Viewpoint Tactical Magazine #4 Summer 2015

A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS

VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM

EXIT STRATEGIES FOR THE

DRUG WAR

By Jack A. Cole

ISIS: IS THE FRONTLINE MOVING TO THE U.S?

By John Gomez

CYBER TSCM

By J.D. LeaSure

HOW DID THEY GET HERE?

By Steven Krzyzanowski

WELCOME

WELCOME

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VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

ISSUE 4, SUMMER 2015 8

ISIS: IS THE FRONTLINE MOVING TO THE U.S.?

By John Gomez

18

CYBER TSCM

By J.D. LeaSure

24 EXIT STRATEGIES FOR THE DRUG WAR

By Jack A. Cole 36 NUMBERS 44 HOW DID THEY GET HERE?

By Steven Krzyzanowski

PUBLISHER:

VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine is published by: MAD4ART ® International LLC., P.O. Box 56454, Virginia Beach, VA, 23456. / scott@mad4art.com / 757-721-2774 / MAD4ART.COM © MAD4ART ® INTERNATIONAL LLC 2015 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED U.S Department of Veterans Affairs,Registered Veteran- Owned Small Business (VOSB), DUNS: 829545115 Articles that appear in VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine or on VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM are for informational purposes only. The nature of the content of all of the articles is intended to provide readers with accurate information in regard to the subject matter covered. However, some of the articles contain authors’ opinions which may not reflect a position considered or adopted by VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM. Articles are published with the understanding that VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM is not engaged in rendering ANY advice, instruction or opinions. VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM has taken reasonable care in sourcing and presenting the information contained in VIEWPOINT TACTICAL Magazine or VIEWPOINTTACTICAL.COM, but accepts no responsibility for any physical or emotional injury, damages of any kind, financial, or other loss or damage. There is no promise or warranty, either expressed or implied regarding the content of any published submission appearing in this publication or website.

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By John Gomez

ISIS IS HERE?

FRONTLINES

8

ISIS IS HERE? IS THE FRONTLINE MOVING TO AMERICA?

By John Gomez

“S

upporting the Islamic cause is a mentality and ideology more than anything else. You are always looking at everything through your Mujahid eyes, always thinking how any situation could benefit the Jihad. Any opportunity can be a Mujahid moment.

Any opportunity to get; money, anonymity, weapons, friendships, leadership positions amongst Muslims, and even beneficial knowledge is your Jihad and will help you in the future.

You will get rewarded from Allah –in this life and the next- for every Jihad effort you take.

When the Jihad reaches your neighborhood, rise up and race towards shahadah (martyrdom). That has been your goal from

the beginning, that is why you are reading this book. Do not let the fitnah (temptation) of money and weapons override your intention of istish-haad (seeking martyrdom).

Use what you are good at and make most out of it to support the Islamic struggle.

Work with similar minded people to you anonymously online. Some people will be hackers, others will be news sharers on social media by promoting their accounts.

Specialize in what you are good at and teach it to others anonymously.”

Those are the words from the last page in a chapter entitled “Last Words of Advice” from an e-book developed by ISIS to educate those in the west how-to conduct covert operations. The book’s nearly one hundred pages contains chapters on “hiding the extremist identity”, “earning money”, “primitive weapons”, “weapon acquisition”, “bomb making”, “covert weapons transports” and “what to do when the jihad begins in the west?”

By John Gomez

ISIS IS HERE?

FRONTLINES

10

The book, in essence an instruction manual for covert ISIS operators, is well developed and the tactics, techniques and practices (TTP) that it describes are not only effective, but reminiscent of guerrilla tactics our spe-

their field agents to evolve the content. This has worked so well that the book has been translated into Spanish, French, Norwegian, Russian and Portuguese and new releases of the book incorporates new TTP that continues to evolve the operators skills.

The book itself is an unnerving glimpse into the maturity and sophistication that is ISIS. More chilling is the fact that the book is evidence that ISIS does have covert operators in the west - specifically Europe and North America. There is no reason to develop an instruction manual of this nature, as well as update the content, without having an audience. cial operation and intelligence teams would teach those living in oppressed nations. Relying on open source principles, the book has been developed

by ISIS as a means to not only educate covert operators, but to allow for

The book itself is an unnerving glimpse into the maturity and sophistication that is ISIS. More chilling is the fact that the book is evidence that ISIS does have covert operators in the west specifically Europe and North America. There is no reason to develop an instruction manual of

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FRONTLINES

ISIS IS HERE?

By John Gomez

this nature, as well as update the content, without having an audience. Although it is difficult to know for sure how many have obtained the book, or why, we can be certain that some percent of those who have the book consider themselves to be ISIS covert operators and that is cause for serious concern.

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The single reason that evil triumph over good, is that good people cannot conceive evil. The very approach being used by ISIS to recruit operators is not something we would conceive of occurring in the west, specifically here in the United States. The methods used by ISIS to develop a network of covert operators is highly sophisticated and yet extremely simplistic.

Let’s take a look at how this duplicity works together to form a very credible and significant risk to our homeland.

ploying field agents is that it provides your opposition (in this case the FBI) with TTP that they can profile and eventually use to ferret out the field agents. Basically it creates the classic cat and mouse game of the spy world. Yet ISIS has not needed to follow this traditional model. ISIS simply relies on social media agents, currently estimated at about 250, who have made Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube and other social media websites their area of operation to win hearts and minds.

ISIS has one of the most advanced and sophisticated social media strategies bar none. Their social media tactics are so effective, that they would make a fascinating study for an MBA class or marketing company. ISIS, relies on a social media methodology that is highly focused on driving emotional reactions that favor their brand. Much like a soda company uses images of summer, athletes and pretty girls in bikinis to create association with their products, ISIS utilizes images of freedom fighters freeing the oppressed and poor, a society of equals and positions themselves as misunderstood and liberators. Regardless of the validity of those messages, for someone in the west who feels alienated, in the minority or on the fringe, the messages resonate and lead to further exploration.

The reason we consider ISIS approach to recruitment of covert operators sophisticated is that it relies upon non-tradiexploration leads to a virtual contact, tional means. There This a friend and eventually a bond is formed. offer is made “maybe when the time is no need for ISIS to An comes you would take up arms and help deploy field agents, our brothers and sisters?” as has been done tra- “But how can I help? I want to help, but ditionally by western how?” is often the answer. intelligence agencies. “There are ways, but I cannot guide you, only Allah can guide your heart” continues Field agents typically will target a the dialogue. A dialogue that uses specific population of recruits and then court constructs to make the target believe they them in hopes of gaining their alle- are free to choose and empowered. It is a giance and ultimately the ability to powerful technique we employ in our inteldirect their activities. The risk of em- ligence communities.

ISIS has one of the most advanced and sophisticated social media strategies bar none.

Their social media tactics are so effective, that they would make a fascinating study for an MBA class or marketing company.

ISIS, relies on a social media methodology that is highly focused on driving emotional reactions that favor their brand.

FRONTLINES

ISIS IS HERE?

By John Gomez

“Man it would be so cool to help, to know I am making a difference for God” the reply is typed from a keyboard in a small bedroom in Maine. The target’s choice of words (God instead of allah) is not corrected, again a passive technique that creates a bond, a warmth.

Subtle, but effective and creates layers or trust and support.

