The conflict resolution stakeholders' network

THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION STAKEHOLDERS ’ NETWORK (CRESNET) AN INDEPENDENT PROGRAM EVALUATION OF UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

March 2002

Bronwyn Bruton School of Public Policy and Social Research University of California at Los Angeles

CONTE NTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY … 3 INTRODUCTION … 6 Methodology … 10

BACKGROUND … 12 The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) … 12 Nigeria’s transition to democracy … 14 Previous attempts to form conflict resolution networks in Nigeria … 16

THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION STAKEHOLDERS NETWORK … 19 Organizational history … 19 Role of OTI/Nigeria … 22 Organizational structure and capacity … 25

PROGRAM ANALYSIS … 28 Lessons Learned … 28 Potential for duplicating CRESNET in future OTI Country Programs … 31 Nigeria: a representative case … 31 Limitations of the approach … 34 Critical criteria for comparison … 35 Potential for duplicating CRESNET in priority Watch List countries … 39

CONCLUSION … 41 APPENDICES … 43 Appendix A: Persons Interviewed … 43 Appendix B: Bibliography … 42 Appendix C: CRESNET Interim Steering Committee … 47 Appendix D: CRESNET National Executive Committee … 47 Appendix E: CRESNET Locations … 48

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EXECUTIVE SUMMAR Y

The Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET) was an experiment in promoting civil society responses to conflict developed by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) during its two-and-a-half year program in Nigeria, immediately following the collapse of the military dictatorship. OTI is an office housed in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an independent federal government agency that receives “overall foreign policy guidance” from the Secretary of State.1 From its arrival in Nigeria in May 1999 until February 2001, OTI pursued a variety of program options that provided critical support to Nigeria’s transition to democracy.

In February 2001,

OTI convened a Stakeholders Conference that drew together a number of NGOs working in conflict resolution.

This conference was colored by the unprecedented violence of riots

occurring simultaneously in the northern city of Kaduna, and resulted in a cooperative decision on the part of the attending NGOs to create CRESNET.

Originally envisioned as a NGO

network, CRESNET evolved with extensive support from OTI/Nigeria into a professional association of conflict resolution experts. OTI/Nigeria’s conflict resolution program was a visible success, and subsequently CRESNET gained considerable attention from international donor agencies as an innovative model of “bottom up” conflict resolution programming.

Two questions naturally emerge from OTI’s experience in Nigeria: 1) What were the key factors that contributed to the success of CRESNET? 2) Can CRESNET be used as a model that could be duplicated in other OTI country programs?

This report provides OTI Headquarters (OTI/Washington) with a set of “Lessons Learned” and an analysis of the potential for duplicating CRESNET in future OTI country programs. The study is divided into three sections. In the B ACKGROUND section, I provide a brief overview of OTI and of Nigeria’s recent political history, and offer a more extensive overview of previous attempts by local NGOs and other international donor agencies to form conflict resolution networks in Nigeria. In the section titled THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION STAKEHOLDER’S NETWORK, I provide a brief history of CRESNET that highlights the role of OTI/Nigeria in the organization’s

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development. The section concludes with a brief description of CRESNET’s organizational structure and an analysis of its capacity. In the final section, titled Program Analysis, I outline a set of Lessons Learned, and attempt to predict the potential for duplicating CRESNET-like organizations in other OTI country programs by defining a set of critical criteria that I apply to the “priority” countries on OTI’s current Watch List. The Watch List is a listing of countries that OTI is monitoring for signs of political or social transitions.

The nine “priority” countries

comprise a set of the most likely candidates for an OTI program in the near future.

Six “Lessons Learned” may be drawn from OTI/Nigeria’s experience in developing CRESNET: Ø

The ideal timeframe for the construction of a viable, self-sustaining network under the set of constraints typical of transition countries is a minimum of two years of active OTI support.

Ø

The management structure of the conflict resolution network should be cooperative rather than dependent upon the leadership of a single individual.

Ø

OTI/Nigeria should continue to perform active oversight of all network activities and to closely monitor the use of all OTI funding.

Ø

The network should neither distribute grants nor receive substantial direct funding from OTI.

Ø

OTI should use a participatory approach to program development; such an approach encourages network members to feel ownership and increases the network’s viability.

Ø

The promotion of CRESNET members as the leaders of conflict interventions and activities is vital in improving the network’s viability.

This report defines a set of critical criteria that determine the likelihood of successful duplication in future OTI country programs. These critical criteria include: Ø

Timeframe available for OTI’s program

Ø

Local commitment to the creation of a conflict resolution network

Ø

Low potential for the recurrence of organized violence

Ø

Management style of the in-country staff

Ø

The capacity and concentration of local NGO power

Ø

Ease of communication and travel

Ø

Ethnic and religious diversity

1

USAID: This is USAID, available at http:/www.usaid.gov/about

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Some of these criteria are not measurable prior to an in-country assessment or the commencement of an OTI program. Using the measurable criteria, this study reviews the ten countries currently on OTI’s priority Watch List to determine the potential for a CRESNET program. The study finds two countries that are high potential targets for the duplication of this program: Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Eritrea is currently the priority Watch List country with the lowest potential for duplication.

A previous report submitted to OTI/Washington in November 2001 provided a more detailed description of CRESNET’s organization, structure and capacity; measured the probable impact of OTI’s withdrawal from Nigeria; and suggested guidelines for the selection of USAID/Nigeria’s Implementing Partner and for the targeting of future USAID grants to CRESNET. The current report includes a summary of only those findings that are relevant to the program analysis.

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INTRODUCTIO N

CRESNET is a professional membership organization that seeks to provide a group of individuals with conflict resolution skills that can be applied to mitigating Nigeria’s ethnic, religious and economic conflicts. It was created in February 2000 at a training conference organized and sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Inititiatives in Nigeria (OTI/Nigeria). Between its creation and July 2001, when OTI effectively ceased its active programming in Nigeria, CRESNET developed rapidly but with extensive managerial and indirect financial support from OTI/Nigeria.

At the time of

OTI/Nigeria’s departure in September 2001, CRESNET was the only viable 2, nation-wide civil society network devoted to peace building and conflict resolution in Nigeria, and had become the cornerstone of the Office of Transition Initiatives’ conflict resolution programming in that country.

When OTI initiated its program in Nigeria in May 1999, its activities were broadly—the honest assessment of one report is “opportunistically” 3—focused on ensuring transparency and good governance practices in the newly democratized nation. Various program components were focused on anti-corruption, civilian-military relations, police reform,4 the media, and the training of 14,000 of Nigeria’s recently elected officials in governance skills.

By the end of 1999, the need to expand conflict resolution activities into a program focus became apparent; Nigeria had exploded in a series of ethnic, religious and economic riots.

These disturbances, coinciding with the end of the repressive military dictatorship, threatened to undermine Nigeria’s transition to democracy. The need for a responsive conflict resolution program became increasingly obvious, as the riots threatened to undermine Nigeria’s transition to democracy.

2

At the time of OTI/Nigeria’s departure, CRESNET was the only conflict resolution network in Nigeria with a functioning leadership, regular member meetings, a Constitution/by-laws, offices, and status as a registered private organization.

3 Stewart, DRAFT: 2 4 The police reform component of OTI/Nigeria’s program was active up to and beyond OTI’s official departure from Nigeria in September 2001.

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In response to the developing crisis, OTI/Nigeria’s Country Director, Lisa DeSoto, called a Stakeholders Conference in February 2000 that gathered together 36 representatives of prominent Nigerian NGOs engaged in conflict resolution.

In gathering these NGOS, OTI was motivated by an awareness that previous, “top-down” approaches to conflict resolution had frequently been ineffective. In the top-down approach, members of the country’s government and elite and/or members of the international development community are called on to intervene directly in the conflict by mediating between the disputants. Joseph Ola Shopade described three critical problems that OTI associated with this intervention approach: Development agencies 1) had no access to the critical stakeholders who had the power to stop the conflict; 2) were unable to mobilize the community; and 3) found that their intervention was frequently rejected, primarily because development agencies and elites were not perceived as credible.

The motivation behind the Stakeholder’s Conference, and ultimately, CRESNET, was to abandon the top-down approach in favor of a “bottom-up,” community-based approach to conflict resolution. It was OTI’s intention to establish a pool of credible community based organizations (CBOs) that could be mobilized to intervene in conflicts occurring within their communities. OTI’s role would be to enable those CBOs to intervene in the conflict by providing them with adequate training in conflict resolution techniques, and to accompany the CBOs to the site of the conflict. It was not OTI’s explicit intention to form a network that would allow the CBOs to communicate directly with each other. The decision taken during the February 2000 Stakeholders Conference to form a “Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network” was entirely the result of the efforts of the attending NGOs. (See FIGURE 1) The creation of a conflict resolution network at the end of the Stakeholders Conference was not an unusual outcome. Nigeria’s community of conflict resolution NGOs is small, but its members are separated by large distances and a dismally inefficient communications infrastructure.

