, and Azerbaijan to mention only a few outside Europe. Our MA courses on Peace and Conflict, Maritime Security and Global Diversity Governance and our Doctoral Training Program are part and parcel of our academic philosophy that teaching should be informed by research. But, to put it in the words of our Director Mike Hardy: “The Centre is much more than its scholarship”. The RISING Global Peace Forum, our annual Istanbul Human Security Conference, the Global Youth Workshop for Peace and the Coventry City-University Initiative are examples of our activities and societal projects. Our engagement with the United Nations reflects CTPSR’s applied research approach. We not only research UN policies and practices such as the UN’s agenda on women peace and security, UN peace operations, and UN-NGO relations, we also cooperate with inter alia the Human Security Unit in organizing the Istanbul Human Security Conference, the UNDP Crisis Response Unit for Armed

A C U N S Q UA R T E R LY N E W S L E T T E R > I S S U E 2 > 2 0 1 8

Violence Reduction and Citizen Security, the IMO in Jakarta on trafficking, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, UNESCO and ILO. CTPSR’s philosophy and trajectory reflect the aspiration of Coventry as a ‘City of Peace and Reconciliation’, and Coventry University, which since its formal establishment as a university in 1992 has become one of the largest UK universities with about 30,000 students. Coventry University is a comprehensive, young and ambitious university that has much in common with ACUNS’ vision and approach to make academic research and teaching impactful. Since its inauguration, Coventry University has steadily climbed the UK University League tables and is now a recognized top 15 UK University. Coventry’s motto “excellence with impact” reflects both its academic aspiration as well as its commitment to societal engagement. Its global outlook is evidenced by its Global Engagement Program which (financially) supports around 10,000 students yearly “to engage in internationalisation across the globe” and the fact that 40% of its students are ‘from abroad’. The decision of Coventry University’s leadership to invest in hosting ACUNS’s Secretariat, signals its commitment to grow and diversify its ‘global engagement’. UN Secretary-General Guterres’ daunting ideal of restoring trust, prioritizing peace and reconstructing relations may very well be the strategic objective around which the global missions of ACUNS, Coventry University and the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations converge.

CTPSR HAS BECOME A COMMUNITY OF AROUND 70 STAFF MEMBERS AND 50 PhD STUDENTS WHO SHARE THE IDEA THAT...

...WE HAVE TO WORK FOR AND WITH INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND ORGANISATIONS, AND THAT OUR RESEARCH AND TEACHING MUST BE IMPACTFUL AND TRANSFORMATIVE.

OUR RESEARCH IS CONCENTRATED IN 7 RESEARCH GROUPS WHICH BROADLY FOCUS ON: TRUST, PEACEBUILDING, COMMUNITIES, FAITH, MIGRATION, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT.

* Math Noortmann has taught and researched at Universities in the Netherlands, Singapore, Germany, and the UK. Holding a PhD in International Law and an MSc in Political Science, his research combines the knowledge and understanding of international politics and public international law. Within the CTPSR, he leads the Research Cluster on Armed Violence and Illicit Activities and researches the roles, rights and responsibilities of non-state actors from the perspective of law and politics.

A C U N S . O R G 8

THE RHETORIC ON MORAL DUTY TO HELP THE POOR TURNS INTO NATIONAL INTEREST FIRST WHEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL POTENTIAL THREATS MIGHT IMPACT UK CITIZENS’ SECURITY OR WELFARE.

IS THE UK’S NEW DEVELOPMENT AID STRATEGY A PRODUCT OF THE RISING POPULISM? Continued from page 4 > Surprisingly, David Cameron’s mandate maintained the 0.7% target for ODA, though historically the conservative party was less generous with aid. In the 2010–2015 period, the aid disbursements per sector are slightly altered as compared with Blair’s period. The new agenda on aid in 2015 was, nevertheless, pure conservative discourse, which, apart from its traditional perspective on aid, takes into account Brexit, migration, terrorism, and global conflicts. The rhetoric on moral duty to help the poor turns into national interest first when external and internal potential threats might impact UK citizens’ security or welfare. The message is not entirely surprising if we look at the recent polls carried out in the UK on the topic of development aid. Both conservative and labour voters (representing the majority of British electorate) support spending development aid based on national interests. Voters are eager to see politicians acting for the country’s own interests rather than for others. Finally, Theresa May’s government chose to continue Cameron’s take on aid, in both budgetary commitment and aid objectives, contrary to what the extreme right parties would have pleaded for. Her effort to maintain the same ODA target, despite the harsh criticism of her party colleagues, can be understood within a larger context: Brexit requires the consolidation of the UK’s position at international level, hence the soft power of UK’s foreign policy is key to achieve this objective. The conclusion is that the UK’s current development aid strategy is as populist as Blair’s; the difference in between the two is only dictated by the external environment, reconfirming the importance of the international context above ideological considerations.

