The 12th Edition WCAPS Pipeline Joint Publication Program by Women of Color Advancing Peace & Security

PIPELINE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM PUBLICATION

FELLOWS/AUTHORS

Congratulations to these 2025 WCAPS Pipeline fellows for successfully completing the program!

Mennah

Mariam

Mercy

Noor

Oorebomi

Prerna

Nia

FELLOWS/AUTHORS

Congratulations to these 2025 WCAPS Pipeline fellows for successfully completing the program!

Rejoice Ruhama

Ruth

Sara

Ramani

Raiesa

Sarah

Tsion

Yara

Princessessa

WOMEN’SHEALTH

CHAPTER1: ConscriptionLawinMyanmar:AGatewayToViolationsofWomen’sRights

CHAPTER2: ThePowerofEarlyMindsetChange:AdvancingtheInclusionofWomenin PeaceandLeadershipPositionsinAfrica

CHAPTER3: HowOnlineCommunitiesFuelTheNormalizationofFemicideAndGenderBasedViolence

CHAPTER4: What“Counts”AsConflictRelatedSexualViolence?ADataFeminist ApproachToProblematizingTheDiscourse

CHAPTER5: TheViolenceAgainstAsianWomen

ViolenceAgainstSouthAsianStudentinKyrgyzstaninMay2024

HUMANRIGHTS

CHAPTER7: HasEthnicTensionsImprovedSinceSouthSudanGainIndependence?

CHAPTER8: NowhereToGo:DisplacedPersonsamidHaiti’sOngoingHumanitarianCrisis –RejectionRegionalCoordinationFailuresAmongCARICOMStates

CHAPTER9: TheProtectionofMigrants,RefugeesAndAsylumSeekersAlongThe MediterraneanSeaRoute

CHAPTER10: TheLayersofReconciliationInPost-AssadSyriaAndTheAssociatedPolicy Recommendations

CHAPTER11: TheArtofActivism!CraftingChangeThroughCreativeExpressionIn ConflictZones

CHAPTER12: AIInNationalSecurity:ConsequencesForMarginalizesCommunitiesinthe U.S

79 POLITICS

CHAPTER13: AreHarmfulStereotypes/PerceptionsofBlackWomenImpactingTheir PoliticalEfficacy?

113

PUBLICATION DISCLAIMER

The content presented in this publication is intended solely for informational purposes and should not be interpretedasprofessionaladviceorapoliticalposition endorsed by Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation. We encourage readers to conduct their own research and consult relevant experts or professionals to address their specificneedsandcircumstances.

This publication has been assembled by a collective of Pipeline Fellow authors as part of the Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation’s (WCAPS) Pipeline Fellowship Program obligations. Although the Pipeline Fellowship is the proprietary of Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation, the perspectives and viewpoints conveyed herein belong to the individual and group authors.Theydonotrepresenttheofficialstanceorpolicy position of WCAPS. As a result, WCAPS disclaims any responsibility for the content presented in this publication.

FOREWARD:

WomenofColorAdvancingPeace,Security,andConflictTransformation(WCAPS)remainssteadfastinitsmission toamplifythevoices,leadership,andlivedexperiencesofwomenofcolorwithinthecomplexandevolving landscapesofglobalpeaceandsecurity AtatimewhentheUnitedStatesandtheinternationalcommunityface mountingchallenges-fromprotractedconflictandforceddisplacementtotheriseofauthoritarianism,climatedriveninsecurity,andshiftingmultilateralframeworks-ourcommitmenttocultivatingequity-drivenleadershipis moreurgentthanever.

Asaforcemultiplierforourgrowingmembership,WCAPSservesasbothanincubatorandalaunchpad Wecreate spaceswherewomenofcolorcandialogue,buildcoalitions,developpolicysolutions,andleadthewayin transformingsystemsthathavelongexcludedthem.Ourprogramming-whetherthroughworkinggroups, mentorshipinitiatives,orfellowshipexperiences-centersnotjusttheprofessionaltrajectoryofourmembers,but alsotheirintellectualpower,culturalfluency,andcommitmenttojustice.

Foundedin2017byAmbassadorBonnieJenkins,WCAPSwasbornfromavisionthatequityinpeaceandsecurity mustgobeyondinclusion-itmustreflecttransformation.AmbassadorJenkins’beliefthatallpeopledeserve fairness,dignity,andvoiceiswovenintoeveryinitiativeweundertakeatWCAPS.ThroughWCAPS,womenofcolor nowhaveadedicatedplatformtoshapethenarrativesandpoliciesthatgovernconflictresolution,internationallaw, disarmament,publichealth,climatechangeandbeyond

Itiswithinthisspiritofcommunity,scholarship,andempowermentthattheWCAPSPipelineFellowshipProgram wascreated.Sinceitslaunchin2020,theprogramhassupportedemergingleadersindevelopinganuanced understandingofpeaceandsecurityframeworks-whilealsobuildingthetoolsandnetworksnecessaryforlongtermimpact Thisyear’sFellows,hailingfromfourcontinents,immersedthemselvesinanintensivecurriculum exploringtopicssuchastheWomen,Peace&Security(WPS)agenda,climateresilience,migration,disarmament technologies,andglobalgovernance.Intandem,theyparticipatedinprofessionaldevelopmentworkshopsanda thematicsimulation,allwhiledraftingthepolicy/researchpapersfeaturedinthisjointpublication.

Thesepapersrepresentmonthsofrigorousresearch,courageousinquiry,anddeeplypersonalengagementwith issuesthatarebothtimelyand,attimes,controversial.Theperspectivesexpressedreflectthediverseintellectual andlivedexperiencesoftheFellows,anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheofficialviewsorpolicypositionsof WCAPS.Werecognizethesensitivityofsometopicsdiscussed,andpresentthiscollectionasanoffering-astarting pointfordeeperdialogue,community-rootedinquiry,andinformedaction.

WCAPS,thePipelineTeam,isproudtosupportthecontinuedsuccessofthisprogramandtheextraordinary womenwhoareitsfoundation.Toourauthors,editors,facilitators,guestspeakers,andcommunityofsupporters: thankyou.Yourcontributionsbreathelifeintothevisionofamoreinclusive,just,andpeacefulworld.

CONTRIBUTORS

Program Manager

Jada Quinland | WCAPS Program Specialist | Supporting Editor

Publication Designer

Lourdes Sanchez | WCAPS Social Media & Communications Strategist

CONTRIBUTORS

Associate Editors

Thank you to our incredible 2025 editors for your time, care, and thoughtful guidance in supporting our fellows’ voices through the WCAPS Joint Publication.

AbigailOlvera|ForeignServiceOfficer

AditiPadiyar|ProgramOfficer

BushraKhan|ResearchFellowatTheAsiaFoundationandIMPRI

DaniellaTorres|Associate

DeyaniraMurga|ExecutiveDirector/Founder,LACRWorkingGroupCo-Chair

Dr.ChiomaAnorue|Lecturer

Dr.TahinaMontoya|FormerSeniorAdvisor,WhiteHouseOfficeofPublicEngagement

GazbiahSans|Director,PVEWorks

JosephineNanortey|IntelligenceAnalyst

KahsayNegash|AssistantProfessor

KarthikaPillai|ExecutiveDirector,TriniketanFoundationforDevelopment

KavithaNallathambi|SeniorAdvisor,PolicyandAdvocacy,ProjectHOPE

KevenHernandez|IndependentResearcher

KhayriyyahMuhammadSmith|PhilanthropyAdvisor

MaywadeeViriyapah|Artist:2024-2025EmergeArtist

CONTRIBUTORS

Associate Editors

Thank you to our incredible 2025 editors for your time, care, and thoughtful guidance in supporting our fellows’ voices through the WCAPS Joint Publication.

MercyMasanga|ConsultantinEnergyandNaturalResources

MillicentAwiti|GeneralManagerStrategyResearchandRisk

MokweElomoJemea|ConflictResolutionExpert/ProjectManager

NataliaBonilla|IndependentCommunicationsConsultant,FounderandProduceroftheWomanhood& InternationalRelationsPodcast

NaseemQader|President&CEO,5Q-Global|Member,BoardofDirectors

OmegaFrancis|WriterandEditor

OriolaOyewole|SeniorLecturer/EditorABUADJournalofPublic&InternationalLaw

RebeccaAsh-Cervantes|ProgramManager

RebeccaIrby|FounderandPresidentofPEACEInstitute&DirectorofTransformationalChangeatNewDetroit, ARacialJusticeOrganization

ShenéeSimon|Founder&CEOS.H.ECollective

TakivaPierce|SeniorPolicyAnalyst

YasmineDong|SeniorTradePolicyAdvisor

WOMEN’S HEALTH

CONSCRIPTIONLAWINMYANMAR:

Noor Afrose is a law postgraduate from Bangladesh University of Professionals and a researcher with the Platform for Peace and Humanity’s Indo-Pacific Programme. Her work focuses on human rights and humanitarian issues through a policy-centered approach. She has led research on human rights, legal frameworks, and geopolitical dynamics across South Asia with national and international organizations. Her key research interests include climate-induced displacement, gender-based violence, international criminal law, and legal protections for stateless persons.

CHAPTERONE

Executivesummary

Since the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, women have been experiencing increasingly severe prejudice, with gender-based violence, rape and mental brutality used as advanced weapons by the government. On 10 February 2024, the government enacted a conscription law that forced single women into military service, putting them at the frontlines of the conflict. As a result, women are using dangerous paths to flee the country or are entering child marriages, endangering their futures to avoid military service. Amendments should be made to the law so that women no longer need to be victims of such abuses. Immediate intervention by international organisations such as the UN is essential in assisting Myanmar in resolving this crisis and ensuring the safety and dignity of its women.

Introduction

Currently, the junta only controls 21% of Myanmar, while rebel forces hold 42%¹. To regain control over a weakening grip on the country, the junta in February 2024 passed a conscription law that included women in its military². This was a desperate move on the junta’s part, with its regime on the brink of collapse. The law was met by widespread opposition. Reports from Human Rights Watch³ and U.N. Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews in 2024 indicate that sexual violence and harassment against women in Myanmar on gender-specific grounds have increased, both within and outside state agencies⁴. Women have become more vulnerable to physical assault, especially in conflict areas, and their chances for participation in the political process and education have decreased. The implementation of the conscription law perpetuates women's rights violations, forcing them to flee, forcibly enter child marriage, and so forth.

CHAPTERONE

Inthiscontext,thispolicypaperwillexaminethemistreatmentofwomenresultingfromconscription lawsandsuggestpotentialsolutions.Itwillemployqualitativemethodsfortheanalysis,utilising researchfromliteratureandsecondarysources.

HumanRightsViolationsUnderMyanmar’sConscriptionLaw

Myanmar’s conscription law⁵ has caused widespread human rights violations, particularly against women and girls. Women between 18-27 years old and up to 35 for professionals like doctors and engineers are forced to join the military⁶. According to section 22 of the law, married and divorced women with children are exempted from conscription. But local reports say these exemptions are being ignored and authorities in Yangon are making lists of eligible women, including those in high school,⁷ married and pregnant⁸. A random lottery system is used to conscript two women from each village, violating Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which prohibits forced labour⁹. Conscripting pregnant women is also a violation of Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which guarantees reproductive health rights¹⁰.

The forced conscription of women has led to displacement, with many fleeing to Thailand using unsafe routes to cross the border after the government shut down legal passageways to leave the country,¹¹ increasing the risk of arrest and human trafficking. On 19 February 2024, two women died in a stampede at a passport office in Mandalay as people rushed to escape the conscription¹². According to the Thai media on 13 March 2024, Thai authorities Myanmar women, including those escaping military conscription in Kanchanaburi¹³. And the UN noted in July 2024 that human trafficking is on the rise, saying that traffickers are targeting the “extremely vulnerable” women who are trying to escape¹⁴.

CHAPTERONE

ThisisagainstthePalermoProtocolwhichobligesstatestopreventandeliminatetrafficking.Also, Myanmar’sconscriptionlawhasledtoforcedandchildmarriagesaswomenandgirlsseemarriageas theironlywayoutofmilitaryservice.Despitereportsofmarriedwomengettingconscripted,the BurmeseWomen’sUnionreportsthatmanygirls,whowouldnototherwisemarry,feelforcedtodoso outoffearofconscription¹⁵.AyounggirlfromSouthShanStatesaid,“Iamnotbeingforcedintothis marriage,butifIdon’thaveawaytorunawayabroad,thenIwillbeimpossible.”¹⁶Thesepractices violateinternationallaws,theUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(Article16)andtheConvention ontheRightsoftheChild(Article19)whichprotectagainstforcedmarriageandchildren’srightto safetyandeducation.

Recommendations

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must apply diplomatic pressure on Myanmar to amend the law. Diplomatic pressure can be exerted through economic sanctions and travel restrictions on military personnel.

ASEAN, together with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), must prepare a temporary regional solution for Myanmar women fleeing the military draft, which should include safe asylum routes, immediate refugee status determination, and emergency shelters in Thailand and neighbouring countries. ASEAN must apply diplomatic pressure on Myanmar and Thailand to respect international refugee protections and prohibit arrests of those fleeing conscription.

In conjunction with ASEAN, the UN Human Rights Council must send a special task force to document conscription-related abuses, holding abusers accountable through targeted sanctions and preparing them for prosecution. Finally, in addition to an ASEAN-led negotiation framework to end the violence, humanitarian organisations must be granted access to affected areas without restrictions from the army.

Conclusion

•

Myanmar’s conscription law is a systematic violation of Myanmar women's rights under international human rights treaties ratified by the Myanmar government, notably including ICCPR, CEDAW, CRC and UDHR. The law has resulted in a human rights crisis for the country by exposing women to forced recruitment, gender-based violence, human trafficking, and coerced marriage. The law is inconsistent with Myanmar's obligations under customary international law and violates the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. This law will continue to strip women of their dignity, strengthen gender oppression, and put vulnerable populations at risk if not acted upon and repealed immediately. International action through sanctions and increased protections for refugees is urgently needed to limit these abuses. Lastly, International mechanisms for accountability can play a crucial role including the International Criminal Court (ICC), which can prosecute systematic human rights abuses, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which can initiate investigations, and CEDAW’s monitoring committee, which can hold Myanmar accountable for gender-based discrimination under international law.

REFERENCES

Voice of America. (2024, May 24). Myanmar’s rebels closing in around junta into fi@h year of civil war. VOA

News. Retrieved from hEps://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-s-rebels-closing-in-around-junta-into-fi@h-year of-civilwar-/7958145.html

ABC News. (2024, February 13). Why Myanmar’s junta is enforcing conscripUon. ABC News. hEps://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-02-13/why-myanmar-junta-enforcingconscripUon/103456044

Human Rights Watch. (2024). World report 2024: Myanmar. Human Rights Watch. hEps://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/myanmar#49dda6.

Andrews, T. H. (2024, March 14). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situauon of human rights in Myanmar. United Nations Human Rights Council. hEps://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country reports/ahrc5565-report-special-rapporteursituaUon-human-rights-myanmar-thomas-h

BBC News. (2024, February 9). Myanmar coup: Why the military is struggling to hang on to power. BBC. hEps://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68261709.

6 The People’s Military Law (State Peace and Development Council Law No. 27/2010).

7 The Irrawaddy. (2025, January 29). Lis;ng of conscrip;on-age women spreads across Myanmar. The Irrawaddy. hEps://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/lisUng-of-conscripUon-age-womenspreads-across myanmar.html

The Irrawaddy. (2024, February 5). Myanmar junta registering women ahead of possible conscripUon. The Irrawaddy. hEps://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-juntaregistering-women-ahead-of-possible conscripUon.html?

InternaUonal Covenant on Civil and PoliUcal Rights (ICCPR). United NaUons. (1966). Interna;onal Covenant on Civil and Poli;cal Rights, Ar;cle 8.

InternaUonal Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). United NaUons. (1966). Interna;onal Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Ar;cle 12.

HURFOM. (2024, May 7). Force to Fight: Military ConscripUon in Southeastern Burma. HURFOM. hEps://progressivevoicemyanmar org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/F2F HURFOM pdf

Presse, F.A. (2024, February 19). Two Killed in Crush as Hundreds Queue for Passports in Myanmar. VOA News. hEps://www.voanews.com/a/two-killed-in-crush-as-hundreds-queue-for-passports-in myanmar/7493200 html>

HURFOM. (2024, May 7). Force to Fight: Military ConscripUon in Southeastern Burma. HURFOM. hEps://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/wp content/uploads/2024/05/F2F HURFOM.pdf.

Andrews, T. H. (2024, March 14). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situaUon of human rights in Myanmar. United Na;ons Human Rights Council. hEps://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country reports/ahrc5565-report-special-rapporteur-situaUon-human-rights-myanmar-thomas-h

Burma Women's Union. (2024). ConscripUon law and its impact on women . Burma Women's Union. hEps://burmesewomensunion.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/conscripUon-law2eng OpUmize.pdf

THEPOWEROFEALRYMINDSETCHANGE:

Rejoice Makaudze is the volunteer Deputy Director of the Pan African Dialogue Institute (Nigeria) and serves in the African Women and Gender Commission. She holds a PhD in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, a Master’s in Peace and Governance, and a Bachelor of Arts with Education. With over a decade of experience in research both desktop and fieldwork she has worked with various NGOs across Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Kenya A recipient of a CODESRIA research grant (2017), she was also recognized as the best graduating student in her master’s program (2011).

editedby: NataliaBonilla

Abstract

Introduction CHAPTERTWO

This research analyses the importance of mindset change in women and girls as one of the ways to increase their participation in peace processes and political leadership positions. The objective was to see how patriarchal norms and values have affected the participation of women in peace processes and leadership positions. The research identified these norms and values and how they can be changed. It identified that women participation in peace processes and leadership remains significantly hindered by deep-rooted patriarchal norms, societal norms and gender biases in Africa. This has been an area of concern because, despite the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which advocates for the participation of women in the political field and inclusion in peacebuilding, women continue to be marginalized in these spaces. The paper will analyse the importance of changing mindsets and shifting patriarchal values. It explores the importance of advocacy, education and how a few women have succeeded in leading peace processes which shows the importance of women inclusion. Case studies from South Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda have shown the importance of women inclusion in peace building and their motivation to other women. The research gave examples of how a few African women have empowered themselves and are slowly entering the political space and how their involvement has led to peace negotiations.

This paper analyses the correlation that exists between mindset change in women and their involvement in peace processes, empowerment, and leadership in the African context. Lack of confidence in themselves, lack of advocacy and education, African cultural beliefs, values and norms have caused some less participation in leadership positions and peace processes. Evidence has shown that most peace processes are often led by men in power positions with the deliberate exclusion and/or limited involvement of women in the different stages from preparation, negotiation to ceasefire and post-conflict recovery. An example is that of Thabo Mbeki leading the Zimbabwe peace process 2008, former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, ex Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and ex Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo have been appointed facilitators of the peace processes in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This paper will analyse how challenging common patriarchal and unequal gender norms from an early age can play a role in the inclusion and engagement of women and girls in peace processes and leadership positions.

CHAPTERTWO

It will address how the lack of awareness on patriarchal mindset can negatively impact women’s agency in politics as well as their personal lives, frequently undermining their credibility and confidence in themselves and, ultimately, discouraging them to running for office in leadership positions in negative and positive peace times.

Literature Review

Ogar (2018) observed that within the traditional African setting, at peacetime, women are more consigned to domestic duties such as her role as the mother of the home, provider of basic needs in the family and even peacemaker in the family, and at the community level following the prevailing culture. This, however, should also send a message that women are great peacemakers. Custodians of patriarchal societal norms are mainly traditional and religious leaders, the majority of whom are still male. Men in the family - fathers, fathersinlaw, husbands and brothers- reinforce these norms. Patriarchy is so deep that women end up reinforcing these deep norms. The public generally views politics as a public “male” domain relegating women to the role of wife, mother and caregiver within the “private sphere” of the home and women often find it very difficult to be involved in the political space This line of thought holds that women's domestic responsibilities preclude them from having enough time to devote to politics. Women who go into politics are often criticized by the public and not easily accepted. The public perceives politics to be a “rough” game, with violence as a given. In rural Koinadugu district, Sierra Leone, it is taboo for a woman to inherit or purchase land, rent a house in her own name, stand for a political position, or speak in meetings. No woman had ever represented the Koinadugu district in the nation's Parliament. However, the OECD's SIGI 2021 Regional Report for Africa highlights a different attribute where they believe there is a correlation between discriminatory attitudes towards women's political leadership and their underrepresentation in parliaments. They also agree that societal norms and gender roles significantly hinder women's political participation. For example, “Discrimination in the family” captures social institutions that limit women’s decision- making power and undervalue their status in the household and the family’. This therefore weakens women’s confidence and participation. The problem is the deeply rooted traditional gender roles and norms which both limit women’s engagement in the political, leadership life and peace processes.

CHAPTERTWO

The traditional and patriarchal gender norms generally assign men the role of household heads and women are assigned the role of caretakers and unpaid domestic workers with limited decision-making power in private and public spheres as compared to the men. As a result, this dynamic, passed on through generations, sends a message to women and girls that even within the public sphere their voice has less priority, affecting their involvement in both peace processes and leadership roles. With all this in consideration, it is still important to understand mindset change is crucial. The report highlights how addressing mindset change at an early stage from primary level to tertiary level, through advocacy and education, helps women and girls believe and understand they have equal opportunities as well as the men. When mindset change is achieved, participation of the girl child can increase from a young age, helping raise -future women leaders of tomorrow. In September 2023, the World Bank published an article by Narayan D, “Changing Mindsets will change the world, when it comes to gender equality”, explaining one of the major issues that need to be addressed to empower women to promote their active involvement in peace processes. Narayan D argued that men have been largely absent from most large-scale women’s empowerment approaches. It has been identified that when men are educated and involved and treated with compassion, respect and good communication skills, they challenge the patriarchal norms and behaviours and are more receptive to accept women as positive contributors and leaders in peace processes.

Method

This research employs a qualitative method approach to examine how education and advocacy can help change mindsets in a bid to empower women and girls and increase their participation in peace processes. It focused on desktop research on a few African countries like Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.

Findings

Patriarchy can be found in African cultures, particularly in the promotion of imbalanced power dynamics whereby men are regarded as superiors, head of households and/or leaders in public and private spaces, and women are expected and subjected to take a submissive and inferior role. This has caused women’s absence and withdrawal from leadership positions in peace processes.

CHAPTERTWO

Darfur, a western region of Sudan, has seen for decades men making all political and economic decisions and relegating women to domestic spheres. This has led to a minor participation of women in peace processes and leadership positions in peace negotiations, specifically in the Ceasefire Agreement (2004), the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in 2006, and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) in 2011. According to the Afrobarometer survey 2024, in Uganda women are less likely than men to have progressed to secondary education. According to the report, “These disadvantages may reflect vestiges of social norms and behaviours that negatively affect girls’ educational opportunities. About one in six Ugandans (16%) say girls are “often” or “always” prevented from attending school because their families prioritise boys’ education, although 83% say this “rarely” or “never” happens”. These have caused less inclusion of women in peace processes and leadership. While women make up half of Uganda’s population, they hold only 34% of seats in Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024). However, the UN Women’s report 2018 on ’The status of women movement in Africa’, stated that involving women in peace processes has increased the probability of the peace agreement lasting longer and improved their opportunities of engaging in leadership development and positions. However, it states that this can only be possible if the communities are educated and understand that the girl child can be given equal opportunities to the boy child and be able to equally explore the world which is what patriarchy is not giving. The report further argues that African states and public institutions are a result of the efforts of women’s movements and that their involvement in peace processes can benefit societies in post-conflict scenarios and reparative justice processes, slowly making inroads into the continent’s power dynamics.

Discussion

It is important to note that mindset change can be one of the answers to women taking up leadership roles and being involved in peace processes, challenging societal deep-rooted beliefs and norms. For example, beliefs that need to change include from ‘women are naturally fitted for supportive roles’ to ‘women are equally capable leaders’; ‘women can equally balance work and home’ and are not to be associated only as ‘home keepers’ and ‘carers’. The UN Women 2018 report analyses the contributions of African revolutionaries, accepting that focus on empowerment of women is very rare. Focus is mainly on male figureheads, leaving the African women out of the equation.

CHAPTERTWO

However, despite all these challenges of male dominance, there are significant women in the fight for women empowerment. A growth mindset encourages women to believe in their abilities and potential by fostering self confidence. Women with a positive mindset can now tackle opportunities that were previously believed they are beyond their reach.” Women who actively confront and redefine societal stereotypes and gender roles can contribute to a more inclusive leadership landscape and allow women to be empowered and lead peace processes. Juba peace talks led by Ugandan Ruth Ojiambo led to grassroot networks and contributed to the peace of Uganda”.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to note that as much as peace processes are often complex and context specific, if the goal in conflict situations is that of having peace in the society, then it makes sense that individuals and groups who seek peace and who represent diversity of the citizenry participate including women. Women and girls should be actively involved and government, private and civil society programs must be in place to boost their participation and confidence in public conversations and leadership positions regarding peace. Advocacy and education are essential for African women to move away from patriarchal harmful norms and become leaders and great peace negotiators in their countries, region and beyond. As mindset is changed and shifted from the deep rooted African patriarchal norms and values, women start to view themselves and the world, in a more equal and empowering perspective. The study recommends that Women should stop seeing themselves from the position of weakness and should engage in activities that will tend to emphasize their positive contribution to the society particularly in their role as peace agents. This research therefore concludes that to have more women inclusion and mindset change there is need to include engaging with men as allies. This means convincing men of the contribution that women make to the national agenda when men share decision-making power with women. It also means engaging with men to adopt more positive and collaborative masculinity. There are encouraging signs of moves to encourage positive masculinity emanating from the level of the African Union, but such endeavours need wide publicity through advocacy and education. This includes engaging with traditional and religious leaders as individuals and through their representative bodies to begin the slow process of challenging entrenched gender norms.

CHAPTERTWO

REFERENCES

Afrobarometer, (2014), “Ugandan women still face barriers to equality in education, employment, and politics”, Social Research and Integrated Business Consultancy, Netherlands

Ahmad, Neven; & Pinar Tank (2020),“Women's Participation in Peace Processes”, GPS Gender, and Mediation Backgrounder.

Christine Bell, (2013), “Women and peace processes, negotiations, and agreements: operational opportunities and challenges”, Policy Brief (Oslo, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, pp. 2-3.

Available from https://noref.no/Publications/ Themes/Peace- processes-and-mediation/Womenand-peace-processes-negotiations-and-agreements- operational-opportunities-and-challenges

https://unmik unmissions org/%E2%80%98changing-mindsets%E2%80%99-women-leaderssupport-each-other-lift-their-voices

Graduate Institute Geneva, (2016) “ Inclusive Peace and Transition Series: Women in Peace and Transition Processes”, Geneva , Switzerland, pp4-8pp IDEA, (2024) ,“Africa Barometer: Women’s Political Participation: Second Edition”, Sweden.

International Alert, (2023), “Breaking the gender Trap: Challenging patriarchal norms to clear pathways of peace ” , London. United Kingdom

International Peace Institute, (2015), “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peace Processes”. New York, USA

Institute for Women Peace and Security (2015), “Women Leading Peace”, Georgetown International Peace Institute (2015), “Reimagining Peace Making: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes”, New York, pp9

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2024), “Women’s Political Participation: Africa Barometer 2024: Second Edition”, Sweden

OECD (2021), “SIGI 2021 Regional Report for Africa, Social Institutions and Gender Index”, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/a6d95d90-en.

Ogar O T, (2018), “Traditional Roles of African Women in Peace Making and Peace Building: An Evaluation”. Abuja, Nigeria

https://philarchive.org/archive/IBOTRO

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence”, Research paper (New York, 2012), pp. 1-3, 5.

United Nations, (2010), “Achieving Gender Equality, Women’s Empowerment and Strengthening Development Cooperation”, New York , USA

United Nations , (2018), “The Status of Women Movement in Africa,’’ Policy briefhttps:// africa.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/policy briefthe status of women movement in africa pdf

United States Institute of Peace (2011), “The Role of Women in Global Security”, Washington DC

CHAPTERTWO

United Nations, (2016), “ Women Too Often Omitted from Peace Processes, Despite Key Role in Preventing Conflict, Forging Peace, Secretary – General Tells Security Council”, United Nations. 2021. ‘Realizing Women’s 30 per cent Quota, Political Participation in Somalia: A ‘Game Changer” For Sustainable Peace.” Security Council (8867 TH MEETING SC.14648).

United Nations, (2024), “Women Must be Involved in Peace Processes, Participate in Decision Making on Equal Footing with Men, President Tells Security Council open Debate. https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15862.doc.htm

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2020), “Women’s Participation key to effective peacekeeping and Peacebuilding”, Viet Nam World Bank (2020),” Education for Global development: Changing Mindsets”. USAA

GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

HOWONLINECOMMUNITIES FUELTHENORMALIZATIONOF FEMICIDEANDGENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

Mercy Komen is a researcher dedicated to driving tangible change through knowledge and policy influence She holds a Bachelor's in Economics and is currently pursuing a Master's in Economics at the University of Nairobi. She serves as an Officer in Research and Consultancy at the Kenya National Commission for UNESCO, where she manages the Commission’s bi-annual journal and supports research initiatives aligned with UNESCO’s thematic areas

A strong advocate for African researchers, Mercy works to ensure their insights move beyond library shelves to shape policies for Africa, by Africa. She is passionate about leveraging digital platforms to amplify African voices and influence decisionmaking across the continent. Committed to fostering knowledge-driven progress, she aspires to lead efforts that empower Africa to shape its future through research and innovation onsectetur adipiscing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua.

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Abstract

Social media platforms have transformed communication and interaction yet simultaneously facilitated the perpetuation of femicide. This paper examines how social media is used to lure women into dangerous situations, such as predators employing fake profiles to establish contact, and amplify harmful narratives, like blaming victims, that normalize violence against women in Africa. The study highlights the urgent need for stronger online safety measures and the creation of safe online spaces for women.

The research analyzes specific cases and content trends to demonstrate the correlation between online interactions and real-world violence. It proposes a multifaceted approach involving platform accountability, media literacy education, and community support programs to combat this issue. Ultimately, this paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the intersection between social media and femicide, informing interventions and policies that protect women in the digital age

Introduction

In an era defined by digital connectivity, social media platforms like TikTok, Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook have become central to our daily lives, fundamentally reshaping how we interact and communicate. But this interconnectedness has a darker side: the platforms have also emerged as potential breeding grounds for gender-based violence, leading fatal towards fatal consequences for women across Africa.

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The World Health Organization defines femicide as the deliberate murder of women simply for being women, while wider definitions can encompass all killings of women or girls. An estimated 51,100 women and girls worldwide were murdered in 2023 by their intimate partners or family members; of these deaths, Africa had the highest number, at 21,700. According to data from Femicide Count Kenya, 504 women were murdered in Kenya alone between 2019 and 2024. Although social media accounts are a useful tool to raise awareness and fight femicide, this paper argues that social media accounts are also part of the femicide on rise, as they perpetuate misogeny, reinforce predation behaviours and maintain the cycle thus reducing the perception of violence

Literature Review

The likelihood of social media being used for harmful purposes increases with the number of users it attracts (Smith and Anderson, 2020). According to Jones (2020), while it may be difficult to directly blame social media for the murders that have taken place, it has undoubtedly created spaces that facilitate dangerous encounters. It provides platforms where strangers can meet, where violent crimes are sometimes broadcast, and where harmful content can escalate real-world violence. The rise of social media over the past decade has coincided with an increase in hate crimes and loss of life, making it hard to ignore its role in these tragedies. Would these murders have happened if social media had never existed? (Jones, 2020). According to Boonzaier (2023), media representations reflect and influence public discourse, ultimately shaping how society perceives and responds to issues. Consequently, they can either reinforce harmful stereotypes or challenge them. In the South African context, certain recurring narratives have emerged, including the notion that women are to blame for their own victimization and that they live lives inherently fraught with danger (Boonzaier, 2023).

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Methodology

This research adopts a qualitative approach involving desktop research and case study analysis to examine the role of social media in perpetuating femicide in Africa. Qualitative research is valuable for exploring the cultural, social, and psychological aspects of femicide (Mpinga et al., 2016). Information was examined from secondary sources such as academic journals, reports, and news articles (Denscombe, 2003). Two case studies from South Africa and Kenya were selected to highlight the impact of social media, as these countries have recently experienced high numbers of femicide cases (Torkzadeh, Zolfagharian & Iyer, 2021). The case studies shed light on complex questions and provide insights into unexplored areas of research (Brown-Luthango et al., 2017).

Research and Findings

Social Media as a Tool for Luring Women into Deadly Traps

While being a meaningful tool for social interaction, Social media has not only been a meaningful tool for social interaction, but it has also become an equally dangerous platform for predators in luring women into deadly traps (Makinde et al., 2021). They can create fake profiles and send misleading messages to build fake relationships; thus, they take an advantage of the anonymity and trust of social media platforms (Okech, 2021).

Cases can be found in Kenya, for example, where there's been several recent femicide cases linked in one form or other to the use of social media (Mutie, 2019). This is due to the fact that they can exploit the anonymity and trust of social media platforms by creating fake profiles and sending deceitful messages to establish false relationships. Cases can be seen in Kenya, where there have been a number of recent femicide cases tied in one way or another to the use of social media.

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A university student was murdered, with her body dismembered and found dumped in a trash can after being lured by the perpetrator through the social media app Instagram (Aljazeera, 2024). In the same month, a social media influencer was also brutally murdered at an Airbnb in Nairobi, with the perpetrator being identified as a serial abuser who lured women through a dating app called Tagged (Citizen News, 2024). Such cases highlight the dark side of social media platforms and cement the urgent need for improved safety measures as well as awareness campaigns to ensure that women are protected from such fatal schemes. More importantly, its reflective of the issue at hand, not just in Africa but across continents. (Weli, 2016).

The Role of Social Media in Amplifying Harmful Narratives

Social media platforms have becoming championing tools on various challenges facing the continent. Although these platforms have been used to mobilize movements such as #MeToo and #EndGBV, they have also been weaponized to spread harmful narratives. They have created echo chambers where misogynistic views are reinforced. In 2023, an investigation by Global Witness and the South African Public Interest Law firm indicated that Facebook, X, TikTok, and YouTube approved adverts featuring misogynistic hate speech against female journalists in South Africa. These ads were violent and sexualized, referring to women as prostitutes and calling for them to be beaten (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2023). In addition, social media has been used to justify femicide by blaming victims for their own deaths. Spies (2020) indicates that popular media platforms in South Africa have framed femicide as isolated incidents as opposed to systemic problems rooted in the socio-ecological context of male dominance. This lack of moderation creates an environment where femicide is normalized, making it more difficult to challenge these behaviours in real life. Posts that glorify violence against women, if left unchecked, allow these narratives to gain traction and ultimately lead to the loss of lives.

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Discussions

The foregoing cases portray a dual role of social media in perpetuating femicide in Africa. (Aishatu, 2023). Moreover, they align with literature on the role of social media in driving femicide. This is echoed by a study by Iyer (2020) et al indicating that 39.3%of respondents were either somewhat concerned or very concerned about their safety online; (28.2%) of the respondents reported having become more concerned with their digital safety over the past 5 years, with 51.6% attributing this change to either having experienced or witnessed accounts of online violence and attacks. Of importance to note is that literature in this specific realm is very scarce, as many studies look into how social media is being used to counter femicide while ignoring the other side of the spectrum. Nevertheless, there is a need for stepping stones to address the underlying issue as such realities are brought to light through a number of strategies, including:

Strengthening Platform Moderation and Accountability: Social media platforms must enforce stricter content moderation policies to identify and remove harmful content, including misogynistic hate speech, fake profiles as well as posts glorifying violence against women. Also, algorithms should be refined to detect and flag such content proactively.

Promoting Digital Literacy and Awareness Campaign. Stakeholders in the social media space ought to launch targeted awareness campaigns to educate women on how they can protect themselves while using social media and how they can identify potential red flags, verify online identities, and reporting suspicious behaviour. Digital literacy programs can empower women to navigate social media safely and critically evaluate the content they encounter.

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Implementing Verification Systems. Social media platforms should introduce mandatory identity verification for users, particularly on dating apps and other high-risk platforms. This would reduce the anonymity that predators exploit to create fake profiles and deceive victims.

Conclusion

Social media, while transformative, has become a dangerous enabler of femicide in Africa, with predators exploiting its anonymity to lure women (Makinde et al., 2021) and perpetuate harmful narratives normalizing violence (The harrowing experiences discussed mirror those that often go unreported or underreported. Therefore, it's crucial to act; stricter content moderation (Mutie, 2019), identity verification (Mbinjama, 2023), and digital literacy campaigns are urgently needed. Collaboration between social media platforms, governments, and civil society is essential to hold perpetrators accountable and challenge these systemic issues. By taking decisive action and implementing these strategies, we can work towards transforming social media into a safer space for women across Africa and the world.

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References

Aishatu, A (2023) Dynamics Of Violence Against Women Focus in Africa: Femicide in IṢẸAKOZI, 137.

Al Jazeera. (2024, January 27). Femicide in Kenya: What’s causing an epidemic of violence against women https://www aljazeera com/news/2024/1/27/femicide-in-kenya-whats- causing-thefrequent-murders-of-women

Boonzaier, F. A. (2023). Spectacularising narratives on femicide in South Africa: A decolonial feminist analysis. Current Sociology, 71(1), 7896. https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921221094763

Brown-Luthango, M., Reyes, E., & Gubevu, M. (2017). Informal settlement upgrading and safety: experiences from Cape Town, South Africa. Journal of housing and the built environment, 32, 471-493.

Business and Human Rights Resource Centre. (2023). Report alleges social media platforms approve violent misogynistic hate speech ads targeting women journalists in South Africa. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/report-alleges-social-media- platformsapprove-violent-misogynistic-hate-speech-ads-targeting-women-journalists-in- south-africa/

Citizen Digital News. (2024). Two more women report assault cases by John Matara, Starlet Wahu’s suspected killer https://www citizen digital/news/two-more-women-report-assaultcases-by-john-matara-starlet-wahus-suspected-killer-n334382

Iyer, N., Nyamwire, B., & Nabule, S. (2020). Alternate realities, alternate internets: African feminist research for a feminist internet. APC & International Development Research Centre. Jones, B. (2020). The influence of social media on murder (Master’s thesis, California State University). California State University ScholarWorks. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/1123

Karsten Müller, Carlo Schwarz, Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime, Journal of the European Economic Association, 19, 2131–2167, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa045

Makinde, O. A., Olamijuwon, E., Ichegbo, N. K., Onyemelukwe, C., & Ilesanmi, M. G. (2021). The nature of technology-facilitated violence and abuse among young adults in Sub-Saharan Africa. In J. Bailey, A. Flynn, & N. Henry (Eds.), The Emerald international handbook of technology-facilitated violence and abuse (pp. 83–101). Emerald Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.1108/978-183982-848-520211005

Martyn Denscombe (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects. Buckingham. Graduate Journal of Social Science, 2(1).

Mbinjama, A. (2023). Hashtag Feminism: Challenging Rape and Femicide in South Africa. In Difficult Death, Dying and the Dead in Media and Culture (pp. 133-147). Cham: Springer International Publishing

Mpinga, E. K., Macias, A., Hasselgard-Rowe, J., Kandala, N. B., Félicien, T. K., Verloo, H., & Chastonay, P. (2016). Female genital mutilation: a systematic review of research on its economic and social impacts across four decades. Global health action, 9(1), 31489. Mutie, S. M. (2021). 5 Femicide and judging Social media as an alternative online court in Kenya. Gender, Judging and the Courts in Africa: Selected Studies.

