Nuclear Weapons: The “Other” Extreme of Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century Colonel John Mark Mattox Defense Nuclear Weapons School mark.mattox@abq.dtra.mil (505) 846-6779
1 Nuclear Weapons: The “Other” Extreme of Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century Introduction Given the international experience of the last decade, there is a temptation to stereotype all irregular warfare as an attempt to stop violence perpetrated by terrorists using small arms, car bombs, and improvised explosive devices against troops organized primarily to counter more conventional threats. However, moral philosophers tend to give comparatively little attention to what might be called the “other” extreme of the irregular warfare spectrum, namely, nuclear weapons. At first blush, it may seem odd to call nuclear weapons “irregular.” They always have been regarded as “non-conventional,” but does that make them irregular? The answer is no; conventionality and non-conventionality, regularity and irregularity are two separate concepts. The thing that makes a particular kind of weapon non-conventional is its nature; the thing that makes a weapon irregular is the manner in which it is used. For the first five decades of the now nearly seven-decade-long nuclear era, nuclear weapons were very much “regular” weapons, even though non-conventional. That is to say, regular troops practiced their deployment, the weapons figured squarely into regular war plans—often to make up for numeric mismatches between opposing conventional forces, and there was a very regularized understanding of who was empowered to authorize their use and, in general terms at least, of the form that use was likely to take. During the Cold War, issues involving nuclear weapons loomed in the background—and often in the foreground—of virtually every interaction in the
2 world of international politics. They were the focus of treaties and summit meetings, and they served to demarcate which nation belonged to which “camp.� To be a member of the Warsaw Pact meant, in part, to be under the nuclear protectorate of the Soviet Union; to be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization meant, more often than not, to be under the nuclear protectorate of the United States. As a result, there was virtually no part of superpower military planning that was not affected by the existence of nuclear weapons. Of course, there were the nuclear plans themselves, based upon a triad of nuclear-capable aircraft, submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, the effects of nuclear weapons were also felt in conventional operations. Nuclear weapons were seen not only as the last word in the case of cataclysmic scenarios, but also as the great levelers in conventional operations. In the first decade of the 21st century, however, nuclear weapons have acquired an irregular quality. Very few troops are trained to deploy them and even fewer are trained to function on a nuclear battlefield. Nuclear weapons rarely are included in deliberate war plans. Most important, however, among those who aspire to possess nuclear weapons are states and non-state actors, whose likely use of them could look like something very much akin to irregular warfare, only on a grand scale.
The Present Problem For a very long time now, moral philosophers have availed themselves to the luxury of sidestepping a serious discussion of nuclear weapons. For most of
3 the latter part of the 20th century, the discussion was simply unavoidable; nuclear weapons were the elephant in the room; even if one did not like them, one could not ignore them. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the nuclear paradigm has changed. However, that does not mean that the fundamental problems—including the moral-philosophical problems—which underlie the paradigm have disappeared. Not only have they not disappeared, they have become less tractable than ever. Consider how this is so: •
During the Cold War, the actors belonged to well defined, stable blocs. Today, the international community features multiple potential opponents and sources of conflict.
•
During the Cold War, the number of possible exigencies, including those involving the possibility of nuclear weapons use, was limited and circumscribed. Today, there exists an entire spectrum of possible exigencies.
•
During the Cold War, the superpowers kept their client states in check; even members of the so-called “Non-Aligned Movement” found themselves, in one way or another, operating within the sphere of influence of one or the other nuclear superpowers. Today, there are numerous threatening entities describable as “rogue states” and many others not describable as “states” at all, at least not in the Westphalian sense.
4 Moreover, the Westphalian world is receding in important ways germane to the present discussion. For example: •
Today, numerous multinational corporations have operations which far exceed the gross domestic product of many nations. Thus, traditional states are no longer the only entities with sufficient wherewithal to obtain nuclear materials.
•
Easy access to mass telecommunications and the relative ease of international travel (legroom considerations and surcharges for checked baggage excluded) have conferred unprecedented individual autonomy such that, for better or for worse, no state can adequately control the movement of information —to include technical information about nuclear weapons—in ways previously possible. As a result, the internet has made accessible to the masses technical nuclear data that only a handful of persons in a handful of states used to possess.
