Capenhurst The Facts

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Capenhurst The facts

Capenhurst‌ Ever heard of it? Probably not. Read on to find out more‌

“Without a doubt, there are very real concerns about the lack of transparency surrounding Capenhurst’s activities – the adequacy of nuclear safeguards at Capenhurst, environmental and public health risks associated with Capenhurst’s routine operations, as well as incidents and accidents associated with Capenhurst’s management of uranium hexafluoride.” Dr Paul Dorfman The Energy Institute University College London

“The uranium hexafluoride (UF6) containers in your photos are of the type 48Y which is designated as a Type B cask that is required to sustain immersion in a fire of 800°C for 30 minutes – this test condition is not that particularly onerous, neither in temperature nor duration of the immersing fire.” John Large (in an email to Radiation Free Lakeland).

February 2019 Published by Wildart Books ISBN 978-0-9571485-7-4


About the author Lowana Veal is a biologist and freelance journalist who has been involved in the anti-nuclear movement since the mid 1970s. She wrote Wildlife and the Atom for Greenpeace (London) in 1983. She now lives in Iceland, where there are no nuclear power stations.

Contents 1 The basics 2 History of the plant 3 The URENCO company 3.1 URENCO’s customers 4 Uranium enrichment and the nuclear cycle 4.1 HEX 5 Transport of HEX 5.1 Accidents 6 Depleted HEX 6.1 Tailings plant 7 Storage of submarine reactors 8 Close Capenhurst Campaign


! October 1984, Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at URENCO in the Netherlands (Bogaerts, Rob / Fotocollectie Anefo) 1. The basics Capenhurst is a uranium enrichment site in Cheshire, owned and operated by URENCO, and consists of three enrichment plants – E22, E23 and A3 – though most comes from E23. Sister plants are found in the Netherlands and Germany, in Almelo and Gronau respectively, as well as in New Mexico in the USA. Most of this leaflet will focus on the UK arm. Located just ten kilometres (seven miles) north of Chester and less than six km (four miles) southwest from Ellesmere Port, URENCO’s Capenhurst site spans 110 hectares (270 acres). Wales is a mere four km (2.5 miles) to the west while Liverpool is 15 km (10 miles) north of the plant. Ellesmere Port and Liverpool are two of the ports that URENCO uses for exporting uranium from the plant. South of Liverpool, Eastham Dock in the Wirral has been used occasionally for large shipments.


2. History of the plant The Capenhurst site had originally been developed as a Royal Ordnance factory during World War II. After the war, a uranium enrichment facility which used diffusion technology was set up there, but in 1993 it was divided into two sites, one for the diffusion plant and the other for the enrichment plant.

! The company was enacted via an Agreement signed in Almelo in 1970 by the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, called Collaboration in the Development and Exploitation of the Gas Centrifuge Process for Producing Enriched Uranium1. This Agreement is commonly known as the Treaty of Almelo. It was ratified by the UK parliament in March 1971 and entered into force in July 1971. The idea was to set up joint capacity in Europe to enrich uranium as nuclear reactor fuel, using the previously untested but potentially more profitable centrifuge process, and to break free of the monopoly exerted at that time by the USA. Initially, the URENCO Group operated as a marketing agent for three separate enrichment companies in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, but in 1993 they became amalgamated under URENCO Ltd as a holding company. In 2012, the Capenhurst site was relicensed and URENCO UK Ltd became the sole holder of the site licence. 3. The URENCO company The structure of URENCO is somewhat complex as can be seen on the !5

company’s website2. Headed by URENCO Limited (ULtd), it comprises the following subsidiaries: URENCO UK Limited (UUK); URENCO Nederland, which has two enrichment plants in operation; URENCO Deutschland GmbH (UD); URENCO USA in New Mexico, which began operating in 2010; URENCO ChemPlants, which is responsible for the building and operation of a Tails Management Facility (see later); the Central Technology Group, which has been particularly involved in the

A Game of Tennis outside “CANCERHURST”

design of the American plant and promoting “best practice” techniques; and URENCO Stable Isotopes, which provides materials for medical diagnostics and radiation treatment for cancer. This sector is not important economically but “improves” the company’s image, or as their website says, “it is of considerable value from commercial, social and environmental perspectives.”

