UBC Journal of International Affairs 2015

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THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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THE 2015 ISSUE OF THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Annual Publication of the International Relations Student Association The University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C.

Cover Design: Anita Hung Cover Photograph: Benjamin David Clark Back Cover Photograph: Cyrus Sie The cover photograph juxtaposes old and new architectural elements in London. The One New Change shopping centre represents an essential node in the capitalist economy. The dome of St. Paul's Cathedral, reminiscent of many political buildings, finds its place in a sea of globalization and powerful market forces.

The back cover photograph shows Ledra Street, an iconic point of division between the Turkish Cypriot-held northern section and the Greek Cypriot-held southern section of Nicosia from 1974 to 2008. No Man’s Land constitutes a part of the demilitarised UN Buffer Zone established between Cyprus and the still-contested territory of Northern Cyprus.

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CONTENTS Contributors Foreword Faculty Foreword Introduction “Nation-To-Nation” or Nation-To-State?

Julie Jenkins The Goddess of Democracy Julie Sagram Questioning the Rhetoric Zak Jacques Taking Off the Facemask Justin Yee Graduate Commentary Tianjiao Jiang Perceptions Trump Institutions Nicolas Thomson Submission Map Biographies Sponsors

V VII VIII IX 2 34 46 56 70 76 85 87 92

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CONTRIBUTORS Editor-in-Chief Klaudia Wegschaider

Managing Editors Isabella Casciola, Agathe de Marcillac

Senior Editors Zak Jacques, Natalya Kautz, Alexander Kilpatrick

Editors Rebecca Barclay, Spencer Brown, Jordan Buffie, Nicole Chan, Russo Chechelashvili, Sebastian Cooper, Elizabeth Good, Paul AndrĂŠ Narvestad, Bobby Sangha, Cyrus Sie, Martin Stillman, Audrey Tong, Kiah Van der Loos

Layout and Design Sean Durfee, Anita Hung, Ada Sin

Authors Zak Jacques, Julie Jenkins, Tianjiao Jiang, Julie Sagram, Nicolas Thomson, Justin Yee

Photography Benjamin David Clark, Cyrus Sie

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Faculty Reviewers Dr. Erin Baines Dr. John Barker Dr. Tim Brook Dr. Michael Byers Dr. Arjun Chowdhury Dr. Katharina Coleman Dr. Viktoria Hnatkovska Dr. Kurt Huebner Dr. Brian Job Dr. Richard Johnston Dr. Philippe Le Billon Dr. Steven Lee Dr. Xiaojun Li Dr. Jenny Peterson Dr. Allen Sens Dr. Lisa Sundstrom

Liu Institute for Global Issues Department of Anthropology Department of History Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Vancouver School of Economics Institute for European Studies Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Liu Institute for Global Issues Department of History Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Department of Political Science Department of Political Science

Special Thanks Dr. Steven Lee Alex Mierke-Zatwarnicki Andrea Reynolds Gregg Iftody

Chair, International Relations Program UBC Journal of Political Studies International Relations Program MET Fine Printers

2015 UBC International Relations Student Association | All rights reserved.

313 – 6476 NW Marine Drive | Vancouver, BC | Canada | V6T 1Z2 The UBC Journal of International Affairs is a publication of the International Relations Student Association of the Alma Mater Society of the Unitversity of British Columbia.

All articles published in the Journal of International Affairs represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the policies or opinions of the University of British Columbia, the staff of the Journal of International Affairs, or the International Relations Student Association. The University of British Columbia does not assume any responsibility for errors or omissions in this journal.

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FOREWORD Dear Reader,

On behalf of the International Relations Student Association, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the 2014-2015 issue of the UBC Journal of International Affairs (JIA). As one of the University of British Columbia’s oldest and most celebrated undergraduate journals, the JIA upholds a dedication to excellence by working closely with UBC’s highly accredited faculty and with some of the university’s top students through a faculty- and peer-reviewed process.

This volume marks the 30th anniversary of the JIA. To celebrate this important milestone, the JIA will launch an online timeline of its previous journals with highlights on its history. For years, the JIA has published outstanding undergraduate research from around the world. This year’s journal has solicited submissions from universities that are part of Universitas 21, a network of international research-based universities devoted to advancing global perspectives and international communication. For the future, I hope the JIA will continue its ambitious scope in publishing the best undergraduate research from around the world.

I would like to congratulate the 2015 JIA team on the successful publication of this journal, and to thank them for their time, passion, and dedication. Thank you for lending us your talent. In particular, thank you to Editor-in-Chief Klaudia Wegschaider, Managing Editors Isabella Casciola and Agathe de Marcillac, the editorial board, and the publication team. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support of our sponsors, the Liu Institute for Global Issues, the UBC Sustainability Fund, and the UBC International Relations Program. Thank you for your continuous support and gracious open-door policy.

And finally to the reader, I would like to thank you for supporting our student-run association and this journal.

With great pleasure, I present to you the 30th volume of UBC’s Journal of International Affairs.

I hope you enjoy reading the journal and that it will stimulate you to engage in important international issues. Happy reading!

Sincerely,

Beckie Che

President, 2014/2015 UBC International Relations Student Association

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FACULTY FOREWORD Dear Reader,

I am delighted to write a foreword for the Journal of International Affairs, which celebrates a milestone achievement this year, the publication of its thirtieth issue. The journal is a leading undergraduate publication of the University of British Columbia, attracting submissions from the best students engaged in issues associated with international relations.

This year, partly to celebrate the journal’s long-standing publication history, the journal editors sought and received submissions from around the globe. Indeed, the journal attracted essays from twelve universities outside Canada, representing four continents and nine countries, including China, India, the United States, South Africa, and the UK.

One of the strengths of the journal is that its editorial procedure mirrors important aspects of the process through which articles are published in academic journals. In particular, academics review each submission and make comments which are taken into account by the editors, who decide which essays to publish.

This year’s journal features five excellent essays (and one opinion piece), dealing with a broad variety of topics and regions. They include Julie Jenkins’ exploration of the contradictions between Westphalian state sovereignty and Indigenous self-determination; an examination of the global context for understanding the construction and symbolism of “the Goddess of Democracy” statue at UBC, written

by Julie Sagram; an assessment, by Zak Jacques, of the role of American liquified natural gas exports to Europe in shaping Russia’s energy relationship with the European Union; a chapter by Nicolas Thomson that explains the divergences in the British and American responses to the 2008 economic crisis; and Justin Yee's essay that analyzes the source of persistent haze pollution in Southeast Asia and discusses what can be done by the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) to alleviate the hazard. As part of the internationalization of the journal, the editors have engaged a graduate student at Fudan University, Tianjiao Jiang, to write a response to Justin Yee’s article.

The editors and authors have much to be proud of in producing and contributing to the 2015 edition of the Journal of International Affairs, and readers will learn a lot from its stimulating and wideranging contents.

Sincerely,

Dr. Steven Lee

Chair of the International Relations Program Department of History

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INTRODUCTION Dear Reader,

Welcome to the 2015 issue of the UBC Journal of International Affairs!

Over the past thirty years, the format and name of what is now the Journal of International Affairs have changed many times, but our commitment to showcasing outstanding undergraduate contributions has remained constant.

This has been a special year for the Journal of International Affairs. We solicited submissions from the Universitas 21 research network, and received more than 110 undergraduate papers from thirteen different universities in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. The Journal of International Affairs now marks a confluence of ideas on global issues, written and read by undergraduate students from around the world.

All five selected papers stand out with analytical nuance and argumentative novelty. Jenkins challenges the Westphalian state model that has long defined our understanding of international relations.

Sagram’s reflections on the Goddess of Democracy statue situate international politics within the very heart of our campus. The contributions of Yee and Thomson show how perceptions of issues, specifically haze pollution and banking legislation, shape policy outcomes. Jacques’ exposé of Europe’s energy security assesses the feasibility of shifting to liquefied natural gas from the United States to decrease dependency on Russia.

I would like to express my gratitude to all students, faculty, and staff who contributed to this issue. Our excellent editors and production staff have dedicated countless hours to making the publication of this year’s Journal of International Affairs possible, while the thoughtful and detailed feedback by UBC faculty has allowed us to maintain our high academic standard. I would also like to thank the AMS Sustainability Fund whose continued support enables us to print using sustainable resources, and the AMS Student Initiatives Fund whose generous support allows us to send copies of this year’s issue to Universitas 21 partners.

Lastly, dear Reader, I thank you for your interest. I hope that this issue will challenge you with new ideas and questions.

Sincerely,

Klaudia Wegschaider

Editor-in-Chief

2015 UBC Journal of International Affairs

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

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“Nation-to-Nation” or Nation-to-State?

THE WESTPHALIAN STATE AS A CHALLENGE TO INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION IN SETTLER SOCIETIES

JULIE JENKINS1

Most scholarly dialogue on Indigenous politics takes the stance that the

“Canadian state’s political relationship with Aboriginal Peoples should be renewed with respect to the early treaties.”2 Understood as ‘nation-to-nation’ agreements between Indigenous nations and the Crown, the early treaties represent an original reciprocal relationship based on equality, self-determination,3 and coexistence that sets a standard for post-colonial justice today. Most recently, the nation-to-nation frame has been featured prominently in the grassroots Idle No More movement, which since 2012 has mobilized thousands of diverse Indigenous peoples and non-Indigenous allies in protest against Canadian government policies. The Idle No More manifesto begins by affirming: The Treaties are nation to nation agreements between First Nations and the British Crown who are sovereign nations. The Treaties are agreements that cannot be altered or broken by one side of the two Nations. The spirit and intent of the Treaty agreements meant that First Nations peoples would share the land, but retain their inherent rights to lands and resources.4 This overwhelming demand for renewed nation-to-nation relations raises important and complicated questions about state, territory, and sovereignty that unsettle both Western political theory, and contemporary political practice.

1

I would like to acknowledge that the research and writing of this thesis was undertaken on the occupied, unceded, traditional, and ancestral territories of the Coast

Salish peoples, specifically the sḵwx̱wú7mesh (Squamish), sel̓íl̓witulh (Tsleil-Waututh), and xʷməθkʷəy̓əm (Musqueam) nations. I would also like to offer

my sincere gratitude to Dr. Antje Ellermann, Dr. Barbara Arneil, Charles Breton, and my Honours program colleagues, whose insightful comments helped clarify

and shape the arguments in this thesis, and whose encouragement ensured it was written. I also wish to extend my gratitude to my PhD discussant, Jan Luedert, for

his thorough feedback and constructive suggestions.

2

Dale Turner, This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 8.

3

Here, self-determination refers to a nation’s inherent right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural

development” (United Nations 1966, Article 1).

4

Idle No More, “The Manifesto,” 2012, accessed 25 February 2015, http://www.idlenomore.ca/manifesto.

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In this article, I consider theoretical understandings and practical manifestations

of the modern Westphalian state as a barrier to the revival of the nation-to-nation

relationship today. Existing theoretical discussions tend to take Westphalian statehood as given. Rather than problematize the state, these theorists instrumentalize it. Existing literature overwhelmingly advocates nation-to-nation relations delivered through state structures, including constitutional reform, institutional accommodation,

and differentiated citizenship. These state-centric approaches elide a fundamental asymmetry underlying contemporary Indigenous-Crown relations: once a land of fluid, overlapping, and contested national territories, Canada is now a Westphalian state—a political entity claiming and exercising authority over bounded, fixed, and mutually exclusive territory.5 Political and international relations theories show that the Westphalian state is a uniquely modern form of political organization that had yet to consolidate in Europe let alone spread to the European colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries when the early Indigenous-state treaties were negotiated.