“I know, much like the revolutionaries who fought against the British and took up arms to overthrow tyranny” the ISIS

We have seen the outcome of this strategy in Canada, France and most recently in Garland, Texas. ISIS has been able to reach across the globe, recruit operatives, train them, arm them and motivate them to act. This approach to establishing covert networks (cells) is close to foolproof, in that there is little that can be done by law enforcement to detect these

We have seen the outcome of this strategy in Canada, France and most recently in Garland, Texas. ISIS has been able to reach across the globe, recruit operatives, train them, arm them and motivate them to act.

This approach to establishing covert networks (cells) is close to foolproof, in that there is little that can be done by law enforcement to detect these activities without requiring a rather serious threat to our privacy and liberties.

Social Media Agent offers. Another example of how the agent constructs images, familiar history and creates iconic association that is eventually used to build trust and fuel passion and purpose.

It doesn’t take much to realize that continuing to fuel the passions and romantic images of someone desiring to be more, would lead to a the birth of a covert ISIS operator right here in our country.

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marketing and ultimately virtual training and education, ISIS is able to field a rather able and secretive set of operators across the world in a highly cost effective manner.

This approach by ISIS has literally rewritten how intelligence agencies across the world are recruiting their operatives. It is, as I stated, sophisticated yet extremely simple and most of all effective. Utilizing a mix of social media technologies, sophisticated

activities without requiring a rather serious threat to our privacy and liberties.

Although we have evidence of the effectiveness of this strategy, there are still those in Government who questions ISIS’s ability to rally large scale operations. I think that taking a traditional view of what defines an operation is a critical mistake. ISIS has rewritten what is an operation and how it views success. ISIS does not need to rally hundreds of operatives or even dozens. In fact I would argue that ISIS simply needs to rally six operatives in the US to be effective. I base my belief on domino theory, which simply states that if I can influence or inspire two others through my actions and they each inspire two people, we soon have a rather effective cascade of a belief.

By John Gomez

ISIS IS HERE?

FRONTLINES

If I start with six operatives, throughout the US, and they take an action, a small action (attack an art exhibit, hack a policeman with an axe, set off a bomb at a marathon) and those actions lead to dialogue that it is possible to strike the US from within effectively, then I am happy.

I don’t need to carry out a large scale attack, I simply need to continue evolving my attacks over time and with each attack I enlist another set of operatives. Over time I have a covert force, that eventually can carry out a large scale attack and more

His radicalization didn’t take long, a few months. He was provided with education

The bottom line is that ISIS has the means, ability and patience to establish an organic framework of cells and operators within the United States.

They have taken steps to assure there is on-going education that is practical and timely, they have developed a highly sophisticated recruitment methodology that is effective and simple to deploy and they have no need to follow our preconceived notions of operational rules or methods. than likely a good foundation of reserve agents who can be called upon to provide support and misdirection if needed.

The bottom line is that ISIS has the means, ability and patience to establish an organic framework of cells and operators within the United States. They have taken steps to assure there is on-going education that is practical and timely, they have developed a highly sophisticated recruitment methodology that is effective and simple to deploy and they have no need to follow our preconceived notions of operational rules or methods.

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ISIS, we find ourselves face-to-face with a teen who is grew up in West Palm Beach, Florida.

He comes from a Christian family, played soccer, attended church and eventually became brain washed by ISIS. In the video he burns his US passport, is ecstatic and thankful for his role in helping ISIS establish a worldwide caliphate.

Weeks after the video was published, he carried out a suicide bombing by driving a truck filled with explosives into a Syrian army base.

To date 150 Americans have successfully joined ISIS and taken up arms in Syria and Iraq. In a video posted by an American citizen, who left the United States to join

on how to raise funds to get to Syria through Turkey, what to pack, what to tell custom officials and information on how to connect with a safe house in Turkey to help him get over the border. This leads to a critical question we must ask “what if he would have stayed in the United States? Would he have launched an attack against a military base in Florida?”

We can debate the answer and speculate. But maybe we don’t need to argue or speculate, maybe he provided us with the answer, in the video he made shortly before his cowardly act ,that did nothing to honor God. Here are his final words, from his video: “You think you’re safe where you are, in America or Britain or Indonesia or Jordan or China or Russia or Somalia or Africa?” asked Abu Salha, who went by the alias Abu Hurayra al-Amriki.

‘You’re not safe. I have one [thing] to say ... we’re coming for you. Mark my words… Just know that we’re coming.”

My belief is that ISIS isn’t coming, ISIS is here.

About the Author John Gomez is the CEO of Group Espada and Sensato. He has a back ground in special operations, cyber-security and counter-terrorism.

By J.D. LeaSure

CYBER TSCM

CYBER TSCM

TECH

A Vital Part of Your Overall Counterespionage Prevention Plan

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By J.D. LeaSure

C

orporate espionage is one of the most rapidly growing challenges corporations of all sizes must contend with. Corporate espionage, often referred to as industrial espionage, is espionage conducted for commercial benefit. It includes all manner of confidential information collection by illicit means including electronic eavesdropping/ technical surveillance, HUMINT intelligence, cyber collection and related information collection by a person(s), entity(s) or country(s) for financial or other gain.

Trade secret theft costs businesses throughout the world billions of dollars each year. The loss figures are staggering particularly in consideration of the current economic climate in the US, and subsequently the world at large. And, when the economic climate is challenging, trends indicate corporate espionage increases as businesses scramble to remain viable. Challenging economic climates make it increasingly more difficult to set aside resources for technology development, to retain top talent, to secure new contracts and/or to retain existing clients. All of these factors considered, it becomes imperative for corporations to put a plan into place to prevent corporate espionage in an effort to protect valuable corporate information.

By J.D. LeaSure

CYBER TSCM

TECH

20

One method of corporate espionage is defined as technical surveillance, which involves the capture of information by electronic means. Detection of technical surveillance requires both physical inspection and electronic counter measures, which is the skill set referred to as Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM). Cyber TSCM, which utilizes a combination of Technical Surveillance Counter Measures and Cyber Security skill sets, has become a skill set that is increasingly in demand as cyber attacks grow in frequency

One important fact that corporate executives and IT security professionals need to remember is that all information exists in the physical realm, before it ever enters the cyber realm. So, in the current corporate espionage climate, it is not adequate to perform only TSCM inspections OR IT security testing.

A comprehensive cyber espionage program must incorporate Cyber TSCM inspections, along with IT se-

In the cyber realm, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), information drain and hacking are the biggest espionage risks corporations face. A Cyber TSCM Inspection detects electronic eavesdropping devices and/or technical intrusions via remote access attack, within a corporation’s IT infrastructure. and in the volume of personal and corporate curity so data in the physical realm data that can be captured in a single attack or is not lost via the cyber realm. with a single device increase.