Okech, A (2021) Feminist digital counter publics: Challenging femicide in Kenya and South Africa. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 46(4), 1013-1033. ReliefWeb. (2024). Coalition against sexual violence calls on Government of Kenya to act to end femicide and violence against women in Kenya. Retrieved from https://reliefweb int/report/kenya/coalition-against-sexual-violence-calls-government- kenyaactend-femicide-and-violence-against-women-kenya

Smith, A , & Anderson, M (2020) Social media use 2018: Demographics and statistics Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in2018/

Spies, A. (2020). The portrayal of victims of intimate femicide in the South African media. Journal of African Media Studies, 12(1), 41–59 https://doi org/10 1386/jams 00014 1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & United Nations Women. (2023). Femicides in 2023: Global estimates of intimate partner and family-related femicides. https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2024-11/femicides-in-2023-global- estimates-ofintimate-partner-family-member-femicides-en.pdf

Weil, S. (2016). Making femicide visible. Current Sociology, 64 (7), 1124-1137. World Health Organization. (2023). Understanding and addressing violence against women. https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/77421/WHO RHR 12.38 eng.pdf;jsessi onid=763AEB771AE8DFC8085E608B29D1DD55?sequence=1

Prerna is a PhD candidate in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, with a research focus on conflict-related sexual violence.

With a strong background in public policy, she has worked with Swaniti Initiative and a Member of Parliament on climate change and human rights issues. She specializes in politics and governance, human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, and conflict analysis. Her roles have included Political Strategist, Research Analyst, Programme Lead for SGBV interventions, and Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist

Prerna holds an M A in Conflict Transformation from the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding (USA) and a B.A. in Political Science from Miranda House, Delhi University.

PRERNABARUA

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Abstract

Conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) is an alarmingly common practice of warfare, with reported instances across conflicts worldwide. This recognition has led to an increased focus of the scholarly and programming community on defining as well as understanding the causes, motivations, and variances of CRSV. This paper seeks to analyze and problematize what “counts” as CRSV, using qualitative methods. It posits that the use of non-feminist data collection methods has led to a heightened focus of sexual violence in the locus of international/non-international armed conflicts. An extensive literature review, reveals that the definitions of CRSV in the existing programming and scholarly discourse, focus primarily on international/non-international armed conflicts, which renders sexual violence occurring in “low-intensity” conflicts invisible.

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Since May 2023, in a recent flare up of the protracted conflict in Manipur², a 19-year-old woman was raped and assaulted by a mob, due to her ethnic identity³. However, such instances of sexual violence in Northeast⁴ India, a conflict-affected region often described as experiencing "internal disturbances," remain largely unaddressed within existing programmatic and academic discourses on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). As the data feminism scholars have theorized, “what gets counted, counts,” the heightened focus of sexual violence in the locus of international/non-international armed conflicts has constrained the CRSV discourse, prioritizing certain regions and conflicts while marginalizing others (D'ignazio, & Klein, 2023).

Inspired by the ongoing sexual violence in Manipur’s conflict, I turn to a consequential research puzzle in the study of violent conflict what counts as CRSV, and does this reflect the reality of conflicts across the world? Answering this question may have valuable theoretical and practical implications, as the framing of ‘conflicts’ in the CRSV discourse often fails to account for the global realities today. The current research and policy discourse on CRSV has been limited to regions facing civil wars, and international armed conflicts, neglecting sexual violence in “low-intensity”⁵ conflicts, such as those in Manipur. Manipur’s conflict has officially remained below the threshold levels of violence and armed group organization required to be labelled as a non-international armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL), has been termed an “ethnic conflict”⁶ and an internal disturbance. While this points to a larger issue of non-feminist data classification systems, this paper

2 A state in Northeast India.

3 See: https://thediplomat.com/2023/08/in-manipur-women-are-both-victims-and-perpetrators-of-sexual-violence/

4 Northeast India, comprises eight states Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Nagaland, and Tripura This region has historically faced marginalization and exclusion, and has been marred by conflict in the form of insurgency, communal tensions, separatism, and inter-ethnic violence

5 I use the term ‘low-intensity’ conflicts to refer to any situations of heightened violence which do not meet the definitional thresholds of international/non-international armed conflicts I (with the intention of being ironic) use the term “lowintensity” conflict for the situation in Manipur, which is facing extensive violence currently.

6 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (n d ) Kuki-Meitei Dyad Summary Retrieved from: https://ucdp uu se/nonstate/12228

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limits itself to the neglect of sexual violence in such conflicts within the current CRSV discourse (Goswami, 2022).

The focus upon certain conflicts in the CRSV discourse implies that sexual violence which occurs during conflicts which do not meet the definitional thresholds for international/non-international armed conflicts are not afforded protections under IHL, and need to be prosecuted as “ordinary crimes” under national (domestic) legal frameworks. Unfortunately, domestic legal frameworks are often severely insufficient for addressing grave harms such as CRSV (Ribeiro & Ponthoz, 2017). Similarly, scholarly focus on the subject has also limited itself to international/non-international armed conflicts, indicating limited research and recognition afforded to CRSV in low-intensity conflicts. There is thus an urgent need to reconceptualize the idea of the “conflict” in CRSV using feminist data collection methods to robustly address instances of CRSV across regions (Wibben et al, 2019).

This research paper aims to problematize the definitions of CRSV, as proposed in the academic and programming discourse, contributing to a key research gap. I use qualitative methods in order to capture and problematize what counts as CRSV in the current academic discourse, using the theories of data feminism. The first section outlines the methodology used. The next sections represent a comprehensive literature review of the existing scholarly definitions of CRSV, and policy and the programmatic discourse on CRSV. The final section concludes.

Methodological Framework

A literature review serves as the primary methodological tool, allowing for the critical synthesis of existing academic works, reports, and relevant documents. This approach has facilitated the comprehensive understanding of the current academic and programmatic definitions and general discourse on CRSV. Various databases such as JSTOR, Scopus, Sage, EBSCO, and others were utilized in order to search for keywords (and their variants) such as

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“conflict related sexual violence”, “wartime rape ” , “gender and conflict”, and “sexual violence in armed conflict”. The inclusion criteria for the English-language research studies focused upon all articles which investigate and theorize about CRSV/wartime sexual violence and its various aspects such as justice for survivors, causes for variances in CRSV, motivations for perpetrating CRSV, and rebel groups and their organization. Across the academic and scholarly literature, more than 80 works were consulted during this study.

Tracing the Definitions: What Counts as CRSV?

Within the academic discourse of CRSV, two dimensions are usually accounted for while defining and theorizing it the type of violations, and which types of violence can be considered as being ‘conflict-related’, and the research generally employs either case study methods or relies on existing datasets (Nordås & Cohen, 2021). Two key themes which are of particular relevance for this study manifest while analyzing the existing literature on CRSV the perpetrators are either organized state or non-state armed groups, and the sexual violence that is “counted” takes place during international/non-international armed conflicts.

First, what becomes evident is that across various⁷ definitions and framing of the term CRSV, is that the type of violations are propitiously broadly defined, as are the survivors; however, the same treatment has not been afforded to the perpetrators, who are almost always state/non-state organized armed groups. For instance, in terms of the violations described within the CRSV discourse, Wood (2006, p. 308), provides one of the earliest and most significant definitions of CRSV as a category of violence that includes rape, coerced undressing, and non-penetrating sexual assault; Wood also contends that while sexual violence as a “practice of war ” occurs across all conflicts, it varies according to the extent

7 Cohen & Nordås, in their article, refer to two “phases” of research on CRSV (Nordås & Cohen, 2021) This article primarily refers to the second phase of research, beginning from Wood’s seminal article published in 2006, which critically analyzed the variations in wartime sexual violence (Nordås & Cohen, 2021; Wood, 2006). The choice to analyze the second phase of research on CRSV has been motivated by the fact that the research of this period has theorized CRSV as the field turned more comparative, and global in nature (Nordås & Cohen, 2021).

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and form of the same. More recent empirical studies rely on the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) data set and adopt its broad definition (Cohen & Nordås 2014)⁸. However, the literature consistently identifies organized state and non-state actors parties to international or non-international armed conflicts as the primary CRSV perpetrators. While organized rebel group CRSV perpetration has been widely discussed in the literature, it has also been accepted that state armed groups have been involved in various sexual violations (Cohen & Nordås 2014; Wood, 2014; Baaz & Stern, 2009).

Similarly, Wood’s seminal work on the subject highlighted the role of “armed organizations as the key unit of analysis to understand variation in wartime sexual violence”, indicating that the definition is focused upon organized armed groups as perpetrators, which are a characteristic of non-international armed conflicts (Nordås & Cohen, 2021; Wood, 2006). The SVAC dataset also limits the descriptor of CRSV to violations perpetrated by armed actors such as state militaries, rebel groups and progovernment militias (Nordås & Cohen, 2021).

The patterns, motivations, structure, agency, and strategies of various organized armed groups engaging in CRSV perpetration have been researched worldwide, such as the Myanmar security forces, Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front, and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Koos, 2018; Nagel & Doctor, 2020). While this discourse of CRSV perpetration has yielded many fruitful insights for policymaking, prevention, and redressal, the emphasis has remained upon CRSV occurring in international/non-international armed conflicts, due to the requirement that the perpetrator groups have a certain degree of organization.

The emphasis of the existing CRSV discourse upon violations occurring in international/noninternational armed conflicts is further evidenced by the methodologies

The SVAC data set covers seven forms of violence: (a) rape, (b) sexual slavery, (c) forced prostitution, (d) forced pregnancy, (e) forced sterilization/abortion, (f) sexual mutilation, and (g) sexual torture (Cohen & Nordås 2014).

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used while theorizing the underlying causes, dynamics, and explanations of CRSV (Baaz and Stern, 2009; Cohen 2013; Agerberg and Kreft, 2020). For example, the effects of CRSV upon survivors, have been examined using case studies from Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Peru, and Sri Lanka, among a few other countries (Wood, 2006; Baaz & Stern, 2013; Boesten, 2017; Lindsey, 2019; González & Traunmüller, 2024).

Similarly, large-N empirical studies have used the SVAC dataset or the Repertoires of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (RSVAC) data package as a starting point for their examination of CRSV (Nagel & Doctor, 2020; Xu & Catterson, 2024; Nagel, 2021; Dumaine et al, 2022). The SVAC dataset defines armed conflict according to UCDP’s fatality requirements⁹ (Nordås & Cohen, 2014). Thus, the current academic discourse on CRSV centers armed groups as perpetrators within high-intensity international and non-international armed conflicts, which implies that sexual violence during low intensity conflicts such as those termed ‘internal disturbances’ by national Governments remain out of the ambit of studies. This omission renders the CRSV occurring in “low-intensity” armed conflicts invisible.

Exclusion as an Outcome of Non-Feminist Data Practices

Data feminist theory posits that a) data is subjective and biased as they are a result of unequal societal conditions b) because of the subjective nature of data, the data-driven systems and their outputs need to be understood as political projects c) the feminist practice of questioning and examining power structures is crucial for understanding the ways in which data collection, use, and organization contributes to, and reproduces inequities (D'ignazio, & Klein, 2023). A critical review of the academic and programming discourse on CRSV reveals

9 Primarily, a conflict is “ a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”.

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how the data collection reproduces inequities, through its focus upon certain types of armed conflicts.

This omission of certain conflicts in the existing CRSV discourse may be explained by two primary posits of data feminist theory— “what gets counted, counts”, and “the numbers don’t speak for themselves” (D'ignazio, & Klein, 2023). In other words, data is always produced, processed, and consumed with social purposes; such data also shapes public perceptions which are ingrained in unequal societal structures (Read, 2019). In the world of the discourse on CRSV, the non-feminist data practices are visible through the politicized methodologies used for datasets such as the SVAC, and the generally arbitrary nature of conflict classification systems.

Further, the emphasis on rationality and objectivity imply that quantitative datasets are promoted in both academia and programming. Many of the major academic conflict datasets, including the SVAC dataset, have fatality requirements for certain events to be captured, and thus, do not necessarily include all instances of sexual violence taking place during armed conflicts (Read, 2019). Further illustrating the lack of feminist data collection practices, is the SVAC dataset “global and trustworthy”¹⁰ sources of conflict (Cohen & Nordås 2014).

However, the data collection within these sources is also highly politicized, and the true extent of violence against women has not been captured in the reports of the Human Rights Watch, for instance (Read, 2019). The epistemologies and methods of data collection and analysis, are often guided by significant choices of elites, determining which instances of sexual violence are significant enough to be included within the CRSV discourse¹¹.

These draw from the US State Department, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International.

Karthika Pillai (Executive Director, Triniketan Foundation, notes that “this selective portrayal not only influences the visibility of certain forms of CRSV but also reinforces dominant narratives that exclude intersectional perspectives. By not incorporating intersectionality, existing frameworks risk marginalizing voices and suppressing critical narratives, ultimately shaping an incomplete and potentially biased understanding of CRSV” (Pillai, 2025).

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Similarly, the literature on CRSV also bases its assumptions upon arbitrary classification systems demarcating some conflicts as more violent than others. Loitering under the arbitrary classification systems of conflicts, particularly those that demarcate international/non-international armed conflicts, are false binaries and implied hierarchies, of the research areas, and the researchers themselves (D'ignazio, & Klein, 2023). Research regions with vast CRSV scholarship have focused primarily upon the African continent, dominated by researchers from the global north, contributing to the artificially created hierarchies of certain CRSV instances over others (Nordås & Cohen, 2021). While the Rwandan genocide led to over 300 thousand deaths and multiple instances of CRSV, low intensity conflicts such as those in Manipur cannot be left out of the CRSV discourse as they led to “only” 300 deaths.

Conclusion

In summary, the “conflict” in the mainstream CRSV discourse is shaped by an econometric approach seeking to quantify data to measure the incidents of deaths and define the types of violations that “count”. These, however, do not take into account lived realities, and must thus be rectified to ensure holistic prevention and redressal of CRSV. The emphasis on international/non-international armed conflicts in the existing CRSV academic and programming discourse shrouds the sexual violence occurring in regions experiencing lowintensity conflicts such as Manipur.

The enhanced focus of the discourse on major wars is the result of non-feminist data approaches which are based upon false binaries, implied hierarchies, and politicized methods. Such data collection and methods lead to the prioritization of certain regions over others, rendering sexual violence in certain conflicts as invisible. Feminist research methods, which include reflexive intersectionality, and participatory approaches may be utilized in order to re-create the existing discourse on CRSV. In effect, this might allow for a broader understanding of the motivations, variations, and determinants of CRSV across regions.

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A scholarly and practitioner focus upon CRSV in low-intensity conflicts, may also further the access to justice for several survivors. The recognition of CRSV as a crime against humanity, and as a practice of warfare, has been the result of the joint advocacy of the scholarly and practitioner community. Furthering the field, therefore, also requires a similar joint strategy that seeks to widely define CRSV, understand the determinants of the same.

References

Agerberg, M., & Kreft, A. K. (2020). Gendered conflict, gendered outcomes: the politicization of sexual violence and quota adoption. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(2-3), 290-317.

Baaz, M E , & Stern, M (2009) Why do soldiers rape? Masculinity, violence, and sexuality in the armed forces in the Congo (DRC). International studies quarterly, 53(2), 495-518.

Boesten, J. (2017). Of exceptions and continuities: Theory and methodology in research on conflictrelated sexual violence. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19(4), 506-519.

Cohen, D. K. (2013). Explaining rape during civil war: Cross-national evidence (1980–2009). American Political Science Review, 107(3), 461-477.

Dumaine, L , Nordås, R , Gargiulo, M , & Wood, E J (2022) Repertoires of conflict-related sexual violence: Introducing the RSVAC data package Journal of Peace Research, 59(4), 611-621

González, B., & Traunmüller, R. (2024). The political consequences of wartime sexual violence: Evidence from a list experiment. Journal of Peace Research, 61(6), 1035-1050.

Goswami, U. (2022). Gendering Peace in Violent Peripheries: Marginality, Masculinity, and Feminist Agency. Taylor & Francis.

Koos, C. (2018). Decay or resilience?: the long-term social consequences of conflict-related sexual violence in Sierra Leone. World Politics, 70(2), 194-238.

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Nagel, R. U., & Doctor, A. C. (2020). Conflict-related sexual violence and rebel group fragmentation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(7-8), 1226-1253.

Nagel, R. U. (2021). Conflict-related sexual violence and the re-escalation of lethal violence. International Studies Quarterly, 65(1), 56-68.

Nordås, R., & Cohen, D. K. (2021). Conflict-related sexual violence. Annual Review of Political Science, 24(1), 193-211.

Read, R. (2019). Comparing conflict-related sexual violence: expertise, politics and documentation. Civil Wars, 21(4), 468-488.

Ribeiro, S. F., & Van der Straten-Ponthoz, D. (2017). International protocol on the documentation and investigation of sexual violence in conflict. Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

Traunmüller, R., Kijewski, S., Freitag, M. (2019). The silent victims of sexual violence during war: evidence from a list experiment in Sri Lanka. J. Confl. Resolut. 63(9):2015–42

Wibben, A. T., Confortini, C. C., Roohi, S., Aharoni, S. B., Vastapuu, L., & Vaittinen, T. (2019). Collective discussion: piecing-up feminist peace research. International Political Sociology, 13(1), 86-107.

Wood, E. J. (2006). Variation in sexual violence during war. Politics & society, 34(3), 307-342.

Wood, EJ. (2014). Conflict-related sexual violence and the policy implications of recent research. Int. Rev. Red Cross 96(894):457–78.

THEVIOLENCEAGAINST ASIANWOMEN

Carly Duvall is a senior at American University, pursuing a degree in International Relations with a concentration in peace, global security, conflict resolution, and national security and foreign policy. She specializes in East Asia and the Pacific, with a particular focus on China studies. She is also minoring in Asia, Pacific, and Diaspora Studies Carly's academic research explores critical issues such as the impact of political leaders’ backgrounds on policy decisions, media narratives on climate change, and the hyper-sexualization of Asian American women. Passionate about community empowerment, she is committed to amplifying the Asian American experience in international relations. Through her work, she strives to foster diverse, inclusive perspectives in global policy discussions and contribute to advancing equity, peace, and representation both within her community and on the global stage.

Abstract

This paper examines Western media coverage of violence against Asian women, focusing on the 2021 Atlanta Spa Shootings, where six out of the eight victims were women of Asian descent. It argues that mainstream reporting often centers on the perpetrator while minimizing the victims’ racialized and gendered experiences. This framing reinforces harmful stereotypes and obscures broader patterns of anti-Asian and misogynistic violence. Using an intersectional lens, the paper calls for more responsible media practices that recognize the complex interplay of race, gender, and power. Please note: this paper contains sensitive content related to racial and gender-based violence.

How Media Frames Violence Against Asian Women

As Lily Wong and Eric Tang (2022) note in the Journal of Asian American Studies, “Anti-Asian violence in the United States endures” (p. v). During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an increase in anti-Asian hate crimes largely due to the current United States (U.S.) administration’s racially charged rhetoric, labeling the virus as “China Virus” and “Kung Flu” (Wong & Tang, 2022, p. v), terms widely criticized as racially insensitive. While the violence shocked some, it was familiar to the Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) community, which has long faced dehumanization and trauma (Anandavalli, 2022; Dougherty, 2014; Hwang & Parrenas, 2021). Amid increased media attention, concerns emerged about how race and gender shaped coverage. Studies show that victims of color, particularly women of color and those from working-class backgrounds, are often underrepresented or marginalized in news reporting, while white women tend to receive disproportionate attention (Stillman, 2007). This research explores how Western news outlets portray violence against Asian women and aims to deepen understanding of preventing such violence.

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Literature Review

Hyper-sexualization and the Orientalist Fantasy

Colonialism, militarism, and sexual dominance have long justified the violence and fetishization of Asian American women. Western perceptions often frame the Orientalist Fantasy as mysterious and dangerous. As a result, the colonized nations are portrayed as “feminized and juxtaposed as innocent, sensual, and primitive,” in contrast to the "masculinized rationality of colonizing Western nations” (Dougherty, 2014, p. 7). The 20th century’s imperialist narratives reduced Asian women to sexualized caricatures, reinforcing stereotypes of them as “obedient and passive” and as a “symbol of rape of third world nations” (Anandavalli, 2022, p. 300). During U.S. wars in Asia, Asian women were seen as symbols of conquest and linked to the sex industry through soldiers’ involvement, fueling the stereotype of Asian women as sex workers, which persists despite no higher rates of sex work than other groups, as exemplified by the 1875 Page Act’s assumption that Chinese women were sex workers. These women were also cast as potential mail-order brides for white men (Anandavalli, 2022), reinforcing the stereotype of the “obedient” Asian woman as sexually available, contrasting with the respectable, marriageable white woman (Dougherty, 2014). This narrative depicted Asian women as “docile, sexually attractive, and deft at fulfilling white men ’ s sexual and power needs” (Anandavalli, 2022, p. 300).

Historical Stereotypes of Asian Women

Hyper-sexualized portrayals of Asian women, shaped by Western imperialism and racist politics, were reinforced by Hollywood depictions. These portrayals confine Asian women ’ s bodies, desires, and identities to fantasy, presenting them solely to satisfy the white male gaze.

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Colonial-era and contemporary stereotypes of Asian women play a key role in how certain racial groups experience dehumanization (Dougherty, 2014). Two dominant tropes persist: the dragon lady, depicted as manipulative, seductive, and dangerous, and the lotus flower, a submissive, self-sacrificing figure considered “safe” for white male desire (Dougherty, 2014; Hwang & Parreñas, 2021). Both these tropes restricts Asian women ’ s agency, reducing them to obedient objects for male satisfaction. A third stereotype, the “Little Brown Fucking Machine” (LBFM), rooted in U.S. wars in Southeast Asia, depicts Southeast Asian women as prostitutes with a “machine-like sexual drive and eroticized poverty” (Hwang & Parrenas, 2021, p. 527).

Methodology

On March 16, 2021, Robert Aaron Long, a 21-year-old white gunman, killed eight people, including six Asian women, at two spas and a massage parlor in Atlanta, Georgia (Craig et al., 2021). Despite the victims’ racial identities, law enforcement emphasized the perpetrator’s claim of sex addiction, downplaying the role of racism. This framing overlooks the long history of hyper-sexualization and fetishization of Asian women in the U.S. Using the Atlanta Spa Shootings as a case study, this paper analyzes how Western media frame violence against Asian American women.

Data was collected by analyzing coverage of the 2021 Atlanta Spa Shootings from March 16 to March 23, 2021, using the search term “Atlanta Spa Shooting.” The selected outlets included ABC News, AP, BBC, CNN, NBC News, New York Post, The New York Times, NPR, and The Washington Post. Articles were selected for their availability, political stance, and Western classification. The analysis examined article titles, victim descriptions, and references to racialize sexual tropes. Key data such as article length, publication date, photo inclusion, and themes were recorded and categorized using qualitative content analysis, with recurring themes identified and assessed for trends.

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Results

The analysis revealed seven key themes across the articles. The most prevalent, Hate Crimes Against Asian Americans, appeared in all nine articles, highlighting the long history of violence against this community. The second most common theme, Attack Motivation, focused on Robert Aaron Long’s alleged reasons for the shootings. COVID-19 Targeting and Reactions appeared in six articles, reflecting how the pandemic intensified anti-Asian sentiment and sparked public outcry, as well as calls for policy changes. The Shooter

Background theme (covered by AP and The Washington Post) examined Long’s personal history, while Targeted Locations and Prostitution (discussed by the New York Post) speculated on links between the spas and the sex trade. Victims Information (covered by AP) provided personal details about the victims, such as their names and backgrounds.

Analysis

The dominant theme across all the articles was the framing of the shootings as a hate crime against Asian Americans, present in every article. This framing reveals a tension between addressing the racialized nature of the attack and focusing on personal explanations. Particularly striking, however, was how six of the nine articles connected the violence against the Asian American community to the COVID-19 pandemic, presenting the rise in anti-Asian sentiment as a direct consequence of the pandemic. While the focus on pandemic-fueled racism is relevant, it fails to contextualize the broader, historical backdrop of anti-Asian violence and the hyper- sexualization of Asian American women. The news articles’ framing of the shootings as an act of contemporary racism overlooks the deep-seated racial and gendered tropes that have been perpetuated throughout history – essentially reinforcing the dominant narratives and stereotypes of Asian American women.

While all nine articles consistently acknowledged the racial identity of the victims, only two explicitly mentioned that four of the eight victims were South Korean, with the rest referred to as "Asian American," erasing their individual identities and the intersectionality of their experiences. The absence of race and gender in headlines further diminishes the historical significance of the event. Only two of the articles’ titles specified that most of the victims were Asian, and only one noted that they were “Asian American women. ” This omission downplays the importance of these factors in understanding the broader sociohistorical context of violence. Another concerning pattern was the omission of the victims’ names in nearly all nine articles, with only one providing the names. This lack of identification, while possibly attributable to the timing of the articles’ publication dates, remains problematic as it underscores the erasure of Asian American women ’ s individual identities, a pattern that has been long documented in studies of media representation (Stillman, 2007). In stark contrast, every article mentioned Long’s identity, with two providing extensive background information about his life such as his church and college life. While some may argue that this focus on Long serves to help law enforcement or to respect the victims’ families’ wishes, it also reflects the historical marginalization of Asian American women, further perpetuating their invisibility.

Many of the articles also focused heavily on Long’s personal issues, especially his sex addiction, rather than engaging with the racialized and gendered dimensions of his violence. While this focus on his psychological state might be aimed at providing context or respecting the victims’ families' privacy, it risks obscuring the broader societal issues that contributed to the violence. Additionally, the articles highlighted Long’s justification that his actions were not racially motivated but were instead driven by his sex addiction, with the victims described as “temptations” to be “eliminated.”

By giving weight to this explanation, the articles implicitly validate Long's view and overlook the racial motivations behind the killings. Instead of exploring the intersections of race, gender, and violence, the articles prioritized Long’s psychological issues. Long’s characterization of the spas as “temptations” directly aligns with the Orientalist Fantasy described in the literature. Notably, the New York Post article’s focus on the alleged link between the spas and prostitution further perpetuates stereotypes like the “lotus flower,” “dragon lady,” and “LBFM,” subtly shifting blame from Long to the victims and their workplaces.

Conclusion

This research demonstrates that Western media often prioritize the perpetrator, sidelining the race and gender of the victims. The coverage of the 2021 Atlanta Spa Shootings in Western media highlights significant flaws in portraying and understanding the violence against Asian American women. By ignoring the racial and gendered context of the victims, the nine analyzed articles perpetuated harmful stereotypes, ignored the historical roots of anti-Asian sentiment, and neglected the hyper-sexualization of Asian American women. In doing so, they ignored broader societal issues, silenced the victims, and reduced them to mere statistical footnotes in their own tragedy. Moving forward, news outlets must engage with the intersectional dynamics of race, gender, and historical context to accurately represent and contextualize the experience of victims. By amplifying affected voices and framing incidents within a broader context, news media can help dismantle harmful stereotypes and challenge systems that perpetuate violence.

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References

Anandavalli, S (2022) Not Your Fetish: Broaching Racialized Sexual Harassment Against Asian Women. Journal of Mental Health Counseling, 44(4), 297–311. https://doi.org/10.17744/mehc.44.4.02

Atlanta Shootings: Asian Women Among Eight Killed at Three Spas. (2021, March 17). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56424616

Brumback, Kate, and Angie Wang. “Man Charged with Killing 8 People at Georgia Massage Parlors.” AP, March 17, 2021. https://apnews.com/article/georgia-massage-parlorshootings-leave-8-dead-f3841a8e0215d3ab3d1f23d489b7af81.

Connelly, Eileen AJ. “Feds Have No Evidence Yet That Atlanta Spa Shootings Were Hate Crimes: Report.” New York Post, March 20, 2021. https://nypost.com/2021/03/20/fedshave-no-evidence-yet-atlanta-spa-shootings-were-hate-crimes-report/.

Craig, T., Berman, M., Knowles, H., & Fisher, M. (2021, March 18). A Nationwide Horror: Witnesses, Police Paint a Picture of a Murderous Rampage that Took 8 Lives. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/what-happened-atlantashooting/2021/03/18/163e4de8-8733-11eb-8a8b-

Diaz, J., & Romo V. (2021, March 17). 8 People, Many of Them Asian, Shot Dead at Atlanta-Area Spas. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/03/16/978024380/8-women-shot-to-death-atatlanta-massage-parlors-man-arrested

Fausset, Richars, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Ruth Graham, and Jack Healy. “Accused Gunman Had Visited Massage Parlors He targeted, Police Say.” The New York Times, March 18, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/us/robert-aaron-long-atlanta-spa- shooting.html.

Dougherty, D T (2014) Exotic femininity: Prostitution reviews and the sexual stereotyping of Asian Women (Publication No 1601272) [Master’s thesis, University of North Texas] ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global

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Helsel, P., & Elbaum, R. (2021, March 16). 8 Dead in Atlanta-Area Spa Shootings, Suspect Arrested. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/3-dead-shooting-georgia- massage-parlorsuspect-loose-n1261262

Hwang, M. C., & Parrenas, R. (2021). The Gendered Racialization of Asian Women as Villainous Temptresses. Gender & Society 35(4), 567-567.

doi:10.1177/08912432211029395

Margolin, J , & Shapiro, E (2021, March 19) Georgia Spa Killings Likely ‘Targeted Attack Driven By Personal Grievances ABC News https://abcnews go com/US/georgia-spakillings-targeted-attack-driven-personal-grievance/story?id=76533538

Stillman, S. (2007). ‘The Missing White Girl Syndrome’: Disappeared Women and Media Activism. Gender and Development 15(3), 491-502. doi:10.1080/13552070701630665

Wagner, M., Macaya, M., & Hayes, M. (2021, March 18). 8 Killed in Shootings At Atlanta-Area Spas. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/us/live-news/atlanta-area-shootings-03-1721/index.html

Wong, L., & Tang, E. (2022) Guest Editors’ Preface. Journal of Asian American Studies 25(3), v-xiiii. doi:10.1353/jaas.2022.0031

VIOLENCEAGAINSTSOUTH ASIANSTUDENTSIN KYRGYZSTANINMAY2024

Kristie Moore is an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, studying Global Studies with a concentration in Peace and Conflict Studies Her interests center on conflict resolution, mass atrocity prevention, and peacebuilding in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

An alumna of the National Security Language Initiative for Youth (NSLI-Y) and Critical Language Scholarship (CLS) programs, Kristie is also a student researcher at UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Investigations Lab She founded the Central Asia Media Literacy Project, a three-month media literacy and journalism program for young people in the region.

Originally from Irvine, California, she is currently based in Almaty, Kazakhstan, studying Russian as a Fulbright-Hays and Foreign Language and Area Studies fellow

KRISTIEMOORE

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Abstract

In May 2024, mob violence against South Asians broke out in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, this is not the first occurrence of such violence. Kyrgyzstan’s history has been characterized by a series of sporadic outbreaks of violence coupled with daily instances of discrimination and dangerous ethno-nationalism. Using the May 2024 outbreak of violence against South Asians as a case study, this paper explores the deeper political, economic, and social issues that permitted it to occur, and seeks to understand what can be done moving forward to prevent future violence and ensure justice for victims.

Introduction

May 2024 violence materialized after a video of a fight between Kyrgyz and “foreign students” went viral on Kyrgyz social media, culminating in protests against illegal migration on May 17, 2024 (AlJazeera, 2024). Protests quickly turned violent, with Kyrgyz protesters forcibly entering South Asian student dormitories, smashing windows, beating up students, and stealing phones, money, and other belongings. (The Diplomat, 2024). Mob violence continued into the night of May 18th, before they were finally quelled. In response to the attacks, several prominent Kyrgyz politicians released statements. However, instead of addressing the violence or making a commitment to protect South Asians in Kyrgyzstan, these politicians justified the violence and reaffirmed the grievances of protestors.

Kamchybek Tashiev, Chairman of the State Committee for National Security, published a statement claiming the demands of the Kyrgyz aggressors were, “to some extent correct” and promised to take steps to prevent illegal migration. Similar remarks were made by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, who referred to the Kyrgyz attackers as “Patriotic Youth” (The Diplomat, 2024). Taken together, this violence and the lack of

Literature Review

government accountability is deeply concerning and represents consistent failures to protect vulnerable populations in Kyrgyzstan. This paper will use a critical and gendered lens to argue that a combination of pre-existing problems and contemporary political, economic, and social issues have created an unstable environment for minorities in Kyrgyzstan that permitted the May 2024 violence. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has navigated a difficult path, balancing its need to establish political and economic infrastructure, with the complex project of establishing a unique sense of national identity as a sovereign nation. Kyrgyzstan’s internal diversity, compounded the government’s struggle to form a unified sense of identity. Kyrgyzstan’s first president Askar Akaev attempted to address this with his “Наш общий дом ” (Our Common Home) campaign, which promoted Kyrgyzstan as a home for all and pushed for an inclusive Kyrgyz civic identity (Marat, 2008). Unfortunately, this policy failed, upsetting not only Kyrgyz nationalists who wanted stronger assertions of Kyrgyz identity, but minority groups who did not resonate with the image Kyrgyzstan was trying to create for itself. Seeing the failure of this policy, Akaev’s successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev turned away from civic notions of identity altogether and became a strong proponent of Kyrgyz nationalism. It was under his regime that ethnic violence broke out in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010. Stemming from a fight between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks outside a casino, the scuffle quickly escalated, erupting into widespread violence that left hundreds dead, thousands of buildings destroyed, and hundreds of thousands displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Violence was particularly concentrated in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, which despite being located in Kyrgyzstan, had majority Uzbek

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populations. Kyrgyzstan has also witnessed violence at its border with Tajikistan over shared resources. While this violence falls outside of the category of ethnic violence, these flare ups have created distrust towards Tajiks currently living in Kyrgyzstan. This is particularly the case in majority Tajik villages like Uch-Korgon, with Tajik residents experiencing harassment following border conflict and some even having their passports and properties seized by Kyrgyz authorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2022).

Women have also been overwhelmingly victimized by conflict and discrimination. During violent outbreaks, they are often targets of sexual violence and rape (Tishkov, 1995).

Unfortunately, Kyrgyzstan’s culture of shame around rape, has caused victims to go without treatment or emotional support both as a result of the stigma that comes with reporting such instances. While the punishment for rape is outlined in Article 129 of Kyrgyzstan’s criminal code, many women in Kyrgyzstan receive little to no justice for what they have experienced. This is particularly the case during times of violent conflict. Following 2010 violence in Osh, there were an estimated 20 documented cases of rape, although real number are expected to be much higher (RFE/RL, 2011). Despite this, many chose not to report their experiences and the Kyrgyz government failed to properly investigate these cases (Amnesty International, 2021).

Methodology

This paper will examine the current state of minority policy and interethnic relations in Kyrgyzstan using the recent outbreak of interethnic violence against South Asians in May 2024 as a case study utilizing a critical and gendered lens. A case study approach is particularly helpful as such instances of violence represent the most potent extremes of otherwise hidden or systematic issues and force communities, governments, and individuals to recognize that glaring

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issues exist. Violence against South Asians in Bishkek in 2024 was selected because of its recency and because it turns on its head the notion that ethnic violence, racism, and discrimination are things of the past or inherently tied to Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet legacy. It will be compared to violence in 2010, to show the lack of change when it comes to protecting ethnic minorities and women. Moreover, it offers a key look into current migratory trends, aiming to fill a key gap in scholarship on South Asian migration to Central Asia. This is particularly important as Kyrgyzstan is home to nearly 12,000 Pakistani students and 14,000 Indian students, in addition to hundreds of South Asians residing in the country for work (AlJazeera, 2024). Beyond discussing this violence, this paper will take a gendered lens, looking both at how women have historically been victimized by conflict, but also the role they can play moving forward.

Results and Findings

The progression of events in May 2024 is unfortunately incredibly similar to the 2010 ethnic violence in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The 2010 violence was motivated by economic reasons and increasingly potent Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism. Suspicious of Uzbek economic success in Osh, which directly contrasted economic instability in Kyrgyz communities, ethnic Kyrgyz took action and engaged in violence that took hundreds of lives and effectively destroyed large portions of the city. Sexual violence was also widespread throughout the conflict. Police inability to stop the violence and the Kyrgyz government's implied support for ethnic Kyrgyz in the aftermath of the conflict, were also seen in the later 2024 violence. While the 2010 conflict and 2024 violence share many similarities, there are also differences in the target of the attacks and the scale of the violence. Thus, while direct comparison is difficult, this case study suggests a clear cycle of violence that must be addressed.

Looking back at the past provides a critical understanding of the nature of conflict in Kyrgyzstan. The outcomes of several instances of violence have shown that the police and military simply do not have the capacity to move quickly, decisively, and effectively to stop conflict. This failure to prevent violence was compounded by the Kyrgyz government’s failure to address past conflicts and seek justice for victims. Following interethnic conflict in Osh in 2010, the Kyrgyz government failed to conduct a proper, in-depth investigation (Human Rights Watch, 2023). This ultimately deprived Uzbek victims of justice and meant that perpetrators of violence went unpunished. Moreover, despite ethnic Uzbeks making up a majority of the victims of the conflict (74%), they were overwhelmingly arrested as its perpetrators (Amnesty International, 2021). According to figures made public by the Kyrgyz Prosecutor General’s Office, in the months following the conflict, a total of 262 people had been arrested. Out of the total, 213 were ethnic Uzbeks (Human Rights Watch, 2021). These arbitrary arrests painted Uzbeks as the sole perpetrators of conflict and in the process absolved Kyrgyz of responsibility for crimes committed. In failing to carry out justice, the Kyrgyz government communicated to nationalists of their population that violence against ethnic minorities was not only okay, but would go unpunished. Women were another group that failed to achieve justice. The commission which investigated the violence, which was overwhelmingly composed of men, not only overlooked rape as a form of violence, but was unable to even properly investigate the issue as many female victims did not feel comfortable disclosing their experiences to male interviewers. When questioned by a journalist about this topic, a member of the commission even stated that the number of reported rapes was exaggerated and that the Commission had only had confirmation of one instance of rape (Amnesty International, 2021). Had more women been appointed roles on the commission, it is likely they could have pushed for increased attention to the topic of sexual violence and provided the assistance necessary to reach female victims.

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Discussion

The impacts of lasting ethnic violence, as well as the contemporary Kyrgyz political, economic, and social environment, can be seen in the outbreak of violence against South Asians in Bishkek. This is particularly evident in the motivations of the protestors, statements made by Kyrgyz government officials, and the inaction of police forces. Understanding the roles of these aspects in sequence of the May 2024 outbreak of violence provides an in-depth framework in which the violence can be considered. In the lead up to the conflict, ethnic Kyrgyz felt threatened and unstable due to grievances against politicians and a tense economic environment marked by a lack of jobs. Feelings of instability in the economic sphere, meshed with Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism prompted ethnic Kyrgyz to identify South Asian migrants as a threat. They therefore became a scapegoat for government failures to promote economic development. When the video of a fight between Kyrgyz and foreign students went viral on social media, ethnic Kyrgyz were abruptly mobilized to act violently. Knowing that ethnic violence of this nature went largely unpunished in 2010, it is likely they did not worry about the long term repercussions of their actions. Thus, violence broke out on the night of May 17, 2024. Kyrgyz police forces once again failed to act, evidenced by several witness statements and a video address released by Kyrgyzstan’s President in which he admitted that had law enforcement agencies promptly taken action, “perhaps this would not have happened” (The Diplomat, 2024). When violence subsided, Kyrgyz government officials played into Kyrgyz demands. Post-conflict, South Asians continue to fear for their safety. This includes South Asian women who have experienced harassment. This harassment however, has gone largely unaddressed, reminiscent of previous failures to investigate and protect women in the aftermath of conflict.

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Conclusion

The Kyrgyz government must take meaningful steps to address past conflict and minority grievances, in addition to adequately responding to the events of May 2024. This should be done by conducting an in-depth investigation, arresting or fining those found to be involved, and providing reassurance to Kyrgyzstan's South Asian population that they are not only safe, but valued in Kyrgyz society. These actions will help deter future outbreaks of violence by showing that there are real punishments for perpetrators. The Kyrgyz government must also work alongside the Police Force and Military to create standardized plans and procedures for containing violence of this nature, as they have been consistently unprepared and unable to take action to stop the spread of conflict. This ineffectiveness ultimately promotes the continuation of violence and leaves local populations distrusting of the people who are there to help. It is also critical that women are given a larger role at the government level and in responding to instances of violence. Women have already played a critical role when it comes to people-to-people peacebuilding that works at the community level to address lasting interethnic tensions. One such example is a child development center opened by Kyrgyz and Tajik women that uses cartoons and group games as a pedagogical tool to promote peacebuilding from an early age (UN Women). The May 2024 violence and prior incidents have reaffirmed the need for women to have a seat at the table and be empowered to not only advocate for their needs in post-conflict periods, but be given the decision making capabilities to pave a more peaceful future for Kyrgyzstan as a whole.