I take this contrast between pre-Westphalian colonies and modern statehood

as a starting point to consider the form of political organization in which the original nation-to-nation relationship emerged, and from this to glean insight into a strategy for the revival of such a relationship today. I contend that modern state norms represent a glaring yet overlooked challenge to the state-centric models of nation-to-nation relations that dominate by contemporary political and legal theory. My argument aligns with several emerging critical Indigenous theorists who reject state-centric approaches to revitalize Indigenous-crown relations, and instead advocate Indigenous resurgence from below. Taking the state as a pragmatic barrier to the revitalization of nation-to-nation relations today, I lend support to the compelling normative anti-state arguments that have already been strongly articulated by critical theorists, including Taiaiake Alfred, Jeff Corntassel, Glen Coulthard, and others.

5

This definition of the domestic Westphalian state is inspired by John Ruggie’s discussion provided in “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in

International Relations,” International Organization 47.1, 1993, 139-174.

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

This article

makes two related contributions

4

to theories of nation-to-

nation revival in what is now Canada. First, it ties the emergence and consolidation of the Westphalian state with the demise of the nation-to-nation relationship

throughout the last four hundred years of Canadian history. This first contribution characterizes Westphalian states by three fundamental organizing principles that are incommensurable with the re-establishment of a nation-to-nation IndigenousCrown relationship: (a) Fixed, mutually exclusive territoriality inheres state rule over

all inhabitants within its borders, regardless of explicit consent. Rendering Indigenous nations incapable of withstanding incorporation, territoriality undermines the equality, coexistence, and self-determination principles of the nation-to-nation relationship. (b) Deriving from territoriality, Westphalian states organize political power hierarchically.

Fortified by its monopoly on legitimate coercive power, the state retains final authority to sanction, suppress, and intrude upon sub-state organizations and jurisdictions, including so-called “self-governing” Indigenous nations. (c) Westphalian states inculcate nations. State promotion of common identity, whether explicit or implicit, necessarily promotes the suppression of rival national identities, either through assimilationist policies that aspire towards eradication, or multinational incorporation policies that de-politicize national difference. Together, these organizing principles (mutually-exclusive territory, hierarchical rule, and nation-building) reinforce the dominant-subordinate coercive logic of colonialism.

The second contribution grows out of this historical inquiry. Inspired by Idle

No More, I question whether the nation-to-nation aims of grassroots Indigenous resurgence can be reconciled with the survival of the Canadian state, and thus with the principles and outcomes of state reform. The short answer is “no.” Only a specifically extra-Westphalian approach can revive the nation-to-nation relationship represented in its fullest conceptualization in the early treaties. In the pre-Westphalian world, two sovereign nations sharing land but retaining exclusive rights to land and resources was consistent with understandings of territory and political authority. This is the legitimate Indigenous-state relationship, and its revival today depends on the Westphalian state’s demise. Renewed nation-to-nation relations thus depend upon a

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more radical transformation of the Westphalian state into a post-colonial system of political organization—a change mere reform cannot achieve. Such a system will emerge not through top-down reform strategies that reinforce Westphalian territoriality,

but through bottom-up Indigenous resurgence that fundamentally challenges the norms of mutually exclusive rule by asserting and embodying coexistence and self-determination. A commitment to renewed Indigenous self-determination is inseparable from a commitment to decoupling political authority from territory and re establishing a system of political organization that is conducive to multiple overlapping sovereignties in shared time and space.

THE SPECTRE OF STATE IN INDIGENOUS-CROWN RELATIONS AND EXISTING NORMATIVE ALTERNATIVES

The extent of the state’s advantage in Indigenous-Crown relations is observable

in contemporary politics. As the “basic building block” of the state’s executive, judiciary, and legislative6 powers, the Crown is not merely a partner in the nation-to-nation relationship, but also its arbiter. Since 1982, the federal minister in charge of Indigenous complaints about treaty non-compliance approved just 16% of nearly 1,000 complaints.7 Regularized tolerance of treaty infraction is echoed by the judiciary, which has justified Crown infringement on treaty rights when it benefits the Canadian “national” interest.8 The state’s de juris upper hand is fortified and displayed in its de facto monopoly on coercive power. Consider October 2013, when heavily armed Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers enforced a court injunction against Mi’kmaq warriors who, after failed legal recourse, had blockaded road access to their unceded traditional territory to prevent the trespass of shale gas prospectors. The state responded with a spectacular display of its coercive authority. Rubber bullets, tear gas, batons, dogs, and gunpoint were deployed to remove Mi’kmaq protesters and restore the private company’s access.

6

Canadian Heritage Portfolio: A Handbook for Appointees to Boards and Commissions, 2009, accessed 25 February 2015, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/

collection_2009/pc-ch/CH4-136-2008E.pdf, 3.

7

Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “National Summary on Specific Claims,” 2014, accessed 25 February 2015, http://services.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/

SCBRI_E/Main/ReportingCentre/PreviewReport.aspx?output=HTML.

8

Lisa Dufraimont, “From Regulation to Recolonization: Justifiable Infringement of Aboriginal Rights at the Supreme Court of Canada,” University of Toronto Faculty

of Law Review 58.1, 2000.

Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Sparrow, 1 S.C.R. 1075, 1990.

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Forty Mi’kmaq nationals, including Elsipogtog Chief Aaren Sock, were arrested in this display of the Crown’s de facto sovereignty over Indigenous territory and Indigenous peoples. While the events at Elsipogtog may appear extreme, they are far from unusual

in the contemporary political landscape. Indeed, the Indigenous-state relationship today is far from embodying nation-to-nation principles of equality, self-determination, and coexistence.

NATION-TO-NATION RELATIONS THROUGH STATE REFORMS

Overwhelmingly, political theorists have responded to the state’s extant

domination over Indigenous nations with calls for renewed nation-to-nation relations.9 Yet, their formulae for achieving such relations range from inadequate to incomplete.

Those whom I call state reformists envision the nation-to-nation relationship re-emerging through a combination of state reform measures. From a reformist perspective, Crown intrusions on Indigenous land, resources, cultures, and governance are not essential state behaviours, but corrigible outcomes of faulty institutions. Thus, Indigenous nations are considered capable of overcoming their subordinate position vis-à-vis the Crown not just in spite of but also through state sovereignty, reimagined as divided and shared.10 State reform theories advocate constitutional redesign, institutional accommodation, and differentiated citizenship models. I will discuss each briefly, in turn.

Constitutional redesign, however implemented, is expected to ultimately

include Indigenous peoples as co-authors of the political community, and thereby restore political legitimacy to the state. According to Dan Russell, constitutional redesign would transform Indigenous peoples from “subjects on whom sovereignty could be imposed” into “people with whom one form[s] a political community.”11 Yet, the 9

This thesis will limit its analysis to proponents of nation-to-nation relations, who dominate both academic literature and Indigenous public opinion. For widely cited

challenges to the nation-to-nation normative ideal not discussed at length in this thesis, see Alan Cairns’ Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State

(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) and Tom Flanagan’s First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000).

10

Joyce Green, “Toward Conceptual Precision: Citizenship and Rights Talk for Aboriginal Canadians,” In Insiders and Outsiders: Alan Cairns and the Reshaping of

Canadian Citizenship, edited by Gerald Kernerman and Philip Resnick, (UBC Press, 2005).

Peter Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).

James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 224.

11

Dan Russell, A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 4.

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principle of inclusion mistakenly conflates the reality of living together with a necessity to govern together. In doing so, it assumes a diverse but united political community, and a diverse but united sovereignty. This model only approximates the original nation to-nation relationship.

A second strategy—institutional accommodation—is primarily advocated

as a means to resolve democratic deficits. Proponents suggest that Indigenous

representation in state institutions, such as legislative bodies and Supreme Court benches, would facilitate Indigenous contestation of state legislation, while also providing a means to forward an Indigenous policy agenda. Among more radical proposals, John Borrows advocates “Aboriginal control of Canadian affairs” to reconcile Indigenous people with their traditional territories and bolster Indigenous voices against incendiary corporate and state interests.12 More moderate proposals focus on simply increasing Indigenous participation in state legislative bodies alongside the creation of novel Aboriginal institutions that can accommodate Indigenous nationbuilding and self-governance within a single state.13

A final strategy is differentiated citizenship. These models reject liberal

universal citizenship and instead advocate identity-based rights and obligations that affirm the unique political status of Indigenous nations. For example, Will Kymlicka assigns minority groups “community rights” on top of basic individual rights, including the right to treaty-based self-government.14 Others seek to reconcile shared citizenship with differentiated national identities. For example, Melissa Williams reconstructs the nation-to-nation relationship as differentiated citizenship within the state, wherein citizenship unites disparate nations in mutually recognized “shared fate.”15 Similarly, Hanvelt and Papillon suggest multinational citizenship is “a way for Aboriginal peoples not to ‘break out’ of Canada … but to ‘break in’ to Canada on their 12

John Borrow, “Landed Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation,” in Citizenship, Diversity & Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives,

edited by Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann and David E. Smith (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1999), 80.

13

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 350-2.

14 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 27.

15 Williams, Sharing the River.

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own terms.”16 Yet, differentiated citizenship models elide the fact that Indigenous nations never consented to incorporation into Canada, nor do they necessarily accept that incorporation today.

NATION-TO-NATION RELATIONS BY TRANSCENDING THE STATE

In comparison to state reform theorists, more radical scholars question

the legitimacy of the state as a starting point for restoring the nation-to-nation

relationship. These thinkers take up what I call a “state transcendent” thesis. The state transcendent thesis aims not to incorporate Indigenous nations within Canada, but rather, to break away from below. State transcendent thinkers seek to subvert the state through grassroots resurgence of Indigenous political and cultural practices.17 These theorists begin with an assumption that the colonial state lacks legitimacy to recognize or mediate the nation-to-nation relationship.18 Following Frantz Fanon,19 they argue colonized nations must reclaim their sovereignty from below in a process of Indigenous resurgence.20 This process is two-pronged, involving at once the Indigenous reclamation of self-determination and the rejection of Canadian values and institutions.21 To accept anything less is to accept colonialism and occupation in new, more attractive, attire.22

Despite their dramatically different strategies, state transcendent thinkers strive

towards a similar political goal as state reformists: renewed nation-to-nation relations based on the original treaty relationship. However convincing the state reformist view 16

Marc Hanvelt and Martin Papillon, “Parallel or Embedded? Aboriginal Self-Government and the Changing Nature of Citizenship in Canada,” In Insiders and

Outsiders, 252-3.

17

Leanne Simpson, “Aboriginal Peoples and Knowledge: Decolonizing our Processes,” The Canadian Journal of Native Studies 21.1, 2001, 13-148.

Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism,” Government and Opposition 40.5, 2005, 597-614.

Dale Turner, This Is Not a Peace Pipe.

Trish Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward: Dreaming First Nations Independence (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Fernwood, 1999).

Glen Coulthard, “Resisting Culture: Seyla Benhabib’s Deliberative Approach to the Politics of Recognition in Colonial Contexts,” In Deliberative Democracy in

Practice, edited by David Kahane, Daniel Weinstock, Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), 138-54.

18

Coulthard, Resisting Culture, 153.

Alfred and Corntassel, Being Indigenous, 600.

19

Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 84.

20 Alfred, Wasáse.

Jeff Corntassel, “Indigenous Governance Amidst the Forced Federalism Era,” The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 19.9, 2009, 47-62.

Glen Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition’ in Canada,” Contemporary Political Theory 6, 2007, 437-460.

21 Coulthard, Subjects of Empire; Alfred and Corntassel, Being Indigenous; Turner, This is Not a Peace Pipe; Monture-Angus, Journeying Forward; Alfred, Wasáse.

22

Alfred and Corntassel, Being Indigenous, 598-600.