Conferences sponsored by international donor organizations are a rare but not unexpected opportunity for discussion and, primarily, for networking. Previous conferences sponsored by international donors and by local NGOs had frequently resulted in the creation of conflict resolution networks.5 Therefore, while OTI/Nigeria was responsible for providing the opportunity to form a network, the impetus to create CRESNET demonstrably sprang from the NGO community and cannot with any fairness be attributed to OTI. During interviews, CRESNET 5

Several prominent examples are included in the section entitled PREVIOUS A TTEMPTS TO FORM CONFLICT R ESOLUTION NETWORKS IN N IGERIA , pages 14-16.

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members frequently expressed a sense of ownership of the initiative, and cited the previous networks as proofs of the uniquely Nigerian origin of CRESNET. Without exception, however, these previous networks were unproductive and short-lived, and there is no doubt that it was OTI/Nigeria that supplied the expertise and the motivation for continuing CRESNET and for allowing it to develop beyond the capacity of previous organizations.

Tjip Walker, Deputy Country Director, described his original perception of CRESNET as “a means to an end,” and stated openly that ensuring the sustainability of CRESNET was a lateterm, if vital, goal. What had begun as an exercise in conflict resolution unexpectedly became an exercise in civil society building. As OTI’s program continued, CRESNET members were increasingly relied on to respond to conflicts and to host conflict resolution training sessions.

These trainings and interventions were so effective that CRESNET increasingly came to dominate the OTI program.

By the end of 2000, ensuring CRESNET’s sustainability had

become one of OTI’s major goals. In the final months of its program, OTI was therefore obliged to undertake an extensive last-minute effort to increase CRESNET’s organizational capacity and to ensure that the USAID Mission (the long-term development arm of USAID) would continue its funding.

It is OTI/Nigeria’s comparative success in supporting CRESNET that has motivated this report.

The three primary questions motivating the research are: 1) Can CRESNET be duplicated in other OTI country programs, or is it too much the product of circumstance?

2) What factors were critical to OTI’s success?

3) Assuming that the network approach can be duplicated, what lessons can be drawn from OTI’s experience with CRESNET in Nigeria to maximize the future likelihood of success?

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FIGURE 1: TOP-DOWN, BOTTOM-UP AND NETWORK APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION TOP-DOWN A PPROACH

BOTTOM-UP APPROACH

International Development Agency

Community in conflict

Community in conflict

OTI

Community in conflict

CBO

Community in conflict

CBO

Community in conflict

CBO

Community in conflict

NETWORK A PPROACH OTI CBO

Community in conflict

CBO

CRESNET

Community in conflict

CBO

CBO CBO

CBO Community in conflict

Benefits of the bottom-up network approach to conflict resolution: Ø Ø Ø

Networks have the potential to provide sustainable benefits to the host country.

Networks allow monitoring and intervention over a wide geographical area.

Networks allow OTI to build a heterogeneous corps of mediators that can act as credible representatives of varying religions, ethnicities and regions. Ø It may be easier to share successful tactics and methods across CBOs. Ø The scale of the potential intervention is potentially greater.

Disadvantages of the network approach Ø Ø

Networks are extremely time and effort intensive.

The success of the network is dependent upon the commitment and skill of a large group of individuals, not ultimately on OTI. Ø There may be less accountability to OTI than in the top-down and bottom-up approaches.

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METHODOLOGY The evaluator had an opportunity to visit Nigeria and to interview the staff of CRESNET during the course of completing an internship at OTI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The findings of this report are based on research conducted in Nigeria from September 9 - 28, 2001.

Data collection methods included interviews and a review of primary

documents in Washington DC, Lagos, Abuja and Ibadan. The evaluator interviewed 25 individuals

from

OTI/Washington,

OTI/Nigeria,

CRESNET

national

and

zonal

organizations, the British Council and Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW). The evaluation was written in fulfillment of university requirements and the opinions expressed should not be attributed to USAID, the Office of Transition Initiatives, or to CRESNET staff.

The single case-study approach provides nuanced and qualitative data. The obvious limitation of such an approach is that a single case study cannot be used to prove the potential for duplication. The goal of this report is therefore to isolate the key and unique aspects of OTI and CRESNET’s success, and to provide a set of parameters and criteria that will allow OTI to conduct for an effective initial assessment of the countries that are “likely” candidates for conflict resolution programs.

The many previous attempts to form conflict resolution networks in Nigeria offered what amounts to a “control group” for this study.

One network in particular, the “British

Network” that was supported by the British Council from 1996 to 1998, was chosen as an appropriate test case for comparison. The British Network collapsed only two and a half years prior to the creation of CRESNET. It had similar organizational goals, and its funding was also provided by a single bilateral donor. Perhaps the most vital similarity, however, is the fact that the British Network was comprised of virtually the same set of conflict resolution professionals who created of CRESNET. The political environment did change somewhat dramatically in the two and a half year interim between the collapse of the British Network and the creation of CRESNET: the military dictatorship crumbled, and the increased frequency of violent riots gave increased urgency to the need for effective conflict resolution initiatives in Nigeria. However, the outstanding failure and success of the two organizations, respectively, suggests that there were specific actions taken by OTI and not by the British Council that had a pivotal impact on the networks’ survival. These pre-existing attempts to form conflict resolution networks therefore make Nigeria an especially good candidate for a case study approach.

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Another relevant characteristic is the wide variety of conflict types in Nigeria. Nigeria’s conflicts are ethnic, religious, political and economic in nature, and therefore seem to span the universe of conflict types. This again increases its applicability as a model to future OTI programs. FIGURE 2 provides a more complete picture of the complexity and extent of Nigeria’s conflicts.

Certain countries or regions have obtained “priority” status on OTI’s Watch List. These countries are considered to be the most immediately likely candidates for OTI programs.

As of August 2001, the eight Priority Watch List countries and provinces are: Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kashmir, North Korea, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Ecuador. The Watch List is currently being updated and it is likely that, due to recent political events, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will be given priority status. Because these countries are the more immediate candidates for an OTI program, they have been chosen as the sample for the comparison of critical criteria.

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BACKGROUND

THE OFFICE OF TRANSITION I NITIATIVES (OTI) OTI is an office of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and is currently housed in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.6 USAID is an independent federal agency but receives foreign policy direction from the Secretary of State.

OTI was created in 1994 in response to a perceived gap between the end of short-term humanitarian intervention and long-term development. USAID noted that there tended to be a two-to-three year lag between the delivery of humanitarian relief (such as the short-term delivery of food and medical supplies) and the commencement of long-term development projects (in areas such as infrastructure repair and economic expansion).

Because it was explicitly created to continue development efforts during this interim period, OTI’s mandate is limited to a two-to-three year period. As its name suggests, OTI is also mandated to work primarily in countries undergoing “complex” humanitarian emergencies, usually in countries that are undergoing transitions to a democratic regime. (Complex humanitarian emergencies include wars, revolutions, coups d’etat, misgovernment, and other man-made crises, and exclude natural disasters such as flood, earthquake or famine.) OTI’s programs have tended to focus on strengthening independent media sources and promoting transparency and democratic processes in governance and elections.

OTI has four criteria for entering a country and establishing a program: 1) The country must be deemed significant to U.S. foreign policy goals.

2) There must be “a window of opportunity,” or a significant potential for change, such as the end of a war, a change of regime, or an attempt to shift to a democratic form of government. (In the case of Nigeria, the “window of opportunity” was the end of the 18-year military dictatorship and the subsequent transition to democracy.)

6

At the time of the evaluation, OTI was located in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response. This Bureau was renamed during the USAID reorganization of November 2001.

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3) There must be evidence of a political will for change among the nation’s leaders.

OTI will not attempt to initiate program activities in a country whose leaders appear hostile to democratization, to the strengthening of the independent media, or to other OTI program goals.

4) There must be evidence of a political will for change among the populace. The people of the country must be committed to stabilization and democratization.

OTI is designed to respond to extremely volatile political conditions and to respond quickly to “windows of opportunity” that may appear—and disappear—within months.

The timeframe for selecting a country and implementing a program is short. When a country becomes a candidate for entry, OTI headquarters in Washington D.C. will send a team of three to four experienced staff members to perform an assessment of the country. The in-country assessment generally takes three to four weeks and is followed by a period of consultation at OTI/Washington headquarters. If the team determines that the country has met all of the entry criteria, and if it is felt that OTI can make a significant contribution to the country’s development, a program staff will be hired and sent to the country to design and implement a program.