The URENCO Enrichment Company (UEC) is responsible for operating URENCO’s European centrifuge enrichment plants and marketing the enriched uranium globally to nuclear facilities; URENCO Inc. does the same as UEC but for the North American market; and U-Battery3 is a conceptual design for a micro modular reactor currently under !6

development by a consortium of partners including URENCO. URENCO Nuclear Stewardship was originally set up in 2012 under the name of Capenhurst Nuclear Services but changed to its current name in November 2017 as the new name was thought more appropriate. According to the website, it provides “responsible stewardship of nuclear materials through waste management and decommissioning services”. It will be responsible for the Ministry of Defence’s submarine dismantling project of reactor pressure vessels (described in more detail later). Finally, URENCO and another company, Orano, set up the Enrichment Technology Company Limited (ETC) in 2003 to develop and manufacture centrifuge enrichment technology. 3.1 URENCO’s customers Some of URENCO’s enriched HEX is sent abroad. In 2013, the New York Times said that the company has 50 customers in 17 countries, including the Indian Point nuclear plant north of New York city (which will be closed down over the next few years); Wolf Creek Generating Station in Burlington, Kansas, and the Olkiluoto plant on an island off western Finland. They appear to have obtained more customers since then, as on their website URENCO say they have customers in 19 countries. In their news section, they report that a long-term contract has been signed to serve the French reactor fleet run by EDF (Electricité de France). This will support “the recycling of nuclear fuel by enriching uranium recovered from fuel which has been previously used and reprocessed”. A report on global uranium markets states that URENCO will be providing “enrichment services” in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, for the Barakah nuclear power plant. The Dutch anti-nuclear watchdog WISE report that enriched uranium was transported 182 times to and from Capenhurst in 2014. See below for more information. There is, however, continuing oversupply of enriched uranium due to the phase-out of nuclear reactors in countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Belgium, not to mention the shutdown of Japanese nuclear reactors after Fukushima. URENCO is also suffering the consequences of this. !7

4. Uranium enrichment and the nuclear cycle Several forms of uranium exist, but most uranium ore deposits are uraninite, which used to be called pitchblende. Once mined, the ore is milled to produce yellow granules, called yellowcake or urania. This has the formula U3O8 and is usually called uranium oxide, though it is also known as triuranium octaoxide, as its formula dictates (tri- for three and octa- for eight).

! Springfields Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing Plant This uranium oxide is then sent to the Springfields nuclear fuel manufacturing plant near Preston, where two types of processes occur. It can either be made into uranium tetrafluoride as nuclear fuel for Magnox, Advance-Cooled and Light-Water reactors, or it can be converted into uranium hexafluoride, UF6, and sent to Capenhurst for further enrichment. Uranium hexafluoride is generally called HEX. HEX is the “best� form of uranium for enrichment as it easily gasifies when heated. Uranium can occur in three forms (isotopes): U-238, U-235 and the decay product U-234. Most naturally occurring uranium, over 99%, is in the form of U-238. During the enrichment process, the HEX is fed, in gaseous form, into a centrifuge that spins at high speed and separates the isotopes so that the heavier form, U-238, is forced nearer to the wall of the centrifuge and the HEX, UF6, thus becomes depleted of U-235. The process is repeated in adjacent centrifuges (cascades) until the UF6 (HEX) becomes sufficiently enriched with U-235, or up to 5%. !8

The enriched uranium is fed into a compressor and then into cylinders in a cooling box. The HEX vapour solidifies within the cylinders. Closer to the walls of the centrifuge, the UF6 vapour is (partly) depleted of U-235 and is variously known as depleted UF6, DUF6, depleted HEX or simply tails. After enrichment, the solidified HEX is either returned to Springfields for fuel fabrication or to other locations where fuel fabrication takes place. This involves converting the enriched uranium into pellets that are then loaded into fuel rods and delivered to the nuclear reactors. Depleted HEX is also collected in a similar way and stored in containers (cylinders). 4.1