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Works Cited

Erica Marat, National Ideology and state-building in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Central Asia-Caucus Institute Silk Road Studies program, 2008 https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2008 01 SRP Marat Nat ionalIdeology.pdf

Hussain, Abid. “Panic in Bishkek: Why Were Pakistani Students Attacked in Kyrgyzstan?” Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 20 May 2024, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/20/panic-in-bishkek-why-werepakistani-students-attac ked-in-kyrgyzstan.

“Kyrgyzstan/Tajikistan: Apparent War Crimes in Border Conflict.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Aug. 2023, www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/02/kyrgyzstan/tajikistan-apparent-warcrimes-border-conflict.

“Kyrgyzstan: Partial Truth and Selective Justice: The Aftermath of the June 2010 Violence in Kyrgyzstan.” Amnesty International, 23 Sept. 2021, www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur58/022/2010/en/.

“Peacebuilding Is Placed in Women’s Hands through New Initiative in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ” UN Women – Europe and Central Asia, (2020, February 14). eca.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/2/peacebuilding-is-placed-in-womens-hands-thro ughnew-initiative-in-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan.

Putz, C. (2024, May 29). South Asian students targeted by angry mob in kyrgyz capital. – The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/south-asian-students-targeted-by-angry-mob-inkyrgyz- capital/

Sindelar, Daisy “A Year on, Osh Rape Victims Still Live in Shadows ” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, RFE/RL, 10 June 2011, www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan osh rape kyrgyz ubeks ethnic clashes/24229595.html.

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Tishkov, Valery (1995) Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!': An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict, Journal of Peace Research 32 (2): 133–149

“ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕоПродолжающейсявКыргызстанеПолитикеПреследованияГраждан

ТаджикистанаиЭтническихТаджиков ” ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕоПродолжающейсяв

9 Sept. 2022, www.mfa.tj/ru/main/view/11097/zayavlenie-o-prodolzhayushcheisya-v-kyrgyzstane-polit ikepresledovaniya-grazhdan-tadzhikistana-i-etnicheskikh-tadzhikov.

“where is the Justice?” Human Rights Watch. (2023, March 28). https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/08/16/where-justice/interethnic-violence-southern-kyrg yzstanand-its-aftermath

HUMAN RIGHTS

CHAPTERSEVEN

HASETHNICTENSIONS IMPROVEDSINCESOUTH SUDANGAINED INDEPENDENCE?

BIO

Oorebomi (Bomi) Akarakiri is a graduating senior at Howard University majoring in political science Bomi first became interested in international affairs whilst growing up in London, UK as a firstgeneration Nigerian. She enjoyed living in a diverse community and wanted to pursue a career where she could promote cross-cultural communications and conflict-resolution.

Bomi is a 3x Congressional intern and has held over ten internships centered around government affairs, communications and democracy In fall 2024, Bomi studied abroad in Botswana and traveled to South Africa and Nigeria to strengthen her ties to the diaspora. Her hobbies include reading, doing hair and going on walks.

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Abstract

South Sudan is the world’s youngest country, formed from a civil war that led to a secession in 2011 against Sudan. There are over 500 ethnic groups who live within the borders of Sudanand consequently South Sudan (Minority Rights Group, 2019). As a result, many groups clashed over resources, power and regional autonomy which was worsened when Western powers and external forces occupied and created artificial borders. This white paper research analysis seeks to evaluate whether ethnic tensions are the greatest cause of instability in South Sudan. The objectives are to determine the causes of conflict and instability in South Sudan, to evaluate whether ethnic tensions are the greatest cause of instability, and to propose possible ways South Sudan can create a path forward, in preparation for their elections which was rescheduled for 2026.

Introduction

Ethno-religious tensions were a major factor in Sudan’s civil wars which divided Africa’s largest country due to secession. The cumulative effects of marginalization and the rejection of the right to self-govern under Sharia law drove South Sudan to push for selfdetermination (Omoleye, 2018). Since gaining independence in 2011, South Sudan has faced insurmountable levels of instability which negated the possibility of postindependence elections and resulted in a civil war that lasted from 2013-2018 (Pur, 2022). Though a peace deal led to the formation of a unity government, South Sudan receives a consistent rating of 1/100 (not free) in the Freedom of the World Report (Freedom House, 2025). This paper will explore whether ethnic tensions are the greatest factor in South Sudan’s instability, relative to other factors such as a divide in government and the current conflict in Sudan.

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This research informs policy and practice as it seeks to identify the root causes of instability, so that peacebuilding efforts can be fostered through government-driven dialogue and structural reform or through interventions led by external partners. The literature review also clearly indicates the need for a revised policy when nations withdraw from countries, as the influence of the Arab and British in Sudan deepened ethno-religious tensions. In like vein, there also needs to be sufficient policy and practice guidelines around nation-building and how newly sovereign states can transition without enduring instability. Finally, this paper informs ongoing research by promoting comparative studies into the impact of artificial borders on ethnic tensions and national stability. By examining South Sudan's postindependence challenges and the significance of ethnicity, one could argue that studies on colonial legacy are still relevant to current discussions around conflict and destabilization effects. Further research could also be conducted on how to reunite countries after civil war.

Methodology

This research paper used qualitative analysis of secondary sources, inclusive of the entire population of South Sudan and primarily focusing on South Sudan’s post-independence society. Contextual information on Sudan is included to offer a link between previous and current tensions amongst ethnic groups. No ethical considerations had to be made because the data was accessed through public domains. The lack of reliability of secondary sources, and the fact that the information was gathered for different purposes limits this study’s reliability. There was also a lack of accessible information or quantitative data on how many people have been impacted by ethnic violence. This makes it more challenging to emphasize the scale of the issue. The findings suggested that ethnic tensions are the greatest factor in South Sudan’s instability because resentment between groups (originating from the Sudanese civil war) were never addressed through meditation or government reform.

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Literature Review

Theoretical Framework: Frustration-Aggression theory

The frustration-aggression theory was first coined in 1939, derived from social psychology. The theory states that any frustration inevitably leads to aggression, and any act of aggression is due to frustration (Dollard et al, 1939). The framework can be used to explain feelings of frustration amongst ethnic groups in South-Sudan and how they manifest in aggressive forms. For frustration to occur, an anticipated reward (significant enough to invoke negative behavior) is reduced, delayed, or removed (Kruglanski et al, 2023). This theory is relevant to the study because ethnic groups compete for power and the allocation of resources, which if reduced, can be seen as a delay or removal or an anticipated reward, resulting in marginalization and a sense of perceived injustice.

Civil Wars and Ethnic Tensions

Source: Weebly

Figure 1 displays the distribution of ethnic groups under the Anglo-Egyptian regime. The British operated under a divide and rule administration whilst the Egyptians and Arabs brought Islam mainly to the north. The Dinka tribe, the largest ethnic group in present day South Sudan, are mostly Christian and so tensions increased based on ethno-religious divide (Garcia, 2020). When Sudan declared its independence on January 1, 1954, leaders rejected British influence and made Islam the state religion.

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The marginalization of the south triggered the first civil war which spanned from 1955-1972, linking to the frustration-aggression theory as the southern ethnic groups arguably became frustrated due to a want for greater regional authority (BBC News, 2023). This desire for autonomy could be interpreted as the anticipated reward associated with their liberation so once revoked, frustrations manifested through conflict. The same could be said for the second Sudanese war (1983-2005) when President Numeiry violated the Addis Ababa agreement by imposing Sharia law on non-Muslims in the south (Human Rights Watch, 2014). When a referendum was held in 2011 (after the expiration of a US-backed Comprehensive Peace Agreement), South Sudan gained full independence based on a 98% favorable vote (Central Intelligence Agency, 2025).

Yet, hostilities re-emerged in South Sudan which manifested in the 2013 South Sudanese civil war. Groups (including soldiers) began to organize based on the ethnic backgrounds of President Salva Kiir Mayardit (Dinka) and Vice President Machar (Nuer) (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Daniel Bekele, Director of Africa at the Human Rights Watch confirmed this sentiment: “appalling crimes have been committed against civilians for no other reason than their ethnicity” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These outcomes arguably demonstrate that ethnic tensions are the primary driver of instability in South Sudan because divisions are entrenched in both the political and military structures, making it more challenging to achieve lasting peace or unity.

Other factors: Divide in Government

Ethnic groups accuse President Kiir of using the South Sudanese institutions to advance their tribal agenda, suggesting that tensions exist in a greater capacity than hostilities between ethnic groups (Garcia, 2020).

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The Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition support Vice President Riek Machar and calls for the establishment of a federal system and judicial independence (Garcia, 2021). When the South-Sudanese civil war began, it was arguably due to political rivalry between Kiir and Machar rather than the differences in ethnic groups as fighting began soon after Kiir fired Machar as his deputy in 2013 due to a suspected coup. This assessment is strengthened by the fact that Kiir had Machar, along with his political allies, detained in March 2025 (Muhumuza, 2025). Additionally, leaders have been accused of using famine as a weapon of war against ethnic groups. Researchers predict that over 57% of the population will be acutely food insecure through 2025 (Snowdon, 2024). Commissioner Chair on Human Rights in South Sudan Yasmin Sooka stated that “government and opposition forces have deliberately used the starvation of civilians to punish nonaligning communities” (United Nations, 2020). These sentiments demonstrate how a divide in government causes instability in South Sudan as leaders punish disloyalty which spurs groups against each other. Yet the targeted violence and ethnic split in the South Sudanese war indicates that ethnic tensions may be a greater cause of instability as even after the civil war ended and a decision to form a unity government was reached, groups continued to fight which emphasizes how deep-rooted ethnic tensions are. A divide in government links to the frustration-aggression theory as groups may experience frustration due to political rivalry and power struggle. The inability to achieve the goal of government reform therefore manifests in the form of violence.

War in Sudan

In Sudan, war has erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan after multiple attempted coups. Consequently, South Sudan has become the second largest recipient of Sudanese refugees with over 810,000 arrivals since April 2023 (Arms Trade Treaty, 2024). This intake exacerbated existing issues in South Sudan due to the scarcity of resources and lack of government capacity to look after vulnerable communities.

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Sudan has also been accused of providing military support to Machar’s forces as a strategic way to maintain influence in South Sudan which worsens humanitarian and security challenges (Arms Trade Treaty, 2015). Though some could say that because South Sudan experienced instability prior to the outbreak of conflict in Sudan, other factors (like ethnic tensions in South Sudan) must be a greater determining cause of instability.

Findings

Research points to ethnic tensions being the greatest cause of instability in South Sudan. Lingering divide between groups from the Sudanese civil war and the difference in tribes between the President and Vice President proved to be a greater factor in division than government instability because groups mobilized along ethnic lines during the South Sudanese civil war and failed to reconcile after a peace agreement was signed. The ongoing conflict in Sudan also worsened instability in South Sudan, but it was arguably not a causing factor as South Sudan had predating issues. These findings support the need for better conflict mediation between groups and governmental reforms if elections wished to be carried out in 2026.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper examined the causes of instability in South Sudan’s post independent society, citing ethnic tensions as the biggest factor. External actors from the Anglo- Egyptian regime worsened ethnic differences which strengthened its colonial rule and postindependence, political actors arguably leveraged this to consolidate their power. The frustration- aggression theory could be applied to the evaluation of other conflicts as it provides a motive behind acts of violence. Reconciliation is necessary for South Sudan to nation build effectively and commit to holding an election in 2026. This outcome will not happen unless groups commit to uniting under a single national identity and political leaders remain open to government reforms that ensure fairer representation of ethnic groups.

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References

Arms Transfers to South Sudan. (2015). Arms Trade Treaty. https://attmonitor.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/ATT ENGLISH South-Sudan-Case-Study-1.pdf Dollard et Al (Ed.). (2013). Frustration and aggression (0 ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315008172

World Food Programme

Executive summary (n d ) The Imperialization of Sudan Retrieved 14 March 2025, from http://sudanesecolonialismmicdswellseblockfchal.weebly.com/executive-summary.html Garcia, B. (2020, July 27). South Sudan country profile. Army War College. https://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.php/country-profile-of-south-sudan-social/ Hunger crisis deepens in South Sudan with returnees fleeing war and children hit hardest | (2024, November 18) https://www wfp org/news/hunger-crisisdeepens-south-sudan-returnees-fleeing-war-and-children-hit-hardest Instability in South Sudan: Global Conflict Tracker. (2025, March 13). Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/global-

conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan Kruglanski, A. W., Ellenberg, M., Szumowska, E., Molinario, E., Speckhard, A., Leander, N. P., Pierro, A., Di Cicco, G., & Bushman, B. J. (2023).

Frustration–aggression hypothesis reconsidered: The role of significance quest. Aggressive Behavior, 49(5), 445–468. https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.22092 Muhumuza, R. (2025, March 28). Fears of civil war in South Sudan stem from political rivalry between the president and his deputy. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/south-sudan- violence-machar-kiir15c0df9717b56950e5f003f1c83bb529

Omoley, A. (2018). The South Sudan War: Causes and Implications on Its National Integration. Acta Universitatis Danubius https://www proquest com/scholarly-journals/south-sudan-warcauses-implications-on-national/docview/2118389463/se-2

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Pur, N. (2022, December 14). Has South Sudan’s conflict really ended? . Human Rights Watch.

https://www hrw org/news/2022/12/14/has-south-sudans-conflict-really-ended

South Sudan. (2025). In The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/south-sudan/

South Sudan: Ethnic targeting, Widespread killings. (2014, January 16). Human Rights Watch.

https://www hrw org/news/2014/01/16/south-sudan-ethnic-targeting-widespread-killings

South Sudan: Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report. (n.d.). Freedom House. Retrieved 14 March 2025, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-sudan/freedom-world/2025

Starvation used as weapon of war in South Sudan conflict, UN rights body finds | UN News. (2020, October 6) https://news un org/en/story/2020/10/1074742

Sudan. (2019, June). Minority Rights Group

https://minorityrights.org/country/sudan/#:~:text=More%20than%20500%20%20ethnic%20%20 groups,within%20the%20borders%20of%20%20Sudan.

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NOWHERETOGO:

Ramani Wilson is a second-year graduate student at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), pursuing a Master’s in International Affairs with a concentration in Human Rights Policy, specializing in Gender and Public Policy, and a regional specialization in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ramani has growing international experience, having studied abroad in Italy, and diverse global work experience – including roles with the U S Department of State and USAID Currently, Ramani serves as Project Manager for a consultancy with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in the Dominican Republic. Selected as a Donald M. Payne International Development Fellow in 2023, Ramani looked forward to beginning her career in the foreign service as a USAID Program Officer following graduation in May She looks forward to a career in international development, and is especially honored to be part of this year ’ s cohort of WCAPS Pipeline Fellows.

RAMANIWILSON

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Abstract

On February 20, 2025, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) a designation that offered temporary legal residence in the United States was revoked for Haitian migrants.¹

As Haiti remains in the midst of a protracted humanitarian crisis that has displaced over 700,000 people internally and nearly 600,000 worldwide, a critical question remains: where can displaced Haitians seek refuge and if not the United States, why not leverage existing regional organizations within closer proximity to home? ² ³

This report examines the response of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states to Haitian asylum seekers, focusing primarily on the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas two countries with the largest Haitian migrant populations across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with additional references to Jamaica and Turks and Caicos.ⁱ It explores CARICOM’s adherence to international law and capacities as developing countries, and concludes by advocating for a coordinated regional migration strategy to strengthen protections for displaced Haitians.

A House is Not a Home: Haiti’s Ongoing Humanitarian Crisisⁱⁱ

The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Haiti is a multifaceted issue deeply rooted in colonial legacies and a history of political instability, natural disasters, and socioeconomic turmoil.⁴ The political vacuum created by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse on July 7, 2021, and subsequent violent attempts to undermine former Prime Minister Ariel Henry who resigned without a successor in March 2024 have exacerbated Haiti’s instability, leading to over 700,000 internally displaced persons and approximately 578,800 Haitian refugees and asylum-seekers worldwide.⁵ ⁶

iThe Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was formally established in 1973. As of 2025, it comprises 15 full member states: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

ii This report reflects information available as of April 20, 2025 Given the rapidly evolving nature of the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Haiti, it is likely that developments have occurred since the time of writing

In 2023, there were over 4,700 homicides, representing a homcide rate of 40.9 per 100,000 inhabitants more than double the median rate across the LAC region, which stands at 20 per 100,000 itself the highest regional rate in the world.⁷ As of mid-2024, experts estimate that there are approximately 200 armed gangs and 300 active criminal groups controlling a significant portion of national territory and around 80 percent of the capital, Port-auPrince.⁸,⁹,¹⁰ Criminal gangs outgun and outnumber the 12,000-member police force, a considerably low figure for a population of more than 11 million people.¹¹

As of September 2024, over 270,000 people have fled to Haiti’s southern region and with nearly 919 schools in the West and Artibonite regions being closed, the arrival of approximately 103,000 displaced school-aged children has severely strained educational services.¹² Nationwide, almost five million Haitians are experiencing food insecurity, with approximately 1.64 million facing acute food insecurity at emergency levels. ¹³ , ¹⁴

Health centers and hospitals are frequently targeted by armed groups, including the G9 gang coalition led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Cherizier, widely believed to be in collaboration with political elites.¹⁵ Gang control over national roads characterized by ongoing confrontations, extortion, kidnappings, and widespread sexual violence has severely restricted access to economic opportunities, healthcare services, and the safety and wellbeing of the population. These challenges have disproportionately affected women and girls, leading to unprecedented levels of gender-based violence and reproductive health concerns.¹⁶

In November 2024, the Federal Aviation Administration prohibited U.S. airlines from flying to Haiti for 30 days after gangs shot at three planes.¹⁷ This incident also led the United Nations to temporarily suspend flights to Port-au-Prince, further limiting the flow of humanitarian aid into the country.¹⁸

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In short, Haiti has long been in an escalating state of crisis. Policies for displaced Haitians to return disregard these realities and essentially facilitate deportations that many advocates have referred to as a ‘death sentence.’¹⁹

While much of the literature centers the United States as an increasingly unviable option for Haitians seeking refuge, far less attention has been given to the LAC region where asylum opportunities are geographically closer but remain limited and unpromising in offering meaningful pathways to protection.

The Dominican Republic

Despite sharing a border with Haiti, the Dominican Republic has consistently carried out extensive and mass deportations of Haitian refugees and asylum seekers. As of 2022, an estimated 500,000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent resided in the Dominican Republic, many of whom had lived there for generations working primarily across agriculture, construction, and service industries.²⁰

As the country in closest proximity, it expelled an estimated 1,800 unaccompanied Haitian minors in 2022 and deported over 250,000 Haitians in 2023 alone.²¹,²² These widespread crackdowns have disproportionately affected not only Haitian nationals but also Dominicans of Haitian descent, darker-skinned individuals, and even tourists.²³

William Charpantier, coordinator for the National Roundtable for Migration and Refugees in the Dominican Republic, told Al Jazeera:

“These deportations have resulted in the separation of families. People with valid documents have been deported, people who were born here in the Dominican Republic have been deported These aren’t deportations. It’s persecution based on race.”²⁴

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Georges Fouron, a professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook who specializes in immigrant identities and Haiti, added:

“There is no way [the deportees] can survive in Haiti. Many of them barely speak Haitian Creole. They’re not familiar with the social realities of Haiti, so they are in limbo, and after a while, what do they do? They cross back.”²⁵

The Dominican Republic’s collective expulsions and denials of asylum constitute clear violations of its international obligations. Not only are they a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which together prohibit the return of individuals to countries where they face serious threats to their life or freedom, but it is also one of only two Caribbean nations to have passed domestic legislation establishing a formal national procedure for determining refugee status.²⁶

Its domestic refugee process remains largely nonfunctional in practice undermined by limited institutional capacity and trained personnel, poor enforcement and oversight, and systemic discrimination leaving most Haitian asylum seekers either immediately detained and deported or facing years of delay. This has contributed to an estimated 130,000 “stateless” persons of Haitian descent residing in the country as of 2023.²⁷

Relative to its response to other migrant groups, the Dominican Republic’s approach to Haitian migration has been notably harsher. Since implementing a comprehensive Normalization Plan for Venezuelan migrants in 2021, which regularized the status of approximately 139,800 Venezuelans in 2024 alone, President Luis Abinader has simultaneously made plans to construct a $32 million border wall aimed at deterring irregular Haitian migration.²⁸,²⁹ Much like the wall itself projected to leave 134 miles of the border unfenced the Dominican Republic’s response to Haitian displacement remains flawed. ³⁰

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The Bahamas

As a State party to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, The Bahamas also has legal obligations to provide protections for refugees; however, much like the Dominican Republic, its implementation of these commitments has been inconsistent.

532 miles from Haiti, The Bahamas has historically served as both a transit and destination country for Haitian migrants with an estimated 30 percent of the Bahamian population being of Haitian descent.³¹ Despite this, a similar pattern of deportations has emerged, with crackdowns targeting Haitian communities living in informal “shantytowns.”³²

As Haiti’s instability began to rapidly deteriorate in 2022, Bahamian authorities apprehended 3,605 migrants that year, with over three-quarters of them being Haitian. By June 2023, an additional 1,281 Haitian migrants had been apprehended, though official records do not consistently indicate whether individuals were detained, deported, or released. In October 2023, The Bahamas, Turks & Caicos, and Jamaica deported a combined total of 231 individuals. ³³ , ³⁴

Speaking at a Latin American leaders’ meeting in November 2023, Bahamas Prime Minister Philip Davis states,

“The crisis in Haiti is getting worse … The tragic situation there continues to pose a substantial threat not only to Haitians but also to The Bahamas and neighboring countries, all of whom are experiencing a significant increase in irregular and often dangerous migration,” and in an earlier statement declared “The Bahamas is for Bahamians.”³⁵

The Bahamas’ policy inaction and limited engagement fails to acknowledge its active role in Haiti’s migration crisis, as it has long served as an illegal transit route for migrants from various countries attempting to reach the United States.

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In May 2022, a boat carrying 842 Haitians bound for the U.S. strayed off course and washed ashore along the northern coast of Cuba. On July 24, 2022, the Bahamas experienced its worst maritime tragedy in years when the Bare Ambition, a boat likely heading to southern Florida, capsized killing at least 17 Haitians including one man, 15 women, and one girl. ³⁶ , ³⁷

Together, the responses of the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas reveal opportunities for CARICOM to develop a more coordinated and equitable approach to refugee protection one that navigates the realities of varying national capacities as developing countries.

Jamaica, Turks

and Caicos,

and Multilateral Coordination

In recent years, other CARICOM countries have adopted similar approaches in implementing increasingly restrictive migration policies toward Haitian asylum seekers. In March 2024, despite Jamaica being one of 22 countries to have endorsed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection at the IX Summit of the Americas in June 2022, Jamaican Minister of National Security Horace Chang explained to Parliament that the Holness Administration “would not allow Jamaica to be overwhelmed by an influx of refugees.”³⁸

In February 2023, Turks and Caicos Minister of Immigration and Border Services Arlington Musgrove also stressed the country’s limited capacity, stating:

“We are a small country, and this increasing activity, if left unchecked, undoubtedly will continue to pressure our system and resources.”³⁹

Overall, regional officials have cited widespread resource constraints and national security concerns, prioritizing enforcement measures over direct humanitarian support. Rather than addressing the immediate needs of Haitian asylum seekers, greater political emphasis has been placed on supporting a UN-led multinational force aimed at stabilizing Haiti.⁴⁰

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Despite the United States’ allocation of $13.3 million toward the mission (representing 3 percent of the mission’s overall budget) being stalled as part of recent reductions in U.S. foreign assistance, the operation has proceeded.⁴¹

As of February 2025, 800 Kenyan police officers are currently working alongside Haiti’s National Police as part of the multinational effort, which includes personnel contributions from several LAC nations. The Bahamas has deployed six defense personnel, Jamaica 24, Belize two, Guatemala 75, and El Salvador seven.

Conclusion

While this multinational force signals relative progress in cross-regional engagement, it has yet to meaningfully respond to the scope of Haiti’s displacement crisis. As a political union founded on principles of foreign policy coordination, social development, and security, CARICOM has a shared responsibility to act decisively in response to the urgent needs of Haiti as a fellow member state. Without a coordinated migration strategy, Haitian asylum seekers will continue to face extreme vulnerability with limited pathways to resettlement. Recognizing this, CARICOM must develop a comprehensive strategy that equitably divides responsibilities among its member states of varying capacities and do so urgently.

Otherwise, displaced Haitians will continue to have nowhere to go.

Hayes, C. (2025, March 22). Revoking protections for Cubans, Haitians and other migrants. BBC News.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2024, October 2). Over 700,000 displaced in Haiti, half are children, as humanitarian crisis worsens. International Organization for Migration.

Hernandez-Roy, C , & Rubio, J (2024, September 19) The gender-based violence crisis in Haiti Center for Strategic and International Studies.

UNHCR. (2024, October 3). Haiti: A multi-dimensional crisis leading to continued displacement. UNHCR Data Visualization.

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2024, October 2). Over 700,000 displaced in Haiti, half are children, as humanitarian crisis worsens. International Organization for Migration.

Hernandez-Roy, C., & Rubio, J. (2024, September 19). Gender-based violence crisis in Haiti. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

ReliefWeb. (2024, March 7). Retrospective estimation of crude mortality and level of violence suffered by the population of Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during the year 2022 and 2023 – Final report (November 2023).

Robles, F. (2024, March 7). Who are the gangs that have overrun Haiti's capital? The New York Times. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024, December 1). Haiti. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

1 PBS NewsHour. (2024, April 26). Haiti’s new transitional council faces urgent demands for solutions amid gang violence PBS NewsHour

Charles, J. (2025, January 10). Why Haiti’s gangs are gaining ground despite the presence of an international armed force. Miami Herald.

United Nations (2024, September 11) Haiti: Education in jeopardy as gang violence continues UN News

UnitedNationsSustainableDevelopmentGroup(UNSD)(2024,April1). Explainer: 5 things to know about food security in Haiti in times of crisis.

InSight Crime. (2024, February 21). InSight Crime’s 2023 homicide round-up.

InSight Crime. (2023, November 10). Jimmy Chérizier, alias “Barbecue”. InSight Crime.

Hernandez-Roy, C., & Rubio, J. (2024, September 19). The gender-based violence crisis in Haiti. Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Chappell, B. (2024, November 13). U.S. prohibits airlines from flying to Haiti after planes were shot by gangs. NPR.

Ibid. 18

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Kestler-D'Amours, J. (2024, April 18). ‘Unconscionable’: US sends dozens to Haiti on deportation flight.

Al Jazeera. (2022, November 24). Dominican deportations to Haiti fuel growing fears, frustration.

Al Jazeera. (2024, April 4). Rights advocates demand end to Haiti deportations as unrest continues.

Luscombe, R. (2022, November 22). US warns its ‘darker-skinned’ citizens of Dominican Republic’s migrant crackdown The Guardian

Ibid.

Luscombe, R. (2022, November 22). US warns its ‘darker-skinned’ citizens of Dominican Republic’s migrant crackdown The Guardian

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.(2009). Submission for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ compilation report: Universal periodic review: Dominican Republic.

Kanno-Youngs, Z , & Enecia Pérez, H (2023, October 6) They’ve been stateless for 10 years Now many are facing deportation. The New York Times.

ACAPS. Country Analysis: Dominican Republic.

Valera, A (2023, May 8) Dominican Republic border wall deepens tensions over Haitian immigration. Cronkite News.

De La Rosa, R. (2023, May 8). Dominican Republic border wall deepens tensions over Haitian immigration. Cronkite News.

Wilkinson, B. (2023, January 29). The Bahamas has a Haiti crisis. Caribbean Life.

Charles, J. A. (2023, February 27). Haitians are being deported in record numbers. The Dominican Republic defends its actions. Miami Herald.

Schmidt, S., Villegas, P., & Dormido, H. (2023, July 27). In the Bahamas, migrants are increasingly dying in dangerous seas. The Washington Post.

Duncan, N., & Lugg, A. (2024, November 14). Stop ‘draconian’ mass deportations of Haitians fleeing gangs, activists say. The Guardian.

Wilkinson, B. (2023, January 29). The Bahamas has a Haiti crisis. Caribbean Life.

Al Jazeera. (2022, July 24). At least 17 Haitian refugees killed as boat capsizes off Bahamas.

Schmidt, S., Villegas, P., & Dormido, H. (2023, July 27). In the Bahamas, migrants are increasingly dying in dangerous seas. The Washington Post. 36

DominicanToday.(2024,March9). Jamaica wants to avoid ‘ an avalanche’ of Haitians and will only take in a few refugees.

Charles, J. (2023, February 10). Turks and Caicos Islands issues warning against Haitians trying to go there. Miami Herald.

Coto, D , & Sanon, E (2025, February 6) New contingent of Kenyan police joins UN-backed mission to fight gangs in Haiti. AP News.

Ibid.

The Watch Journal. (2024, November 18). Bahamas sends first RBDF contingent to Haiti to restore stability.

Coto, D. (2024, September 10). Jamaica to deploy a limited number of soldiers and police to help fight gangs in Haiti. AP News.

Morland, S , & Isaac, H (2024, September 9) Belize army sends officers for long-delayed Haiti mission to Jamaica. Reuters.

Burgess, J. (2025, January 5). Guatemalan forces arrive in Haiti to fight gangs. BBC News.

Sanon, E., & Coto, D. (2025, February 4). Soldiers from El Salvador join UN-backed mission in Haiti to combat gang violence. AP News.

THEPROTECTIONOFMIGRANTS,

THEMEDITERRANEANSEAROUTE

BIO

Tsion Weldetsadik currently serves as a Program Associate at IREX in the Mandela Washington Fellowship team She is a result-driven young professional with a demonstrated experience working in federal government, corporate and nonprofits. She most recently interned in the U.S. House of Representatives through the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation in the Office of Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-CA). During her internship, she supported a breadth of policy areas and the work of the Congresswoman in the House Foreign Affairs Committee including the launch of the Global Migration Caucus Tsion is equipped with excellent communication, analytical and problem-solving skills and has a proven ability to engage with different stakeholders including C-suite, congressional staff and community members. Tsion is passionate about the intersection of foreign policy and law and the protection of human rights in conflict-stricken areas She is fluent in English and Amharic and has a limited working proficiency in French Tsion is a graduate from Hope College where she earned her B.A in Political Science complemented by a minor in French.

editedby: KahsayNegash

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Executive Summary

For over a decade now, hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa have passed through the deadly Mediterranean Sea route in order to reach Europe. This migration crisis, happening across the Sahara desert traversing to North Africa and extending to the shores of Europe, has taken the lives of thousands and serves as an example of the extensive impact caused by a lack of effective multilateral cooperation that is often crucial in avoiding such catastrophes. This paper addresses past and current policy implementations put forward to curb illegal migration in the Mediterranean and sets forth recommendations including engaging countries of origin, increasing accountability, de-funding armed groups and facilitating the safe return of willing migrants, to foster a lasting solution and forge a system which adheres to the protection of human rights, particularly the rights of migrants.

Introduction and Background

Found between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the Mediterranean is currently one of the deadliest pathways used by irregular migrants. Many of the migrants crossing the sea come from Sub-Saharan African countries such as Eritrea, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and Middle Eastern countries including Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Recent findings by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2025), estimates that in the year 2023 alone, as many as 280,000 people departed from North Africa on the dangerous journey to Europe. However, not everyone who starts the journey is able to reach Europe and this is highlighted by the International Organization for Migration’s Missing Migrant Project (IOM, 2024) which found that since 2014, over 20,000 people have lost their lives and 31,287 people have gone missing while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

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Analysis of Past Policies and Existing Gaps

The above-mentioned staggering statistics then beg the question on why many are willing to risk their lives even when their arrival to Europe is not guaranteed. For a majority of migrants and refugees, political instability, gross violations of human rights by authoritarian regimes and economic disparities in their home countries are some of the primary reasons as to why they are forced to leave their home (Suderland, Simpson et al 2015). These push factors are further fueled by tactful smugglers who sell these vulnerable individuals the false dream of a smooth and easy journey to Europe. The UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000:2) defines smuggling of migrants as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. This violence and extortion does not end when migrants reach North Africa. A communication by the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR, 2021) further highlights the extent of suffering and abuse inflicted on migrants and refugees in Libya in particular. According to the ECCHR document, both state and non-state actors run detention centers where migrants are detained and tortured until ransom payments are made. Furthermore, men are targeted for forced labor whereas young girls and women are forced into sexual slavery and prostitution. Migrants and refugees are also “treated as slaves -bought, sold, auctioned off in the streets and face persecution for their migrant or refugee statues” (ECCHR, 2021). These incidents highlight the urgent need for sustainable solutions to end the suffering of those waiting to cross the Mediterranean and stuck in these inhumane conditions. Given the geographical spread of the migration crisis, different regional measures have been taken to reduce the number of migrants embarking on this dangerous journey. One of these measures is an agreement between the European Union (EU) and Libya where the former provides financial and other capacity building support to the Libyan Coastal Guard (LSG). Since 2017, the EU and Italy have spent about $64 million supporting LSG.

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However, this effort is mainly geared towards ensuring as few migrants as possible reach the shores of Europe (Okunade, Monyani & Oni, 2024). Additionally, there have been several reports of LSG boats interfering with rescue operations by sinking boats in the Mediterranean. In March 2024, for instance, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF, 2024), a non-governmental organization, accused the coastal guards of “deliberately endangering the lives of hundreds of people seeking safety’’ by interrupting one of the organization's rescue operations in the sea.

In addition to the obstacle that the LSG causes on the work of NGOs, many of its personnel have ties to militias within the country and are also involved in the crimes committed against migrants in Libya (ECCHR, 2021). Other similar EU aid given to African regional partners to curb irregular migration has also largely been ineffective. As seen in the shortcomings of the European Union’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), a program created in 2015, has not fully met its objectives after having spent 5 million Euros, as noted by the European Court of Editors (2024). Hence, it is imperative that all stakeholders look to create sustainable and effective solutions that address the root causes of illegal migration.

Policy Recommendations

Engage countries of origin: Economic initiatives such as funding for small businesses to increase employment opportunities as well as engaging youth from origin countries are crucial to addressing the root of the migration crisis. African countries should also focus on creating more economic partnerships with one another and create opportunities that will benefit their citizens and deter them from this dangerous journey. Halt the funding of armed groups: The amount of funding given to the Libyan Coast Guard has not truly made it effective in solving the migration crisis. Instead, it has led to migrants being forcibly returned to the dangerous conditions that they were in Libya and has been used as an instrument to shift the burden from European countries.

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Due to the danger these armed groups pose, halting their funding is pivotal.

Accountability: Groups and/or individuals who either fail to protect migrants or commit crimes against them need to be held accountable for their actions. As such, international justice organizations such as the International Criminal Court should investigate and hold accountable those responsible for the abuse inflicted on migrants. Safe return of migrants: Transit countries and Europe nations, with assistance from a UN enforcing body, should cooperate to facilitate the safe return of willing migrants. Executing the safe return of migrants will require increasing border security and a crackdown on smugglers and human traffickers who are illegally bringing migrants. This strategy will need to have oversight to ensure that the project is effectively being done and not endangering the lives of migrants.

Conclusion

Since its steep rise more than a decade ago, illegal migration across the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean Sea has claimed the lives of thousands. It has challenged regional leaders and non-governmental organizations to come up with tangible solutions to mitigate the numbers of those embarking on this dangerous journey and the eventual physical and psychological harm that follows. It is therefore imperative that all concerned stakeholders look to implement tangible policies such as those recommended above to address the root causes of migration and commit to protecting the fundamental rights of migrants.

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References

ECCHR (2021) Migrants and refugees in Libya face crimes against humanity. ECCHR. https://www ecchr eu/en/case/migrants-and-refugees-in-libya-face-crimes-against-humanity-the-i cc-must-investigate/

European Court of Auditors (2024 September 24). Auditors Step Up Criticism of EU Migration Auditors.

Funds for Africa. European Court of https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/news/NEWS-SR-2024-17

International Organization for Migration (2024) Mediterranean: Missing Migrants project. Mediterranean | Missing Migrants Project. https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean

Medicins Sans Frontier (2024 March, 19). EU-Funded Libyan Coast Guard Obstruct MSF MSF.

Rescue Operation |

https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/eu-funded-libyan-coast-guard-obstruct-msf-rescueoperation

Okunade, S., Monyani M., and Oni, E. O. (2024). European Union/Africa Synergy: A Panacea to Ending Irregular/Illegal Migration from Africa? The Round Table, 113(6), 612-627. https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2024.2440209

Sunderland, J., Cosee E., Simpson G. et al (2015, June 19). The Mediterranean Migration Crisis. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/19/mediterranean-migrationcrisis/why-people-flee-what-eu -should-do

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2000). Protocol Against The Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/smugglingmigrants/SoM Protocol English.pdf

United Nations Regional Information Center for Western Europe (2024) Migration: Twice as many migrants die crossing the Sahara than the Mediterranean Sea https://unric org/en/migration-twice-as-many-migrants-die-crossing-the-sahara-than-themediterranean-sea/

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THELAYERSOFRECONCILIATIONIN

POST-ASSADSYRIAANDTHE

ASSOCIATEDPOLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Nia Harris is a conflict and peacebuilding young professional with expertise in conflict affected environments. She most recently served as the Senior Program Associate at the International Republican Institute Prior to this, she served as a Program Associate with the US Institute of Peace Nia holds bachelors degrees in International Affairs and French from the University of Georgia and a masters degree in Conflict Transformation and Social Justice from Queen’s University Belfast. Nia has extensive experience in project management, report writing, and event planning and coordination. She has intermediate proficiency in Arabic and a full professional proficiency in French

editedby: KhayriyyahMuhammadSmith

NIAHARRIS

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Executive Summary

After 24 years, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has fallen. However, it has left behind a damaged economy, infrastructure and society. As Ahmed al-Sharaa, leader of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), leads the transition, the United States and its regional allies are unsure how the country will rebuild after a 14-year civil war. Policies must be implemented on the national and subnational level in order to rebuild Syria. Their security is vital to the overall security of the Levant and United States’ geopolitical interests. A new constitution that codifies the rights of all Syrians and accountability for perpetrators of crimes will be essential. On the subnational level, community dialogues and memorialization of the disappeared will be vital to eliminating community divides and respecting the collective grief of all communities.

Introduction

As the Assad family dynasty falls, the Syrian people must now rebuild their country and society. For decades, the Assad family manipulated ethnic and religious divisions in order to protect their regime. Though the Alawites are an ethnic minority in Syria, they comprised the majority of senior government and military positions. This not only protected the regime but ensured the loyalty of the entire Alawite community. They were also perpetrators of countless human rights violations including enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings (ICMP). While some policymakers may focus on the security or economic situation, repairing the internal social situation in Syria is vital to regional stability and US interests. The 14-year civil war impacted its immediate neighbors. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan received millions of refugees, with Turkey alone hosting 3.3 million Syrians (Staff A.P, 2024). The rise of ISIS in Syria led to their invasion and partial takeover of Iraq in 2014. Consequently, a power vacuum could cause another wide scale conflict as the Israel-Hamas war continues and Israel’s ceasefire with Lebanon has not held strong.

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Background

Bashar al-Assad inherited the presidency from his father Hafez in 2000 and ruled with an iron fist. Many hoped that he would be a more benevolent ruler than his father, but they were quickly proven wrong. In 2011, following economic stresses and minimal human rights, Syrian society erupted into protest. Assad chose to respond with such force that members of his military defected, forming the Free Syrian Army and sparking a 14-year long civil war. The war caused mass displacement, with 1.6 million fleeing to Turkey alone by 2014 (Brumfield, Levs, Tuysuz 2014). On November 27, 2024, a coalition of rebel groups led by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) launched an offensive beginning in Idlib province to capture the city of Aleppo. From there, the coalition moved southward, finally capturing the capital city, Damascus. Assad has fled Syria and is now believed to be in Moscow.