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might be, state transcendent thinkers raise important normative questions about the legitimacy of the Canadian state. These thinkers suggest there is something essentially illegitimate

and foreign about the notion of statehood that cannot be resolved

by tweaking one thing and fixing another. I accept the normative validity of these arguments. Settlers cannot ignore the essential critiques raised by Indigenous peoples not just about the Canadian state as it is currently organized, but about the Canadian state as such. Thus, if we are to take the arguments of state transcendent theorists

seriously, the question remains: If the state of Canada is dismantled, what replaces it? What would constitute a post-colonial form of political organization capable of facilitating an uncompromised nation-to-nation relationship between resurgent Indigenous nations and the enduring, but de-colonized Canadian nation?

According to Alfred, to discover the formula for a just relationship today, “we

don’t need to go forward, we need to go back.”23 In the next section, I look back across Canadian history to discern the non-state form of political organization in which the original nation-to-nation relationship was negotiated, and trace how the emergence of the state facilitated and necessitated the erosion of nation-to-nation IndigenousCrown relations.

THREE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE WESTPHALIAN STATE

“Nation-to-nation” refers to the Crown’s relationship with each individual

Indigenous nation. Indigenous peoples in Canada do not constitute a single nation, but several, each relating to the Crown as distinct political partners. Models that assume the re-emergence of nation-to-nation relations within the state overlook a fundamental underlying asymmetry; namely, that one nation (Canada) is a state while the others (Indigenous nations) are stateless. In this section, I ask to what extent the nationto-nation relationship, as a normative ideal (see Figure 1), can be reconciled with the structural limits of Westphalian statehood.

23

Taiaiake Alfred, “Writer Taiaiake Alfred Interview,” CBC Radio, 2011, accessed 25 February 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/player/Radio/More+Shows/8th+Fire+-

+CBC+Series/Doc+Zone+video/Interviews+and+Dispatches/ID/2174329046/.

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The Canadian nation does not exist in abstraction. Born of and sustained by the

state, the Canadian nation, as a partner in the nation-to-nation relationship, cannot be theoretically isolated from the Canadian state. Qua territorial state, the contemporary

Canadian nation’s borders surround and circumscribe Indigenous nations.

Nation

Nation

Figure 1: Nation-to-Nation relations as a normative ideal. Parallelism and symmetry imply foundational principles of equality, selfgovernance, reciprocity, and coexistence.

These factors forestall the parallelism ‘nation-to-nation’ implies and enforce a dominant-subordinate hierarchical relationship reminiscent of colonialism (see Figure 2).

In the discussion that follows, I develop

three principles of Westphalian states that are incompatible with a renewed nationto-nation relationship: (a) territoriality, or the

Westphalian state

norm of fixed, mutually exclusive territorial rule; (b) hierarchical rule, or the state’s final authority to sanction or omit sub-state political jurisdictions, civil society organizations, and individuals, and (c) nation-building, which

Indigenous nations

encourages cultural convergence over time and demands civic unity through both overt and insidious means. Together, these three principles preclude the elevation of Indigenous nations to a position that is parallel to Canada.

Rather, the Canadian nation, qua Westphalian state, surrounds, circumscribes, regulates, and limits all that falls within its borders and therefore inherently orders its constituent parts—including hierarchically.

Indigenous

nations—

Figure 2: Nation-to-Nation relations in the context of the Westphalian state. Qua state, Canada circumscribes the Indigenous nation and imposes a hierarchical relationship that contradicts the normative principles of equality, selfgovernance, reciprocity, and coexistence.

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After elaborating the three principles of Westphalian statehood, I trace the

evolution of Indigenous-Crown relations across three broad stages of Canadian state development: the Pre-Westphalian Era (1534-1763), the Era of Frontier and State

Development (1763-1921), and the Era of Aboriginal Rights (1969-present).24 Against assumptions that the last forty years have seen a general trend toward Aborignal selfdetermination in Canada, this genealogy suggests that a nation-to-nation relationship is less likely to emerge in the contemporary context than ever before. Poor constitutional

or institutional design cannot fully account for the persistence of colonialism in contemporary Canada, making state reform an unlikely solution. Rather, the breakdown of the nation-to-nation relationship is inherent to the foundational principles of the state itself (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: CANADIAN STATE DEVELOPMENT AND INDIGENOUS-CROWN RELATIONS Pre-Westphalian Era (1534- Age of Frontier and State 1763) Development (1763-1969)

Age of Aboriginal Rights (1969-present)

System of Rule / Level of State Development

Several co-existing, personalistic political authorities on overlapping territories.

State development in progress: territorial claims coupled with political and nationalist expansion.

Consolidated Westphalian state independent from metropole: Territoriality, political hierarchy, and Canadian national identity.

Character of Indigenous-Crown Relationship

Strong: Treaty relationship embodying principles of equality, self-government, reciprocity and coexistence.

Weakened: Indigenous legal, political and cultural autonomy undermined; treaty process becomes restrictive and is eventually halted.

Specious: Official treaty and self-government rights. Recognition of nationhood undermined by patterns of state intrusion.

Exclusive territorial rule, as entailed in the Westphalian model, fundamentally

undermines Indigenous self-determination as understood in the nation-to-nation model, especially the principle of coexistence. Defined as parallel existence in shared time and space, coexistence of Indigenous and non-Indigenous nations implies the theoretical opposite of mutually exclusive territoriality. In the international system, states’ constituent parts are necessarily subordinated. To secure its territory 24

Historical periods are never perfect, as events and eras always overlap and interact. I have chosen these dates to correspond with important political events that

served as catalysts for change in Aboriginal policy, Indigenous resistance, public opinion, or all three.

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

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internationally, a single state must be considered the final unit of political power in the international system, and exercise authority over all inhabitants within its borders.

From this assumption of territoriality a “secede or compromise” discourse emerges

vis-à-vis Indigenous self-determination.25 However, the “secede or compromise” discourse takes us further away from reviving the principles of the original nation-tonation relationship, which at its core was built upon the norm of shared, overlapping territory and personalistic, not territorial, rule.26

The discussion that follows traces the genesis of territoriality in Canada, pinning

its emergence to the mid-18th century. As this genealogy demonstrates, the first two hundred years of Indigenous-Crown relations existed in a context of pre-Westphalian political organization that fostered the maintenance of separate political communities on shared and overlapping territories. This relationship received its first formidable challenge as the norms of Westphalian statehood began to develop in the mid-18th century, beginning with the concept of territoriality.

PRE-WESTPHALIAN ORIGINS OF THE NATION-TO-NATION RELATIONSHIP

The nation-to-nation relationship invoked by Indigenous scholars and activists

today emerged in a political context that looked dramatically different from modern Westphalian territoriality. Indeed, in the 16th century, when sustained colonial contact between Indigenous nations and Europeans began, the modern concept of territoriality was non-existent in the Americas and still a fledgling reality in Europe.27 In contrast, boundaries in the early colonial era differentiated European “frontiers,” better understood as “spheres of interest” in land, and resources that were fluid and often overlapping.28 Colonial powers in this era did not aspire to exercise political control over Indigenous subjects, nor to deny Indigenous nations’ political autonomy. It was 25

See Alan Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000).

26

Personalistic rule is tied to nationality.

27 The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia established de jure sovereignty between Spain and the Dutch Republic. Eleven years later, the Treaty of the Pyranees established

Europe’s first modern border between France and Spain. Still, surviving modes of personalistic rule made such borders difficult to draw and impossible to enforce,

indicating a lack of de facto sovereignty. See Friedrich Kratchowil, “Of Systems, Borders and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of State System,” World

Politics 39.1, 1986, 33.

See also Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 2002, 127-149.

28 Kratchowil, Of Systems, Borders and Territoriality, 37.

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not until the late 18th century that Britain slowly changed its colonial tactics to statebuilding, with an emphasis on exacting fixed, mutually exclusive political authority over defined colonial territories.29

The absence of modern territoriality in the early colonial era fostered unique

nation-to-nation relationships between Indigenous nations and the French and British Crowns. Despite overlapping territory, Indigenous, French, and British nations maintained political self-determination over their distinct populations and interacted

with each other reciprocally as in the international system.30 First, it must be clarified that no single authority established de facto territorial sovereignty in this era.31 Rather, sovereignty claims were overlapping and contested. As historian Cole Harris notes, “most of the French territory in North America was Native [sic] territory over which French control was disputed and tenuous.”32 In this context, political authority was necessarily decoupled from territory. Neither French nor English land claims established mutually exclusive political rule, as they would in a Westphalian system.

Rather, Indigenous inhabitants retained political self-determination and overlapping title within the colonial boundaries.33 Even Indigenous land surrenders in this era were decoupled from the surrender of political self-determination. For example: In 1715 when the British tried to persuade the Mi’kmaq to swear allegiance to the British Crown after the French cession of Acadia, the Mi’kmaq replied that the French Crown could not have ceded away their rights since they had always been independent peoples, allies and brothers of the French.34 Indeed, the absence of strict territoriality in the early colonial era enabled the 29

Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European Statehood: AD 900-1992 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 1992), 94.

30

This is not to say that Indigenous-Crown relationships were necessarily friendly. Quite the contrary, this relationship was marked by occupation, war, bloodshed,

disease, coercion, and racism. However, conflict in this era must be characterized as international, not domestic. Despite the many injustices that occurred,

Indigenous and European nations retained self-determination and political autonomy, and were not considered subjects to the domestic laws of the

other. See Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996).

31

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 138.

32

Cole Harris, The Reluctant Land: Society, Space and Environment in Canada Before Confederation (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), 118.

33

However, it must be acknowledged that the intentions of colonial powers were neither charitable nor marked with a genuine respect for Indigenous self-

determination.

34

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 152.

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14

establishment of mutual sovereignties and land claims on shared territory. Yes, these sovereignties were often contested, but the existence of one did not extinguish nor necessarily restrict the others as would inherently occur within a Westphalian state.

THE EXPANSION OF TERRITORIALITY AND THE EROSION OF COEXISTING INDIGENOUS-CROWN SOVEREIGNTIES

Not until the second half of the 18th century did Britain begin to lay the

groundwork for statehood in what is now Canada. In doing so, it fomented the breakdown of the nation-to-nation relationship. Fearing revolts like those in the United States, Britain began to establish and settle permanent political communities with localized laws and institutions.35 An 1866 Royal Commission report called the period from 1757 to 1763 “the decisive stage in the development of Empire” in Canada.36 In this period, Britain established mutually exclusive sovereignty in the colonies for the first time, leading to fixed, mutually exclusive territoriality. Consequently, we see also a turning point in colonial policy, from coexistence to the strategic dispossession of Indigenous peoples.

The Royal Proclamation, 1763, issued by the British Crown to claim territories won in the Seven Years War, marks the turning point in the nation-to-nation relationship and establishes Britain’s territorial and state-building ambitions. Recognized today by the Supreme Court of Canada to have established British sovereignty,37 the Royal Proclamation is rife with paradox. On the one hand, it contains the most explicit and important legal affirmation of the political and legal autonomy of Indigenous nations.

By extension, it normalizes and protects nation-to-nation Indigenous-Crown relations.

The 1763 Royal Proclamation acknowledges injustices committed against Indigenous nations, and outlines specific measures to protect Indigenous title in future agreements.

Yet, according to Taiaiake Alfred, the 1763 Proclamation also set forth Britain’s “imperial

35

“Her Majesty’s colonies; a series of original papers issued under the authority of the Royal Commission,” Colonial and English Exhibition (London: W. Clowes and

sons, limited, 1886), xv-xvi.

36

“Her Majesty’s colonies,” xviii.

37

Supreme Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1997.

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prerogative to pre-empt Indigenous ownership of land,”38 foreshadowing a one-hundredand-fifty-year dispossession campaign that would eventually undermine the nationto-nation principles. Eventually, Britain’s territorial and political ambitions would outweigh its commitment to respecting the national autonomy of Indigenous groups.