A 1995 American publication entitled Uranium Hexafluoride: A Manual of Good Handling Practices4 details the hazards involved with handling HEX. This publication was first published in 1957 and has been updated several times (this is the 7th edition) but it does not seem to have been updated since 1995. However, much of the information is still valid. It gives detailed information about the cylinders used and the problems associated with them, such as bent valves, bulges or visible cracks, all of which are considered “unacceptable” damage. Mild steel, it says, is corroded by UF6, but “Steel is used for shipping and storage cylinders, since the small amount of corrosion that occurs does not warrant the cost of more expensive metals”. It is clearly important that gaseous HEX does not enter the atmosphere. “Gaseous UF6, when released to the atmosphere, reacts with atmospheric moisture to form HF gas and particulate UO2F2 that tends to settle on surfaces. The corrosive properties of UF6 and HF are such that exposure can result in skin burns and lung impairment. The inhalation of fumes for more than a few breaths may result in lung impairment soon after the exposure and in some instances, mild but repairable kidney damage within a few days … For UF6 the chemical toxicity is more significant than the radiotoxicity,” the manual says. UO2F2 is commonly known as uranyl fluoride. Like other water-soluble !9

uranium and heavy metal compounds, it is toxic to the kidneys when ingested or inhaled in large quantities. When released to the atmosphere, the combination of UO2F2 and HF (hydrogen fluoride) produces a white cloud that can be so dense it obscures vision. From samples taken between 1979 and 1989, the British Geological Society reported levels of uranium three times higher than normal background levels in stream sediments near Capenhurst. 5. Transport of HEX Enriched uranium is sent from Capenhurst in standard 30B cylinders that typically weigh 2.27 tonnes (5,020 lb) and are approximately 75 cm (30’’) in diameter. Natural uranium (UF6 before it is enriched) and residues of UF6 (called heels) are transported in 48Y cylinders, which are considerably larger than 30Y cylinders and can accommodate 12.5 tonnes (27,560 lb) of uranium. Heels are highly radioactive residues of enriched UF6 that are left in cylinders after unloading of UF6. They too are “The uranium transported in 30B cylinders.

! Springfields May 10th 2018

hexafluoride (UF6) containers in your photos are of the type 48Y which is designated as a Type B cask that is required to sustain immersion in a fire of 800°C for 30 minutes— this test condition is not that particularly onerous, neither in temperature nor duration of the immersing fire.” John Large in an email to Radiation Free Lakeland.

The 2001 technical manual from the USA called Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride for Transport says that cylinders may no longer be used if their shell thickness is less than 5/16 inch for 30B cylinders or 0.5 inches for 48Y cylinders. Maximum anticipated radiation levels in HEX shipping cylinders are 5.70 !10

curies unirradiated uranium for 48Y containers but 4.92 and 5.47 curies for the 30B containers that are used for enriched HEX and heels. The latter figure is because “0.110 parts U232 plus 500 parts U233 per 106 part U235 are considered to be present”5. A government document published in 2017 and entitled Survey into the Radiological Impact of the Normal Transport of Radioactive Material in the UK by Road and Rail6 says that in 2014 there were 38 consignments by road of natural uranium in 48Y cylinders from UK ports to Capenhurst and 20 in the opposite direction, most of which went to European ports. That same year, 25 consignments with a total of 190 48Y cylinders containing heels were made from Springfields to Capenhurst. In addition, another 13 consignments were made by road carrying 60 full 48Y cylinders, again from Springfields to Capenhurst. However, the total number of 30B cylinders transported by road from Capenhurst in 2014 was close to 600. Of these, 252 cylinders went in 22 consignments from UK sea ports to Capenhurst; 46 consignments with a total of 251 cylinders went from Capenhurst to the ports; and 18 consignments with 91 cylinders went from Capenhurst to Springfields. The World Information Service on Energy (WISE) has a webpage devoted to uranium transport7, which is updated frequently. A number of companies seem to have been involved in uranium shipments overseas, including the Latvian Shipping Company, Advanced Uranium Asset Management and the Atlantic Container Line. However, it is not clear whether these companies are still operating in the field. At least two companies still seem to be shipping uranium, with connections to URENCO’s sites: RSB Logistic (which is part of Compass Logistics International) and Daher-TLI – the latter has a subsidiary, TLI Shipping (TLI stands for Transport Logistics International). Germany’s Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management has an upto-date table8 showing uranium consignments in and out of Germany and lists these two companies in relation to URENCO’s sites. The URENCO shipments have been Unbestrahites UF6 heels, or “unirradiated UF6 heels”. When empty, the 48Y cylinders will be cleaned, cut up and recycled on the market via a scrap contractor. It appears that the 30B cylinders are also washed before being reused. !11

