Spring 2012

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Cover courtesy of: http://www.boston.com/partners/greader/prfmkt/images/29fracking_photo1.jpg


Virginia Policy Review EDITOR’S NOTE Dear Reader, It is with great excitement and pleasure that I present the Spring 2012 Issue of the Virginia Policy Review. Yet again, the publishing of our journal marks another milestone in the history of our school and this very publication. In mid-April the Virginia Policy Review hosted its very first Policy Forum. The purpose of this forum was for students to organize a day-long event with speakers from different aspects of a policy area of interest. This year’s topic was energy policy. We kicked off the event with an overview of the current energy policy arena from former deputy-energy secretary Linda Stuntz followed by an impassioned and informative debate about Uranium mining in Virginia from two advocates: Cale Jaffe of the Southern Environmental Law Center and Patrick Wales from Virginia Uranium, Inc. Next, we had Chad Boyer, a congressional fellow working on nuclear energy appropriations, talk about his experience working with nuclear energy followed by a discussion about unconventional oil from Deborah Gordon and a conversation about innovation and entrepreneurship from Mike Lenox from the Darden School of Business at the University of Virginia. These experts came from different disciplines and different areas of practice in the energy policy arena. Some were analysts, and others were advocates. At the Batten School, our vision is: “Policy is everywhere. Lead from anywhere.” Different academic fields have different policy perspectives. The purpose of events such as our policy forum and this publication is to bring together students and faculty from different academic disciplines and foster conversation about important policy issues that cross disciplines. We believe that this issue helps cover the wide range of topics that our students and faculty at the Batten School find most interesting. We hope that in years to come others will continue to step forward and contribute to our country’s most pressing policy questions either through written journal articles or presentations of research such as our forum. I am honored to have served as Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Policy Review for the 2011-2012 academic year, and I am excited to continue to follow its exciting history as a reader once again. Sincerely,

Borna Kazerooni Editor-in-Chief


Staff Acknowledgments: Editor-in-Chief:

Borna Kazerooni

Layout Manager: Business Manager: Publicity Manager:

Sarah Williamson Susan Sainz Vanessa Orco-Zerpa

Senior Editors:

Michael Karlik Anna Mohan Mackenzie Porter

Associate Editors:

Adelina Bryant Ammy George Vanessa Orco-Zerpa Melissa Rickman Susan Sainz Melina Schoppa Evan Vahouny

We welcome your thoughts. Please forward any comments, questions, or concerns to virginiapolicyreview@gmail.com or visit us online at www.virginiapolicyreview.com.


VOLUME V, ISSUE 2 SPRING 2012

Virginia Policy Review

CONTENTS Faculty Feature:

Fast Forward: Planning for 6 Alternative Foreign Policy Futures Gerald Warburg & Jeff Bergner Policy & Research

An Incentive to Stay: Incentives 12 & Human Rights in the Health Worker Migration Debate O. Darlene Nnanyelugoh Tipping Points for U.S. 24 Involvement in Arab National Uprisings Lilly Frost Hydraulic Fracturing: Problems 32 & Policy Solutions Cristina Mestre Reinventing the Power Grid for the Twenty-First Century: 53 Emerging Technologies Patrick Mayfield Opinion Cost-Benefit Analysis: Not the 60 Best Approach to Environmental Policy Making Jean Paul Martinod-Sanchez 63 Acknowledgments


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FF

aculty eature

Fast Forward:

Planning for Alternative Foreign Policy Futures by Gerald Warburg & Jeff Bergner

T

his essay is an exercise in futurology—employing the type of Fast Forward controls we take for granted in our TiVo’s and CD players, but which our national government does not do well. Even though the intelligence community publishes a forward-looking report every four years to identify the most significant long-term national security challenges, these exercises in policy planning are striking for how often they fail to predict how rapidly and how fundamentally radical change will occur in the international arena. Furthermore, they often fail to gain the attention of officials, the media, and the public, and therefore have strikingly limited impact on policymaking.

bring a straight continuation of present trends. Here is where inbuilt bureaucratic tendencies toward caution create one of the nation’s greatest sources of vulnerability.

Predictions made by U.S. policymakers today need to be far more imaginative than in even the recent past. Unlikely scenarios should be considered; no major assumptions should go untested. Change, as Heraclitus argued, is indeed a constant. The turbulent contemporary international scene demonstrates above all that the future is unlikely to

A few scenarios suffice to illustrate the urgency of advance planning to secure national interests:

Predicting the future is, of course, difficult. But one thing is certain: doing so through the hopeful lens of one’s own political ideology is a sure source of error. The two of us have engaged in policymaking combat with one another for decades, representing different parties and divergent philosophies about the proper role of national government. We did so under an earlier mindset reflecting a now-quaint notion: the idea that bipartisan cooperation is not treasonous—and can The pace of change has increased dramatically as actually advance the national interest. This is the globalization accelerates virtually all trends. Presi- spirit of the current essay, which rejects ideological dent Obama has dealt with an In Box as full of pre-commitments. international crises as any recent president. The stock market collapse, a massive oil spill, a tsuna- In foreign policy especially, thinking about the mi-driven nuclear meltdown, the collapse of po- “what ifs” should be as basic as packing a flashlight litical regimes across the Arab world, the rise of a and spare tire before setting off for vacation in the nuclear Iran, and three wars in Iraq, Libya, and family van. With foresight, crises can turn from Afghanistan/Pakistan—many of these events were problems to opportunities. unpredicted, but all urgently required the attenTurbulence Ahead tion of policymakers.

The collapse of China American policymakers and pundits alike are fixated on the rise of China. China’s annual eco-


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nomic growth rate of roughly 10% has continued for more than a decade, propelling China’s economy to number two worldwide, on a path soon to pass the U.S. The only question, pundits suggest, is not whether—but when—the century of China’s worldwide supremacy will begin.

of protection against environmental degradation, raising costs and making products less competitive.

China also suffers from a severe shortage of domestic energy. With the world moving away from nuclear energy in the wake of Japan’s disaster, oil, What if this scenario is wrong? What if U.S.-PRC gas and coal costs will continue to rise. China will conflicts arise not from China’s strength, but from not be able to insulate itself from this reality. This China’s decline? What would be the implications will further dampen China’s prospects for rapid for American policymakers? economic growth. The PRC’s growing influence has been built upon its extraordinary economic growth. In contrast to the Soviet experience, Chinese leaders got it right; they chose to move away from a rigid Marxist economic model. Chinese leaders learned from the Russian experience: they chose to liberalize the economy, but to retain strict political controls. But what if, over a longer timeframe, economic liberalism does indeed create social forces destined to undermine China’s political authoritarianism?

Finally, the demographic reality of China’s rapidly aging population will also jeopardize China’s economic growth. What will happen if and when China’s economic growth turns negative? Chinese economic growth has fueled a massive influx of workers into its cities, especially along the coast. These cities will be the source of enormous social and political instability when economic growth stalls, and the situation in the countryside is hardly better. The countryside will not be a political power base upon which the Chinese leadership Here are some reasons to think so. China’s lead- can build when it responds to the social turmoil of ers have purchased temporary political stability under-employed and unemployed Chinese urban with hyper-growth and a sharply rising standard workers. of living. But China faces substantial threats to its continued rapid economic growth. In the com- Economic decline and recession is tough to maning years, China will inevitably need to move into age, even in societies which operate through the higher-value products. Managing this transition, consent of the governed. It is extremely difficult with all its attendant social costs, will be very dif- in one party states which do not have the safety ficult for a one-party authoritarian system. valve of periodic elections. Repression, fueled by economic dissatisfaction, can produce further China’s rapid economic growth also has occurred economic decline, setting up a vicious downward unevenly. Some regions of China have grown rap- cycle. idly; others hardly at all. High-growth pockets have fueled extraordinary price increases in the The result of all this might simply be a China housing market in cities along the coast—which which struggles to regain its footing, or it might have all the ominous characteristics of a bubble be a more cataclysmic shift. In any event, the waiting to pop. This reality is disguised by the impact of chaos in China on the United States will opaque Chinese banking system, which is itself at be substantial. Stalling Chinese growth will transrisk from this real estate bubble. late into economic decline around the globe. As Beijing struggles to maintain control, Chinese auThe Chinese environment is also a disaster. Citi- thorities are likely to see less use for the world syszen pressure will grow for the Chinese government tem. A weakened China will turn inward, calling to address health crises and to provide a minimum in foreign reserves to provide economic benefits to


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a restive domestic population. Beijing will likely a stretch to conceive such forces might align with try once more to rally support by fueling national- terrorist groups? Surely, the U. S. would intervene ist sentiment. if this came to pass; a Predator-drone campaign would be one likely result. Such a military incurAll of the problems which are often associated with sion would fuel Mexican nationalist sentiments a rising China—declining American growth, Bei- and jeopardize already strained U.S.-Mexico ties. jing calling in U. S. IOUs, and Chinese national- In addition, the collapse of authority in Mexico ist threats to Taiwan and its neighbors—are more would intensify emigration pressures and require likely to result from a weakened China than from urgent, high priority attention. a growing China. Are U.S. policymakers ready? BRICs on steroids Mexico becomes a failed state The rising economic powers in what we used to Another given is that the U.S. will continue to be call the “Third World” grow less tolerant daily of blessed with good neighbors offering political sta- international financial institutions run by Washbility, attractive markets and inexpensive labor, not ington and Brussels. The rise of the so called to mention cheaper consumer and manufactured “BRICS”—Brazil, India, South Africa, Indonesia, goods. U.S. policymakers take stability and friend- Russia and other emerging economic powers—is ship on our borders for granted, an optimism that inevitable, yet could markedly accelerate. Conhas freed U.S. military forces for extensive forward sider how rapidly the Soviet Union went under, deployments elsewhere overseas. or how quickly the power of Chinese bond buyers rose. The conventional wisdom is that while the What if these assumptions are no longer valid in BRICs will modify the international order at the the 21st century? What if our large neighbor to margins, they will still have common cause and the south becomes a fractured, failed state? Do common interests with post-industrial democraU.S. policymakers have a plan, other than a very cies. What if they don’t and they become “BRICs high 2,500 mile fence? What will chaos to the on steroids?” What if these emerging new ecosouth do to California agriculture, Texas markets, nomic powers use their muscle to settle old scores? and to democratizaThe hyper nationaltion movements in ism of the 1930s Central America? did not end well. One need only conThe drug wars have sider how Venezuealready corrupted thousands of Mexican federal la has used its petrodollar powers as a destabilizing officials. Virtual no-go zones exist in many large force—or how Yugoslav republics used their new cities. The short-term U.S. reaction has been freedom in the 1990s to slaughter each other—to stricter U.S. immigration policies. Yet the ongo- worry that the BRICs may not always promote ing assumption—that Mexican violence will affect stability. Are U.S. policymakers confident that a American interests only at the margins—may be Brazil won’t over-reach, or an Indonesia or Turkey wrong. will be able to retain their secular democracies?

“With foresight, crises can turn from problems to opportunities.”

A failed Mexican state would present challenging tasks for Washington, imperiling more than just cross-border trade. Lawless areas across the southern U. S. border already offer safe havens for drug runners and money laundering militias. Is it

There is every reason to believe that the world’s most populous democracy, India, will make extraordinary progress as a regional power. What will be India’s new course? Already the U. S. has chosen to reverse thirty years of nuclear nonprolif-


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eration policy to engage India and its market. The recent U. S. nuclear trade deal with India swept away a basic principle of the Nuclear Age—that responsible nations should not sell sensitive fuel cycle facilities to nations running nuclear weapons programs. What other policies will Washington reverse to build common cause with the rising BRICs? Will the BRICs use their growing consumer/producer powers to claim new security roles and UN Security Council seats? What will be the impact of this on the post-World War II international security system we have known? The assumption that the BRICs will be easily and seamlessly worked into the prevailing system of international ‘norms’ is comforting. It is also delusional. Cyber-attacks on the U.S Parallel to the growth of cyber power is the alarming growth of our vulnerability. Consider the economic havoc wrought on 9/11 by a handful of terrorists with box-cutters. The disruption of our economic system by a concerted IT attack would be enormous.

A sophisticated penetration of U.S. banking or communications systems would have devastating effects. The disruption of markets and interference with first responders’ communications could profoundly impact Washington’s capabilities in an international crisis. World War II began with cavalry defending against tanks; it ended with mushroom clouds. The specter of cyber-attacks should raise concerns about the possibility of a half-blind nuclear power thrashing about with conventional weapons in response to electronic warfare. In Sarajevo, a typo brought bombs down on a Chinese diplomatic facility. Could a wrong IP address spark a new global conflict? Given current American military superiority, a cyber-attack on America is an attractive option for our adversaries. Is enough being done to avert this danger, now? World food shortages

Global energy demand is growing rapidly, in a race with the long-term growth in proven reserves of non-renewable energy sources. Long-term rising energy costs will have direct and negative effects. But they will also be felt in increasing worldwide It has become routine for U.S. adversaries to hack food prices because a large share of consumer food into our sensitive communications links. There is costs come from energy inputs. Nearly 20% of at least one university in China where assaults on U.S. energy is used to provide food. U.S. communications infrastructure have become something of a rite of passage. The U.S. govern- Several factors promise an escalation of energy ment acknowledges cyber assaults that have com- prices. These include the shattering by the Fukupromised 24,000 sensitive U. S. sites. Even the shima disaster of an emerging consensus around technologically backward North Korean regime expanded use of nuclear energy; the inability of has mounted a successful cyber-attack against renewable fuels to fill the gap in the near-term; South Korea. The threat is real, the danger clear and the reluctance of developing nations to limit and present. reliance on oil, gas and coal as they transition to more advanced economies. There is resistance in As a counter, the Pentagon has established a cyber- some developing nations to leap-frog traditional security command. Recent developments have energy sources to embrace experiments in green prompted the U.S. declaration that a nationally energy, no matter how substantial their promise. sponsored cyber-attack against the U.S. might be Solar and wind technologies are often more popumet with an asymmetrical response. In plain Eng- lar among political elites than economic planners lish: “your hackers hurt us and we’ll bomb you.” hard-pressed to meet short-term demand projections. Moreover, as developing economies mature,


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their food consumption patterns will move toward higher protein, more highly processed and packaged food. These are exactly the foods that require the most energy to bring to market. Rising energy prices will produce many impacts across economies, virtually all of them negative. None will be more negative or more far-reaching than worldwide food shortages and the competition to assure food security. Are U.S. policy planners ready for this? A Different Europe What if the Europe of the future changes in ways so radical as to make it barely recognizable? What if the Europe we have known since the end of World War II and the creation of NATO is dying before our eyes? Could this happen, and how? Demographers project the European population to decline to roughly 600 million, a 20% reduction. This will occur not a century from now, but in the next 40 years. A rapidly declining European population will create serious economic problems. Economic demand may decline precipitously, causing Europe to re-double its efforts to export its way to health. There may also be a much smaller European market for American imports. Moreover, Europe’s already unsustainable social welfare programs may go further into the red, forcing deep reductions. Today’s problems with Greek (and Italian and Spanish) debt will look like child’s play. Economic and social dislocation will put grave pressure on the European Union itself, which has not yet been seriously tested, and which does not enjoy the underlying loyalty of the European populace to sustain it. Another factor will intervene. Demographers’ estimates of 600 million Europeans in 2050 include continued immigration to the European continent. Virtually all of those immigrants will come from poverty-stricken populations in North Africa and the Middle East. Europe’s relatively poor predominantly Muslim immigrants are the only

cohort that will continue to grow in the coming years, both absolutely and as a share of the overall population. Europe has for decades shown little ability to integrate its minority populations into its mainstream. This failed assimilation may yield trends in European politics that are less than congenial to American interests. Europe may increasingly align itself on foreign policy matters in ways that are fundamentally at odds with the interests and ideals of the U.S. What does all this mean for American policymakers? A Europe once again set against itself, inevitably drawing American forces back to the continent? Declining European demand and declining trade causing reciprocal declines in the American economy? An end to the post-World War II political, economic and trading system? A dissolving European Union, sunk in economic turmoil and scarred by political, racial and religious infighting, would be a very serious departure from the postWorld War II norm. Are we prepared for this? Preparing for the Future Government planners intent upon securing U.S. interests must think far beyond current realities and current trends in order to anticipate the unforeseen. Based on simple extrapolation, we could not have predicted even two decades ago the world in which we live today. Significant “breaks” in current trends frequently occur in international relations. We must do a far better job of incorporating thinking about such breaks into our planning process if our national interests are to be advanced effectively. In addition, we must also foster flexibility in our policy responses. Once upon a time, both the U. S. and the Soviet Union had five year budget plans. U.S. policymakers had the good sense generally to ignore ours, while Soviet leaders clung madly to theirs until the end, rigidly executing their plans regardless of a world changing around


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them. By contrast, the U.S. celebrates change, incorporating new information into our decisionmaking processes. Our strength in the future, as in the past, derives from our pluralism, our openness and our flexibility. We are a nation with diverse inputs, as opposed to a command economy which shapes its policies around ideological suppositions about the future. Our continuing challenge is to reject rigid ideologies that limit creative planning and flexible policy implementation. Liberals and conservatives alike claim the great American thinker, Thomas Jefferson, as their own. We would do well to recall how this antiideologue responded when his personal preference for less government and limited executive authority encountered the once-in-a-lifetime possibility of doubling the size and resources of the young nation—without bloodshed—with the Louisiana Purchase. He seized the future, acting boldly to advance interests which knew no party. In the years ahead, we should too.

Professor Gerald Warburg is Assistant Dean at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He previously served as a senior legislative assistant to members of the U.S. House and Senate (Democratic) leadership and has authored several works on U.S. national security interests, including Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle Between Congress and the President Over Foreign Policymaking (Harper & Row, 1990). Dr. Jeff Bergner is visiting professor at Christopher Newport University. He previously served as (Republican) Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as Assistant Secretary of State. He is the co-author with Dr. Lisa Spiller of the recently published Branding the Candidate: Marketing Strategies to Win Your Vote (Praeger, 2011).


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An Incentive to Stay: Incentives & Human Rights in the Health Worker Migration Debate by O. Darlene Nnanyelugoh Abstract International health worker migration from rural to urban areas and from low- and middle-income nations to high-income nations is an issue that compounds inadequate access to health services for the most vulnerable individuals. But while the primary focus of arguments on the topic tends to be on the human right of patients to medical care, the fundamental human rights of health personnel to tenets such as adequate remuneration and freedom of movement are equally important. This paper explores the use of financial incentives such as increased pay, tax subsidies, and reduced costs of sending remittances through formal channels, as well as incentives that are not directly financial in nature, such as increased training opportunities, subsidized housing and transportation in rural areas, and reduced workplace violence and occupational hazards, as methods of building the health workforce and reducing migration. Finally, it contends that protecting the rights of health workers from manipulative practices by international recruiting agencies is essential. A combination of these activities may lead to the critical goal of reducing health workforce migration to the benefit of patients, while still respecting the human rights of health workers. Introduction Each year thousands of health professionals in resource-limited countries leave their country of origin in order to seek better opportunities abroad. This loss of medical personnel is a dire problem in a number of countries, as many health professionals are exiting from regions that have some of the greatest need. For instance the World Health Organization (WHO) designated 36 of the countries

in sub-Saharan Africa as having critical shortages of health personnel in 2006,1 yet countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa have high rates of physician and nurse exits.2 The reasons for the departure of health professionals from their homecountries are often referred to as “push” factors while the opportunities that await them in highincome nations abroad are referred to as “pull” factors. “Push” factors include concerns about a lack of promotion prospects, poor management, heavy workload, lack of facilities, a declining health service, poor living conditions, and high levels of violence, while “pull” factors include the possibility of better pay, gaining more experience, and a safer environment.3 Because low- and middle-income nations are losing their highly skilled and valuable workers to high-income nations, this phenomenon of heath workforce migration is colloquially referred to as the “brain drain.” While medicine is not the only field affected by this global migration, workforce migration in the medical field has particularly serious effects on the health and well-being of citizens. In Ghana, there are only 6.2 physicians per 100,000 individuals, with approximately 1,210 physicians practicing in the country, yet there are an estimated 478 Ghanaian-trained physicians practicing in the United States.4 In South Africa approximately 37% of the home-country health workforce, or 12,136 of the physicians who were trained there, have left the country in order to work abroad,5 leaving the 5.7 million South Africans living with HIV/AIDS with a shortage of health professionals to care for them.6 While state and non-governmental organizations can provide health facilities, equipment, and essential medicines, patients suffer when there is not adequate staffing of health personnel. Not only do low- and middle-income countries


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lose the health professionals themselves when they migrate, but they also lose the funds that they invested in training them. Africa loses an estimated $184,000 per health professional that migrates abroad after finishing medical school.7 A central question in addressing the problem of health workforce migration is then whether physicians and nurses have an obligation to treat individuals in their home-countries.8 Physicians in particular take an oath to treat patients, but whether they have a special moral obligation to the patients in their home-countries is a source of contention. Some may argue that despite there being a greater need for trained health professionals in low- and middle-income countries, physicians and nurses from those countries are no more obligated to treat patients there than are the physicians practicing in the high-income nations to which they migrate. On the contrary, others insist that they do in fact have a special obligation to help those in their home-countries, particularly when their medical education has been funded by the federal government. This discussion concerning obligations to assist others then leads directly into questions regarding human rights.

on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) which protect a right to medical care for racial and ethnic minorities, women, and children respectively.10 Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also protects a right to health and medical care when it states that “…everyone [has the right] to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”11 The right to medical care for patients is the driving force behind the great concern for an adequate supply of medical professionals in low- and middle-income countries.