Those who purport corporate espionage are constantly searching for In the cyber realm, Advanced Persistent vulnerabilities in corporate securiThreats (APT), information drain and hacking ty plans that will allow intrusions. are the biggest espionage risks corporations They are well aware that vulneraface. A Cyber TSCM Inspection detects elec- bilities tend to exist where existing tronic eavesdropping devices and/or techni- inspection methods don’t provide cal intrusions via remote access attack, within complete coverage because they a corporation’s IT infrastructure. A cyber at- transcend more that detection spetack may be conducted via the wireless cellu- cialty. Cyber TSCM is an area that lar network or over GSM / 3G / 4G or CDMA is outside the traditional role of a that is purposed for remote cellular access TSCM specialist, as well as beyond and collection of your confidential informa- the expertise of typical IT specialist. tion. These attacks enable cyber intruders to gain unauthorized access to your informa- Here’s an example. A normal looktion from anywhere in the world via a mobile ing “power mains strip” is commerphone signal. cially available with an on board

By J.D. LeaSure

CYBER TSCM

TECH

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high-gain 802.11b/g/n wireless, high-gain Bluetooth (up to 1000′), dual-Ethernet and GSM cellular capability that includes hacking software. A typical IT security inspection would not detect this type of, yet the device has the capability to extract massive amounts of data through the cellular network. While this device is not a typical electronic eavesdropping device, Cyber TSCM inspections would include inspections for this type of device.

In this instance, a Cyber TSCM inspection could stop a massive loss of data that would not be detected via an IT security inspection.

Victims of corporate espionage can unknowingly pass huge amounts of valuable data to a competitor, foreign government or other persons/entities. This data can

include business plans, product trade secrets, customer information, and other data that can compromise your corporate viability and/or damage your corporate reputation.

Proper IT Risk Management doesn’t involve only “cyber” threats within the scope of IT security, but should also include physical technical surveillance threats that use the wireless cellular network to capture data.

If your organization fails to implement periodic Cyber TSCM inspections in its IT risk management program, your corporation can become one of the many US corporations whose losses total a staggering $250 billion each year. Periodic Cyber TSCM Inspections along with your IT security inspections can protect your corporation and help to ensure your Governance, Risk & Compliance (GRC) plans are effective.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR J.D. LeaSure is President/CEO of ComSec LLc. A global counterespionage advisory firm. J.D. was active within the counterespionage, counterterrorism and counterintelligence fields for 26 years prior to founding ComSec LLC. During his extensive and distinguished career, J.D. has conducted counterespionage investigations and Technical Surveillance Counter Measures (TSCM) in the United States, and throughout the world.

By Jack A. Cole

EXIT STRATEGIES

DRUG WAR

24

OPERATION ALBATROSS Afghan and DEA Special Agents destroying hashish bunkers.

EXIT STRATEGIES FOR THE DRUG WAR

By Jack A. Cole

I

As presented to the Strategic Meeting on Public Security and Drug Policies Sponsored by the Brazilian Military Police and Viva Rio

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil , September 19-21, 2011, Updated December 29, 2014

didn’t come here today to tell you police officials from seventeen countries how to formulate your laws or conduct your business.

I know you are perfectly capable of doing that for yourselves. I came here to warn you, no, to beg you, please don’t follow the United States down its road to prohibition because it is a road to despair, a road to disaster, a road to destruction.

My name is Jack Cole. I am a retired detective lieutenant—26 years with the New Jersey State Police and 14 in their Narcotic Bureau, mostly undercover. I bear witness to the abject failure of prohibition and to the horrors produced by the U.S. war on drugs.

I am the co-founder and Board chair of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition. LEAP is a 100,000 member international educational organization of police, judges, prosecutors, correction officials, and supporters, in 120 countries. LEAP members know a system of legalization and regulation of drugs is far more efficient and ethical than a system of prohibition.

DRUG WAR

EXIT STRATEGIES

By Jack A. Cole

In the words of Norm Stamper, former chief of the Seattle, Washington police department, “[For the United States, the] drug war has arguably been most devastating, dysfunctional social policy since slavery.”

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The drug war is a complete failure, and even worse it is a self-perpetuating, constantly expanding policy disaster.

If Current Drug Policy actually worked, seven things should have happened:

1. Drug supply should decrease 2. Drug purity should decrease 3. Drug prices should then increase and therefore: 4. Drug use should decrease 5. Drug overdose deaths should decrease 6. Drug Prohibition murders should decrease 7. Drug violation arrests should decrease

In each case, the exact opposite happens. Let us look at the true outcomes of each of these items.

1. Drug supply should decrease

The easiest way to judge whether that has happened is by looking at drug seizures over the years. At the beginning of the drug war in 1970, law enforcers measured the largest individual drug seizures in “pounds.” Today we measure them in “Tons.”

• 15 tons of methamphetamine – one seizure • 20 tons of cocaine – one seizure • 23 tons of heroin – one seizure • 242 tons of marijuana – one seizure But nothing changed on the streets as a result of those massive seizures. They didn’t affect the street price by so much as one penny and no drug user went to bed without his or her drug.

2. Drug purity should decrease

When I started buying heroin as an undercover officer in 1970, street level packages of powder sold as “heroin” averaged 1½% pure, the rest was cutting agent—today they average 60% pure. That is a problem 40 times greater than it was at the beginning of the war.

3. Drug prices should increase

According to DEA, since the beginning of the war, the wholesale price of cocaine has decreased 60% and the wholesale price for heroin has decreased 70%.

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By Jack A. Cole

EXIT STRATEGIES

DRUG WAR

4. Drug use should decrease

DEA estimated that before we started the drug war there were about 4 million people, above the age of 12, who had used an illegal drug. That was 2% of that population. Today DEA tells us, there are 121 million people, above the age of 12, who have used an illegal drug. That is 46% of this population; a problem 30 times greater than 40 years ago.

run out of people wanting to sell drugs. Not so! In 1965 we made 65,500 of those arrests across our nation but by 2005 we had increased that number to 1.9 million a year. Most recently the yearly total has fallen to 1.7 million in 2013; still a rate 25 times larger than before the drug war.

And arrests do no good. I learned very early while working undercover that if a uniformed police officer 5. Drug overdose deaths arrested someone in our neighborhood for rape or robshould decrease bery, the number of rapes and robberies went down.

In fact, after 37 years of drug war drug overdose deaths We got the bad guy. But when I arrested a person for in the US had become 9 times worse than they were selling drugs the number of drugs sales didn’t change when we began this bloody mess in 1970.

6. Drug Prohibition murders should decrease

Of course, as we all know, drug prohibition murders have increased dramatically. During 2011, per 100,000 population, the murder rate was 4 in the United States, which is a destination country for illicit drugs; New York registered 515 murders that year – 6 per 100,000.

But in Puerto Rico, a transit location that has roughly half the population of New York City, 1,135 homicides occurred – 30 killings per 100,000 residents during the same year.

After Felipe Calderón declared war on drug cartels, during his six-year reign as President, Mexico suffered escalating violence. There were more than 95,000 drug prohibition murders – an average of 17 murders per 100,000 population. But neither the US nor Mexico can match the level of violence in drug transit countries such as Guatemala – 41 murders per 100,000 population or Honduras, which the United Nations has labeled as the most dangerous nation on the planet – 92 murders per 100,000 population. Transit nations always suffer even more violence than the countries of drug origin or the countries of final destination.

7. Drug violation arrests should decrease

One would think that after making more than 50 million arrests for nonviolent drug offenses in the course of the longest war in US history, we would eventually

One would think that after making more than 50 million arrests for nonviolent drug offenses in the course of the longest war in US history, we would eventually run out of people wanting to sell drugs.

With a 45-year-long war costing US tax payers

DRUG WAR

EXIT STRATEGIES

By Jack A. Cole

1.5-trillion dollars and re-

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at all. I was simply creating a “job opening” for hundreds of people more than willing to accept the risk of arrest for what they perceived as an obscenely high income.