This policy shift is directly related to the transition from the flexible form of political organization that marked the pre-Westphalian era, to the norms and principles of territoriality, which presume mutually exclusive rule within a fixed and internationally recognized geographic space.

The shift towards “land surrenders” in the post-1763 era precipitated the

demise of nation-to-nation relations. Indigenous accounts of treaties signed leading up to confederation call into question whether land surrenders were understood as permanent extinguishments of title by those Indigenous nations who signed them.39 Veritably, many of the treaties signed after confederation were coerced or fabricated by Canadian agents.40 Casting aside the ambiguities surrounding the actual parameters of treaties in this era, they remained important to the Crown’s intentions as it scrambled to ensure its ownership of land while establishing itself as a state to the international community. The expansion of Crown territory in this era slowly shrank Indigenous self-determination as frontier boundaries were replaced with mutually exclusive state borders.41

TERRITORIALITY AS A BARRIER TO REVITALIZED NATION-TO-NATION RELATIONS TODAY

Since the norms of territoriality solidified in Canada, Indigenous peoples have

been increasingly forced to limit their self-determination to jurisdictional arenas compatible with the logic of statehood. For example, while the original Indian Act at confederation recognized full treaty territories, an 1876 amendment introduced the 38

Taiaiake Alfred, “Colonialism and State Dependency,” National Aboriginal Health Organization Project: Communities in Crisis (Canada: University of Victoria,

2009), 9.

39

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 248.

40 Ibid.

41

Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European Statehood.

John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47.1, 1993, 150.

Cole Harris, The Reluctant Land: Society, Space, and Environment in Canada before Confederation (Vancouver: UBC Press 2008), 117.

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

16

idea of “bands” on small reserves modelled after municipal governments beneath the provinces.42 The logic of territoriality restricts within-state Indigenous self-governance to demarcated territories, such as reserve lands, wherein the state voluntarily limits its sovereignty over specific jurisdictions. Such jurisdictions may erect their own civic

institutions, legal codes, and law enforcement regimes that apply only to inhabitants and visitors to the territory. But importantly, these regimes do not nullify state sovereignty.

In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Indigenous self-government rights were provisions for land “use” only, or the “right to control and

manage the use of lands and resources in the territory, as well as the right to govern the people within the territory.”43 Use rights stop when they become “incompatible with every principle of the parliamentary sovereignty vested in the Imperial Parliament in 1846.”44 In other words, unlike international borders between states that are mutually exclusive, borders around Indigenous land are unilaterally exclusive. Indigenous sovereignty is limited and does not extend beyond the state-defined borders of their territories. In contrast, state sovereignty is absolute, and trumps all other authorities both within and outside Indigenous territories.

The state-controlled geopolitics of Indigenous self-governance also contravene

traditional Indigenous land use and understandings of political organization.

Indigenous peoples have disputed whether ‘sovereignty’ is an appropriate way to conceptualize Indigenous governance. Critics claim that Western understandings of supreme power or authority are foreign to traditional Indigenous political theory and practice.45 In this view, the contemporary push towards Aboriginal self-governance can be seen as a substitute for authentic Indigenous self-determination. While Indigenous sovereignty fundamentally undermines—even subverts—the norms of territoriality, Aboriginal self-governance passively supports and in turn helps constitute and perpetuate the Westphalian system. The norm of territorial sovereignty in a Westphalian system is “mutually constitutive:” territorial rule is exclusive, and only when a state 42

Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereignty: The Existing Right of Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press 1992), 154-155.

43

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, paragraph 34.

44

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, paragraph 45.

45

Taiaiake Alfred. “From Sovereignty to Freedom: Towards an Indigenous Political Discourse.” Indigenous Perspectives 1.3, 2001, 22-34.

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relinquishes some of its sovereign jurisdiction may another state claim it.46 In other words, Indigenous nations may only exercise sub-state sovereignty if that sovereignty is first granted by, or relinquished to, the state. Aboriginal self-governance as it is

characterized in the “treaty federalism” model therefore fails to have the revolutionary potential to bypass the dominant-subordinate colonial relationship. Rather, because federated Aboriginal governments operate within the state’s borders, their sovereign jurisdiction is conditional on state approval and, in turn, retractable.

Consequently, the expectation that Indigenous peoples will claim the

sovereignty the state relinquishes in specific “self-governing” sub-state territories forces Indigenous conformity to a colonial political order.47 Exclusive sovereignty in a given territory does not reflect pre-colonial patterns of inhabitancy and governance, when it was not uncommon for more than one Indigenous nation to occupy overlapping territories. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia acknowledges this reality, yet still forces Indigenous nations to make land claims together and receive singular title to a particular area.48 In the Modern Land Claims Agreement process in British Columbia, this artificial, state-imposed construction of land title, based on Westphalian models of exclusive territorial rule, has incited conflicts between Indigenous nations with overlapping traditional territories.49 While distinct political authorities on overlapping territories were common in the pre-Westphalian system, they are incommensurable with territorial statehood. Land must therefore be artificially divided in a way that does not correspond with traditional understandings and uses, both by Indigenous peoples and by the pre-Westphalian Crown.

HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY

Territoriality, as the defining feature of the modern state, constrains the

organization of political power within its borders to a hierarchical pattern, which by 46

Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State”, 134.

47

As a non-Indigenous author, I will deliberately refrain from defining the content or scope of Indigenous governance. Rather, I focus on creating space for Indigenous

self-determination in its fullest form, defined as a context where the self-determined scope and content of Indigenous self-determination is not limited by

extraneous colonial structures or forces, including circumscribing state borders.

48

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1997.

49

“Shared Territories/Overlap Resolution,” Union of British Columbian Indian Chiefs, 2008, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.ubcic.bc.ca/files/PDF/

Doc8SharedTerritoriesOverlapFINAL.pdf

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necessity subordinates Indigenous nations and thereby contradicts the principles of nation-to-nation relations. Of course, hierarchical authority does not obviate competing spheres of social organization. Markets, civil society organizations, and sub state federal and municipal jurisdictions organize social relations, demand loyalties, and both empower and constrain subjects within Westphalian states. Nevertheless, these competing spheres of authority remain subordinate to the territorial state, whose legitimacy in the international system depends on its exclusive claim to authority

within its borders.50 The state’s supreme authority is embodied in effective and efficient centralized institutions that uphold its sovereignty in the international system.51

Bourdieu et al. distinguish the modern state’s “domestic supremacy” from the

absolute power characteristic of developing states. The emerging state “must assert its physical force … internally, in relation to rival powers and to resistance from below.”52 In contrast, the developed state must merely maintain its capacity to act violently and its legitimacy. The modern alternative to the assertion of violence is bureaucratic authority.53 Through its central administrative function, the state represents the final (and in some cases only) “link in the chain” of authority.54 Through “symbolic power,” state recognition grants legitimacy to certain non-state authorities, while non-recognition or mis-recognition delegitimize others.55 In other words, the state unilaterally possesses both the positive power to recognize and affirm, and the negative power to suppress, defame, mis-recognize, and ignore for instrumental, ideological, or arbitrary reasons.

The take-home part is twofold. First, limited state power does not mean

subordinate state power. While ostensibly benign, constitutional limits enforced through judiciaries and maintained through bureaucratic systems are effective precisely because they conceal the state’s monopoly on coercive force. A state need 50

Hendrik Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International Relations: State Anarchy as Order,” International Organization 48.3, 2004, 527-557.

51

Robert Jackson, Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: the Empirical and Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35.1, 1982, 6.

52

Pierre Bourdieu, Loic Wacquant, and Samar Farage, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” Sociological Theory 12.1, 1994, 5.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., 12.

55 Ibid.

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not be absolute to be supreme, but since supremacy is inherently difficult to discern, it often goes undetected. Second, and more important, state supremacy does not preclude co-existing and powerful non-state organizations and nested jurisdictions. In

fact, a state may even benefit from the operations of non-state institutions, especially religious and educational institutions which encourage submission to state authority, thereby eliminating the necessity of state coercion.56 Indeed, powerful jurisdictions of Indigenous self-governance may exist and flourish within states. But their power is

inherently limited by the fact that their legitimacy is ultimately achieved through and granted by the state. Unlike states, which do not require the recognition of any superior entity, and whose powers are not limited by the authority of any superior body, sub-state entities are always limited by the state. This arrangement both necessitates hierarchy and positions the state at the apex, above Indigenous nations. The resultant hierarchical relationship between state and non-state actors fundamentally undermines the nationto-nation principles of equality and self-determination. I now turn to a more detailed discussion of the evolution of political hierarchy in Indigenous-Crown relations, from its genesis alongside the emergent Westphalian state to its consolidated presence today.

PARALLEL INDIGENOUS AND CROWN AUTHORITIES IN THE PRE-WESTPHALIAN ERA

The pre-Westphalian era was marked by a non-hierarchical relationship between

Indigenous and European nations. By and large, Indigenous nations and colonial powers recognized each other and behaved as separate and equal political entities.57 The first written treaties between European and Indigenous nations in the 17th and 18th centuries established military and trade alliances, not dissimilar to international peace treaties signed between nations in Europe around the same time.58 Notably absent were provisions that would establish a political hierarchy with the Crown above Indigenous nations. To the contrary, it was not uncommon for pre-Westphalian treaties to positively affirm the political equality of nations. This emphasis on parallelism was 56

Philip S. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

57

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 152.

58

Ibid., 164.

Indian Treaties and Surrenders, From 1690 to 1890 (Ottawa: B. Chamberlain, 1891).

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

20

enabled by the norm of personalistic political rule in this era. As discussed in the previous section, personalistic rule fostered equal and coexisting, or parallel, political authorities on overlapping territory. Yet, because it contradicts the hierarchical logic of

Westphalian political rule, parallelism did not survive state development in subsequent centuries.

COERCIVE SUBORDINATION IN THE ERAS OF FRONTIER AND

STATE-BUILDING

Parallelism began to break down after the Royal Proclamation of 1763. After

establishing fixed borders and claiming exclusive rule within them, the Crown was required to establish its political sovereignty over its territory. Between the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, the Crown quickly established its hierarchical authority over Indigenous nations in the colonies, through both overt coercive and more benign legislative and juridical means. Most significantly, the British North American (BNA) Act, which established the Canadian state through the confederation of colonial provinces in 1867, incorporated the governance of all Indigenous territory, ceded or not, beneath the powers of the federal government.59

The post-confederation decades witnessed aggressive state efforts to ensure

both de jure and de facto sovereignty over all lands and inhabitants north of the 49th parallel. The Indian Act of 1867 codified the new hierarchical relationship between stateless Indigenous nations and the newfound Dominion of Canada and arbitrarily created “reserve” lands for Indians. With provisions on band membership, land use, resource access, cultural and religious freedoms, political autonomy, and much more, the Indian Act reflects Canada’s early efforts to establish itself as the final political authority across the entire Canadian territory. The Indian Act was the first document to specify the terms and scope of internal Indigenous governance. While previous treaties stipulated the relationship between the Crown and Indigenous nations, the Indian Act stipulated the relationship between Indigenous political leaders and Indigenous subjects. The emerging Canadian state delineated Indigenous communities, which it 59

G.P. Browne, Documents on the Confederation of British North America (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009), 18.

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called “bands,” and assigned “band councils” to lead them.

In stark contrast with the nation-to-nation treaties of the previous era, evidence

suggests that the eleven “Numbered Treaties” signed between 1871 and 1921 were negotiated coercively under the implicit threat of violent conquest.60 The absence of a meaningful choice to decline or negotiate the numbered treaties highlights the state’s hierarchical character. The signatures of Indigenous leaders were a mere formality to

secure legal title rather than a meaningful contract. As theorized by Bourdieu et al., the establishment of state authority was predicated upon violent suppression of “rival powers” and “resistance from below.”61 In the years immediately following confederation, Indigenous resistance was overcome by the mounting authority of the state. In this period, Indigenous peoples were demoted from partners to subalterns, without authority or recourse in the emerging international Westphalian system. Together, the state’s unilateral constitutional and institutional policy in this period reframed the Indigenous relationship from the parallel ‘nation-to-nation’ to the hierarchical ‘nationto-state’.