LABOUR

TORY

LABOUR

TORY

LABOUR

TORY

1964-1970

1970-1974

1974-1976

1979-1990

1997-2007

2010-2015

Harold Wilson

Edward Health

Harold Wilson

Margaret Thatcher

Tony Blair

David Cameron

1976-1979

1990-1997

2007-2010

2015-present

James Callaghan

John Major

Gordon Brown

Theresa May

Publication of White Paper: Overseas Development, the Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies, More help for the poorest (1975)

Reverts to the 1970-74 status.

First time 0.7 % pledge.

Continuation of the 0.7% pledge.

Independent Ministry of Overseas Development created, with minister having a seat in the Cabinet (1964) Publication of the White Paper: Overseas Development: The work in hand (1967)

(CONSERVATIVE)

Department renamed Overseas Development Administration (ODA), becomes formally part of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

(CONSERVATIVE)

Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century (1997) Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (2000) Eliminating World Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor (2006)

Yet, this time, ironically, populism in relation to aid may lead to a positive outcome: following extensive use of development aid in the electoral debates, voters expect transparency and results for the 0.7% GNI spending for ODA. To manage both efficiently will be decisive for the next round of elections. And it comes with a risk. The pressure on delivery for results is high. This pressure is perhaps the reason why DFID’s report Raising the Standards Multilateral Review, 2016 clearly states the UK’s expectations from the partners, including multilateral organizations, that link funding to performance: “the UK’s aid should not be taken for granted by any agency”. One of the main reasons for that is to demonstrate the UK’s taxpayers receive maximum value for money (p.32). It is for the same reason they argue full transparency of spending, information on salaries and other policies or per diem rates will be requested from partner agencies (p.28). The exercise has been already started and many of the traditional multilateral partners of the UK have been evaluated against the new standards. Lack of sufficient highly skilled personnel in UK’s development aid agencies and ministerial units or more bureaucracy as the solution at hand for transparency and accountability are potential risks that might impede the efficient implementation of an otherwise salutary decision on aid spending. It is to be seen if the UK’s current approach to development aid will work as planned. In the event it is successful, it will certainly open up the perspective for a reinterpretation of aid. * Denisa Meirosu ¸ is a senior business development consultant in international development, with extensive knowledge of EU external funding policies and programmes. Visit http://interactivi.ro/product/fundamentals-of-eu-tendering/ for details about her expertise.

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Publication of the following White Papers:

(CONSERVATIVE)

Publication of the following policy papers: National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest

Table 1 Source: T, Killick, Understanding British Aid to Africa: A Historical Perspective, 2006. Table 3-2 Four Decades of Governments, Prime Ministers and Aid Administrations, p.69 and data for the last column compiled by the author.

2018 DISSERTATION AWARD ANNOUNCEMENT

ACADEMIC COUNCIL ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

is pleased to announce the winner of the 2018 Dissertation Award

DOROTTYA MENDLY PhD Candidate, Corvinus University of Budapest International Relations Multidisciplinary Doctoral School

VIEW THE 2019 DISSERTATION AWARD CALL FOR APPLICATIONS ONLINE

> visit acuns.org/2019da/

for her dissertation entitled:

Constructing Agency: The UN in a Global Governmentality

HOW THE LAW ENABLES STATE TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SYRIA AND IRAN

Continued from page 6 > the power to act using “measures necessitated by circumstances” when facing contexts of “Grave Danger” or “Threatening National Unity, the Safety and Integrity of the Territories”. To further absolve the President of any responsibility or in the interest of national unity and security: Article 117 states that the President is not responsible for the acts he/she commits or authorizes in carrying out their duties, except in the case of high treason. By reason and practice, no President or Government can set standards or definitions of treason that would prosecute himself/herself for acts done using State machinery “in the interest of national unity and safety”. In contrast, the Syrian constitution (2012) also protects its citizens against extreme acts of human rights violations. Article 19 bases the society of the Syrian Arab Republic on the respect for the principles of social justices, freedom, and the maintenance of human dignity of every individual.