Actually, it was worse than that. I wasn’t just creating a job opening; I was creating a safe job opening. If a potential novice drug dealer tried to horn in on a current drug dealer’s territory the interloper would probably get shot—but after I removed the first dealer his replacement simply stepped into to that open slot and started selling.

With a 45-year-long war costing US tax payers 1.5-trillion dollars and resulting in at least 50 million arrests for nonviolent drug offenses, one would think that at the very least we would have had some effect on reducing the rate of people in the US who are addicted to illicit drugs.

Sadly, that is also not true.

sulting in at least 50 million arrests for nonviolent drug offenses, one would think that at the very least we would have had some effect on reducing the rate of people in the US who are addicted to illicit drugs. Sadly, that is also not true.

Near the end of 1914 we created our first federal law prohibiting a drug. Before that, when all drugs were available to everyone regardless of their age, the government told us that

NARCO SUBMARINE IN ECUADOR

1.3% of the population was addicted. Our leaders couldn’t accept that so they started making many drugs illegal. Fifty-six years later, in 1970, when we were getting ready to start a “war on drugs,” our government told us 1.3% of the population was addicted to drugs. They couldn’t accept that, so they started a “drug war.” Into the fifth decade of this raging drug war, today our government tells us 1.3% of the population is addicted to drugs.

That is the only statistic that has not changed in a hundred years.

things that should really count. And we say, “Let us get back to doing what we do best, protecting people from each other.” It should not be the job of law enforcement to protect every adult from his- or herself and that is the role we have been required to take in enforcing today’s drug laws.

If you wish to end the gun violence the choice is simple, legalize all drugs, just as we legalized alcohol in the US in 1933. The next morning Al Capone and his smugglers were out of business. They were no lonBut some statistics have changed ger killing each other to control that dramatically. For instance, the clear- very lucrative market. They were no ance rate of arrests for major crimes longer killing our children in crossfire in the US has declined considerably. and drive-by-shootings. They were That means police are no longer no longer killing us cops, charged solving major crimes as they did be- with fighting that useless war. fore the drug war. Today, nearly 4 of 10 murders, 6 of 10 reported rapes & arsons, 7 of 10 reported robberies, and 9 of 10 reported home burglaries go unsolved.

I would like to point out that before the drug war, in 1963, our police were credited with solving 91% of the murders DEA/Coast Guard Record Cocaine Seizure in the US. Today they solve 61%. What happened? Did police suddenly become incompetent?

When we then regulate those drugs, The 150,000 police, judges, and we can stop overdose deaths. No prosecutors, and supporters at Law one dies of an overdose because Enforcement Against Prohibition they inject more and more drugs. believe that today police spend They die because they don’t know so much time and energy chasing how much of that tiny package of nonviolent drug offenders that we powder they purchase is really the no longer have enough staff to pro- drug and how much is the cutting tect people from violent predators, agent. Too much drug and they from child molesters, from those are dead. In an illegal, unregulated

market, they will never know what is in that package.

When we then regulate those drugs, we can also prevent half of all potential cases of horrible blood borne diseases such as AIDS and Hepatitis C; according to the US Centers for Disease Control 50% of all new cases of AIDS and Hepatitis C can be traced back to intravenous drug users sharing needles, which they would not have to do if the drugs were legal and regulated.

Then, when we start treating drug abuse as a health problem instead of a crime problem, we can save the millions of people we are today sacrificing through arrest and imprisonment on the altar of the drug war. And we should be interested in stopping those arrests because they are our children, our parents, ourselves. This is not a war on drugs, it is a war on people.

If you want to make a difference about this issue, join www.leap.cc.

The effect of the above talk was made clear when retired Chief Constable Tom Lloyd of Cambridgeshire, England, UK, ask for a show of hands within the 50 ranking police officers representing 17 countries that attended the Strategic Meeting on Public Security and Drug Policies, to see how many agreed with me that we should end the war on drugs by legalizing and regulating all drugs. Eighty-five percent agreed and only 5% wanted to continue the drug war, with 10 percent abstaning.

DRUG WAR

EXIT STRATEGIES

By Jack A. Cole

system. We resent this situation that exposes us to great risks, endangering our own lives as well those of others, our morale and the image of our institutions. It is not fair and it doesn’t address the root cause of the problem. A civic police force in a democratic society should pursue more intelligent and consistent goals.

32

“Strategic Meeting on Public Security and Drug Policies”

Headquarters of the Brazilian Military Police in Rio de Janeiro 19 to 21 September 2011

On the last day the below document was arrived at by consensus of the 50 ranking police officers from 17 countries who participated in the strategic meeting.

The countries represented were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Germany, Guatemala, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay.

Excerpts from “The Rio de Janeiro Declaration” We have gathered here to rethink the repressive law enforcement policies against the trade and use of illegal drugs. We are concerned about the very few results that have been achieved in so many years of battle [and we] are even more concerned about a number of negative consequences for which we have paid a high price in resources and lives.

Individual choices that lead to drug use are the result of complex psychological and social factors, which affect people from childhood onwards and in particular during adolescence. Family, religious faith, school and the community all play a role in this, but in many countries current drug policies dump the entire issue on the police and the penal

Instead of fighting tooth and nail for the fantasy of a drug-free world, we want to achieve more objective goals to reduce the harmful consequences of drug use, both for individuals and society as a whole.

No longer satisfied with the “War on Drugs” doctrine. We are looking for other, more effective and more constructive approaches like the decriminalization of drugs in Portugal and in Uruguay, the sale of medicinal marihuana in seventeen US states, harm reduction policies and therapeutic models in Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, as well as multidisciplinary reintegration programs for at‐ risk youth and for youth in conflict with the law in Nicaragua and Peru.

We call upon our colleagues in law enforcement and public security to courageously commit to this issue and foster a closer relationship with other government sectors and society who also need to be involved.

In the International Day of Peace, September 21, 2011, subscribe this declaration: 8. Alejandro Silva, Nicaragua. Delegation of Terres des Hommes in Nicaragua.

9. Daniel Llaury, Peru. Chief of the El Augustino precinct and coordinator of the Specialized Module focused on Youth in Police Precincts.

10. Erlinda Castillo, Nicaragua. Chief of the Youth Services Division at the Police of Nicaragua.

11. Flávio Alves, Portugal. Supervisor at Portuguese Police of Public Se-

curity and director of the Department of Criminal Investigation.

12. Hans van Duijn, Netherlands. Former president of the Dutch Police Union and current member and speaker of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP).

13. Hugo Armando Ramírez Mejía, El Salvador. Vice‐director of Public Security for the El Salvador Police.

14. Jack A. Cole, USA. Retired Detective Lieutenant with New Jersey State Police and co-founder of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP), worked as undercover police officer in drug crimes investigations.

15. João Goulão, Portugal. President of the Portuguese Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction (IDT).

16. Joaquim Pereira, Portugal. Director of the National Unit to Fight Drug Trafficking (UNCTE) in Portugal.

17. Jorge da Silva, Brazil. Former Chief of Staff of Rio de Janeiro State Military Police and current professor in the State University and current member and speaker of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP).

18. Juan Sonoqui Martinez, Mexico.

Class “A” officer of the D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) project for the Municipal Preventive Police in Cajeme, Sonora, in Mexico.

19. Luciene Magalhães, Brazil. President of the do Brazilian Forum on Public Security and colonel of Minas Gerais State Military Police.