In the face of changes like these, nuclear weapons continue to exist and in some cases to proliferate. Indeed, some of the most vexing issues in the international arena involve the efforts of states and non-state actors to acquire or brandish nuclear weapons. The bottom line: Now, of all times, is no time to omit from moral-philosophical discourse a discussion of nuclear weapons. At very least, we need to identify the key moral issues pertaining to nuclear weapons in the first decade of the 21st century and in what, for the reasons suggested above, might well be the most perilous era of the nuclear age. To that end, let us
5 consider five pressing moral-philosophical problems concerning nuclear weapons today: Problem #1: Changes in the Role of International Law and Norms Back in the good old days when irregular warfare was merely a nuisance on the periphery of regular warfare, it made sense to appeal widely—almost exclusively—to international humanitarian law and norms to resolve a great many legal and moral questions. That is not necessarily because nations were altruistic and uncritically embraced the notion that a civilized world is a world governed by law. Rather, the driving factor was, more likely than not, nothing more than old-fashioned national interest; nations, the parties to binding international undertakings, almost always recognized that it was in their respective national interest to act within a framework of law. However, given the current prominence of irregular warfare in the life of the international community, it is not clear that those entities which seem to be the greatest source of concern feel themselves bound by international humanitarian law. (If they did, we would not call them “terrorists.”) For example, although terrorists might be among those with the shrillest voices in an otherwise respectable chorus of calls for the closure of places like Guantanamo Bay, many of these same terrorists seem to have no qualms with kidnapping, decapitating, and randomly detonating car bombs among groups of civilians. What constraining influence, therefore, would international humanitarian law exert on these terrorists if they possessed a nuclear weapon? Is this to suggest that international humanitarian law is of no contemporary value? Of course not.
6 Rather, it is simply to serve notice that in the world of 21st century irregular warfare, the role of international humanitarian law may not be the same as it was in the 20th century, at least not vis-à -vis nuclear weapons. (On this account, one is reminded of the famous words of Ulysses S. Grant, who said, "If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail."1) Of particular interest is the 1996 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice regarding the legality of nuclear weapons. In a vote of 7 to 7, the court found itself unable to decide whether the use of nuclear weapons would be permissible in the extreme case in which the very existence of a state were at stake. (Note to self: Whenever entertaining a decision of extreme gravity before a court of last resort, always make certain to have an odd number of jurists!) In the first decade of the 21st century, the question might be asked as to what role international humanitarian law plays in the calculus of non-state actors whose professed objective is to overthrow the Westphalian order and to establish in its place a medieval theocracy—and who, by the way, aspire to possess nuclear weapons. Problem #2: Fairness and Equality in the International Community As an axiom of the international system, sovereign political states, regardless of size, wealth, population, military prowess, etc., are, by virtue of their sovereign status, generally regarded as entitled to be treated as equals in the international community. (This idea is institutionalized, for example, in the composition and function of the United Nations General Assembly.) However, 1
Ulysses S. Grant, available at http://www.ushistorysite.com/us_grant_quotes.php, accessed 12 September 2009.
7 during the Cold War, states were more or less willing to accept the reality that vast inequalities existed with respect to nuclear weapons, to wit: some states had nuclear weapons and some states did not. Indeed, this acceptance is codified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which states, “For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”2 As a practical matter, that meant that the international community acknowledged the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China to be “nuclear states” and all others to be “nonnuclear states.” Although the treaty remains in force, there is an increasingly vocal discussion to the effect that it simply is unfair, hypocritical, and essentially immoral to permit some states to have nuclear weapons while at the same time denying that “right” to others. However, this argument seems to ignore the reality that the officially designated “nuclear states” have been, by virtually every reasonable measure, conscientious stewards of their nuclear wherewithal; whereas, states such as North Korea and Iran have consistently thumbed their noses at international consensus on nuclear matters. Is it, in fact, the case that fairness and equality should trump all other considerations when it comes to assessing who should have nuclear weapons and who should not? Of course, the “easy” solution is merely to abolish nuclear weapons altogether; that would solve one aspect of the equality problem. However, the likelihood of that
2
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. available online at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html, accessed 20 July 2009.