ESTABLISHED HIERARCHIES AND LIMITED RIGHTS IN THE CONSOLIDATED TERRITORIAL STATE

Given the hierarchical logic of the Westphalian state, it is not surprising that

constitutional protection of Aboriginal treaty rights, instated in 1982, has not pacified the Crown’s domination of Indigenous nations. Models of differentiated citizenship presume that Aboriginal rights can protect the interests of minority Indigenous nations against the will of the majority state. However, these assumptions underestimate the hierarchical nature of Westphalian statehood. As a result, they fail to anticipate or problematize the contravention of Aboriginal rights that is bound to occur when they are rendered irreconcilable with state interests. Rights, which denote equality, cannot be reconciled with Westphalian hierarchy. When push comes to shove, state interests outweigh those of the Indigenous nations, especially if those interests are essential to 60

Réne Fumoleau, As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11, 1870-1939 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004), 191.

61

Bourdieu et al., Rethinking the State, 5.

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the state’s survival and legitimacy in the international sphere. This incompatibility is at the root of what James Tully has called the “doctrine of infringement” that characterizes contemporary Indigenous-Crown treaty arrangements.62 While the Crown is obliged

to consult with First Nations over matters of mutual interest, the state retains final decision-making authority.

The state’s capacity to intervene in Indigenous affairs has been interpreted by

state reformists as a failure of institutional checks and balances. My diagnosis finds a more fundamental problem, and thus requires a more radical solution. As I have shown,

Canadian interference in Indigenous affairs is an inherent quality of the Westphalian state. Hendrik Spruyt considers “the capacity … to intervene in their societies” an essential feature of the modern state—one that distinguishes it from predecessors.63 In this view, non-compliance with treaty obligations is not merely a circumstantial failure, but a symptom of the systemic logic of Westphalian statehood. The capacity to intervene in all nested jurisdictions is the state’s defining feature—the embodiment of sovereignty itself. Spruyt’s theoretical hypothesis finds empirical support in the Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in R. v. Gladstone, which affirmed the relationship between territorial sovereignty and state hierarchy: Because distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social, political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the fact that aboriginal societies are a part of that community), some limitation of those rights will be justifiable.64 In other words, the state has recourse to act on the part of the majority even when protections of minority rights exist. Sub-state Indigenous nations lose out in this formula, which positions their rights as a burden on state sovereignty that can be lifted 62 Tully, Strange Multiplicity, 224.

63

Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” 128.

64

Supreme Court of Canada, R. v. Gladstone, 2 S.C.R. 723, 1996, emphasis added.

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at any time, should that sovereignty be existentially threatened.

Thus, even in the present era of Aboriginal rights, state hierarchies are

undergirded by the state’s monopoly on the threat and use of physical coercion. Even though the modern state’s violent authority is typically dormant, its continued capacity to leverage its interests via violence raises the stakes of hierarchical authority. Unlike stateless Indigenous governments, state laws, including those regulating Indigenous

land and governance, are fortified by “legitimate” violent enforcement capacities. The state’s authority over Indigenous nations is thereby marked on the bodies of Indigenous peoples. Contrast the state’s “legitimate” violent response to the Elsipogtog nation’s “illegitimate” resistance to state treaty-breaking. The Elsipogtog case exposes the power imbalance behind the nation-to-nation relationship when one of those nations is also a Westphalian state. The Crown, by its very definition as a state with a monopoly on ‘legitimate’ coercion, is unilaterally vested with the means to enforce its interests against all interests of sub-state actors. There is little recourse for Indigenous nations, considering the state judiciary is then charged with interpreting what constitutes “legitimate.” In contrast, Indigenous nations are barred from coercive tactics to resist state encroachment, whether they be judicially or violently enforced.

NATION-BUILDING

A final organizing principle of the Westphalian state is nation-building. The

combination of territoriality and hierarchical authority transforms states into political communities, otherwise known as nations.65 The state development process is therefore marked with efforts to both suppress rival political nations, and simultaneously promote a civic national identity that will ensure civic cohesion and legitimize the arbitrary borders of the state. I shall now give a brief theoretical discussion of each process before turning to a historical evaluation of the role of nation-suppression and nation-building in the establishment of Westphalian statehood in Canada, and its role in eroding the nation-to-nation relationship.

65

Hendrik Spruyt, “The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State,” 133.

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

24

To exact its power and legitimacy within a given territory, the Westphalian state

must disempower competing sub-state nations. According to Jacques Maritain, states naturally rearrange constituent nations into new singular civic national units that

depend on the existence of the polity for their survival and flourishing.66 Civic national identities are deliberately cultivated by states, but they also emerge through more insidious means. In the first instance, states deliberately deploy nationalist policies aimed at crafting a civic mythology that will bind citizens together through common

identities, beliefs and experiences. Most often this is accomplished through the public school system and state-supported civil society organizations or religious institutions that together work to discipline and unite the masses.67 The second method is less deliberate, but rather a natural result of living together with access to and rule by centralized institutions.68 Bourdieu et al. observe the subtle process of nation-building through collective exposure to the common holidays, classification systems, language, and measurement which contribute to “the unification of the cultural market” and help construct a “national identity” or “true ‘civic religion.’”69 In Westphalian states, citizens are guaranteed to share at least one identity in common: that their lives operate within, not outside, the border.

If this nation-suppressing/building logic is indeed an inherent feature of

territorial statehood, then even multinational states that make efforts to promote diversity and plurality risk national convergence over time. As discussed, multicultural theorists have envisioned alternate models of Canadian nationalism that simultaneously promote civic cohesion and national pluralism.70 Yet, the homogenizing logic inherent to territorial states undermines the capacity of any multinational society to fully protect constituent nations from cultural and linguistic convergence, even if political will is present. When surrounded by borders that demarcate rule and intersubjective

66

Jacques Maritain, “The People and the State,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 11.2, 2008, 169.

67

Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution.

68

Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

69

Bourdieu et al., Rethinking the State, 7-8.

70 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; Tully, Strange Multiplicity.

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interaction, political subjects tend to become more alike, not more different.71 The state, by virtue of being a single, aggregating political unit, reduces heterogeneity and promotes homogeneity. All inhabitants of the territory are subjects, and as subjects

their differences matter less than their similarities. To summarize, even if plural multinational states actively cease to suppress rival sub-state nations, more covert and unintentional forms of nation-building are likely to remain as mere by-products of national institutions and policies. In ruling over all territories and citizens within

its borders, the state tends towards crafting policy and institutions that naturally also reach into the lives and identities of all citizens.

COEXISTENT NATIONS IN PRE-WESTPHALIAN CANADA

Rival Indigenous nations have posed a challenge to the Canadian state since

its inception. Yet, the state’s strategies to deal with this challenge have evolved in correspondence with the strength of Canadian national identity. When Canadian national identity was fledgling, the emergent state aggressively suppressed Indigenous nationhood. Later, the state aimed to assimilate Indigenous nations into a unified Canadian identity, while today, the state tolerates some level of depoliticised Indigenous identity, incorporated into a “multinational” Canadian identity. Common to all three eras is the state’s prerogative to decide the terms of Indigenous nationhood within predetermined unilateral parameters.

Prior to the establishment of statehood in Canada, the French and English

Crowns recognized Indigenous communities as nations with distinct cultural, religious, linguistic, and political practices. Quoting the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: The existence of relatively strong, organized and politically active and astute Aboriginal nations caused the Europeans to recognize in practice, and later in law, the capacity of Aboriginal nations not only to govern their own affairs and 71

Of course, diversity can never be totally erased in a society. Moreover, ironically, the homogenization process that naturally occurs within states may function to

pronounce those differences that remain. When under threat, our identities become more important, and those few things that distinguish us from one

another become more obvious when everything else seems quite similar. This may help explain the rise of nationalist movements in the 20th century. However, while

interesting, this question is beyond the scope of this article.

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26

to possess their own lands, but also to conclude treaties with them of a type similar to those the European nations were accustomed to making with each other.72

In other words, the nation-to-nation relationship in this period recognized inherent Indigenous nationhood and respected the right to political self-determination.

THE MUTUALLY REINFORCING EFFECTS OF STATE-BUILDING AND

NATION-BUILDING

Aggressive nation-suppression and nation-building policies began to appear in

anticipation of and in response to confederation, which solidified the transformation of colonies into states. In the decades leading up to confederation, new treaties denied recognition of Indigenous nationhood, substituting the established term “nation” with “tribes” or “inhabitants.”73 This discursive shift signalled imminent colonial efforts to deny the distinct cultural, linguistic, and political characteristics of Indigenous peoples. The Indian Act extended the arm of the state into the daily lives of Indigenous peoples in new and unprecedented ways, leaving no option for a continued nation-tonation relationship. The Act’s strict qualifications for whom the state would recognize as “Indian” and who would not receive this status is just one example of how the state was now asserting itself as the arbiter of Indigenous identity. At the same time, the state outlawed Indigenous cultural practices, such as the potlatch, and sanctioned a major influx of Christian missionaries onto the newly established reserves. In sum, Indigenous peoples no longer controlled their own affairs. Rather, the newly consolidated sovereign Dominion of Canada controlled all aspects of their daily and political lives.

In the same period, the state assumed its monopoly on the legitimate rule of

Indigenous children.74 Between the late 1870s and 1996, more than 150,000 Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their homes and communities to attend Indian Residential Schools. These state- and church-run boarding schools socialized Indigenous children in the English language and European culture, and punished them 72

Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 137.

73

Indian Treaties and Surrenders, From 1690 to 1890.

74 Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution.

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for speaking their native tongues. Traditional knowledge and practices were replaced with “civilizing” educations in European methods of agriculture and cooking.75 Residential school policy was modelled after the American system of “aggressive

civilization” with the ultimate goal of assimilating the next generation of Indigenous peoples into mainstream Canadian society.76 Both nation-suppression and nationbuilding strategies are found in residential school policies; schools were designed to annihilate Indigenous nations while simultaneously promoting European culture and

sensibilities.

Contrary to popular contemporary discourse, residential schools were more than an ill-conceived project to educate what the West saw as underprivileged children from “backwards” cultures. Rather it was a conscious policy measure instrumental to the expansion of the Canadian frontier across unceded Indigenous territories in the prairies and Western Canada.

Once its frontier was secured in the early 20th century, Canada could revise

its nation-building strategy towards more banal symbols of national independence, identity, and unity. While subtler, these measures still contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous culture, history and identity. Moreover, national symbols help erect and maintain a cohesive national identity, or what Bourdieu et al. call a “civic religion.”77 In 1926, the anthem O Canada! was authorized for singing in public schools. In 1931, Britain passed the Statute of Westminster and thereby established legislative parity between Canada and Britain. In 1965, Canada replaced the Union Jack with its own flag. In the culmination of these efforts to build a single and self-conscious Canadian community, Canada introduced its infamous White Paper in 1969. The White Paper proposed completing Canada’s colonial project by eradicating the state’s special relationship with Indigenous peoples as established in the Indian Act. In 1887, Canada’s first Prime Minister, John A. MacDonald, promised to “do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the other inhabitants of the Dominion as speedily

75 Ibid.

76

Nicholas Flood Davin. “Report on Industrial Schools for Indians and Half-Breeds,” Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada Library, accessed 25 February 2015, http://eco.

canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.03651.

77

Bourdieu et al., Rethinking the State, 7-8.