20. Luis Mauricio Lermanda López, Chile. Chief of Personal and Logistics for the Drugs Department, at the Carabineers of Chile.

21. Melissa Jardine, Australia. Researcher on harm reduction in the Nossal Institute and member of a network of law enforcement agents who support harm reduction strategies (LEAHRN).

22. Milton Romani, Uruguay. Traveling Ambassador on Drugs and Human Rights.

23. Nairo Lopez Riaño, Colombia.

Chief of the Judiciary Police at the Atlantico province, Colombia National Police.

24. Neill Franklin, USA. Executive Director of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP) and retired Maryland State Police Major, who was director of their drug task forces.

25. Nicole Turner, Australia. Police officer for twenty years, researcher at the Nossal Institute as Coordinator of the Law Enforcement and Harm Reduction Network (LEAHRN).

26. Orlando Zaccone Brazil. Chief police officer of the 18th Precinct at Praça da Bandeira in Rio de Janeiro, former director of Prisoner’s Control of the Interstate Police (POLINTER) and current member and speaker of Law Enforcement Against Prohibition (LEAP).

27. Plauto Roberto de Lima Ferreira, Brazil. Major of Ceará State Military Police and coordinator of a drug rehabilitation project for law enforcement professionals.

28. Reinaldo Correa, Brazil. Police officer of the Division for Prevention and Education (DIPE) of the Drugs Investigations Department of the Civil Police (DENARC) in São Paulo.

29. Robson Rodrigues, Brazil. Colonel of Rio de Janeiro State Military Police and Coordinator of the Pacifier Police Units (UPP).

30. Roger Flury, Switzerland. Drug analyst for the Federal Criminal Police of Switzerland.

31. Rubem Cesar Fernandes, Brazil.

Executive director of Viva Rio. 32. Rubens Fabian Rebuffo, Argentina. Head of the Division for Information Services of the Neuquén Police, Argentina.

33. Sonia Dall’Igna, Brazil. Director of the Division for Prevention and Education (DIPE) of the Drugs

Investigations Department of the Civil Police (DENARC) in Rio Grande do Sul. 34. Thomas Zosel, Germany. Chief‐ Detective and Investigation Team Leader of the Police Department in Frankfurt am Main, in Germany, at the Drug Crimes Division.

35. Tom Lloyd, England. Former Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, England, and current coordinator of the Law Enforcement project of the International Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC).

36. Wagner Ricardo Coutinho Rego, Brazil. Major of Alagoas State Military Police and creator of a specialized module on drug prevention, Human Rights and citizenship in municipal schools.

37. Wilson Petronilo Lopez Maldonado, Guatemala. Police officer at the Division for the Analysis of Antinarcotics Information (DAIA) of the National Civil Police of Guatemala.

38. Yony Robert Mezquita Machado, Uruguay. Police officer at the Department of Public Order of the Investigations Division from Montevideo Police, in Uruguay.

About the Author Jack Cole knows about the “war on drugs” from several perspectives.

He retired as a Detective Lieutenant after a 26-year career with the New Jersey State Police—fourteen in narcotics, mostly as an undercover officer. His investigations spanned cases from street drug users to international “billion-dollar” drug trafficking organizations. Jack ended his undercover career living nearly two years in Boston and New York City, posing as a fugitive drug dealer. For more information on Jack and LEAP visit www.leap.cc.

References “Mexican authorities announced their largest methamphetamine seizure ever late Wednesday: 15 tons, found in pure powder form at a ranch outside Guadalajara. It was about 13 million doses worth $4 billion — more than double the size of all meth seizures at the Mexican border in 2011.”

Source: Damien Cave, “Mexico Seizes Record Amount of Methamphetamine,” New York Times (NY) Published: February 9, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/world/americas/mexico-seizes-15-tons-of-methamphetamine.html “Then drug agents received a tip about suspicious comings and goings at a warehouse in the Los Angeles suburb of Sylmar. They obtained a search warrant, sliced off a $5 padlock, and discovered 36 wooden pallets stacked with boxes of cocaine. The hoard, weighing 21.4 tons, was the size of two school buses.

Ledgers showed that billions of dollars of cocaine -- hundreds of tons -- had passed through the warehouse. The seizure caused what the American Embassy in Mexico described in a cable as ‘’an earthquake’’ that redefined Washington’s understanding of the drug war by highlighting the growing role of Mexican smugglers.”

Source: Dillon, Sam and Craig Pyes. “Foiled Drug Pursuit of a Mexican Bares a System Rife With Graft,” The New York Times (NY) April 15, 1998, Wednesday. http://www.nytimes. com/1998/04/15/world/foiled-drug-pursuit-of-a-mexican-bares-a-system-rife-with-graft.html?scp=1&sq=Foiled+Drug+Pursuit+of+a+Mexican+Bares+a+System+Rife+With+Graft&st=nyt&pagewanted=all.

“Afghanistan Heroin Bust: 23 Tons Of Heroin, Morphine Seized In Helicopter Raid,” Huff Post World March 12, 2013 03:10 PM ET EDT http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/12/afghanistan-heroin-morphine-bust_n_2862536.html#slide=106435 “Paraguay destroyed 242 tons of marijuana seized during a 10-day operation.” Source: Tatiana Faramarzi, “Paraguay Destroys 242 Tons of Marijuana,” In Sight Crime: Organized Crime in the Americas, Monday, 12 March 2012. http://www.insightcrime.org/newsbriefs/paraguay-destroys-242-tons-of-marijuana “[L]ocal, state and federal law enforcement work so closely that they celebrated this week over the destruction of the largest load of marijuana — 134 metric tons, or about 150 United States tons — ever seized in the country.” Source: Randal C. Archibold, “Marijuana Bonfire Celebrates a Fragile Calm,” New York Times (NY) October 21, 2010. http://www.nytimes. com/2010/10/22/world/americas/22marijuana.html “Tijuana police seized a record 105 tons of marijuana they say was headed for sale in the United States.

It’s one of the biggest pot busts in all of Mexico in recent years.” Source: Amy Isackson “Record 105 Ton Marijuana Seizure in Tijuana,” KPBS Radio, San Diego State University (CA) October 18, 2010. http://www.kpbs. org/news/2010/oct/18/record-105-ton-marijuana-seizure-tijuana/ “The Mexican army discovered [40 tons of marijuana] inside a smuggling tunnel between Tijuana and leading into California. In the past decade law enforcement has discovered 50 tunnels from Mexico to California and 89 from Mexico to Arizona.” Source: AOL.com Video http://www.aol.com/video/tons-of-marijuanadiscovered-in-new-drug-tunnel/517417854/ By the year 2000 heroin was registering over 60% pure in Atlanta, Boston, and New York, and over 70% pure in Newark and Philadelphia. A pure gram of heroin was worth between a low of $300 in San Diego and a high of $2,740 in St. Louis, which made an ounce worth between $8,505 and $77,678 or about 30 percent of what it was worth in 1970 ($258,200). Source: Drug Intelligence Brief, 2002 Domestic Monitoring Program Drug Intelligence Report, US Drug Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/in-

tel/03057/03057.html#e, July 24, 2005.