However, in addition to the rights of individuals to the highest attainable standard of health, the ICESCR and UDHR also protect rights to employment, commensurate pay, physical integrity, and movement. Article 13 of the UDHR is critical to the discussion of health worker migration as it states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state;” and “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”12 This means that all individuals including physicians and nurses are free to leave Human rights are at the center of the health work- any country as they please. Policies that aim to force migration debate for two very important, yet physically restrict their ability to travel within or conflicting, reasons. The first is that all individuals across the borders of their country of origin would have a right to medical care. The right to medi- be in violation of their human rights. While pacal care is stipulated in Article 25 of the Universal tients have a right to health, and thus health-care Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which for which health personnel are needed, physicians states that “Everyone and nurses also has the right to a stanhave their own dard of living adequate “Through cooperation and use of incentives, set of rights.13 for the health and wellproviding necessary care to patients can being of himself and the rights then be achieved while still respecting the From of his family, includdelineated in the human rights of physicians and nurses.” basic internationing… medical care and necessary social servical human rights es.”9 All major human documents, it rights declarations and treaties support this right can be inferred that health personnel have rights to health and medical care, including the Interna- to travel, to be employed and paid fair wages, and tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms have physical and occupational safety. Because of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention health personnel posses these rights, it is necessary


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that their governments give them fair and regular pay, protect them from workplace and political violence, and provide them with materials such as basic gloves and prophylactics to prevent infections with viruses like HIV, to which they may be exposed on the job. When health professionals are unable to have these rights secured to them in their home-countries, they may decide to use their right of movement to travel from rural to urban areas and even from their home-country to a high-income country. Numerous countries have undertaken a variety of policies which aim to reduce the migration of skilled health professionals and increase the health workforce. The policies range from requirements to practice medicine within the country for a designated number of years after medical school to training people from rural areas, from creating recruitment guidelines for high-income countries to creating financial incentives for health workers to remain in or return to their home-countries. In protecting and promoting human rights, policies that protect health professionals from abuses by recruiting companies are also vital. Financial and non-financial incentives are arguably the best way to reduce health worker migration and build the health workforce because they simultaneously encourage individuals to return to their homecountries or move from urban to rural areas while respecting their human rights. Rather than restricting the movement of health professionals, or punishing them for migrating, financial and non-financial incentives offer them motivation and rewards to not migrate or to return to their home-countries. Incentives may also encourage new individuals to choose to enter the health workforce, and encourage former health personnel who are now employed in other fields to return to medicine. Financial incentives include increased pay, pensions, and tax subsidies, while examples of non-financial incentives include increased training opportunities, agreeing on the number of years that will be spent in a rural placement (as opposed to having the place-

ment be indefinite), support and feedback regarding work-performance, and subsidized housing and transportation in rural areas.14 Both resource-limited and resource-rich nations can use financial and non-financial incentives to build their health workforce in rural areas. This increase in the health workforce may in turn lead to a reduced demand for physicians and nurses, in high-income nations such as the U.S. where there is also a health worker shortage and a full 23.5% of physicians are foreign-trained.15 Successful approaches to reducing the migration of the health workforce must involve cooperation on the part of home-countries to address “push” factors, highincome countries to address “pull” factors, and intergovernmental organizations that can assist in monitoring the progress. Through this cooperation and use of incentives, providing necessary care to patients can then be achieved while still respecting the human rights of physicians and nurses. Existing & Proposed Policies on Building & Retaining Health Workforce Each year the World Health Organization’s World Health Report has a different theme, in 2006 it was “Working Together for Health,” stressing the importance of building health workforce and collaboration in working toward achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The chapter of the report devoted to managing exits from the health workforce has served as a guide for some of the efforts that have been made to reduce the migration health professionals. In this section, the reader will see that policies can generally be placed into one of two categories, those that require action on the part of the low- and middleincome nations that “push” health professionals to leave, and those that require action on the part of receiving nations that “pull” them in. As stated above, push factors can be attributed to many things including but not limited to a lack of sufficient employment, inadequate pay, poor working conditions, inadequate infrastructure and tech-


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nology, lower social status and recognition, and repressive governments, while pull factors may include a better standard of living and practice conditions.16 Using a human rights framework to view these policies is helpful in achieving the goal of increasing the supply of health professionals in rural areas, while still upholding the rights of the health personnel. Addressing “Push” Factors in Sending Countries Low wages and irregular pay are central factors that compel many health professionals to leave their country of origin. When salaries are not only low, but paychecks also arrive months late, physicians and nurses may be forced to consider leaving the public sector or even the country altogether. For the neediest patients, the public sector is most often more affordable and accessible than the private sector. But as the non-governmental group Physicians for Human Rights points out, nurses in Zimbabwe can increase their salary by up to 40% immediately upon transferring from the public to the private sector.17 As a result, physicians and nurses may be compelled to leave the public sector, and thus those patients who have the greatest need. Leaving the public sector may not only be a desire, but a true necessity in order to support one’s self and family. One private physician in Kenya felt that he was forced to leave the public sector as the pay was not enough to send all of his children to school.18 Article 23 of the UDHR states that, “Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.”19 If the federal government of a country is incapable of providing an adequate salary with regular payments to individuals, the health personnel may then be justified in leaving the public sector or even the country in order to secure remuneration that will enable them to care for themselves and their loved ones. There are numerous reasons why a government may be incapable of providing salaries that sup-

port an adequate standard of living. It may be that there are truly not enough funds available to allocate toward the health sector, or it may be that public officials find greater importance in using funding for maintaining physical building structures, equipment, and medication than they do on salaries. A lack of sufficient pay could also be attributed to other causes as well, including a general lack of public investment on the part of the government due to embezzlement or other forms of misallocation of funds. Ameliorating government operations and transparency is beyond the scope of this argument, but the primary point is that the salaries of physicians and nurses must not be neglected. In a 2005 survey of physicians from five low- and middle-income countries (Colombia, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines), 83.5% of participants believed that increasing pay would reduce migration, and 57.6% believed that there were enough resources in their countries to do so.20 It is simply a matter of whether governments are willing to put funds toward it and make it a priority. Action must be taken to better remunerate physicians and nurses for the work that they do, as this would reduce migration. The question is simply how to do so, when in many low- and middle-income countries national health budgets are already stretched thin. One proposed solution to helping low-and middle-income countries increase the pay of health workers has been to have high-income countries compensate resource-limited nations for the health workers that immigrate across their borders.21 The presumption is that thereafter the states would be able to use those funds to increase pay and strengthen their health systems. This policy, first proposed in the 1970s, has not come into fruition partly because the countries to which the workers migrate state that they do not know how long the workers will stay, and also that many of the workers come by their own accord.22 Perhaps there could be a bilateral agreement on a sum that would be given to the home-countries each year, or arguably less favorably, a sum might be given per individual who has migrated, but this could wade


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into the dangerous area of commodifying the exchange of individuals. The WHO has suggested that direct compensation paid by host countries to source countries in the form of a tax or proportion of salary paid per health worker recruited,23 but this does not account for those workers who are not directly recruited. While there is no formal compensation from wealthy countries to poorer countries, there are exchange programs of health professionals, such as a program led by the Rural Doctors Association of Southern Africa in South Africa.24 Donor contribution to the pay of nurses and physicians is another proposed solution that is also riddled with problems.25 Donors tend to focus on other aspects of medicine such as providing essential medicines and equipment for patients, and may not be interested in contributing to increasing the pay of health professionals. The sustainability of such a proposal would also need to be evaluated, as it seems unwise to increase salaries on the premise that the donor funds will continue to be available in the future. Resting the increase in pay on the generosity of donors who may reduce funding at any time might ultimately lead to instability in the health professions. It is certain that increasing pay is a necessary step toward reducing health worker migration and providing them with an adequate standard of living, but there are problems still yet in deciding how to go about doing so, such as the debate over health system structuring. In the case of Zambia, the federal government attempted to decentralize the health system so that physicians and nurses would no longer be part of the civil service, and in doing so, fiscal restraints that limited how much they could be paid would be removed.26 But individuals protested this action because of a desire not to lose their pensions.27 Despite decentralization of the public health system being controversial in some countries such as Zambia, in Uganda such an approach has led to the lessening of health worker migration.28

States must decide between many options in order to satisfy their specific health workers, but as in the case of Uganda, decentralization is beneficial in some cases. Because rural-urban migration is an even greater problem in many African countries than is international migration, a focus on regional development through decentralization may be ideal.29 With centralized health systems there may be an emphasis on state hospitals that are located in more urban areas, and less of a focus on smaller health posts in rural areas. Focusing on regional development will lead to an increase in the numbers of health workers in rural areas and will reduce opportunities for misallocation of financial resources by diverting the focus away from the central government30. In addition to increasing the rate and regularity of pay, offering tax subsidies is another form of financial incentive that may encourage some health workers to stay in or return to their home country. One country that has had success with the use of tax subsidies is the Philippines, where physicians who return to the country are given loans for business capital at preferred rates, subsidized academic scholarships, tax-free investment opportunities, tax-free purchases for one year, and networking opportunities.31 As a result of these policies and agreements with receiving countries, the Philippines has managed to find somewhat of a balance between building its domestic workforce, training surplus health workers who will go aboard to work, and benefitting from the remittances of those health personnel who go abroad and stay abroad. Of those health personnel who migrate abroad, many send remittances back to their homecountries. However, these remittances are most often sent via informal means such as to family and friends using money transfer companies. Although remittances to low- and middle-income countries can be quite large (10% of GDP in the Philippines in 2004) if they are not sent via formal channels,32 then they do not directly aid the health sector of the home-countries to which mi-


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grated health workers are sending funds. While remittances might not directly affect the health sector, policies that make it easier or beneficial to send remittances by formal means may result in growth in the financial sectors of the economies of low- and middle-income countries. The increased wealth of the state could then be reinvested in the health sector. Polices that may make it easier to send remittances formally include expanding banking networks, allowing domestic banks in the high-income countries to operate in the low- and middle-income countries, and reducing fees associated with sending the remittances.33 As in the case of the Philippines, those policies that provide financial incentives such as tax subsidies and make it easier to send remittances formally, may encourage some migrated health personnel to return to their country of origin and develop the public health system. Financial incentives have been explained at length, but incentives that are not directly financial in nature are also quite useful, especially given the national budget constraints of most low- and middle-income countries. Non-financial incentives can encourage physicians and nurses not to migrate in much the same way as financial incentives do, but in a more affordable manner for the government. It has been suggested that providing subsidized housing and transportation to health workers in rural areas may encourage them to work and remain there, and that non-financial incentives such as these can be particularly helpful when it is not possible to use strictly financial incentives such as raising pay.34 While the lifestyle in the community may not necessarily be what the health worker desires, there is still the incentive of reduced housing costs and transportation costs, thereby potentially reducing migration rates. It is important to acknowledge that even when physicians and nurses reside in the area where they work, they may still not show up to work regularly, but the benefit to reducing migration may ultimately outweigh this. One study conducted in

Bangladesh in 2004 found that 36% of physicians who lived just outside of the town where they worked did not show up for work when they were supposed to, as compared to 13% of physicians who did live in the town.35 If physicians are absent for a half-day or full-day when they are scheduled to work, it limits the ability of patients to receive the care they need. However, when health workers are given the incentive of subsidized housing and transportation, they may be more likely to live in the town where they work, thus reducing rates of absenteeism and migration. While it is impossible for low- and middle-income countries to increase pay to the amount aid in high-income countries, non-financial incentives such as providing housing and transportation may help to reduce absenteeism and prevent the migration of physicians and nurses from rural to urban areas. Another approach to reducing migration is offering free training to individuals in exchange for working a certain number of years after graduation. The United States is one high-income country that uses this model, but it may be applicable to low- and middle-income countries as well. The U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps attempts to fill the national need for primary care health providers by paying the loans of physicians, nurses, and other health workers who go into the field of primary care. In exchange for each year of education paid for by the federal government, individuals then work one year in an area where there is a dearth of health personnel, usually rural areas. The incentive to have one’s medical education paid for may encourage some individuals to enter the medical field and receive training that fulfills the immediate need for primary care providers. The program has been praised, but at same time it has been noted that participants tend to stay in their areas of placement for no longer than the time that is required of them.36 Still, the elective program seems to be more successful than a relatively young mandatory program in South Africa that is similar in that there is a rural placement of paid community service physicians.


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In contrast to the U.S. program which is one that individuals enter by their own volition, South Africa requires all medical school graduates to complete one year of paid community service.37 The initiative can be described as an attempt to both give individuals additional training and increase access to health services for all citizens of the country. The program began in 1998, and in 2007 the requirement expanded to two years of paid community service.38 As of 2008, the plan was for nurses to also be required to conduct community service beginning in 2009.39 The expansion of the community service requirement was met with resistance by physicians, whose sentiment was that it was not a way for them to gain more training as the Department of Health had stated, but instead a way for the government to forcibly fill needs in rural areas. Since the installation of the mandatory community service commitment, South Africa has seen its number of individuals entering medical school decline nearly every year,40 and the number of migrants leaving the country is thought to have increased as some individuals leave the country to evade the requirement.41 While rural communities are benefitting from the program, urban placements fill up quickly while many rural placements tend to remain unfilled even after the second round of selections.42 Based on an informal comparison of the two country approaches to reducing shortages in rural areas, it seems that the incentive of free medical training in exchange for working in medically underserved areas may be a more effective way in which to increase the health workforce in rural areas, than is a mandatory requirement to work in rural areas. Because training and schooling in many low-and middle-income countries may already be subsidized, a focus on incentives that involve training opportunities may be a good approach to building the health workforce and lowering migration rates. In addition to opportunities for training, other non-financial incentives that might reduce health worker migration include increased autonomy at

work, encouraging career development, flexible shift-work for nurses, and protecting physical integrity by reducing violence in the workplace and occupational safety hazards.43 Workplace violence can include violence or harassment from fellow co-workers, but most commonly refers to attacks or threats by patients and can be physical or psychological.44 A looser definition might also include civil or political violence (such as during a war) that spills over into the hospital. Steps must be taken so as to protect health workers from these dangers. In protecting the physical integrity of health personnel, they must also be protected from occupational safety hazards. Some health personnel may not want to practice in rural areas or in their home-countries due to a lack of basic supplies to prevent the transmission of disease. As such, protecting the physical integrity of physicians and nurses by providing adequate supplies is another non-financial incentive that may reduce the likelihood of their migration. Addressing “Push” Factors in Sending Countries The preceding section centered on actions that have been or should arguably be taken on the part of low- and middle-income countries in order to address the problem of physician and nurse migration, with a focus on the merits of financial and non-financial incentives. In addition to resourcelimited countries needing to address “push” factors however, “pull” factors must also be addressed by receiving countries. While the human rights of health workers are at risk of being violated due to maltreatment in home-countries, the human rights of health workers are also at risk of being violated by deceitful or manipulative recruiting companies abroad. Many of the high-income countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development are currently struggling with their own shortages of health personnel. As a result, many of the countries either have recruiting agencies that operate in the private sector, have formal ex-


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change programs, or administer visas for health professionals to come to their countries and work. In the U.S., foreign-trained health professionals are said to be filling a great need in inner-cities,45 but there is still a shortage of health professionals in rural areas. When health workers migrate to high-income countries, some go on their own while others are recruited. Those who are recruited may face human rights abuses by the companies that have recruited them. Among the abuses that recruited health personnel face are companies rescinding on agreements regarding pay, charging high fees which then force the health personnel to take out large loans, and controlling health personnel through housing and transportation arrangements.46 As the plight of one group of nurses who migrated to the UK from Asia was described: When the nurses arrived in the UK they were given tenancy agreements to sign. They had not yet seen their accommodation, but signed.…After two months the nurses found that they were unable to pay for the accommodation and give themselves an adequate diet. They approached their nursing manager for advice, but were told that this was a matter that needed to be arranged directly with their accommodation agent and was not something in which their employer could intervene.… They were…called in to a meeting in which both their manager and their recruiter/ landlord were present. They were informed by their manager that if they did not pay the full house rental they would have proven themselves “not trustworthy” and that the [British National Health Service] NHS Trust therefore would not support their application to register to practice nursing in the UK. Forms had been prepared authorizing the deduction of their rent from their salaries, and they were told that if they did not sign, they would not be registered: “We were caught between the fear of being sent home and the fear of not paying back the debt, when the interest is getting higher all

the time”. The nurses signed the authorization….So, while the nurses’ average net salary was £805 exclusive of tax, the amount they received, after deductions of £305 for rent and £302 for loan repayment) was £198, or £46 a week, from which of course they also had to pay the loans incurred for video interviewing and visas. [One nurse] described how he lived on £5 worth of food in a week, having an apple for breakfast, a snack in the staff canteen for lunch, and rice for dinner. He felt that he was relatively fortunate because he lived close enough to the hospital to walk.47 From the experience of these nurses, one can clearly see that their rights to free choice of employment and remuneration sufficient for a life of human dignity (protected under Article 25 of the UDHR) were being violated. Because they needed to work in order to pay off loans that they had taken out in order to make the journey, they were not able to leave their jobs. The nurses were left with barely enough money to eat after they had been manipulated into arranging accommodation with their recruiter/landlord. In a survey, two-thirds of foreign-trained nurses in the UK stated that they had used a recruiting agency.48 As such, the UK has commendably taken active steps to prevent such abuses from occurring by prohibiting NHS hospitals from recruiting from low- and middleincome countries.49 However, private hospitals may still recruit from these countries.50 Because the ultimate goal of many workers is to work for the public sector, despite these protections, they are still susceptible to the manipulative practices of certain recruiting agencies; as seen in the case of the group of nurses who were told that if they did not pay for their accommodations they would not be able to work for the NHS. In an attempt to prevent such clear human rights violations, the World Health Organization has released guidelines on the ethical recruitment of health personnel. The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of


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Health Personnel was released in 2010 and may be an indication that some members of the international community are taking greater notice of the human rights abuses that migrating health personnel face not only in their home-countries, but also in the wealthy countries to which they are migrating. Article 3 of the Code states that “Member states should facilitate circular migration of health personnel, so that skills can be achieved to the benefit of both source and destination countries,” while also stating that “nothing in this Code should be interpreted as limiting the freedom of health personnel, in accordance with applicable laws, to migrate to countries that wish to admit and employ them.”51

undertaken or proposed in order to solve the issues associated with health worker migration. This section reviews these observations and makes suggestions for policies that source countries, receiving countries, and the international community might follow:

In review of the matters discussed in the paper thus far, several themes have appeared in policies

2. Offering incentives that are not directly financial in nature such as training opportunities, subsidized

1. Offering financial incentives such as increased pay, tax subsidies, and reduced costs of sending remittances formally will help lessen international health worker migration and build health systems.