While there is an urgent need for Syria to rebuild economically and militarily, repairs to the social fabric must be made as well. These are most essential to national security because healing social divides will be the only way to prevent the country from fracturing and malign actors such as ISIS taking advantage of the power vacuum. The Assad family intentionally promoted members of their ethnic community, the Alawites, in order to build loyalty and shield himself from opposition. This however alienated the Sunni majority and other minorities including Shia, Druze and Christians. Many Alawite officers were also responsible for torture and other human rights violations that took place in Syrian detention centers, the most notorious of these being Sednaya prison which was called “a human slaughterhouse” (Staff, A. J. 2024).

PolicyOptions

There are options that exist on the national and subnational levels. The appropriate combination of options is essential for the internal stability of Syria and larger regional stability.

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On the national level:

Prosecution potentially via the International Criminal Court (ICC)

New constitution that protects ethnic and religious minorities

Prosecution via the Syrian judicial system

Amnesty for some Syrian officials in exchange for confessions

On the subnational level:

Community dialogues

Truth commissions

Memorialization

Recommendations

On the national level, prosecution of former members of the Assad regime via the ICC is the most appropriate option. No government institution has the trust of the Syrian people, and the judicial system is not equipped to prosecute cases of this magnitude. The International Criminal Court has already met with Syrian leaders to discuss how they can offer their resources (ICC chief prosecutor meets Syria’s de facto leader, 2025).

Ahmed Al-Sharaa has declared himself the new interim president, but he maintains his promise of an inclusive government (Syria’s new rebel leader pledges to form an inclusive government, 2025). A new constitution that protects the rights of religious and ethnic minorities is vital to a new Syria. This along with prosecutions will send a strong message of accountability to human rights abusers. A new constitution can also include provisions for a new judicial system, which could demonstrate a commitment to impartiality and due process. Furthermore, this display of internal stability will reassure regional allies, such as Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, of the security of the region. More stability in the region protects American national security interests and reduces the risk of deploying US forces to the region.

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On the subnational level, the policies implemented must focus on repairing the social fabric. Community dialogues similar to the unity and reconciliation forums conducted in Rwanda after the genocide will repair the social fabric and bring internal stability to Syria (Hitayezu, 2021).This is important not only in cities and towns but across provinces. Due to the protracted war, many people living in semi-autonomous regions lost contact with those living in regime-held areas. In order to reconnect the country, dialogues must be conducted to rebuild unity and trust. Memorialization will also be an important tool. However, it must be implemented judiciously to avoid the pitfall of competitive memorialization similar to that in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Simic, 2024). This type of memorialization creates push-andpull between communities and the marginalization of certain perspectives of the war. As of 2021, an estimated 130,000 people were missing in Syria, due to either forced disappearances by the Assad regime or disappearing along migratory routes out of the country (ICMP). Even if some individuals are found, memorialization will be an important tool to honor the missing and provide a space for grief for the community. These gestures of remembrance will strengthen community ties and the Syrian national identity, if done in a way that is deliberate and holds space for all communities.

Conclusion

Even before the fall of the Assad region, the Levant was experiencing an uptick in conflict that left many regional actors concerned about full-scale regional conflict. This concern remains along with the concerns about the future of Syria. Rebuilding from within is vital to the security of Syria and the region at large. On the national level, prosecution via the ICC and drafting a new constitution will be an important foundation for a new government. It will also reassure allies of the country’s stability. On the subnational level, community dialogues and memorialization will repair the social fabric along religious, ethnic and geographic lines.

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Bibliography

Brumfield, B., Levs, J., & Gul Tuysuz. (2014, September 22). 200,000 flee in biggest displacement of Syrian conflict, monitor says. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html

Fraser, Guzul (2024, December 14). The Warm Turkish welcome for refugees is ending and Syrians are Worried. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/turkey-syria-assad-erdogan-refugeese5ea4587b0d010d5319 667897a52ff51

Hitayezu, E (2021) Understanding the role of forum for unity and reconciliation in post genocide peacebuilding Rwanda: case of Gasabo district https://dr.ur.ac.rw/handle/123456789/1426

Jazeera, A. (2025, January 17). ICC chief prosecutor meets Syria’s de facto leader. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/17/icc-chief-prosecutor-meets-syrias-de-facto-le ader

Šimić, G. (2024, September 19). BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: THE PERILS AND PITFALLS OF MEMORIALIZATION IN DIVIDED POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES. https://hrcak.srce.hr/320810

Staff, A. J. (2024, December 9). Syria’s White Helmets director says Sednaya Prison was ‘hell’ for detainees. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/9/dead-bodies-in-ovens-syrianrescuers-free-pr isoners-from-sednaya-jail

Syria – International Commission on Missing Persons. (n.d.). https://icmp.int/themissing/where-are-the-missing/syria/

Syria’s new rebel leader pledges to form an inclusive government (2025, January 31) NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syrias-new-rebel-leader-pledges-forminclusive-go vernment-rcna190127

THEARTOFACTIVISM!

CRAFTINGCHANGETHROUGH CREATIVEEXPRESSIONIN CONFLICTZONES

BIO

Ruhama Solomon is an emerging activist and artist, committed to addressing social justice issues and fostering cultural understanding, with a focus on the Horn of Africa and the broader African diaspora. Combining her Bachelor's in Political Science and Environmental Studies from St. Olaf College with artistic expression, she explores pressing issues such as ethnic identity and regional politics. Aspiring to a career in diplomacy and human rights, Ruhama aims to contribute to her ancestral homeland and across the Global South She seeks to leverage her interdisciplinary approach, blending political analysis, environmental awareness, and creative advocacy to bridge cultural divides and promote sustainable development beyond Eurocentric paradigms.

RUHAMASOLOMON

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Abstract

This paper examines artivism (creative resistance in conflict zones) as an transformative tool but underutilized tool for peacebuilding. Through case studies from Ethiopia, the U.S., and the Middle East, it demonstrates how artivism preserves cultural memory, resists repression, and reimagines justice. Centering Global South voices and women of color, it offers new insights into the strategic role of art in conflict transformation and the vulnerabilities that come with visibility.

Introduction

Artivism has emerged as a powerful tool for addressing national conflicts worldwide. From street murals in war-torn cities to lyrical symbolism during political upheavals, artistic interventions challenge dominant narratives, preserve cultural memory, and mobilize communities toward justice. This paper argues that artivism is not merely a form of selfexpression but a reframing force for conflict resolution, capable of fostering solidarity and dismantling structural violence. This review will examine three distinct case studies: Oromo protest music in Ethiopia, athlete activism in the United States, and digital art from Palestine and the Arab Spring. These examples reveal how artivism amplifies marginalized voices while navigating challenges such as censorship, commodification, and state repression. By exploring these interventions, this paper highlights artivism’s dual role: an accessible yet resilient tool for peacebuilding across diverse contexts.

Literature Review

The role of art in conflict resolution has garnered increasing attention, with research examining its potential to foster dialogue, challenge dominant narratives, and mobilize communities (Taylor, 2021). While much of the initial literature focused on U.S.-centric

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contexts, recent scholarship has expanded to explore the transformative potential of artivism in the Global South (Medrado and Rega, 2023). This section aims to synthesize these diverse perspectives by examining: the historical role of art in conflict resolution; critical perspectives on artivism, including its limitations; and the significance of decolonial and intersectional frameworks in artistic activism.

Moreover, social movement theory provides a framework for understanding how artivism functions as a collective effort to enact social change. Social movements are defined as sustained, strategic campaigns driven by a desire to address inequities and perceived threats to social well-being (Nyamari, 2024). In this context, artivism serves as a tactic employed by social movements to mobilize resources, foster collective identity, and disrupt Eurocentric power structures. Artivism challenges dominant cultural hegemonies by creating counterhegemonic discourses that promote solidarity across Global South communities (Medrado and Rega, 2023).

However, it’s critical to acknowledge that symbolic representation can be limited in dismantling deeply entrenched systems. The effectiveness of artivism depends on context, cultural norms, and the engagement of local communities (Deane, 2024). When dissecting the significance of Fela Kuti’s music in Nigeria, scholar Vivane Saleh-Hanna asserts that music/artists can provide alternative values and an avenue through which oppression is both discussed, criticized, and thus disrupted (Saleh-Hanna et. al, 2008). This approach recognizes that conflict is multifaceted, and cannot be confined to a single narrative. It can be seen as a way to bridge the gap between social movement theory and the practice of artivism, emphasizing its use as a tool for social change.

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Methodology

This qualitative case study approach draws on interviews, social media ethnography, and archival research to analyze artivism’s role in conflict transformation. Case studies were chosen for their Global South and non-Eurocentric perspectives, focusing on Africa (Oromo protests), the U.S. (athlete/musician activism), and the Middle East (Palestine/Arab Spring). Special attention is given to gendered resistance, such as Palestinian feminist digital collectives and indigenous Oromo women. Limitations include reliance on English-language sources and potential social media algorithm bias. Ethical concerns include the risk of exposing activists to surveillance. The cases were also chosen for their importance amongst the diaspora and their influence on socio political conversations within their home nations. As an Oromo researcher, I approach the Ethiopian case from a place of cultural proximity and lived resonance, drawing on cultural familiarity. In contrast, my analysis of Palestinian digital resistance is shaped by an outsider’s perspective anchored in solidarity but mindful of interpretive limits. Moreover, restricted access to certain scholarly sources due to paywall barriers or requiring institutional subscriptions. As a result, some relevant research, particularly from women of color scholars or specialized journals, may not have been fully incorporated into the analysis. Despite these challenges, this methodology provides a comprehensive framework to understand the multifaceted role of artivism in contemporary conflicts.

Case Studies

A. Music as Memory: Oromo Protest Songs and Decolonial Resistance

Oromo protest music serves as a powerful tool for preserving cultural memory and resisting colonial domination in Ethiopia. Since the 1960s, Oromo artists like Haacaaluu Hundeessaa have used songs to document land dispossession, cultural erasure, and state violence under successive Ethiopian regimes (Regassa, 2022).

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Ethiopians around the world considered him to be the pioneer of Contemporary Oromo resistance music. Through the Ethiopian government's desire to expand the capital, The Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan (2014) reignited longstanding Oromo grievances over land dispossession, mirroring 19th-century colonial policies that displaced Indigenous communities. In response, Haacaaluu Hundeessaa’s Maalan Jirra (Do I Exist?) released in 2015 strategically used his geerarsa (recitative poetry) to critique systemic violence. His lyrics, though superficially romantic, invoked Oromo clan histories of dispossession of the ancestral homeland, Finfinne to protest state-led erasure. This resonated with Siinqee (ritual stick women hold when married) practices, where women historically used song and oratory to mediate conflicts and protect community rights. By embedding collective memory into protest music, Haacaaluu empowered the Qeerroo/Qarree (young) movement to reclaim agency. A dynamic reflecting social movement theory and emphasis on cultural mobilization (Nyamari, 2024). Siinqee serves as a crucial point of reference here, symbolizing the continuous fight for autonomy and the embodiment of historical claims to land by Oromo women, which Haacaaluu's music amplifies. Notable lyrics from the chorus:

Galaan Finfinnee marsee

Laal Galootoo / Silaa akka jaalalaa laal Galootoo

Wal irraa hin fagaannuu / Laal Galootoo / Jara nu fageessee

Galan surrounded Finfinne, Look, my Galoo / If things go as per our love we would have never been apart, / Look, my Galoo, / [But] they separated us

While Oromo music mobilizes resistance, its impact is constrained by state repression. The song ’ s critique of Amhara hegemony resonates with bell hooks’ analysis of how dominant cultures appropriate and commodify marginalized identities (‘othering’) (hooks, 1992).

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Haacaaluu reframes Finfinne (Addis Ababa) as sacred and ancestral to Oromos, Haacaaluu’s call to transcend material restitution, advocating for autonomy a decolonial praxis. The song reflects artivism’s dual role: symbolic resistance and tactical ambiguity, similar to tactics in Tameshnie Deane’s Sri Lanka study (2021).

Yet bell hooks’ caution about visibility applies here: Haacaaluu’s assassination underscores how artivism’s power makes it a target for state violence. This directly ties into the risks faced by women engaged in Siinqee, who often face social and political backlash for challenging patriarchal norms and advocating for peace (Advocacy for Oromia, 2019). Oromo protest songs serve as cultural memory and grassroots mobilization, linking Haacaaluu’s legacy with the enduring role of women in Oromo peacebuilding traditions, and underscoring the risks of resisting such hegemonies.

B. Performance as a Protest: Visual Symbolism in Athletic and Musical Realms

Kendrick Lamar’s 2025 Super Bowl halftime show serves as a contemporary example of artivism within a highly commodified space. Lamar was the first solo rapper to headline the halftime show in the sporting event’s history (Treisman, 2025). Drawing from his earlier performances, such as his 2016 Grammy performance where he addressed mass incarceration through visuals of chains and prison uniforms, Lamar continues to use powerful imagery to critique systemic racism. When fans of his music asked what to expect on stage, it was all put in one word: “storytelling”. His Super Bowl performance incorporated dancers in red, white and blue, and synchronized in the formation of an American flag and a split of the dancers. This portrayed other meanings, referencing the Bloods and Crips street gangs, and the United States being built off the back of Black people. This visual symbolism aligns with Gil Scott-Heron’s critique in The Revolution Will Not Be Televised, which warned against the commodification of revolutionary messages in mass media spaces (Baram, 2005).

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Lamar’s work demonstrates how artivism can amplify marginalized voices on a global stage. However, performing within a corporate platform like the National Football League, a league criticized for its handling of racial justice issues raises questions about whether such activism is diluted by its association with commercial interests. As bell hooks argues, visibility within corporate spaces often commodifies Black bodies, turning resistance into spectacle rather than sustained action.

Known for her advocacy against racial and gender bias in tennis, Serena Williams has consistently used visual storytelling to reclaim agency. Her raw, unretouched Harper’s Bazaar issue featured her purpose for advocating for herself and female athletes worldwide (Overby, 2021). Williams’ activism also highlights the tensions between personal expression and commercial sponsorship. While her presence in high-profile spaces amplifies her message, it also subjects her to heightened scrutiny by corporate interests. This duality mirrors Lamar’s position, where the transformative potential of their art is both enabled and constrained by its visibility.

C. Digital Canvases: Social Media Art in Palestinian and Arab Spring Resistance

Social media has become a critical platform for artistic activism, amplifying marginalized voices and fostering transnational solidarity. Women of color, particularly in Palestine and the Arab Spring uprisings, have leveraged digital art to reclaim agency, challenge systemic oppression, and mobilize communities. Rand Jarallah, a Palestinian digital artist and activist featured in Marie Claire’s magazine feature (2016), uses makeup as a medium to tell stories of resilience and resistance. Her work with the UN Population Fund highlights how creative expression can address issues like gender-based violence and displacement while promoting healing through visual storytelling. Jarallah’s artistry exemplifies bell hooks’ concept of the “oppositional gaze, ” wherein marginalized individuals reclaim representation to subvert dominant narratives (hooks, 1992).

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Similarly, the experiences highlighted by scholars Muftee and Rosales’ (2022) work demonstrate how women with histories of racial othering use digital art as both a personal outlet and a collective tool for activism . These artists navigate tensions between visibility and vulnerability, echoing hooks’ caution that increased visibility can lead to commodification or censorship. Their work aligns with Medrado and Rega’s (2023) analysis of media activism in the Global South, which emphasizes how digital platforms amplify counter-hegemonic discourses while fostering solidarity across borders.

However, it’s crucial to acknowledge the growth of digital repression of Palestinian artists and activists that is documented. Earl et al. (2023) describe digital repression as a global pattern where social media platforms and state actors implement algorithmic controls to silence dissent and coalition, which Palestinian artists experience firsthand. Recent investigations reveal that platforms like Instagram and Facebook systematically censor Palestinian content through “shadowbanning” limiting an individual's visibility without notification, restricted engagement, and monetization (Human Rights Watch, 2023). While Meta has stated promise to address these crackdowns, the abrupt restrictions on peaceful Palestinian content is inconsistent with the right to access to information.

The Arab Spring uprisings demonstrated how street art, graffiti, and spontaneous writings became powerful tools of resistance. As Aletto (2016) notes, these forms of expression, also seen in Turin, Italy, provided immediate and uncensored commentary on political events, reclaiming public spaces for dissent. This physical art form transitioned into the digital realm, where social media amplified its reach. Women played a significant role in this digital transformation. Palestinian women have been at the forefront of digital resistance, like the Palestinian Feminist Collective to document lived realities and resist erasure. These creative interventions often blend environmental themes with political resistance, highlighting the interconnectedness of social justice struggles (Hahn and Berkers, 2024).

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This approach resonates with Deane’s (2024) framework for reconciliation through cultural practices, suggesting that artivism can bridge divides by creating shared narratives rooted in collective identity.

However, digital artivism is not without limitations. Algorithmic biases on social media platforms often amplify certain voices while silencing others, particularly those from marginalized communities. Despite these challenges, Palestinian women like Jarallah continue to use art as a means of preserving cultural memory and advocating for justice. Their work underscores the dual role of artivism: as a vulnerable yet resilient tool for conflict transformation.

Discussion

Artivism serves not only as a form of resistance but as a catalyst for reimagining justice and fostering solidarity within deeply divided societies. The case studies demonstrate that artivism unites individuals across divides and challenges oppressive systems. However, its effectiveness and associated risks vary significantly by context. Oromo protest music drives grassroots resistance but exposes artists to state violence, while digital Palestinian art amplifies marginalized voices globally but remains vulnerable to censorship. These distinctions underscore the necessity of nuanced, context-specific strategies.

Comparative analysis reveals the critical roles of audience and visibility. In Ethiopia, the visibility of protest musicians both empowered communities and made them targets. Within the U.S., performances by Kendrick Lamar and Serena Williams capitalized on corporate platforms to reach mass audiences, but faced risks of commodification. Conversely, digital artists in Palestine and during the Arab Spring navigate global reach and algorithmic repression, illustrating the double-edged nature of online visibility. These findings suggest that strategically navigating visibility and audience engagement is essential for artivism to realize its full potential.

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To support artivism's transformative impact, sustained funding and resources are vital for community-based art programs and cultural preservation efforts. Integrating artivism into peacebuilding requires respecting local traditions and co-creating with communities. Ethical considerations are paramount, especially in digital contexts where surveillance and censorship can pose risks. Practitioners and policymakers must develop guidelines for protecting artists, ensuring culturally sensitive and ethically sound interventions. The role of audience and visibility differs across cases, demanding tailored approaches while ensuring the safety and well-being of those who participate in these initiatives.

Conclusion

This study underscores artivism’s capacity to transform conflict zones by challenging dominant narratives and fostering solidarity. Artistic expression preserves cultural memory and inspires new possibilities for justice and peace. However, artivism remains vulnerable, threatened by censorship, commodification, and violence. Long-term research is needed to assess how artivist interventions impact community resilience, with an emphasis on investigating the ethical implications of digital art in conflict zones.

To maximize artivism’s impact, policymakers and practitioners should develop guidelines for its integration into peacebuilding policies and create platforms that enable artists and communities to share experiences globally. With sustained support, ethical engagement, and a commitment to cultural sensitivity, artivism contributes significantly to building a more just and peaceful world, fostering hope and catalyzing lasting change amidst adversity.

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Aletto, L. (n.d.). Street arts, graffiti and spontaneous writings from the Arab Spring to the walls of Turin Spaces of Memory and Resistance

Baram, M. (n.d.). The Revolution Will Not Be Televised

. .

Deane, T. (2021). The Potential Role of Arts and Culture in the Reconciliation Process in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka. Journal of Arts and Humanities, 10(6), Article 6. https://doi.org/10.18533/jah.v10i6.2123

Deane, T. (2024). The Case for Arts in Reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Africa. Southern African Journal of Security, 18 pages-18 pages. https://doi.org/10.25159/3005-4222/16141

Features, M. C. published in. (2016, September 14). EXCLUSIVE: How one Palestinian activist is using make up to raise awareness of global crises. Marie Claire UK. https://www.marieclaire.co.uk/reports/rand-jarallah-the-palestinian-make-up-artist-work ing-withunfpa-296029

Hahn, U., & Berkers, P. (2025). Artists on Climate Change: Their Intended Impact and Audiences. Empirical Studies of the Arts, 43(1), 188–208. https://doi.org/10.1177/02762374241258632 hooks, bell. (1992). Black looks: Race and representation. South End Press.

Medrado, A., & Rega, I. (2023). Media Activism, Artivism and the Fight Against Marginalisation in the Global South: South-to-South Communication (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003215103

Regassa, A. (2025). Jirra: Oromo protest songs as weapons of resistance against domination in Ethiopia. African Identities, 23(1), 176–193. https://doi.org/10.1080/14725843.2023.2251693

Saleh-Hanna, V., Saleh-Hanna, V., Affor, C., Agomoh, U., Agozino, B., Akporherhe, C., Anagaba, S. M., Elechi, O. O., Eribo, O., Nagel, M., Odibo, I., Sudbury, J., & Ume, C. (2008). Fela Kuti’s Wahala Music: Political Resistance Through Song In Colonial Systems of Control (pp 355–376) University of Ottawa Press https://doi org/10 2307/j ctt1ckph37 23

The power of ‘Siinqee’ : In protecting woman ’ s rights and brokering peace in Tulama Oromo. (2019, January 21). Advocacy for Oromia. https://advocacy4oromia.org/resource/the-power-of-siinqee-inprotecting-womans-right s-and-brokering-peace-in-tulama-oromo/

Treisman, R. (2025, February 7). The 2025 Super Bowl guide: When is it, who’s performing at halftime and how to watch. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2025/02/07/nx-s1-5288007/super-bowl-2025-eagleschiefs-kendric k-lamar

‘We just want to make art’ – Women with experiences of racial othering reflect on art, activism and representation. (n.d.). https://doi.org/10.1177/13505068221127127

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AIINNATIONALSECURITY:

CONSEQUENCES FOR MARGINALIZED COMMUNITIES IN THE U.S.

Mennah Abdelwahab serves as the arms associate at Human Rights Watch, where she supports the Arms Program’s work to advance humanitarian disarmament, including on issues of killer robots, landmines, and incendiary weapons Previously, she worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Middle East Program as a program coordinator and research assistant. She has also worked with the Offices of Senator Jon Ossoff and the late Congressman John Lewis as well as the Human Rights Measurement Initiative and several local and state political organizations in Georgia. Mennah graduated summa cum laude from the University of Georgia with bachelor’s in international affairs and journalism

editedby:YasmineDong

BIO

MENNAHABDELWAHAB

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Abstract

This paper explores the use of AI in national security efforts in the United States (U.S.), identifies current applications, examines risks to communities of color, and concludes with a series of proposals to improve transparency about AI tools and mitigating risk of bias. AI offers numerous opportunities for the national security community to improve efficiency and effectiveness of existing processes as it can rapidly derive insights from large, disparate datasets and identify connections that could go unnoticed by human operators. Given the extensive literature on the disparate impacts of AI powered systems on communities of color, it is imperative that lawmakers, federal and state government agencies, and policymakers develop policies that mitigate the risk of this technology on marginalized communities.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence increasingly supports decisions impacting people’s lives. Public sectors, private companies, universities, workplaces, and even video gaming platforms are all working to harness AI to remake their services and platforms, enamored by the promise of increased efficiency and convenience. AI systems may be able to accumulate and synthesize information more quickly than humans and identify trends in large datasets, making it a particularly attractive tool in the national security space where decisions are often taken at a moment's notice. The U.S. has underscored the valuable role AI could play in national security, including in an October 2024 memorandum which stated that “the United States must lead the world’s development of safe, secure, and trustworthy AI,… [and] harness powerful AI, with appropriate safeguards, to achieve national security objectives” (The White House, 2024). As aptly noted by the memorandum, American geopolitical power extends from its innovation and leadership in times of technological transition, and falling behind in the AI race would present serious geopolitical risks to the U.S.

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Literature

Yet, advancements also raise serious questions about the potential harm to various communities as general use of AI, if created without considering specific cultural or community needs, can unintentionally reinforce biases and inequalities. This paper will focus on two communities particularly impacted by bias in AI tools: Black and Muslim Americans. Artificial Intelligence Defined and Sources of Bias Artificial intelligence aims to create systems that emulate human intelligence, often with the goal of automating previously complex or tedious tasks. In the national security context, AI systems use machine learning which is designed to analyze a large dataset, “identify patterns, make decisions, and improve themselves through experience and data” (Columbia University, 2023). There are multiple entry points for bias throughout this process. Algorithmic bias, or “ any variance between the desired accuracy of an AI model and the actual output,” occurs when AI models preference one group above another (Hobart, 2024). There are numerous reasons why this bias occurs. As explained by Lisa Herzog in the Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, the problem with algorithmic decision-making systems is that they rely on “ a crucial methodological assumption: that the patterns of the past will repeat themselves” (Herzog, 2021). If the patterns of the past were not reflective of reality but instead a reflection of societal bias, then the probability that AI systems would accurately predict future threats is minimal. Dr. Gaudys Sanclemente further lays out other sources of bias in the AI workflow, including sampling bias, or training machine learning systems on a subset of data that is not reflective of a wider population, and confirmation bias, or programming AI systems to “confirm preexisting beliefs or assumptions rather than providing an objective and accurate analysis” (Sanclemente, 2023).

AI Applications in U.S. National Security Efforts AI tools are already being used to advance U.S. national security interests in a number of ways, including threat detection, border control, and intelligence analysis (Sanclemente, 2023). These applications, however, also pose risks to the rights of marginalized communities. One such application is facial recognition software which can help national security agencies identify individuals of interest at a far faster rate than they could if they were required to manually search through state and national databases. This efficiency, however, often comes at a cost of accuracy. For example, in 2019, the National Institute of Standards and Technology within the U.S. Department of Commerce found that false - positive incidents of a facial recognition algorithm inaccurately finding that images are of the same person, were highest among Native Americans, African Americans, and Asian Americans (Grother et al., 2019). In fact, depending on the algorithm employed, false positives were 10 to more than 100 times more likely for these demographics (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2024). False positives were also higher in women than men and the elderly and children (Grother et al., 2019). Though the study did not identify the reasons behind these disparities, other research points to the lack of diversity in commonly used image datasets, which are overwhelming white, adult, and male. (Findley, 2020).

Another issue is the image quality of the faces the program is trained on. Cameras have traditionally been calibrated for lighter skin tones, often failing to clearly capture the facial features of darker skinned individuals. As a result, facial recognition technology is often trained on blurry images of Black people (Findley, 2020). Another prominent use of AI is in predictive policing, which aims to more efficiently allocate police resources by utilizing previously recorded incidents of crime to predict when and where crime will occur. Crime records, however, are an inaccurate proxy to identify areas most likely to have crime in the future (Bennett & Chan, 2018).

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In a 2023 study from University of California, Los Angeles, researchers found that police spent 3.6% more time in neighborhoods where more than 10% of residents were Black and 5.2% more time where more than 10% of residents were Hispanic, compared to other neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic demographics (Chen et al., 2023). Increased police patrol increases the likelihood of documenting crime in these neighborhoods, creating a self-fulfilling cycle of heightened crime recording leading to more police patrol and in turn more crime recording. Law enforcement also employs risk assessments to forecast if a specific individual is likely to commit a crime in the future to inform decisions on release following arraignment, post- conviction sentencing, or parole board reviews (Berk, 2020). These assessments, however, can introduce bias that disproportionately impacts Black Americans. For example, risk assessments rely on criminal records to determine a defendant’s likelihood of committing another crime. However, given that Black Americans are more likely to be charged and found guilty of a crime than their White counterparts, relying on criminal records introduces bias. In fact, one 2019 study found that Black males aged 18 – 19 were 12.7 times more likely to be imprisoned than White men at the same age (Sreenivasan et al., 2022). As a 2018 Yale Law Journal article finds, “ as long as crime and arrest rates are unequal along racial lines, any method of assessing crime or arrest risk will produce racial disparity” (Mayson, 2018).

Analysis

The National Security Impact on Communities of Color A central element of redefining national security is recognizing that national security policies should work to protect all Americans. To achieve this end, it is vital that national security agencies prioritize combatting bias in the application of AI. As noted by Dr. Sanclemente, “AI algorithms imbued with bias can engender erroneous or unjust decisions, thereby introducing flaws into the fabric of national security endeavors.”

As it pertains to law enforcement, AI tools have resulted in the wrongful incarceration of Black Americans. Beyond the bias mentioned above in the tools often used by law enforcement, AI tools also introduce automation bias, or individual’s tendency to overly trust automated systems, failing to exercise basic precautions to ensure the accuracy of a systems’ decision. In two cases reported by The Washington Post (2025), police failed to conduct basic reviews of facial recognition findings, such as checking alibis or DNA samples, though their internal police policies required doing so, resulting in the wrongful detention of Black Americans. Muslim Americans are also likely to be negatively impacted by the incorporation of AI tools by agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). In the aftermath of 9/11, the Patriot Act gave national security agencies broad leeway to collect data on Americans and to profile, interrogate, and detain them, with a particular focus on Muslim Americans because of a generalized association of all Muslims with the perpetrators of 9/11. Faiza Patel, senior director of the Liberty and National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice, explains how the domestic intelligence programs employed by the U.S. government following 9/11 treated Muslim Americans as “inherently suspect because of their faith” (2021). These programs amassed vast amounts of data on Muslim Americans by mapping Muslim communities and infiltrating mosques to monitor Muslims’ speech and religious observance, all without actual cause that monitored individuals were connected to terrorism. In the years following 9/11, technological advances allowed the FBI, NSA, and law enforcement to amass exponential amounts of data on Muslim communities. The advent of AI will only amplify these agencies’ ability to amass and process data, coupled with bias in the systems themselves. For example, one study of OpenAI’s GPT-3 model showed an overwhelming bias towards associating Muslims with violence.

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When repeatedly prompted to complete the sentence “two Muslims walk into a ” , the model generated violent scenarios 66% of the time, compared to 20% for Christians and less than 10% in Jews or atheists (Abid, Farooqi, and Zou, 2021). Therefore, the national security apparatus’ increasingly reliance on AI tools will exacerbate the targeting of Muslim Americans and the infringement on their basic rights.

A Just Way Forward

Given the risk of harm to marginalized communities from the integration of AI tools into policing and the work of agencies like the FBI and NSA, it is crucial that the government take proactive steps to mitigate this harm. Oversight is especially important. The majority of the aforementioned tools, such as facial recognition and predictive policing software, are created by private corporations. This often means that, unless corporations willingly submit their technology for review by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, it is difficult to assess overall trends in bias. Moreover, some corporations consider the inner workings of their algorithms to be proprietary information, making it difficult for independent reviews to assess their accuracy or precision. Employees of national security agencies or local law enforcement often lack the technological expertise to identify potential bias in such systems. Oversight committees should be created to ensure these assessments occur. Such oversight should not only include national security officials and tech companies who create the AI tools, but also civil rights lawyers, academics, and government officials to ensure comprehensive reviews and oversight. Congress should also play a particular role in guaranteeing that government funds are not being used to profile Americans and to allow public oversight over these systems to mend community relations with communities of color. Moreover, such an oversight board would be vital in keeping up to date on the ever-evolving nature of AI tools. Another key step is ensuring AI education for all individuals involved in a decision impacting national security.

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One study of 9000 subjects from the United States, Russia, China, and other countries found that the individuals most capable of using AI tools to enhance the accuracy of their decisionmaking where those with a higher level of AI knowledge and those with only a minimal amount of knowledge were most susceptible to automation bias (Horowitz & Kahn, 2023). Similarly, the law must explicitly identify liability for misidentification and specify the bar necessary to sue for misconduct as current ambiguity over who can be held responsible may create an environment of impunity, or at least uncertainty. It is also important for identifying and addressing potential bias to be a central part of the AI system creation process. This includes employing a diverse staff of individuals to create AI systems, analyzing input data for potential bias, creating well-defined targets, and ensuring regular assessments of bias once AI tools are deployed (Livingston, 2020). Input data should also respect Americans’ privacy. In this area, the U.S. would greatly benefit from studying the EU’s AI Act, which is the world’s first comprehensive AI legislation (European Union, 2024).

Conclusion

As the national security community considers how best to harness the benefits of AI, it must also consider how its application will disparately impact its citizens. While the allure of efficient allocation of resources and quick recognition of potential suspects is appealing, these systems have been shown to reinforce pre-existing bias towards communities of color. Ultimately, national security efforts must serve all Americans by not only protecting them from domestic and international threats but also ensuring their basic rights are respected in the process.

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References

Abid, A., Farooqi, M., and Zou, J. (2021). Persistent Anti-Muslim Bias in Large Language

Models 298-306 10 1145/3461702 3462624

Bennett Moses, L., & Chan, J. (2018). Algorithmic prediction in policing: assumptions, evaluation, and accountability. Policing and Society, 28(7), 806–822.

https://doi org/10 1080/10439463 2016 1253695

Berk, R. A. (2020). Artificial Intelligence, Predictive Policing, and Risk Assessment for Law

Enforcement. Annual Review of Criminology, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.1146/annurevcriminol- 051520-012342

Chen, M , Christensen, K , John, E , Owens, E , & Zhuo, Y (2023) Smartphone Data Reveal Neighborhood-Level Racial Disparities in Police Presence. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest a Columbia University. (2023). Artificial Intelligence (AI) vs. Machine Learning. Columbia Engineering. https://ai.engineering.columbia.edu/ai-vs-machinelearning/

European Parliament. (2024). EU AI Act: First Regulation on Artificial Intelligence. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-aiact- first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence

Findley, B. (2020). Why Racial Bias is Prevalent in Facial Recognition Technology. Jolt Digest. https://jolt law harvard edu/digest/why-racial-bias-is-prevalent-in-facialrecognition- technology

Grother, P., Ngan, M., & Hanaoka, K. (2019). Face recognition vendor test (FRVT) part 3: Demographic effects. Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic Effects, 8280 https://doi org/10 6028/nist ir 8280

Hobart, L (2024) AI, Bias, and National Security Profiling Berkeley Tech

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Horowitz, M. C., & Kahn, L. (2024). Bending the automation bias curve: a study of human and AI-based decision making in national security contexts. International Studies Quarterly, 68(2), sqae020.

Klosowski, T. (2020), Facial Recognition is Everywhere. Here’s What We Can Do About It. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/wirecutter/blog/how-facial-recognition-works/.

Livingston, M (2020) Preventing racial bias in federal ai Journal of Science Policy & Governance, 16(02).

MacMillan, D., David, O., & Schaffer, A. (2025, January 13). Police ignore standards after AI facial recognition matches. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ interactive/2025/police-artificial-intelligence-facial-recognition/

Mayson, S. G. (2018). Bias In, Bias Out. The Yale Law Journal, 128, 2218 – 2300. https://www yalelawjournal org/pdf/Mayson p5g2tz2m pdf

Patel, F. (2021). The Costs of 9/11’s Suspicionless Surveillance: Suppressing Communities of Color and Political Dissent. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/78133/the-costs-of-911s-suspicionless-surveillance-suppressing-communities-of-color-and-political-dissent/

Sanclemente, G (2023). Digital Tools: Safeguarding National Security, Cybersecurity, and AI Bias. Journal of the Brazilian Center for International Affairs, no. 7, https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/112/digital-tools-safeguarding-nationalsecurity- cybersecurity-and-ai-bias

Sreenivasan, S., DiCiro, M., Rokop, J., & Weinberger, L. E. (2022). Addressing Systemic Bias in Violence Risk Assessment. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online, 50(4), 626–635. https://doi.org/10.29158/JAAPL.220031-21

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The White House (2024) Memorandum on Advancing the United States’ Leadership in Artificial Intelligence; Harnessing Artificial Intelligence to Fulfill National Security Objectives; and Fostering the Safety, Security, and Trustworthiness of Artificial Intelligence. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidentialactions/2024/10/24/memorandum-on-advancing-the-united-states-leadership-in-artificialintelligence-harnessing-artificial-intelligence-to-fulfill-national-security-objectives-and- fosteringthe-safety-security/

U S Commission on Civil Rights (2024) The Civil Rights Implications of the Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology. https://www.usccr.gov/files/2024-09/civil-rightsimplications-of-frt 0.pdf

POLITICS

AREHARMFUL STEREOTYPES/PERCEPTIONSOF BLACKWOMENIMPACTINGTHEIR

Kua Ngilbus is a student at the University of the District of Columbia where she studies Political Science with a concentration in Global Studies She is a passionate student researcher with a strong focus on international relations in West Africa as well as community outreach focusing on engendering more positive health outcomes for disadvantaged communities. She is motivated by equity and inclusion of women of color in solutionmaking for hunger in the domestic and international context, learning about and amplifying the work of changemakers on the ground, and sustainable development in West Africa.

editedby:RebeccaIrby

kps.ngilbus@gmail.com

BIO

KUANGILBUS

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Abstract

Women candidates must overcome longstanding biases that question their suitability for public office, and Black women face the added burden of racialized stereotypes. Building on Nikol Alexander-Floyd’s (2007) and Grace Howard’s (2018) concept of the Black Cultural Pathology Paradigm (BCPP), this paper explores how such stereotypes affect Black women's political viability. Through a discourse analysis of editorials in The Guardian, I examine the elections of Kamala Harris (U.S., 2020), Kemi Badenoch (U.K., 2024), and Francia Márquez (Colombia, 2022). These case studies were chosen because they represent significant political victories for Black women in different countries and provide a rich source of data to understand how their candidacies navigated, reinforced, or challenged the BCPP. This tripartite case study considers what their victories reveal about representation in the face of persistent bias.

Introduction

In 2022, The Economist claimed that overweight or obese women earned less per year and were less likely to be promoted than their thinner counterparts, except for Black women. This unlikely assertion reveals a research gap regarding the specific experiences of Black women. Stereotypes such as the “Welfare Queen” often rely on imagery of larger size to portray Black women as “too much” compared to the demure, thin ideal of white womanhood. Dr. Sabrina Strings traces the racist roots of fatphobia to Enlightenment-era thinking, where thinness symbolized the triumph of reason over sensuality, qualities seen as exclusive to white men. Black people in contrast were governed by uncontrolled appetites. In this framework, larger size becomes symbolic of moral failure (Strings, 2019). Dr. Ange-Marie Hancock’s concept of the “Public Identity” explains how such stereotypes form hyper-visible caricatures that are difficult to dispel. The “Welfare Queen,” in particular, became a potent political tool in the 1990s to mobilize public opinion in favor of weakening welfare.

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The Welfare Queen’s larger size symbolizes laziness and uncontrolled sensuality, reinforcing harmful ideas about Black women ’ s fitness for public life (Hancock, 2004). As Strings shows, these ideas are historically contingent: when full-figured bodies were idealized, thinness in Black bodies was deemed a sign of inferiority.

Thus, Black women ’ s bodies are always marked as “ wrong, ” regardless of size. Despite this, recent years have seen Black women making political gains. Kamala Harris’s election as Vice President and her 2024 presidential run, Francia Márquez’s election as Vice President in Colombia, and Kemi Badenoch’s rise in the UK Conservative Party all demonstrate the growing political presence of Black women. Yet, these women still face media narratives steeped in ideas of excess and impropriety. This paper uses Dr. Strings's framework to analyze international media coverage of Harris, Márquez, and Badenoch, asking: How do discussions of their appearance or demeanor reflect deeper stereotypes of excessive sensuality? How do these women win despite those challenges? This study seeks to understand how weight operates as a dimension of racialized excess and how Black women navigate the double bind of race and body politics in the public sphere. It also underscores the urgent need for further research in this area.

Literature Review - Women and Politics

Politics, both as a discipline and as a practice, is a heavily gendered arena. Initially, the exclusion of women from the field was taken for granted; women were the guardians of the private sphere, and their place as secondary to men was unquestioned. The discipline then naturally emerged to prioritize the concerns of the men who created the field. This influenced the narrow definition of politics as the study of the machinery of government, which translated to the public sphere, where women were largely absent (Celis, 2020).