By the year 2000 heroin was registering over 60% pure in Atlanta, Boston, and New York, and over 70% pure in Newark and Philadelphia. A pure gram of heroin was worth between a low of $300 in San Diego and a high of $2,740 in St. Louis, which made an ounce worth between $8,505 and $77,678 or about 30 percent of what it was worth in 1970 ($258,200). Source: Drug Intelligence Brief, 2002 Domestic Monitoring Program Drug Intelligence Report, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/03057/03057.html#e, July 24, 2005.

Prices Nationwide, in 2000, SA heroin ranged from $50,000 to $200,000 per kilogram. SEA and SWA heroin ranged in price from $40,000 to $190,000 per kilogram.

Wholesale-level prices for Mexican heroin were the lowest of any type, ranging from $13,200 to $175,000 per kilogram. The wide range in kilogram prices reflects variables such as buyer/seller relationships, quantities purchased, purchase frequencies, purity, and transportation costs. Source: DEA State Factsheet http://www. dea.gov/pubs/state_factsheets.html Prohibition coupled with the war on drugs has increased the number of people in the US above the age of twelve who use illegal drugs from 4 million (two percent of the population) in 1965 to 121 million (46 percent of the population). Sources: SAMHSA http://www. druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/fsduse.pdf http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DownloadCenterServlet?_ts=296977786179 htt p : / / w w w. s a m h s a . g o v / d ata / N S D U H / 2011SummNatFindDetTables/NSDUH-DetTabsPDFWHTML2011/2k11DetailedTabs/Web/HTML/NSDUH-DetTabsSect1peTabs1to46-2011.htm#Tab1.1A “Drug overdose death rates have risen steadily in the United States since 1970. (See Figure 1) In 2007, 27,658 unintentional drug overdose deaths occurred in the United States [a 900% increase over 1970]. Drug overdose deaths were second only to motor vehicle crash deaths among leading causes of unintentional injury death in 2007 in the United States.”

Source: “Unintentional Drug Poisoning in the United States,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 2010. http://www.cdc.gov/homeandrecreationalsafety/pdf/poison-issue-brief.pdf accessed 3/14/2013.

Drug overdose deaths increased for the 11th consecutive year in 2010, according to an analysis from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The findings are published today in a research letter, “Pharmaceutical Overdose Deaths, United States, 2010,” in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA).

CDC’s analysis shows that 38,329 people died from a drug overdose in the United States in 2010, up from 37,004 deaths in 2009. This continues the steady rise in overdose deaths seen over the past 11 years, starting with 16,849 deaths in 1999. Overdose deaths involving opioid analgesics have shown a similar increase. Starting with 4,030 deaths in 1999, the number of deaths increased to 15,597 in 2009 and 16,651 in 2010.

In 2010, nearly 60 percent of the drug overdose deaths (22,134) involved pharmaceutical drugs. Opioid analgesics, such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, and methadone, were involved in about 3 of every 4 pharmaceutical overdose deaths (16,651), confirming the predominant role opioid analgesics play in drug overdose deaths.

Source: http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose_deaths.html. Accessed 6/29/2013.

United States Population: 313,847,465 (July 2011 est.), Death Rate: 8.39 deaths/1,000 population (July 2011 est.), Deaths per year: 2,633,180, Murder Rate: 4 per 100,000 population, Estimated number of murders per year for all reasons: 12,553 Source: https://www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ran-

korder/2119rank.html Source: Frances Robles, “Puerto Rico tackling fearful murder rate” McClatchy, December 16, 2012 http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/12/16/177559/ puerto-rico-tackling-fearful-murder.html Lizette Alvarez, “Murder Rate and Fear Rise in Puerto Rico,” New York Times (NY) June 20, 2011 http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/21crime.html?pagewanted=all “Limited to one term of six years, Calderon will hand Enrique Peña Nieto the presidency at the end of the year (December 1), leaving him with a damning balance sheet of death. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico has released startling figures: 27,199 homicides were recorded in 2011; between 2007 and 2011, the total came to 95,632 murders. On the basis of the trend in recent months, an estimated 120,000 homicides will have occurred during the term of Calderon. This is more than double the figure often mentioned - already staggering - of 50,000.” Source: Mark Karlin, “Fueled y War on Drugs, Mexican Death Toll Could Exceed 120,000 As Calderon Ends Six-Year Reign,” Truthout, November 28, 2012. http://truth-out.org/ news/item/13001-calderon-reign-ends-with-six-yearmexican-death-toll-near-120000 Guatemala population: 14,099,032 (July 2011 est.), Death rate: 4.92 deaths/1,000 population (July 2011 est.) Deaths per year: 69,367, Guatemala Drug Prohibition Murders per year: 41 per 100,000, Estimated number of drug prohibition murders per year: 5,781, Drug prohibition murders as percent of total Guatemalan deaths: 12% http://www.indexmundi.com/guatemala/demographics_profile.html The United Nations lists Honduras as the most dangerous nation on the planet, with a rate of one violent death every 74 minutes. Source: Drug War Violence Throws Honduras into Disarray, BY Jeremy Kryt, In These Times, May 29, 2012 http://www.inthesetimes.com/ article/13271/drug_war_violence_throws_honduras_ into_disarray/ Source: United Nations Office of Drug Control, “Homicide count and rate Intentional (1995 - 2011),” UNODC lists Honduras at 91.8 Homicides per 100.000 population. Venezuela at 45 htt p : / / w w w. u n o d c . o rg / d o c u m e nt s / d a ta-and-analysis/statistics/crime/Homicide_statistics2012.xls In 1965 we made 65,500 of those arrests but by 2005 we had increased that number to 1.9 million a year. Most recently the yearly total has fallen to 1.6 million in 2012. Source: http://drugwarfacts.org/ cms/?q=node/53 Drug abuse arrests in 2012 were 1,552,432.

Source: “Crime in the United States 2012,” FBI Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2013), Table 29, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2009/data/table_29.html “Crime in the United States 2009,” FBI Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2010), Table 29, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2009/data/table_29.html and Arrest Table: Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2009/arrests/index.html. “2008 Crime in the United States,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2009), Table 29, http:// www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_29.html and Arrest Table: Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, http:// www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/arrests/index.html. “2007 Crime in the United States,” (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2008), Table 29, http://www.fbi. gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html and Arrest Table: Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, http://www.fbi. gov/ucr/cius2007/arrests/index.html. “2006 Crime in the United States,” (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2007), Table 29, http://www.fbi.gov/

References ucr/cius2006/data/table_29.html and Arrest Table: Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, http://www.fbi.gov/ ucr/cius2006/arrests/index.html. “Crime in the United States 2005,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2006), Table 29, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29.html and Arrest Table: Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations, http:// www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/arrests/index.html.

“Crime in the United States 2004,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 278, Table 4.1 & p. 280, Table 29. http://www. fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/CIUS2004.pdf. “Crime in the United States 2003,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 269, Table 4.1 & and p. 270, Table 29; http:// www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec4.pdf. “Crime in the United States 2002,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, 2003) http:// www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/html/web/arrested/04-table29.html and http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_02/html/ web/arrested/04-NC.html#t41. “Crime in the United States 2001,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 232, Table 4.1 & and p. 233, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/ ucr/cius_01/01crime4.pdf. “Crime in the United States - 2000,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 216, Tables 29 and 4.1; http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_00/00crime4. pdf. “Crime in the United States - 1999,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 211-212. http://www.fbi.gov/ filelink.html?file=/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99c4_01.pdf.