Low wages and irregular payments are a principal reason why health workers in low- and middleincome countries migrate to high-income countries. Low- and middle-income countries should From these continue to maintain “Low wages and irregular payments are a specific statethe physical structures principal reason why health workers in low- of buildings and proments and the document as and middle-income countries migrate to high- vide necessary supplies a whole, it apand medication. Howincome countries.” pears that the ever, there should also be WHO is calling for the freedoms of employment an increased priority in ensuring that physicians and movement of health professionals to be ob- and nurses receive adequate pay is an even greater served, while urging recruiting countries to pro- priority. Their pay should also be sent at regular tect their human dignity and right to an adequate intervals. Due to financial constraints in these standard of living. Further, while migration is countries, governments may find it difficult to not being discouraged, it seems that the “circu- make room in their budgets for increased pay. As lar migration of health personnel” might entail such, international donors should continue to aid exchange programs such as that in South Africa low- and middle-income countries in developing where health workers in low- and middle-income their health systems. As seen in the Philippines, countries exchange places with health workers in tax subsidies on purchases for a designated period high-income countries in order to develop new of time might encourage migrated health personskills before returning to their home-countries. nel to return to their home countries. For those While low- and middle-income countries should health personnel who remain abroad, facilitating protect the human rights of health workers by pro- the less costly transmission of remissions through viding sufficient remuneration and using financial formal channels may encourage their use, and in and non-financial incentives, receiving countries doing so build the economies of source countries and the international community should also pro- in a way that would allow for state investment in tect their human rights by monitoring recruiting the public health system. Finally, decentralization practices and encouraging exchange programs. of the health system may reduce opportunities for the misallocation of funds and encourage regional Observations and Suggestions development.


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housing and transportation, and reduced workplace violence and occupational hazards, may also lessen rural health worker shortages and international migration. Incentives such as training opportunities may reduce health worker migration, increase the number of individuals practicing in rural areas, and encourage more individuals to enter the health professions schools. As seen with the informal comparison programs in the United States and South Africa, whether elective or mandatory, health workers who are placed in rural areas tend to stay in those areas no longer than the time that is required of them. However elective programs where loans may be eliminated or students receive free schooling, may be more effective than mandatory requirements. South Africa’s mandatory paid community service requirement might in the interim be increasing the supply of health workers in rural areas, but could also be having adverse effects on the number of individuals entering the health professions schools and migrating abroad. In addition to training opportunities, subsidized housing and transportation, a reduction in workplace violence, protection from occupational hazards, and generally offering greater incentives for working in rural areas may also increase health workforce numbers in rural areas, reduce migration, and lower rates of absenteeism. 3. Incentives may reduce international health worker migration, but when health workers do migrate, their human rights should be protected against manipulative recruiting practices. The final recommendation that might be followed in order to reduce health worker migration involves receiving countries protecting the rights of health workers who have migrated from low- and middle-income countries. The actions of recruiting companies should be regulated by the federal government in receiving countries. While the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel is not international law, it is an important step toward

protecting the human rights of health workers. Members of the international community should work together in order to monitor the treatment of recruited health workers, and strive to protect their rights to free choice of employment and remuneration sufficient for a life of human dignity. Conclusion There are many policies that together may address the problem of a dearth of health personnel in rural areas and their migration from low- and middle-income countries to high-income countries. As demonstrated, offering financial and non-financial incentives gets to the root of the problem by addressing some of the “push” and “pull” factors that cause health workers to want to migrate from rural to urban areas and across state borders. While it may be tempting to place blame on low- and middle-income countries that “push” health workers away, or the high-income countries that “pull” them in—sometimes through direct recruiting—it is a more effective use of time to examine policies that may truly be successful in reducing migration and building the health workforce. While patients have an important and irrefutable human right to health and medical care, physicians and nurses also have rights to employment, remuneration that can sustain a decent standard of living, physical integrity, and movement. In order to achieve increasing the availability of health personnel in low- and middle-income countries, as well as rural communities globally, it is important that steps be taken to protect the human rights of health workers. Health personnel should be enabled to travel freely, but through the provision of adequate pay and regular pay, protection from workplace violence and occupational hazards, and other financial and non-financial incentives, health workers will be more likely to practice in rural areas of need and not migrate internationally. Therefore a combination of incentivized policies and international collaboration to protect human rights will help increase the health workforce


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and reduce the problem of domestic and global health workforce migration. Endnotes Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010). International migration of health workers: Improving international co-operation to address the global health workforce crisis. OECD Policy Briefs, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/1/44783473.pdf 2 Hagopian, A., Thompson, M. J., Fordyce, M., Johnson, K. E., & Hart, L. G. (2004). The migration of physicians from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States of America: Measures of the African brain drain. Human Resources for Health, 2(17). Retrieved from http://www.human-resources-health. com/content/2/1/17 3 World Health Organization [WHO]. (2006). Managing exits from the workforce. The World Health Report 2006, p. 96. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/whr/2006/06_ chap5_en.pdf 4 Hagopian, et al. 5 Ibid. 6 Republic of South Africa. (2010). Country progress report on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: 2010 report, p. 10. Retrieved from http://www.unaids.org/en/ dataanalysis/monitoringcountryprogress/2010progressrepo rtssubmittedbycountries/southafrica_2010_country_progress_report_en.pdf 7 Pang, T., Lansang, M. A., & Haines, A. (2002). Brain drain and health professionals: A global problem needs global solutions. British Medical Journal, 324, 499. Retrieved from http://www.bmj.com/content/324/7336/499. full 8 Zimmerman, J. (2008, March 13). Brain drains and blame games. The New York Times. Retrieved from http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/opinion/13iht-edzimmerman.1.11045986.html 9 United Nations General Assembly [UNGA]. (1948, December 10). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ index.shtml 10 Marks, S. P. (Ed.). (2006). Health and Human Rights: Basic International Documents. Cambridge, MA: FrancoisXavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Harvard University Press. 11 UNGA. (1966, December 16). International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Retrieved from http:// www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm 12 UNGA, 1948. 13 Mensah, K., Mackintosh, M., & Henry, L. (2005). The “skills drain” of health professionals from the developing world: A framework for policy formulation. London, UK: Medact, p. 6. Retrieved from http://www.medact.org/ article_health.php?articleID=337 14 Stilwell, B., Diallo, K., Zurn, P., Vujicic, M., Adams, O., 1

& Dal Poz, M. (2004). Migration of health-care workers from developing countries: Strategic approaches to its management. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 85, 595-600. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/bulletin/ volumes/82/8/595arabic.pdf 15 Astor, A., Akhtar, T., Matallana, M. A., Muthuswamy, V., Olowu, F. A., Tallo, V., Lie, R. K. (2005). Physician migration: Views from professionals in Colombia, Nigeria, India, Pakistan and the Philippines. Social Science & Medicine 61, 2492–2500. Retrieved from http://reidarlie.com/Documents/socscimed.pdf 16 Hagopian et al., 2004. 17 Physicians for Human Rights. (2004). An action plan to prevent brain drain: Building equitable health systems in Africa, a report by Physicians for Human Rights. Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, p. 37. Retrieved from https:// s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Africa-prevent-braindrain-report-2004.pdf 18 Ibid. 19 UNGA, 1948. 20 Astor et al., 2005 21 Connell, J., Zurn, P., Stilwell, B., Awases, M., & Braichet, J. (2007). Sub-Saharan Africa: Beyond the health worker migration crisis? Social Science & Medicine 64(9), 18761891. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953606006198#sec6.1. 22 Ibid. 23 World Health Organization. (2004). Recruitment of health workers from the developing world: A report by the secretariat, p. 3. Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/gb/ ebwha/pdf_files/EB114/B114_5-en.pdf 24 World Health Organization. (2004). Recruitment of health workers from the developing world: A report by the secretariat. Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/ pdf_files/EB114/B114_5-en.pdf 25 PHR, 2004, p. 38. 26 High Level Forum on the Health MDGs. (2004). Health workforce challenges: Lessons from country experiences (Abuja, Nigeria: High Level Forum on the Health MDGs, 2004). Retrieved from http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org/ Documents/HealthWorkforceChallenges-Final.pdf 27 Ibid. 28 Connell, 2007. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2005). Unlocking the human potential for public sector performance: World public sector report 2005. New York, NY: United Nations, p.43. Retrieved from http:// unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021616.pdf 32 Ibid, p. 42. 33 World Bank. (2006). Global economic prospects: Economic implications of remittances and migration 2006. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from http://www-wds. worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/


POLICY & RESEARCH 23 WDSP/IB/2005/11/14/000112742_20051114174928/additional/841401968_200510327112047.pdf 34 Stilwell et al., p. 598. 35 Chadhury, N., & Hammer, J. S. (2004). Ghost doctors: Absenteeism in rural Bangladeshi health facilities. World Bank Economic Review 18(3). Retrieved from http://wber. oxfordjournals.org/content/18/3/423.full.pdf+html 36 Reid, S. Community service for health professionals, p. 58. Retrieved from http://www.hst.org.za/uploads/files/ chapter8.pdf 37 Ibid., p. 136. 38 Department of Labour South Africa. (2008). The shortage of medical doctors in South Africa, p. 43. Retrieved from http://www.labour.gov.za/downloads/documents/researchdocuments/Medical%20Doctors_DoL_Report.pdf 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., pp. 43-4. 41 Reid, p. 138. 42 Ibid. 43 Connell et al. 44 Wiskow, C. (2003). Guidelines on workplace violence in the health sector: Comparison of major known national guidelines and strategies: United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, USA (OSHA and California). Geneva, Switzerland: Joint Programme on Workplace Violence in the Health Sector, pp. 7-8. Retrieved from http://www.who. int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/interpersonal/en/ WV_ComparisonGuidelines.pdf 45 Hagopian et al. 46 Anderson, B., & Rogaly, B. Forced labour and migration to the UK. Retrieved from http://www.tuc.org.uk/international/tuc-9317-f0.pdf 47 Ibid. 48 Buchan, J., Jobanputra, R., Gough, P., & Hutt, R. (2005). Internationally recruited nurses in London: Profile and implications for policy. London, UK: King’s Fund. Retrieved from http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/internationally.html 49 Code of practice. Nhsemployers.org. Retrieved from http:// www.nhsemployers.org/RecruitmentAndRetention/InternationalRecruitment/Code-of-Practice/Pages/Code-practiceinternational-recruitment.aspx#5 50 Africa’s health-care brain drain. (2004, August 13). The New York Times, p. 2. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes. com/2004/08/13/opinion/africa-s-health-care-brain-drain. html?src=pm 51 World Health Organization (2010). WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/ code_en.pdf

O. Darlene Nnanyelugoh is a fourth-year majoring in Foreign Affairs with a minor in Bioethics. She plans to earn a master’s degree in public health, and hopes to pursue a career in international development and global public health policy with a focus on women’s health.


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Tipping Points for U.S. Involvement in Arab National Uprisings by Lilly Frost Introduction The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia marked the beginning of the Arab Spring. Bouazizi was a 26-year-old vegetable street vendor who frequently had to bribe police to continue his work. On the morning of December 17, after a female police officer slapped him, spat on him, took his electronic weighing scales, and knocked over his cart claiming that he did not have a vending permit, Bouazizi decided he had encountered enough of this corruption and public humiliation. Angered, Bouazizi went to the governor’s office to voice his grievances. Receiving no response, he followed up on his threats to light himself on fire by dousing himself in gasoline and lighting a match.1 Many Middle East experts point to events that preceded Bouazizi’s self-immolation, including the Palestinian intifadas, as the primary precursors to the 2011 uprisings, but the self-immolation of Bouazizi stands as a clear trigger of the ensuing protests that continue today.2 Since December 2010, there have been protests in nearly every Arab country, from Morocco to Jordan and from Oman to Lebanon. In three of these countries, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, major protests have led to regime change.3 This widespread upheaval has been a source of both joy and concern for the United States. Even though democracy may prevail, protests can threaten the shared interests between the U.S. and incumbent Arab regimes. These conflicting attitudes in the United States have provoked unique American responses in each country. Understanding the American interests that affect the American response can help to elucidate questions of U.S. motives in intervention. This paper attempts to explain these different responses by assessing four revolutions—Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria—and discussing the

consistent tipping points for U.S. involvement based on these cases. Case Studies It is helpful to focus on four specific cases of Arab national uprisings from 2011, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, to develop a better understanding of why or why not the U.S. decided to intervene. Each case study involves an evaluation of the background, interested stakeholders, and actions taken by the U.S. to help determine an explanation of the U.S. response. The dictators of these four countries had maintained power for decades and were seemingly unconcerned with the welfare of their respective citizenries. These dictators often alienated the intellectual classes, provided limited job opportunities for young people, and responded violently to civic unrest. Each of these countries experienced popular, (at least initially) nonviolent, pro-democracy protests, but each received a different response from the U.S. in terms of financial, military, and diplomatic support. Egypt Egypt’s popular upheaval began on January 25, 2011 in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Citizens protested against the corrupt regime, police violence, and limited popular freedoms, as well as economic concerns over the rising cost of food and limited number of jobs. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruled for 30 years, claiming the longest reign in Egypt since Muhammad Ali Pasha who served as the Ottoman governor of Egypt and present-day Sudan for about 43 years.4 Mubarak well represented the dictatorial, imperial rulers that had plagued Egypt’s history for centuries. In addition to a historical sense of disenfranchisement, Egyptians also resented how difficult it had become to make a living. EgyEgyptians felt frus-


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trated with the regime for appearing like a puppet of American and Israeli interests.

proach to the revolution ended up delegitimizing the U.S. in the eyes of many Egyptians and angered pro-democracy and human rights groups who wanted the U.S. to take an active role in supporting protestors.

When the revolution began, a number of key stakeholders were especially concerned for the country’s fate. On the one hand, many leaders at the U.S. Department of State, pro-democracy The Egyptian protestors were predominantly Sunnon-governmental organizations, human rights ni Muslim and generally from the same sect. This activists, and Arab publics across the region were cohesion made the protestors a more viable force delighted by the and helped make initial successes of “Conflicting attitudes in the United States their demands innon-violent protests have provoked unique American responses creasingly difficult calling for a more for the Obama adin each country.” democratic governministration to igment. Conversely, nore. The fact that some of the leaders in the White House had res- the international community—particularly Westervations about abandoning support for America’s ern European leaders—was tuned into Egypt’s long-time ally, President Mubarak. These reserva- revolution in support of the protestors placed adtions stemmed not only from Mubarak’s help in ditional pressure on the U.S. to take a firm posithe 1991 Gulf War, in privatizing Egyptian mar- tion against Mubarak. Overall, these factors furkets, and in facilitating U.S. military operations ther complicated the White House’s position on against terrorists, but more importantly from Egypt and helped explain the U.S.’s eventual shift Mubarak’s stable and peaceful relationship with its in policy to support the protestors and the ousting neighbor Israel—a critical U.S. ally in the Middle of Mubarak. East. Before the U.S. could endorse protestors’ calls for democratic governance, it was impor- Bahrain tant to consider Israeli interests, including both those of the Israeli government and the American Bahrain’s uprisings began on February 14, 2011 Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), one of just as Egypt’s protests were winding down. Prothe most powerful lobbies in the United States. tests in Bahrain were mainly concerned with American businesses with economic interests in obtaining more political freedoms and human Egypt were also wary of political change in Egypt, rights, rather than threatening the ruling monparticularly because of Mubarak’s friendly posi- archy, which has led Bahrain since 1783 (though tion toward foreign direct investment, private en- King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa has only been in terprises, and open markets. power since 2002). Despite Shia Muslims making up the majority of Bahrain, the ruling family America’s interests were conflicting in Egypt be- is Sunni Muslim like most of the other rulers in cause, though the U.S. strives to support democ- the Persian Gulf. Bahrain prominently landed on racy and human rights around the globe, the U.S. the Western map when oil was discovered off its also prioritizes the safety and concerns of Israel. shores. This valuable resource as well as Bahrain’s These contradicting forces led President Obama strategic location drew the attention of the Britto take a weak, indecisive stance on the protests ish, who sent their army in the 1930s to take adinitially, calling on Mubarak to make modest po- vantage of these assets—oil and strategic military litical reforms in response to the protesters’ de- bases.5 Today, these resources remain important mands. President Obama did not shift this stance to the United States and affect its policies toward until it became apparent that the political pres- Bahrain. Bahrain’s Sunni Muslim ruling family is sures on the ground in Egypt prevented Mubarak also important to one of the U.S.’s leading Arab from remaining in power. The U.S.’s hesitant ap- allies, Saudi Arabia, which would not want to see


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a democratic majority of Shia Muslims heading a government on its border. This background helps to draw out the main stakeholders involved in determining the U.S. response to Bahraini protestors. First, the U.S. has military interests in Bahrain as the Al-Khalifa regime permits the U.S. to station its Fifth Naval Fleet in the country. This strategic position allows the U.S. to patrol the Persian Gulf and surrounding waters, control shipping lanes to Iran and suspected terrorist groups in the region, monitor the increasing problems with pirates on the Horn of Africa, and provide over-flight clearances for aircraft engaged in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense, fearing the installation of an anti-American regime, did not want the administration to support protestors in Bahrain. Second, Saudi Arabia (along with other Gulf leaders) remains extremely concerned with the idea of Shia Muslims taking over the region. This fear has escalated since a Shia majority replaced Saddam Hussein’s Sunni Ba’ath Party in nearby Iraq, eliminating the Sunni barrier between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Third, business and oil interests in Bahrain that lose money during social unrest had an interest in maintaining a stable status quo. Conversely, as with Egypt, leaders at the State Department along with pro-democracy and human rights groups want the U.S. to respond consistently to the peaceful protests of citizens around the world. Human rights groups have been particularly concerned with Bahrain because of the government’s violent and abusive responses to the protestors. Despite the interests in support of Bahrain, the above-mentioned interests against the protests in Bahrain were stronger. For this reason, the U.S. never publicly condemned the Bahraini regime. Furthermore, Bahrain is not a prominent Arab nation, which made it easier for the U.S. to avoid international criticism of its inaction and made it more difficult for pro-democracy and human rights groups to advocate on behalf of Bahraini protestors in Western capitals and media outlets.

Libya Libya’s anti-government uprisings began on February 15, 2011 and quickly took a violent turn. Protestors were concentrated heavily in the town of Benghazi, which they took over after clashes with local police and government officials. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Libya’s 42-year dictator, retaliated in an attempt to recapture Benghazi. With Gaddafi’s threat to murder the citizens of Benghazi, a civil war seemed imminent, instigating Western leaders to consider taking action on behalf of the pro-democracy opposition. United States institutional memory remained haunted by the consequences of U.S. negligence in Rwanda in the 1990s and worried about the same consequences for the people of Benghazi. This fear, along with the Libyan opposition’s cohesion, was an important factor in the decision to organize a NATO mission and no-fly zone in Libya. More importantly, the Arab League and UN Security Council approved the mission as long as NATO only engaged air power against Gaddafi’s military. International support for the mission in Libya was easy to garner due to Gaddafi’s unpopularity, Libya’s insignificance to most countries’ foreign affairs, and international interest in Libya’s oil industry—in terms of both improving the oil output as well as ensuring that this output remained stable. The mission ultimately succeeded in helping the opposition to defeat Gaddafi and overthrow the government. With this situation in mind, the stakeholders concerned with Libya were European countries interested in protecting the Libyan opposition and their Libyan oil imports, as well as American businesses interested in entering the Libyan market. State Department officials were eager for an opportunity to support pro-democracy protestors and feared that, without international intervention, genocide could occur in Benghazi. It is also possible that the U.S. and Israeli governments considered Libya as a potential new ally, which could balance the current shifts in Arab-Israeli regional alliances.