(The timeframe for hiring staff and

commencing a program varies, but may be as short as several months.) OTI’s budget is designed to allow for this flexibility. OTI has nearly complete discretion in allocating the annual budget awarded by Congress.7 This freedom allows OTI to allocate funding in response to rapidly evolving conditions and to experiment with innovative program approaches.

7

The budget for Fiscal Year 2002 is $52 million, but is likely to include as much as $30 million in additional allocations for specific projects.

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NIGERIA’S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY Nigeria declared its independence from Britain in February 1960.

Between its

independence and 1983, Nigeria alternated between democratic and military forms of government, interrupted by an extended and violent civil war that claimed an estimated one million casualties. In 1983, a coup established a military dictatorship that lasted for the next fifteen years.

In 1998, as a result of popular uprisings and increasing

international pressure, the military bowed to demands for popular elections, and in February 1999, Nigeria elected a civilian leadership headed by the former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo.

Nigeria’s government has systemically infringed on political, women’s and workers rights. The violent suppression of political dissent that took place under the military dictatorship resulted in the suspension of Nigeria from the British Commonwealth in 1995, and the military dictatorship’s human rights abuses interrupted the delivery of U.S. aid in the early 1990s. Since the end of the military regime, however, the U.S. has dramatically increased its commitment of aid resources in support of Nigeria’s transition to democracy. In the decade between 1986 and 1996, bilateral assistance to Nigeria totaled $135 million. In Fiscal Year 2000 alone, U.S. humanitarian and development assistance to Nigeria exceeded $100 million. 8 Shortly after the collapse of the military regime, Nigeria’s longstanding ethnic, religious, economic and political conflicts deteriorated into a wave of violent riots. The MuslimChristian riots that claimed approximately 2,000 lives in Kaduna in February 2001 coincided with the Stakeholder’s Conference that created CRESNET, and supplied a sense of urgency and commitment to the creation of a nation-wide conflict resolution initiative. Violent conflict in Nigeria continues at an alarming rate (most recently, at the time of this report, in the ethnic riots in Lagos), confirming the need for CRESNET and other conflict resolution organizations.

A map showing the six geopolitical zones and the distribution of regionalized conflicts in Nigeria is included as FIGURE 2.

8

Department of State, Country Background Paper. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/2836.htm

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FIGURE 2:

SOURCE: Conflict data provided by ARD, Inc 9 and mapping data by the U.S. Geological Survey 10

9

Ard Inc, 2001: 25-27 U.S. Geological Survey, 2001

10

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PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO FORM CONFLICT RESOLUTION NETWORKS IN NIGERIA Since 1993, there have been several cooperative attempts by local non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and international donor organizations to form conflict resolution networks in Nigeria. 11 These networks are frequently formed opportunistically at the tail end of conflict resolution training programs or conferences sponsored by international donor agencies. These meetings offer rare opportunities for Nigerian conflict managers to gather.

The frequency of the attempts to form these networks attests to the widespread commitment of the community to conflict resolution initiatives.

The networks have,

however, proven to be extremely difficult to sustain past the first few months. This has resulted both from the logistical difficulties of maintaining communication between the members, and what one interviewee describes as a tendency for the networks to be perceived primarily as a means by which participants can gain personal prestige. The organizations are highly informal, rarely meet, have no distinct programs, and have rarely achieved legal status as registered private organizations. The membership of these networks overlaps heavily.

Nigeria’s community of conflict resolution

professionals is extremely small, and previous networks have been headed consistently by a handful of NGOs, in particular the Lagos-based Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW) headed by Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni, and the Kaduna-based Strategic Empowerment Management Agency Ltd. (SEMA) headed by Samuel Ihejirika, who is also the current National Coordinator of CRESNET. Prominent among the attempts to form conflict resolution networks are: Ø

The Corps of Mediators (COM), an association of prominent Nigerians, created at the end of a training conference organized by AAPW in 1994.

Ø

The Conflict Management Network, a loose partnership between AAPW (then simply Academic Associates) and two other NGOs, the African Leaders Forum (ALF) and the African Strategic and Peace Research Groups (AFSTRAG) in 1994.

11

Parallel efforts to form networks of human rights NGOs have been successful in Nigeria. Though beyond the scope of this report, a comparative study of these organizations would make an interesting subject for future research.

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Ø

A two-year cooperation with the Strategic Empowerment Management Agency (SEMA), funded by the British Council and involving a range of individuals and organizations, many of whom later became CRESNET members, took place between 1996 and 1997. This cooperation is loosely referred to as “the British Network.” AAPW continued its activities with the network members with the support of British Council funding until 1998.

Ø

In 1997, AAPW revived the defunct Corps of Mediators as the National Corps of Mediators. Dr. Asuni stated during our interview that the National COM is currently active, but it is not clear that the group can be adequately distinguished from the Board of Directors of AAPW. (Dr. Asuni admitted that COM lacks a functional leadership, by-laws, and offices, and is not registered as a private organization.)

Ø

The Nigerian Peace Network was established by AAPW in 1998, but ceased functioning within six months. What remains of the network is a quarterly newsletter produced and distributed by SEMA.

Ø

Several of the leading members of CRESNET had attempted to form a conflict resolution network as a result of a conference held in Accra-Ghana in 1997. The first CRESNET newsletter12 actually dates the organization’s origins to this workshop.

The British Council’s experience both informed OTI’s approach to supporting its network and colored the expectations of the first members of CRESNET, the majority of whom had worked with AAPW during that year-long period.

The influence of the British

Council’s experience is evident in several key OTI decisions: Ø

OTI chose not to award funding directly to CRESNET and was careful not to allow CRESNET to become a mechanism for distributing funding to members or their NGOs. The British Council had chosen to take a “hands off” approach to the British Network, allowing AAPW, despite a foreseeable conflict of interest, to select local participants and projects and to control and distribute all funding. As a result of this arrangement, participants stated that AAPW was able to monopolize both the decision-making process and the majority of available funds.

This led to a

widespread perception that the British Network was a network in name only, and ultimately resulted in a severe decrease in member participation.

12

Peaceful Coexistence, Newsletter of the Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET), Vol.1 No.1, July-August 2001: 1

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Ø

OTI ensured that CRESNET was guided by a group of leaders rather than a single executive. British Network participants complained of the lack of democratic processes in prior networks and expressed concern that the success of those networks had seemed to depend primarily on the reputation of a few key individuals.

In contrast, they frequently praised the organization of CRESNET. For example, Deputy National Coordinator Felicia Iyore Onibon said that, although Samie Ihejirika is the head of CRESNET, “Samie is not CRESNET. If Samie’s reputation went bad, CRESNET would not go bad.”

She also described the unusually cooperative

organization of CRESNET as a direct outcome of OTI’s refusal to concentrate its conflict resolution initiative on a single individual or NGO.

In contrasting her

experience with OTI and with the British Council, the Ms. Onibon said, “I saw that OTI was not willing to work with just one person.”13 Ø

OTI insisted on and oversaw the creation of formal mechanisms to ensure transparency and democratic processes. These mechanisms are formalized in an extensive Constitution and include the election of officers by the membership.

As a result of these initiatives, CRESNET is at present the only viable conflict resolution network in Nigeria, having successfully developed into a registered private organization with a functioning leadership structure.

13

Felicia Iyore Onibon, interview held on September 10, 2001 at the OTI office in Lagos.

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THE CO NFLICT RESOLUTION STAKEHOLDERS NETW ORK

ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY CRESNET was created during the last day of a Stakeholder’s Conference that was sponsored by OTI/Nigeria and held at Bagadry, Lagos, from February 23-26, 2000. An Interim Steering Committee, headed by Barrister Yamah Mohammed and Dr Isaac Olawale Albert, was elected during the conference, and remained active until a new national leadership was elected in November 2000. 14 In March 2000, OTI organized a Training of Trainers (TOT) at Port Harcourt. The TOT was attended by 30 representatives from Nigeria’s CBOs and civil society organizations (CSOs). The training was facilitated by CRESNET members under the guidance of two members of an American NGO. The purpose of the TOT was to build a corps of “master trainers” who would be proficient in teaching basic conflict resolution and participatory training skills. In the four months following the TOT, the 30 attendees spread out over Nigeria, hosting a series of zonal 15 training sessions, at which an additional 200 individuals received basic conflict resolution skills.

This zonal training approach not only created a fairly extensive network of potential conflict resolution managers, but cemented the basis for current structure of the organization, which is divided into six geo-political zones covering the whole of Nigeria.