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Campaigning

Campaigning as a woman can be a difficult space to negotiate. “Women in nationalist projects are often limited to reproductive roles, including pregnancy and birth, the reproduction of national boundaries, and the reproduction and transmission of ideology and culture” (Howard, 2018). First Ladies, though unelected, still have formal and informal agendas and serve as symbolic representations of ideal American womanhood. The First Lady must disappear into the role of “the woman behind the man. ” Michelle Obama, for example, effectively ran an auxiliary campaign through her Let’s Move! Initiative, presenting a manicured image while addressing obesity from a safe distance. Barack Obama, as the first Black president, was not granted the typical assumptions of masculinity, and Michelle Obama faced both racial and gendered scrutiny. Like Hillary Clinton, her accomplishments drew criticism, but her race fueled discourse that she might “emasculate” the president. She was even called his “baby mama, ” a racist insult no white First Lady had faced (Howard, 2018). Michelle Obama successfully evoked traditional femininity through careful self-presentation: staying trim, embracing a housewife image, and avoiding race-specific issues in favor of universal projects. This distanced her from the Black Cultural Pathology Paradigm (BCPP) stereotypes of crime, absent fathers, and angry, obese matriarchs (Howard, 2018). By framing obesity as an issue of personal responsibility, she invoked the language of self- control and discipline to subtly comment on the unrespectable sex relations of Blacks without naming the issue. Women continuously pushed back. Feminist movements exploded throughout the Western world in the 1960s, ushering in a new era where 60 percent of women entered the workforce. However, in the field of political science, women are still heavily underrepresented, comprising only 20 percent of the discipline. Women who enter politics are often considered “ a deviant version of the male norm ” which increases the level of scrutiny to which they are subject (Celis, 2020).

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If public image impacts candidates' success, we must ask how women of color who don’t match Obama’s model of respectability are received.

Methodology

This study uses discourse analysis to examine how language in media reflects and reinforces stereotypes associated with the Black Cultural Pathology Paradigm (Alexander-Floyd, 2007; Howard, 2018). By analyzing media portrayals of three Black women politicians Kamala Harris, Kemi Badenoch, and Francia Márquez I explore how ideas of racialized excess shape perceptions of their political legitimacy.

These figures were selected not only because their victories mark important milestones in the U.S., U.K., and Colombia, but also because they represent different strategies of navigating public image. In contrast to Michelle Obama, whose carefully managed appearance distanced her from dominant stereotypes, Badenoch and Márquez embraced more confrontational or unapologetic public personas and won anyway. This contrast allows for a deeper understanding of how different performances of Black womanhood interact with cultural expectations and media narratives.

I selected The Guardian for its international coverage and balanced readership (10.2 million men and 9.4 million women across platforms [Studies, 2022]). For each figure, I analyzed a key article published at the peak of their campaign or shortly after their win. I conducted a close reading to identify patterns in how their appearance, demeanor, and legitimacy were discussed. I paid special attention to language suggesting discipline, excess, sensuality, or deviance terms often embedded in fatphobic and racialized stereotypes.

Ultimately, this analysis helps answer the core research question: How do media representations of Black women candidates reinforce or resist racialized and body-based stereotypes and how do these women succeed despite them?

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Findings and Discussion

The Black Cultural Pathology Paradigm (BCPP) continues to shape perceptions of Black women in politics across national contexts. This section examines how three figures Kamala Harris (U.S.), Francia Márquez (Colombia), and Kemi Badenoch (U.K.) either conform to, confront, or are constrained by these narratives, particularly those linking Black womanhood with excess, deviance, or lack of discipline.

Kamala Harris exemplifies a strategy of strategic assimilation. Her biracial identity, professional polish, and moderate platform recall Barack Obama’s multicultural appeal. While her tough-on-crime record as California’s Attorney General alienated some Black voters, it helped deflect conservative critiques that she was soft on criminal justice. Her refusal to directly challenge Joe Biden’s record famously stating, “not a thing comes to mind” ("YouTube," n.d.) reflects an intentional distancing from racial grievance. This strategy has yielded results: by 2024, Angela Alsobrooks and Lisa Blunt Rochester became the first two Black women to serve simultaneously in the U.S. Senate, mirroring Harris’s phenotype and moderate tone. However, Harris’s approach is not the only available path.

Stacey Abrams, while not a main case study, offers a contrasting model that helps contextualize Harris’s positioning. Her 2018 Georgia gubernatorial campaign mobilized disaffected voters of color and nearly overturned Republican control of the state despite being widely considered “unelectable” due to her size and skin tone (Khalid, 2018). Unlike Harris, Abrams did not avoid race or grassroots organizing. Yet she was passed over for the vice presidency in favor of Harris, revealing how phenotype and public image still shape the perceived viability of Black women in national politics.

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Francia Márquez challenges the BCPP even more directly. A darker-skinned, larger single mom with natural hair and a working-class background, Márquez’s 2022 vice-presidential win in Colombia represents a radical departure from traditional aesthetics of leadership. Frequently derided in the media mocked as “King Kong” and accused of stoking division she nonetheless secured national office through an activist platform rooted in environmental justice and racial equity (Daniels, 2022). Her candidacy suggests that a visibly Black, unapologetic public identity can win, though her limited influence within President Petro’s administration also reveals the ongoing constraints Black women face post-election (Osorio, 2025).

Kemi Badenoch offers a complex and contradictory case. As a Black British Conservative, her confrontational style and anti-“woke” rhetoric mark her as ideologically distinct from Harris or Márquez. Though not physically larger, her choice to wear braids and her direct, at times combative rhetoric such as calling a fellow MP a “liar” in Parliament ("Furious Row Breaks Out," n.d.) invoke discourses of unruliness commonly associated with the BCPP. Yet her rise through a party that has historically marginalized racial minorities suggests the symbolic utility of a nonwhite figure who does not challenge structural inequality. Badenoch’s brand of representation ultimately reinforces the status quo under the guise of diversity.

Taken together, these case studies demonstrate that the BCPP is a flexible but persistent frame. Whether through Harris’s assimilation, Márquez’s defiance, or Badenoch’s ideological rebranding, Black women in politics are scrutinized through intersecting lenses of race, gender, and body politics. Their differing levels of media hostility, political influence, and perceived legitimacy suggest that phenotype, ideology, and self-presentation remain critical to understanding Black women ’ s political viability. While success is possible, it often comes at the cost of either downplaying identity or being marginalized once in power.

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Conclusion

This study contributes to the growing body of literature on intersectionality and political representation by examining how race, gender, and embodiment converge in shaping Black women ’ s political trajectories. While the scope was limited to a small sample of media texts, the comparative analysis reveals the persistent influence of racialized and gendered stereotypes across diverse national contexts. The symbolic inclusion of Black women in political spaces often obscures the structural barriers they continue to face. Nevertheless, the electoral successes of Harris, Márquez, and Badenoch suggest the emergence of varied strategies for navigating and subverting these constraints. Future research should expand the empirical base examining variables such as campaign resources, phenotype, and media framing to better understand how intersectional identities inform both candidate viability and public perception. Such work is essential to advancing a more nuanced and comprehensive account of representational politics.

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King,M.(2020,November8).HowStaceyAbramsandherbandofbelieversturnedGeorgiablue. Politico.https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/08/stacey-abrams-believers-georgia-blue-434985

Lugo,V.P.,&Osorio,C.(2025,March27).FranciaMárquezenfrentasupeorcrisispolítica.ElPaís AméricaColombia.https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2025-03-27/francia-marquez-enfrenta-supeor-crisis-politica.html

Strings,S.(2019).FearingtheBlackbody:Theracialoriginsoffatphobia.NewYorkUniversityPress. MediaStudies.(2022,December2).TheGuardiannewspaper:Audienceandmediaindustryanalysis. MediaStudies.https://media-studies.com/the-guardian-study-guide/

HOWENHANCINGWOMEN’SPOLITICAL

PARTICIPATIONINLEBANON CONTRIBUTESTOPOST-WARRECOVERY

A social worker and advocate for gender justice, climate action, and human rights Holding a Bachelor of Arts in Social Work from Saint Joseph University of Beirut, I have spent years on the front lines of crises, addressing gender-based violence and sexual and reproductive health challenges among vulnerable Lebanese and refugee communities. My extensive field experience includes responding to the Beirut blast, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon To further strengthen my expertise in crisis response, I am currently pursuing a university diploma in Humanitarian Crisis from Saint Joseph University of Beirut on a full scholarship.

Beyond my professional work, I am engaged in regional youth-led initiatives in the SWANA region. I lead the Lebanon office of NAMA Human Rights Network, an initiative dedicated to supporting human rights defenders across the region

Additionally, as a policy committee member of Climate Sirens, I advocate for decolonizing climate justice, focusing on the SWANA region’s young women and indigenous communities.

As a member of the Arab Network for Young Researchers in the Field of Economics and Social Rights, I have authored a policy paper on the inclusion of children in Lebanese schools and another one on decentralization as a solution to mitigate economic and social challenges in Lebanon

editedby:GazbiahSans

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Introduction

Lebanon is a country devastated by war, political perturbations, regional insecurity, and multiple crisis. Like many countries, it has failed to achieve gender equality, and is ranked 132nd out of 146 countries (World Economic Forum, 2021), reflecting the systemic barriers that affect the progress of achieving gender equality in Lebanon and worldwide. In Lebanon, women are forced to fight for their basic rights; including the right to pass on their nationality to their children when married to a foreign man, equal rights to inheritance, child custody, and divorce; all of which is based on religious-based personal status law, as the country lacks a unified civil code regulating personal status. These societal norms and patriarchal structures in Lebanon, limits women ’ s participation in public life and in political decisionmaking rooms.

Religion, Law, Politics and Gender Equality in Lebanon: Ratifying a Patriarchal System

Lebanon ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1996. However, entered reservations to articles related to women ’ s rights in nationality, marriage and family, particularly, regarding equality in parental rights, guardship, and spousal responsibilities (CEDAW, OHCHR).

In Lebanon, there are 17 different sects, and personal status matters related to marriage, inheritance, and child custody are governed by separate religious-based status laws and courts. Each religion has different sects, each sect has its own court, and each court applies different laws. For example, when a Lebanese woman decides to step into marriage, she should be fully aware of her rights. This means understanding the religious-based status laws that apply to her based on her religion whether Islam, Christianity, Druze, or another faith and her specific sect, such as Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, or Maronite Christian. Since Lebanon does not have a unified civil code for personal status laws, these regulations are inspired by religious discourse rather than a standardized legal framework.

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These religious-based courts apply rules that reinforce patriarchal structures in Lebanon, are subjecting women to systemic inequalities in comparison to men. While these rules are not arbitrary in the sense that they follow the framework of religious-based status laws across 17 sects, the inconsistencies between them create unequal legal outcomes for women. For example, custody laws vary significantly depending on the religious court overseeing the case, even within the same religious tradition. Sunni and Shiite courts, both deriving their legal framework from Islamic jurisprudence, grant custody at different ages. Sunni courts allow maternal custody until the child reaches 12 years old for boys and 14 for girls, while Shiite courts set the limit at 2 years for boys and 7 for girls. This disparity illustrates how religious interpretations, cultural norms, and legal traditions intersect to shape personal status laws.

On the political side, the fear of Lebanese politicians to disrupt Lebanon’s sectarian balance has prevented Lebanese women from passing the Lebanese nationality to their children and spouse if she is married to a foreigner. This is because the Taif Agreement grants politician’s specific seats in parliament based on their sect. For example, the president must be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, ... This sectarian division was established after the civil war through the Taif Agreement and is based on Lebanon’s demographic statistics. Each sect is allocated a certain number of seats and key positions according to its relative population size.

How does this affect women? If Lebanese women were able to pass their nationality to their children and husband, Palestinian refugees that many of whom are Sunni Muslims and who are married to Lebanese women would gain Lebanese nationality. This could lead to an increase in the Sunni Muslim population, allowing the Sunni sect to demand more parliamentary seats and greater political influence. As a result, other sects would see their political power downsized potentially leading to another civil war.

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Onasidenote,inLebanon,thedemographicstatisticshavenotbeenupdatedsince1932(CRS,2017), infearofsectarianchanges.ThisrestrictionisbasedonalawfromtheFrench-mandateerathathasnot beenchangedfor90years(ThelegalAgenda,2020).Politiciansfearthatgrantingcitizenshiptochildren andspousesofaLebanesewomanmarriedtonon-Lebanesemen,particularly,Palestinianlivingin Lebanon,woulddisruptLebanon’ssectarianbalance.Asaresult,women’srightsaresacrificedinfavour ofmaintainingLebanon’ssectarianstructure.Similarly,ifyou’reaChristianMaronitewomanaskingfor adivorce,theprocedureistime-consumingandtheMaronitecourtoftenannouncesadeclarationof nullityratherthanadivorce.Thishasledsomepeopletoconsiderconvertingtoanotherreligionas meanstoobtainadivorce.Thesearefewexamplestoshowhowgender-basedsystemicbarriersto womenobtainingadivorce,placingasignificantburdenonwomenmultiplelevels:personal,financial, political,social,..

Lebanese law clearly demonstrates that women have little governance over their own bodies, as these laws limit their autonomy, especially in matters related to reproductive rights. This lack of control is enshrined in the legal framework and underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive overhaul of the laws to ensure women ’ s rights to make decisions about their own bodies. Article 541 of the Lebanese Penal Code criminalizes abortion and effectively denies women their right to control their bodies. However, abortion is not considered criminal if it is with the intention of maintaining a woman ’ s 'honor' (Article 545), even in the case of forced abortion inflicted on women without their consent by male family members (articles 542 and 543). According to articles related to abortion, women's bodies and unwanted pregnancies can be subject to decisions by (most probably male) family members, but not by women themselves (Civil Knowledge Center, 2014).

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Barriers to Women Political Representations

Only 73 years ago, in 1952, women gained the right to vote and to run for office in Lebanon, yet they remain underrepresented in political life (UN Women,2022). In 1992,

3 Lebanese women secured a seated in the Lebanese parliament for the first time (The Arab Institute of Women, 2023). Women represent 4.7% of the Lebanese Parliament, holding just 6 seats out of 128 (The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2021).

Since 1953, 17 women have been elected members of Parliament, most of them are wives, sisters, or daughters of male politicians. This highlights the role of nepotism in enabling women ’ s political participation, as their involvement in politics is facilitated by their male family members rather than their own qualifications. While women ’ s participation is welcomed, nepotism certainly should not be the qualifying factor for women's political participation or women politicians being elected. In fact, access and equity are some of the external challenges that limit qualified female politicians in Lebanon. Independent competent female political candidates without prior political connections or exposure struggle to secure a seat in the Parliament due to several barriers, such as a lack of political party support and a disadvantageous electoral system. Political parties rarely nominate women on their candidacy lists. Moreover, individuals wishing to run for candidacy must pay a high, non-refundable nomination fee of $5,300 USD, and a campaign financial ceiling is fixed at $100,000 USD, an amount affordable only to wealthy candidates (Hivos 2020). This financial burden places additional pressure on women seeking political representation. Since the Taif agreement, 36 years ago, male politicians in the Lebanese Parliament developed a clientelism strategy (LCPS, 2018) building loyalty through the services they provide to their potential voters, putting further barriers to women ’ s political participation.

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Another obstacle stopping women from participating in politics is the different types of violence they face, such as, domestic violence, political violence, online violence,.. Several Lebanese women who ran for 2022 elections faced violence against women in politics, according to a study conducted in 2022 by the Maharat Foundation and Madanyat, the types of online violence practiced against women working in politics were defamation, hate speech, psychological abuse, threats of physical harm and sexual violence, and bullying. Some female candidates withdrew their candidacy because of the threats they received on social media and self-censorship. The absence of legal protections against gender-based political violence makes it harder for women to engage in political life safely (Daraj, 2022).

Conclusion and Recommendations

4.1 Lowering the fees of the campaigns.

4.2 Putting a law for violence against women in politics.

4.3 Introduce gender quotas: Lebanon is ranked 180th globally in terms of women representation in parliament. while law No. 44/2017 includes a provision that mandates political parties to ensure that at least 30% of candidates on electoral lists are women (UNDP, 2022).

4 4 Strengthen the implementation of gender equality frameworks in public policy to support women’s rights in both private and public spheres.

4.5 Integrating WPS principles into national legislation. This includes removing obstacles to women passing on citizenship to their children and spouses, as well as addressing gender-based systemic barriers in divorce courts.

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Reference

CAWTAR Clearinghouse. (n.d.). Gender politics in Lebanon and the limits of legal reformism. https://www cawtarclearinghouse org/storage/AttachementGender/Gender%20politics%2 0in%20Lebanon%20and%20the%20limits%20of%20legal%20reformism.pdf

Daraj Media. (2021, November 29). Biased algorithms: How digital platforms reinforce abuse against female politicians in Lebanon. Daraj. https://daraj.media/en/biasedalgorithms-how-digital-platforms-reinforce-abuse-against-female-politicians-in-lebanon/?

Jafal, A., & Awad, T. (2020). Challenges faced by women candidates in accessing campaign financing in Lebanon and Jordan Hivos https://hivos.org/assets/womeninleadership/2021/01/CHALLENGES-FACED-BYWOMEN-CANDIDATES-IN-ACCESSING-CAMPAIGN-FINANCING-LEBANONAND-JORDAN-4 pdf

Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. (2021). Women’s political participation in Lebanon: An analysis of electoral quotas and political institutions. https://api.lcpslebanon.org/content/uploads/files/1617105491-women participation.pdf

UNDP. (2018). Electoral quotas and women ’ s participation in Lebanon: A review of the legal framework https://lebanon ec-undp-electoralassistance org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2018/10/ec-undp-jft-lebanon-resources-publications-quotabrochure-web-en.pdf

United Nations Treaty Collection. (n.d.). Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Declarations, Reservations and Objections.

United States Congressional Research Service. (2017, July 25). https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/uscrs/2017/en/118655

World Economic Forum. (2021). Global Gender Gap Report 2021. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF GGGR 2021.pdf

ADVANCINGUNSCR1325INAFRICA:

Ruth Awentirim Pechim Ane is an aspiring policy analyst and research with specializing in gender peace and security, dedicated to advancing women ’ s roles in post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, and advocating for the rights of women , youth, and children in conflict settings Currently, she is pursuing a Master’s in Gender, Peace, and Security at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC), where she is also keen on increasing women ’ s efforts in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Fluent in English, Spanish, and four Ghanaian languages, Ruth is an avid reader whose interests extend to thought-provoking classic literature that transforms perspectives. In her free time, she enjoys dancing and swimming activities that provide her with serenity, creative connection, and a continual drive for self-discovery and balance.

editedby:MokweElomoJemea

1 2 3

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSCR) adopted resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) that marked a pivotal shift in global peace and security efforts by encouraging member states of the United Nations (UN) to incorporate a gender perspective in their peace and security policies. Since then, numerous countries and regional bodies have developed National Plans of Actions (NAPs) to implement this resolution within their specific contexts. However, in West African post-conflict contexts, the implementation of UNSCR 1325, also known as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, has faced significant challenges such as institutional weakness, cultural barriers, ownership, and funding gaps. Post-conflict contexts refer to societies emerging from violent conflicts where efforts are being made to restore social cohesion. This policy paper examines these challenges and explores opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of the resolution in post-conflict reconstruction in West Africa. Recommendations include fostering cultural shifts, empowering grassroot organisations to enhance women ’ s roles in peacebuilding, and securing sustainable funding.

INTRODUCTION

The UNSCR 1325 emphasises the critical role women play in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. It also highlights the need to protect women and girls from gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict settings. This official adaptation of the resolution is a result of decades of lobbying by women advocates from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs)¹. The adaptation of UNSCR 1325 was well received by African women ’ s groups and CSOs, as it was the international framework recognizing the linkage of Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)². It also recognised the capabilities and efforts of women in peacebuilding³. Out of the 56 countries in Africa, only

Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security (n d ) >The Free Library (2014) Retrieved Jan 31 2025, from https://www thefreelibrary com/Trick+or+treat%3f+The+UN+and+implementation+of+security+Councila0215069791

Ilesanmi, O A (2021) UNSCR 1325 and African women in conflict and peace In The Palgrave Handbook of African Women's Studies (pp 813-832). Cham: Springer International Publishing. Ibid

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32 have adopted the resolution and created National Action Plans (NAPs)⁴. The African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other regional communities have also adopted Regional Action Plans for implementation⁵. However, a lot of these implementation efforts have not been successful. The successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 in West Africa is essential for achieving sustainable peace and development, as many countries, such as Liberia, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, etc., are grappling with the aftermath of conflicts. Despite the potential of UNSCR 1325, progress remains uneven due to systematic and contextual challenges. This policy paper probes these barriers and proffers actionable recommendations to improve implementation in post-conflict settings.

KEY CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1325

The UNSCR 1325 ensures that women and girls are not left out in the reconstruction process and that their voices are taken into account in the development of policies to reshape the country and enhance development. However, the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in postconflict African countries is fraught with unique challenges that need to be addressed to enable successful implementation. Many African countries lack robust mechanisms to effectively coordinate, monitor, and evaluate NAPs on UNSCR 1325, and the situation in post-conflict countries is more dire. For example, Liberia, the first post-conflict country in West Africa to create a NAP on UNSCR 132⁵,⁶ has developed two NAPs but has struggled with implementation due to limited inter-agency collaboration and weak institutional oversight.

4 PeaceWomen. (n.d.). National Action Plans (NAPs) overview. 1325 National Action Plans Database. Retrieved January 31, 2025, from https://1325naps.peacewomen.org/index.php/nap-overview/

Ibid

6 Government of Liberia (2020) Liberia's second phase of the national action plan on women, peace, and security: Progress report Monrovia: Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection

Ibid

8 UN Women (2021) Implementing UNSCR 1325 in fragile states: The case of South Sudan

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The Liberian Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection often lack the authority to effectively enforce inter-ministerial cooperation, making it difficult for it to successfully coordinate the plan⁷. The fragile state of state institutions and the ongoing conflict have also delayed the implementation of South Sudan’s NAP⁸. The persistent instability plus weak legal frameworks and lack of coordination between local and national authorities in the country make it difficult to allocate constant funding for gender-responsive peacebuilding efforts, thereby further impeding progress.

A 2010 International Alert Report⁹ highlights that even though women ’ s organisations in Liberia possess substantial practical knowledge regarding UNSCR 1325, a key challenge is the absence of an effective mechanism to ensure that women’s peacebuilding priorities are integrated into broader implementation plans. Sections of this manifest a case of institutional and framework gaps that perpetuate acts against the objectives of UNSCR 1325. For example, provisions in Section 27(4)(d) and (e) of the 1991 Sierra Leonean Constitution¹⁰ allow for discrimination in areas of customary law and personal matters, which makes it difficult to hold traditional leaders accountable for actions that perpetuate gender inequality. These provisions further marginalize women, denying them equal rights to land, property, and inheritance, thereby weakening the economic empowerment of women, which is a cornerstone of post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

9 International Alert. (2010). Implementing Resolution 1325 in Liberia: Challenges and opportunities. [PDF]. Retrieved January 29, 2025, from https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/09/IFP-ImplementingResolution-1325-Liberia-EN-2010 pdf

10 Government of Sierra Leone (1991) The constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 Government Printer

12 Federal Register. (2025, January 29). Ending radical and wasteful government DEI programs and preferencing. U.S. Government Publishing Office Retrieved March 30, 2025, from https://www federalregister gov/documents/2025/01/29/2025-01953/ending-radical-and-wasteful- government-deiprograms-and-preferencing Côte d’Ivoire – 1325 National Action Plans (n d ) https://1325naps peacewomen org/index php/cote-divoire/

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There is a need for significant financial investments in NAPs for them to be successful. However, post-conflict countries suffer financially as they try to rebuild and develop the country; hence, they are unable to allocate the needed funds to successfully implement the NAPs. For instance, Ivory Coast’s second NAP (2019-2023) did not have an allocated budget,¹¹ which means there is no allocated time for the completion of the actions. Postconflict countries rely on donor funding to help implement their NAPs, which are usually insufficient, unpredictable, and come with conditionalities. The recent cuts made by President Trump of the United States on the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) and Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI)¹² programs highlight the unpredictability of donor funding.

Grassroots participation in post-conflict reconstruction processes is essential for development and the implementation of UNSCR 1325. In Liberia, local women's organizations played a pivotal role in ending the civil war; however, their involvement in post-conflict governance structures has been minimal as they are excluded from formal decision-making processes¹³. This exclusion stems from systematic challenges such as inadequate recognition of their contributions, limited access to resources, and structural barriers within governmental frameworks. Foreign aid donors, peacekeeping officials, and other international actors risk causing more harm than good when they fail to consult and incorporate grassroot perspectives.

13 Prasch, A. M. (2015). Maternal bodies in militant protest: Leymah Gbowee and the rhetorical agency of African motherhood. Women's Studies in Communication , 38(2), 187-205.

14 United Nations Peacekeeping. (n.d.). MONUSCO. United Nations. Retrieved January 29, 2025, from https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/monusco

15 The New Humanitarian (2024, September 24) In DRC’s Beni region, departing UN peacekeepers leave a trail of abuse and anger Retrieved January 29, 2025, from https://www thenewhumanitarian org/newsfeature/2024/09/24/drc-beni-region-departing-un-monusco-peacekeepers-leave-trail-abuse-anger

16 Gbowee, L., & Mithers, C. (2011). Mighty be our powers: How sisterhood, prayer, and sex changed a nation at war. Beast Books.

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For instance, from 1991 to 2010, the UN spent about US $8.73 billion on peacekeeping mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through its initial United Nation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and has subsequently spent US $1.123 billion between 2021 and 2023 via the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO);¹⁴ however, the mission has not done much to help the local people of the DRC as they are viewed as external and rebel supporters¹⁵. Peacekeepers often struggle to integrate and engage local communities, sometimes operating under the assumption of superior knowledge. It is also for the same reasons that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) failed¹⁶.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The challenges hindering the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325 in post-conflict West African countries are significant but not insurmountable. To address the barriers that hinder the success of UNSCR 1325, there is a need for institutional reformation, cultural shifts, increased dedicated financial commitments, and inclusive decision-making. West African nations can create a more enabling environment for women's participation in postconflict reconstruction processes by leveraging lessons learnt from successful interventions and fostering stronger collaborations among government, civil society, and international partners. The following policy recommendations offer concrete steps to enhance the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

Governments in post-conflict countries must set up multi-stakeholder committees instead of fully independent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) units with representatives from governments, civil society, donors, and local women agencies. These committees will reduce political resistance from state actors who often view independent M&E units as external interference while increasing local ownership and credibility of the NAPs.

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For instance, the involvement of women groups and civil society in Liberia’s NAP implementation enhanced community trust and legitimacy. Ministries are also most likely to cooperate when the M&E function is part of their structure rather than imposed externally. More importantly, a multi-stakeholder committee ensures that no one body dominates decision-making hence, preventing government agencies from self-reporting biased data or donors from pushing external agendas.

The importance of grassroots participation in the implementation of NAPs cannot be emphasised enough. The aim of UNSCR 1325 is to integrate women into every aspect of the peacebuilding process; however, this cannot be if the opinions of women in all parts of the country are not taken into account. From Liberia’s women-led peace movement to South Sudan’s advocacy networks, grassroots actors have persistently championed change despite structural barriers. Their voices, experiences, and leadership are indispensable in shaping sustainable peace. To further incorporate grassroots voices in peacebuilding efforts, it is essential to run public awareness campaigns and education initiatives to challenge patriarchal norms and advocate for women ’ s leadership. Local women should be consulted in the drafting and revision of NAPS to ensure that local concerns and perspectives are included. Nigeria had commendably included rural women and traditional leaders in the development of its second NAP (2017-2020), resulting to localized implementation strategies that better addressed issues such as gender-based conflict zones.¹⁷ Local women may also need training in leadership, negotiation, and policy-making expertise to enable them to participate meaningfully in decision-making. It is therefore necessary for the government to invest in capacity-building initiatives to prepare women for leadership roles in security and governance sectors.

17 Nigeria Federal Ministry of Women Affairs (2017) Second National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions Government of Nigeria

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In light of the recent DEI funding reduction, it is imperative for governments to allocate funding for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 NAPs to ensure the sustainability of women, peace, and security initiatives. Reliance on donor funding has often resulted in fragmented and short-lived interventions, leaving critical programs vulnerable to political shifts and financial constraints. This will strengthen institutional capacity, support womenled peace initiatives, and enhance gender-responsive security sector reforms. A long-term commitment to funding will not only promote women's meaningful participation in conflict prevention and resolution but also contribute to more stable and resilient post-conflict societies.

CONCLUSION

UNSCR 1325 implementation efforts have faced significant challenges in a lot of postconflict West African countries. However, these challenges, some of which have been discussed are not insurmountable. A review of the NAP drafting by including the voices of local women instead of only expert opinions can make all the difference. Some laws, such as Section 27(4)(d) and (e) of Sierra Leone's Constitution, which may perpetuate gender-based violence, need to be reviewed. At the same time, inter-agency collaboration should be strengthened to include women, civil society organisations and relevant government institutions in M&Es. This would also significantly reduce political tensions. These reforms will ensure that NAPs move beyond policy rhetoric and lead to meaningful changes in women ’ s roles in peace and security processes.

THEROLE WOMEN,PEACE, ANDSECURITYAGENDAIN

AUTHORITARIANREGIMES

BIO

With a strong foundation in leadership, community engagement, and a deep commitment to public service, Kareena brings a unique combination of academic knowledge and hands-on experience to her work Her passion for international affairs was ignited through her involvement with nonprofit organizations, where she gained a deeper understanding of how global challenges impact local communities. Throughout her academic and professional journey, she has embraced leadership roles that have allowed her to make meaningful contributions to her community. As an aspiring foreign policy leader with a proven track record in research, strategy development, and crossfunctional collaboration, she is experienced in developing communication strategies for climate initiatives, global events, and sustainable development projects. Kareena has studied and worked across four continents, leveraging her language proficiency in Arabic, Spanish, Russian, and Darija to connect with diverse communities. Kareena is currently working with the Sustainable Impact Alliance to develop a data platform that tracks local implementation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals She continues to synthesize complex data into actionable insights in promoting peace and security through effective communication and thoughtful strategy implementation. She also enjoys mentoring younger students, providing resources and workshops for young women in her community.

editedby: DeyaniraMurga

Executive Summary

Across the world, women continue to be the practical and normative face of resistance to authoritarian rule. This paper explores the intersection of gender and power structures in authoritarian regimes, tracing the rollback of gender equity and highlighting the links between gender equality and global security. It argues that authoritarian regimes exploit gender dynamics to advance their political agendas, using it as a tool for both domestic control and foreign policy. Misinformation has become a critical geopolitical challenge, and addressing the erosion of the WPS agenda must focus on promoting women-led peacebuilding. Therefore, this paper invites the United States and its allies to take action by integrating gender-informed strategies into their defense and diplomatic policies to better counter authoritarianism and support global security.

Introduction

In opposition to the reactionary gender roles prescribed by authoritarian regimes, women play crucial roles in challenging these power structures. This paper employs a comparative policy analysis that draws on the utility of gender analytic approaches and emerging principles of integrated deterrence. The following methodology provided insights into the gendered dynamics at play in these regimes and their impact on global stability. Globally, the WPS agenda highlights the need for diverse perspectives in peacebuilding, yet autocratic governments actively exclude women from decision-making (Jung, 2024). In China, for instance, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched campaigns to silence feminist dissent networks, recognizing the threat women pose to the dominance of authoritarian political discourse (Fincher, 2021). While leadership figures have long insisted on maintaining a firm grip on gender norms to maintain the political status quo, recent events have introduced more traditional family hierarchy and societal roles at large (Meacci, 2022). Further, President Xi Jinping's

decision not to include women in the CCP's leadership contradicts decades of Chinese policies that once promoted gender equality (Cozens, 2024). Similarly, when President Vladimir Putin declared 2024 the “Year of the Family,” many critics saw it as a political move, driven by a desire to consolidate power rather than genuine moral commitment. These policies have left Russian families vulnerable and under-resourced, with state funds being diverted to the military instead of welfare, education, and healthcare (Zagorcheva, 2024). Therefore, Russia’s model of governance is utilizing its understanding of gender to advance its political agenda, often to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy ambitions (Spears & Prey, 2022). As a result, these developments underscore the need for a more comprehensive approach to countering repression one that recognizes the role of gender in shaping both domestic and foreign policies.

Background

Currently, the U.S. national security community tends to view women ’ s issues as irrelevant to “hard” security matters (McInnis & Hunter, 2024). However, recent crackdowns in authoritarian regimes reveal how gender plays a crucial role in the exercise of power and control. In China, for example, state repression against the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang illustrates how gender roles is weaponized as part of a broader effort to consolidate Han ethno- nationalist identity. The persecution includes the erasure of Uyghur masculinity through mass sterilization of women and policies that require Uyghur women to live with Han Chinese men–– effectively using gender-based assimilation to weaken cultural and familial structures. Further, democratic backsliding witnessed in countries influenced by Russia and China is often accompanied by gender-based harassment and the erosion of women ’ s rights (McInnis et al., 2024). As Russia expands its influence, women are frequently targeted as victims of repression and retaliation. This pattern is evident across Europe, with authoritarian movements gaining

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traction in countries like Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania (Matthews, 2025).

President Putin’s emphasis on “family values” is driven by a strategy to consolidate power both domestically and globally by aligning with far-right movements and exploiting divisions in liberal democracies.

Findings & Policy Analysis

Russia and China, two dominant geopolitical players, are actively using gender to reinforce patriarchal systems globally. In response, the United States and its allies must integrate gender-informed analysis––which examines how power, identity, and inequality shape behavior– – into their security and foreign policy planning. For example, a more feminist foreign policy approach would weave gender analysis throughout its national security policies. By understanding how authoritarian actors manipulate gender norms to consolidate power, policymakers can design tailored deterrence strategies to counter these tactics. This strategy was successfully demonstrated in 2021 when the U.S. and other G7 countries launched the Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership as a direct response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Holland & Faulconbridge, 2021). Liberal democracies must also challenge misinformation about gender equality, recognizing that supporting women ’ s participation in governance and peacebuilding directly undermines authoritarian power structures.

Recommendations

It is essential for the U.S. and its allies to view WPS programs and capabilities as strategic enablers in their competition with non-democratic regimes. China’s disengagement from the WPS agenda presents a clear opportunity for liberal democracies to strengthen alliances grounded in democratic values. Moreover, the application of the WPS agenda must evolve from being a conceptual framework to a fully resourced strategy with measurable outcomes. This includes investing in security initiatives that elevate women ’ s leadership, integrate gender analysis into planning, and shape global governance structures. Doing so will help unlock underutilized potential across allied and partner nations (McInnis et al., 2024).

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The U.S. must actively monitor the rollback of gender policies as a key indicator of democratic backsliding. The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) are flagship programs designed to communicate U.S. and partner red lines to Moscow and Beijing. However, gender and WPS are rarely referenced in these discussions, leaving a significant gap in deterrence strategies. Integrating gender perspectives into these programs would close critical gaps, enhance threat forecasting, and build more resilient, values- based coalitions. Gender-sensitive deterrence strategies aren’t just inclusive––they’re essential for building a stronger, more adaptive defense posture in an era of authoritarian resurgence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, authoritarian policies contribute significantly to global destabilization, and gender-informed analysis has a key role to play in the context of great power competition. By incorporating gender into defense and foreign policy planning, liberal democracies can more effectively mobilize diverse constituencies in partner states, fostering resilience in local communities and exposing gendered dimensions of oppression. WPS offers a unique way to counter autocratic strategies by securing a future where equality strengthens global stability. Moving forward, it is essential to view women not as separate from but integral to the broader societal context in which men also operate, recognizing that both genders are key to building sustainable peace and countering authoritarianism.

References

Cozens, Claire “For the First Time in Decades, There Are No Women on China’s Top Leadership Team ” The Fuller Project, 17 Jan 2024, fullerproject org/story/there-are-nowomen-on-chinas-top-leadership-team/

Fincher, Leta Hong. “Feminists Thwarting China’s Population Goals.” Politico, 29 April 2021. https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2021/04/29/feministsin-china-thwarting-governments-population-planning-objectives-492643.

Holland, Steve and Guy Faulconbridge. “G7 rivals China with grand infrastructure plan.” Reuters, 12 June 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/g7-counter-chinas-belt-road-withinfrastructure-project-senior-us-official-2021-06-12/.

Jung, Yeonju. “China’s Approach to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda.” Institute for Security & Development Policy, 31 Jan. 2024. https://isdp.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2024/01/Interview-Yeonju-Jung-Jan-31.pdf.

Matthews, Jillian. “Democratic Backsliding in Georgia.” UAB Institute for Human Rights Blog, 31 Jan 2025, sites uab edu/humanrights/2025/01/31/democratic-backsliding-ingeorgia/

McInnis, Kathleen J, et al. “Countering China and Russia: The Hidden Advantages of Women, Peace, and Security.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 Nov. 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-china-and-russia-hidden-advantageswomen-peace-and-security.

McInnis, Kathleen J, and Kyleanne M Hunter. “Gender Wars Are an Early Warning Sign for Authoritarianism.” RAND, Foreign Policy, 22 Nov. 2024, www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/gender-wars-are-an-early-warning-sign-forauthoritarianism.html.

Meacci, Ludovica. “China’s Conservative Turn on Gender Roles.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 25 Jan. 2022, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/chinas-conservative-turn-gender-roles-32970.

Spears, Kinsey and Emily Prey “Why U S –China Relations Need a Gender Analysis ” New Lines Institute, 3 Mar 2022, https://newlinesinstitute org/gender/gender-as-ananalytical-tool-for-foreign-policy/why-u-s-china-relations-need-a-gender-analysis/.

Zagorcheva, Dessie. “Putin and the Weaponization of Family Values.” Center for European Policy Analysis, 18 Mar. 2024, cepa.org/article/putin-and-the-weaponizationof-family-values/.

RECLAIMINGSTABILITYINANERAOF CRISIS:

Princessessa Calixte (she/her/elle) is a young professional in the Gender, Women, Peace, and Security sector. She holds a Bachelor's in Conflict Studies and Human Rights and a Master’s in Political Science/International Relations from the University of Ottawa, Canada She currently advances gender equality, health equity, and human rights-based approaches at the WHO Regional Office for Africa in Congo-Brazzaville. Previously, she served as a policy analyst for Canada’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Global Affairs Canada, supporting the development of Canada’s third National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. Committed to feminist, decolonial and post-colonial, and youth-oriented practices and methodologies, she strives to drive innovation for justice-focused and sustainable peace processes.

PRINCESSESSACALIXTE

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Executive Summary

Haiti faces complex and interlinked crises, driven by political instability and escalating violence. This policy brief analyzes current challenges to achieving a sustainable and positive peace through a Women, Peace and Security (WPS) analytical framework. By incorporating feminist and postcolonial lens, this brief identifies strategic entry points across the four WPS pillars, emphasizing Haitian women’s leadership and agency. A WPS approach in Haiti offers a pathway to a gender-responsive, inclusive and sustainable peace, security and justice.

Introduction

Haiti has endured prolonged instability, state and non-state violence and humanitarian crises, exacerbated by weak governance and insecurity. Since its independence in 1804, the country has faced crushing economic hardships, including crippling national debt, brutal dictatorships and political turmoil. The July 7, 2021, assassination of President Jovenel Moïse deepened further unrest¹. With no elections since 2016 and no elected officials since 2023, Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s April 2024 resignation enabled a more prominent power vacuum. Gangs and criminal networks, bolstered by rampant arms flows and ineffective leadership, now control at least 85% of Port-au-Prince². A Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) was formed in 2024 to counter gang violence and restore governance³. However, questions around its legitimacy, internal corruption and limited authority hinder its effectiveness⁴. The Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission — approved by the UN Security Council in 2023⁵—, continues to face operational challenges, funding shortfalls and mistrust linked to past UN peacekeeping abuses⁶.⁷

1 Human Rights Watch. (2024). World Report 2024: Rights Trends in Haiti 2023. https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2024/country-chapters/haiti Shuldiner, H. (2025). Haiti violence surges as gangs expand influence. InSight Crime. Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti. (2024). Human rights and the rule of law in Haiti: Key recent developments, June 2024 through November 2024 (December 2024). Idib.

United Nations. (2023). Security Council authorizes ‘historic’ support mission in Haiti. UN News. United Nations.https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141802

The Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH) (2004-2017) was marred by controversy due to reported sexual exploitation and abuse and a deadly cholera outbreak.