8 abolition occurring in the foreseeable future is probably comparable to the likelihood of the repeal of the second law of thermodynamics. Even if on the basis of cold logic alone the case can be made that all nations have an equal right to possess nuclear weapons, is that logic sufficient to address the moral issues at stake? Is it indeed the case that any entity, individual or national, should have the right to possess a power as potentially devastating as that produced by nuclear weapons? While track records are not infallible guides, some individuals and nations have demonstrated themselves to be more reliable and consistent than others, and there are times in moral discourse when concerns over consistency simply get trumped. For example, it seems patently wrong to allow a minor to have unfettered access to a loaded firearm. It likewise seems wrong to allow an unlicensed person to dispense prescription medications窶馬o matter how vehemently the unlicensed person might argue that according that right to some and not to others is inconsistent. One surely would dismiss an argument like that out of hand. However, in an analogous vein, does it make sense that any entity desiring nuclear weapons in the name of fairness and equality should necessarily be recognized as possessing such a right? Problem #3: The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence Deterrence, as it applies to nuclear weapons, has always been problematic. This is so because deterrence requires two things: (1) a believable capability to thwart, overcome, or, in the cases of nuclear weapons, devastate a potential opponent and (2) a believable will to use that capability under the right
9 circumstances. This is no trivial matter, especially as it applies to nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, a fair amount of discourse on nuclear deterrence occurs behind a logical smokescreen and says, in effect, “you can have these weapons, not test them to ensure that they work, and move toward disarmament—even unilateral disarmament, just as long as you don’t actually use them—and you can still have nuclear deterrence in the meantime, until we can get the international community to agree to general disarmament as it has bound itself to do.” However, this is not possible, for it is the threat of use that makes deterrence work. To say that one has means but no will to use the means doesn’t deter anything. Thus, the logic of deterrence always has, as an inherent quality, the threat of violent action; and when applied to nuclear weapons, that threat is a serious matter indeed. Let us assume that, in addition to being logically problematic, nuclear deterrence is also morally problematic. If nuclear deterrence is held to be immoral because the threat of violent action is itself immoral, then the whole institution of standing militaries for defensive purposes is called into question. If nuclear deterrence is held to be immoral because any use of nuclear weapons is allegedly disproportional, an enormous practical problem remains: What should our response be if an adversary uses nuclear weapons? Problem #4: The Possible Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence Perhaps the biggest challenges associated with the questionable morality of nuclear threats is that the threat seems to work! Anecdotal evidence is easily
10 brought to bear to advocate the claim that nuclear deterrence has saved many millions of lives. As U.S. Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter recently argued: Over the past four hundred years, between one and two percent of the world’s population annually lost their lives as casualties of war. Yet after World War II we observe a macrotectonic [sic] shift downward in wartime fatalities. As a matter of fact, the percentage of the world’s population lost in war over the past sixty years is a small fraction of that percentage lost over any other sixty-year period since the Renaissance.3 Thus, Secretary Winter concludes: Although the world has seen many conflicts since the end of the Second World War, America’s strategic deterrent [meaning nuclear weapons] has ensured that none of them became major wars. History proves that our strategic deterrent works.4 Thus if, even anecdotally, nuclear deterrence lessens the probability of anyone using nuclear weapons or of engaging in a major conflict that, by its nature might invite nuclear weapon use, how is it the case that deterrence does not serve the ultimate ends of morality? Problem #5: Proportionality Even if we grant, as some might be more willing to do than others, the proposition that nuclear deterrence, with its threat of overwhelming violent action, saves lives, moral philosophers still are left to grapple with the problem of whether the proportionality issues usually associated with discourse on nuclear weapons are so great as to be insurmountable. As Judge Christopher Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice argued in 1996, 3
Remarks by Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy, 1000th TRIDENT Submarine Patrol, Naval Submarine Base, King’s Bay, Georgia, Thursday, February 19, 2009, available online at http://www.navy.mil/navco/speeches/2009/SECNAV_1000th_Trident_Patrol-19Feb09.doc, accessed 12 September 2009. 4
Ibid.