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Syria Syrian protests began on January 26, 2011 and had escalated into a larger uprising by March. The protestors demanded that President Bashar al-Assad step down and the government allow political parties outside of the ruling Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. They also wanted the government to provide equal rights for all Syrian citizens and to institute reforms to provide greater political freedoms like freedom of press, speech, and assembly. Leading up to the 2011 uprisings, Syria has experienced increasing youth unemployment, reduced subsidies for basic goods, and cuts in state services for the poor, all of which have contributed to the diminishing standard of living in Syria. The violent treatment of protestors has also empowered opposition rallies. For instance, the Syrian government detained thirteen-year old Hamza Ali Al-Khateeb on April 29 during a protest in Daraa and returned him dead to his family on May 25 badly bruised with burn marks, three gunshot wounds, and severed genitals.6 His family disseminated disturbing images of his body afterward, which further fueled anger and vengeance toward the government and served as a provocation similar to Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia. There has also been a sectarian tone to the uprisings in Syria because the majority of the protestors are Sunni Muslim. Although this is in line with the demographics of the general Syrian population, the members of Bashar al-Assad’s regime are predominantly Alawite, a sect of Shia Islam. This sectarian tension has helped Assad to convince Syria’s minorities—including Kurds and Christians—that his strong rule is necessary to protect them. Without a national, non-sectarian opposition movement, it will be hard for the opposition to gain substantial international support, including from the U.S. Syria is a compelling case in the Arab Spring because of the number of stakeholders involved. In support of the regime, there is Russia and China, both of which have blocked UN resolutions condemning the government’s violence against its

citizens. Russia and China both have a stake in preventing Syria from becoming pro-American and in preserving trade relations with Assad and his regime. Iran also supports the regime as both a predominantly Shia and anti-Israeli country. Iran’s close relationship with Syria allows it to send financial and military support to anti-Israeli groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, who both use this support to launch rockets at Israel and strengthen the Arab resistance. The United States, Israel, the European Union, the Arab League, Turkey, and human rights and prodemocracy groups remain in support of the opposition. Assad and his anti-Israeli friends in Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza position him as an enemy of the U.S. and its allies. Despite the U.S.’s ideological support for pro-democracy movements, the U.S. and Israel worry that further destabilization in Syria could disrupt the region and allow the current situation to deteriorate further into sectarian warfare. It is also unclear whether the Syrian opposition would be more or less friendly to Israel. There is a degree of risk involved in Western support for the Syrian opposition because Assad’s cold peace with Israel could deteriorate with a Sunni Islamist government in power. The U.S. and Israel therefore are hesitant to remove Assad forcefully from leadership before ensuring a stable alternative. Human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the regime’s violence and have provided reports detailing the regime’s atrocities, demanding justice and reform. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar, as predominantly Sunni countries, have a stake in promoting the Sunni opposition against Assad’s Alawite regime and Shia allies (namely Iran). As mentioned above, Sunni-Shia tensions have increased in the Arab World since regime change in Iraq, which placed a majority Shia government in power and removed the Sunni buffer zone between Iran, Jordan, and Persian Gulf countries. Turkey may also desire to assert its influence as a major power in the Middle East by weakening its neighbor and playing a visible role in supporting the opposition.


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The United States has condemned the Syrian regime’s violence against peaceful protesters and has been working with Turkey to prepare for Assad’s fall, hoping to prevent a sectarian civil war. The U.S. seems convinced Assad will eventually fall, but American officials have renounced any interest in organizing a NATO force, similar to that used in Libya, to aid the opposition in Syria. Instead, the U.S., with the EU and Turkey, has imposed heavy economic sanctions on Syria, including on the export of its oil, and encouraged a UN resolution condemning Assad and imposing UN-mandated sanctions on the country. The U.S. has also provided political advice to the opposition along with assistance in expanding the opposition’s access to the Internet. In general, the U.S. has avoided calling for Assad’s departure, and instead suggests that Assad embrace the protesters’ demands for meaningful political and economic reform. However, this U.S. position may toughen as the protests continue and causalities increase. Policy Options and Tactics for Implementation Three main factors have influenced U.S. intervention in Arab countries over the last year of regional upheaval. The first factor is the role of international and regional support for intervention; when international or regional support favored some type of intervention, the U.S. was more likely to take a position against the current regime. In Egypt, regional leaders were hesitant to speak against President Mubarak because he was an important ally to the U.S., Israel, and Gulf monarchies. Furthermore, the international community did not take a firm stand calling for action in Egypt, at least not until it seemed inevitable that Mubarak would fall. Likewise, the U.S. echoed this approach waiting until the last minute to shift its stance. In terms of Bahrain, the international community barely mentioned the uprisings and there was strong regional sentiment against intervening in Bahrain, namely from the Saudi regime. In Libya, there was strong international and regional support for intervening, including a UN and Arab League endorsement of a NATO mission in the country. The U.S. responded to this support by becoming actively involved in Libya.

In Syria, the U.S. has also condoned international and regional opinion by leveraging sanctions on Assad’s regime, but has stopped short of advocating a full-scale military intervention. Second, the degree of allied interests in a particular country has influenced the U.S.’s decision to intervene because if important allies supported intervention, then the U.S. was more likely to become involved. In Egypt, America’s close ally Israel did not want to see Mubarak fall, and therefore the U.S. responded tentatively, encouraging reforms rather than regime change. The U.S. also viewed Egypt as an important ally, which contributed to the Obama Administration’s reluctance to condemn President Mubarak. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, an important Arab ally for the U.S., did not want to draw any attention to the protests, which the U.S. reinforced by never even publicly condemning the regime’s violent response to protests. In addition, the U.S. considered Bahrain an important ally in terms of its oil and willingness to host U.S. military bases. Then in Libya, much of Europe and Israel supported intervention. European nations saw intervention in Libya as a way to become more involved with oil exports as well as facilitate another Western-friendly regime in the region. Furthermore, Israeli officials advocated intervening in Libya to set an example of Western determination against forces threatening human rights and regional security. These Israeli officials highlighted the importance of taking action in Libya in order to send a strong message to Iran. Finally, in Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia both have advocated placing pressure on the Assad regime and its oppressive behavior. These countries have an interest in reducing Iranian and Shia influence in the region by removing one of Iran’s key allies—Bashar al-Assad, who provides a gateway for Iranian influence in Lebanon and Palestine. Israel worries about its security and would like to see reforms in Syria as long as they lead to better relations between Syria and Israel. This position helps explain the recent emphasis on soft rather than hard power pressure on Syria. The U.S. has acted on these concerns by sanctioning and condemning the Syrian regime, but asserting that there will not be an American military intervention.


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Third, the U.S. perception of the opposition as significant, cohesive, and secular is important in determining American foreign policy. If the opposition has all of these traits and is advocating democratic rule in a peaceful manner, it is more difficult for the U.S. to ignore the movement. As opposition groups become larger, more cohesive, and more clearly secular, the U.S. shifts toward supporting the opposition and turning against the regime. This situation was evident in Egypt where the Obama administration reversed its stance and asked Mubarak to step down after it became clear how determined, cohesive, and influential the opposition was in Cairo. In Bahrain however, the opposition was not clearly secular because the vast majority of protestors were Shia Muslims against a Sunni Muslim regime. Although it is unclear whether the Bahraini protestors truly had a sectarian agenda, the Bahraini regime and other U.S. allies perceived the protests in this light, which made the opposition easier for the U.S. to ignore. With Libya, the opposition was secular, cohesive, and significant and protested about economic problems and political corruption rather than religious or ethnic discrimination. Although there were tribal divisions in the case of Libya, the opposition and regime maintained the same religion. This purely political agenda made it easier for the U.S. to justify its support for the opposition and intervene militarily. Currently in Syria, the opposition is much less cohesive and consists mainly of Sunni Muslims. The opposition not only seems disjointed, as reflected in the generally disorganized, smaller protests, but there have not been as many sizeable protests happening in Syria’s two largest cities, Aleppo and Damascus. This reality, whether a result of sectarian or logistical issues, makes it difficult for the U.S. to intervene in Syria on behalf of the opposition because the U.S. needs to know a sizeable and representative segment of the population wants to see reforms and regime change. Otherwise, American support of one sect could lead to the persecution of another, which is an important consideration in the region where neighboring countries like Lebanon spent decades immersed in sectarian warfare. This feature of Syria’s uprisings helps explain why the U.S.

has chosen to intervene with economic sanctions and diplomacy rather than military actions. After considering the central explanations of U.S. intervention during the Arab Spring, it is useful to consider what policy options legislators have for influencing U.S. intervention in an Arab country. Taking Syria as an example and considering the factors affecting intervention outlined above, these policy options include intervening using hard power military resources, intervening using soft power sanctions, or not intervening at all. Hard Power Intervention More extreme pro-democracy and pro-human rights groups along with supporters of Israel who believe intervention in Syria could improve regional stability would advocate for the U.S. to intervene using hard military power. These groups could advocate their views by highlighting the dangers the Assad regime poses for Israel, including its close relationship with Iran. By taking a tough stand on Syria, the U.S. and Israel would be sending a signal to Iran that they are not afraid of military intervention. If the U.S. could help establish a democratic government in Syria, the Sunni majority would come to power, which would reduce Iranian influence in Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. These advocates could likewise point out that most of the Arab League and international community, with the exceptions of Russia and China, have condemned the Syrian regime. This broad criticism of Assad’s oppressive regime could help validate U.S. intervention. Lastly, Syria’s opposition is arguably cohesive, secular, and large. Considering Assad has barred international media from Syria, it is possible that the opposition is larger than Americans realize and the protestors are not as sectarian, disparate, and violent as the regime claims. This is plausible because there have been reports describing the secular nature of protests from Homs and Hama—major opposition enclaves—and the protests have persisted despite the high death toll over the last year.


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Soft Power Intervention The U.S. has applied this strategy to Syria since the beginning of 2012 through diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions on the Syrian regime. The advocates in this scenario would include the Obama administration, moderate liberals and conservatives, and less extreme human rights and pro-democracy groups. This coalition could argue that it is in Israel’s interest to handle this situation tentatively. If Assad falls, it could lead to a civil war or a regime unfriendly Israel. Therefore, a milder level of intervention provides the U.S. with more time, distance, and flexibility to adopt smart policies that accurately reflect American interests. Advocates could highlight the lack of sufficient information concerning the opposition and the inability to determine whether it is truly secular, cohesive, and popular. There are reports from Latakia and Aleppo—cities without strong opposition movements—that many Syrians still support Assad’s regime and do not agree with the opposition’s demands. This uncertainty makes it more risky for the U.S. to act more aggressively against Syria’s regime, especially provided the risks this could have in terms of regional instability and sectarian warfare. No Intervention There is also the position on the other end of the intervention spectrum, advocating that the U.S. take no intervening action at all. Groups in support of this policy might include libertarians, fiscal conservatives, neo-isolationists, Christians who worry about the safety of minorities in Syria without Assad, Russian lobbies, and some corporate lobbies with a financial stake in the Syrian regime. This coalition could argue that there is not enough international and regional interest in becoming involved and the Syrian regime maintains support from Russia and China. Since this group would strongly oppose taking any action, they could apply higher standards for meeting the factors that justify intervention. For instance, they could point out Israel’s interest in Syrian stability, which Assad has provided, and the high risks of allowing the opposition to come to power. The fact

that the Syrian regime maintains a powerful military, a base of support in the largest cities, and the backing of minority groups suggests that Assad would win in the absence of international intervention. The lack of clarity concerning opposition groups and the potential that they are more akin to sectarian thugs and terrorists than democratic protesters, as the Syrian regime has suggested, implies that none of the factors supporting intervention exist and it could be dangerous to intervene. Conclusion After a long synthesis of U.S. intervention in the Arab Spring, it seems clear that there are three core factors influencing U.S. decisions to become involved in Arab uprisings. These factors include the level of international and regional support for intervention, the degree of strong allied interests in favor of intervention, and the U.S. perception of the opposition as significant, cohesive, and secular. In the case of Syria taken above, the most effective and appropriate advocacy group would be supporters of soft intervention. Libya was the only situation in which the U.S. took a hard military intervention approach, and taking this approach in Syria will likely generate more enemies than friends. Damage inflicted in fire exchanges on buildings, land, and citizens as well as the difficulty in gaining American domestic support for further international military obligations would make U.S. intervention unpopular abroad and at home. The U.S. has effectively ignored uprisings in other Arab countries, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but once uprisings reach a certain size in terms of numbers and international attention, it is impossible to ignore them completely. Therefore, a policy of soft power exertion through diplomatic, economic, and regional venues is the best response to Syria’s revolution and acts as a general standard for the U.S. to follow in terms of widespread unrest in other Arab countries. With this conclusion in mind, the Obama administration could take two approaches to promote soft power intervention. First, Obama’s allies in Congress could propose legislation to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Syria. Ex-


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amples of this type of pressure include additional economic sanctions on Syria, increasingly terminating diplomatic communication, and requiring Congressional approval before the U.S. agrees to participate militarily in Syria. This legislation could come as a regular bill or legislators could attach the measures as riders to an appropriations bill in order to facilitate their passage. Second, this coalition could work with Russia and China to limit their indirect and direct support for the Syrian regime. Russia has a long relationship with the Syrian regime and does not want to see its economic and geo-strategic interests in Syria harmed. This situation has provoked Russia to support Kofi Annan’s UN-brokered ceasefire, while rejecting any UN resolutions against the Syrian regime. Russia’s persistent resistance to punishing Assad has provided the Syrian President with legitimacy and made a ceasefire less attractive to him. The U.S. should therefore negotiate with President Putin to ensure that Russia’s most important Syrian assets and trade deals remain intact if Assad leaves. If the U.S. can convince Russia to cooperate in sanctioning and opposing the Syrian regime, then China would likely follow suit because of the countries’ shared perspective on Syria and China’s hesitance to cast the lone veto in the UN Security Council. With Russia’s support, a UN resolution increasing pressure on Assad’s regime would likely lead to a resolution of the current revolution. Overall, the three factors discussed that influence U.S. intervention in the Arab uprisings offer an analytic tool for assessing the U.S. responses to the Arab Spring as well as for developing strategies to change these responses. The influence of international support, U.S. allies, and the opposition’s features on U.S. policy in the region helps highlight the areas of maneuverability that policymakers can engage to provoke peaceful outcomes and appropriate levels of U.S. intervention. Endnotes 1 “The Story of Mohamed Bouazizi, the man who toppled Tunisia,” International Business Times, January 14, 2011, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/101313/20110114/thestory-of-mohamed-bouazizi-the-man-who-toppled-tunisia.

htm 2 Helena Cobban, “The Arab Spring at Nine Months,” Just World News, October 27, 2011, http://justworldnews.org/ archives/004231.html 3 Although in Libya’s case, the opposition won regime change with the assistance of NATO enforcement of a no-fly zone over the country and NATO air support to the opposition. 4 “Hosni Mubarak—Times Topics,” New York Times Online, Sept. 26, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ timestopics/people/m/hosni_mubarak/index.html 5 Stephen Luscombe, “Bahrain,” The British Empire, http:// www.britishempire.co.uk/maproom/bahrain.htm 6 Liam Stack, “Video of Tortured Boy’s Corpse Deepens Anger in Syria,” New York Times Online, May 30, 2011,http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/world/middleeast/31syria. html

Lilly Frost is a graduating Master of Public Policy student at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. She is currently working as a ShortTerm Staff member for the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Social Protection Sector and as a publishing assistant for Just World Books.


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Hydraulic Fracturing: Problems & Policy Solutions by Cristina Mestre Executive Summary The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the natural gas boom in the U.S. and the process of hydraulic fracturing; examine the costs and benefits associated with hydraulic fracturing; examine the regulatory and political environments surrounding the practice; and, to analyze policy options for addressing the problems associated with hydraulic fracturing. There are many problems associated with hydraulic fracturing, and those of greatest concern relate to public and environmental health, including water quality and air quality. Other concerns include land use, habitat fragmentation, increased traffic and road construction, and community safety. Yet there are also benefits to consider for localities, such as job growth and increased revenue associated with fracking. The regulatory environment is considered in terms of national-scale (federal regulations), state-level, and local-level actions. Though there are no explicit federal regulations that pertain to hydraulic fracturing, a series of investigations and regulatory proposals are in the works. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is leading these efforts in coordination with the Obama Administration, though the Department of the Interior and the Department of Energy have been intimately involved in fracking-related discussions. At the state and local level, there has been a significant movement to ban fracking in municipalities, though drilling companies are questioning the legality of these actions, claiming that only states can regulate industry. Politically, lawmakers must consider their capabilities and potential actions to manage fracking activities. Governments are also responsible for

issues such as protecting public health and safety, managing risk, and protecting the rights of residents to own homes and corporations to conduct operations. These considerations suggest the complicated arena in which lawmakers must determine the best way forward for hydraulic fracturing activities. This paper examines 10 policy options for addressing problems and recommends prioritizing those policies that are easiest to implement and address the most significant problems. Because water quality concerns pose the most immediate and significant threat to public health, regulation and research into this area should be a primary goal. Information sharing and additional research is also a theme throughout this paper, largely because the practice of fracking is relatively new (wells have proliferated since 2000). Despite the challenges associated with policy implementation and the role of government, action should be taken to ensure that public health and the environment would be protected, while allowing for economic growth and a reduction in dependence on foreign oil. Introduction Extracting natural gas from shale formations via hydraulic fracturing is a rapidly growing trend in the United States, with implications for federal, state and local policymakers and planners. Natural gas has been a domestic source of fuel for more than 100 years and is commonly used for cooking, heating, electricity, and transportation. In 2011, natural gas supplies approximately 22 percent of U.S. energy supply, whereas natural gas, coal and oil together supply a total of 85 percent of domestic energy. Oil and gas production is oc-


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curring in hundreds of localities in over 30 U.S. states. Policymakers have cited significant domestic natural gas reserves as a solution for meeting growing U.S. energy demand without increasing reliance on foreign oil, and for alleviating climate change concerns. Natural gas contains more energy per pound than coal, and it is cheaper to produce than other fossil fuels. Natural gas is also considered a clean burning fuel, because, unlike coal, it emits little to no mercury, sulfur dioxide or particulates (this is discussed in more detail in subsection 1a). However, there are significant concerns associated with the extraction and production of natural gas, in particular with the hydraulic fracturing of shale, a dense rock formation found two miles below the earth’s surface. Hydraulic fracturing, also known as hydro-fracking, hydro-fracturing, or fracking, dates back to the 1940s, though the practice did not become more widespread until the past decade. Currently, approximately 70 percent of the world’s hydraulic fracturing occurs in North America. Though fracking is used in gas wells other than shale formations, it is most commonly used in shale reservoirs. Fracking is also the primary method used to extract gas from these shale formations, which contain nearly 30 percent of all recoverable natural gas resources in the United States.

“Unconventional” natural gas sources include shale gas, tight gas, coal bed methane, and methane hydrates. These unconventional sources have received significant attention not only for their potential to greatly expand estimates of available natural gas in the U.S., but also because many conventional sources are being depleted. Today, unconventional sources provide more natural gas than do conventional sources (see the figure above). Considering both conventional and unconventional sources, shale gas is the fastest growing natural gas resource in the U.S. and internationally. The U.S. Department of Energy foresees domestic natural gas production growing by 20 percent by 2035, with shale gas’s contribution of total production growing from 16 to 45 percent in that time frame. Shale gas was traditionally difficult to access because the natural gas is trapped in source rock, which is composed of organic-rich sediments. For this reason, shale gas represented only 1 percent of domestic natural gas supplies in 2000. Yet as the New York Times reported, a businessman named George P. Mitchell fought to extract natural gas from shale using hydraulic fracturing, despite widespread skepticism. Today, the use of hydraulic fracturing in shale formations is cited as a primary reason why U.S. access to shale gas deposits has significantly improved in recent years. Shale

While proponents tout the economic benefits of hydro-fracking, opponents cite the Figure 1: Natural gas production by source, 1990-2030 (trillion cubic feet). environmental and health impacts EPA, 2009. associated with the practice. All about shale gas Shale gas differs from conventional natural gas, which is associated with oil reservoirs and extracted via vertical wells drilled through impermeable cap rock to reach the highly porous and permeable reservoir. Unconventional natural gas, on the other hand, is more costly and difficult to utilize because it is stored in low permeability formations.

Source:


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gas currently represents 30 percent of U.S. total natural gas supply, though this figure is projected to rise even higher as new technologies allow drillers to reach more gas reserves than ever before. Supply and consumption There are approximately 16,000 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ) of recoverable natural gas remaining in the world, though this figure varies greatly depending on projections and new discoveries of supply in recent years. In 2009, the EPA estimated that there were 267 Tcf of undiscovered recoverable shale gas in the U.S. In 2010, MIT projected the amount of recoverable U.S. shale gas to be between 420 and 870 Tcf, which represents between 18 and 38 years of supply. Other estimates in 2011 were as high as 2,200 Tcf, or enough to meet 100 years of demand at current consumption levels. Yet a January 2012 report from the Energy Information Administration estimated that there are only 482 Tcf of natural gas in the U.S., as compared to their 2011 estimate of 827 Tcf, representing a 40 percent drop.