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The humanitarian crisis has disproportionately affected women and girls. By September 2024, over 700 000 Haitians, including children⁸, were internally displaced⁹. Nearly half of the total population – 5.5 million Haitians – lacks basic access to food and healthcare¹¹. Gangs have weaponized sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including rape, to incite fear, control territory and access to services. Sexual violence against children – primarily girls – increased by 1000% in 2024, according to UN data¹². Women and children are increasingly recruited or coerced into gang activity under extreme economic and social pressure often being subjected to SGBV¹³.

WPS Analytical Framework

The WPS agenda, rooted in the UN Security Council Resolution 1325¹⁴, emphasizes that women’s full, equal and meaningful participation enhances sustainable peace¹⁵. It is built around four pillars—Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief and Recovery—to address women's unique challenges in conflict while advancing gender equality in peace and security. Research shows that when women are involved in peace agreement negotiations, the likelihood of those agreements lasting increases – by 20% over two years, and by 35% over 15 years¹⁶. Feminist and postcolonial lens challenges patriarchal and colonial systems that have historically excluded women, in the Global South, and failed to address inequalities that that are intersectional historical and structural¹⁷. This approach recognizes the diverse experiences and expertise of Haitian women as vital to shaping pathways towards sustainable peace, security and justice.

Blondel, P. (2024). Haiti’s destiny “bright” despite terrifying escalation of Violence | UN News. United Nations News: Global Perspectives Human Stories. International Organization for Migration Haiti Report 2024 . Idib.

NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. UNICEF.

UNICEF estimates that some gangs consist of approximately 30 – 50% children. In addition to 9 subsequent resolutions on WPS.

The four pillars are: Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief and Recovery.

UN Women, The Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 2015 Pérez, M. J. (2022). Decolonizing peacebuilding: Feminist perspectives from the Global South. Routledge.

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations align across the four pillars as interdependent strategic entry points. 1) Participation Measures: Haitian women’s political participation and representation in peacekeeping, police and security should not be considered an afterthought or an add-on. This entails addressing systemic and gendered barriers to Haitian women’s active participation. Hence, the prioritization of gender parity and diverse representation benchmarks could propel more women leaders with decision making and voting power in the TPC.²⁰ An advisory civil society group composed of youth, women peacebuilders and advocates could work alongside the TPC to advocate and foster WPS integration. In addition, gender-responsive and intersectional assessments of the Kenya-led Security Mission would highlight safety and security needs and gendered barriers for female civilian and military staff, especially at leadership and senior levels ²¹. Elevating diverse Haitian women , gender-diverse peoples and youth peacebuilders would promote Haitian ownership of localized WPS implementation at regional platforms. Notable opportunities could include Haiti’s participation in future Caribbean inter-government meetings on WPS implementation²³ . 2) Protection Measures: Immediate safety and security are paramount amid rising violence and forced displacement. As such, coordinated state and regional action is essential to curb cross-border arms flow fueling gang activity. Moreover, Haitian women’s and feminist organizations should lead SGBV response, supported by targeted, rapid and sustained funding²⁴ and comprehensive, gender-responsive reintegration provisions for former recruits ²⁵. Mandatory trainings on SGBV and robust accountability mechanisms would be paramount towards rebuilding trust and collaboration . Lastly, justice systems must be bolstered to combat

Only 4 of the 18 cabinet members in the TPC are women. The TPC did not consider any women candidates for the position of Prime Minister. The TPC should implement a 30% or more quota for women representation as outlined in the Haitian Constitution.

In 2024, Jordan received acclaim for its commitments to advancing gender parity in peacekeeping and police security forces, surpassing UN targets.

The first convening meeting was held in May 2024. Haitian women-led organizations include the Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA) and Alliance of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Women’s Empowerment known as L’Alliance (AOSCPAFH). These organizations advocate for Haitian women’s autonomy, access to health care, leadership and the eradication of GBV.

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impunity for state and non-state perpetrators of violence and protect survivors from retaliation²⁷. 3) Prevention Measures: Haitian feminist and grassroots organizations should lead the work on gang violence prevention and conflict mitigation strategies, while also addressing root causes²⁸. Gender-responsive analyses of gang recruitment methods could better inform prevention strategies²⁹. National gender and human rights policies may be assessed to address provisions for vulnerable groups³⁰, and align with international frameworks³¹. 4)Relief and Recovery Measures: Previous measures such as women’s economic empowerment initiatives to counter gang exploitation should be re-evaluated to not reinforce harmful global north dynamics. Community- led rebuilding and relief ³² could include psychosocial support and independent mechanisms to address human rights abuses through inclusive and survivor-centered approaches³³.

A WPS framework offers actionable pathways across its four pillars through feminist, and postcolonial lens. Transformative change demands strong political will, bold investment, and accountability, especially given past failed Western-led efforts. Amid intensifying resistance to gender equality and recent global funding cuts, support for fragile and conflictaffected contexts is becoming more uncertain and dire. Yet, the evidence underscores the critical role of WPS in achieving sustainable peace. Haiti's future and its regional position in the region relies on elevating women and youth’s voices, ensuring their protection, and uplifting leadership for lasting peace, security, and justice.

In Colombia, the peace agreement between the government and the (FARC) included specific provisions for gender-responsive DDR The agreement recognized the distinct experiences of women as combatants and non-combatants and emphasized their participation in the reintegration process Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2024). Open letter to the Haitian transitional government demanding action on genderbased violence.

Idib Papworth, E , & Hunegs, K (2023) Gang violence and the WPS Agenda: Analyzing Gendered Realities in Central America and the Caribbean IPI Global Observatory

Current national strategies and plans include the National Gender Equality Policy (2014 -2034) and the National Plan for Eradicating Violence against Women (Plan national de lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes (2012-2016). A bill was presented to the TPC to adopt legislation on the prevention, punishment, and elimination of violence against women. This bill was tabled by the Senate in 2018 but was ultimately not enacted Conclusion

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References

Applebaum, A., & Mawby, B. (2018). Gang Violence as Armed Conflict: A New Perspective on El Salvador. GIWPS. https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/gang-violence-as-armed-conflict/. Blondel, P. (2024). Haiti’s destiny “bright” despite terrifying escalation of Violence | UN News. United Nations News: Global Perspectives Human Stories. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158481 Conciliation Resources. (2016). Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process: A gender subcomission. https://www.c-r.org/news-and-insight/innovations-colombian-peace-processgender-subcomission Figueroa, M. C. (n.d.). Peacekeeping in Haiti: Successes and failures.

Peacekeeping in Haiti: Successes and Failures | The Pardee Atlas Journal of Global Affairs. https://sites.bu.edu/pardeeatlas/advancing-human-progress-initiative/back2school/peacekeepingin-haiti-successes-and-failures/

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2024) Open letter to the Haitian transitional government demanding action on gender-based violence

https://www.globalr2p.org/publications/open-letter-to-the-haitian-transitional-governmentdemanding-action-on-gender-based-violence/.

Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime. (2023). Gang Violence and Insecurity in Haiti. https://globalinitiative.net/

Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti. (2024). Human rights and the rule of law in Haiti: Key recent developments, June 2024 through November 2024 (December 2024). ReliefWeb. ht t ps:/ /r elie fw e b. int /r eport /ha it i/ hu ma n - r ig ht s- and- r u le- la w- ha it i- ke y- r ece ntdeve lo p me nt s- ju ne2024-through-november-2024-december-2024

International Organization for Migration. (2024). Report on the internal displacement situation in Haiti Round 8. https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haitireport-internal-displacement-situation-haitiround-8-september-2024.

Parashar, S. (2019). Coloniality and Women, Peace, and Security: The Politics of Global Discourses. International Affairs. Press.

MacKenzie, M H , & Wegner, N (2021) Feminist Solutions for Ending War Pluto Press NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (2024) Haiti Profile https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/region/americas/central-america-caribbean/haiti/ Papworth, E., & Hunegs , K. (2023). Gang violence and the WPS Agenda: Analyzing Gendered Realities in Central America and the Caribbean. IPI Global Observatory. https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/11/gang-violence-and-the-wps-agenda . Pérez, M. J. (2022). Decolonizing peacebuilding: Feminist perspectives from the Global South. Routledge.

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Shuldiner, H. (2025). Haiti violence surges as gangs expand influence. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/haiti-violence-surges-gangs-expand-influence/. Sofa - Solidarité Fanm Ayisyèn-Haitian Women’s Solidarity. (2023). SOFA. https://sofahaiti.org/ UNICEF. (2024). Number of children in Haiti recruited by armed groups soars by 70 per cent in one year. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/number-children-haiti-recruited- armedgroups-soars-70-cent-one-year-unicef. UNICEF. (2025). Haiti’s children under siege: The staggering rise of child abuse and recruitment by armed groups. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/haitischildren-under-siege-staggering-rise-child-recruitment-armed-groups. United Nations. (2023). Haiti: “unimaginable violence” against women, children, reports UNICEF | UN News United Nations https://news un org/en/story/2023/08/1139487

United Nations (2023) Security Council authorizes ‘historic’ support mission in Haiti UN News. United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141802

United Nations. (n.d.-b). The four Pillars of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 | she stands for peace. United Nations. https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/content/four-pillarsunited-nations-security-council-resolution-1325 United Nations. (n.d.-c). United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325 (2000) | she stands for peace. United Nations. https://www.un.org/shestandsforpeace/content/united-nations-security-council-resolution-13252000-sres1325-2000

United Nations: Gender Unit, Department of Peace Operations. (2020). Policy brief women transforming peace in peacekeeping contexts peacekeeping. United Nations. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/policy-brief-women-transforming-peace-peacekeeping-contexts. UN Security Council. (2024). Annual report of the UN Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, 2024. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un documents. UNSDG. (2024). Breaking Barriers, building peace: The women of El Salvador https://unsdg un org/latest/stories/breaking-barriers-building-peace-women-el-salvador

UN Women – Americas and the Caribbean (2024) L’Alliance: A safe space promoting women ’ s leadership and participation in Haiti. https://lac.unwomen.org/en/stories/news/2024/08/lalliancea-safe-space-promoting-womens-leadership-and-participation-in-haiti.

HOWTOAPPLYLESSONSFROMTHE

MONTREALPROTOCOLANDAML

REGIMETOADDRESSCLIMATECHANGE

Amanda is a Master's student in International Public Affairs, graduating in June 2025. She is currently interning at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, Austria, within the Terrorism Prevention Branch, and chairing a working group on nuclear harm reduction policy with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), focusing on integrating scientific insights into deterrence thinking. Previously, Amanda spent two years at the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil, focusing on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism. She also contributed to the Global Initiative to End Wildlife Crime during the 12th UNTOC Conference of the Parties Amanda holds a BA degree in International Relations from Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo and has participated in prestigious programs, including the Young Women in Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Mentorship Programme and a fellowship on the anti-money laundering agenda

editedby:BushraAliKhan

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Abstract

The widening gap between climate commitments and actual emissions reductions now makes the Paris Agreement's central goal increasingly unattainable under current governance approaches. This paper argues that the climate crisis suffers from a fundamental collective action problem, where nations lack incentives to prioritize long-term global benefits over short- term costs. To break this impasse, the study examines two successful models of international cooperation: the Montreal Protocol, which effectively phased out ozonedepleting substances through binding trade sanctions, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which combats money laundering through flexible but enforceable standards. By comparing these regimes, the paper identifies key lessons binding enforcement mechanisms, reputational and financial incentives, and adaptive governance structures that could be adapted to climate policy. It proposes a new framework, inspired by the FATF model, to incentivize compliance through peer pressure, transparent reporting, and economic consequences for non-participants. The findings challenge the notion that climate inaction is inevitable and offer a pragmatic pathway toward more effective global cooperation.

Introduction

Despite decades of international negotiations and agreements, efforts to combat climate change remain alarmingly insufficient. For instance, even if the commitments under the 2021 Glasgow Climate Pact are fully met, the global average temperature is projected to rise at least between 2.4°C and 2.8°C (Maslin, Lang, & Harvey, 2023). This stands in stark contrast to the Paris Agreement’s 2015 goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C (Lewis, 2015), showing not just slow advancement but also a striking absence of concrete outcomes.

A central challenge, as Barret (2014) observes, lies in the lack of incentives for countries to restrict their own emissions. International climate efforts continue to fall short without mechanisms to ensure collective action and accountability. This article explores how lessons from two successful global frameworks the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone Layer and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regime for Anti-Money

Laundering can be applied to reinvigorate climate action and drive meaningful progress. By examining these models, it aims to identify strategies that could break the current impasse and foster a more effective global response to the climate crisis.

Literature Review

The climate governance impasse is well-documented in academic literature, with scholars identifying systemic barriers to collective action. This gap between ambition and action reflects a deeper structural problem: a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, where short-term selfinterest undermines cooperation. In this scenario adapted from game theory each nation faces incentives to free-ride (avoiding costly emission cuts while benefiting from others’ efforts), even though mutual cooperation would yield better long-term outcomes for all (Barrett, 2014; Sadler, 2016). While these theoretical frameworks have powerfully explained climate inaction, few studies have systematically compared successful regimes that overcame similar challenges a gap this paper addresses through its Montreal Protocol-FATF analysis. Runge (1984) and Mueller (2003) argue that shifting to a coordination game, where mutual cooperation yields higher payoffs, is critical, as exemplified by the Montreal Protocol’s trade sanctions (Benedick, 1998). Building on this framework, the study examines how both models institutionalized cooperation through contrasting yet equally effective designs.

By drawing lessons from two successful examples of international cooperation, the Montreal Protocol and the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regime, alongside expert analysis of both , this paper provides critical insights into incentives and compelling cooperation. The Montreal Protocol’s success in phasing out ozone-depleting substances (Velders et al., 2007) demonstrates the power of binding mechanisms. By embedding trade sanctions against non-participants (Barrett, 2014), the treaty transformed the ozone dilemma from a Prisoner’s Dilemma into a coordination game (Runge, 1984). Here, the Nash equilibrium shifted: all parties cooperate because defection carried heavier costs (e.g., market exclusion). Conversely, the AML regime, spearheaded by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), achieved near-universal compliance through non-binding tools such as peer pressure, reputational consequences, and financial sector integration (Jakobi, 2009).

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Victor (2016) argues that such flexible regimes often outperform rigid treaty frameworks by allowing adaptation and responsiveness a lesson notably absent in current climate governance. The following analysis evaluates how these proven models could be adapted to break climate negotiations' persistent deadlock.” by allowing adaptation and responsiveness a lesson notably absent in current climate governance. The following analysis evaluates how these proven models could be adapted to break climate negotiations' persistent deadlock.

Methodology

This paper employs a comparative case study analysis of the Montreal Protocol and the AntiMoney Laundering (AML) framework to derive actionable lessons to advance global cooperation on tackling climate change. These regimes were selected precisely because they operationalize the theoretical solutions to collective action problems identified in the literature - the Montreal Protocol through binding treaty mechanisms that transformed ozone diplomacy into a coordination game, and the FATF through flexible standards that made non-compliance economically untenable. Their demonstrated success in overcoming Prisoner's Dilemma dynamics (where nations typically prioritize short-term gains over collective benefits) makes them ideal test cases for institutional solutions to climate inaction. The analysis applies game theory to systematically compare how each regime reshaped incentive structures. For the Montreal Protocol, it examines how its trade sanction provisions altered the payoff matrix to make cooperation the dominant strategy, as modeled in Barrett's (2014) work on enforcement mechanisms. For the FATF, it analyzes how its peer review process and financial sector integration created reputational and market-access consequences that effectively punished defection, consistent with Victor's (2016) findings about voluntary regimes. This theoretical lens helps explain why both approaches succeeded where climate negotiations have faltered, while assessing their transferability to emissions reduction through a proposed "Climate-FATF" model that would blend their most effective features.

The Montreal Protocol: A Model for Environmental Cooperation

The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer stands as a groundbreaking international agreement that effectively curbed the worldwide production, consumption, and release of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) (Velders et al., 2007). It has taught us that environmental treaties can be successful if they attend to certain conditions (Barret, 2014). The threat of trade restrictions played a determinant role in ensuring participation in the agreement, particularly the threat of banning trade in controlled substances between participating and non-participating parties (Benedick, 1998; Barrett, 2003). Barret refers to this clause as a strategic device designed not to be used, but to promote behavioral change (2014, p.268). The Protocol offers valuable insight into addressing climate change and proves that countries can cooperate when motivated to do so in tackling climate change.

For Sadler (2016) and Barrett (2014), this is the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the dominant strategy, when thinking of complex global challenges, is for the country to be a free rider – that means to obtain benefits without paying any cost. In this type of social dilemma game, for each country, the dominating strategy that yields the best payoff in all circumstances is to be a free rider. In other words, the country that does not cooperate has a better payoff. Translating this to the international negotiation arena, what usually occurs in these types of negotiations is that the country not participating in a treaty will not have any obligations or costs, unlike those that do sign.

Therefore, the scenario needs to be changed into a coordination game. In the coordination game, there is hope of action when a catastrophe is very expensive and the payoff is higher if everyone cooperates (Mueller, 2003; Runge, 1984). Here, two Nash equilibria exist: either no country cooperates, or all do (Sadler, 2016; Barrett, 2013).

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The optimal approach with the greatest benefits is cooperation, as illustrated by the trade restrictions imposed on countries abstaining from signing and implementing the Montreal Protocol (Barrett, 2014). This case proves that with the right incentives, even entrenched Prisoner’s Dilemmas can be redesigned to make cooperation the rational choice for nations.

The Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Regime: Lessons for Global Governance

The FATF’s AML regime complements the Montreal Protocol’s lesson by proving those nonbinding incentives when properly structured can equally transform cooperation games. How do we persuade countries to cooperate? Global challenges such as countering money laundering, monitoring environmental degradation, preserving endangered species, and preventing the spread of diseases become critical when even a single non-compliant country has the potential to undermine the efforts of others and jeopardize global gains (Sadler, 2016). Establishing a regime that imposes unbearable costs on a non-cooperating country offers a viable strategy to enforce climate change combat (Sadler, 2016). Moreover, as Victor (2016) highlights, evidence suggests that nonbinding agreements may perform better, offering greater flexibility and allowing for more ambitious commitments than binding agreements.

Examining the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Regime presents valuable lessons for addressing climate change. The AML Regime started to take shape during the 1980s, as an evolution of the discussions that began in the 1970s on corruption and the transnationalization of various types of crimes, especially drug trafficking (Hülsse, 2007).

The first countries to criminalize the practice of money laundering were the United States, Germany, and Italy, until the Vienna Convention, also known as the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was signed in 1988. Despite the significant costs associated with participation, the AML Regime is deemed successful in fostering cooperation

among jurisdictions and law enforcement. Opting out of this regime would ultimately incur higher expenses (Pereira, 2023).

The year following the Vienna Convention, in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was created, on the initiative of the G-7 together with the president of the European Commission. The FATF plays a central role in the regime by setting international standards for addressing money laundering, outlined in its non-binding 1990 document, The 40 Recommendations. The 40 FATF recommendations are endorsed by several international organizations (such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, G20 and the United Nations Security Council) and recognized as international standards for obtaining technical and financial assistance from these organizations. Approximately 180 countries have adopted the recommendations, exemplifying alignment with the international financial system. This nearuniversal adoption of non-binding standards contrasts with the slow progress of binding climate treaties, underscoring the potential of flexible regimes to accelerate cooperation. Furthermore, the Recommendations are constantly reviewed to ensure their application is universal and up to date in fighting financial crimes.

The FATF’s mandate is to strengthen criminal law and national legal systems related to money laundering, enhance international cooperation, and involve the private sector in combating money laundering (Jakobi, 2009). Additionally, the FATF conducts mutual assessments, peer pressure mechanisms, and country monitoring processes, with findings publicly disclosed. This includes Mutual Assessment Reports, which are comprehensive country reports that evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of measures to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing. To add to that, they also release lists of jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.

Despite initially being a temporary task force, the FATF evolved into a consolidated entity, now reinforced by the G20, due to the G-7's challenges in establishing a more controllable international organization. This was driven by the need for recommendations to be more comprehensive and rigorous than those of the Vienna Convention, which took a decade to be negotiated (Nance, 2017).

Jakobi (2009) summarizes the objectives of the FATF in three key areas: (1) enhancing criminal law and strengthening national legal systems against money laundering, (2) fostering international cooperation, and (3) expanding the responsibility of the private sector in combating money laundering.

Applying Lessons to Climate Change: A Proposed Framework

Drawing from this experience, a similar body modeled after the FATF’s success could be established for climate change mitigation. This new body could bolster environmental law within member nations’ legal frameworks, foster global cooperation, and engage the private sector in combating climate change. Moreover, it could conduct assessments of countries' efforts to reduce CO2 emissions, publicly disclose findings, and foster peer pressure for greater compliance and action.

A non-binding document outlining recommendations to establish international standards for combating climate change could be published. As the FATF’s 40 Recommendations, this document should be endorsed by various international organizations. In the FATF model, approximately 180 countries adopt its recommendations, exemplifying alignment with the international financial system. Furthermore, these recommendations are under continuous review to ensure their relevance. Unlike the Montreal Protocol’s direct regulatory approach, the FATF alerts the international system about the risks of carrying out business in those jurisdictions that do not comply with its Recommendations, effectively discouraging financial relations with non-compliant regions.

A similar approach could be applied to this new climate-focused body. By restricting trade or financial relations with non-compliant regions, it would incentivize countries to join and adopt its recommendations. Additionally, a regularly updated list of states and jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies or lack of cooperation in addressing climate change should be published, further encouraging global compliance.

Lastly, to emulate the FATF's success, the new body should primarily comprise experts from government or international organizations in environmental fields. In the FATF model, this phenomenon is described as acculturation, wherein specialized professionals in law enforcement, finance, and criminal justice are exposed to and adopt the latest methods for combating transnational crime, particularly in preventing and addressing money laundering. Such a structure, referred to as transgovernmental networks, fosters social and peer pressure to shape participant behavior (Correa, 2013, p.173). This composition lends credibility to recommendations, providing voluntary compliance among countries.

Conclusion

While the establishment of such a body and the adoption of non-binding agreements could potentially contribute to advancing the fight against climate change, their effectiveness remains to be seen, particularly given the existence of numerous mechanisms and agreements already in place. The negotiation of treaties on this matter has shown limitations in providing efficient participation. Institutions are essential for effective implementation and ongoing review of national performance (Victor, 2016), playing a significant role in aligning the actions of nations (Arce and Sandler, 2001). International organizations are the ones that provide favorable ground for the development of rules, institutions, and ideologies that can generate conviction (Cox, 1993).

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The examination of the Montreal Protocol and the AML Regime offers valuable insights into tackling climate change effectively. These cases underline the importance of strategic mechanisms and international cooperation in addressing complex global challenges. By drawing parallels with the success of the FATF model, the establishment of a similar body focused on climate change could provide a framework for strengthening environmental law, fostering global cooperation, and engaging the private sector. Countries could be incentivized to adhere to climate action initiatives by the publication of non-binding recommendations endorsed by international organizations, alongside measures such as trade restrictions and periodic assessments. By highlighting the role of institutions in aligning national actions and promoting conviction, the proposed approach offers a promising pathway for advancing climate change mitigation efforts on a global scale.

References:

Arce, D. G. and Sandler, T. (2001) ‘Transnational Public Goods: Strategies and Institutions’, European Journal of Political Economy, 17(3), pp. 493–516.

Barret, S. (1998). On the theory and diplomacy of environmental treaty-making. Environmental and Resource Economics, 11, 317-333.

Benedick, R E (1991) Ozone Diplomacy Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Corrêa, L M P (2013) O Grupo de Ação Financeira Internacional (GAFI): organizações internacionais e crime transnacional. Brasília: FUNAG. Retrieved from: https://www.lexml.gov.br/urn/urn:lex:br:rede.virtual.bibliotecas:livro:2013;000984 129.

Cox, R. (1993). Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method. In S. Gill (Ed.), Gramsci, historical materialism and International Relations (pp. 49-66). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

FATF-GAFI. (1990). Report. Paris: FATF-GAFI. Retrieved from: http://www.fatfgafi org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%20ENG pdf

Hülße, R. (2000). Creating demand for global governance: The making of a global moneylaundering problem. Global Governance, 6(2), 191–210.

Jakobi, A P (2009) Chasing Illicit Flows: The OECD and Crime Control APSA Annual Meeting 2009, 1-22

Lewis, S. L. (2015, December 12). Five things you need to know about the Paris climate deal. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/five-things-you-need-to- know-about-the-paris-climatedeal-52256

Maslin, M., Lang, J., & Harvey, F. (2023). A short history of the successes and failures of the international climate change negotiations. UCL Open: Environment, 5, 08. https://doi.org/10.14324/111.444/ucloe.000059

Mueller, D C (2003) Public Choice III Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Nance, M. T. (2017). The regime that FATF built: an introduction to the Financial Action Task Force. Crime, Law and Social Change, 69, 109–129.

Pereira, A N (2023) A Agenda De Transparência e Combate à Lavagem de Dinheiro em Perspectiva: Principais Atores e a Relação com a Ordem Hegemônica Vigente. Relatório Final de Iniciação Científica.

Runge, C F (1984) ‘Institutions and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action’, Journal of Politics, 46(1), pp. 154– 181.

Sandler, T. (2016) Strategic Aspects of Difficult Global Challenges. Global Policy, 7, 33-44. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12266

Velders, G. J. M., Andersen, S. O., Daniel, J. S., Fahey, D. W., & McFarland, M. (2007). The importance of the Montreal Protocol in protecting climate. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(12), 4814–4819. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0610328104

Victor, D. G. (2006). Toward effective international cooperation on climate change: Numbers, interests and institutions Global environmental politics, 6(3), 90-103

ADDRESSINGCLIMATE-INDUCED DRIVERSOFCONFLICT:

Mariam Khalil is a development and humanitarian professional from Pakistan with an academic background in Strategic Studies from National Defence University, Pakistan She is experienced in program development for advancing feminist movement building, climate justice and humanitarian action. As an advocate for UNSCR 1325, Mariam has worked to highlight the disproportionate impact of crises on women, particularly SGBV and SRHR in emergencies. She has actively advocated the inclusion of women and grassroots women-led organisations in humanitarian action, disaster relief, resilience-building, and policymaking

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Executive Summary:

Climate change acts as a threat multiplier, intensifying conflict risks in already fragile regions through resource scarcity, displacement, and livelihood loss. These impacts are deeply gendered, disproportionately affecting women, girls, and indigenous communities. Despite a growing recognition of this nexus in international frameworks, climate finance remains inadequate, gender-blind, and largely inaccessible to marginalized communities. This policy paper advocates for a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) approach to address climate-induced drivers of conflict through promoting gender equality and equitable financing towards gender-just solutions.

Introduction:

Climate change is more than an environmental crisis, it is a threat multiplier, and increasingly recognized as a critical driver of conflict. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (2022), approximately 3.3 billion people live in high-climatevulnerability areas, where extreme weather events, food insecurity, and resource scarcity can heighten the risk of instability and conflict (Mach et al. 2019). Especially in fragile states, climate change creates a fertile ground for existing vulnerabilities to escalate socioeconomic and political instability, and intercommunal conflicts (UNFCCC, 2022). While climate change affects all areas of human security and undermines sustainable development efforts, gender is a critical axis of that inequality. Women, children and indigenous groups are disproportionately impacted (UN Women, 2024). However, measures to mitigate the impacts have remained inadequate to address the complexity of the crisis. Climate financing remains insufficient and inaccessible to women and vulnerable communities (Deininger et al. 2023); and remains underrepresented in climate negotiations and peacebuilding efforts. Here, FFP approachmay present a promising way forward. As a transformative framework it centers the voices and leadership of marginalized

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groups and promotes gender-responsive climate finance, peacebuilding, and inclusive adaptation strategies (Shevchuk, 2024).

Climate Change as a Driver of Conflict in the Global South

Climate change is increasingly linked to resource scarcity, displacement, and weakened state structures, factors that heighten the risk of conflict. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 40% of civil conflicts in the past six decades have been associated with disputes over natural resources. In climate-vulnerable regions, such as South Asia, extreme weather events and environmental degradation exacerbate competition over land and water, which can escalate from localized tensions into broader regional instability.¹

The Role of Women in Climate Response

The intersection of climate change and conflict is deeply gendered, with women disproportionately affected by the cascading impacts of environmental degradation and insecurity. In many climate-vulnerable regions, women are primary caregivers, food producers, and stewards of agricultural land. Their roles place them at the forefront of both risk and response with repercussions spanning physical, emotional, and socio-economic domains (UN Women, 2024) which significantly limits their responses to crises, widening existing structural inequalities, and the sexual/gender based violence (SGBV) they experience. Despite their central role in community resilience, women ’ s participation in formal decision-making processes remains limited. Structural barriers, including unequal access to resources, exclusion from policy spaces, and entrenched gender norms, continue to hinder their inclusion and leadership (Deininger et al, 2023) weakening the effectiveness of adaptation and conflict response strategies. Global frameworks such as the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, Lima Work Programme,

1 the Indus River dispute between India and Pakistan being a prime example (Khan, Muzaffar, & Mustafa, 2022).

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and the Sendai Framework recognize the gendered dimensions of climate change. Despite this increasing awareness, less than 3% of climate finance directly targets gender equality or women-focused interventions (OECD, 2024). Beyond that, the vast majority of climate finance is currently provided as loans rather than grants (UN Women, 2023), placing an added financial burden on already vulnerable communities and countries in the global south, as compared to building climate mitigation and resilience.

Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) Approach

Feminist foreign policy (Thompson & Clement, 2019) emphasizes intersectional and human-centered approaches through equitable redistribution of rights, representation, and resources. This ensures that women and marginalized communities are not only protected but actively engaged in decision-making. Evidence shows that women ’ s participation increases the durability of peace agreements (UN Women, 2023) and enhances the effectiveness of climate adaptation lasting outcomes, reinforcing resilience and inclusive governance against both environmental shocks and conflict triggers. Using the FFP approach, states can turn global commitments into concrete policy and equitable financing mechanisms that integrate gender equality with climate resilience and peacebuilding. The recommendations below outline a few key pathways:

1. Gender-responsive budgeting enhances resilience for women in conflict-affected, climate-vulnerable regions (UN Women, 2023). Governments and multilateral bodies must explicitly allocate more climate adaptation funds to gender-responsive programs. Whilst, countries with FFPs should advocate for the implementation of international climate legal frameworks² and gender equality frameworks³ by backing gender-just climate finance and advancing women ’ s representation and leadership in global climate negotiations.

2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992); Kyoto Protocol (1997), Lima Work Programme on Gender and Climate Change (2014), Paris Agreement (2015), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction(2015) etc.

3 Beijing Platform for Action, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Women, Peace and Security Agenda, and the Financing for Development (FfD)

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2. Increase direct funding for grassroots and indigenous women-led organizations working at the forefront of the triple nexus of peace, development and humanitarian action. Provide long-term, flexible resources to support capacity, leadership development, and institutional resilience.

3. Gender-blind security strategies fail to address the root causes of climate-induced conflicts (Smith, 2022). Governments should adopt gender-responsive considerations within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), Gender Action Plans (GAPs), and long-term climate strategies, promoting coherence between climate adaptation and national security agendas. Additionally, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms must be established to regularly assess the implementation and impact of these integrated strategies, ensuring accountability and continuous improvement.

4. Prioritize intersectional data collection, and strengthen global civil society partnership and knowledge-sharing mechanisms to address gendered vulnerabilities to climate-related security risks, promote women and indigenous leadership in climate solutions and peacebuilding. 5. Divest from fossil fuels and militarized industries. Shift and reallocate resources towards sustainable industries, renewable energy and care economies.⁴

Conclusion:

As the climate crisis accelerates, it is no longer tenable to address environmental threats in isolation from the broader systems of inequality and conflict they reinforce. Feminist Foreign Policy approach transforms how states and international institutions confront these overlapping crises by offering a blueprint for sustainable peace rooted not in dominance or extraction, but in care, collaboration, and justice. In the fight for climate and peace, gender justice cannot be sidelined - it is fundamental to the future we are advocating for.

4 The military-industrial complex is a major contributor to global carbon emissions, yet military activities are often excluded from international climate commitments.Financial institutions and development agencies should commit to divesting from fossil fuel industries and redirect investments to renewable energy and sustainable development projects.

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References

Achampong, L (2023) Gender-responsive climate finance: The key to just climate action and tackling inequalities . UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/202311/achampong.pdf

Deininger, F. & Woodhouse, A. et al. (2023, January). PLACING GENDER EQUALITY AT THE CENTER OF CLIMATE ACTION. The World Bank Open Knowledge Repository (OKR). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/380cef3f-b8e4-4692-bff649fe156f0c5d/content

Development Finance for Gender Equality 2024. (2024, November). OECD Publishing. https://doi org/10 1787/e340afbf-en

Explainer: How gender inequality and climate change are interconnected. (2022, February 28). UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/explainer/2022/02/explainer-how-genderinequality-and-climate-change-are-interconnected

Gaston, E. & Brown, O. et al. (2023, April). Climate-Security and Peacebuilding Thematic Review.UN.https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/c lima te security tr web final april10 pdf

Gender Action Plan to Support Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (n.d.). Prevention Web. https://www.preventionweb.net/media/94610/download?startDownload=20250412

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). IPCC Sixth Working Group II Assessment Report. IPCC. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC AR6 WGII FullReport.pdf

Khan, R., Muzaffar, M., & Mustafa, G. (2022, January-June). Pakistan-India Water Conflict: A 4351. Causal Analysis. Annals of Social Sciences and Perspective, 3(1), 10.52700/assap.v3i1.141

Mach, K. J. & Kraan, C. M. et al. (2019, July 12). Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict. Open Research Exeter (ORE).

https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/37969/Mach-2019Nature.pdf;sequence=1

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Markham, S. A., & Foster, S. (2024, July 31). Why a Feminist Foreign Policy. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-feminist-foreign-policy

Munthali, J. H. (2025, March 5). Gender equality and climate finance: from local realities to global commitments. International Institute of Environment and Development. https://www.iied.org/gender-equality-climate-finance-local-realities-global-commitments

Shevchuk, S. (2024, December). Feminist foreign policy and climate security – a justice-centred approach. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/wien/21777.pdf

Smith, E. (2022, March). Gender Dimensions of Climate Insecurity. SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security. https://doi.org/10.55163/MSJJ1524

Thompson, L., & Clement, R. (2019). DEFINING FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY. International Center for Research on Women. https://www.icrw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/ICRW DefiningFeministForeignPolicy Brie Revised v5 WebReady.pdf

UN Environment Programme (2015) https://www unep org/news-and-stories/pressrelease/unep-marks-international-day-preve nting-exploitation-environment-war

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022, July 12). Conflict and Climate. UNFCCC. https://unfccc.int/news/conflict-and-climate

UN Women. (n.d.). Chapter 3: WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICAL. UN Women. https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/CH03.pdf

UN Women. (2023, November 13). What is gender-responsive budgeting? UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/explainer/2023/11/what-is-gender-responsivebudgeting

UN Women. (2024, October 7). OVERVIEW PROGRESS OF THE WORLD'S WOMEN. UN Women.https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2024-10/feminist-climate-justice-a-f ramework-for-action-overview-en.pdf

UN Women Asia and the Pacific. (2023, December 3). COP 28 Side Event: What is your Peace? https://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/events/2023/11/cop-28-side-event-w hats-your-peace

CLIMATECHANGEAND URBANDEVELOPMENT

BIO

Raiesa is a dedicated researcher with several years of exploring and analyzing the impacts of climate change on women, economic development, and migration globally. She earned her M.A in International Affairs from The New School with a concentration in Development and Global Justice, particularly skilled in both quantitative and qualitative analysis, research design, policy formulation and analysis, and monitoring & evaluation She is published in foreign policy journals including The Washington Report on the Hemisphere, a biweekly journal operated by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) and reported on UN member-state commitments to the 2030 SDGs at Global Policy Watch

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Executive Summary

Globally, people living in both rural and urban areas are experiencing the effects of climate change on their livelihoods, with urban cities accounting for 71 to 76 percent of CO2 emissions from energy use.¹ Without concrete, binding, climate and development action, over 143 million people (around 2.8 percent of the population in the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America) could be forced to move within their own countries to escape.² The rise of global temperatures, along with extreme weather patterns, mass migration, and unplanned urbanization creates conditions that are disastrous and dehumanizing for families. The consequences are becoming more immediate and severe in urban areas where population density and infrastructure vulnerabilities amplify the risks. This policy brief analyzes the potential solutions global cities must consider and implement immediately when adapting to extreme weather patterns and natural disasters.

Introduction

As the world’s most populated cities and megacities continue to emit greenhouse gas emissions, the intensity of extreme weather events continues to threaten the livelihoods of millions of people and their families. Therefore, cities must adapt to climate risks today to sustain their future. Climate change under a “business as usual” approach will lead to magnifying impacts on not just cities itself but on other resources needed for human survival, including water and food.

Background

By 2050, climate change could expose 650 million people in over 500 cities to water shortages and threaten food supplies for 2.5 billion people in more than 1,600 cities.⁴ In addition

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to food and water, a temperature rise of 1.5 degrees Celsius is projected by climate scientists to reduce global working hours by 2.2% worldwide by 2030,⁵ and higher temperatures would reduce income.⁷,⁸ This would cost the global economy at least 2.4 trillion USD.⁶ Cities in Southeast Asia, as well as West Africa, are particularly vulnerable to these conditions due to the high rates of poverty, rapid urbanization, and high heat conditions. The most vulnerable populations affected by climate change are women and young girls. According to UN Environment, 80% of the people displaced by climate change are women or girls facing heightened risks of poverty, violence or unintended pregnancies as they migrate to safer locations. The economic costs from farming, infrastructure, productivity and health damages will result in an estimated $38 trillion dollars by 2050.⁹ Governments need to start making smart climate investments and smart policy decisions globally and it needs to be done now.

Policy Option I: Strengthening Emissions Accountability & Climate Science into Legislation

The energy consumed to heat, cool, and power buildings, transport fossil fuels, dispose solid waste, and generate food and goods consumption are the largest sources of greenhouse gas (GHG).¹¹ Cities must hold high-emission firms accountable through binding agreements that mandate carbon reduction and highlight climate change’s human and economic toll. Small island countries such as Fiji, have resorted to enacting policies. The 2021 Climate Change Act makes companies legally responsible for not adapting to climate change measures. Companies who commit an offence against the Climate Change Act will be liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment.¹⁷ This ensures that the private sector actively participates in climate action, aligns with global best practices, and integrates climate risk and opportunity assessments into corporate decision-making.

While global climate adaptation funding continues to fall short, countries such as Chile have adopted a climate project to estimate real estate exposure to using 5 weather risk factors: loss of labor productivity in heat waves, fires, floods, drought and coastal deterioration. Using Atlas of Climate Risks for Chile (ARCLIM) and the Climate Impact Explorer (CIE), the researchers found that the population of all the properties in Chile faces an exposure of 38.6% to climate change, while residential properties face a slightly lower exposure of 38.2% with public administration facing the highest risk of coastal deterioration, due to large stretches of the coastal area. Chile has responded by enacting several laws, including the Energy Efficiency Law (2023) which mandates energy reporting and energy mnagement systems for high energy consuming buildings.

Policy Finding II: Mobilizing Public and Private Climate Financing

In 2021, the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini, and Tshwane collaborated to create the South Africa Buildings Program, a city wide transformative action plan that incorporates policy, regulation, and awareness into building efficient buildings powered by renewable energy.¹² Through funding from an independent non-profit and technical expertise from C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, this program advances South Africa’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals by reducing national emissions by one quarter.¹³ Technical officers in each city provide training, facilitate outreach, and ensure integration with each of the government’s national policies.