(See FIGURE 2) Formal elections to replace the Interim Steering Committee with a National Executive Committee were held in November 2000. These elections were intended to mitigate some of the difficulties described above, but were problematic. Due largely to logistic constraints, invitations to the elections were not sent by mail, but rather by word of mouth. As a result, many members from the Southern zones have stated that they were not aware that the November meetings, which were in fact frequently referred to as

14

A list of the Interim Steering Committee members is included as APPENDIX C. The zonal structure and leadership of CRESNET had been established at the Bagadry Stakeholders Conference. This early arrangement excluded the areas that would become the North Center and South East zones, which had not been represented by the 36 individuals from civil society and communitybased organizations who attended at the Stakeholders Conference.

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“strategy meetings,” were for the purpose of holding national elections. Those who were aware that elections were to take place mobilized larger groups of people to attend and to cast votes. This led to accusations of an unfair distribution of information, and caused a temporary schism within the organization. Ultimately, these tensions were reduced through mediation efforts made by the OTI staff, particularly during an Executive Meeting that was held in Abuja in March 2001. This meeting led to a reconciliation between CRESNET’s leaders, and simultaneously marked CRESNET’s registration as a private organization.

In April 2001 the CRESNET Constitution was revised, a process that provided additional strengthening of the organization. There is strong feeling among members that the revision of the Constitution was genuinely participatory, designed explicitly to incorporate corrections and comments from all of the zones. A major change that was brought about by the revision was the requirement that all leaders of CRESNET receive a minimum level of training before becoming eligible for election. Under the new guidelines, zonal officers are required to receive 50 hours of training in order to qualify for election, and leaders aspiring to the national level are required to receive 100 hours of training.

During April and May 2001, the first formal election of zonal officers took place. The election of the six Zonal Coordinators at this time led to the completion of the 16member national board. These elections were deliberately made to coincide with a series of zonal training sessions then in progress. All of the several hundred participants of the zonal training sessions were invited to vote in the elections, on condition that they register as members of CRESNET. The desire on the part of the attendees to vote led to a dramatic increase in the number of registered members. Since that date, CRESNET’s membership has continued to dramatically expand. Approximately 300 members were registered as of the end of September 2001.

The following timeline indicates the comparative speed of the organization’s development, and the two gaps in supportive activities at the beginning and end of OTI’s program in Nigeria.

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TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS February 1999

Democratic elections end the 15-year military dictatorship

May 1999

Start of OTI program in Nigeria

(9-month gap between the commencement of OTI program and the creation of CRESNET)

February 2000 March 2000 June 2000

Stakeholders Meeting sponsored by OTI/Nigeria Training manual developed Follow-up meeting sponsored by OTI/Nigeria Training of Trainers (TOT) at Port Harcourt TOT held in all six geo-political zones

September 2000

Draft of Constitution meeting held at OTI/Nigeria office in Abuja

November 2000

Strategic planning meetings Regional trainings Formal election of national officers Development of federal structure Constitution is revised during an Executive Meeting in Abuja CRESNET officially registered as a private organization Zonal structures established

March 2001 May 2001 July 2001 September 2001

Publication of first CRESNET newsletter and Inauguration End of OTI active programming Departure of OTI/Nigeria (5-month gap between OTI and USAID support)

January 2002

Commencement of USAID/Nigeria support

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ROLE OF OTI/NIGERIA OTI played a critical role during the early stages of CRESNET’s development.

In

addition to capacity building and sponsorship of activities and meetings, OTI was able to resolve, to a large extent, three early problems that would otherwise have been devastating to the organization. Ø

Lack of conflict resolution expertise An early, and ongoing, difficulty derived from the significant variation in the members’ capacities to perform conflict resolution work. The membership of CRESNET is divided between individuals with fairly extensive experience in conflict resolution and those who were new to the field.

Although a minority of CRESNET members

possessed extensive conflict mitigation skills, OTI was obliged to host repeated training sessions and offer ongoing assistance in an attempt to obtain a basic level of competence from a critical mass of members. Ø

Tension between the North and South A major difficulty was a perceived imbalance in the opportunities available to the Northern and Southern zones of CRESNET. Tension between residents of the North and South is widespread and certainly not restricted to CRESNET. The southern areas of Nigeria are relatively more developed in terms of industry and human capital.

The majority of CRESNET’s early leaders, including the National

Coordinator, were drawn from the Southern zones, as were a majority of the CRESNET members who were experienced enough to act as facilitators. This led to the perception that Southerners had “hijacked” the organization. This problem was aggravated by administrative difficulties in OTI/Nigeria’s Abuja office that caused the process of distributing grants to be longer in the southern zones of the country than in the north. The resulting imbalance in funding opportunities led to the perception that the Southern NGOs were being favored by OTI. Finally, there was an ongoing dispute over how to determine the zonal affiliation of members: whether members should belong to the zone in which they resided or the zone in which they worked.

(This question was vital to establishing eligibility for zonal leadership positions.)

23

OTI was able to correct the imbalance in its grant making process. The membership dispute, however, was perceived by OTI staff as a reflection of the wider “indigene” and “settler” disputes that are frequently the cause of Nigeria’s conflicts. OTI staff felt it was necessary to impose a solution on CRESNET members by insisting that members belonged to the zone in which they worked. However, OTI also sponsored team-building activities that assisted in smoothing over this conflict and the conflict surrounding the November elections. Ø

The “cash cow” vision of CRESNET OTI’s early relationship with CRESNET was complicated by an unfounded rumor that CRESNET would eventually be selected to act as USAID’s Implementing Partner 16, and would “inherit” a substantial operating budget, offices and equipment upon OTI’s departure. This misunderstanding was to some extent symptomatic of a widespread problem: the perception that performing conflict resolution activities for the American government was a potentially lucrative business. Profit is a common expectation among NGOs that work with bilateral donors. An important motivation for many who participated in CRESNET was the perception that conflict resolution training could provide opportunities for remunerated employment with USAID or other donor agencies. Almost all CRESNET interviewees acknowledged that the expectation of obtaining a per diem or other compensation for acting as a facilitator at USAIDsponsored training sessions was a primary goal, particularly for newer members.

OTI staff members took pains to correct these assumptions, and by the time of OTI’s departure, a majority (a credible given estimate was 75%) of the 100 “original” members of CRESNET were strongly committed to participation in the organization’s development, regardless of the extent of USAID funding and support. However, it remains an ongoing concern.

16

USAID engages an Implementing Partner, generally an American or international NGO, to design and oversee its program.

24

In addition to assisting in the resolution of intra-organizational conflicts, OTI also encouraged the implementation of two substantial structural changes: Ø

CRESNET was conceived as an NGO network but developed into a professional association during the course of its first year.

Ø

CRESNET’s original structure was centralized. The current “federal” structure, which links the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria under one national secretariat, was not put into place until April 2001.

OTI also engaged in extensive capacity building. 17

Capacity building was targeted

toward two major goals: Ø

Individual capacity building: providing NGO members with conflict resolution expertise adequate to support the OTI program

Ø

Organizational capacity building: providing improvements to infrastructure and systems of financial accountability of associated NGOs to support the management of OTI grants

It is worth noting two innovative techniques employed by OTI to encourage the NGOs to build capacity: Ø

Prior to awarding a grant, OTI staff would provide the NGO with recommended changes to improve the organization’s system of grant management and financial accountability. Kury Cobham, Regional Coordinator for OTI/Nigeria, stressed that these recommendations were “presented to the NGOs as assistance.” However, due to the size and complexity of OTI grant requirements, the recommended changes had to be implemented before funding was distributed.

Ø

The use of receipts is not common in Nigeria, and so the creation of some sort of incentive was vital to reduce the occurrence of overcharging for costs and materials.

OTI accomplished this by building a 10% institutional capacity building fee into its grant contracts. No restrictions were placed on the use of this fee: it could be spent in any way the NGO saw fit. However, OTI retained the right to withhold the award.

The potential loss of the 10% capacity building fee supplied the NGOs with an incentive to maximize its use of the program funding portion of the grant.

17

Capacity building is a fluid term used to refer a number of different activities. In this context, the term refers to OTI/Nigeria’s efforts to build financial accountability and conflict resolution expertise.

25

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY CRESNET is a young organization. At the time of OTI’s departure from Nigeria, it had succeeded in developing: Ø

A network of individuals competent in basic techniques for mitigating conflict

Ø

A smaller group of individuals who can facilitate conflict resolution training

Ø

An infrastructure of zonal offices that is organized under a functioning National Executive Committee

Ø

A binding Constitution that guides the conduct of the zones and secretariat

Ø

Recognition as a registered private organization

CRESNET is currently organized into a National Executive Committee and six zonal offices. Ideally, CRESNET would function as a network of offices linked both by the National Executive Committee and by direct communication between offices and members. Currently, however, communication between the zones is imperfect. This is due largely to logistic difficulties and a shortage of financial resources.