Although the U.S. has large reserves of natural gas, more gas is currently consumed in the U.S. each year than is produced. The primary supplier of natural gas to the U.S. to meet domestic needs is Canada, though some natural gas comes from overseas and is transported as liquefied natural gas. Domestically, the primary shale basins can be seen in the map at right. The most productive shale formations (defined by the amount of natural gas recovered during production) are: Barnett, Haynesville, Fayetteville, Woodford, Utica, and Marcellus, the largest untapped source in the U.S. Hydraulic fracturing “101”

Fracking can occur in vertical wells, which are drilled down to a reservoir to allow for gas to escape naturally, or in horizontal wells, which are drilled vertically until the source rock is reached, and then drilled horizontally. Because shale gas is trapped in layers of ‘laterally-extensive’ and impermeable source rock, vertical drills are not as effective as horizontal drills at extracting natural EPA scientists have noted that since natural gas gas. Horizontal wells used in hydraulic fracturing extraction from shale is not certain, additional are approximately two to three times more proexploration and research is needed to fully under- ductive than vertical wells, because vertical wells stand the resource potential. would require drilling a greater number of wells in one area, an option that Figure 2: Map of the shale gas basins in the United States. Source: U.S. Energy Information Adis often not economically ministration (EIA) http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/analysis_publications/maps/maps.htm. or geographically feasible. To implement hydraulic fracturing in a horizontal well, the first step is to drill a concrete casing production well vertically through the rock formation until it reaches the shale bed (the shale formation), located thousands of feet below the ground. After reaching between 1,000 – 12,000 feet below the ground, the drill hole, also known as the wellbore, then curves and follows the shale horizon-


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tally. The lateral drilling can extend horizontally from approximately 1,500 to 5,000 feet from the drill hole. The process of extracting shale gas then involves injecting (pumping) large volumes of water mixed with chemicals and sand, commonly known as “fracking fluid,” into the well at extremely high pressure. This in turn creates fractures (cracks) in the rock, increasing the rock’s permeability. The fracking fluid keeps these cracks open and allows the release of trapped natural gas to flow from the fractures out through the wellbore and up to the surface for collection. Although fracking fluid is 99 percent water, there are approximately over 500 chemicals that make up the remaining one percent of the fluid. These chemicals can include acids, corrosion inhibitors, antibacterial agents, friction reducers, and gelling agents, though specific chemicals used are not well disclosed by the drilling industry. According to the EPA, between 15 and 80 percent of the fracking fluid used is recovered at the wellhead (this range depends on the individual well and the site), and comes to the surface in the form of “produced water,” which is very saline and can be contaminated by fracking chemicals. Problem Scoping Problems and concerns Supporters of hydraulic fracturing tout the practice as a solution to oil depletion, dependence on foreign oil, and pollution caused by other forms of fuel. While increased usage of natural gas can help to reduce reliance on foreign oil and reduce emissions that lead to global warming, the practice of fracking has additional consequences. The primary concerns associated with fracking are unclear cost and production estimates, climate change (due to methane emissions), water quality, water quantity, wastewater and contamination, public health and safety, transportation and infrastructure, habitat fragmentation, and earthquakes. These issues are discussed below.

Unclear cost and production estimates A June 2011 New York Times story revealed that gas might not be as easily or cheaply extracted from shale gas formations as energy companies claim. Analysis of hundreds of internal industry documents and emails revealed widespread skepticism about the current forecasts of available natural gas from shale formations, and raised questions about the accuracy of companies’ claims regarding the productivity of their wells. While the amount of gas available is generally not disputed, the cost of extraction is in question. According to the article, data show that there are often some very active and productive wells within an area, but that zones with less productive, more costly wells frequently surround them. These less productive wells may in fact cost more to operate than the profit gained from their recoverable gas. The New York Times report looked at data from more than 9,000 wells and determined that less than 10 percent of the wells had recouped their costs in the first seven years of production. If the industry is overstating the productivity of these wells, financial implications could be felt broadly and harm the economy. For example, landowners’ and investors’ investments could falter, and consumers could end up paying much higher costs for heating and electricity. Meanwhile, significant investments that are currently being made by federal and state policymakers (due to the current encouraging projections of supply) could lead to a financial crash. Additionally, ranging estimates for the availability of shale have been made based on very limited data, given that shale gas drilling is a relatively new technology. Climate change and air pollution The appeal of natural gas is that it emits fewer greenhouse gases than other fossil fuels. For example, burning natural gas emits only half as much carbon dioxide as coal, less than one-third as much as nitrogen oxides, and only one percent as much as the sulfur oxides that are emitted from


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coal-fired power generation. However, methane makes up approximately 90 percent of natural gas and can be emitted into the air when natural gas is not completely burned. Methane is a substantial contributor to climate change, because its warming impacts are considered 105 times more potent than carbon dioxide and impacts are seen in a shorter time frame. It may also be emitted through leaks that occur during natural gas production and transportation. A Cornell University study released earlier this year reported that between 3.6 to 7.9 percent of the methane from shale gas production escapes to the atmosphere during production over the lifetime of a well. The methane emissions that occur during production are known as “fugitive emissions” and are between 30 to 50 percent greater than the methane emissions from conventional gas operations. Hydraulic fracturing tends to have more “fugitive emissions” of methane than other processes in part because of a longer time period required to drill wells, the massive amounts of fracking fluid that flow back to the surface, and the removal of the drill that occurs after fracturing. According to the Cornell study, the 20-year methane ‘footprint’ (defined as the total greenhouse gas emissions) of shale gas is between 20 and 50 percent greater than coal, though their methane footprint is similar over a 100-year time frame. This study brings into question whether the emissions “savings” from burning natural gas over coal are greater than the methane emissions that occur when wells are hydraulically fractured. In the past two years, several groups opposing fracking have voiced their concerns about shale gas, stating that the greenhouse gas implications of shale gas have not received enough attention, and that early evidence shows shale gas may in fact worsen global warming. Climate change concerns also stem from the thousands of trucks and longhaul trips that are required during the fracking process, and from the chemicals used in fracking fluid that contribute to high levels of ozone (these issues are discussed below).

The EPA also noted in February 2011 that there have been several reports of air quality impacts caused by shale gas. Residents in Texas, southwest Wyoming, and eastern Utah have all experienced high ozone levels in the areas where fracking is occurring. Ground-level ozone is produced from fracking operations because of the sunlight-induced chemical reaction between nitrates and volatile organic compounds. Ground-level ozone is the primary component of smog, which can cause a number of health problems, especially asthma. Ozone also causes environmental impacts, such as making trees more susceptible to disease and weather events. Diesel used at fracking sites (to power generators, drill rigs and other fracking equipment) also contributes to poor air quality. Water quality Because of the high level of methane in shale gas, there are widespread concerns about methane migration into drinking water supplies. Currently, at the federal level, methane is not regulated in drinking water because it is not considered a contaminant in public water systems under the EPA’s National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR). Individual states have not acted to regulate methane in drinking water, either. However, an increasing number of residents living near fracking wells have claimed that their water is contaminated. As of June 2011, the Natural Resources Defense Council had documented nearly 40 incidents across the U.S. where fracking has been the suspected cause of drinking water contamination. However, drilling industry supporters claim far fewer incidents of contamination, and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Shale Gas Production Subcommittee believes the risk of fracking fluid leaking into drinking water sources (via fractures made during fracking) is remote. A 2011 Duke University study researched shale gas sites in Pennsylvania and New York and found that methane concentrations in private drinking water supplies were found to be 17 times higher in areas with active drilling and extraction as compared to sites without active fracking taking place. Some of the methane levels discovered were found


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to be far above what is considered hazardous for human health. Interestingly, the study found no evidence of water contamination caused by fracking fluid or saline waters; all evidence showed contamination solely via methane. Methane has also been linked to fracking in Colorado and Ohio, and benzene has been linked to fracking in Colorado and Wyoming. A ProPublica report from November 2011 also discussed new EPA findings about water contamination in Pavillion, Wyoming. The city’s aquifer was found to have high levels of carcinogens, at least one of which is used in the fracking process. The chemicals detected include 2-Butoxyethanol (2-BE), a solvent commonly used in fracking, and benzene, which was found to be 50 times higher than the level considered safe for humans. Water quantity Between 2 and 4 million gallons of water are needed to drill for and extract natural gas from just one horizontal shale gas well. This water is also used in a relatively short time period, thereby posing a threat to overall water supplies for municipalities and possibly threatening water-dependent species, recreational activities, hydropower generation, and power plants that require large amounts of water. The sheer amount of water used may also divert water needed for other uses and sectors across localities. Community water needs are therefore a large area of concern related to fracking, for all levels of government and for corporations dependent on water usage. Wastewater and contamination During the drilling and production phases, one well can produce over one million gallons of wastewater, which may contain high concentrations of pollutants. The pollutants are not only from the fracking fluid itself, but also from the absorption of naturally occurring metals, salts, and radiation (radioactive chemicals). Not all of the fracking fluid can be recovered from the cracks, but the water that flows back to the wellbore is

known as “produced water.� Occasionally, the high concentration of pollutants in this water exceeds values considered safe for drinking water or for release into the environment. Because produced water can contain dissolved chemicals and contaminants, it needs to be treated. Though the water is typically stored or recycled, the sheer volume of water can make treatment options difficult. Additionally, flowback can surface to the wellbore for months after fracking occurs. Contamination can occur if fracking fluid is mismanaged, given the potentially hazardous nature of fracking fluid. Accidental spills or leaks contaminate surrounding areas and pose a significant threat to the environment. Tears in water storage containers have led to spills in some localities. Many water contamination problems have been associated with fracking. For example, 18 cows died in Louisiana in April 2009 when they drank spilled fracking fluid from a Chesapeake Energy Corporation site, and fracking may be responsible for a 35-mile fish kill that occurred in Dunkard Creek in West Virginia and Pennsylvania in 2009. Public health and safety Residents of fracking towns have reported serious human health concerns, including headaches, dizziness, peripheral neuropathy (irreversible brain damage), arsenic poisoning, and a loss of smell and taste. Given the hundreds of chemicals used in fracking, there are many potential toxicity and human health effects of exposure to these chemicals. Safety concerns include chemical spills from drilling sites and blowouts that occur from excessive methane build-up. Claims of fracking-related safety incidents include an April 2011 well blowout in Leroy, PA, and an incident of gas leakage into drinking water in Dimick, PA, due to a poor cement job. Transportation and infrastructure As shale gas extraction grows rapidly around the


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U.S., especially in the Marcellus shale, rural roads are seeing significant increases in traffic. This increase in traffic on rural roads also increases maintenance costs for municipalities, and negatively impacts tourism in rural towns that are dependent on scenic views. As the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources acknowledges, a significant impact of drilling in the Marcellus Shale is the extensive road construction that is needed to transport fracking supplies and natural gas. Habitat fragmentation Natural habitats support wildlife and ecosystem services, but fracking poses a significant threat to preserving natural corridors in rural areas. The proliferation of roads and infrastructure needed to support fracking is one concern, along with the land clearing that is necessary for building a drill pad area where the fracking occurs. The size of a drill pad can range from approximately 3 to 5 acres. Earthquakes In late May of 2011, tremors measuring between 1.9 and 2.8 on the Richter scale were detected in Blackpool, England, and have since been attributed to fracking. There is currently only one British company, Cuadrilla Resources, using fracking in shale gas formations. However, the incident has raised concern about possible tremors in other drilling locales around the world. In the U.S., the Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Geological Survey have also suggested a causal link between injecting fluids into rock formations underground and seismic activity. Benefits: Economic Impacts In addition to the benefits of increasing domestic energy supplies and reducing dependence on foreign oil, fracking can generate significant economic benefits, namely, job creation. Frackingrelated jobs and industries include legal and regulatory specialists, truck drivers, construction, and well operation. Some estimates state that fracking

has created over half a million jobs in the U.S. Additionally, drilling companies must pay local, state and federal taxes, though the tax rates vary widely across states. A recent Pennsylvania State University study evaluated the economic impacts of the Marcellus Shale and found that in 2009, fracking created a $3.77 billion stimulus to the local economy. Moreover, Pennsylvania’s gross output grew by $1.56 billion; this figure represents the ‘domino’ effect of spending that occurs from fracking activities. State and local tax revenues, including severance taxes, received $389 million from fracking, and federal revenues grew by $1.05 billion from Pennsylvania. The study also noted that 21,000 ‘direct jobs’ and 44,000 total jobs were created as a result of hydraulic fracturing developments in the Marcellus Shale. Additionally, when drilling takes place in very poor areas of the U.S., impoverished landowners greatly benefit. When farmers and other landowners lease land to natural gas companies, the financial gain is tremendous. The term often used for impoverished farmers who become millionaires overnight is often referred to as “shalellionaires.” However, an October 2011 New York Times story reported on an interesting development: at least eight local or national banks have refused to issue mortgages on land that is leased for drilling because of concerns about future contamination. When considering whether or not to allow fracking, municipalities need to consider the potential costs and benefits, along with the limitations of the practice. As noted by the National Conference of State Legislators, most economic impact studies used to make decisions on fracking address employment and income, but they fail to evaluate the distribution of income or determine who benefits from fracking activities. As the Occupy Wall Street protests drew significant attention to the widespread income disparity in the U.S., this issue will become increasingly important in the near future. Additionally, localities need to consider the environmental concerns mentioned


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above, the impact of fracking on other sectors and on local government services, and the transportation and traffic implications. Moreover, they will need to weigh the desires of residents to become homeowners (the ‘American Dream’) with the mortgage risk issue reported by the New York Times. Another consideration that is important for localities is the cultural implications of fracking. Some towns that have experienced a fracking boom have seen an influx of workers and residents from all across the U.S. and Canada. Oftentimes localities are not prepared for the growth in population, and these places have seen increases in drug abuse and crime rates. Regulatory Environment Natural gas has become a contentious issue in the U.S., with proponents defending fracking as an important method for increasing the U.S. energy supply and opponents campaigning to highlight the dangers of the practice. In considering what policy options could be implemented to address the problems of hydro-fracking, it is important to consider the regulatory environment surrounding the practice and the key players involved. Primarily, these regulations and legislators are at the federal, state and local level, and are discussed below. Additionally, much of the decision-making power for allowing fracking lies largely with lawmakers, but also with voters, landowners, and state environmental agencies. Most decisions to permit fracking occur at the state and local level, though the question of “who can allow (or ban) fracking?” is still unanswered, and several cases are currently in the courts. National level At the federal level, the government can regulate water quality through the EPA, particularly through the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). In 1997, a federal court of appeals in Atlanta ordered the EPA to regulate fracking under the SDWA, and in response, the EPA began a study

in 2000 to examine fracking’s impact on underground drinking water supplies (the focus of this study was on coal seam fracturing for methane production). This EPA report was completed in 2004 and found that fracking poses “little or no threat” to underground drinking water supplies, and noted that no further studies on fracking were needed. Yet as a November 2011 Associated Press story and others have reported, the 2004 study and its methodology were widely criticized as flawed. Because of the EPA’s approval of fracking leading up to the 2005 Energy Bill, the legislation included an exemption to the SDWA for oil and gas companies. Therefore, the SDWA currently does not apply to the injection of fracking fluids into shale formations. Furthermore, oil and gas companies are the only U.S. industries allowed to inject hazardous substances into or near subsurface drinking water supplies. Opponents refer to the SDWA exemption for oil and gas companies as the “Halliburton loophole” because of the belief that the exemption was created by former Halliburton CEO and Vice President Dick Cheney’s Energy Task Force, which was established in 2001 and recommended to Congress that hydraulic fracturing be exempt from the law. Halliburton employees were closely involved in the Energy Task Force’s work and in the review of the 2004 EPA report. Moreover, Halliburton, which patented fracking in the 1940s, is one of the largest manufacturers of fracking fluid. In 2009, several members of Congress introduced the Fracking Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, commonly known as the FRAC ACT, which proposed ending the SDWA exemption for hydraulic fracturing and requiring companies to disclose of the chemicals used in the process. Though Congress adjourned without taking action on the legislation, it was reintroduced in March of 2011 and has since been referred to the House Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. No further action has taken place on this bill in the 112th Congress, though the energy industry has been vocal in their


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opposition to the proposed regulation, arguing that it would be unnecessary and cumbersome. Proponents of the bill have also been vocal in their support for removing the exemption. Interestingly, the EPA announced in March of 2011 that it will investigate water contamination allegedly caused by fracking at sites in Texas, Colorado, North Dakota and Pennsylvania. When the EPA previously asked nine companies to disclose of the chemicals they used, eight complied but Halliburton did not, and Halliburton was later subpoenaed in 2010. The earliest results of this latest EPA study may be released in 2012, though the study will not be completed until 2014. The study will focus on evaluating the effects of water withdrawals, fracking fluid spills, and fracking itself on both water quality and quantity, and will also evaluate the entire life cycle of the fracking process, ending with the treatment of produced water. In terms of toxic chemicals, the EPA will prioritize the evaluation of chemicals based on their toxicity and potential human health effects. The four states being studied have all had a large number of wells drilled in recent years, but critics of the EPA study note that Wyoming is missing from the list. Yet residents of Pavillion, Wyoming have requested a separate EPA study of drinking water contamination attributed to fracking, the initial results of which were released in December 2011 and found that the area’s water pollution was indeed linked with fracking. According to ProPublica, this represents the first time that the federal government has linked fracking with water contamination. In late July of 2011, the EPA also announced a proposed New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for oil and gas companies. These regulations would essentially develop the first-ever national standards for fracking, by implementing standards for the disposal of produced water and regulating air pollution at hydraulic fracturing sites. Specifically, drillers would have to capture the gases released at a drilling site, thereby reducing emissions by 95

percent. Additionally, the EPA has claimed that this would actually benefit fracking companies, because they could capture and reuse or sell the methane that is currently lost during production. The proposed federal standards are a significant development because previously, all fracking regulation was left to the states. Fracking industry executives have stated that they would prefer regulations to remain at the state level, while proponents see the agency’s move as a positive step towards protecting public health. The proposed rules are currently under consideration, and are expected to be finalized in late April of 2012. Additionally, the Department of the Interior made an announcement in November 2010 that it would consider requiring drilling companies to disclose the make-up of fracking chemicals used on federal land. According to an October 2011 Reuters story, the Department will soon issue their proposal to force companies to reveal the list of chemicals used in fracking. This requirement will apply for all fracking on federal lands, and will model the disclosure rules used in Wyoming (discussed in the following section). The “NAT GAS Act” was also introduced in April 2011, and would provide tax incentives for the infrastructure needed to produce natural gas. Though the bill has not yet been voted on, it has bipartisan support and many experts believe it will pass. State level As a 2010 report by the National Council of State Legislators notes, states are charged with regulating gas and oil drilling. They have the power to regulate all aspects of natural gas development, from permitting to enforcement, and have regulatory agencies that provide permits for wells and protect environmental resources. However, according to an October 30th Charlottesville Daily Progress feature article on fracking, 39 U.S. states allow “private eminent domain” that gives corporations drilling rights on private land. This practice is known as “forced pooling,” and it compels landowners who have been holding out against


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drilling to join gas-leasing agreements with their neighbors. In terms of requiring the disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking fluid, companies in Wyoming must, as of September 2010, release a list of the substances that are injected into drilling wells; this information must also be publicly available, though there are exemptions for “trade secret protection.” In Colorado, companies must provide limited information on the chemicals used in fracking. In February 2011, Pennsylvania also began mandating the disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking. Other states have implemented similar requirements, but they often do not require drillers to provide detailed information on the chemicals used, the amount of fluid injected into wells, or the amount of produced water that returns to the surface or remains underground. According to the nonprofit group Earth Works, most states do not require companies to show the extent of fractures or to adequately monitor water quality. The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), which regulates water quality in New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, is also raising multi-state questions about fracking. The DRBC released draft plans in early November 2011 to regulate the natural gas industry. If the current moratorium is lifted on drilling in the river basin region, thousands of wells are expected to be drilled in the area. The commission was expected to vote on the plan in late November 2011, but the vote was postponed. The revisions to the DRBC’s “Natural Gas Development Regulations” were conducted in part due to nearly 70,000 public comments that were received after the release of the original draft. The DRBC was also sued by New York’s attorney general, Eric Schneiderman, who criticized the industry for failing to conduct environmental impact studies prior to gas drilling. Although there have been too many state actions to list in this paper, several examples (listed alphabetically) are highlighted below:

• Arkansas: The state has made amendments to their drilling standards to help prevent associated leaks and accidents. • Louisiana: The state has required its Ground Water Resources Commission to provide information on the state’s water resources and how to protect them, specifically in areas where hydraulic fracturing is occurring. • Michigan: The state is considering legislation that would make a drilling operator liable for groundwater contamination by fracking chemicals. • New Jersey: The state has proposed legislation that would ban the use of fracking for natural gas extraction or production. • New York: Up until this point, New York has not allowed hydraulic fracturing in the state’s portion of the Marchellus Shale. However, in September of 2011 the state’s Department of Environmental Conservation released new draft regulations for fracking, suggesting that the state may start issuing permits for the practice next year. Many experts believe that the state is moving closer to allowing fracking and that the approval will happen quickly. However, in response to the most recent EPA study, the state of New York introduced a series of bills including a proposal to require disclosure of hydrofracking chemicals, prohibit drilling near watersheds, and mandate the tracking of chemicals. This is unusual as regulations are normally implemented only after fracking is allowed to take place. As a response, many New York localities have preemptively moved to ban fracking at the local level (this is discussed in the subsequent section). • Ohio: The state has introduced a bill to place a moratorium on horizontal drilling until the EPA completes their latest study and the state comes up with a plan to address the issues identified in the EPA report. Ohio has also introduced bills to improve safety standards related to shale drilling.