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

28

as they are fit to change.”78 Nearly one hundred years later, MacDonald’s program and the proposed White Paper have conclusively failed. Not only have Indigenous peoples successfully resisted assimilation, their vocal rejection of the policy confirmed that

such assimilationist attempts would not be tolerated in the future.

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INDIGENOUS RESURGENCE AND THE “STRATEGIC DOMESTICATION” OF INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD

The contemporary era begins immediately after the failed White Paper and is widely considered an era of significant gains for Indigenous peoples. Yet, there is reason to be sceptical of state-sponsored efforts to “recognize” Indigenous nations and cultures and revitalize Indigenous languages. As Glen Coulthard argues, state recognition of difference only reproduces colonial hierarchies.79 State recognition of Indigenous nationhood today cannot reverse the injustice of colonialism. Without repairing those underlying structural injustices, recognition politics will simply encourage the “strategic ‘domestication’ of the terms of recognition in such a way that the foundation of the colonial relationship remains relatively undisturbed.”80

Contemporary governments have rejected overt assimilation policies, and

embraced the ‘recognition’ of Indigenous nations and the development of selfgovernance agreements. Yet, contemporary policy trends promote equally unpalatable outcomes: the depoliticization of rival national identities and thus the incorporation of Indigenous nations into the Canadian political apparatus. Depoliticization reduces national difference to cultural peculiarities, and then argues that such cultural differences are compatible with a single pluralist state. Such assertions are coupled with the praxis of recognition politics, which manifests as the display of Indigenous art in airports and public buildings, or the featuring of Indigenous dancers in Olympic opening ceremonies. When Indigenous cultural objects are placed out of context in these ways, the soft cultural aspects of diversity are affirmed in the interest of the state. There 78

University of British Columbia, “The Indian Act,” Indigenous Foundations, 2009, accessed 28 February 2015, http://Indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/

government-policy/the-indian-act.html

79 Coulthard, Subjects of Empire.

80

Ibid., 451.

29

JENKINS

emerges a narrative of political allegiance to the state in spite of difference, while the political distinctiveness of Indigenous peoples is erased. Conflated with multicultural policies and administered by the state, symbols of Indigenous nationhood lose their

subversive appeal and become subsumed in a form of soft multinational statehood based on cultural diversity.

Conveniently, the circumscribing nation—Canada—still gets the final word in

every conflict. As state-transformist nation-to-nation scholars have argued, the only way to subvert this authority is through the revitalization of Indigenous nationhood not from within the state, but independently and from the grassroots.81 In other words, state recognition of diverse civic national identities allow only superficial displays of difference while simultaneously undercutting real political distinctions that are seen to delegitimize or threaten state survival. It affirms the equality and coexistence of cultures, while still emphasizing the unity of politics and thereby violating the nationto-nation principles of equal and parallel self-determination.

This critique is not intended to fetishize Indigenous difference nor to malign

efforts to better showcase Indigenous culture in Canadian society, especially efforts that are genuinely directed by Indigenous peoples. Cross-cultural understanding and appreciation is an essential but not sufficient component of nation-to-nation relations. When recognition strategies are pursued in isolation, the Westphalian state is left unchallenged, despite it representing the fundamental political barrier to a contemporary nation-to-nation relationship. If the state’s homogenizing logic cannot be completely resisted, then self-determination is violated, and the nation-to-nation relationship will not deliver the coexistence it promises. As a thought experiment, it is useful to compare the capacity of non-Indigenous peoples to resist—even eschew and make ‘other’—Indigenous nationhood, with the inundation of Canadian nationhood in the daily life of the Indigenous subject. As Coulthard shows, multicultural recognition politics, designed to resist the universalizing tendencies of the territorial state, are inadequate to counter the state’s hegemony. Indeed, they may encourage its consolidation.

81 Alfred, Wasáse; Alfred and Corntassel, Being Indigenous.

“NATION-TO-NATION� OR NATION-TO-STATE?

30

TOWARDS A POST-COLONIAL SYSTEM OF RULE

While a growing body of nation-to-nation literature suggests the injustices

of political hierarchy and nation-suppression can be resolved through remedial

measures of constitutional redesign, institutional accommodations, and differentiated citizenship, my analysis suggests otherwise. Stripped bare, the Westphalian state engenders a commitment to territorial rule over all inhabitants within mutually constituted, mutually exclusive borders. But the Westphalian state is more than

mere territory. Territoriality disciplines domestic political organization, producing a hierarchical state and encouraging the slow convergence of custom and identity that orders subjects within. Hierarchical rule and nationalism inevitably emerge wherever constricted territorial rule is present, and thus ought to be considered natural byproducts of bounded territoriality. This relationship is not unidirectional.

Simultaneously, hierarchical rule and nationalism support and protect territory, through both explicit and tacit control of subjects and subordinate political powers.

All three features present tangible and theoretical threats to the nation-to-nation principles of equality, self-governance, and coexistence. Their entanglement means none can be tackled in isolation from the other. Moreover, their ontological roots in territoriality doom attempts to tackle hierarchical authority and nationalism while leaving territorial rule intact. In other words, territorial sovereignty is the root from which hierarchical authority and nationalism grow. Pruning the branches will leave the root in place, and the branches will simply grow back. Without uprooting the tree, the nation-to-nation relationship will see continued encroachment and abuse.

SUBVERTING TERRITORIALITY TO AFFECT DECOLONIZATION

Where do we go from here? This thesis began with a question: What stands in

the way of revitalizing a nation-to-nation Indigenous-Crown relationship in the 21st century? Nearly five hundred years have passed since Indigenous nations began to permanently share their land with non-Indigenous nations. In that time, the norms of political organization in Canada and worldwide have undergone drastic transformation with the rise and global consolidation of the Westphalian state system. Obviously, the 21st century is a dramatically different political context than that which fostered the

31

JENKINS

first nation-to-nation relationships in the “New World” nearly five hundred years ago.

It is futile and perhaps even counterproductive to long for a pre-colonial world where Indigenous and European nations were isolated on separate territories. Instead of

asking how we can go back to our previously separate lives, we might discern how it is that we used to live together as equals, and take those lessons as inspiration for a model of the future.

My historical and theoretical discussion suggests that patterns of Crown domination throughout history and today are upheld, even required, by the Westphalian state’s commitment to fixed, mutually exclusive, and territorial systems of rule. Isolated as such, territoriality constitutes the preeminent systemic barrier to nation-to-nation relations today. Without subverting the norm of mutually exclusive territorial rule, reforms to counter state hierarchy and nation-building are futile. For this reason, political theorists must recognize the limitations of solutions that propose mere constitutional, institutional, and citizenship reforms. Rather, as state transcendent theorists have recognized, we must begin by rejecting the state’s authority and capacity to act as an arbiter or vehicle of a renewed the nation-to-nation relationship today.

Indeed, the nation-to-nation relationship preceded the Canadian state. It will also survive it.

In support of this growing body of political theory that seeks post-colonial

justice beyond or outside the state, I will conclude by suggesting some parameters for a system of rule that might replace the Westphalian state. These suggestions are offered to inform the strategies and scope of effective resistance now.

A just post-colonial form of political organization must begin by dismantling

territorially defined rule. Before discerning the means of attaining post-territorial rule, we must first establish the end. In 1993, John Ruggie developed a comprehensive outline of the ways in which territory has been conceptualized vis-à-vis systems of rule. Contra the Westphalian norm of fixed, mutually exclusive territorial authority, Ruggie offers three alternatives. First, systems of rule need not be defined by territory; second, if they

“NATION-TO-NATION” OR NATION-TO-STATE?

32

are defined by territory, that territory need not be fixed; and third, if they are defined by fixed territory, that fixed territory need not be mutually exclusive.82 Ruggie’s analysis transcends the political imaginary of Westphalian thinking and provides a typology for

alternative territorial arrangements. Moreover, by bundling together the various levels of territoriality, Ruggie also offers a vision for “unbundling” it83—a vision that might help imagine a post-colonial settler society.

Two lessons can be drawn from Ruggie’s theory of unbundled territoriality.

First, “The terrain of unbundled territoriality … is the place wherein a rearticulation of international political space would be occurring today.”84 In other words, participation in transnational spheres of political organization that are not tied to territory of any kind help produce alternative models that might replace Westphalian statehood.

This lesson supports the tactics of transnational Indigenous movements like Idle No More which join in solidarity with Indigenous peoples worldwide in a way that subverts and rejects domestic political institutions. Yet, because Ruggie’s model was not designed for Indigenous nations with personalistic political communities and corresponding traditional territories, we must add a second conclusion that specifically addresses the radical state transcendent strategy of “being Indigenous.”85 Alfred and Corntassel suggest that practicing indigeneity, or “being Indigenous,” encourages the decolonization of Indigenous peoples from within.86 It also has the potential to revitalize political communities that are fundamentally opposed to the mutually exclusive territorial power of Westphalian statehood. Being Indigenous embraces no state, and while it embraces a deep respect and relationship with the land, it does not see the land as something that can be privately owned or exclusively claimed.

Thus, being Indigenous is not only a practice of resurgence, but a living alternative to Westphalian understandings of territory, authority, and community. Being Indigenous is both a means and an end. Enacting and reclaiming sovereignty from below challenges the norms of mutual exclusivity as by embracing unbundled territory, political selfdetermination, and cultural expression as praxis.

82

Ibid., 149.

83

Ibid., 171.

84 Ibid.

85

Alfred and Corntassel, Being Indigenous.

86 Ibid.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

34

The Goddess of Democracy

MEMORIALIZATION AS A FORM OF POLITICAL PROTEST JULIE SAGRAM

In 1991, on the eve of the second anniversary of the Tiananmen Square

Massacre, a woman made of white marble dust was put on display at the campus of the University of British Columbia (UBC). Bestowed the title of Goddess of Democracy, she commemorates the many lives lost during the Tiananmen Massacre on June 4, 1989.

Her arrival was met with a ceremony of three hundred people who wished to witness the erection of this symbolic monument, which continues to stand today “in memory of those who died.”1 It is evident through her history, however, that this statue is not solely a memorial; it serves as a politicized object designed to represent the ongoing protest against the oppression of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Goddess symbolizes the liberal revolutionary ideals that were crushed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on June 4, while standing in defiance against the government-imposed silence, censorship and collective amnesia that characterize the legacy of this event in China. In the parts of the world where the memory of the massacre has not been banned but deemed necessary, this statue has been replicated as an expression of hope for China’s democratization. This paper will explore the political role and international significance of the Goddess of Democracy by chronicling the Goddess’ history, examining her international imitations, and discussing how her political connotations spill over in both domestic and international spheres.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The original Goddess of Democracy was created during the Tiananmen Square

protests, a transformative series of pro-democratic protests in 1989 activating against government corruption and social inequality. These protests erupted under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who came into power following Chairman Mao’s death 1

See UBC Goddess of Democracy plaque.

35

SAGRAM

in 1976, ushering China into an era of Gaige Kaifang (Reforms and Openness).2 As a result of these reforms, China became more exposed to the international arena, as demonstrated by Deng’s 1979 visit to the United States and its improved relations with Japan, and became less opposed to Western cultural influence, as indicated by the lifted ban on Western literature, art and film.3 The tide of Chinese politics seemed to be turning towards liberalization, which, after a long period of radical oppression under Mao, gave students and young workers hope for a brighter future. Under Deng, China was on the path to becoming a global superpower by the 21st century.4 Despite the promising ideals of the reforming CPC, inflation and social inequality undermined economic growth, leading to widespread frustration with government corruption, nepotism and incompetence.5 A growing portion of the population began calling for faster economic progress on a larger scale, demonstrating faith in the belief that further modernization through democratization was necessary to advance the country.