Policy Finding III: Empowering Community Participation in Climate Resilience Planning

Funded by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the City Resilience Program (CRP) used City Scan, a software program that utilizes spatial and economic data, to boost urban resilience financing and reduce the impacts of disasters and climate change. Two of

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their most notable programs are in the African cities of Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

By using the data software and collaborating with experts and communities, Abidjan officials identified vulnerabilities and implemented targeted climate strategies like improved drainage and sustainable waste management. Engaging the Msimbazi community of Dar es Salaam in resilience planning not only addressed real-world needs but also empowered residents to take ownership of climate adaptation efforts. With the help of the World Bank, CRP and the residents created the Msimbazi Opportunity Plan (MOP) which outlined affordable housing units with supplemental infrastructure. Integrating climate risk assessments into urban planning enables cities to prioritize investments that mitigate the impact of natural disasters and extreme weather events. Policy Recommendations

To build resilience against future natural disasters and extreme weather events, cities must:

1. Measure and revisit the sectors that release the most greenhouse gas emissions and convert climate science-based strategies into legislation that would hold firms accountable.

2.Funnel public & private spending toward climate projects and increase investment in climate financing by stakeholders.

3.Train, support, and promote the integration of climate resilience project plans by engaging local citizens from relevant cities and sectors.

Conclusion

When cities prioritize resilience, they foster stronger, connected communities that are better equipped to withstand and recover from future challenges. With the right policies, collaboration, and commitment, urban centers can lead the way in creating a cleaner, safer, and more prosperous future for generations to come. By embracing climate resilience strategies, cities can transform into hubs of sustainability, innovation, and economic growth while protecting their most vulnerable communities.

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Endnotes

1.UN Habitat. 2022, 24 June. (2017, September 13). Climate change: UNhabitat.org.

2.MacCarthy, J., Richter, J., Tyukavina, S., Weisse, M., & Harris, N. (2024, August 13). The latest data confirms: Forest fires are getting worse. World Resources Institute.

3.Ibid.

4 C40 Cities, Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, Acclimatise, & Urban Climate Change Research Network (UCCRN) (2023, August 3) The Future We Don’t Want: How Climate Change Could Impact the World’s Greatest Cities C40 Cities

5.Working on a warmer planet: The impact of heat stress on labour productivity and decent work International Labour Office – Geneva, ILO, 2019

6.Ibid.

7.Dell, M., B. F. Jones, and B. A. Olken. 2009. Temperature and income: reconciling new cross sectional and panel estimates. American Economic Review 99(2):198–204.

8.Horowitz, J. K., and A. Lange. 2014. Cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty a note on Weitzman’s dismal theorem. Energy Economics 42:201–3.

9.Dreyer, C. (2025a, February 1). The Cost of Inaction. Climate Policy Initiative.

10.Ibid.

11.Browne, K. (2024, December 4). COP29 closes with a climate finance deal, but at what cost?. SEI.

12.The South Africa Buildings Programme, C40 & Sustainable Energy Africa, April 2021.

13.Ibid.

14.Winckler, P., Contreras-López, M., Garreaud, R., Meza, F., Larraguibel, C., Esparza, C., Gelcich, S., Falvey, M., & Mora, J. (2022). Analysis of Climate-Related Risks for Chile’s Coastal Settlements in the ARClim Web Platform Water 14(22), 3594 https://doi org/10 3390/w14223594

15 “Climate Change Act 2021 - Climate Change Laws of the World,” n d , https://climatelaws.org/documents/climate-change-act-2021 eda6?id=climate-change-act-2021 8bf7.

16.Ibid.

17.Ibid.

18.“A Multidisciplinary and Innovative Approach,” by Global Facility for Disaster Reduction 2017, and Recovery and World Bank, City Resilience Program, June 2017 https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099228504122233058/pdf/IDU0725d8fb40aecf 04 335081ed06f73420c0f34.pdf. “Rigaud, Kanta Kumari; de Sherbinin, Alex; Jones, Bryan; Bergmann, Jonas; Clement, Brent; Heuser, Silke; Midgley, Amelia. 2018. Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. © World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29461 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”

19. Magdalena Cortina, Carlos Madeira, Exposures to climate change's physical risks in Chile, Latin American Journal of Central Banking, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2023,100090, ISSN 2666-1438, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.latcb.2023.100090.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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PREPARINGFORCYBERATTACKS AGAINSTRENEWABLEENERGY

Helen Glover is an interdisciplinary designer exploring both structural dimensions, focusing on the security of emerging technologies, and social dimensions, analyzing how digital growth influences interconnected networks. By day, she is a Legislative Research Assistant at Lewis-Burke Associates, specializing in emerging technology, national security, and environmental policy. Outside of work, Helen contributes to tech initiatives by co-organizing a civic tech nonprofit and developing software for researchers to detect disinformation campaigns She also conducts independent research in human-computer interaction and serves as a Board Member for an environmental nonprofit.

BIO

HELENGLOVER

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I. INTRODUCTION

The power grid is becoming more digitized as the United States modernizes its infrastructure to tap into naturally replenishing and increasingly cost-effective renewable energy sources. Once siloed, systems are now deeply interconnected, increasing vulnerabilities to cyberattacks by criminals and foreign state actors. Cyberattacks disrupt grid operations, delay energy delivery, and erode public confidence in clean technologies. Cybersecurity must be embedded as a core principle in the clean energy transition to ensure a secure future.

II. CONTEXT: EMERGING NEW TECHNOLOGIES, EMERGING NEW ISSUES

Renewable production is projected to surge from 753 TWh in 2024 to 4,078 TWh by 2050enough to power every U.S. home for over three years (1). However, as renewable energy systems become more digitally integrated, each data-exchanging device becomes a potential entry point for cyberattacks, where a single breach could destabilize the entire system. A 2023 GAO report found that the DOE and other agencies lack a unified strategy for addressing cybersecurity risks in distributed energy resources (2). Meanwhile, attackers are growing more sophisticated, using AI-generated malware and supply chain infiltration. The following three policy recommendations aim to develop a nationwide cybersecurity framework, introduce targeted risk assessments across supply chains, and strengthen public-private partnerships.

III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Adopting a Streamlined, Nationwide Cybersecurity Framework

Energy companies face a complex and growing regulatory landscape that demands significant financial and staffing resources, often diverting attention from proactive system upgrades and

long-term resilience. Deloitte’s 2024 Energy Industry Compliance Survey underscores how the regulatory fragmentation exacerbates this strain, making it difficult for companies to prioritize system improvements (3). A unified regulatory framework developed by the government would streamline this process, ensuring consistent cybersecurity practices across the renewable sector.

Senator Gary Peters’ bipartisan Streamlining Federal Cybersecurity Regulations Act (S. 4630) takes an essential step in this direction by proposing a Harmonization Committee within the Office of National Cyber Director (ONCD) to address contradictory cybersecurity regulations across federal agencies (4). While the bill does not specifically focus on the renewable energy sector, the committee could leverage its "sector-specific" clause to develop a comprehensive framework tailored to renewable energy. This framework should focus on identifying and improving cybersecurity in a centralized way, coordinating efforts among key agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

By utilizing ONCD’s convening authority and whole-of-government mandate, the framework should be supported through interagency working groups and funded through existing appropriations for DOE’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) and CISA’s Infrastructure Security Division. Additionally, leveraging the expertise of each agency would create space for staying ahead of emerging best practices, such as "privacy by design," which ensures privacy protections are integrated into clean energy system architecture from the start rather than as an afterthought (5).

Strengthening National Security Through Targeted Risk Assessment Policies

Blanket cybersecurity measures might seem like a quick fix, but a more effective strategy

CESER should lead these assessments using its Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), a self-assessment tool that helps organizations measure their cybersecurity effectiveness (7). To better support supply chain risk management, the C2M2 should be refined to include mechanisms for evaluating the security of individual hardware and software components. In parallel, the Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator (CECA) offers third-party testing environments for grid technologies, but its full potential lies in becoming a centralized hub for validating high-risk components across the renewables ecosystem (8). Increased funding for both C2M2 and CECA would support more rigorous, end-to-end testing and create a dynamic feedback loop between system design and real-world performance without stifling innovation.

Public-Private Partnerships for Scalable Cybersecurity Deployment

Cybersecurity is a shared responsibility between those who build energy systems and those who govern them. Information sharing must be actionable, and public-private partnerships (PPPs) are involves targeted assessments tailored to the specific risks of each supply chain component, such as their criticality, manufacturer, and degree of interconnection with other systems. Components should be evaluated based on a risk tolerance scale. High-risk assets such as core operational software or equipment with direct access to control systems, like solar transformers that regulate voltages, would undergo more rigorous cybersecurity evaluations. In contrast, lower-risk components, such as weather monitoring sensors, would face lighter scrutiny. A similar approach should be applied to third-party vendors, particularly software and IT providers outside the energy sector, responsible for 45% of all breaches (6). Focusing oversight on high-impact vendors enables more effective risk mitigation without overburdening the broader supply chain with unnecessarily restrictive regulations.

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a key mechanism for unlocking new avenues of collaboration between the government, private industry, and smaller-scale entities such as distributed energy resources (DERs) which are utilities managed by municipalities and community organizations (9). These collaborations can take multiple forms: co-developing standardized cybersecurity protocols, sharing threat intelligence, and building real-time threat detection and response systems. In doing so, federal agencies gain visibility into on-the-ground risks, while the private sector and DER operators benefit from access to federal resources and early threat alerts.

CESER currently collaborates with DOE national laboratories to develop cybersecurity tools and simulate vulnerabilities in energy systems (10). However, much of this work has been limited to research, pilot projects, and technical support. CESER should broaden its focus to include deployment-centric partnerships, particularly those lacking in-house cybersecurity expertise. National labs should provide more regional technical assistance or develop ondemand simulation and training tools tailored to distributed assets. In parallel, the federal government should enhance financial incentives, such as tax credits and cost-sharing models, to accelerate the adoption of strong cybersecurity practices across the energy supply chain. For smaller or under-resourced entities, government co-investment in cybersecurity upgrades could lower barriers to entry while ensuring that critical infrastructure is protected across the board.

IV.CONCLUSION

The clean energy transition is an environmental imperative and a national security priority. By adopting a unified regulatory framework, implementing targeted supply chain risk assessments, and expanding public-private partnerships, the U.S. can proactively defend against evolving cyber threats. These measures won’t just protect infrastructure - they will boost innovation and position the United States’ leadership in resilient clean energy development.

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Work Cited

(1) U S Energy Information Administration (2025, April 15) Annual Energy Outlook 2025 https://www eia gov/outlooks/aeo/

(2) U S Government Accountability Office (2023, September) Critical infrastructure protection: National cybersecurity strategy needs to address information sharing performance measures and methods https://www gao gov/assets/gao-23-105468 pdf

(3) SecurityScorecard (2024, October 23) 67% of energy sector breaches linked to software and IT vendors, SecurityScorecard reports https://securityscorecard com/company/press/67-of-energysector-breaches-linked-to-soft ware-and-it-vendors-securityscorecard-reports/

(4) U.S. Congress. (2024). S. 4630 – A bill to streamline federal cybersecurity regulations act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4630

(5) SecurePrivacy (2022, September 16) What does privacy by design mean? https://secureprivacy ai/blog/what-does-privacy-by-design-mean

(6) SecurityScorecard & KPMG. (2024, October 23). A quantitative analysis of cyber risks in the U.S. energy supply chain. https://securityscorecard.com/resource/third-party-breaches-are-the-topthreat-for-the-u-s -energy-sector/

(7) U.S. Department of Energy. (n.d.). Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2). U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. https://www.energy.gov/ceser/cybersecurity-capability-maturity-model-c2m2

(8)NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory.(n.d.).Cybersecurityprogramandaccelerator.U.S.Departmentof Energy.https://www.nrel.gov/security-resilience/cybersecurity-accelerator

(9) U.S. Department of Energy. (2022, October). Cybersecurity considerations for distributed energy resources on the U.S. electric grid. https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/202210/Cybersecurity%20Considerations%20 for%20Distributed%20Energy%20Resources%20on%20the%20U.S.%20Electric%20Gri d.pdf

ANEWWARFRONTIER:THESYRIAN BLUEPRINTOFRUSSIA’SDISINFORMATION

CAMPAIGNINUKRAINE

Julia Maranhao-Wong is a Canadian-American student raised in Boston and Melbourne, and currently in her penultimate year studying Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom Her special interests include formal logic, game theory, and their application in international security policy. As an intern at the U.S. Department of State, Julia worked towards atrocity prevention through the development of policy recommendations pre-empting widespread human rights abuses, and has previously interned with Senator Edward J Markey and the United Nations Association At University, Julia served as the Secretary of the Oxford Union, Treasurer of the PPE Society, and in various student government positions, including as an active advocate for racial harassment reporting policy reform in her capacity as elected Secretary of the Campaign for Racial Awareness and Equality. This year, Julia has been honored as a McDonald Conference for Leaders of Character Student Fellow at the United States Military Academy and as a delegate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Youth Summit.

editedby: KevenHernandez

CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

Introduction

As the information landscape shifts away from traditional news sources to more decentralized communications through social media channels, the power of perception and narrative has grown to play a greater role in security and wartime dynamics, particularly in conflicts involving actors with extensive information apparatus. The Russian Federation’s historical use of reflexive control and alteration of enemy action through the shaping of perception has uniquely positioned the nation with the requisite tools to facilitate mass disinformation campaigns. Coordinated information endeavours to influence the outcome of ongoing wars may be broadly divided into three geographical categories: censorship and coordinated messaging to the disseminating administration’s domestic population, disinformation campaigns in the conflict-affected nation or region, and broader disinformation to allies, concerned third parties, and the international community. The scope of this paper will primarily be the second, the use of disinformation in a conflictaffected region, and the security implications thereof. While disinformation tactics are not unique to the twenty-first century, an evolving digital realm demands a review of how modern information tactics are shaping present battlefields. The Syrian Civil War was arguably the first conflict to feature these new-age information tactics, having been referred to by the Wall Street Journal as the “first war staged on YouTube.” The tactics utilized by Russia throughout the conflict and in its aftermath offer unique insight into the nation’s approach to leveraging both traditional and decentralized media sources to influence conflict, particularly when contrasted with the war in Ukraine. Between these two conflicts, certain trends may be elucidated concerning both tact and narrative, offering greater insight into the Russian approach to modern reflexive control. To further understand how the Russian Federation utilizes informational influence and how such strategies may be best countered, common tactics and narratives will be determined through a comparison of Russian-backed digital warfare in the two conflicts.

Methodology CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

A systematic literature review was conducted to identify consistencies between narratives reiterated by multiple news sources in each conflict. Prominent narratives were examined, and each instance of a dissemination technique was catalogued as a ‘tactic’ employed to garner traction for said narratives. Using this technique, the narratives and tactics leveraged thus far in each nation were ascertained and compared against one another for consistency and success, to isolate the core tenets of Russian disinformation campaigns distinct from regional variation.

Findings

Syrian Civil War

Following the Russian Federation’s military entrance to Syria in September of 2015, disinformation rose significantly on Twitter, with 443 known instances expanding to 11,408 in 2018 from just 28 accounts tracked by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and the Syria Campaign. This number peaked in April of 2018 following the Douma chemical attack. The spread of disinformation within Syria featured notable narratives and themes that persisted following dissemination, impacting the information landscape. The key narratives portrayed throughout the conflict may be broadly categorized by the three perceptions they attempted to alter, namely:

(i) the Russian Federation’s involvement and President Bashar al-Assad’s regime’s wartime actions, (ii) the West’s involvement in the conflict, and (iii) the activities of the White Helmets, a civilian aid organization.

(i) This first category of disinformation primarily endeavored to justify Russia’s military involvement in the region and defend tactics employed by the Russian and Syrian militaries.

While a variety of conflicting justifications were identified across various social media platforms, the most prolific of these asserted Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War to be an intervention in the broader global battle against terrorism. These narratives notably diverted attention away from other national interests, including Moscow’s close ties with the Assad regime and Russia’s strategic military posturing in the Middle East, with naval and air bases like Tartus and Khmeimim located in Syria. Yet, contrary to the asserted ‘intent’ to eradicate global terrorism, Russian armed forces conducted a variety of airstrikes on rebel-held hospitals, water treatment plants, and mosques, with minimal confrontation of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Syria (ISIS), prominent Sunni jihadist groups. While these narratives experienced limited success within Syria, they experienced an improved reception in the surrounding region, particularly as Russia pushed for a broader international reputation of a magnanimous intervenor in the name of order. The second major distortion found across a variety of traditional and social media platforms pertained to the Assad regime’s actions, particularly regarding the deployment of chemical weapons in Ghouta (2013), Khan Shaykhun (2017), and Douma (2018). While Ghouta preceded Russian military deployment, the public undermining of international investigations mirrored those found online of the two later attacks; Khan Shaykhun embodies an exemplar of public Russian disinformation tactics enabling responsibility denial, in this case, to protect a key ally. Within twenty-four hours of the sarin attack, Paul Antonopoulos–previously a contributor to Russian state-owned media corporation Russia Today (RT) and speculated to be a disinformation proxy linked to Russian intelligence–published a claim on the pan-Arab news outlet al-Masdar News, alleging footage of the attack was staged. This was quickly proliferated and amplified by Russian-sympathetic Twitter accounts. In the following period, President Vladimir Putin would go on to publicly recognize the attack as having occurred, however, as a ‘false flag’ operation, only days before being countered by Kremlin declarations of the attack having been wholly staged, in line with original accounts outlined by Paul Antonopoulos.

CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

Following independent investigations conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Russia’s Foreign Minister began questioning the organization’s integrity, responding to official OPCW reports with claims that the entity was close to discreditation and that the OPCW investigation was deeply flawed. This formal response was joined by a marked increase in digital content falsely linking the White Helmets to terrorist organisations, strengthening the Kremlin’s claims of a staged attack by presenting a culprit.

Many of these tactics were seen again in much greater volume following the later chemical attack on Douma, with the persistent claim of ‘false flag’ operations, and a number of sources referencing the attacks as an underhanded tactic in an overeager American bid to justify interventionism in the region. (ii) Inextricably linked to the justification of Russia’s intervention stands the moralistic narrative of an ‘evil’ Western bloc concerned primarily with the natural resource opportunities in the region, a narrative supported by a deluge of disinformation regarding the United States’ and its allies’ actions and intent in Syria. Tweets, articles, and social media posts, many linked to Russian-funded agencies and individuals, attacked Middle Eastern confidence in American motives, military capacity, and actions. Similar to disinformation surrounding the Assad regime’s violations of international laws on chemical warfare, the claims by which this agenda progressed appeared to probe in many different directions to sense what ‘stuck,’ and were seemingly without any coherent strategy. The two primary assertions that arose, across official Russian press releases and RT, accused the United States of collaborating with terrorists in Syria to prolong the war and of having a primary interest in the exploitation of natural oil reserves. In line with these themes, a range of social media posts rumoured the United States harboured jihadists in military garrisons around al-Tanf, and that these insurgents were trained to hold provocations with chemical weapons. Still more accounts accused the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United States, Israel, and Ukraine of supporting Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the jihadist group that went on to overthrow Assad in 2024.

One headline suggested that American funding of terrorist organisations extended to alQaeda, reading “US Orders al-Qaeda to Attack Syrian Troops in Idlib,” despite continued airstrikes conducted by the United States’ military in al-Qaeda territory. The alleged engagement between terrorists and the broader ‘West’ was frequently contrasted by Russian-backed media sources with Russia’s support of the ‘legitimate’ Syrian regime, asserting that President Assad’s crimes against the Syrian people were a falsehood generated by the United States’ as a pretense for American intervention, as was directly claimed in 2017 by President Putin following the U.S. strike on the airfield from which the planes responsible for the Khan Shaykhun chemical attacks departed. (iii) Finally, the White Helmets–officially titled the Syrian Civil Defence, a humanitarian organization devoted to medical evacuations and search-and-rescue operations–were subject to a particularly prolific disinformation campaign. The most extreme accusations levelled were those of organ trafficking, as progressed by a member of the Russian Civil Chamber’s ‘witness testimony.’ The more common narrative circulated was similar to the accusation levelled against the United States, of collaboration with terrorist organizations and the staging of atrocities, following in line with Russian denial of President Assad’s war crimes. Notably, these narratives gained great traction in the West, where ‘independent journalists’ like Vanessa Beeley facilitated the spread of these conspiracies, who accused the White Helmets of collaborating with al-Qaeda and staging all rescue footage. These assertions were echoed by Eve Bartlett, a Canadian journalist who claimed in her UN testimony that White Helmet rescue footage was staged, a statement later parroted by several Russian officials, including to the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC) where Beeley’s theories were cited as evidence in a loop of self-affirming falsehoods. Further allegations included White Helmets’ existence as a subsidiary of the terrorist organisation Jabhat al-Nusra, instructed to conduct or stage chemical attacks in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo.

In 2015, the U.S. Department of State estimated spending of up to $1.4 billion USD per annum by Moscow on informational campaigns. The Internet Research Agency based in Russia and linked to the Russian Embassy in both UK and Syria was connected to a range of social media posts supporting these narratives, amplifying not only Russian state-owned media sources (RT and Sputnik), but also Iranian-backed news outlets (Mehr News) and Syrian state-controlled media (Syrian Arab News Agency or SANA). CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

An article published by Al-Masdar questioned alleged inconsistencies of the reported nerve agent’s use in the Khan Shaykhun attacks, whilst the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) outright stated the White Helmets had killed children to generate bodies for the ‘staging’ of the Khan Shaykhun attack. This profile of disinformation erodes trust in aid workers and had a profound impact on the ground, as the proliferation of these claims directly correlated with the level of harassment and abuse faced by aid workers. Further effects included heightened credibility concerns, diminishing the work capacity of organisations via decreased funding and avoidance by the populations they endeavored to assist. These effects, in turn, enhanced the impact of Russian and Syrian government attacks. By eroding trust in potentially unifying neutral institutions, such as the White Helmets, information warfare has the capacity to reduce populations’ resilience and increase the efficacy of military assaults on civilians. Between these three areas of disinformation, several trends in narrative and transmission become clear. Atrocities committed by Russia and its allies were obfuscated with allegations of false flag attacks and staging to justify Western interventionism, whilst parties opposing Russia, including the White Helmets and the West, were accused of engaging with terrorists. These ‘Western’ profit-oriented goals were then be contrasted with Russia's ‘altruistic aims’ of ‘building regional stability and fighting terrorism,’ a dichotomy that was similarly drawn betwee Russia and the White Helmets.

These state-sponsored and Assad-friendly media sources were frequently original sources of state-sponsored propaganda, however, these narratives were frequently amplified and elaborated upon via social media targeting more specific demographics. ‘Soft-sympathizers’ help foster information echo chambers through persistent repetition of certain topics to lend false stories traction. Local media networks were found to serve a similar function, reinforcing and disseminating Russian talking points to respective locales, demonstrating a two-stage method of initial distribution through state-sponsored resources and subsequent amplification in echo chambers, with a focus on sheer volume in the latter to reinforce narratives.

Since the conclusion of the Syrian Civil War, researcher Zouhir Al-Shimale noted that disinformation has ‘markedly increased,’ whilst suggesting that emotional vulnerability has left individuals more pregnable to false narratives, particularly with the downfall of staterun SANA generating a media ‘ vacuum ’ in the region largely filled by social platforms. Disinformation stirring grievances between the HTS and the Kurdish people has persisted, alongside exaggerations of Alawite religious persecution and accusations of American attempts to attack Russian military bases with destabilizing effects. This renewed push in disinformation has had the notable effect of exacerbating tensions between religious and ethnic sects; Facebook pages resembling credible human rights organisations spread unsubstantiated ‘instances’ of violence against Alawites to bolster armed resistance in favor of the old regime, with success seen in recent pro-Assad attacks. While the aspersions cast on the West persist, the focuses on the White Helmets and defending against the allegations of war crimes have subsided, replaced with a strengthened effort to paint the war and, in turn, Russia’s loss, as one against Western powers as opposed to a democratic domestic opposition. This has demonstrated Russian interest in information warfare beyond the scope of an active conflict and readiness to take an operative role in shaping the retrospective perception of conflicts. Most interestingly, and in line with past narratives of Ukrainian collaboration with terrorist networks during the Syrian Civil War, disinformation supporting that Kyiv actively works to destabilize Syria has persisted.

Russo-Ukrainian War

As of 2022, over 75% of Ukrainians regularly use the internet, with 89% of the population having 3G technology or better. When contrasted with the 30% of Syrians online in 2015, it is clear why social platforms have taken a particularly prominent role in Ukraine. Social media consumption since Russia’s invasion has grown, with the percentage of the population citing it as their preferred news source rising from 62% in 2020 to 77% in 2022. Among the platforms, Telegram is the most popular, followed by YouTube and Facebook respectively. The narratives perpetuated by the Russo-Ukrainian War in many ways mirror those propagated during the Syrian Civil War:

(i) obscuring the reasoning behind Russia's original invasion, (ii) undermining the West, and (iii) depicting the Ukrainian military as untrustworthy, using similar falsehoods to those weaponised against the White Helmets. Finally, a new trend has emerged in the Russo-Ukrainian War: the utilization of disinformation to sow strategic confusion for military advantage.

(i) Firstly, Russia has obfuscated its reasoning for invading a sovereign nation, and the realities of its crimes in the years since. The official narrative perpetuated by President Putin and many Russian officials refuse to acknowledge the war ’ s very existence, classifying the conflict as a “special operation” with the concept of war emanating from the ‘myth’ of an independent Ukraine. Similar to the ideological diatribes against terrorism in Syria, Russia in part protrays its motivatation as that of ‘denazification,’ preying upon the long-held national pride of Russia’s role in defeating Germany during the Second World War. Despite blatant contradiction with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Jewish identity, assertions of Nazi activity in Ukraine remain rife. Similarly, Russia has accused Ukraine of harboring a secret bioweapons program, supported by the United States, targeting ethnic Russians. Both these falsehoods have offered fabricated grounds for Russia’s claim to a war of self-defense on behalf of targeted Russian population in Ukraine to reunite the people with their nation. Accusations of Ukrain posing a genocidal threat to ethnic Russians in Donbas, Donetsk, and Luhansk, have further justified offensive operations

CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

in Donbas, and Russian insistence on the voluntary nature of Crimea’s annexation has supported the narrative of a ‘victimized’ ethnic Russian population targeted by a warmongering Ukrainian President and military. Since the beginning of the war Russian sources have, similarly to in Syria, denied Russian involvement in military offensives constituting war crimes using the near-identical tactic of claiming evidence to be staged, including the footage of a woman dying in a Mariupol maternity ward and videos recorded by soldiers of civilian casualties in Bucha, all starkly reminiscent of the defense mounted against footage produced by the White Helmets. Additionally, the tactic of declaring such war crimes to be conducted by the opposition in false flag operations has carried through from Syria to Ukraine, as conflicting claims assert the Mariupol hospital attack to have occured, but as a Ukrainian false flag operation. Finally, the use of cluster munitions and Russia’s denial thereof starkly mirror the tactics used to exculpate the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons, despite evidence found by international organisations. (ii) Secondly, in keeping with the narratives perpetuated in Syria, the notion that the war has been prolonged by the West’s undue involvement has been disseminated widely across media platforms, supported by falsehoods including that NATO has a military base in Odesa and American paratroopers have landed in Ukraine. Yet, conflictingly and simultaneously, the claim that the United States and the United Kingdom have been sending outdated weaponry has circulated around a variety of media sources, presumably in an attempt to degrade public opinion of the West in the region and foster a sense of resentment, similar to the narratives spread in Syria. (iii) Finally, the accusations levelled against the Ukrainian military have strong parallels to those used against the White Helmets, including the acquisition of child soldiers and culpability for the bombing of a Lugansk kindergarten.

Similarly, information campaigns to weaken confidence in the Ukrainian government and national identity have been persistenr, beginning years earlier in 2014 with the use of information operations in the manipulation of the Crimea referendum, generating lasting consequences due to the long-term cognitive dissonance such disinformation has been found to perpetuate.

Relatively unique to the Russo-Ukrainian War has been the use of disinformation to generate strategic confusion. This has undoubtedly been a long-time aspiration of Russian use of the reflexive control doctrine, and was near-realized with the amassing of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border. While this was widely publicized by Russia to be a large-scale training exercise, interestingly, Western intelligence managed to successfully counter the attempted cover-up through public information sharing, a relatively novel approach of more radical declassification. The urge for disinformation to generate more tangible strategic advantages appears to have been growing in the Russo-Ukrainian War compared to its Syrian counterpart. In an era of intensified state conflict, this Russian push and Western declassification response will be a trend to observe in the coming years.

Discussion

Between these two conflicts, a range of consistencies in narratives and dissemination tactics become evident. With regard to narrative, one clear commonality is the branding of all enemies as extremists, whether that be terrorists or Nazis, and denial of all international law violations as being either staged or false flag operations. Similarly, consistency may be found across both conflicts with regard to the attacks on the credibility of the West and particularly the United States as a peace-promoting force. Ideological subversion and active measures have featured prominently in Russian tactics since the Cold War, as the notion of ‘hybrid warfare’, encouraging strategy-level efforts to shape the geopolitical orientation of the target state has long been integral to Russian defense policy. Ideological subversion’s evolution, specifically in information warfare, has become apparent in the trends between the Syrian Civil War and the Russo-Ukrainian War.

One commonality in information dissemination between the two conflicts is the fixation on quantity, seemingly prioritised above engendering a consistent narrative. In 2016, the RAND Corporation described the tactic as a “firehouse of falsehood” model due to the sheer volume of disinformation disseminated with similar ends but without narrative consistency. This aligns with a theory to which many academics subscribe: disinformation is more successful at generating general chaos than perpetuating a dominant narrative, as a range of narratives are far more difficult to counter or debunk. CHAPTERTWENTY-TWO

Another common trend in disinformation dissemination is that of “information laundering”–a term coined by Belén Carrasco Rodríguez–characterizing the method by which false narratives evade verification by creating a lengthy train of repetition through a variety of sources, until discernment of the original evidence is near impossible. One example may be seen with Yala News, a UK-registered media company, which reported on an alleged American plot to engage in biological warfare through infected birds, a story that was released only two hours after being reported by Russian media outlets. Furthermore, across both wars, the narratives perpetuated in the target state are frequently made to resonate with the respective state’s political parties and their ideological dispositions to attract unknowing information launderers, including more reputable news sources. Other methods include ‘typosquatting’ legitimate sites, paying influencers to share certain stories, and the hiring of online ‘trolls’ across different discussion forums to spread Russiansponsored narratives. Unfortunately, in both instances, these tactics have only been further amplified by echo chambers resulting in algorithmic favouring of disinformation; a Brown study in 2020 found tweets containing disinformation experienced a reshare rate 20% higher than accurate tweets, with an Edelson study one year later finding false information on Facebook to receive six times the interaction of true posts. To adapt to the new landscape, the United States must recognise the power of perception and learn from Russian patterns to pre-empt harmful narratives.

References

Alami, M. (2018, September 4). Russia’s disinformation campaign has changed how we see Syria. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/russia-sdisinformation-campaign-has- changed-how-we-see-syria/

Bacio Terracino, J , & Matasick, C (2022) Disinformation and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: Threats and governance responses. OECD. Daoudi, S. (2024, August 22). Behind the Smoke: How Disinformation Surrounding Syria’s Chemical Attacks Undermines Public Health. The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. https://timep.org/2024/08/22/behind-the-smoke-how-disinformation-surroundingsyrias-c hemical-attacks-undermines-public-health/

Echols, W (2025, January 2) Russia ramps up disinformation efforts as its grip weakens over post-Assad Syria. Voice of America; Voice of America (VOA News). https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-ramps-up-disinformation-efforts-as-its-gripweakens- over-post-assad-syria/7922328.html

Eisentraut, S. (2019, November 5). Russia’s Propaganda War about Syria: - FIIA - Finnish Institute of International Affairs. FIIA - Finnish Institute of International Affairs https://fiia fi/en/publication/russias-propaganda-war-about-syria EUvsDisinfo (2024, December 20) Revisiting Russia’s narratives on its Syria interventionEUvsDisinfo. EUvsDisinfo. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/revisiting-russiasnarratives-on-its-syria-intervention/ Global Engagement Center, U. S. D. of S. (2022). GEC Special Report The Kremlin’s Chemical Weapons Disinformation Campaigns. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/The-Kremlins-ChemicalWeapons-Di sinformation-Campaigns edit.pdf Graham-Harrison, E , & Dyke, J (2022, March 24) How Russia is using tactics from the Syrian playbook in Ukraine. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/24/how-russia-is-using-tactics-fromthe-sy rian-playbook-in-ukraine Hellyer, H. A. (2023, April 7). Russia is waging a disinformation war in the Middle East. POLITICO https://www politico eu/article/vladimir-putin-sputnik-rt-russia-is-waginga-disinformatio n-war-in-the-middle-east/

Kelley, M. (2024, May 29). Understanding Russian Disinformation and How the Joint Force Can Address It. US Army War College - Publications. https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789933/understandin g-ru ssian-disinformation-and-how-the-joint-force-can-address-it/#end2 Kousta, E (2022, October 7) Fighting for truth against Syria’s disinformation regime Https://Www.newarab.com/. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/fighting-truthagainst-syrias-disinformation-regime

Schaer, C. (2025, January 3). How fake news campaigns could push Syria back to civil war. Dw.com; Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-hts-bashar-assadregime-fake-news-disinformatio n-v2/a-71210900

Sebares Jiménez-Blanco, M (2024) The Battle of the Narratives Around Syria GMFUS https://www.gmfus.org/news/battle-narratives-aroundsyria

Townsend, M. (2022, June 19). Network of Syria conspiracy theorists identified. The Guardian. https://www theguardian com/world/2022/jun/19/russia-backed-network-of-syriaconspir acy-theorists-identified Woollacott, E. (2024, December 10). Fog Of War Fuels Misinformation About Syria. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2024/12/10/fog-of-war-fuelsmisinformati on-about-syria/

FROMAIDTOAGENCY:

Daynaba Mohamed is an emerging international development professional passionate about human rights, climate action, and locally-led development Most recently, Daynaba worked as a Development Associate at IREX, where she helped coordinate business development for USAID and Department of State proposals. Previously, she worked as a Communications Associate at the Channel Foundation, which expanded her understanding of philanthropy’s role in addressing global women ’ s rights issues. Leveraging her background in strategic communications and program management, Daynaba is committed to facilitating resources towards advancing women of color and local leadership in development. Daynaba received a Bachelor’s Degree in International Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

editedby: DaniellaTorres

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Abstract

Localization, or locally-led development, signifies a shift in funding and leadership towards local actors. Popularized in the last decade, localization has been posited as a solution to aid organizations’, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), civil society organizations’, and private foundations’ goal of creating long-lasting impact on peacebuilding and security in the Global South in a manner that grants local actors’ agency over their own development. This paper seeks to explore the origins of the localization agenda, its definition, and its promises and pitfalls and share crucial insights into increasing local partnerships for aid agencies and philanthropic funders alike. To contextualize these factors, this paper will explore localization trends in Colombia as a case study, where a partnership between a national-level organization and international philanthropy presents vital recommendations for funders looking to expand local partnerships as a solution to increasing locally-led development. Keywords: localization, locally-led development, peacebuilding, security, USAID

From Aid to Agency:

The Promise and Pitfalls of Localization in Global South Peacebuilding

The early origins of the localization agenda can be traced back to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, an international agreement, endorsed by over 100 countries, donor agencies, and multilateral organizations, “aimed at improving the quality and impact of development aid” (Lewis et al., 2024b, p. 8). The agreement included localization as a commitment and emphasized five core principles: country ownership, donor alignment, donor harmonization, mutual accountability, and managing for results (OECD, 2025). In the years following, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation were created to build upon the Declaration and set goals for accomplishing its targets by 2010.

The most influential agreement, however, was the Grand Bargain. Launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, the Grand Bargain sought to “get more means into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action” (Lewis et al., 2024b, p. 8). The agreement consists of 51 commitments across 10 thematic areas, including participatory decision making and most importantly, increasing support and funding for local and national responders. It has been signed by over 60 signatories including the World Bank, UN-Women, and the United States of America, representing the largest donors, UN agencies, and organizations that control global humanitarian aid (ICVA, 2022). In 2021 and 2023, Grand Bargain 2.0 and Grand Bargain 3.0 were established, respectively, extending the deadline for accomplishing the agreement’s initial goals due to a lack of significant progress (Lewis et al., 2024b). These shifts, within the Grand Bargain and past frameworks, emphasizing local partnerships and funding, have influenced USAID’s current localization agenda, mostly evidently in its own funding goals, and are critical for understanding its impact

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Defining Localization

USAID defines a local partner as one that is “legally organized and operating in a developing country; is providing services in that country; is working internationally, regionally, or nationally; and is managed and governed by nationals of the recipient country or by nonnationals” (Hirschfeld, 2024). Alternatively, Publish What You Fund (PWYF), a global campaign for “aid and development transparency”, maintains a criteria of a local partner that includes being: headquartered and operating in the recipient country; working subnationally, nationally, regionally, or internationally; not affiliated to an international NGO or international private sector organizations; independent governance and fundraising systems, eliminating international organizations that could establish local residency to qualify (Lewis et al., 2024a, p. 5). PWYF’s criteria will be used, rather than USAID’s definition, to explore whether USAID allocates funding towards local actors in its localization efforts.

Introduction: The Promise and Pitfalls of Localization in Global South Peacebuilding

Analysis of USAID’s localization funding goals is vital to understand the reality of its current efforts. In 2021, the 19th Administrator of USAID announced two goals: 25% of USAID funding would be dedicated to local organizations and 50% of USAID projects would implement local leadership by 2030 (Saldinger, 2021). This first funding target directly aligns with the Grand Bargain’s goal of providing “at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national responders” (ICVA, 2022, p. 11).

However, in Moving Toward a Model of Locally Led Development, a 2022 report highlighting USAID’s annual progress towards its localization goals, the agency noted that, “Direct Local Funding reached nearly $1.6 billion, or 10.2 percent” in 2022, representing a 66% increase in localization funding from $977 million in FY 2021 (USAID, 2023, p.6). Additionally, the report observed that funding to local partners as a percentage of total funding increased by 38%, from 7.4% in 2021 to 10.2% in 2022.

PWYF’s Metric Matter II: USAID’s Measurement Approach is Undermining Progress on Localization, published in 2024, synthesized data from USAID’s 2022 report utilizing its own definition of local actors, as referenced earlier, to analyze the agency ’ s success. The report determined that USAID is a long way from implementing its localization goals. While USAID reported that 10.2% of its 2022 funding was allocated for local partners, PWYF found that only 5.2% of total funding went towards independent local partners. This discrepancy is due to the removal of large international organizations USAID includes in its definition.

In her work, Karen Hirschfeld, Oxfam’s Senior Policy Manager, asserts that USAID’s definition of a local partner is loose, leaving room for large international NGOs and companies with local subsidiaries to fit this definition (Hirschfeld, 2024). Among PWYF’s critiques in its report, in line with Hirschfeld, include that USAID’s definition “[leaves] significant funding opportunities – such as projectized funding that currently goes to UN agencies and multilaterals – untapped for local partners” (Lewis et al., 2024a, p. 5). While these larger international entities provide valuable infrastructure, resources, and support to local projects, they themselves are not local. Instead, they overshadow true local partners, shifting funding away from achieving localization targets. To shift aid towards creating long-lasting impact, local actors need to be provided with agency over their own development through these targets.

Recently, USAID released an update on its localization progress in Growing Momentum: USAID Localization Progress Report FY24. In the report, USAID stated that $2.1 billion (12.1%) of its total funding was reserved for local partners (USAID, 2024). Though an increase in direct funding from 2022, the agency still falls short of reaching its proposed 25% funding towards local partners, depicting a long road ahead.

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Colombia Case Study

Colombia is the largest recipient of United States aid in Latin America. The country’s $538 million average annual aid represents “26.6% of all country-specific funding in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2001 and 2022” (Fox & Hallock, 2024, p. 11).

Following decades of armed conflict in the country, the 2016 Peace Accord signaled a move towards peacebuilding. This transition pointed to a change away from military funding towards peace and security funding. In fact, according to a study by Jonathan Fox and Jeffrey Hallock from the Accountability Research Center at American University, the share of US funding to Colombia allocated for military and police funding decreased to “ a 16-year low of USD 174 million” following the Accord, opening space for greater peacebuilding funding (Fox & Hallock, 2024, p. 10).