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• Pennsylvania: The state’s governor recently proposed a fee on natural gas companies’ drilling activities in order to cover gas production costs. The state secretary of public health has also created the nation’s first drilling-related health registry. • West Virginia: The state is considering implementing requirements to improve water quality measurements and tracking related to shale gas extraction in the Marcellus Shale. Local level Though some states have not yet determined their policies on hydro-fracking, many localities have already taken action. Hydraulic fracturing has been contentious, and many communities appear to be divided on the issue. This poses challenges to planners and other government officials that are working to promote and balance equity, sustainability, and economic development. Although there have been far too many local actions to list in this paper, several examples active in early 2012 (listed alphabetically) are discussed below: • Colorado: In South Park, local residents have been seeking significant reductions in lease sales to gas companies as a way to protect property owners. • New York: In the fall of 2011, the town of Dryden banned fracking through an antifracking ordinance that was based on local zoning. More than one-third of Dryden’s land has been leased to natural gas companies and now one of these companies, an out-of-state driller, is suing the town and claiming that the anti-fracking ban conflicts with New York State law. Dryden, on the other hand, argues that under the state constitution’s home rule provision, towns can control their own zoning and therefore they can change the code to exclude heavy industry and natural gas companies. Interestingly, Dryden is not alone in their actions. There are over 50 municipalities in New York that

have addressed fracking, by either changing zoning regulations or passing laws to ban fracking. Though New York state laws seem to imply that only the state can regulate mineral extraction, the localities claim they are banning the practice, not actually regulating fracking. In February 2012, a New York state court ruled that towns do have the authority to ban fracking, thereby potentially setting a precedent for natural gas drilling. • Pennsylvania: In Peters Township, a judge recently approved an anti-fracking referendum. Additionally, both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have outlawed fracking through local ordinances. The city council in Pittsburgh took their ban a step further by sending its ordinance to all other Pennsylvania localities, urging them to adopt their own fracking bans. Salem Township attempted to impose regulations on fracking through their zoning ordinance, but the state Supreme Court ruled that the local regulation conflicted with the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act and was therefore preempted by this legislation. • Texas: In South Lake, there is a moratorium on fracking to protect property owners. The town of Dish invested in an air quality study to determine the impacts of fracking, and found that air quality was significantly worsened by the practice. • West Virginia: In Morganstown, the city council voted to ban fracking, but the decision was later overturned by the court system. • Wyoming: In Pinedale, citizens are lobbying the EPA to address air pollution that is caused by fracking. As localities implement anti-fracking policies, gas companies are not only commenting on ordinances, but also initiating lawsuits. Though these actions are hampering the companies’ drilling activities, some fracking companies have threatened litigation intended to bankrupt localities


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that challenge them. Therefore, political action and tension in municipalities can have widespread economic implications. The municipal movement towards local sovereignty is an interesting trend, though it appears cities and towns are being left to fight the fracking battle without state or national support. Political obstacles and considerations The primary political obstacle associated with fracking is balancing the tradeoffs between economic benefits and the environmental and health costs. For lawmakers and private citizens who are weighing whether or not fracking should be permitted, there is no easy formula for determining strengths and weaknesses of possibly adopting and implementing fracking in a community. Considerations for lawmakers include government’s regulatory capacity, the power to tax, public participation and responsiveness. The power to regulate is extremely relevant to the hydraulic fracturing debate, given the need for the public sector (governments at all levels) to regulate private sector actions (drilling and fracking). Additionally, land use zoning has thus far been used as a mechanism for preventing drilling, though legal precedents may challenge this interpretation of local law. Taxes can also be implemented on drilling activities in localities as a way to regulate the industry, and therefore lawmakers need to consider their extractive capabilities as a way to potentially support fracking policies. Public participation and responsiveness is also a key area of debate in the fracking arena, and is characterized by the significant number of antifracking campaigns that have been formed across the U.S. Residents are working to hold their leaders accountable for fracking practices that are threatening the drinking water and livelihoods of local residents and the character of entire communities. Thousands of groups are working to influence legislation at all levels of government, helping to inform government actions.

In addition, policymakers are responsible for protecting public health and safety, and therefore must consider risk management, including the protection of ecological corridors and drinking water quality. The political challenges for lawmakers are evident in the case of in Niagara Falls, New York, where the Niagara Falls Water Board is considering whether or not it should allow the city to become a destination for the disposal and treatment of produced water. The benefits of doing so would be economic, but the costs would mean produced water would enter into the waterways (and tourist hotspot) of Niagara Falls. The city is divided on the issue; some residents and environmentalists are touting the potential for another disaster on the scale of Love Canal (the highly toxic waste site discovered in Niagara Falls in the 1970s), whereas economic development proponents want to bring in new revenue. A related issue is that New York state has not yet approved the process of fracking, as compared to Pennsylvania which has seen nearly 4,000 new wells drilled over the past several years (and tens of thousands of additional wells are planned for the state). Because the practice of fracking is relatively new, better and more comprehensive data are needed to help inform decision makers about the various costs and benefits of fracking. Specifically, more information is needed on methane emissions, methane leakage intro drinking water, the chemicals used in fracking fluid, water quality, and the environmental consequences of produced water. Policy Options This section examines the array of policy solutions for addressing the problems associated with hydraulic fracturing, though the list is by no means comprehensive. The process of hydraulic fracturing in shale gas formations has proliferated only in the last decade, and therefore policies and best practices are in many cases still in the early stages of implementation. A number of the policies and strategies discussed below are related to and/or extracted from the Sec-


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retary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Natural Gas Subcommittee’s report on recommendations to improve the safety and environmental impacts of fracking in shale formations. As ProPublica noted, the findings of the SEAB report show that current gas drilling regulations may not be sufficient for protecting public health and natural resources, and therefore several recommendations for improvement are made. The SEAB subcommittee’s draft report focusing on recommendations was released on August 18, 2011, and the final report focusing on implementation of the recommendations was released on November 18, 2011. The types of policies that can help cope with the problems of fracking are primarily regulatory, though some are voluntary or have voluntary components, largely requiring action by the industry. A common theme within these policies and solutions is the need for more information and improved information sharing in order to implement best practices and gather baseline data to better determine and analyze impacts. The SEAB recommendations and other policy options are examined briefly in the following subsections, and considered in light of factors such as political feasibility, ease of implementation, and potential for effectively mitigating impacts, while also taking into account the balance of environmental, economic and equity concerns. Ban fracking outright (local level) Given the numerous environmental and health concerns associated with fracking, some groups and citizens are advocating for a complete ban on fracking. Moreover, as referenced above, several localities are banning fracking via local ordinances. Although support for banning fracking is based in part on the location’s political environment, the evidence of New York towns’ bans suggests that this is a politically viable solution. Banning fracking would eliminate all environmental and public health concerns, but would negate the projected economic growth that some localities experience from fracking activities. However, the legality of towns’ bans is currently in question by drillers

wanting to access shale gas formations, and the outcomes of several pending lawsuits could influence the future use of this strategy by localities. Therefore, the legitimacy of this policy could be determined during 2012. The question up for debate is, “Is it legal to ban fracking via ordinances at the local level?” Experts note that legality may depend on the precise language in localities’ ordinances as well as the considerations of individual states’ laws, for example whether or not a state has home rule or is a Dillon Rule state. In general, experts seem to agree that municipalities do have the right to use the law to prohibit certain kinds of land uses within their boundaries, and that prohibited uses can include industrial activities such as gas drilling. Such prohibition is generally not construed as regulation of the industry, a responsibility that is administered at the state level. The distinction between regulating industry and prohibiting certain land uses through zoning or other land use powers is important when considering the question of legality. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have made key legal distinctions between regulations that determine the scope of environmental operations or pollution limits, and local laws that determine whether or not and where certain activities take place. From a landowners’ perspective, a property owner has the right to enter into a legal agreement on their property. In the case of fracking, this gives a drilling company the right to explore. However, the contract is solely with the gas company, and therefore does not have any impacts on the rights of the government to regulate for the public interest (zoning cannot be implemented via contractual agreement). Because pecuniary interests are subject to government regulations, landowners may not always be able to pursue the most profitable use of their land, so long as their rights are limited solely for the good, safety or protection of the entire community. From a community and local governance perspective, once drilling is allowed in a municipality,


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the community has no further right to determine how drilling proceeds. They do, however, have the right to determine how drilling proceeds before fracking takes place, and therefore localities should conduct thorough analysis of any possible impacts and mitigation measures before drilling is allowed (see section 2g for additional information). From a corporate perspective, businesses are largely viewed as individuals under the Constitution, yet the Supreme Court has noted that industrial uses can be prohibited from a community if they will have negative impacts on that community. In considering the issue of whether or not a community can ban the transport of fracking wastewater through its boundaries, the rules of interstate commerce apply. Therefore, a community cannot enact such a prohibition, though they can enact a ban on gas storage, wastewater treatment, or other land uses that they do not want in their community. Create reporting requirements to determine the profitability and accuracy of long-term natural gas production from shale (federal and state level) As noted previously, a June 2011 New York Times article noted that there is mixed data available on the productivity of shale gas wells. The newspaper’s analysis noted that the data of fracking’s profitability may be misleading, yet it serves as a significant attraction for investors. This misinformation poses a risk for financial markets and national economic health, because current trends are showing that some wells could become financially unviable within the next 10-15 years. As the article explains, the Barnett shale provides the best opportunity for a case study on calculating future natural gas potential. Therefore, federal resources could be used to obtain more accurate data and conduct audits of the industry’s estimates. This action should be prioritized in order to manage risk and avoid detrimental financial consequences, and could be implemented in the short-term and managed by federal agencies.

At the state level, state compacts could be implemented to require more accurate and consistent reporting for well data, perhaps at the shale-level (multi-state). A provision for ensuring accurate data could be implemented through the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, a multi-state government agency whose mission is to promote the use of oil and natural gas in environmentally friendly ways. Implement measures to protect water quality (multiple levels of government) Ideally, federal and state regulatory agencies could implement effective rules and enforcement mechanisms to protect surface and groundwater resources from possible contamination associated with fracking. However, according to the SAEB, the federal and state governments’ shared responsibility for water quality management is “not working as smoothly or as well as it should,”1 suggesting this option is not feasible in the short-term. Some advocates have also lobbied for oil and gas companies to be subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act. Nonetheless, comprehensive and consistent information is lacking on water consumption at every stage of hydraulic fracturing. Additional information is needed about water consumption, methane leakage into drinking water systems, and baseline water quality in order to better understand the impacts of fracking on water resources and to fully understand the implications of fracking for localities as well as soil and water conservation districts. Shale gas companies and regulatory agencies could collect this data (some companies and nonprofits are already collecting some data on water). The EPA’s current study of fracking’s impacts on drinking water resources will help to inform the policy options related to water resources protection. This study will be completed in 2014, though significant findings will be released as they are discovered. In the interim, states and localities could begin requiring the collection and dissemination of water data. Mandatory regulations for baseline water quality


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measurements would allow for accurate comparisons of methane emissions pre and post-fracking, and to help determine the validity of contamination claims. Although regulators and industry recognize the value of having this baseline data, localities have varied policies on authority for accessing private water well data. According to the SEAB report, this lack of consistency is an impediment to policy development. Therefore, a federal requirement would not be feasible, though a statelevel mandate could be possible. Additionally, safety measures could be required. For example, microseismic surveys can help drillers to ensure that fracking will only affect the shale rock formations and not spread into groundwater areas. Regular inspections during well construction and the fracking process can also help to avoid contamination. Fortunately, there has been significant progress on this issue with the EPA’s study of fracking’s impact on surface and groundwater. As the EPA notes, their research will examine the entire lifespan of water use in fracking. Once this data is made publicly available, lawmakers at all levels of government can implement policies and programs that will protect water resources. Implement measures to reduce air pollution (federal level) While further research is needed, initial studies have shown that air quality is worse in areas where fracking is occurring, largely due to methane emissions. Therefore, policies are needed to regulate and reduce methane emissions, air toxics, and other pollutants such as diesel from shale gas extraction. The EPA’s plans to review New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for oil and gas companies signifies government action to regulate air emissions. These regulations represent the first-ever national standards for fracking and would be a significant step toward protecting public health and the environment.

More information is needed on the methane emissions from shale gas and the extent of methane loss to the atmosphere from shale gas extraction. The 2011 Cornell University study was the original peer-reviewed paper on methane emissions from shale gas, and one of only several studies that have evaluated the greenhouse gas emissions from conventional gas extraction. The most effective policy strategy would be to have the federal government mandate that fracking companies measure and disclose the amount of emissions from shale gas operations. Although the EPA’s proposed standards mentioned previously are an important step toward reducing emissions during the fracking process, further actions could be taken to minimize impacts. For example, the EPA’s proposal does not address methane emissions (the rules do not control for methane emissions), and the New Source Performance Standards do not cover most existing shale gas sources (the exceptions are existing wells that are fractured or re-fractured). Yet previous studies have suggested that methane exposure be set at 10 percent of the gas’s “explosive limit” in order to avoid narcosis and potential explosive hazards. Mandating that drillers measure their emissions would require the implementation of systems to collect data on air pollution from fracking, which could be done with the help of oil producers who have already expressed interest in designing a system to collect this data. Alternately, this data could be collected through a federally funded and managed interagency planning initiative, which could also serve to address the impact of fracking emissions as compared to other fossil fuels. Incentives could also be provided to oil and gas companies to utilize the best available pollution reduction technologies and methods, for example, through tax breaks. Because incentives would operate outside of the scope of federal government regulation, they may be more politically feasible than implementing regulatory measures (at least for short-term implementation). However, many experts are encouraging the EPA to explicitly address methane and shale gas production controls in the agency’s current rule making process for


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shale gas production, believing that this would be the most effective policy. Policies that require a reduction in the amount of diesel used in surface operations during the drilling process could help to alleviate harmful emissions. Diesel is currently used as an additive to hydraulic fracturing fluid, and can contain harmful chemicals such as benzene, thereby adding to the toxicity of fracking fluid and produced water. There is no economical or procedural reason for using diesel, it is simply convenient to use in field operations. Using natural gas or, ideally, electricity generated from renewable sources, would help to improve air quality on drilling sites. Regulations on the use of diesel could be implemented by the EPA, which is currently considering permitting restrictions for diesel used in fracking, under the SDWA’a Underground Injection Control (UIC) program. Improve public information about fracking (multiple levels of government) It is difficult to obtain comprehensive information about shale gas operations, and few government data exist to inform the general public about natural gas extraction through fracking. The SAEB subcommittee suggests creating an online portal in order to centralize data from state and federal agencies and allow the public to access and compare information. Moreover, an online portal would increase transparency and better inform decision makers about the benefits and risks of fracking. The federal government could launch this portal in the short-term, and initial discussions have already occurred between the White House and the Department of Energy. Online portals could also be developed at the state level, and used in coordination with regional oil and gas associations. Publicly disclose the components of fracking fluid (federal and state level) The secrecy associated with hydraulic fracturing is a significant public concern, and the target of many anti-fracking advocacy campaigns. Some

companies and regulators are starting to disclose the chemicals that make up fracking fluid, but the federal government could take action to require disclosure. As previously noted, the Department of Interior has announced that they will propose such a requirement for federal lands. Meanwhile, drillers largely seem willing to comply with disclosure requirements, with the exception of “genuinely proprietary information.”2 Additionally, two important agencies plan on requiring disclosure of all fracking-related chemicals by drillers who use their voluntary disclosure registry known as “FracFocus.” These two groups are the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission and the Ground Water Protection Council (GWPC, a nonprofit whose members consist of state groundwater regulatory agencies that works to protect the nation’s groundwater supplies). The use of FracFocus by these groups could serve as a model for future disclosure policies. Encourage localities to plan for and manage the short and long-term impacts of fracking on communities (multiple levels of government) In order to fully understand the cumulative impacts of hydraulic fracturing on communities, local governments and planning staff should preemptively analyze all costs and benefits. Possible fracking-related impacts include increased traffic, habitat fragmentation, air pollution, loss of rural character and aesthetics, and changes to local water supplies. Currently, regulators, public citizens, and drilling companies have very few effective mechanisms or planning processes for dealing with these impacts. Because local governments have distributive capabilities, they can evaluate how best to deliver services to a community with or without fracking activities. If fracking does take place in a community, regulators should have effective tools available to mitigate these impacts. These mechanisms should be spearheaded at the state and local level, and successful pilot efforts could serve as models for use in other localities and regions.