! Close Capenhurst outside the UK URENCO plant near Chester

5.1 Accidents Accidents happen, both on land and at sea. A few examples are described below. In 1987, a French cargo ship sank in the English Channel after colliding with a car ferry. The ship was carrying 30 48Y cylinders of HEX at various stages of enrichment and 30 empty 30B cylinders that were designed to carry partly enriched uranium on the return journey. Six of these cylinders could not be recovered9. In 1989 a container vessel containing nine cylinders of UF6 residues (heels) was involved in an incident while going from Rotterdam (presumably with material from Almelo) to Montreal, Canada. The cylinders were not fastened correctly, with the result that three cylinders broke loose during a storm and damaged the freight container and two neighbouring containers. Valves from two of the cylinders broke off, leading to a release of UF6 and contaminating the deck of the ship, other equipment, cargo in adjacent containers, and a section of the dock in Montreal. In 2001 a “building emergency� occurred at Capenhurst due to a leak of UF6. Fire crews were called in and the immediate area was evacuated, but both local authorities and URENCO insisted there was no risk to the !12

public. In 2004, a lorry carrying radioactive material from the plant was involved in an accident at Capenhurst and overturned, causing one of the containers it was carrying to crack. Decontamination units were called in. In 2013, a fire broke out on the lower decks of the Atlantic Cartier in Hamburg port. It took 24 hours to extinguish the fire. Amongst other things, the boat was carrying four 30B cylinders containing a total of 40 kg of UF6 heels from enriched HEX. These were on their way to URENCO’s Almelo plant. In 2014, four 30B cylinders of enriched uranium that had been transported to Halifax, Canada, from Liverpool on the ship Atlantic Companion were dropped while unloading was taking place. The fall was around six metres. WISE point out that besides the hazard from a release of HEX, if the containers had been dropped from a greater height and hit each other, there would also have been a criticality hazard. Both the Atlantic Cartier and Atlantic Companion have since been sold for scrap. The former used to carry uranium oxide, uranium hexafluoride and nuclear fuel on a regular basis. Detailed information on the extent of HEX transport and guidelines for carrying it can be found in the chapter entitled Radioactive Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) in the 2018 manual Carefully to Carry10, issued by the UK P&I Club. 6. Depleted HEX As stated earlier, depleted UF6 (depleted HEX) is formed during the enrichment of uranium in centrifuges, when the UF6 vapour is partly depleted of U-235 and aggregates near the walls of the centrifuge. Depleted HEX has various military and industrial purposes, and was allegedly used for bombing Fallujah, Iraq. From 2020 onwards, URENCO propose to process the depleted HEX through a deconversion process to remove the extra fluorine from uranium hexafluoride to make uranium oxide, U3O8, which URENCO say is a more stable form of uranium and is their preferred way of storing it for disposal purposes. Hydrogen fluoride, also known as hydrofluoric acid (HF), will be recycled during the deconversion process. !13

But until then, depleted HEX, like enriched uranium, is stored in cylinders. Although it is now stored in 48Y steel cylinders, until recently it was stored in older “legacy” cylinders, including the 0236 cylinder. In 2014, almost half the stock of depleted HEX was stored in 0236 cylinders. According to the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR)11, many of these cylinders are in poor condition and all of them are in non-transportcompliant cylinders. The ONR have reported a specific issue relating to the processing of the legacy 0236 cylinders: “… these cylinders do not have an operable valve fitted, and therefore to access the contents a valve will have to be installed by means of ‘hot tapping’. This process requires a hole to be punched through the cylinder, which is then tapped to permit the attachment of a valve... During the process of hot tapping the cylinders there is the potential to release UF6, which has been identified as having significant radiological consequences.” They also identify potential problems with crane failure during the handling of the cylinders, “… and proposes to use bespoke forklift trucks in some instances to minimise the potential radiological consequence following a dropped load.” However, they say the main fault is the possibility of hydraulic rupture of a UF6 cylinder during processing, with subsequent release of radioactive material. Depleted HEX inside the cylinders reacts with the steel surface to produce a surface layer of iron fluoride, which supposedly inhibits internal corrosion. In 2013, Capenhurst Nuclear Services (now renamed URENCO Nuclear Stewardship) issued a notice to prospective contractors for a Legacy Container Facility, in which 14,000 tonnes of UF6 material (presumably depleted UF6) would be transferred “from existing/legacy type 0236 cylinders into 48Y cylinders. Regulatory expectations are to start commissioning and be fully operational in 2020 with an expected facility lifetime of 25 years”. Presumably that means that the amount of depleted HEX in old, corroded cylinders is 14,000 tonnes as the Tails Management Facility has not yet started operating. At the end of 2002, there were 435 0236-type cylinders stored on the Capenhurst site. For a while, between the late 1990s and 2011, export to Russia !14