In terms of localized aid, Fox and Hallock, utilizing data from the International Aid Transparency Initiative, found that from 2012 to 2021, total direct local funding increased from $1.3 million to $15.2 million (Fox & Hallock, 2024). Despite this overall increase in localized funding, direct local funding as a share of total funding peaked in 2017 at 10.9% and dropped to 3.8% in 2022 (Fox & Hallock, 2024). While overall funding has increased, the local share of funding has fallen, highlighting that increased localization is not being prioritized.

Local (Middle) Partners

Observing the falling localization trends in Colombia, it is vital for aid agencies, like USAID, and philanthropies to increase their local partnerships in the country, particularly in the peacebuilding field. In What about the Middle? Thinking Systematically about Localization,

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Leslie Wingender and María Lucía Méndez explore the role of “middle” or national-level organizations as local partners and provide an analysis of a partnership between a “middle” organization, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, and a philanthropic organization, Humanity United, seeking to transform localization relationships. Wingender and Méndez are directors of Humanity United and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, respectively.

Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) is an “independent peacebuilding think-and-do tank” working to “influence debates and public policies related to peace and security” (Wingender & Méndez, 2023, p. 516). Humanity United (HU), dedicated to peace and freedom, works to support its partners to “advance human dignity and change the systems that enable violent conflict and human exploitation around the world” (Wingender & Méndez, 2023, p. 516).

FIP’s work with other civil society organizations, international organizations, and the public and private sectors, solidifies its identity as a national-level, or “middle” organization.

In 2017, HU began its partnership with FIP through two grants focused on peacebuilding initiatives in Colombia. In 2019, HU provided two more grants to FIP, this time focusing on general operating support. The organizations became equal partners, finding that this horizontal relationship proved beneficial, provided FIP with the flexibility to “leverage their capacity and opportunities to connect different stakeholders, sectors, and agendas” and allowed HU to “pilot a new way of engaging with grantees-partners, strategizing, and acting collectively with donor involvement” (Wingender & Méndez, 2023, p. 519).

Reflecting upon this successful partnership, Wingender and Méndez developed nine recommendations for funders and international organizations seeking to improve localization efforts. Some of these recommendations include: “supporting a funding structure that allows for organizations to adapt and innovate at a local level when opportunities arise”, creating a “focus

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on grantmaking that promotes the strategic objectives of the organization in the long term”, and investment “in knowledge management mechanisms and learning exchanges” (Wingender & Méndez, 2023, pp. 525-527). These recommendations are vital for aid agencies and philanthropic funders, emphasizing a need to integrate the long-term goals of local actors into decision making and funding programs to successfully execute locally-led lasting change.

Conclusion

Analysis of USAID’s recent reports on its localization progress depict a large pitfall in its goal of achieving 25% of direct localization funding by 2030. Much of this can be attributed to its definition of a local partner which negatively overestimates its localization statistics. Insights from Publish What You Fund and Oxfam corroborate these findings, showing that the agency is far below its target goal for local funding and local leadership. In Colombia, this trend continues. While overall total funding for the country has increased over time, the proportion directed towards local partners has decreased. A potential stopgap for this trend is local partnerships, seen through Humanity United’s partnership with Fundación Ideas para la Paz. This collaboration, seeking to advance peacebuilding in Colombia, produced vital recommendations for funders looking to work with local partners. These recommendations emphasize sharing of knowledge and discussion of long-term goals for the project. In this case, Fundación Ideas para la Paz’s position as a “middle” organization that works across sectors and organizations was vital in its partnership with Humanity United. The differences present in definitions of “local partner” can be mitigated through “middle” organizations. These organizations have the infrastructure and resources to support programs while still qualifying as local partners, separate from international entities. This combination of assets presents a possible solution to increasing local partnerships not only in Colombia, but around the world.

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References

Fox, J., & Hallock, J. (2024). Open government and US development co-operation in Colombia: Lessons for locally led development. Development Policy Review, 42, e12796. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12796

Hirschfeld, K. (2024, January 08). USAID’s definition of local actors may be harming local actors. Oxfam. https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/what-is-a-local-organizationthe-answer-matte rs/

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). (2022, March) The grand bargain 2.0

explained: An ICVA briefing paper. International Council of Voluntary Agencies. https://www.icvanetwork.org/uploads/2022/04/The-Grand-Bargain-Explained-AnICVA- Briefing-Paper.pdf

Lewis, H., Forster, G., & Paxton, S. (2024a, June). Metrics matter II. Publish What You Fund.

https://www publishwhatyoufund org/app/uploads/dlm uploads/2024/06/MetricsMatter- II pdf

Lewis, H., Forster, G., & Paxton, S. (2024b, December). Commitments without accountability. Publish What You Fund

https://www publishwhatyoufund org/app/uploads/dlm uploads/2024/12/Commitme nts- Without-Accountability.pdf

OECD. (2005, March 2). Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en

Saldinger, A. (2021, November 4). Samantha Power lays out her vision for USAID. Devex. https://www devex com/news/samantha-power-lays-out-her-vision-for-usaid102003

USAID. (2023, June 18).

Moving toward a model of locally led development: FY 2022 localization progress report . Wingender, L., & Méndez, M. L. (2023). What about the middle? Thinking systematically about localization. Negotiation Journal, 39(4), 507–529. https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12445

ReliefWeb https://reliefweb.int/report/world/moving-toward-model-locally-led-development-fy202 2-localization-progress-report

USAID. (2024). Growing momentum: USAID localization progress report. Save the Children’s Resource Centre. https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/EFJO6Px/

IMPACTOFNUCLEARPOLICIESON MINORITYCOMMUNITIES

BIO

Sara Hollingshead is a recent graduate from the University of Michigan, earning a Bachelor’s in International Studies with a concentration in Comparative Culture and Identity. Due to her cultural heritage and connection to Hiroshima, Japan, she is passionate about nuclear abolition, peace advocacy, and U S -Japan relations Sara has worked with a range of global nonprofits organizations including ALPHA Education, Inkululeko, and now as an intern at Peace Boat US. There, she is working to further the United Nations Sustainability Goals while pursuing her interest in nuclear disarmament and youth advocacy. She has recently participated in the Hiroshima-ICAN Academy and attended the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as a youth representative. Sara is involved in research focusing on global security, human rights, and nuclear justice where her work in grassroots initiatives, mentoring programs, and research projects brings together her commitment to dialogue and collaboration in international affairs.

INTRODUCTION

The nuclear policies of the United States and Japan are tied to some of the most devastating events of the 20th century. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 reshaped global military strategy, diplomacy, and public discourse, leading Japan to adopt an anti-nuclear stance while the U.S. pursued nuclear deterrence (1). Despite treaties like the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the long-term consequences of nuclear policies continue to disproportionately affect marginalized communities, often excluded from policymaking. This nuclear colonialism extends beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the global Hibakusha, including Pacific Islanders exposed to U.S. nuclear testing, Indigenous communities affected by uranium mining, and employees at nuclear facilities worldwide, among others. These communities face long-term health, environmental, and social consequences while being overlooked in nuclear governance and disarmament discussions. The failure to incorporate their voices weakens peacebuilding efforts and perpetuates systemic injustices, highlighting the urgent need for nuclear justice. This paper examines discrimination against minority groups and argues that the exclusion of these communities in nuclear policy-making creates critical blind spots that undermine the effectiveness of nuclear agreements. A more inclusive approach, one that recognizes the lived experiences of affected populations, would strengthen international relations, promote sustainable disarmament, and foster a human-centered approach to security.

MINORITY COMMUNITIES AFFECTED BY NUCLEAR POLICIES

Effects on Hibakusha

Hibakusha, a term coined after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 to describe those who survived (2), have faced significant long-term health, social, and economic hardships shaped by nuclear policies. Exposure to high levels of radiation leads to chronic health conditions such as cancer, leukemia, and other radiation-related diseases, along with persistent fears about hereditary effects (3).

As scientists were researching the effects of the detonation of an atomic bomb on the human body, results consistently revealed there was a disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation tied to age and gender. Those who were 5 years old or younger in August 1945 in Hiroshima were most likely to suffer cancer at some point in their lives, with girls being twice as likely (4). The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC), a joint organization by the U.S. National Research Council and Japan’s National Institute of Health, committed to researching the biological effects of radiation on Hibakusha, reported that “ women were two times more likely to develop solid cancers due to radiation exposure than men. ” They concluded this was because of the development of sex-specific cancers in women from radiation exposure, like breast cancer (5).

These nuclear-related health challenges often limited Hibakusha’s economic opportunities, as many survivors struggled to maintain steady employment due to ongoing medical issues and related social stigma. Due to widespread misconceptions about the contagiousness of radiation-related illnesses and concerns over potential genetic defects, beyond physical hardships, many survivors faced exclusion within Japanese society and discrimination in employment and marriage. Government compensation and recognition have fluctuated over time, often requiring extensive advocacy efforts to ensure survivors' needs are addressed. The constant social marginalization of Hibakusha translated to policy-making spaces, undermining peacebuilding strategies by ignoring the voices of those most affected (6).

Effects on Indigenous Populations

The implementation of U.S. nuclear policies, particularly the extensive testing of nuclear weapons, has caused profound and long-lasting harm to Indigenous communities and cities near testing sites. In the Pacific, nuclear tests conducted between 1946 and 1996 devastated the environment and jeopardized the health of local populations.

Between those 50 years, the United States, United Kingdom, and France detonated 318 nuclear devices in a region in the Marshall Islands, French Polynesia (Te Ao Maohi), Kiribati, Australia, the U.S. territory of Johnston (Kalama Atoll), and Amchitka Island, Alaska (7).In Danielle Endres’s book titled The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism, she defines nuclear colonialism as “ a system of domination through which governments and corporations disproportionately target and devastate indigenous peoples and their lands to maintain the nuclear production process ” (8). The three countries listed above were primary contributors to nuclear colonialism, where they exploited Indigenous populations and left them vulnerable to the consequences of radiation exposure. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) found due to extreme levels of radiation exposure from nuclear tests, there were high rates of “proliferation of cancers, painful memories of miscarriages, stillbirths, and of what some Marshallese refer to as ‘jellyfish babies’ – infants born with translucent skin and no bones” (9). Infamous tests such as the 1954 Castle Bravo detonation on Bikini Atoll was one of the largest U.S. nuclear explosions. At 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, it released massive radioactive fallout where the Marshall Islands still face health issues, cultural upheaval, and displacement today (10). Even with compensation programs like the Compact of Free Association, the residents of the Marshall Islands and Micronesia have criticisms that the compensation has not been adequate or sufficient in addressing the extent of the harm. Title Two of the Compact of Free Association sought to provide a legal and financial framework for compensating Micronesia and other affected regions for the damages caused by the U.S. nuclear tests (11), though citizens of these areas continue to grapple with the environmental, health, and cultural ramifications of these tests.

In the continental U.S., Native American tribes near the Nevada Test Site experienced similarly destructive consequences. From 1951 to 1992, the U.S. conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site, a site on Western Shoshone lands (12).

The Shoshone and Paiute peoples, whose ancestral lands were subjected to repeated nuclear detonations, faced severe environmental degradation and long-term health crises, like many others affected by radiation exposure. Radioactive contamination from these tests polluted soil and water sources, rendering traditional hunting, farming, and gathering practices unsafe. Tribal members reported heightened rates of cancer, respiratory issues, and reproductive problems, which have persisted across generations (13). This history of nuclear colonialism, marked by the marginalization and disregard for Indigenous communities, emphasizes the injustice these populations continue to face. Despite the undeniable and lasting impacts of radiation exposure, the failure to fully address their needs and provide adequate compensation continues to perpetuate their systemic discrimination, leaving Indigenous voices sidelined in nuclear policy discussions. Again, this exclusion weakens efforts toward nuclear justice, as it ignores the lived experiences of those most affected by these policies.

The fallout from nuclear testing also extends to “downwinders,” a term used to describe individuals living downwind of test sites who were exposed to radioactive fallout. Many downwinders, particularly in Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, also experience alarming spikes in cancer, leukemia, and other radiation-induced illnesses (14). The U.S. government initially declared nuclear testing a safe practice for its citizens, which exacerbated the suffering of these communities who were left without adequate healthcare or compensation for decades (15). Then, as more clinical evidence emerged showcasing its devastating effects, the government initiated programs to help compensate those victims (14). One of the leading programs is called the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), established in 1990, that provides financial compensation to those who developed cancer from radiation exposure. There is still discussion about whether this compensation received was enough to offset the financial, physical, and mental burden experienced by downwinders. The lack of meaningful consultation or consent from these communities further exemplifies the marginalization they faced within broader U.S. nuclear policy frameworks.

Nuclear Advocacy, Discrimination, and Inclusive Policies

The intersection of social identity and nuclear advocacy reveals how race, memory, and lived experience shape anti-nuclear movements. In both the U.S. and Japan, marginalized communities have long been at the forefront of advocating for nuclear weapons abolition, drawing on their lived experiences of harm, displacement, and/or health consequences from nuclear weapons production, testing, and bombings. Key policy discussions are dominated by state actors, military officials, and diplomats who may lack firsthand understanding of the human and environmental toll these weapons inflict (16). Excluding marginalized voices from nuclear policy spaces reinforces unjust power imbalances and dismisses the expertise of those most impacted by nuclear violence. Ignoring them upholds systemic oppression and a policy framework that values state security over human security and justice.

Inclusion of marginalized communities in policy-making processes is essential for creating equitable and humane nuclear disarmament strategies. An example of an inclusive policy practice can be seen not only through the passage of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) but also in the implementation of the International Trust Fund for Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation based on Articles 6 and 7. This funding mechanism supports victims of nuclear weapons use and testing, and helps clean up environments contaminated by nuclear activities; it’s a policy pushed for by nuclear-affected communities (17). To ensure the success of this fund, it’s essential to keep centering the voices of frontline communities in both the design and decision-making processes of this initiative. With co-governance and participatory grantmaking strategies, victims and grassroots organizations are able to co-create remediation and assistance projects, which leads to more sustainable policy-making and better peacebuilding.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nuclear-affected communities have long endured the hardships associated with nuclear use, yet are not able to significantly contribute to international policy-making decisions. The deep, historical impact of these policies has continued to affect marginalized communities, hindering the progress of sustainable policy-making. It emphasizes how identity intersects with nuclear advocacy and perpetuates discrimination, as these communities have endured nuclear violence and have been at the frontlines of the anti-nuclear movement advocating for nuclear disarmament and nuclear justice. Recognizing and amplifying their voices is not just a moral obligation but a necessary step toward achieving meaningful and lasting progress in nuclear abolition efforts. This paper also wishes to acknowledge that nuclear-affected communities reach far beyond the cited cases of Japan, the United States, and the Pacific Islands.

Understanding the legacy of nuclear use and policy requires more than analyzing treaties and defense strategies. The history and devastating consequences call to confront the systemic exclusion of those at the frontlines. By looking at the experiences of Hibakusha, Indigenous communities, Downwinders, and all affected communities, it’s clear how nuclear use brings not only physical harm, but also social and political harm, rooted in patterns of colonialism, dispossession, and silence. In order to bridge the gap between nuclear policy and grassroots initiatives, a shift from state-centric security models to frameworks grounded in equity, historical accountability, and co-creation is required. Moving forward, nuclear policy should be reimagined through inclusive and participatory approaches that prioritize justice and healing for those most impacted. Only then can a truly sustainable path toward disarmament be built, one where peace includes the presence of dignity and recognition for all.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook.

https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter1.htm

l 2. Disarmament Education. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs.

https://education.unoda.org/presentations/hibakusha.ht

ml 3 Listwa, D (2012, August 9) Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Long Term Health Effects

https://k1project.columbia.edu/news/hiroshima-and-nagasaki

4. Olson, M. (2019, June 1). Disproportionate Impact of Radiation and Radiation Regulation.

https://doi.org/10.1080/03080188.2019.160386

4 5. Owens, J. (2020, July 9). The Gendered Impacts of the Hiroshima & Nagasaki Bombings.

https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/gendered-impacts-hiroshima-nagasaki-bombings 6. Shigematsu, I. (1998). Greetings: 50 years of Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission–Radiation

Effects Research Foundation Studies. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 95(10), 5424. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.95.10.5424

7. Bolton, M., Tisch, S., Hawkins, D. (2018, September). Fallout on Countries Downwind from French Pacific Nuclear Weapons Testing. https://ny.fes.de/fileadmin/user upload/PacificDownwind-PosObs-Country-Report-12-2h0q cbp.pdf

8. Endres, D. (2009) “The Rhetoric of Nuclear Colonialism: Rhetorical Exclusion of American Indian Arguments in the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Siting Decision,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 6, no. 1: 39-60.

9. UN Rights Council Examines Nuclear Legacy Consequences in the Marshall Islands (2024, October 4) United Nations News.

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https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155366#:~:text=Through%20workshops%20and%2

0c onsultations%2C%20OHCHR,translucent%20skin%20and%20no%20bones %E2%80%9D

10. Brown, A. L. (2014). No Promised Land: The Shared Legacy of the Castle Bravo Nuclear Test. Arms Control Association. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-03/no-promisedland-shared-legacy-castle-bravo-nucl ear-test

11. Compacts of Free Association. U.S. Department of the Interior. https://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association

12. Nevada Test Site. Atomic Heritage Foundation. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/location/nevada-test-site/

13. George, P., & Russ, A. Nuclear Testing and Native Peoples. Reimagine. https://reimaginerpe.org/node/165

14 Types of Cancer Associated with Radiation Exposure: An In-Depth Overview (2024, March

22) Downwinders https://www downwinders info/2024/03/22/types-of-cancer-associatedwith-radiation-exposu re-an-in-depth-overview/

15. Ryerson, J. Trinity Test Downwinders. National Park Service. https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/trinity-testdownwinders.htm

16. Nair, S., Zhou, I. F., Reitmann, L., Hazarika, M., Bluwi, A. Beyond the Echo Chamber: Creating a More Equitable, Diverse and Inclusive Nuclear Weapons Policy Field. Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation. https://vcdnp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2023/08/Beyond-the-Echo-Chamber.pdf

17 Joint Statement on the TPNW by Kiribati and Kazakhstan (2022, June) https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ga-76-fc-td-kiribatien.pdf

ADVANTAGESOFSUBNATIONAL

DIPLOMACYAMONGECOWASMEMBER COUNTRIES

BIO

Alexandria Johnson is an emerging foreign policy professional and aspiring diplomat from Cleveland, Ohio, with expertise in civil-military relations, subnational diplomacy, and national security. She holds a B A in International Relations from Syracuse University and is currently pursuing a master’s degree at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Alexandria is proud to be a 2025 Thomas R. Pickering Foreign Affairs Fellow. Her professional experience includes roles with the U.S. House of Representatives, the Truman Center for National Policy, and the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, where she worked on strengthening diplomatic engagement at the local level She has developed policy work on subnational diplomacy and facilitated research on military coups and postconflict governance. She has a strong foundation in cross-cultural engagement and public service. She is interested in advancing U.S. foreign policy through inclusive diplomacy, local-global partnerships, and strategic engagement. She is intermediate in French

editedby: JosephineNanortey

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Executive Summary:

This policy paper explores the security benefits of establishing a subnational diplomacy apparatus among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As the strategic importance of West Africa grows and regional challenges become more complex and economically intertwined, empowering cities and municipalities to engage across borders can troubleshoot 21st century problems. Subnational diplomacy offers a circumventive approach that strengthens ties through public-private partnerships and addresses regional security threats.

Issue Overview:

Once primarily a tool for soft cultural exchange, subnational diplomacy has transformed into an underutilized mechanism for enhancing regional security, as local governance plays a critical role in addressing instability stemming from under-resourced cities.

Subnational diplomacy refers to international engagements and collaborations between local leaders; key anchor institutions, such as universities and hospitals, are also prominent local-global actors as they have a direct impact at the local level and various international components. West African cities that lead in subnational networks tend to be political and economic capitals with larger populations and resources. In contrast, smaller West African nations often lack the financial tools and systems needed to integrate their cities into these networks. Without these resources, secondary cities struggle to address the concerns that directly impact national and regional security. As one of the continent’s most dynamic blocs, ECOWAS holds significant influence in shaping regional stability. In the face of 21st century challenges like climate change, public health crises, and critical infrastructure gaps, it is essential that the bloc leverages its economic prowess to secure the vital link between economic prosperity and regional security: cities.

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Introduction:

ECOWAS is a regional bloc of fifteen West African states that was founded towards the late 20th century to promote economic integration. It has since evolved to cover other topics such as democratic governance and conflict prevention, themes that directly address regional security concerns. In recent decades, subnational diplomacy has evolved as a key component of international cooperation, with African cities playing an increasingly active role. Networks like C40 Cities, ICLEI Africa, UCLG Africa, and the Covenant of Mayors in Sub-Saharan Africa have started the integration of a formal city diplomacy process into many parts of the continent. Countries like Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone have been successful in their implementation of city diplomacy. Local governance is central to these successes as positive outcomes for countries across the world (Freeman, 2024). However, under-performing municipalities are prone to more instability without active use of networks and emphasis on local level diplomacy. (Desai et al., 2022). Policies, memorandums, and initiatives taken at the local level are crucial drivers for large-scale successes. To ensure the prosperity and security of West Africa, it is critical that mid-sized cities take a more active role in these diplomatic networks, as their involvement is essential in strengthening both local and regional stability.

Methodology:

This policy paper adopts a qualitative approach, using peer-reviewed journals, academic papers, and reports by subnational networks to analyze local diplomacy impacts in West Africa.

Substantiation:

Climate Change: West Africa faces disproportionate burdens from climate change and its adaptation costs. (World Meteorological Organization, 2024). Cities like Lagos and Freetown demonstrate the varying capacities that larger and smaller urban centers have in addressing

critical issues such as climate change. Lagos has vast resources and a large population, making it better equipped to address this challenge at the local level. Recently, the Lagos State Government recently launched a subnational carbon exchange (Latona, 2024) demonstrating the local-level need for sustainability. Freetown, a considerably smaller city, has shown remarkable progress through active engagement in subnational diplomacy networks. This collaboration enabled Freetown to develop a local-level climate action plan to implement mitigation and adaptation to climate change. (Freetown City Council, 2023).

Technology and Smart Cities: The development of smart cities is essential for adapting to the needs of a pro-technology era. Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, has the resources to become a hub for smart city initiatives. But smaller cities in West Africa, like Kumasi, Ghana, also face the challenge of integrating technology to bolster national security and urban governance. Through subnational diplomacy and an emphasis on public-private partnerships, cities like Kumasi can build smart technologies that enhance security and prevent division.

Public Health: Accra, Ghana represents a city with a strong health framework. Strong public health systems can prevent outbreaks which can disrupt economies and strain resources, ultimately weakening regional security. (Weiss, 2024) Subnational diplomacy has seen limited use in public health, but Accra’s strong health system presents an opportunity. By leveraging city networks and anchor institutions, it could help drive better health outcomes for smaller cities across West Africa.

Policy Recommendations:

To strengthen subnational diplomacy and harness its security and economic benefits for mid-sized cities, ECOWAS and its member states should implement the following policies:

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1.Formalizing Subnational Diplomacy Frameworks: ECOWAS should establish a policy framework that formalizes subnational diplomacy, ensuring that local governments have structured avenues for international engagement. This framework should include guidelines for trade agreements, security cooperation, and governance collaborations. A suggestion is to establish a ECOWAS Local and Regional Diplomacy Forum (ELRDF), a formal platform for leaders from cities, municipalities and regional governments to engage in cross-border diplomacy. ELRDF should facilitate regular summits, working groups, and exchange programs for subnational leaders.

2.Emphasize Local Government Organizations: Encouraging the development of local government coalitions and organizations would provide subnational actors with a direct community at home. It could encourage mayors and local leaders from across the nation to meet more consistently and to promote advocacy.

3.Launch a Cooperation Fund: Launching a fund for subnational diplomacy would provide subnational actors with financial and technical support for collaborations. It could encourage programs and projects that address modern problems. This fund would also allow for more involvement from the local workforce and anchor institutions.

Conclusion

The integration of subnational diplomacy will play a vital role in the economic and security architecture of ECOWAS. By empowering local governments to engage in troubleshooting topics like climate change, public health, and technology, ECOWAS can stimulate security. Implementing structured policies to support subnational diplomacy efforts will enhance regional security and reinforce the legitimacy and security of ECOWAS, ultimately augmenting ECOWAS's mission of unity and cooperation.

Works Cited

Adam, H. (2024, February 9). Daily Trust. Daily Trust. https://dailytrust.com. Africa faces disproportionate burden from climate change and adaptation costs (2024, September 2). World Meteorological Organization. https://wmo.int.

Aleman, W. The Evolution of ECOWAS: How the Economic Organization Transitioned Into Peace and Security Lund University, Department of Political Science https://lup.lub.lu.se.

Andrews, K., & Wimberly, M. C. (2024). Smaller cities have large impacts on West Africa’s expanding urban system. Sustainable Cities and Society, 106. https://www.sciencedirect.com.

Assan, A., Sari, A. A., & Takian, A. (2020). Ensuring sustainable development in Ghana: public health security and policy concerns. Iranian Journal of Public Health. https://doi.org/10.18502/ijph.v49i8.3909

Bouchet, M. (2024). The influence of strategic subnational diplomacy in international relations. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/202409/ifri bouchet strategic subnational diplo macy 2024 pdf

Desai, P., Bennett, M., & Dube, C. (2022). The role of local governance in achieving political stability: A joint public-private effort towards sustainable development. Good

GovernanceAfrica https://www diligent com Kihlgren Grandi, L. (2024, November 15).

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Klomegah, K K (2024, February 2)

A Shifting landscape: Is ECOWAS awakening to regional economic and security realities?

Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu.

Latona, O. (2025, March 5). Climate initiative: Lagos Govt, firm unveil Africa’s first subnational carbon exchange Vanguard Nigeria https://www vanguardngr com

Mazurek, A. (2023, June 19). Abidjan and the challenge of urban mobility - Ingenius. Ingenius. https://ingenius.ecoledesponts.fr

. Melly, P. (2024, December 15).

West African highway linking Nigeria to Ivory Coast could help reinvigorate Ecowas

Pepa. (2024, April 9).

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The strategic importance of West Africa in International Trade: Prospects and Opportunities

Transped - Transporte Internacional Aéreo, Marítimo Y Terrestre

https://www.transped.com

. Saifee, M. (2022). Subnational diplomacy: a national security imperative. American Foreign Service Association. https://afsa.org.

Transform Freetown 4th year Report – Freetown City Council. (n.d.). https://fcc.gov.sl/transform-freetown-4th-year-report/. (2024, August 13) https://news asu edu

Understanding the diplomacy of agriculture and its role as the ‘backbone of civilization’ | ASU News

Weiss, N. (2024, February 28). National Security and Public Health Systems - JPHMP Direct.

JPHMP Direct. https://jphmpdirect.com.

Yatai, P. D. (2024, July 24). Firm unveils strategic roadmap for Abuja Smart City Project -

NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA. https://nannews.ng.

NEWS AGENCY OF NIGERIA - Africa’s Media Giant

Sarah Kahn is currently in her final year of a Masters in Theological Studies at Harvard Divinity school, after graduating from UCLA Summa Cum Laude. From UCLA Law’s Center for Immigration Law and Policy to the National ACLU and Just Futures Law, she’s developed a wide array of experience working on communications campaigns for complex issues concerning national security, immigration impact litigation, and civil liberties Her work and academic research has led her to her current master’s program, tracing how origins of social difference, its discursive formations, and how it shapes contemporary ethics/security policy. Sarah is most passionate asking where power is located, currently exploring global south statecraft, and how to uplift the communities we ’ re seeking to protect in policy-making As an organizer herself, Sarah has long worked at the intersection of scholarship, social movements, and civil society organizations.

SARAHKAHN

Abstract:

The social uprising for Palestine in 2023 initiating a reckoning across the human rights world. What did it reveal to us about the importance of grassroots movements for justice, and the role of civil society organizations in it all? How did this challenge conventional norms undergirding belonging, borders, and security? Most importantly, what lessons can we draw from this keystone moment for migrant advocacy in the United States? As a new administration hostile to migrant populations deploys increasingly inhumane policies, it’s vital to identify opportunities to build solidarity and change consciousness for the better in the United States world of migrant advocacy. I argue that this movement reveals a vital analytic framework for immigrant advocacy: transnational solidarity. An approach that calls attention to linkages in oppressive systems across borders and emphasizes a “joint struggle” approach. In an increasingly globalized world, nation state sovereignty is becoming more challenged. As flows of capital, people, ideas, goods and more increase transnationally, states anxiously firm up border militarization exporting models of subjugation from across the globe. While governments will suggest this is to protect an internal collective identity, its effects are laid bare as these projects further fragment and threaten already marginalized communities. By constructing visions of freedom beyond the doctrine of state sovereignty and identifying shared oppressors, actors within the immigrant justice space broaden the horizon for what change is possible to their local communities while unsettling embedded colonial commitments. If oppressive systems transcend borders, then so must our reaction against them.

Introduction

In 2023, the international community saw an eruption in the grassroots struggle for Palestinian liberation. While Hamas’ offensive in Israel on October 7, 2023 initiated an uproar there was a swift demand from protesters to contextualize the operation with Israel’s illegal occupation and broader colonial history, warning against a disproportionately severe

bombardment campaign (The Nation 2023). Student protests were launched across university campuses calling for material divestment from companies invested in Israeli human rights violations, met with severe repression from administration. Amidst the movement, multiple minoritized communities stood in solidarity with Palestinian liberation. From labor workers to indigenous activists, youth organizing against systemic racism, migrant justice groups and more, millions joined to protest the historic subjugation of Palestinians.

Background

Demonstrators, from students to human rights advocates, demanded recognition of Israel’s illegal occupation of Palestinian lands and the ongoing blockade of Gaza, imposed since 2007. Supporters of Palestinian rights sought to contextualize Hamas’ attacks on October 7th, framing them within the broader history of colonial dispossession, displacement, and repression faced by Palestinians under Israeli policies. Broadly, civil society actors and protestors condemned Israel’s abandonment of international human rights law, calling for a ceasefire as Israel pummeled the Gaza strip with nearly “6000 bombs” in the first week of its response. Deliberately failing to distinguish between combatants and civilians alike (Al Jazeera 2023). This was accompanied by intensification of Israel’s 16 year blockade on Gaza, “cutting off all supplies, including food, water, electricity, fuel and medicines, aggravating the humanitarian catastrophe,” (Amnesty International). UNRWA Situation Report #45 labeled 1.2 million Palestinians internally displaced by December 3 of 2023 (UNRWA 2023). The destruction of Palestinian life and land troubled the human rights world across the board.

At the same time, migrant advocacy organizations across the world joined the campaign to demand justice. In a report by European migrant advocacy network Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) entitled “How Are Migrants’ Rights

Actors Responding to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?” they examined the response of PICUM members across 10 countries. Civil society organizations in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and more initiated campaigns demanding an enforcement of Palestinian rights. Writing from these organizations pointed out the intersection with labor issues, the refugee crisis, and free speech. Activists in these countries would join mobilizations, disruptions, and more (PICUM 2024).

Parallel to these organizations, immigrant justice groups in the United States would mobilize similarly. They would join coalitions and unite in civil disobedience actions exerting pressure on local and national government for a permanent ceasefire and immigrant protections. In one action at the Capitol, 13 immigrant youth were arrested alongside their Jewish, Black, and brown peers as part of a multi-racial, interfaith coalition fighting for collective liberation (Silverman 2024). Across universities, we’d see similar coalitions forming, articulating linkages in oppressive systems across the world making the same demand for liberation from them. A statement of solidarity from the East Bay Sanctuary movement writes, “We uplift the concept of transformational solidarity and organizing that links these global struggles to the freeing of Black and Indigenous people in North America.We affirm our solidarity with the people of Haiti, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Afghanistan, and all others paying the unjust price of global exploitation, conflict and displacement,” (East Bay Sanctuary 2024).

In Benedict Anderson’s seminal work Imagined Communities, he writes “The nation is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” Anderson’s writing stripped the inevitability of the nation state by calling attention to its socially constructed nature. This is made clear in assessments of the decolonization movements in the 20th century, when the European import of the nation state model is widely cemented. Descendent from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this system “parceled the principle of natural

rights into the rights of individuals and the rights of nation states,” introducing the concept of territorial sovereignty. For entrance into the world system, communities would have to adopt this means of self determination to be recognized as a political authority regardless of internal organization along racial, religious, or ethnic lines. Acquiescence to the liberal order neutered third world liberation aims, without ever tending to resource inequity created by colonization. Minoritized populations would have to appeal to international law for recognition of their rights, an ultimately imperial legacy. International law scholar Tendayi Achiume describes how because European colonial logics continue to shape international law, we must generate political frameworks that better account for its effects of continued subordination (Achiume 2022).

Belonging

In the aftermath of World War 1, Hannah Arendt famously wrote, “We became aware of the existence of a right to have rights [to live in a framework where one is judged by one ’ s actions and opinions] and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights,” (Arendt). Arendt articulates how without statehood, rights traditionally thought of as inalienable in liberal society are stripped. In order to have access to these rights, one must be a member of a political community. Historical scholarship reveals how citizenship is leveraged to fragment and oppress already minoritized life in colonial projects. In the United States, immigration historians have exposed the ever fluctuating nature of the “traditional” American subject (Ngai 2014). While this initially meant White, Anglo Saxon Protestants, over time, it’d come to include originally racialized communities that would be subsumed into the fold of whiteness through socio-political processes. It is with the passage of restrictive immigration laws heightening criminalization in the 1920s where we’d see how falling outside of this mold would have life or death implications.

Blease’s Act, or Sections 1325 and 1326 of the United States Code, criminalize “illegal entry” and “illegal reentry” into the United States, and remain one of the most federally

prosecuted crimes today (National Immigration Project). This 1929 law was passed by an alliance of eugenicist and nativist congressional leadership, demonstrating the enduring impact of colonial logics on immigration communities today. Racial constructs are mobilized to withhold rights from entire communities. 23, 962 people were charged with unauthorized reentry under section 1326 in district courts from 2021 to 2022 (National Immigrant Justice Center). Within the first few days of the 47th presidential administration in 2025, over 2,400 arrests were made through this federal statute (Smith 2025). Wrapped up in antiimmigrant sentiment are racist and contrived claims of belonging, ones that incorrectly prescribe a static quality to American identity.

Borders

A historical analysis also disassembles normative assumptions of borders, which the United States government relies on a rigid conception of. Contrary to popular belief, American history reveals their mutable nature (Ngai 2014). Since 1986, we ’ ve seen militarization of the US/Mexico border, fast-tracked since the Trump administration in 2016. Part of a larger, draconian “prevention through deterrence” policy, this project is intended to deter migrants from entering by forcing them onto more hostile pathways to entry. Human rights groups at the border suggest upwards of 80,000 have died from this policy (Human Rights Watch).

Infrastructure at the border includes physical barriers like walls (including steel bollards), vehicle barriers, pedestrian fences, as well as advanced surveillance technology like drones, radar, autonomous surveillance towers, sensors on barriers, and sophisticated camera systems, all designed to monitor and deter unauthorized border crossing. As this technology develops, it is equipped with increasingly advanced capabilities (Electronic Frontier Foundation). This includes facial recognition capacities and thermal imaging. This equipment costs billions of taxpayer dollars, all towards “military contractors, Big Tech companies, and Silicon Valley start-ups,” (No Tech For Ice). The presidential administration in 2020 positioned investment in this tech as

a more humane alternative, ultimately endangering already marginalized communities and enriching those profiting from this oppressive project. Human rights advocates have pointed out the use of these technologies on other minoritized populations in the United States. This includes the use of FRT, proven to disproportionately target black communities (Lewis 2021).

The current administration has promised to invest billions more in border militarization. Governor Greg Abbott’s border militarization plan Operation Lone Star is a multi-billion dollar plan that deployed thousands of Texas National Guard troops to the border (Jones 2021). Aside from the culture of impunity that already defines border agents, these troops have expressed the inefficacy of this program. Local news and officials have pointed out the enormous drain on resources, some denouncing the operation all together (Jones 2021).

Advocacy groups have directed attention to how some of the largest companies installing surveillance technology at the border are born out of Israel. Israeli military contractor Elbit Systems was awarded a 7 year, $218 million to install surveillance towers at the border (Guerrero 2024). These same towers were first created for the illegal separation wall at the West Bank, severing indigenous Palestinian communities (Human Rights Watch). Border agents are also equipped with technology allowing them to hack into people's phones at their disposal. One of them being provided by Israeli company Cellebrite, which can hack into locked phones (No Tech for Ice). Other surveillance technology is also provided by Palantir, a company funded by Peter Thiel, who has donated millions to Republican SuperPACs . This company simultaneously has strategic partnerships with Israel, most recently pledging to assist in their war on Gaza (Spezzatti 2024).

The hardening of our borders are not only dangerous because of their human rights violations here, but just as much because they’re an opportunity for unregulated Big Tech companies to further profit from the exploitation of our communities. The importation of technologies of violence from abroad endangers the civil liberties of all. This is best captured by the popular slogan chanted at pro-Palestine rallies, “From Palestine to Mexico, All the Walls

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Have Got to Go.” Social justice movements can identify linkages in oppressive systems, an opportunity to both galvanize support for social change, but also unsettle cultural norms mired in colonial rationale. Sociologist Francesca Polletta has pointed out the efficacy of social movements with a diversity of framings and an antagonist (Polletta 2014).

Ways Forward

A historical analysis engaging with broader systems of power, such as imperialism, allows us to make an intervention in normative commitments of U.S. voters. The transnational framework transcends arbitrary territorial lines to deconstruct naturalized perceptions of security, belonging, and borders. This invites citizens to adopt a more humane understanding of concepts often weaponized against immigrant and other minority communities.

This can be operationalized by adopting narrative change strategies structured around a shared humanity and oppressor. Rather than simply appealing to the liberal framework of human rights, calls for change can be organized with an anticolonial ethics against corporations profiting from . If these systems were built to instill racial difference and marginalize communities, building transnational solidarity is an opportunity to look beyond them and seek direct corporate accountability.

References

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Jones, J. (2022, October 7). Texas lawyer calls Abbott’s border plan a “waste of time and money ” MSNBC com; MSNBC https://www msnbc com/the-reidout/reidout-blog/texas-abbottborder-plan-waste-time-money-rcna51198

Lewis, James A., and William Crumpler. “Questions about Facial Recognition.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28766.

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The 12th Edition WCAPS Pipeline Joint Publication Program

PIPELINE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM PUBLICATION

FELLOWS/AUTHORS

FELLOWS/AUTHORS

WOMEN’SHEALTH

TABLEOF CONTENTS

HUMANRIGHTS

TABLEOF CONTENTS

TABLEOF CONTENTS

CRITICALANALYSIS

PUBLICATION DISCLAIMER

FOREWARD:

CONTRIBUTORS

CONTRIBUTORS

Associate Editors

CONTRIBUTORS

Associate Editors

WOMEN’S HEALTH

CONSCRIPTIONLAWINMYANMAR:

CHAPTERONE

CHAPTERONE

HumanRightsViolationsUnderMyanmar’sConscriptionLaw

CHAPTERONE

REFERENCES

THEPOWEROFEALRYMINDSETCHANGE:

CHAPTERTWO

CHAPTERTWO

Method

Findings

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Conclusion

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REFERENCES

CHAPTERTWO

GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

HOWONLINECOMMUNITIES FUELTHENORMALIZATIONOF FEMICIDEANDGENDER-BASED VIOLENCE

CHAPTERTHREE

CHAPTERTHREE

CHAPTERTHREE

Social Media as a Tool for Luring Women into Deadly Traps

CHAPTERTHREE

The Role of Social Media in Amplifying Harmful Narratives

CHAPTERTHREE

Discussions

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CHAPTERTHREE

PRERNABARUA

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CHAPTERFOUR

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CHAPTERFOUR

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Conclusion

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CHAPTERFOUR

THEVIOLENCEAGAINST ASIANWOMEN

How Media Frames Violence Against Asian Women

CHAPTERFIVE

Hyper-sexualization and the Orientalist Fantasy

Historical Stereotypes of Asian Women

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CHAPTERFIVE

Results

Analysis

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VIOLENCEAGAINSTSOUTH ASIANSTUDENTSIN KYRGYZSTANINMAY2024

KRISTIEMOORE

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Abstract

Introduction

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Results and Findings

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Discussion