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D’SOUZA
CONCLUSION Canada’s experience in Afghanistan and the opinion of government officials and academics alike indicate that the CAF should, to some degree, focus on preparing for future counterinsurgency operations. These operations should be characterized by a holistic approach to defense, diplomacy, and development, with the aim of addressing the root causes that sustain violent insurgencies in weak or failing states. In this context, population-centric approaches to COIN appear to be more effective than enemy-centric approaches, in turn necessitating the practice of Strategic Force Capacity Building to substantiate limited numbers of Canadian troops. Herein lies an opportunity for Canada to further develop its Special Operations Forces, who are able to deploy into existing or potential conflict zones and effectively counsel indigenous forces through a number of methods, assisted by an emphasised proficiency in language skills and cultural sensitivity. Finally, Canada must create an SFCB doctrinal publication to guide these operations, while expanding high level networks of military and government officials whose experience will pay greater dividends in providing high-level advice to the host government. By engaging with these lessons from Afghanistan and funneling them into constructive output, Canada can continue to actively pursue conflict resolution in the international arena, establishing norms of Canadian military leadership and peace promotion abroad.