IRAN Iran’s positioning in the MENA region has always been a delicate endeavor that drew regional and global attention. As it sought to become a nuclear power in the region, and maybe beyond, Iran felt increasing pressure from the global community, posed by both diplomatic and economic sanctions. These sanctions were in place also because Iran was accused of supporting terrorist attacks, including: a) The 1992 and 1994 attacks against Israeli interests in Argentina b) The 1996 bombing against US forces in Saudi Arabia c) The 1983 and 1984 bombings of US and French targets in Beirut Iran’s proxies, sponsorships, and support for terrorism since the Islamic revolution of 1979, while doing very little to hide this fact, threatened the economic wellbeing of the Gulf States and undermined the growth of democracy in the region. From the 1979 overthrowing of the Shah’s regime, Ayatollah

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Ruhollah Khomeini openly stated that the use of terrorism was a legitimate part of the Islamic Republic’s exercise of power. Iranian leaders viewed “terrorism” as an important instrument of foreign policy that they could use both to advance national goals and to export the regime’s Islamic revolutionary ideals. The capability and ease of Iran’s acts of state-sponsored terrorism was expressed by its use of terror groups willing to act upon Iran’s command – with none more important than Hezbollah. A second major factor was the readiness of Russia and China to use, or raise the possibility of using, their veto powers in the UN at any time that the possibilities of new sanctions were raised.

Hezbollah and Iran Relations Hezbollah remains Iran’s strongest non-state ally in Tehran’s bid to spread its influence in the Middle East. The contemporary Hezbollah sustains close knit relationships with Iranian intelligence officials. In the 1990s, Hezbollah operated with an annual minimum guaranteed support of $100 million from the Iranian Government. In the last decade, the annual contribution by the Iranian Government was doubled to $200 million. The heavy control Iran has over Hezbollah effectively makes it in practice an extension of Iran’s military arm – and hence of Iran’s regional security policies.

Iran’s Constitution Iran’s Constitution was established in 1979, with amendments through 1989. The Constitution places the highest authority in the country on the President, subject to Article 113, for a term of 4 years. He/she has the authority to sign treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements concluded by the Iranian Government with other Governments as well as agreements pertaining to international organizations, but he/she must obtain the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. On use of the state arms, Article 147 notes that:

“Article 147: In time of peace, the government, in complete respect for the criteria of Islamic justice, must utilize the army’s personnel and technical equipment for relief operations, educational and productive endeavors, and the ¯ ¯ Reconstruction Campaign (jehad-e sazandegi ), to the degree that the army’s combat-readiness is not impaired.” Article 148 further reinstates the prohibition of all forms of personal use of military equipment.

Conclusion The international community needs to embrace binding regulations on the use of state machinery to support or sponsor terrorism. The same should also limit the states from using their forces against their own civilian population. The bare recognition of the adverse effects of state terrorism without proactive measures being taken is inadequate for the common goals of peace and security. There is also a pressing need to encourage study and research in the area of state terrorism rather than the now saturated general study of non-state terrorism as a phenomenon. This focus is needed to improve the current poor, or largely politicized understandings of the subject and to create availability of empirical data. There are critical gaps in the regulations on the use of state machinery to support and sponsor terrorist groups, even as these continue to pose threats to the security and socio-political stability of the MENA region and beyond. * Michael Opondo is a transnational policy specialist with expertise in Horn and East African security sector advice and reform; East Africa socio-political analyses; and MENA, ESA & HoA regions’ counter-violent extremism interventions. He has conducted research and several consultancies where his core function was to liaise with and advise stakeholders – including multiple United Nations’ agencies, EU-HoA, U.S. State Department, The British High Commission’s Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF East Africa) among others – on project implementation and evaluation activities on Counter-Violent Extremism in East Africa.

Publisher: Alistair Edgar, Executive Director, ACUNS

AC U N S S E C R E TA R I AT

Issue 2 > 2018

Editors: Brenda Burns, Co-ordinator, ACUNS Gwenith Cross, Program Support, ACUNS

Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) Quarterly Newsletter is published four times a year with the support of the Department of Communications, Public Affairs & Marketing (CPAM) at Wilfrid Laurier University.

Contributing Writers: Denisa Meirosu, ‚ Michael Opondo, Math Noortmann, Alistair Edgar, Brenda Burns and Gwenith Cross

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