“Crime in the United States - 1998,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 209-219. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ Cius_98/98crime/98cius22.pdf. “Crime in the United States - 1997,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 221, Table 4.1 & p. 222, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ Cius_97/97crime/97crime4.pdf. “Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 1996” Federal Bureau of Investigation (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 213, Table 4.1 & p. 214, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_97/96CRIME/96crime4. pdf. “Crime in the United States - 1995,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 207-208. http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ Cius_97/95CRIME/95crime4.pdf. FBI, UCR for the US 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 173-174. FBI, UCR for the US 1980 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), pp.

189-191. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Chart of arrests by age group, number and rates for total offenses, violent offenses, and property offenses, 1970-2003, Dec. 2004.

US Arrests for NonViolent Drug Offenses 1970 through 2010. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/ Crime#Total Sources: Narrative analysis for this Fact

by Mary Jane Borden, Editor of Drug War Facts. ===== “Crime in the United States 2010,” FBI Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2011), Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-... Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-... ===== “Crime in the United States 2009,” FBI Uniform Crime Report (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2010), Table 29. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/ data/table_29.html. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/arrests/index.html. ===== “2008 Crime in the United States,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2009), Table 29. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/ cius2008/data/table_29.html Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/arrests/ index.html. ===== “2007 Crime in the United States,”

(Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2008), Table 29. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/data/table_29.html. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http:// www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/arrests/index.html ===== “2006 Crime in the United States,” (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2007), Table 29. http:// www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_29.html. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www2.fbi.gov/ ucr/cius2006/arrests/index.html ===== “Crime in the United States 2005,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, September 2006), Table 29. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_29. html. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www2. fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/arrests/index.html ===== “Crime in the United States 2004,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2005) Table 29. http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/persons_arrested/table_29.html. Arrests for Drug Abuse Violations: http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/persons_arrested/ index.html ===== “Crime in the United States 2003,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 269, Table 4.1 & and p. 270, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ crime-in-the-u.s/2003/03sec4.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States 2002,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Dept. of Justice, 2003). http://www2.fbi. gov/ucr/cius_02/html/web/arrested/04-table29.html ===== “Crime in the United States 2001,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), p. 232, Table 4.1 & and p. 233, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2001/01sec4.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States - 2000,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 216, Tables 29 and 4.1. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2000/toc00.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States - 1999,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 211-212. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/1999/toc99.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States - 1998,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1999), pp. 209-219. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/1998/toc98.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States - 1997,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 221, Table 4.1 & p. 222, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/1997/toc97.pdf ===== “Uniform Crime Reports for the United States 1996” Federal Bureau of Investigation (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 213, Table 4.1 & p. 214, Table 29. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-inthe-u.s/1996/toc96.pdf ===== “Crime in the United States - 1995,” FBI Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 207-208. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ crime-in-the-u.s/1995/toc95.pdf ===== FBI, UCR for the US 1990 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 173-174. FBI, UCR for the US 1980 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 189-191.

1.3 percent of U.S. population was addicted to drugs in 1914.

By 1890 there was a maximum of 0.46 percent of the United States was addicted to opiates, “thereafter the rate began a sustained decline.” In 1914, the addiction rate for opiates was ranged from 0.32 percent estimated from “statistical evidence upon which objective estimates can be based,” to 1.3 percent by government sources whose “authors manipulated or even fabricated data in order to sway public opinion and achieve political ends,” by applying estimates of more than a million drug addicts in the United States to the 1910 U.S. Census figure of a population of 91,641,195 people.

Source: Courtwright, David T. Dark Paradise: A

History of Opiate Addiction in America. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001. p. 9. and the U.S. Government Decennial Census Information for 1910, http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/ census/cen.pl.

Source: “Policy is not a Synonym for Justice,” by John L. Kane (U.S. District Court Judge for Colorado) The New Prohibition: Voices of Dissent Challenge the Drug War, Edited by Sheriff Bill Masters, St. Louis: Accurate Press, 2004, Chapter 5, p. 45.

1.3 percent of U.S. population is addicted to drugs today.

According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) there were “3.6 million people who met diagnostic criteria for dependence on illegal drugs in 1999” [which would be 1.32 percent of the population of 272,690,813 in the U.S. that year].

Source: Robinson, Matthew B. and Renee G. Scherlen, Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics: A Critical Analysis of Claims Made by the Office of national Drug Control Policy, State University of New York Press, 2007, p. 94. Chapter 5 Endnote 3: ONDCP (2000) President’s national drug control strategy, P-4.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999,” http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclockest.txt.

“Cleared by arrest: In the UCR Program, a law enforcement agency reports that an offense is cleared by arrest, or solved for crime reporting purposes, when three specific conditions have been met. The three conditions are that at least one person has been: • Arrested.

• Charged with the commission of the offense.

• Turned over to the court for prosecution (whether following arrest, court summons, or police notice).”

“In 2010, 47.2 percent of violent crimes and 18.3 percent of property crimes in the Nation were cleared by arrest or exceptional means.

“Among violent crimes, 64.8 percent of murder offenses were cleared, 40.3 percent of forcible rape offenses were cleared, 28.2 percent of robbery offenses were cleared, and 56.4 percent of aggravated assault offenses were cleared.

“Clearance data for property crimes revealed that 21.1 percent of larceny-theft offenses were cleared, 12.4 percent of burglary offenses were cleared, and 11.8 percent of motor vehicle theft offenses were cleared.

“Nineteen percent of arson offenses were cleared by arrest or exceptional means in 2010.

“34.3 percent of arson offenses cleared involved juveniles (persons under age 18); this was the highest percentage of all offense clearances involving only juveniles.”

Source: The 2011 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Table 27, “Percent of Offenses Cleared by Arrest or Exceptional Means.” http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/clearances “FBI figures obtained by The Associated Press show that the homicide clearance rate, as detectives call it, dropped from 91 percent in 1963—the first year records were kept in the manner they are now—to 61 percent in 2007.” Source: Associated Press, “More Are Getting Away With Murder,” Chicago, December 8, 2008. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/08/ ap/national/main4655959.shtml.

“FBI’s estimated homicide clearance rates from 1965-2008,” Scrippsnews: a Scripps Howard News Service Publication. http://www.scrippsnews.com/projects/ murder-mysteries/fbis-estimated-homicide-clearance-rates-1965-2008.

NUMBERS NUMBERS

A GLOBAL VIEWPOINT

$400 BILLION Cost of Cyber-terrorism a year.

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/cyber-terrorism-is-keepingthe-fbi-on-their-toes-2012-4#ixzz3eTUYrInX

distribution of the estimated 875 million fire875 MILLION GUNS The arms that are in circulation in the world. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/smallarms-survey-2007.html

650 MILLION GUNS Global Civilian Gun Ownership 200 MILLION GUNS Global Military Firearms 26 MILLION GUNS Global Law Enforcement Firearms

NUMBERS

Ownership in the USA which averages 89 per 270 MILLION GUNS Gun 100 Americans.

NICS applications / The system has re156 MILLION 156,577,260: ceived 156,577,260 applications since 1998 and the US has the highest gun ownership rate in the world

year — the first year of legal recreational pot $700 MILLION Last sales — Colorado pot businesses sold nearly $700

36

million of marijuana. That amounted to $385.9 million for medical marijuana and $313.2 million for recreational cannabis.