represented the major disposition route for the depleted HEX generated in URENCO’s plants. The abstract12 of a highly technical paper written in 2004 by Peter Diehl from the WISE Uranium Project states: Since 1996, depleted uranium tails from West European enrichers Urenco and Eurodif are being sent to Russia for reenrichment. In Russia, the imported tails are, instead of natural uranium, fed into surplus enrichment cascades. The product obtained from re-enrichment is mostly natural-equivalent uranium plus some reactor-grade low-enriched uranium. These products are sent back to Urenco and Eurodif, while the secondary tails generated remain in Russia, where they are re-enriched further to obtain more naturalequivalent uranium and/or slightly enriched uranium. The latter is then used as blendstock for the downblending of surplus highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium into reactor-grade low-enriched uranium.” Eurodif was a French uranium enrichment plant that ceased operating in 2012. In January 2011, NGO Bellona reported that Russia would be terminating its contracts for reprocessing uranium tails. They say that the Russians had been thinking about setting up a depleted HEX reprocessing plant that would process 30,000 tonnes of tails annually, and that Russia was already home to 900,000 tonnes of depleted HEX. Sergei Kiriyenko, who at that time was head of Rosatom, Russian’s state nuclear corporation, is reported to have said that no decision had been made on whether to build a uranium tails reprocessing plant in Russia, partly because “uranium tails located in storage present almost no radioactive danger, but rather a real chemical one. If a plane crashed into the uranium tails storage site in Angarsk, Siberia, it would be a chemical catastrophe for the region.” Environmentalists had already pointed out this danger when protesting the transport of uranium tails through St Petersburg, he said. Kiriyenko noted that “at present Russia had no contracts to accept any more uranium tails and that there are no new contracts to do so.” The WISE website contains a wealth of information about enriched uranium and Russia13. If chemical danger poses a risk in Russia during storage of uranium tails, the same could apply to Capenhurst. !15


Tailings plant

Besides the depleted HEX that is stored in the 0236 legacy containers, depleted HEX has also accumulated in 48Y cylinders – and will continue to do so during the 25-year lifespan of the Tails Management Facility (TMF). As stated earlier, depleted HEX will be deconverted to remove the extra fluorine molecules from uranium hexafluoride to make uranium oxide, U3O8, and hydrogen fluoride (hydrofluoric acid) which will be sold off. However, this process is not 100% effective, so that tails may also contain trace quantities of HF and UF2O2, uranyl fluoride. The TMF is supposed to be fully operational by 2020, although the date has been postponed many times, and will continue until at least 2053. It will consist of a tails deconversion plant (TDP); a UF6 cylinder handling and storage facility (CHF); a UF6 cylinder wash facility (CWF); a decontamination and maintenance facility (DMF); a residues recovery facility (RRF), an effluent treatment plant (ETP) and a uranium oxide (U3O8) store (UOS). The uranium oxide will be received and dispatched in DV70 containers. Some of these will eventually be dispatched to URENCO’s plants at Gronau and Almelo. The DV70 containers, which are made of steel, have a volume of approximately 3-4 m3, typically hold 10 tonnes of uranium oxide, U3O8, and will be stored for up to 100 years. They will eventually be transferred to a national repository for final disposal, though this will not happen before 2120. URENCO have stated that they will process some 3,000 tonnes of depleted HEX a year, and also that the deconversion process will not be completed until 2053. URENCO has agreed a tails storage limit of 70,000 tonnes with the regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Presumably these calculations do not include the tails that will be produced in the meantime. Note that it is assumed that URENCO will stop enriching uranium in 2035, although this document14 stems from 2004 and URENCO may have changed their minds since then.