States undergoing modernization in hopes of gaining power and wealth often

view the West as a model. Imitating the political structure of Western nations to achieve their level of prosperity was an idea that emerged in China during the late 1800s, a time when a remedy for the nation’s relative weakness as a global power was in demand. This notion challenged traditional Chinese political thought based on Confucianism, which prioritizes the role of a benevolent ruler tasked with maintaining public order to ensure peace and productivity. The principles of democracy, which centre on individualism and equality, naturally come into conflict with the Confucian values of collectivism and hierarchy. Confucian scholars have, however, proposed a compromise.6 Likewise, the democratic movement in China advocated mostly for a form of Chinese democracy, one that remained within the broad framework of Marxism and Chinese political thought.7 It is difficult, to reconcile the disordered nature of individual freedom with the traditional Confucian value of harmony, which the CPC’s policies are based upon.

2

Donna Rouviere Anderson, Donna Rouviere, and Forrest Anderson, “Silenced Scream: A Visual History of the 1989 Tiananmen Protests,” Rouviere Media, 2009, 68.

3

Andrew Langley, Tiananmen Square: Massacre Crushes China’s Democracy Movement (Compass Point Books, 2009), 27.

4 Ibid.

5

William J. Duiker, Contemporary World History (Cengage Learning, 2014), 258.

6

Orville Schell, “Liang Qichao: China’s First Democrat,” in Discos and Democracy: China in the Throes of Reform (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).

7

“Chinese Democracy,” Tiananmen: The Gate of Heavenly Peace, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.tsquare.tv/themes/essay.html.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

36

Prior to the protests of 1989, Deng Xiaoping had already begun hardening his

stance against individual freedom to maintain stability. The government had instated laws against public demonstration in response to the Democracy Wall movement8 in 1978 and had increased the enforcement of existing laws after the pro-democracy protests of 1986.9 Student leaders of these movements were arrested and several highranking party officials were accused of “bourgeois liberalization.”10 Most significantly, General Secretary Hu Yaobang was dismissed in January 1987. Since Hu was seen as a hero to the democratic movement, removing him from government only served to increase political unrest.11 Hu’s sudden death in April 1989 provoked a wave of distress and grief great enough to attract a gathering at Tiananmen Square, initially as a centre for mourning.12 The gathering quickly grew into a full-scale demonstration due to an increase in anti-government sentiment, adding urgency to the protesters’ demands for freedom of speech, an end to corruption, and democratic elections.

By April 18 ten thousand protesters were involved; by April 22 that number had

grown to one hundred thousand.13 Less than a month later, an estimated one million people were present in Tiananmen Square. It was the largest political protest in China’s history.14 Despite its scale, the protest failed to persuade the political elite to consider negotiating possible government reform.15 While some protesters resorted to hunger strikes, many began to succumb to exhaustion.16 Towards the end of May, many had lost hope for democracy in China. On May 30, aiming to strengthen resolve, protesters confronted the portrait of Mao at Tiananmen Square with the erection of the Goddess in a face-off that would determine whether a people’s fight for democracy could defeat the long-standing, authoritarian Communist Party of China. 17 8

Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Harvard University Press, 2005), 49.

9

Yonghong Lu, China’s Legal Awakening Legal Theory and Criminal Justice in Deng’s Era (Hong Kong University Press, 1995), 276.

10

Junhao Hong, The Internationalization of Television in China: The Evolution of Ideology, Society, and Media Since the Reform (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998),

102.

11

Langley, “Tiananmen Square,” 30.

12

Teresa Wright, “Protest As Participation: China’s Local Protest Movements,” In Mobilizing Dissent: Local Protest, Global Audience (World Politics Review, 2013).

13

Langley, “Tiananmen Square,” 32-35.

14

“Timeline: Tiananmen Protests,” BBC News, 2 June 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27404764.

15

Kurt Schock, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Non-democracies (University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 101.

16

Orville Schell, Mandate of Heaven: The Legacy of Tiananmen Square and the Next Generation of China’s Leaders (Simon & Schuster, 1995), 128-129.

17

Ibid., 130.

37

SAGRAM

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

On May 27, in hopes of bolstering the movement, students of the Central

Academy of Fine Arts were hired to construct the Goddess of Democracy.18 Protesters believed that the symbolism of a female deity that alludes to Western folklore, the Roman Goddess of Liberty,19 would resonate with international supporters of the movement.

Her resemblance to the Statue of Liberty is indisputable and was deliberately used to appeal to an American audience.20 The torch, in particular, is a common symbol of enlightenment that “lights the way to freedom showing us the path to Liberty.”21

Although it was primarily an object of self-expression, the Goddess was also

intended to garner international sympathy; this proved to be an excellent way to put pressure on the Chinese government.22 The movement also received over one million US dollars’ worth of donations from the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and many other nations in support of Chinese democratization.23 While the protesters benefited from this international support, they were nonetheless careful to maintain a balance for fear of giving credence to the government’s theory that the protests were being orchestrated by the West. The statue was initially and most commonly referred to as the Goddess of Liberty due to her resemblance to the Statue of Liberty, but was eventually given the official title of Goddess of Democracy, a less explicit expression of American values.24

On May 30, she was officially welcomed to the square to the cheers and applause

of the protesters. The unveiling of the Goddess attracted significant attention and is credited with expanding the movement from ten thousand to hundreds of thousands

18

Scott Simmie, “The Goddess of Democracy’s Short but Enduring Life Began 25 Years Ago,” The Star, 27 May 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.thestar.

com/news/the_world_daily/2014/05/the_goddess_of_democracy_s_short_life_began_25_years_ago.html.

Jodi Dean, Cultural Studies & Political Theory (Cornell University Press, 2000), 169.

19

David Hackett Fischer, Liberty and Freedom: A Visual History of America’s Founding Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2005), 234.

20

Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014), 228.

21

United States National Park Service, “Frequently Asked Questions About the Statue of Liberty,” National Parks Service, 4 December 2014, accessed 28 February 2014,

http://www.nps.gov/stli/planyourvisit/get-the-facts.htm.

22

Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (JHU Press, 2013), 393.

23

Liang Zhang, Andrew J. Nathan, and Perry Link, The Tiananmen Papers (Public Affairs, 2008),334.

24

Orville Schell, The China Reader: The Reform Era (Vintage Books, 1999).

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

38

of square occupants.25 This papier-mâché, thirty-three-foot tall symbol of freedom and democracy inspired the crowd and led many protesters to announce their renewed determination.26 It is also likely that she succeeded in her mission to gain or at least maintain international sympathy. Western media took notice of her unveiling and the support for the cause continued.27 On the other hand, the Goddess of Democracy provoked a harsh response from the government. The statue was seen as an offense against the honor of the CPC, evinced by her confrontational position against Mao in the square, being “reviled … as desecration”.28

On June 4, soldiers were ordered to have the square cleared by 6:00 AM using

any means necessary to clear impediments.29 The Goddess of Democracy was a target and her fall would symbolize the irreversible destruction of the democratic movement in China.30 As one graduate student from the Central Academy of Fine Arts said, “The statue was made so that once assembled, it could not be taken apart again, but would have to be destroyed all at once.”31 The Chinese government viewed the protests in a similar way, and in a matter of hours the thousands of occupants of the square were forced out or otherwise killed by the PLA.32 The statue, the democratic movement, and many protesters were massacred in the early morning of June 4, 1989.

COLLECTIVE AMNESIA VS. MEMORY

Commemorating the Tiananmen Square Massacre is highly controversial, and

depending on which historical narrative one subscribes to, the Communist Party of China is to be either defended or condemned. Amid the uncertainty and disorder of the days following June 4, Chinese authorities popularized their own interpretation of the event, which classified the democratic protests as “counter-revolutionary riots” 25

George Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings: People Power in the Philippines, Burma, Tibet, China, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Thailand and Indonesia 1947-2009,

(PM Press, 2013), 158.

26

Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy Movement (Stanford University Press, 1998), 88.

27 Stoners, Transitions to Democracy, 393.

28

Chris Buckley, “The Rise and Fall of the Goddess of Democracy,” The New York Times, 1 June 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2014/06/01/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-goddess-of-democracy.

29

Roderick MacFarquhar, The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 457.

30 Fischer, Liberty and Freedom, 725.

31 Ibid.

32

“Timeline: Tiananmen Protests,” BBC News.

39

SAGRAM

that threatened China with a return to a state of chaos like that experienced during the Cultural Revolution.33 According to officials, the PLA had displayed great restraint and dignity in their actions and opened fire only in self-defense.34 These claims are highly contested. The preliminary death toll prepared by the Chinese government reported two hundred and forty-one dead, including twenty-three soldiers.35 Many witness testimonies estimate the death toll of protesters to be in the thousands.36 In the months following the massacre, the government halted the public retelling of the massacre, discouraging any public discussion of the “June Fourth Incident.” The authorities opted for a systematic process of forgetting, limiting information in education and media while closely monitoring citizens.37 Indeed, the Chinese government spends more on internal security than on national defense.38 Apart from the small handful of citizens attempting to revive the memory of Tiananmen, government efforts to repress its memory have largely been successful.39 In a nation where memory means defiance and the risk of imprisonment, compliance with national amnesia is the safest choice.

The massacre sparked public outrage in much of the world. Leading up to the

crackdown, Western media portrayed the protests as part of “a heroic struggle by ordinary freedom-loving people against the totalitarian might of the Chinese government.”40 The Tiananmen Square Massacre provoked serious criticism from the international community, and the United States and its allies dramatically decreased their official visits, foreign investment, and foreign lending with China.41 The commemoration of the victims of the massacre through construction of monuments is another significant way the Western world has expressed opprobrium, and the most prevalent form of memorial is the replication of the Goddess of Democracy.

33

Jeffrey Wasserstrom, “China’s June 4, 1989: Remembered — and Misremembered,” Time, 3 June 2010, accessed 28 February 2015, http://content.time.com/time/

world/article/0,8599,1994133,00.html.

34

Louisa Lim, The People’s Republic of Amnesia: Tiananmen Revisited (Oxford University Press, 2014), 94.

35

Ibid., 7.

36

Nicholas D. Kristof, and Sheryl WuDunn, Thunder from the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2000).

37

Louisa Lim, The People’s Republic of Amnesia, 208-211.

38

Ibid., 211.

39 Ibid.

40

P.R.R. White, “Evaluative Semantics and Ideological Positioning in Journalistic Discourse – a New Framework for Analysis.” In Mediating Ideology in Text and Image:

Ten Critical Studies (John Benjamins Publishing, 2006), 49.

41

Robert S. Ross, Allen S. Whiting, and Harry Harding, “China’s Foreign Relations After Tiananmen: Challenges for the US,” NBR Analysis, 1990, accessed 28 February

2015, http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=143.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

40

REPLICAS WORLDWIDE

Imitations of the Goddess were erected as memorials for the massacre

beginning as early as 1989. Replicas have appeared in Hong Kong and all across North America, including in Los Angeles (1989), San Francisco (1994), Arlington (1999), Washington (1989 and 2007), Vancouver (1991), Calgary (1995), and Toronto (1992 and 2012). Many of these replicas have attracted controversy, and emphasize the Goddess of Democracy’s significance as a highly politicized symbol. For example, the 1992 statue at York University in Toronto was reportedly removed without warning, with speculations linked to Chinese political pressure.42 The replica in Los Angeles was banned by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce from entering the Chinese New Year parade.43 Another replica was set to be constructed in Taiwan but the country’s president “bowed to political pressure from Mainland China” and canceled these plans.44 These instances of censorship and control reveal the fragility and insecurity of the Chinese government and indicate the Goddess’ ability to provoke political antagonism.