Elizabeth Hernandez: 303-954-1223, ehernandez@ denverpost.com or twitter.com/ehernandez

FROM THE INSIDE

By Steven Krzyzanowski

IMMIGRATION

AN IMMIGRATION VIEWPOINT

38

HOW DID THEY GET HERE?

By Steven Krzyzanowski , Retired I.C.E. Agent

A

s mentioned in my previous article, I said that there were several ways in which some immigrants enter the U.S. Let me first start out by examining a couple of the hundreds of cases that I have personally worked to give you a flavor of what is out there.

A couple of years ago, just prior to my retirement in the winter of 2013, I was still attached to the Fugitive unit in one of our northwest offices. At this particular post, we were assigned to track down Illegal Immigrants that had Federal Immigration Warrants for them as well as other State and Federal warrants.

One of the cases on my case load was an individual who had arrived two years previous in Boston, Massachusetts. This in-

dividual had been issued a single entry visitor’s visa from our State Department in Brazil and was then subsequently admitted at Boston’s Logan International Airport after being interviewed by a Customs and Border Protection Officer. The subject was eventually arrested by ICE and sent to Immigration Court as an Illegal overstay.

This simply means that whatever time the Officer had given him at the time of entry to the U.S., that he had not returned to Brazil and was then living and thriving here in the U.S. illegally. Subsequently, the subject was ordered deported by the Immigration Judge in absentia and a warrant issued. Small problem though- while awaiting his Immigration Court hearing, he was given a “bond” pending his official Immigration hearing! The subject then decided to skip town, as thousands do each year, and wound up living with a distant relative in the Seattle area. During this time, he also gained full employment at a local roofing company making $45 an hour by producing a fake Green Card to the employer. That’s right, $45 an hour!

FROM THE INSIDE

By Steven Krzyzanowski

IMMIGRATION

time to gain whatever case files and potential arrest records or court documents to make a final decision to admit or deny admission to the U.S.

Of course his green card was so poorly made that we would have referred to it as a “hundred miler,” meaning that if you were in the business, you could see that it was a fake from a hundred miles away. The cards that he obtained on the street usually, depending on where you buy them, cost $25100+ and could possibly include a fake Social Security and driver’s license as well. After the preliminary investigation revealed that he was working in this particular town, we set off to apprehend and take him into custody. After following many leads and using gumshoe detective work, he and his cousin were taken into custody and jailed with a NO BOND order. I personally placed a no-bond order on this subject using what is considered “Officer Discretion” which is allowed during the arrest process.

We usually receive a lot of political pressure from our local as well as national management to not do this because of what they claim unnecessarily clogs our national detention system. My feeling is that if someone is taken into custody as a foreign national and what we consider an unknown, only the immigration judge should be responsible for releasing someone under these circumstances. Many, by the way, have been released and committed additional heinous laws victimizing more of our fellow Americans. The subject was subsequently removed from the U.S. after thousands spent on detention costs, I might add.

Another interesting case that highlighted the flawed system here in America was one that stemmed back in 2002. At the time, I was a Senior Inspector for what was then INS just prior to the creation of DHS. One of my collateral duties was to investigate foreign nationals that were in the Deferred Inspection system. Let me try to make sense of this for you, the generic reader. When someone appears at an Official Port of Entry into the U.S., and there is evidence that there is a problem with their case, they are placed in the Deferred Inspection system.

For example, if someone tries to enter through the Seattle International Airport in route to Boston Massachusetts, they will first be inspected by CBP in Seattle and if they were previously here in the U.S. and overstayed their visa, or in many cases committed crimes here in the U.S. before departing, they would possibly be flagged in our system.

40

If we cannot obtain the needed evidence to bar the person from entry at the time of inspection, we will issue them a form that requires them to appear at the onward port, which in this case was the Boston CBP office, at a specified time to further address their case to then make a final determination of their eligibility. This gives the Boston office

They are basically paroled into the U.S. to appear for further inspection. You can see the basic problem with this program!

We grant hundreds of people, who may at times have significant criminal records, the opportunity to enter the U.S. and show up on their own to possibly be denied entry. I know what you’re thinking, are you kidding me? Anyone of you that has been in law enforcement for more than two or three days knows that this is an absurd proposition!

A short story of one of those is as follows: An individual was deferred from our office in Los Angeles to appear in Seattle, WA for his inspection. Once he failed to show, his case was referred to me to be investigated and to subsequently be taken into custody once found. This particular subject was found and arrested just north of Seattle and was taken into custody, and since he was in the deferred status he was not eligible to appear before the immigration judge. Arrangements were immediately processed to have him removed. However, there was something just not right with this individual and I felt further investigation was warranted.

His demeanor and behavior, along with the eccentric way he was dressed, didn’t fit any of his statements or story during the arrest process and interview. He originated from Suva, Fiji, a small Island in the south pacific, and claimed that he was here to visit and work in the U.S. His body type was large, as many from the south pacific can be, and along with his 6’2 305lbs build, he had several island tattoos and showed an uncommonly aggressive attitude. Not surprisingly, I had to use two sets of cuffs during his arrest!

Interestingly enough, after making many attempts to contact the Fiji Consulate in Washington DC, the consulate was able to obtain a criminal record from the local police in Suva, Fiji that revealed the following: The subject had an extensive record that included several arrests for Assault with a Deadly Weapon, Domestic Assault, Rape, Robbery, Burglary just to name a few. He had a total of 13 Felony and Misdemeanor charges by the local Police in Fiji! I KNOW! How did someone such as this enter the U.S. on a Visa issued by the U.S. Consulate in Fiji? To that

question there is a simple answer, fraud.

One of the ways we make political inroads with foreign countries is to employ local nationals to work at our Consulates in their respective countries, supposedly to help build relationships. In this case, the U.S. representative that was employing these workers was committing fraud with some of the locals he had hired to assist in the Visa issuance process in Suva.

The local national was taking $350 in U.S. currency to forward approved applications for the visas. The U.S. representative would then receive $200 of the $350 and approve these visas. One can imagine in a small country such as Fiji, that word would spread fast and people that know each other would be glad to “pay to play” as they say.

This investigation eventually ended with the U.S. representative being arrested for fraud and a complete change of personnel in that particular consulate. How much money was made and how many

individuals actually committed fraud we will never know, but this goes on all the time.

The point of these two simple cases that Deportation Officers deal with by the thousands every year throughout the U.S. is the following: 1.

2.

In this case, once the foreign national is allowed to arrive and apply for entry to the U.S. with an official Visa issued by the State Department, or under the Visa Waiver program, they will be admitted for a short duration of time to then return “ON THEIR OWN” to their designated country.

Once someone has been admitted to the U.S., there is no accountability.

Most Americans believe that as soon as someone has overstayed their visa, there is a mechanism in place that will highlight the case and someone will be standing by to pursue the individual on the spot. Typically, the only time we run across someone like this

in the law enforcement community is when they are encountered for other reasons such as local law enforcement i.e. city, county, state traffic stop or a response to a 911 call, etc...

My next article will highlight why we need to eliminate the Visa Waiver program that I will discuss at more length. These two cases reflected the tip of the proverbial iceberg that is the visa issuance process, and this is only a small part of the overall gigantic problem facing us as Americans.

Stay tuned for more insanity that is the U.S. Immigration process and what I believe needs to be done to fix this National Security issue.

More next time from the “Inside”.

About the Author

By Steven Krzyzanowski , Retired I.C.E. Agent

Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

Vol. 20, No.4

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