The National Executive Committee18 is currently located in Kaduna and is theoretically responsible for policy implementation, which includes setting the training and certification standards for all members. The National Executive Committee is composed of sixteen (16) officers, six (6) of whom also serve as the coordinators of the zonal offices.19 The zonal offices fulfill an important leadership role, as the primary organizational principle of CRESNET is that of zonal autonomy. This principle is intended to permit the zones to develop in accordance with Nigeria’s diverse needs.

The zones are free to initiate

programs, fundraising activities and membership drives, and to form additional structures at the local or state level. CRESNET’s Zonal Offices coincide with Nigeria's six geopolitical zones: South West, South South, South East, North Central, North East and North West. The capacity of the zones varies widely, but generally, the capacity of the Southern zones is greater than that of the Northern zones.

The majority of

experienced conflict resolution practitioners are located in Lagos, and the South West Zone is therefore generally considered to have the greatest capacity.

18

A list of the current members of the National Executive Committee is included as APPENDIX D.

26

In cooperation with OTI/Nigeria and other organizations, CRESNET members have made substantial accomplishments in the field of conflict resolution.

These

accomplishments have included interactions with religious and local government leaders, the establishment of peace committees, and the facilitation of policy dialogues at the local to the national level.

The scope of these accomplishments is truly

impressive, though beyond the scope of this report. However, an extensive description is provided by Wiebe Boer in his December 2000 report, “To Build a Nation Where Peace and Justice Shall Reign.”

20

CRESNET activities were focused on the training and development of individuals who can serve as an active resource for conflict intervention throughout the country. These activities have consisted primarily of: Ø

Skills training workshops, seminars and conferences

Ø

Research/publications

Ø

Mediation of conflicts

Ø

Advocacy/media activities

To date CRESNET activities have been organized by OTI/Nigeria and by a set of NGOs that are informally associated with CRESNET. At the time of OTI/Nigeria’s departure, CRESNET had yet to develop a cohesive program at the National or Zonal level, and with the exception of the first newsletter, it has yet to exclusively produce a publication.

The next stage of CRESNET’s growth will be to develop an independent program of activities. There is a wide consensus among CRESNET members that a system for monitoring potential conflicts would be the most effective program for the near future.

Such a system would be of value both to USAID and to other NGOs engaged in conflict mitigation activities, and would minimize competition with other NGOs by positioning CRESNET as a resource.

An important long-term goal for the organization is the

creation of a reliable certification for the performance of conflict mitigation.

This

certification may be for individual practitioners and/or organizations. The development of a database of information, including empirical data on conflicts within Nigeria, would also be useful for both academics and practitioners.

19

All of the current national officers of CRESNET were elected during the November 2000 meeting in Abuja. The current zonal officers were elected during meetings that coincided with the Zonal Trainings of Trainers (TOTs) in April-May, 2001.

27

At the time of OTI/Nigeria’s departure, CRESNET had not developed to the extent that it could be considered self-sustaining. The analysis provided in a previous report 21 suggested that CRESNET had indeed developed a sense of organizational identity and a strong core group of members. Because CRESNET was not self-sustaining, however, the survival of the network was dependent upon extensive funding and support from the USAID Mission in Abuja.

20 21

Boer, 2000 Bruton, 2001

28

PROGRAM ANALYSIS

Conflict resolution is an increasingly important program component of international development agencies and appears to sit comparatively high among the Bush administration’s priorities for USAID. The recent reorganization of USAID, in November 2001, led to the elimination of the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, and the creation of a new Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.

A prominent Conflict Prevention Task Force has also been

added to USAID by the Bush administration. The growing importance of conflict resolution has drawn attention to the potential of CRESNET to serve as a model “bottom up” approach.

LESSONS LEARNED Six potentially valuable observations can be drawn from OTI’s experience in Nigeria: 1) The ideal timeframe for the construction of a viable, self-sustaining network under the set of constraints typical of transition countries is a minimum of two years of active OTI support. Given that OTI generally maintains a presence incountry for 2-3 years, it is essential to begin the construction of the network immediately upon arrival. As was the case in Nigeria, the quick evolution of social and political conditions may make such planning impossible. However, many of the difficulties that OTI staff faced in leaving Nigeria—in particular, the difficulty of convincing the USAID Mission to continue the program—may have been avoided if the network had been started a year earlier. Members of CRESNET expressed varying timeframes for CRESNET to become self-sustaining. Though two years was the most frequent estimate, one member predicted that it could take as long as six years. When asked, almost without exception, CRESNET members said that a oneyear extension of OTI’s program would be at the top of their wish list. but it should be recognized that the ideal timeframe is a minimum of two years before hand-off to the Mission. If this timeframe is not possible, then the participation of the USAID Mission should be sought and incorporated from the planning stages of the program onward.

29

2) The management structure of the conflict resolution network should be cooperative rather than dependent upon the leadership of a single individual.

CRESNET members stressed the importance of the nature of leadership within CRESNET. They felt that it was vital to CRESNET’s sustainability that no single person was identified as the driving force behind the organization. Many CRESNET members believed that the collapse of the British Network resulted from interpersonal conflict between Judith Burdin Asuni and the network members, and felt that the diffusion of the leadership of CRESNET into a 16-member National Executive Committee substantially diminished the likelihood of such of a situation occurring again. Some members also expressed that the absence of a single leader, particularly in combination with the institution of democratic processes, had allowed CRESNET to develop an organizational identity and reputation that was independent of the personality of the National Coordinator.

3) OTI/Nigeria should continue to perform active oversight of all network activities and the use of all OTI funding. Ceding this responsibility to a local NGO will cause a potentially devastating conflict of interest. OTI’s constant and impartial engagement ensured that no single person or NGO was able to take a dominant role in CRESNET. This was a vital factor in OTI’s success. Arguably, the lack of a charismatic leader could increase the difficulty of maintaining the members’ commitment to the organization.

However, CRESNET members frequently

expressed their pride in the consultative nature of CRESNET’s decision-making structure. They expressed a belief that many people were drawn to CRESNET as a model democratic institution. In a transitioning country, such perceptions may offset the difficulties that would typically be associated with a cooperative management structure.

4) The network should neither distribute OTI funds nor receive substantial direct funding from OTI. OTI awarded several “start-up” grants to national and zonal CRESNET offices, donated a portion of its equipment to CRESNET at the time of its departure, and typically reimbursed members’ transportation costs to attend meetings. However, the vast majority of OTI’s support to CRESNET was in the form of capacity building, both of individual members (training in conflict resolution techniques) and associated NGOs (training in financial accountability and grant management). Though some members did, inevitably, perceive CRESNET as a conduit to U.S. funding, OTI’s refusal to award funding directly to CRESNET minimized the extent and frequency of this misperception.

30

5) OTI’s participatory approach to program development encouraged CRESNET members to feel ownership and increased the organization’s viability. OTI’s participatory approach included a willingness to engage in what members tended to describe as a “hands-on” style of management. The description “hands-on” may be taken quite literally; Kury Cobham, for example, described having to go to NGOs and feel the fabric of satchels and bags to judge whether they were worth the amount of money the NGO had claimed to pay for them. (Such tactics were necessitated by the absence of receipts in Nigeria.) CRESNET members praised the accessibility of OTI staff, and the rapidity of OTI’s response to conflicts. They also felt that the availability of OTI staff to respond to individual questions and proposals enhanced NGO performance, both by facilitating the approval of projects and by clarifying OTI’s expectations regarding the management of grants. To some extent, a hands-on style of management was unavoidable, due to the relatively low capacity of many of the NGOs. The hands-on style was also the result of the personal management style of prominent OTI staff; particularly Tjip Walker, who was the driving force behind many of the structural and attitudinal changes described in the preceding section. Dr. Walker described his management style as “directive,” which suggests that there is in fact a need to balance participation and the offering of management expertise. While CRESNET members frequently cited OTI’s expertise as a major factor in CRESNET’s success, they regarded OTI as a partner, and expressed a strong sense of ownership and an appreciation of CRESNET as a model democratic institution.

6) OTI’s promotion of CRESNET members as the leaders of conflict interventions and activities was vital in improving the organization’s viability. As Joseph Ola Shopade explained, the promotion of local leaders and CBOs was an integral aspect of OTI’s “bottom up” approach. However, it also fostered a sense of organizational independence and local ownership of goals. CRESNET members reported that their prominence as CRESNET members in OTI-sponsored activities and mediations both strengthened their commitment to the organization and increased CRESNET’s external credibility.