11 the unprecedented magnitude of its destructive power is only one of the unique features of the bomb. It is unique in its uncontainability [sic] in both space and time. It is unique as a source of peril to the human future. It is unique as a source of continuing danger to human health, even long after its use. Its infringement of humanitarian law goes beyond its being a weapon of mass destruction, to reasons which penetrate far deeper into the core of humanitarian law.5 In short, actual nuclear weapon use seems to defy the demands of proportionality on multiple accounts. Let’s see if we can solve those problems with a mental experiment: Suppose the United States developed a weapon which we will call the “Zapper.” The “Zapper” is used only in time of extreme emergency because the way it works is that, when activated, it identifies at one moment every human threat to the security of the United States and “zaps” the threats with terminal effect. It is otherwise environmentally friendly, causes no unsavory residual effects, does no damage to real property, does no harm to animals, leaves no bitter aftertaste, and is much less expensive than a standing military. Moreover, it discriminates between threats and non-threats: It “zaps” only persons in uniform who, at that moment, are actively engaged in the planning, execution, or support of hostile actions against U.S. forces. Thus, it does not “zap” even some personnel in uniform, to include those not presently engaged in the planning, execution, or active support of hostile actions, the wounded or incapacitated, or even, closet conscientious objectors, cowards, etc. Is there any serious question about either the utility or moral permissibility of the “Zapper”? Since it is perfectly proportional and discriminate, is there any
5
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1996, 8 July 1996, “Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry,” p. 453, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7521.pdf, accessed 12 September 2009.
12 moral objection to it? Wouldn’t it be great to have a gadget like the “Zapper” that could be used to protect against threats to the nation? Unfortunately, the “Zapper” does not exist and there is no reason to believe that it ever will. However from time to time, states run up against adversaries who threaten their very existence by violent means. What does one use in that case and in the absence of a Zapper-like remedy? When we talk about the existence of the state, we are not referring merely to the continuance of the bureaucratic apparatus that includes sometimes exasperating entities like the IRS6 or OSHA7. We are referring to the way of life founded upon the principles enshrined in documents like the U.S. Declaration of Independence or the U.S. Constitution. If such values were at stake, do considerations of proportionality and discrimination truly and always trump all others, as much of popular (as well as theoretical) discourse about theses principles seems to suggest? Beginning last September, we began observances of the 70th anniversary of a war that few people seriously believed would happen and that even fewer prepared to fight, but which still engulfed most of humanity, threatened the existence of many democratic states, was feared to threaten the existence of the United States, and perpetrated systematic genocide against whole races. The threat which constituted the proximate cause of that war also was the original impetus for the U.S. nuclear program. Although most people tend to associate U.S. nuclear weapons with the war in the Pacific, still it is the case that nuclear weapons were originally developed by the United States in order to counter the 6
Internal Revenue Service
7
Occupational Health and Safety Administration
13 emerging Nazi threat. The Nazi German regime—hardly the paragon of moral virtue—had set on the path to develop nuclear weapons, and there is no reason whatsoever—even with the benefit of seven decades of hindsight—to suppose that that evil regime was developing nuclear weapons so as never to use them. What, then, was the proportional response by the United States if not to develop nuclear weapons? Conclusion These are some of the big problems, although not the only problems, associated with nuclear weapons in the 21st century. The nuclear club is enlarging, and not all of its newest members and aspirants have a good track record when it comes to observing international laws and norms, to include those laws and norms associated with just war theory. One may eschew nuclear weapons use, or even nuclear deterrence, on the grounds that, even if some rogue entity in the international community uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, two wrongs don’t make a right. But that really doesn’t solve the immediate problem; a moral response to the problem of nuclear weapons in the 21st century is going to require a more nuanced response than that. Now, exactly what is the point of raising this unpopular issue? Is it to advocate the use of nuclear weapons? No, quite the contrary. Rather, the point is to take notice of the reality that we live in a world that is less stable, in nuclear terms, than it ever has been. Our cherished notion that the consequences of nuclear weapons use are too terrible to contemplate and, therefore, we simply won’t contemplate them may be merely academic. Moral philosophers in
14 particular need to consider the question, “What if a nuclear weapon does get used in the post-9-11 world? What are the appropriate responses?” What if truly extraordinary circumstances, perhaps at present not contemplated, indicate nuclear weapons use as the least bad moral alternative? What do we do?” Indeed, in the 21st century, we may not have the luxury of merely asking and answering the antiseptic, theoretical question, “What should everyone do with respect to nuclear weapons?” For, those now seeking nuclear weapons—state and non-state actors alike—may use them in ways that fly in the face of all just war discourse. The more profitable question may be, “What should we do in the light of this reality?” And addressing that question is a proper and urgent task for 21st-century just war theorists.