7. Storage of submarine reactors In 2016, it was announced that Capenhurst would be the site for the MOD’s Submarine Dismantling Project (SDP). A few years prior to the announcement, the MOD produced a factsheet15 detailing the advantages of Capenhurst as a location for the project, which involves interim storage of intermediate-level radioactive waste, as opposed to the other shortlisted sites (Aldermaston, Burghfield, Sellafield and Chapelcross). Four processes are involved, according to the factsheet. First, the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is removed from the submarine and placed in a “secure container” for transport. The RPV and container are then transported to the storage site by road, where they are stored until a geological disposal facility (GDF) becomes available, sometime after 2040. The RPVs are repackaged and sent for size reduction. The different types of radioactive waste arising are sent for disposal. One “advantage” of Capenhurst is that a detailed decommissioning strategy is already in place which includes the progressive refurbishment, decommissioning and demolition of a range of nuclear facilities as well as the appropriate treatment and disposal of wastes.


The Strategic Environmental Assessment reports that minor changes may be made to local roads. Capenhurst Nuclear Services (renamed URENCO Nuclear Stewardship after the decision was made to house the SDP at Capenhurst) said that the RPVs would be transported via the A51 and “through the village, thereby avoiding the Capenhurst bridge”. Moreover, “(T)here may be up to three RPV transports in the first year. Based on initial dismantling of the submarines at Rosyth and then those at Devonport, the long-term rate is expected to be around one a year thereafter. If there were some parallel work at Devonport and Rosyth, it could be around two a year for a few years.” RPVs from 27 nuclear submarines will be stored at Capenhurst.

BAE Trident Shipyard, Hiroshima Day August 2018


8. Close Capenhurst Campaign This booklet was produced by the Close Capenhurst Campaign (CCC), which was founded in 2013 by a number of groups and organizations. Their main aim is to close down URENCO’s Capenhurst enrichment plant, and to show how the plant is connected to the wider nuclear industry. The group is primarily concerned with the transport and use of uranium HEX, along with the transportation of nuclear waste by rail. CCC is endorsed by a number of groups: Japanese Against Nuclear – UK, Kick Nuclear, Nuclear Trains Action Group, and Radiation Free Lakeland. CCC is a direct descendant of earlier campaigns such as Stop URENCO. The latter published a URENCO Declaration in 1978, which CCC updated in 2018. The first Declaration was the following: As an alliance of groups and individuals, we declare our total and uncompromising opposition to URENCO. No safeguards are adequate to prevent the diversion of nuclear material for the production of nuclear weapons. The supply of enriched uranium is a particularly clear example of the way nuclear power threatens all living creatures and their natural environment, concentrates power in the hands of a few, necessitates a military style secrecy and undermines the principles of human liberty. This deal would be another irrevocable step towards a future of which we want no part. Our stand is in defence of the health and safety of ourselves, future generations, and all living things on this planet. We therefore demand an immediate halt to – 1. The plans to supply enriched uranium to Brazil. 2. The marketing of nuclear technology by URENCO. We declare our determination to – 1. Provoke public discussion about the operation of URENCO and all its contracts. 2. Prevent the importing of uranium mined in violation of the land rights of people anywhere in the world: e.g. Australia, Namibia and Brazil. And Announce that we are prepared to take all non-violent steps necessary to achieve these ends. The updated Declaration is shorter. It refers to the original statement, !18

then says: While URENCO continues to enrich Uranium and sell it to many countries around the world, we will continue to oppose these sales, much in the same way as we oppose all aspects of the nuclear power industry. Our immediate concerns are: 1. The increase of radioactive waste which is a direct result of uranium enrichment. and 2. How the proposed building on new nuclear reactors will result in the creation of yet more highly radioactive toxic waste. We continue to declare our opposition to URENCO and the nuclear power industry, and are prepared to take all non-violent steps necessary to achieve these ends. References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. attachment_data/file/603504/RORI_reportNB280317.pdf 7. 8. transportgenehmigungen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=30 9. bull27-1/27104592832.pdf. 10. Carefully_to_Carry/C2C_Articles_2018/ Radioactive_Uranium_Hexaflouride__UF6_.pdf 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. attachment_data/file/374903/Factsheet_Local__Capenhurst_20141111__V1_0.pdf For more details see •



Published by Wildart Books

ISBN 978-0-9571485-7-4 Close Capenhurst, c/o News from Nowhere, 96 Bold St, Liverpool, L1 4HY


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