31

POTENTIAL FOR DUPLICATION IN FUTURE OTI COUNTRY PROGRAMS The priority Watch List countries are the more immediate candidates for an OTI program and therefore comprise a likely sample for a comparison of critical criteria and for the assessment of the potential of duplicating CRESNET in future OTI country programs.

NIGERIA : A REPRESENTATIVE CASE The success of the CR program in Nigeria is a good indicator of the potential for duplication in other country programs for two reasons: 1) The network approach was used to resolve several types of conflict: ethnic, religious, and political/economic. The wide range of conflicts in Nigeria arguably represents the universe of the various types of conflicts. Certainly, few countries suffer from such an extensive range of disputes. The effectiveness of the program in Nigeria demonstrates the potential for success in many different contexts.22 2) The success of CRESNET under these “worst case scenario” conditions indicates that conflict resolution networks can be implemented under severe logistic constraints. Nigeria is one of the world’s least developed countries in terms of its communications and travel infrastructure. The constraints encountered in this program are at least comparable to, if not worse than, the constraints one would expect to find in other OTI program countries.

Nigeria is plagued by a number of severe systemic problems that are colloquially referred to as “the Nigerian factor:”

22

The range of OTI’s success in conflict resolution is evident both in Wiebe Boer’s report, ‘To Build a Nation Where Peace and Justice Shall Reign,’ and in the ARD, Inc. report titled ‘Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria.’

32

Ø

Lack of reliable telecommunications infrastructure

Ø

Low density and poor condition of roads (lack of available and safe means of transportation)

Ø

Lack of a “culture of [charitable] giving” or a tradition of civic responsibility

Ø

Lack of local resources

Ø

Lack of model democratic institutions

Ø

Lack of capacity and financial accountability of local NGOs

Ø

Widespread corruption

Many of these constraints are common in developing countries, and, given that it is the goal of OTI to aid development efforts, none of the following criteria should be prohibitive.

Data collected from the Department of State Country Background

Papers, the CIA World Fact Book and the International Telecommunication Union suggest that Nigeria is in some respects more developed and in other respects significantly less developed than priority Watch List countries in Asia, the Near East and Europe/Eurasia, and Africa. There are four major criteria that are helpful in comparing logistic constraints: 1) Teledensity. Ease of communication between network members greatly facilitates organizational development. A good proxy for the level of development of the telecommunications infrastructure is teledensity, or main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. Less than 1% of the populations of Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Eritrea and Ethiopia have access to a main telephone line. In contrast, the percentages of the non-African Watch List countries—North Korea, Ecuador, Azerbaijan and Armenia—are much higher: 43.79%, 9.1%, 9.48% and 15.53%, respectively. 23 (Data on the province of Kashmir was not available.)

2) Literacy rates.

Literacy rates are an indicator of the level of human development. 24 Nigeria falls squarely into a mid-range category in terms of the literacy of its population.

23

Telecommunications indicator data is for 1999 and provided by the International Telecommunication Union, World Geographic WTI. 24 Literacy rates published in the CIA World Fact Book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.

33

3) GDP per capita. This is an indicator of the level of local resources that may be available to network participants.25 Nigeria is again in the mid-range of the Watch List countries in terms of its GDP. With a GDP per capita of US$1,237 in 1999, Nigeria is an impoverished country, but its average population is approximately five to six times richer than that of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Burundi, and approximately five times less wealthy than the population of North Korea.

25

GDP per capita data is for 1999 and provided by the International Telecommunication Union, World Geographic WTI. http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/basic99.pdf

34

LIMITATIONS OF THE APPROACH The analysis provided in this report is intended to provide a framework for analysis and does not presume to be a definitive assessment of the potential for implementing a conflict resolution network in any of the priority Watch List countries. Due to the rapidly changing political and security environments in Watch List countries, it is extremely difficult to predict which nations will eventually be good candidates for a conflict resolution network of this type. The need for a conflict resolution program in Nigeria was unforeseeable even a year in advance, and the political conditions in any of the Watch List countries are likely to change as dramatically between this report and the planning stages of an OTI program.

However, the rapidity of political change in transition

countries itself argues a need for a blueprint that can facilitate a rapid assessment of conditions and the likelihood of success.

There are several unusual characteristics that appear to have improved or decreased OTI’s odds of success in Nigeria: +

The existence of a large local NGO community whose members shared a preexisting commitment to the development of a conflict resolution network is likely to have increased OTI’s odds of success.

+

The creation of a conflict resolution network closely overlapped OTI’s goal of forming a pool of capable mediators. For that reason, CRESNET may have required less additional time and less additional funding than would otherwise have been the case.

This may have increased OTI’s odds of success.

-

The extensive corruption and the lack of democratic and charitable norms in Nigeria may have significantly decreased the likelihood of success. Nigeria is consistently ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt countries by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 26

26

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 1999 is available at: http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/1999.html

35

CRITICAL CRITERIA The following seven criteria are vital indicators of the likelihood of successful duplication.

If a conflict resolution network is considered by OTI/Washington to be a potential program option, the Assessment Team should evaluate these criteria during the initial field assessment.

1) Timeframe available for OTI program Time is arguably the greatest constraint involved in the creation of a conflict resolution network. Ideally, the decision to form a network should occur during the early planning stages of the program to allow OTI to maximize its time and available support. The shorter the timeframe available for forming and stabilizing the network, the more vital the buy-in of the USAID Mission or other hand-off partners will become.

(Given the uncertainty inherent in any cooperative effort, it would be

advisable to make efforts to include hand-off partners whether or not their participation is expected to be necessary.) If OTI expects to have less than two years in which to nurture the network to a minimal degree of stability, it would not be advisable to employ this program option.

2) Local commitment to the creation of a conflict resolution network The commitment on the part of local NGOs and conflict mediation experts to the creation of a conflict resolution network will be very difficult to measure prior to an incountry Assessment.

However, previous attempts to form conflict resolution

networks, the existence of viable networks of NGOs in other areas (in Nigeria, successful human rights networks had been formed), or other evidence of cooperative action between NGOs or individuals may provide an indication of the potential degree of commitment.

A recurrent pattern of conflicts may foster an

awareness of the need for a conflict resolution initiative. Because the long-term success of the network is ultimately dependent upon the participants rather than on OTI, local commitment to the creation of the network is the second most vital indicator of the potential for success.

36

3) Potential for organized violence CRESNET was not used to intervene in or to report early warning signs of organized conflicts (such as government-sponsored, military or rebel group violence). Although CRESNET members were extensively involved in training government officials and police in conflict resolution and prevention techniques, it is unlikely that such a network could actively intervene in organized violence perpetrated by a rebel or military group, as the security risks to the network members would be severe. The danger of involving individuals in conflict resolution efforts was a consideration in Nigeria. It should be explicitly clear that the majority of CRESNET’s activities were centered on providing conflict resolution techniques to individual stakeholders who may have the potential to intervene in conflicts. CRESNET members were not called on by OTI to intervene individually in ongoing violent conflicts. The capability to perform such interventions was however a long-term goal, as was the development of an early warning system. The use of a such systems to reduce the occurrence of organized violence may expose the network members to reprisal.

OTI requires a minimum degree of stability as a pre-condition for entry: presumably, OTI would not engage in a country until its military and rebel conflicts had been resolved by U.N. Peacekeeping forces or other means. However, should political conditions deteriorate while OTI is on the ground, as arguably was the case during OTI’s programs in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, curtailment of the network’s activities would be highly advisable. The likelihood of organized violence is unquantifiable and often unpredictable; however, a proxy for the potential for organized violence may be the degree of armament among civilians and a previous history of rebel, police or military violence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi and North Korea are three priority countries that have or are suspected of a high degree of organized violence by rebel or terrorist groups and therefore are countries that may pose unusually high security risks to members of a conflict resolution network involved in reporting early warning signs of conflict.