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According to the SEAB report, mechanisms and practices that could be utilized include: • Using multi-well drilling pads (the practice of placing several wells on one drilling pad) in order to reduce the need for new road construction, minimize land clearing and surface disturbances, and reduce truck traffic associated with fracking activities. • Analyzing water consumption at the watershed-scale for affected water systems. • Obtaining formal notification from drilling companies on anticipated impacts. • Protecting (via conservation easement or other mechanism) the most sensitive areas that should be off-limits to fracking activities. • Creating environmental inventories before fracking commences, in order to have a better understanding of important natural resources within a locality’s boundaries. • Establishing a monitoring and enforcement process to continually assess the impacts to communities and the environment. This process would help to inform any mitigation measures that may be necessary, and should incorporate public participation and consider the rights of drilling companies. Given budget cuts within many localities, these efforts may need to be funded from states or federal agencies. However, some localities may already have inventories of their resources as well as policies in place to protect the area’s most critical resources. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Interior has a number of tools that could be implemented at the local level. One tool, known as “Master Leasing and Development Plans,” helps inform and improve the planning process for oil and gas production on federal lands, for example by requiring multi-well pad drilling, limitations on surface land disturbance, and phased leasing and development. Utilization of this tool for private lands at the local level could help to address

comprehensive impacts. Share and implement best practices among fracking companies (industry-led) A shale gas industry production organization could be created to collect and share information on best practices. Similar to an online portal for the general public that would share information broadly (or to FracFocus), this organization could collaborate on technological and environmental best practices. Best practices could also be prioritized for minimizing air pollution and water use, establishing measurements and reporting requirements for emissions from fracking activities, and minimizing the potential for contamination from wells (via casing and cementing best practices). In order to develop reliable metrics, regional considerations would need to be taken into account (e.g., differences in geology, regulatory environments, or water resources). The SEAB subcommittee report noted the challenges associated with accounting for regional differences, but also noted the need for proper training for drillers working in the field. The effort would primarily be industry-led, though the regional centers could involve state and local regulatory agencies, local universities and colleges and vocational resources for training workers, as well as public interest organizations. The drilling industry has already sharing best practices information on a regional level, for example through the Marcellus Shale Coalition or the American Petroleum Institute’s hydraulic fracturing workshop, held in Pittsburgh in early October 2011, that addressed engineering best practices. Public pressures have also influenced public engagement efforts on behalf of some companies. Therefore, greater information sharing could begin in the short-term. Invest in research and development (industry-led and federal level) Research and development efforts can help the in-


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dustry discover technologies that allow for more Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental efficient and less environmentally harmful drill- Regulation (STRONGER) and the Ground Waing practices. For example, the development of ter Protection Council (GWPC), that are already multi-well pad drillsharing fracking ing has reduced land information with “A key first step should be to invest federal clearings and new states. Coordinatresources into obtaining more accurate data road construction. ed efforts would on the productivity and profitability of natu- help to expand Much of this invest- ral gas extraction from shale wells, in order to database management can come from minimize risks to landowners, investors, and ment efforts that the industry itself, aim to share and consumers.� given the economic centralize relevant incentives for discovshale gas developering and implementing more efficient drilling ment information for state and federal regulators practices. However, the federal government can (and could help contribute to the online portal as also help support these efforts by increasing in- mentioned in subsection 2e. Additionally, federal vestment in unconventional gas research and de- agencies could make grants to states that volunvelopment. The SEAB report noted that funding teer to have their fracking regulations reviewed levels for these purposes is currently low. Addi- and analyzed by STRONGER; the SEAB report tional research and development funds for frack- notes that this could act as incentive for the states ing could be allocated through the Department of to implement more effective policies and recomEnergy, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the EPA. mendations. Increase the number of state oil and gas regulators, and increase state and federal communications among regulators (multiple levels of government) A 2009 ProPublica report noted that West Virginia has 17 state oil and gas inspectors and over 55,000 wells. This means that the inspectors would need to each visit nine wells per day, every day of the week, for an entire year. No state has more drilling than Texas, which has 273,660 wells and just 106 regulators to oversee them. Although the gas industry claims that state regulatory agencies would be more effective in regulating the oil and gas industry than the federal government, there are currently not enough inspectors in the 22 states where drilling activities are expanding. The federal government could help to increase the number of regulators by providing targeted funding to the states for this purpose. In addition to addressing the shortage of regulators, communications between federal and state regulators could be improved. Specifically, federal funding could support two nonprofits, the State

Recommendations Ultimately, all of the policies mentioned above are important for addressing challenges that are pertinent to the problems associated with hydraulic fracturing. However, a key first step should be to invest federal resources into obtaining more accurate data on the productivity and profitability of natural gas extraction from shale wells, in order to minimize risks to landowners, investors, and consumers. Regulation is also needed to protect the environment and human health. It is important to acknowledge, however, that federal and state regulatory agencies, along with corporations, are already intimately involved in environmental planning and management issues. Therefore, implementing any of the policy options discussed in this paper will require a significant amount of coordination, effort, and allocation (or a reallocation) of financial and human capital. Implementation will also require a shift of resources away from other policies and programs that may be beneficial in their own right.


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In order to determine prioritization for implementation, the SEAB report suggested two criteria: the ease and importance of implementation. As the report noted, implementing those programs that are seen as ‘low-hanging fruit’ will help to spark investment in additional policies (especially longer-term policies). This suggests that policies related to protecting water quality should be an immediate goal for governments at all levels. Legislators must also consider how to pay for these policies and programs, many of which recommend additional funding and investment. Additional research is needed into the most effective ways to finance these efforts, and could include investigating severance taxes for gas extraction. For example, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett announced a plan in October 2011 to impose fees on natural gas drilling companies. His goal is to use the revenue to cover gas production-related costs, but the revenue could also be considered for regulatory or protective measures. Conclusion Although fracking is intended to be a solution for addressing climate change and the U.S.’s dependence on foreign oil, the practice itself causes numerous problems and concerns. Because the practice of fracking in shale formations has only been used widely since 2000, many of the problems associated with drilling are not yet well understood and therefore require additional research and analysis. Unfortunately, solutions will not come easily or rapidly, as the issue is politically contentious at all levels of government. Nonetheless, the nationwide and international scope of fracking requires significant attention and demands policy intervention. Fracking is growing at a dramatic pace across the country, and therefore legislators must take action now to try and achieve a balance between environmental protection, economic growth, and equity for the affected communities. There are encouraging actions being taken by the EPA, but further data are needed, and additional regulations must be implemented.

As the SEAB report noted, “if the country is to enjoy the economic and other benefits of shale gas production over the coming years, disciplined action must be devoted to reducing the environmental impact that accompanies this development, and a prudent balance between development and environmental protection is best struck by establishing a strong foundation of regulation and enforcement, and adopting a policy and practice that measures, discloses, and continuously improves shale gas operations.” Endnotes U.S. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SAEB). Shale Gas Production Subcommittee Second Ninety- Day Report. November 18, 2011. 1

2

SEAB report, November 2011.

References 60 Minutes. CBS. “Shale Gas Drilling: Pros & Cons.” 14 November 2010. Accessed via: http://www.cbsnews.com/ video/watch/?id=7054210n Boyer, Elizabeth W., Bryan R. Swistock, James Clark, Mark Madden, and Dana E. Rizzo. Pennsylvania State UniversityThe Center for Rural Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania State University. “The Impact of Marcellus Gas Drilling on Rural Drinking Water Supplies.” October 2011. Camuti, Liz. Cornell Daily Sun. “City Bans Fracking on Municipal Land.” 3 November 2011. Accessed via: http:// www.cornellsun.com/section/news/content/2011/11/03/ city-bans-fracking-municipal-land Cappiello, Dina. The Associated Press. “Federal probe into hydraulic fracturing and its effects on drinking water to begin.” 3 November 2011. Chanatry, David . National Public Radio. “New York Town Takes Up Fracking Issue.” 3 November 2011. Accessed via: http://www.npr.org/2011/11/03/141968999/new-yorktown-takes-up-fracking-issue Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Outlook 2009 With Projections to 2030. March 2009. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Outlook 2011 with Projections to 2035. De-


POLICY & RESEARCH 51 cember 2010. Accessed via: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/ electricity.html Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Annual Energy Review 2010. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and National Energy Technology Laboratory. State Oil and Natural Gas Regulations Designed to Protect Water Resources report. May 2009. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SAEB). Shale Gas Production Subcommittee Ninety- Day Report. August 18, 2011. Department of Energy, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SAEB). Shale Gas Production Subcommittee Second Ninety- Day Report. November 18, 2011. EarthWorks website. http://www.earthworksaction.org/issues/detail/hydraulic_fracturing_101 EPA webinar. Office of Ground Water and Surface Water. “Permitting Guidance for Oil and Gas Hydraulic Fracturing Activities Using Diesel Fuels.” May 2011. EPA website on hydraulic fracturing. Multiple resources accessed. November and December 2011. Accessed via: http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm EPA, Office of Research and Development. Draft Plan to Study the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing on Drinking Water Resources. February 27, 2011. EPA, Office of Research and Development. Hydraulic Fracturing Research Study. June 2010. Fox, Josh. Gasland documentary movie. http://www. gaslandthemovie.com/ Groeger, Lisa. ProPublica. “New York Court Affirms Towns’ Power to Ban Fracking.” 22 February 2012. Accessed via: http://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-court-affirmstowns-powers-to-ban-fracking Ground Water Protection Council and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission. FracFocus website: http://fracfocus.org/ Here and Now. Boston NPR. “Can A Town Ban Fracking?” 7 November 2011. Accessed via: http://hereandnow.wbur. org/2011/11/07/dryden-fracking-ban Howarth, Robert W., Renee Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea. Cornell University. “Methane and the greenhouse-gas footprint of natural gas from shale formations.” 13 March 2011. Hurdle, Jon. AOL Energy. “Fracking Critics Blast New Plan

For East Coast Gas Drilling.” 9 November 2011. Jackson, Robert B., Brooks Rainey Pearson, Stephen G. Osborn,Nathaniel R. Warner, and Avner Vengosh. Duke University. “Research and Policy Recommendations for Hydraulic Fracturing and Shale‐Gas Extraction.” May 2011. Downloaded from: http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/researchandpolicyrecommendationsforhydraulic-fracturingandshale2010gasextraction Kusnetz, Nicholas. ProPublica. “Doctors Ask New York to Study Health Impacts Before Allowing Fracking.” 6 October 2011. Kusnetz, Nicholas. ProPublica. “EPA Plans to Issue Rules Covering Fracking Wastewater.” 20 October 2011. Kusnetz, Nicholas. ProPublica. “Pennsylvania Governor Proposes Fee on Gas Drillers.” 3 October 2011. Kusnetz, Nicholas. ProPublica. “Report for Obama Questions Effectiveness of Gas Drilling Regulations.” 12 August 2011. Accessed via: http://www.propublica.org/article/report-for-obama-questions-effectiveness-of-gas-drilling-regulations Lundgren, Kari. Bloomberg news online. “Fracking for Gas in a Field of Cabbages.” 6 December 2011. Lustgarten, Abrahm. ProPublica. “EPA Finds Compound Used in Fracking in Wyoming Aquifer.” 10 November 2011. Accessed via: http://www.propublica.org/article/epa-findsfracking-compound-in-wyoming-aquifer Lustgarten, Abrahm. ProPublica. “Natural Gas Politics.” 26 May 2009. Lustgarten, Abrahm. ProPublica. “State Oil and Gas Regulators Are Spread Too Thin to Do Their Jobs.” 30 December 2009. Accessed via: http://www.propublica.org/article/ state-oil-and-gas-regulators-are-spread-too-thin-to-do-theirjobs-1230 Lustgarten, Abrahm and Kari Lundgren. ProPublica. “Feds Link Water Contamination to Fracking for the First Time.” 8 December 2011. Accessed via: http://www.propublica. org/article/feds-link-water-contamination-to-fracking-forfirst-time Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “The Future of Natural Gas” Interim Report. 2010. Natural Resources Defense Council expert blog: http:// switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html Parker, Tim. San Francisco Chronicle. “How to Profit from Natural Gas.” 30 November 2011.


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Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. Webpage on the management challenges associated with hydraulic fracturing: http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/forestry/naturalgasexploration/challenges/index.htm Pless, Jacquelyn. National Conference of State Legislators. “Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing: States Take Action.” December 2010.

Accessed via: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/newdata-not-so-sunny-on-us-natural-gas-supply.html?_r=1 Urbina, Ian. New York Times. “Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers.” 26 February 2011. Accessed via: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?_ r=2&scp=1&sq=hydraulic%20fracturing&st=cse

Rascoe, Ayesha. Reuters. “U.S. to require details of fracking on federal land.” 31 October 2011.

Urbina, Ian. New York Times. “Rush to Drill for Natural Gas Creates Conflicts With Mortgages.” 19 October 2011. Accessed via: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/us/rushto-drill-for-gas-creates-mortgage-conflicts.html?_r=2

Scherer, Glenn. Charlottesville Daily Progress. “Towns take on ‘corporate bullies.’” 30 October 2011. Seelye, Katherine Q. New York Times. “Gas Boom Aids Pennsylvania, but Some Worry Over the Risk.” 14 October 2011. Accessed via: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/ us/hydraulic-fracturing-brings-money-and-problems-topennsylvania.html?pagewanted=all

Cristina is completing her Masters in Urban and Environmental Planning at the University of Virginia School of Architecture. Prior to graduate school, Cristina worked in marketing and communications at The Nature Conservancy.

Sinden, Amy. Temple University. “Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing (or lack thereof ) under the Safe Drinking Water Act.” PowerPoint presentation, date unknown. Soraghan, Mike, and Greenwire. Scientific American. “A mysterious fish-kill in Dunkard Creek may have been the result of wastewater from hydraulic fracturing of shale for natural gas.” 12 October 2011. Accessed via: http://www. scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=epa-scientist-pointsat-fracking-in-fish-kill-mystery Soraghan, Mike, and Greenwire. The New York Times. “Pa. Well Blowout Tests Natural Gas Industry on Voluntary Fracking Disclosure.” 4 May 2011. Accessed via: http:// www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/04/04greenwire-pa-wellblowout-tests-natural-gas-industry-on-36297.html Team, Trefis. Forbes online. “Abundant U.S. Natural Gas Supply Slakes Asian Demand.” 23 September 2011. The Associated Press. “18 cows die from apparent chemical release.” 29 April 2009. The Associated Press. “Niagara Falls envisions profit in ‘hydrofracking’ waste; treated water could soon be crashing over namesake waterfalls.” 21 October 2011. The Union of Concerned Scientists Website: http://www. ucsusa.org/clean_energy/technology_and_impacts/energy_ technologies/how-natural-gas-works.html Urbina, Ian. New York Times. “Insiders Sound an Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush.” 25 June 2011. Accessed via: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/us/26gas.html?_r=1 Urbina, Ian. New York Times. “New Report by Agency Lowers Estimates of Natural Gas in U.S.” 28 January 2012.


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Reinventing the Power Grid for the TwentyFirst Century: Emerging Technologies by Patrick Mayfield “The provision of reliable and secure energy to meet the growing demands of this century, in a way that mitigates the adverse effects of climate change, is an existential challenge to the human enterprise.” -Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution The twenty-first century energy revolution is upon us. We have made considerable progress toward producing and consuming energy in a more sustainable way that meets the needs of an expanding global population and built environment. Yet despite these advancements, one of the greatest barriers to fully realizing a truly sustainable and secure energy future remains the power grid itself. By almost any measure, the current configuration and capacity of the aging U.S. power grid will become less efficient and resilient in the coming years and decades. Broader economic and environmental concerns will ultimately drive necessary, incremental changes to the current operation and configuration of the grid. However, the system’s current vulnerability to natural disasters and possible attacks demonstrates why a holistic reassessment and restructuring of the grid is of paramount importance.

made these large centralized operations increasingly unattractive and complex to implement. The Information Handling Service, Inc.’s Cambridge Energy Research Associates (IHS CERA) found that between 2000 and 2008, the capital costs involved in constructing a new power plant increased 131 percent. IHS CERA cited “rising raw material and labor costs, a shortage of skilled and specialized engineers and a global increase in demand for similar equipment and services,” as well as increased government regulation as factors that are forcing energy producers to fundamentally rethink how to produce and supply power.2 The reliance on high-voltage transmission lines also represents a “problematic infrastructure” for utility companies due to “NIMBY” (Not In My Backyard) attitudes and, more practically, a power loss of up to 20 percent over long distances.3 Ultimately, the need to “reduce power generation cost and find solutions that provide a rapid return on investment without sacrificing long term reliability and flexibility”4 is quickly encouraging energy producers to reevaluate current industry practices, find alternate technologies, and develop strategies to efficiently and sustainably supply electric power to consumers.

Existing power infrastructure

Distributed power systems and microgrids

In the United States, the prevailing organization of the power grid relies on the centralized generation of power from large-scale plants to consumers through a complex, long-distance transmission and distribution infrastructure. Historically, the centralized model was a result of the highly capital-intensive construction of the first power grids in an attempt to achieve economies of scale.1 Unfortunately, the evolution of energy policy throughout the twentieth century has

The power industry is beginning to look past centralized power production to decentralized production through the development of microgrids that employ distributed generation (decentralized) technologies. In essence, microgrids involve small, distributed generators that are a hybrid of microgeneration (on-site generation) and utility scale (centralized) generation.5 Similar to large, centralized power grids, microgrids consist of a central control system that manages a series of


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interconnected electrical loads and distributed energy generation resources. The capability of the microgrid to operate independently from the larger grid network presents a novel structure that will allow the grid to operate far more efficiently and resiliently by breaking up a supply network into autonomous yet interconnected parts.6 Today there are over 140 microgrids in operation worldwide that supply over 1.1 gigawatts of power through “a wide variety of renewable and fossil fuel-based power sources [across multiple sites] including commercial and industrial sites, university campuses, remote off-grid communities, and military microgrids.”7 One of the greatest challenges designers face in implementing efficient microgrids is the need for a “virtual power plant,” which is a series of “aggregated, distributed generation resources that are treated as a single entity.” The task of controlling multiple, diverse power generation technologies is a careful balancing act that requires information and communication technology-assisted grid control at levels previously unseen.8 A microgrid is different from the operation of a single, centralized power plant whose energy output can be readily managed to meet dynamic power demands at a single location. It becomes more difficult to manage the simultaneous output of multiple power plants across a region linked together in an autonomous network. Distributed generation technologies Certain technologies better lend themselves to the smaller scale operations of decentralized power production, which achieves the economies of scale necessary for distributed generation to proliferate. Currently, these technologies include internal combustion engines, microturbines, photovoltaics, fuel cells, and wind turbines, all of which have numerous advantages and disadvantages depending on the nature of application and implementation.

Internal combustion (IC) engines The reciprocating internal combustion engine accounts for over 75 percent of all fossil fuel-driven distributed generation units, with over 9,000 megawatts of installed capacity in the United States today. While the IC engine provides a lowcost, highly reliable source of decentralized power production with perhaps the most readily available fuel sources, high emissions and low fuel-toenergy efficiency ratings (between 25-33 percent) provide a good incentive to look at more efficient alternatives in larger scale applications.9 In an effort to remain competitive despite mounting environmental concerns, designers hope to further reduce emission levels and increase efficiencies to near the 50 percent level in future designs by better controlling combustion. This will assure that IC engines will likely continue as a prominent form of distributed power generation into the near future.10 Microturbines This is a relatively new technology that generates electricity by burning gaseous and liquid fuels to run an electrical generator. Microturbines are “mechanically simple, single-shaft devices with air bearings and no lubricants” that can run off of a number of different fuels, including natural gas and gasoline, with efficiencies in the 28-30 percent range.11 Microturbines face the same challenges of low efficiency and environmental impact as do internal combustion engines. Photovoltaics Perhaps one of the most familiar microgeneration technologies, the solar industry has recently achieved substantial breakthroughs in cost with some solar panels now below the one dollar per peak watt mark. Nevertheless, the necessary spatial requirements to generate an adequate supply of power at scales beyond the individual site level continue to hinder growth. By 2010, only 2,593 megawatts of total solar capacity were installed


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across the United States, roughly equal to a third of the generating capacity of the Grand Coulee Dam.12 Fuel cells First implemented in NASA’s Project Gemini in the 1960s, the fuel cell generates power through a simple chemical oxidation-reduction reaction. At the most basic level, fuel cells combine fuel with oxygen to produce electricity, heat, and water. Most importantly, because the electrochemical process is a direct form of fuel-to-energy conversion, it is much more efficient than conventional power sources. Fuel cell technology for this reason presents one of the cleanest and most reliable forms of distributed generation, with a 47 percent efficiency rating. Hydrogen is the most common fuel, but with minimal system adjustments natural gas and biofuels present viable alternatives. Because fuel cells contain no moving parts, they can easily adapt to both stationary and mobile applications, potentially broadening their market penetration. Wind turbines With over 40 gigawatts of installed generating capacity nationwide, wind power is showing much greater promise than other renewables, as evidenced by the level of investment it has received in recent years. Many challenges remain, however, due to the high variability of localized atmospheric conditions. Wind generation is less predictable than fuel-driven generation supplied through the grid.13 Ultimately, a mismatch arises as peak generation and peak consumption cannot be synchronized as with fuel-driven generation, introducing the need for temporary energy storage in wind-powered microgrids. Incentives and barriers to decentralized power The benefits of adopting a decentralized power distribution model would have a profound im-

pact on society. With respect to the grid’s current operation, the tangible incentives would include the following: (1) the capacity to add incremental supplies of power closer to where they are needed; (2) the ability to locate future distributed generation sources along existing distribution lines, which provides further financial incentive to “go small” rather than “go big”; (3) the increased efficiency from minimizing the distance from energy production to energy consumption; and (4) the increased resilience against blackouts, as individual microgrids will have the capacity to operate independently within the larger grid network.14 With these enhancements, the most significant benefit of distributed generation, however, lies in the elimination of the need for the central dispatch of power, providing instead the capacity for local control during supply disturbances.15 The development of distributed power systems along existing transmission and distribution lines will allow for power companies to “go small” to meet increasing demand while avoiding the cost-intensive construction of new centralized plants and transmission corridors and increasing the grid’s reliability, security, and efficiency.16 Despite these advantages, many challenges remain in achieving decentralized power generation. Cost remains a primary concern as price parity between large-scale (centralized) generation and small-scale (distributed) generation remains far apart. Furthermore, would-be investors fear that the creation of government subsidies to support distributed generation could ultimately produce an unsustainable industry and discourage growth in the long term.17 Another problem arises from the integration of small-scale generation and power storage systems into an interconnected distribution network. When too many generators are connected under the same transformer, the probability increases for supply voltage variations, rapid voltage changes, short circuits, and grid losses.18 Integrating distributed generation into local and