37

4) Management style of in-country staff The importance of the management style of the OTI staff was evident in the interviews. Many CRESNET members praised Tjip Walker’s open and directive style of management, which they identified as a major component of CRESNET’s rapid growth. It is vital that the OTI staff develop a strong and cooperative working relationship with its community and the network members. The characteristics of the community should dictate the style of management that is adopted. However, there are several characteristics that are likely to be consistent across countries. 1) The relatively low capacity of local NGOs is likely to be an impediment to program implementation in less developed countries. 2) The network participants may be prone to engage in the same conflicts that affect the wider community, but will also have a local knowledge that will be invaluable to program development. Some qualitative parameters that will assist OTI to work under these conditions include:

Ø

A willingness to engage in extensive organizational capacity building

Ø

An openness to participatory approaches to program development and implementation

Ø

An ability to be accessible and willing to engage in informal consultation with network members

Ø

Experience in working with less-developed NGOs, particularly NGOs with limited financial accountability

Ø

Expertise in conflict resolution techniques

Ø

Ability to supervise a rapid distribution of funds to NGOs in order to facilitate a timely response to developing crises

Ø

An ability to take a strong directive approach to overcome organizational problems that are rooted in wider societal conflicts. (For example, OTI was obliged to impose a solution in order to resolve the dispute over the zonal affiliation of members, which was rooted in the deeper “indigene” and “settler” conflicts.)

38

5) The capacity and concentration of local NGO power The creation of a viable network requires that OTI establish a critical mass of individual and organizational participants.

Ideally, the capacity of the NGOs

participating in the network would be approximately equal. This was essentially the case in Nigeria.

(Dr. Judith Asuni described the NGO community there as “a

mountain range” that lacked an apex NGO.) The lack of apex NGOs should lower the risk of one organization coming to dominate the network. If the network is limited to or dominated by a set of dominant NGOs, the likelihood of success may decrease, as there is likely to be a greater potential for conflicts of interest.

Limited capacity on the part of local NGOs should be anticipated and should not be prohibitive. Capacity-building of under-developed NGOs is a frequent component of OTI programs. However, OTI’s experience in Nigeria suggests that the capacity of NGOs does have an important impact on the success of conflict resolution activities.

Interviewees noted that OTI’s efforts were both more extensive and more successful in the northern states, where conflict resolution expertise and the more developed NGOs were concentrated. Clearly, the more time-intensive OTI’s capacity-building activities, the less time will be available for training and intervention.

The

development of local NGOs should therefore be taken into account during the planning stage of the program.

6) Ease of communication and internal travel The ability to communicate with and visit network participants would greatly facilitate the development of the network. However, one of the primary benefits of a conflict resolution network is that it can allow OTI to monitor and intervene in conflicts that occur in inaccessible areas. The easier it is for OTI staff or a few dominant NGOs to visit all areas of the country, the less necessary a network is likely to be. Therefore, countries that are small or widely accessible in terms of telecommunication and internal travel are less likely candidates for this type of program. The size of the country should also be considered relevant.

7) Ethnic and religious diversity The value of a conflict resolution network is substantially increased by the presence of diverse ethnic and religious groups. The more homogenous the population, the greater is the likelihood that a small group of NGOs could intervene credibly with the disputing parties.

39

POTENTIAL FOR DUPLICATING CRESNET IN PRIORITY WATCH LIST COUNTRIES The preceding criteria allow for a rough grouping of the current priority Watch List countries into high/medium/low potential for duplication. Several of the critical criteria, however, are not measurable prior to an in-country assessment: Ø Ø Ø Ø

Available timeframe of OTI program Local commitment to the creation of a conflict resolution network Management style of in-country staff Concentration and capacity of NGO power 27

The determination of the potential for duplication therefore relies only on available data and should not be considered definitive.

Ø

Countries with the HIGHEST potential for duplication: Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In terms of the above criteria, Ethiopia is an ideal candidate for the duplication of this program. It is a large country with a high level of ethnic and religious diversity. The ethnically divisive policies of the Ethiopian government, including the separation of the country into ethnic zones, has led to an increased frequency of ethnic conflict.

Ethiopia’s NGO community is large, comparatively developed, and is increasingly relied upon by the Government of Ethiopia to provide traditional welfare services.28 Ethiopia does, however, contain armed opposition parties, and the launch of a conflict resolution network should be conditional on the political legitimization and disarmament of these groups.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second most likely candidate for a conflict resolution network. Ethnically and politically diverse, the Eastern areas of the country are prone to outbreaks of ethnic violence. Travel and communication in DROC are notoriously difficult.

While prominent Northern NGOs are currently

operating in DROC, detailed information on the composition of the local NGO community is not available. However, it should be noted that DROC has a high occurrence of organized violence.

The likelihood of disarming certain of these

27

Information on the composition of the NGO sector of these and all developing countries tends to be extremely limited.

28 Van Diesen and Walker, 1999

40

groups, particularly the Mai Mai, is low. Duplication of the program is therefore highly conditional on the disarmament of rebel groups and militias.

The remaining countries fall into a mid-range or “medium� category for a likelihood of duplication. Burundi, Kashmir, North Korea, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Ecuador have a likelihood of succumbing to unorganized violence that is high relative to other, non-Watch List countries. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been sites of violent ethnic conflicts in the recent past. The violence currently besetting these mid-range countries is largely organized or state-sponsored. The other characteristics of the countries would neither appear to lend themselves strongly to justifying the construction of a conflict resolution network.

Ă˜

Country with the LOWEST potential for duplication: Eritrea Eritrea possesses an active community of NGOs. However, it is a small country whose population is comparatively homogeneous and united by a strong national identity. Eritrea would be an unlikely candidate for widespread popular violence, and given its homogeneous ethnic and religious composition, it is highly possible that a handful of conflict resolution NGOs could be mobilized to intervene credibly with the population. The cost of constructing a conflict resolution network would likely far outweigh the potential benefits of having a pool of available mediators distributed across the country.

41

CONCL USION

Despite the political, social and economic instability of transitioning countries, there are lessons to be drawn from individual OTI programs that can transcend borders. While conditions in these countries evolve rapidly, there are some steps that OTI can take ahead of its program development stage to maximize its time in the country. This report has provided a set of critical criteria that should assist OTI in performing a rapid and timely assessment of country conditions prior to the implementation of a conflict resolution program. These criteria, in combination with the set of Lessons Learned, should increase the odds of successful implementation of this program option in the future. The report has also identified two countries, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which should be considered likely candidates for duplicating CRESNET in the future.

Two issues are relevant to the analysis but beyond the scope of this report: 1) The future of CRESNET may have been jeopardized by a failure on the part of OTI to coordinate with the USAID Mission. Sustainability, as noted, did not become a prominent goal until the end of OTI’s time in Nigeria, and this may have been a factor in the late involvement of USAID/Nigeria.

However, coordination problems between OTI and the

USAID Mission are an ongoing concern and the subject of a recent report by the Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE). 29

This report also suggests that the

difficulties associated with the handoff could be minimized if the network were developed earlier in the course of the OTI program.

2) The creation of CRESNET was in large part the result of OTI’s responsiveness to evolving conditions and to the local NGO community. A worthwhile study would examine how other USAID offices can be adapted to ensure that more OTI-style innovative approaches are tried in the field, and to ensure that OTI’s own organizational structure continues to leave its program staff the ability to achieve the kind of responsive, on-the-ground innovations that resulted in CRESNET’s formation.

29

Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 2001

42

3) There are two normative concerns that arose during the course of this study.

These

concern the appropriateness of imposing an OTI timeframe and OTI’s objectives for conflict resolution onto the formation of an “independent” civil society organization. The arguably premature withdrawal of OTI from Nigeria may have a substantial, and negative, impact on CRESNET’s chances for survival. 30 At best, CRESNET’s future is dependent upon the continuation of USAID funding. While such prolonged dependence upon an international donor source is not unusual for NGOs in developing countries, it is not beneficial.

CRESNET activities were also tailored to the needs of OTI; the majority of its activities were training sessions that would create a pool of mediators to support OTI’s conflict mediation program. It may not be as a valuable a resource after OTI’s departure. Certainly, the potential for competition from associated NGOs (those run by CRESNET members) will dramatically increase after the loss of OTI funding, and it is not certain that CRESNET will supply enough concrete benefits to its individual members and to these organizations to warrant the extensive and continuous efforts that will be necessary for its survival. Given that ensuring the sustainability of CRESNET was not an original goal of OTI, these problems may not have been foreseeable in Nigeria. However, OTI should consider these issues when sponsoring the creation of civil society networks in the future.

30

Bruton, 2001

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APPE NDIX A: PERSONS INTERVIEW ED

USAID S TAFF Angela Martin, Africa Team Leader, OTI/Washington Sheila Roquitte, Nigeria Desk Officer, OTI/Washington Lisa DeSoto, Country Director, OTI/Nigeria Tjip Walker, Ph.D, Deputy Country Director, OTI/Nigeria Kury Cobham, Regional Coordinator, OTI/Nigeria Chom Bagu, Project Manager, OTI/Nigeria Joseph Ola Shopade, OTI/Nigeria Wendy Marshall, Democracy Specialist, USAID/Global/DG Center

CRESNET MEMBERS Imran Abdulrahman, Centre for Peace Initiatives and Development (CEPID) Imam Mohammed Nurayn Ashafa, Joint National Coordinator, Inter-Faith Mediation Center/Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum Joel Bisina Kunle Fagbemi, Socio-Political Research and Development Ayo Hammed, Ph.D, University of Ibadan Samuel Ihejirika, Executive Director, Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency Mike Ntuen, Executive Director, Centre for Peace and Development Action Mobolaji Ogunsanya, Ph.D, Education Consultant, Department of Educational Management, University of Ibadan Ozonnia Ojielo, President, Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy Isaac Olawale Albert, Ph.D, Senior Research Fellow, Consultant in Conflict Transformation, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan Felicia Iyore Onibon, President, Change Manager International Network Denys O. Onoise, Senior Program Officer, Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency S.O. Popoola, Ph.D, Department of Library, Archival and Information Studies, University of Ibadan Evangelist James Movel Wuye, Joint National Coordinator, Inter-Faith Mediation Center/Muslim Christian Dialogue Forum Mohammed Yamah, Esq, Barrister, Mohammed Yamah & Company

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OTHERS Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni, Executive Director, Academic Associates Peaceworks Bunmi Otoltuni, British Council

MEETINGS ATTENDED Wednesday and Thursday, September 12-12, 2001, Sheraton Hotel Abuja National House of Assembly Committee on Peace and Reconciliation – Conflict Resolution Workshop, hosted by SEMA and sponsored by USAID/OTI, facilitated by CRESNET Members Thursday, September 13, 2001 at USAID/Nigeria Mission in Abuja Meeting on upcoming USAID/Nigeria conflict resolution program Tuesday, September 18, 2001 at USAID/Nigeria Mission in Abuja Introductory Meeting between USAID Mission personnel Carol Grigsby, Liz Hart, and Emmanuel Oche; OTI/Nigeria personnel Tjip Walker and Joseph Ole Shopade; and CRESNET leaders Samuel Ihejirika, Denys Onoise, Mohammed Yamah and Imran Abdulrahman.

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APPENDIX B: BIBL IOG RAPHY

PUBLICATIONS Albert, Isaac Olawale, “New Directions in the Management of Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Insights from the Activities of AAPW,” in Otite, Onigu and Albert, Isaac Olawale, eds.

Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation, A Publication of Academic Associates PeaceWorks, Spectrum Books Limited, Ibadan © 1999 Conflict Management Training Manual, Produced by Conflict Resolution Stakeholders’ Network (CRESNET) with the Support of USAID/OTI, July 2001 Peaceful Co-existence, Newsletter of the Conflict Resolution Stakeholders’ Network (CRESNET), Vol. 1, No. 1, July-August 2001 The Peacemaker, Quarterly Newsletter of the Nigeria Peace Netork, Issue 9 June 2001, SEMA Inc

REPORTS, I NTERNAL DOCUMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE (In chronological order) CRESNET, Report of the Meeting Between CRESNET Executive Members and the Country Director, USAID/OTI at USAID/OTI Conference Room on Wednesday 8-11-2000 CRESNET, Report on 1st Executive Committee Meeting of CRESNET, November 21-24, 2000 CRESNET, National Executive Committee Meeting Holding in Abuja, Nov. 21-24, 2001 Constitution & Byelaws of CRESNET, Produced at the Meeting Held at the Hotel Premises Boer, Wiebe, “To Build a Nation Where Peace and Justice Shall Reign,” A Report on OTI Nigeria Conflict Resolution Initiatives, December 2000 Office of Transition Initiatives, United States Agency for International Development, 1999-2000 Report Stewart, Mary, OTI Nigeria Trip Report, January 30 – February 8, 2001 Letter from Lisa DeSoto, OTI/Nigeria Country Director, to Samie Ihejirika, CRESNET National Coordinator, 9 February 2001 Letter from Samie Ihejirika, CRESNET National Coordinator, to Lisa DeSoto, OTI/Nigeria Country Director, 23 February 2001

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Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network Constitution (Amended) Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE), Evaluation of Transition Assistance: DRAFT Preliminary Findings and Suggestions for Action, 5 May, 2001 Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Evaluation of Transition Assistance, Draft Preliminary Findings and Suggestions for Action, 25 May 2001 Letter, from Tjip Walker, OTI/Nigeria Deputy Country Director, to Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni, AAPW Executive Director, 12 July 2001 Letter, from Samie Ihejirika, CRESNET National Coordinator, to Tjip Walker, OTI/Nigeria Deputy Country Director, 23 July 2001 (Attachments) Letter, from Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni, AAPW Executive Director, to Tjip Walker, OTI/Nigeria Deputy Country Director, 6 August 2001 Letter, from Johanan Chambers, Barristers, Solicitors & Notaries Public, to Tjip Walker, OTI/Nigeria Deputy Country Director, 8 August 2001 Stewart, Mary, DRAFT OTI Results Report, FY2000, 8 August, 2001 Letter, from Tjip Walker, OTI/Nigeria Deputy Country Director, to Dr. Judith Burdin Asuni, AAPW Executive Director, 9 August 2001 CRESNET, Minutes of the National Executive Committee Meeting Held in Abuja on 26th March, 2001 ARD Inc., Future Directions for USAID Support to Conflict Mitigation in Nigeria, July 12, 2001 Bruton, Bronwyn, Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Stakeholders Network (CRESNET), November 2001

DATA SOURCES CIA World Fact Book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook International Telecommunication Union, World geographic WTI, 2001, available at

http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/basic99.pdf U.S. Geographical Society, African Data Dissemination Service, Nigeria Nationwide Data, 2001 http:/edcintl.cr.usgs.gov/adds/c1.c1.html Van Diesen, Arthur with Walker, Karen, “The changing face of aid to Ethiopia – past experience and emerging issues in British and EC aid,” Christian Aid, January 1999

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APPENDIX C: INTERIM STEERING COMMITTEE

National Coordinator Yamah Mohammed (Barrister)

Secretary Isaac Olawale Albert

Zonal Coordinator, North West Samuel Ihejirika

Zonal Coordinator, South West Felicia Onibon (Mrs)

Zonal Coordinator, South South E. Bassey (Professor)

Zonal Coordinator, North East Imran Abdulrahman

APPE NDIX D: NATIONAL EXECUTIVE CO MMITTEE

National Coordinator Samuel Ihejirika, SE Zone

Deputy National Coordinator Felicia Onibon (Mrs), SW Zone

National Secretary Abraham Umoh, SS Zone

Assistance Secretary Tijani Mohammed, NC Zone

Director of Finance Hannatu Ibrahim, NE Zone

Director of Programmes and Training Mohammed Yamah, NW Zone

Director of Research and Publication Osy Okaya, SE Zone

Director of Advocacy, Media and Publicity Tunde Thompson, SW Zone

Director of Legal Services Yusuf Dankofa, NW Zone

Director of Humanitarian Services Joel Bisina, SS Zone

Zonal Coordinator Hassan Salihu (Dr), NC Zone

Zonal Coordinator P.O. Donli (Dr, Mrs), NE Zone

Zonal Coordinator Mustapha Mohammed, NW Zone

Zonal Coordinator Nkechi Ohan (Mrs), SE Zone

Zonal Coordinator George Ogan (Dr), SS Zone

Zonal Coordinator Akin Akinteye (Hon), SW Zone

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APPE NDIX E: CRESNET LOCATIONS

National Headquarters

c/o Strategic Empowerment and Mediation Agency 2nd Floor, Habib Bank Building C17 Kachia Road Kaduna tel: 062-232673, 234821

North Central Zone

Dr. Hassan Salihu Dept. of Political Science, UNILORIN tel: 031-225072, 226054 e-mail: hasalu@unilorin.edu.ng.com

North East Zone

Dr (Mrs) P.O. Donli No. 1 Bama Road (Fototek Building Meiduguri) tel: 076-232150 ext. 3103 e-mail: cresnetne@unimaid.edu.ng

North West Zone

Mustapha Mohammed tel: 064-665056, 634220, 645744

South East Zone

Lady Nkechi Onah PO Box 15672 Enugu State – Nigeria tel: 042-457812 tel/fax: 042-259275 e-mail: jideken@infoweb.abs.net

South South Zone

Dr. George Ogan No. 6B Obinuchi Street Off 176 Aba Roa, Hotel Chez Alec Port Harcourt tel: 064-233360

South West Zone

Hon Akin Akinteye Oyo State House of Assembly Secretariat, Ibadan, PO Box 7476 Secretariat, Ibadan tel: 02-8106009, 6105676 fax: 02-8106009 e-mail: doc@skaret.com

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