56 POLICY & RESEARCH

regional infrastructure plans presents yet another barrier as the implementation of such technologies is not yet a priority for power producers and individual consumers. Complex and inconsistent approval processes continue to hinder growth in those communities where distributed generation projects may hold promise.19 For these reasons, jumpstarting a nationwide transformation from centralized to decentralized power generation will require a fundamentally different bureaucratic process that will enable communities to more readily adopt these technologies at the local and regional scales. Distributed renewable energy sources Beyond all else, the integration of multiple, diverse power technologies into a single microgrid produces a unique set of concerns with the addition of distributed renewable energy sources that have a highly variable energy output over long periods. While the allure of renewable generation continues to attract investment, the reality that most renewable energy sources fluctuate on daily and even seasonal cycles presents a great challenge for producers trying to meet growing energy demands. Understanding the dynamics of renewable energy produces a new set of periodic relationships that engineers and infrastructure planners must account for in future models of power demand and dispatch.20 These models should include the considerations that “solar power can only be used during the daytime, that wind and wave energy can be even more robust at night, that hydro power resources are more abundant in the summer, and that solar and wind resources are more abundant in the winter.”21 The proliferation of renewable generation in high density urban centers remains bleak due to the large footprint renewable generation facilities require to produce levels of power comparable to their more conventional counterparts.22 On the other hand, locating renewable generation facilities far from high-demand centers presents enormous financial and logistical challenges by virtue

of the added infrastructure required to transmit and distribute power to customers over long distances, which is counterintuitive to the distributed generation/microgrid concept.23 With a diversity of generation technologies comes the issue of technical compatibility. For this reason, the guarantee of reliable, uninterrupted power becomes complicated as photovoltaic systems and wind turbines operate differently from traditional steam and hydraulic turbines. This difference often requires reactive power support that can further increase intermittent disruptions in power output.24 Despite these barriers, renewable energy technologies, and photovoltaic systems in particular, continue to grow at the microgeneration (individual site) scale because many customers have the option of selling unused power back to the grid. In the long term however, this arrangement will prove more financially burdensome to utility companies as microgeneration installations proliferate.25 “Smart grid” adaptations Whether distributed generation technologies will proliferate under the microgrid model relies heavily upon the future capacity of the grid to function via advanced, computer-controlled communication networks. Currently, the failure of a single component or even a small software glitch in a complex control system can shut down the entire grid.26 For this reason, the capacity of the independent control systems to respond to localized events at the microgrid scale would improve the system’s resilience and leave fewer customers in the dark when supply disruptions occur. One possible solution to this problem lies in the implementation of “smart grid” technology. Essentially, the “smartening” of the grid would integrate advanced computer control and communication technologies at every level of the power process from generation to transmission and distribution to consumption, achieving an unprecedented level of real-time control over the entire power network.


POLICY & RESEARCH 57

Proponents of the smart grid argue that the implementation of these technologies would accomplish the following goals: first, it would resolve outstanding compatibility issues among emerging technologies with the capacity to accommodate all forms of energy generation and storage. Second, it could provide the grid with the capability to respond to system disturbances by performing “continuous predictive analysis to detect existing and future problems and initiate corrective actions.” Third, the technology would help consumers with advanced power metering and promote the development of new products, markets, and services that will allow for greater choice and competition in the energy market. Fourth, the smart grid could operate with far greater efficiency and with greater resilience after attacks and natural disasters. Finally, it would provide the quality of power necessary for the “digital, computer, and communication based economy” that will continue to expand in the coming decades.27

ponents argue that a smarter grid would inevitably produce a more secure grid, leagues ahead of where it stands now. Cogeneration of heat and power With a proliferation of microgrids and distributed generation technologies comes the unique potential for the cogeneration of heat and power from a single energy source. Traditional forms of power generation have historically produced significant amounts of waste heat. But the smaller scale of emerging distributed generation technologies allows for the ability to better capture the heat.30 According the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the level of waste heat generated by power plants today “could save the United States 5.3 quadrillion British Thermal Units (BTUs) of energy by 2030—equivalent to half of the energy consumed by U.S. households—and could reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 800 million metric tons per year.”31

Despite its great promise, many fear the “smartening” of the grid may leave it more vulnerable Today, most power plants operate at an overall to computer cyber-attack. While some of these fuel-to-electricity efficiency rating in the range fears may be overblown, the reality that the sim- of 28-32 percent, with much of the remaining ple Windows- or Linux-based computers which 70 percent being heat lost to the environment as increasingly control energy production are as fuel is burned and air exhausted.32 In an effort to “vulnerable to malware as your desktop PC” gives recoup some of this wasted resource, combinedpause to many.28 As Professor David Nicol of the power-cycle technology uses heat exchangers, abUniversity of Illinois sorption chillers, and Urbana-Champaign desiccant dehumidi“While discussions of sustainability and describes, “while the fication to capture energy security dominate the national failure of any single waste heat to power component will have discourse, the inevitable renewal of the na- steam microturbines. limited repercussions tion’s power grid represents an undertaking With this integrated to this vast circuit, a approach, newer powof unprecedented scale.” coordinated cyberer plant designs can attack on multiple achieve fuel-to-energy points in the grid could damage equipment so ex- efficiency ratings topping 90 percent. 33 Cogentensively that our nation’s ability to generate and eration at the smallest of scales has the potential to deliver power would be severely compromised for deliver waste heat from nearby power production weeks, perhaps even months” through the infiltra- facilities to surrounding homes and businesses tion of even the simplest computer virus.29 With through steam pipe networks. While this applicathe addition of advanced firewalls, however, pro- tion adds another layer of infrastructure, the po-


58 POLICY & RESEARCH

tential for reduced demand in dense urban sectors could be significant at the appropriate scale.

outmoded power grid will present to our twentyfirst century society.

Conclusions

Endnotes

A complete transformation of the existing national power grid could take decades, requiring an incremental strategy and recognizing that changes and adaptations must occur over many years to have the greatest probability of success.34 With this in mind, the proliferation of distributed power systems via the microgrid model provides the opportunity for phased reconstruction of the power grid. Over time, as more microgrids are brought online, the aggregate impact will have profound impacts for overall system efficiency, reliability, security, and resilience. With the integration of smart technology into the future decentralized grid, energy costs will fall dramatically because of energy-resource optimization, centralized load management, and changes in consumer behavior.35 Furthermore, with the growing potential for cogeneration to provide both heat and power to local communities, the benefits of a twenty-first century power grid could produce a radically different future for how the built environment is designed, operated, and inhabited.

1

While discussions of sustainability and energy security dominate the national discourse, the inevitable renewal of the nation’s power grid represents an undertaking of unprecedented scale. With the technology in development, political will represents the only remaining barrier to what will undoubtedly become one of the great challenges and accomplishments of the next century. Producers and consumers can no longer afford to ignore the current state of the grid and its often precarious and haphazard relationship to the changing built environment. Perhaps to our own detriment, our increasing reliance on the continuous supply of electrical power for our daily routines reaches the breaking point when even small disruptions in supply occur. Ultimately, achieving a sustainable energy future will rest on our ability to address the technological and economic challenges that an

The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011). Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector 2 Ibid. 3 Fuel Cell Energy, Inc. (2011). Retrieved November 2011, from http://www.fuelcellenergy.com/files/FCE%20WhitePaper%20040308_3.pdf 4 Siemens AG. (2011). Retrieved November 2011, from http://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/en/power-generation/ power-plants/ 5 Reitenbach, G. (2011). The Smart Grid and Distributed Generation: Better Together. Power, 46-51. 6 The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011). Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector. 7 Reitenbach, G. (2011). The Smart Grid and Distributed Generation: Better Together. Power, 46-51. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Lasseter, R. H. (2007). Microgrids and Distributed Generation. Journal of Energy Engineering, 144-149. 11 Ibid. 12 The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011). Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector. 13 Ibid. 14 Reitenbach, G. (2011). The Smart Grid and Distributed Generation: Better Together. Power, 46-51. 15 Lasseter, R. H. (2007). Microgrids and Distributed Generation. Journal of Energy Engineering, 144-149. 16 The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011). Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector. 17 Ibid. 18 Cagno, E., Castelli Dezza, F., Delfanti, M., Merlo, M., & Trianni, A. (2011). One Step on the Smart Grid Path: Load and Generation Coordination in a Virtual Power System. Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, 275-282. 19 Lyster, R. Smart Grids: Opportunities for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation. Monash University Law Review, 173-191. 20 Xiao, L., Lin, L., & Liu, Y. (2011). Discussion on the Architecture and Operation Mode of Future Power Grids. Energies, 1025-1035. 21 Ibid. 22 Cagno, E., Castelli Dezza, F., Delfanti, M., Merlo, M., & Trianni, A. (2011). One Step on the Smart Grid Path: Load and Generation Coordination in a Virtual Power System. Journal of Energy and Power Engineering, 275-282. 23 The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011).


POLICY & RESEARCH 59 Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector. 24 Xiao, L., Lin, L., & Liu, Y. (2011). Discussion on the Architecture and Operation Mode of Future Power Grids. Energies, 1025-1035. 25 Ibid. 26 Lasseter, R. H. (2007). Microgrids and Distributed Generation. Journal of Energy Engineering, 144-149. 27 Abbasi, A. R., & Stefi, A. R. (2010). The Basic Concepts of Smart Grid: Initiatives, Technologies, Characteristics, Standards and Solutions. International Review on Modelling and Simulations, 64-68. 28 Nicol, D. M. (2011). Hacking the Lights Out. Scientific American, 70-75. 29 Ibid. 30 Lasseter, R. H. (2007). Microgrids and Distributed Generation. Journal of Energy Engineering, 144-149. 31 The Brookings Institute & The Hoover Institution. (2011).

Assessing the Role of Distributed Power Systems in the U.S. Power Sector. 32 Lasseter, R. H. (2007). Microgrids and Distributed Generation. Journal of Energy Engineering, 144-149. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid.

Patrick Mayfield is a fourth year architecture major with interests in urban planning, public policy, and politics. Upon graduation, Patrick will be joining Governor McDonnell’s cabinet administration in Richmond, working with the Governor’s appointments team in the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth.


60 OPINION

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Not the Best Approach to Making Environmental Policy by Jean Paul Martinod-Sanchez Environmental policy and the process of developing it is arguably one of the most controversial matters in the world of politics. Among some of the most debated issues are health effects of pollution, acid deposition, waste, dam building, and animal rights. Today, most politicians prefer taking an economic approach, analyzing what the costs of putting forward a certain project are and, if the costs are less than the benefits, the project is to be approved. Alternatively, if the costs surpass the benefits, the project would be rejected. This systematic modus operandi is called cost-benefit analysis. It didn’t use to be this way. Yes, the costs and benefits of programs were calculated, but basing decision-making on these data was not customary. It wasn’t till Republicans controlled Congress in 1995 that using cost-benefit analysis in order to decide whether or not to approve certain program became the focus of.1 Before this, environmental policy was mostly debated based on scientific and ethical premises. Many approve of this change, some do not. Most politicians hold in high regard its practicality, while many environmentalists view it as unethical. The truth is, cost-benefit analysis doesn’t always allow for government to enforce certain necessary laws or to create a number of much needed programs. Accepting that money trumps values and that it can measure the necessities for human endurance is foolish and any approach based on this assumption should be discarded for three main reasons: First of all, assuming that everything can be equally exchanged for anything else is unreal, as is the case of believing environmental benefits can be measured with money; secondly, even if we could put a price tag on the environment, by recurring to solutions based solely on cost-benefit studies we are purposely ignoring any ethical responsibilities; and finally, supposing the costs and

benefits could and should be calculated, cost-benefit analyses are not always accurate, allowing the chance for poorly elaborated laws or programs, or impeding the passing of crucial regulation. The cost-benefit approach towards environmental policy frequently implies that things such as health or the environment have a monetary price tag. The costs usually have a directly monetized value. On the other hand, benefits are indirectly given a financial value. Human lives, animal lives, and ecosystems are all to be given a price tag. If this weren’t true, comparing costs and benefits wouldn’t be possible. In order to relate costs and benefits, economists must have both benefits and costs in the same group. Finding the absurdity of putting a price tag on the potential benefits of environmental regulation is not hard to do. Even the EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) admits the process of giving a price to human life is controversial: “The valuation of human health benefits is often a crucial, but sometimes controversial, aspect of the application of benefit-cost analysis to environmental policies.”2 It is a contentious matter, and with good reason. Prices are usually dictated by the market. The question therefore is: Should the market also dictate the price of a human life? The outrageous Senior Death Discount is a great example of why the markets should not dictate the value of a human life: According to surveys carried out during the Bush administration, the average value people give to their own life is of $3.7 million. Some might consider this fair. A same style of survey also provided a price for older people, this being only $2.6 million.3 So should we say that our life is more valuable than that of our parents or grandparents because the market says so? The question is not only rhetoric, but


OPINION 61

it also proves that putting monetary numbers on human life is meaningless. The fact of the matter is there are some things that shouldn’t be priced. Most people would now agree that human life shouldn’t be measured with dollars. Yet many still believe that the environment can and should be priced. The assertion is somehow more “humanly acceptable”, yet it has major flaws, both in reasoning and ethically. Reasonably, the assessment that the environment (the atmosphere, the oceans, rivers, etc.) should be priced has no basis. Putting a price on something would imply that it is potentially for sale. If a person were to buy all of the rivers in the world, this would be surely repudiated, no matter the price. As unlikely as this may be, the point is that a price given to something that should not be priced has no meaning at all. Furthermore, if this same person, as a private owner of the world’s rivers, were to obstruct the access to them, the consequences would be obviously negative to people, which takes us to the ethical flaw. At first sight, a morally correct action is that which doesn’t afflict he who carries it out or others. The consequence of selling the Earth’s rivers negatively affects every single person that is deprived of accessing these rivers because they are now private property, making the action of selling rivers, and concurrently the action of putting a price on them, morally incorrect. This same argument can be made against pricing people, animal species, rivers, oceans, etc. The wrongness of putting a price on what shouldn’t be sold cannot be overstated, and its unethicality is indisputable. But let’s suppose that the market could put a price on health, animal life, and the environment. As I have previously explained, a cost-benefit analysis is the process of measuring the costs and benefits of certain program or proposal. As one might guess, the result of a cost-benefit analysis depends on the accuracy of the calculation of costs and benefits. In order to make a decision based on a CBA, there must be clearly defined numbers. However, when referring to environmental protection and regulation, most discussed issues

incorporate continuously changing facts and predictions. From global warming to nuclear power plant operations, estimates change continuously. A great example may be taken from the predictions of how much oil would be spilled because of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Initially, according to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, government reports indicated that 1,000 barrels of oil per day were being leaked from the well. This estimate would rise up to a worst-case scenario of 100,000 barrels of oil per day.4 Even though this same report indicates unreliable sources from initial calculations, later independent scientists would estimate the amount of oil spilled to be about 26,000 barrels per day, which is still well below the 62,000 barrel per day in the August government estimate. The 1,000 barrel per day initial estimate probably gave many people a sense of indifference towards this accident. If decision-makers, such as the President, would have recurred to a cost-benefit analysis in order to come up with a solution to this problem, this estimate would have lessened their perception of the magnitude of the problem, interfering with the urgent actions that had to be taken. Because of the evident existence of inconclusive and continuously changing evidence in the calculation of costs and benefits, it is irresponsible to rely only on cost-benefit analyses when formulating environmental policy. Assuming to know everything about a developing circumstance is nonsensical. Although sometimes cost-benefit analyses fail in mere mathematical calculations, many miscalculations are due to lack of knowledge. Now, some might say that when taking decisions there is no choice but acting based on the information possessed, and therefore cost-benefit analysis is the “less harmful” out of all the processes for decision making. As many environmentalists, I would propose using the Precautionary Principle. This approach proposes that, in the existence of doubt or in the absence of scientific agreement, decision-makers should take action based on the predicted worst-case scenario. More accurately,


62 OPINION

it is described by environmentalists the following way: “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.”5 In many cases the lack of action due to disagreement or lack of knowledge has caused severe harm. According to a report published by the World Health Organization: “Millions of children worldwide have suffered from nervous system damage, diminished mental capacity and thus ability to make a living, as a result of exposure to lead from smelters, in paint and in gasoline. Tobacco, asbestos and numerous other agents provide ample evidence of the high costs associated with waiting for convincing proof of harm.”6 Although going with a cost-benefit analysis process in order to make decisions might prove fruitful, there is no doubt that using the Precautionary Principle is a much more responsible approach. Relying on cost-benefit analysis as the sole method to decide whether a law or a program should or should not be passed is wrong. A cost-benefit analysis should not be meant to act as the ultimate factor in the government’s decision-making process. The father of cost-benefit analysis, Jules Depuit, “defined the way in which benefits and costs should be measured, and firmly embraced the principle that an investment decision, such as building a road or a bridge, should meet a criterion that benefits exceed costs.”7 This insight gives us a better understanding of how cost-benefit analysis should be used. The government is not meant to function as a business (without implying that it shouldn’t incorporate certain aspects of business operation). The role of the government is not to invest, but, as the Preamble to the United States Constitution states, to “form a more perfect Union” and to “establish Justice”. This includes ensuring that people are allowed to do what is right, and impeded from doing what is not. Costs should be taken into account in order to assure there is no wasteful spending, yet cost-benefit analysis should not be regarded as the deciding authority when formulating a law or bringing forward

an environmental program. Legislators should focus on making a progressive transition from a system that bases decision-making on changing costs and benefits to a system that takes into account the Precautionary Principle and positions ethical reasoning before money making analyses. Endnotes Freeman III, A. (2003). Economics, Incentives, and Environmental Policy. In M. Kraft. & N. Vig. (Eds.), Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century (5th ed., p. 207). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, p. 207. 1

U.S. EPA. Deep water: the Gulf oil disaster and the future of offshore drilling: report to the President. (2011). Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2

Seelye, K. & Tierney, J. (2003, May 8). ‘Senior Death Discount’ Assailed. New York Times, p. 8. 4 SAB Review Draft: Valuing Mortality Risk Reductions for Environmental Policy: A White Paper (December 10, 2010). (2011). Washington, D.C.: United States Environmental Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental Economics. 3

Lewis, S. (1999). The Precautionary Principle and Corporate Disclosure. In C. Raffensperger & J. Tickner (Eds.), Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Implementing the Precautionary Principle. Washington, D.C.: Island Press, p. 241. 5

Martuzzi, M., & Tickner, J. (2004). Introduction – the precautionary principle: protecting public health, the environment and the future of our children. The precautionary principle: protecting public health, the environment and the future of our children. Copenhagen: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, p. 8. 6

Pearce, D. (1998). Cost-benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14(4), 85. 7

Jean-Paul Martinod-Sanchez is a first-year undergraduate currently studying at the University of Virginia. He was born in Miami, Florida, and has lived most of his life in Ecuador. An active member of Amnesty International, he is interested in human rights advocacy and lends his services to the Hope Community Center in Charlottesville. He supports a responsible approach towards environmental policy, without wasteful spending, yet conscious that the role of government is not to make a profit.


Acknowledgments We would like to thank our sponsors for their generous financial support. Without their assistance, this publication would not have been possible.

The Center for Undergraduate Excellence (CUE) The Center for Undergraduate Excellence advises students regarding undergraduate research opportunities and national scholarships and fellowships. Students are encouraged to visit the Center throughout their undergraduate careers. For more information about the Center, please visit its website at www.virginia.edu/cue or its office at 305 Harrison Institute/Small Special Collections Library.

Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy The Masters of Public Policy at the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy has been established to prepare students for careers in both domestic and international policy arenas. The program provides students with the substantive knowledge, analytical skills, and ethical foundation needed for public leadership. The Frank Batten School now offers both an accelerated and a two-year MPP as well as an undergraduate major. For more information about the Frank Batten School, please visit its website at http://batten.virginia.edu/ or its office in Garrett Hall.


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