On June 12, 2007, a bronze replica was unveiled as a Victims of Communism

Memorial in Washington, DC. On her pedestal, two statements are inscribed: “To the more than one hundred million victims of communism and to those who love liberty” and “To the freedom and independence of all captive nations and peoples.”45 Former US President George Bush delivered an emblematic speech at the unveiling ceremony, ending with the words, “May those who continue to suffer under Communism find their freedom.”46 In response, the Chinese government accused the US of “defam[ing] China.”47 The writing that accompanies the statue, as well as the speech delivered by President Bush, demonstrate an unmistakable attempt to use the Goddess of Democracy as a public reminder of the dangers of communism while at the same time encouraging 42

Nicholas Keung, “What Happened to the Goddess of Democracy?,” The Star, 18 August 2011, accessed 28 February 2014, http://www.thestar.com/news/

gta/2011/08/18/what_happened_to_the_goddess_of_democracy.html.

43

Linda Chong, “No ‘Goddess’ for Chinese New Year Celebrants,” Los Angeles Times, 11 February 1990, accessed 28 February 2015, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-02-

11/local/me-1088_1_chinese-culture.

44

Xia Rong, Xiao, “Lawsuit Over Canceled Statue,” Radio Free Asia, 25 April 2012, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/

statue-04252012104711.html.

45

“The Memorial.” Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, accessed 28 February 2015, http://victimsofcommunism.org/initiative/the-memorial/.

46 Ibid.

47

Leora Falk, “D.C. Memorial Honors Victims of Communism,” The Spokesman-Review, 13 June 2007, accessed 28 February 2015, http://news.google.com/newspapers?

nid=1314&dat=20070613&id=HrsyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=SvMDAAAAIBAJ&pg=7070,679288.

41

SAGRAM

democracy abroad and defying the will of the CPC. Although the political dimension of the Goddess is not always so explicit, the same implications are present in every instance of her replication.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY AT UBC

The replica at the University of British Columbia was erected on June 3, 1991. The

artists, Joseph Caveno and Hung Chung, used white marble dust and epoxy to create this nine foot tall sculpture of the famous Goddess and modeled it after the replica in San Francisco.48 A ceremony of inauguration took place to welcome her arrival, which included speeches honouring the victims of CPC brutality and concluding with an expression of support for the continuation of the democratic movement in China.49

Unfortunately, monuments tend to lose their provocative nature over time

and become susceptible to invisibility. The familiarity that spectators develop with the object and the persistence and longevity of the monument itself result in a paradoxical mix of both commemoration and indifference.50 However, like the original and her other imitations, UBC’s statue has been the center of attention at certain momentous points in her life; it is precisely these moments that allow for a constructive dialogue between the Goddess and her spectators, resulting in a negotiated understanding of her symbolism. Monuments are like prisms that filter, clarify or distort memory, acting as mediums between the commemorated event and the spectator’s perception of it.51 Without an interested and informed audience, memorials designed to be political objects that urge the remembrance and relevance of a historical event can be rendered meaningless.52 The legacy of UBC’s Goddess of Democracy depends on her audience’s participation as active interpreters.

48

“Outdoor Art Tour,” Morris and Helen Belkin Art Gallery, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.belkin.ubc.ca/files/outdoor_long.pdf.

49

Liu Bing Ming, “The Unveiling Ceremony of the Goddess of Democracy Statue,” Carnegie Newsletter, 15 August 1990, accessed 28 February 2015, http://edocs.lib.sfu.

ca/projects/chodarr/carnegie_newsletters/1990-08-15.pdf#page=4.

50

Peter Carrier, Holocaust Monuments and National Memory Cultures in France and Germany since 1989: The Origins and Political Function of the Vél’ D’Hiv’ in Paris

and the Holocaust Monument in Berlin (Berghahn Books, 2005), 15.

51

Ibid., 32.

52

Ibid., 32.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

42

The Goddess first appeared in Vancouver at an art exhibition in August of 1989

that was held to commemorate the events of June 4. It was decided that this sculpture was worthy of public display as a memorial, provoking a community debate over which location would be most suitable.53 The Vancouver Society in Support of the Democratic Movement (VSSDM) argued that the Goddess should be placed in Vancouver’s Dr. Sun Yat-Sen Classical Chinese Garden, a garden named after the father of modern China.

The garden’s board of trustees disapproved, arguing that because the garden was “not a political forum, it would be inappropriate to display the statue.54 The CPC had donated more than $500,000 to the building of the garden, which caused speculation that the Chinese government had influenced the decision.55 Upon the failure of negotiations with the Vancouver Parks Board, the VSSDM approached the Alma Mater Society of UBC through the Chinese Student and Scholar Association, receiving a warm welcome.56

Once established at UBC, her presence continued to create debate among

members of the Chinese community in Vancouver. Some Chinese-Canadians agreed with Dongquing Wei, the president of the Federation of Chinese Student Scholars of Canada, who appreciated the statue as an expression of the “outrage of Chinese student scholars to the massacre” while supporting the endeavor to “protect human rights and promote the democratization of China.”57 In contrast, opponents of the statue felt offended and dismayed. The Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA) issued an open letter to the Chinese community in Vancouver’s Sing Tao Daily, describing the erection of the statue as a “dirty political act” and a “blatant interference with the affairs of another country.”58 The CBA has also expressed concern that it would “affect the peace of fellow Chinese and the prosperity and stability of Chinatown.”59 Former professor of Art History at UBC and witness to the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Hsingyuan Tsao, agrees that the statue does not serve a noble purpose, remarking that it “commemorates 53

Nicole Parton, “Goddess of Democracy a Hot Lady in Vancouver.” The Vancouver Sun, August 22, 1989.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56

Moira Farrow, “Tiananmen Statue site proposed: Society seeks UBC site for the replica of Tiananmen statue,” The Vancouver Sun, October 4, 1990.

57

Paul Abbott, “Goddess’ Position on Campus in Question,” Ubyssey, 21 September 1990, accessed 13 December 2014, http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/

compoundobject/collection/Ubysseynews/id/27758/rec/3.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

43

SAGRAM

a failed attempt at achieving what Canada already has.”60

Memorials can also be used in ways that differ dramatically from their intended

purpose, allowing them to take on new roles depending on the political intentions of the interpreters. For example, in February 1997 a series of student demonstrations against the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference used the Goddess of Democracy as a focal point of the protest. There was an absence of human rights issues on the conference agenda, and given that several members of APEC were leaders of oppressive regimes, the student opposition felt that UBC was hypocritical in welcoming these “human rights abusers, murderers, and dictators” to the campus.61 Protesters hung a sign around the Goddess’ neck, urging students to “Remember Tiananmen!

Remember East Timor! No to APEC at UBC! No Mass Murderers at UBC!” A new name was chalked out for her: The Goddess of Hypocrisy.62 In September she was vandalized with lipstick and eyeliner, “gagged,” “bound” and “taped up in plastic.”63 APEC protesters do not take responsibility for these acts, which were considered particularly outrageous.64 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the Goddess’ message was manipulated by some protesters. Her symbolism was altered to represent the memory of human rights abuses in Asia rather than the hope for democracy in China.

In October 2014, another group of activists took interest in the Goddess of

Democracy, decorating her with a yellow umbrella, ribbons, and flowers in support of the recent uprising in Hong Kong. Students stopped to take photos and admire her beauty in the new context of the Umbrella Revolution, allowing for a re-negotiation of her meaning by the community. Similar to the Tiananmen Square protests, in September 2014 citizens of Hong Kong protested against the authoritarianism of the Communist Party of China and demanded democratic rights in response to its refusal 60

Hsingyuan Tsao, “Interview by Thomas Friedenbach,” University of British Columbia, 7 April 2011 accessed 28 February 2015, https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=hsZftBLK2VQ.

Carrier, Holocaust Monuments and National Memory Cultures, 32.

61

Nicole Capler, “Democracy Bound and Gagged at UBC,” Ubyssey, 8 April 1997, accessed 28 February 2015, http://digitalcollections.library.ubc.ca/cdm/

compoundobject/collection/Ubysseynews/id/31518/rec/1.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

THE GODDESS OF DEMOCRACY

44

to allow Hong Kong citizens to choose their own Chief Executive candidates, despite their agreement to preserve the independent political system of Hong Kong prior to its transfer of sovereignty.65 While the Umbrella Revolution did not end in bloodshed, supporters of the Umbrella Revolution in Mainland China have been censored and imprisoned and the protesters in Hong Kong have been forced to give up their fight.

Not unlike the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, participants in these events expect to experience intimidation and increased supervision from Chinese authorities.66 Nevertheless, the hope for democracy in Hong Kong and Mainland China lives on, and may provoke future unrest due to increased levels of oppression, control, and censorship in their citizens’ everyday lives.

CONCLUSION

The Czech writer Milan Kundera once wrote, “The struggle of man against

power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.”67 This holds true in the case of the Chinese people’s struggle against the power of the CPC, which is characterized largely by refusing to forget the events of June 4, 1989, as well as the many “little Tiananmens” that occur on a daily basis.68 The key to maintaining the Goddess of Democracy’s function as a generator of historical consciousness is to encourage debate about her political significance and relevance today. As long as the Goddess of Democracy occasionally arises as a focal point of dialogue, she will remain a strong symbolic figure that stands on the campus of UBC–not only as a reminder of the massacre and its victims, but as a symbol of the unresolved conflict between the persistence of authoritarianism in China and supporters of the democratic movement worldwide. In China, the painful memory of the Tiananmen Square Massacre is a wound that has been bandaged with amnesia.

The Goddess of Democracy is a powerful piece of commemorative art with the ability to remedy the indifference towards an increasingly forgotten event that has not only transformed Chinese politics, but the lives of those silenced after the June 4 protests.

65

“Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate, “ BBC News, 7 October 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-27921954.

66

Lucy Westscott, “Photos: Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Protest Site Dismantled,” Newsweek, December 12, 2014.

67

Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 4. .

68 Lim, People’s Republic of Amnesia, 173.

QUESTIONING THE RHETORIC

46

Questioning the Rhetoric

WILL AMERICAN LNG CURB RUSSIA’S GAS GRIP ON EUROPE? ZAK JACQUES

The current Russia-Ukraine conflict has exposed the European Union’s (EU)

reliance on Russian natural gas. This has brought a new focus on how the conflict may threaten the region’s energy security if Russia decides to ignore contractual obligations and temporarily shut off supplies to Europe. With fears of reliving the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, studies have been undertaken by the European Commission modeling how another crisis might play out and affect the EU. The answers are alarming, particularly for those countries in the Baltic region and Southeastern Europe that are highly dependent on Russian gas.1 In response, abundant rhetoric from parties within the EU and the United States (US) has hypothesized that the American shale gas revolution will provide a solution to this problem.2 By replacing Russian gas with a more reliable and friendly source from the US, Europe will be able to successfully wean itself off Russia’s gas grip.3

This paper discusses whether American liquefied natural gas (LNG) can be

the answer to European energy security. The paper focuses solely on the possibility of American LNG exports to Europe in the short-term (up to the year 2020), because the Russia-Ukraine crisis poses immediate, short-term challenges. Moreover, solutions to address Europe’s energy security problems are being addressed in the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies, which concentrates on reducing dependence on energy imports by increasing the amount of renewables into Europe’s energy mix, and

1

European Commission, “Gas Stress Test: Cooperation is key to cope with supply interruption,” Press Release, October 16, 2014.

2

For example, “The ability to turn the tables and put the Russian leader in check lies right beneath our feet, in form of vast supplies of natural energy,” US House of

Representatives Speaker John Boehner, from his op ed “Counter Putin by Liberating US Natural Gas,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2014; “Today, the US has the leverage

to liberate our allies from Russia’s stranglehold on the European natural-gas market,” US Sens John McCain and John Hoeven, from their op ed “Putting Americas

Energy Leverage to Use,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2014.

3

Nick Cunningham, “Can U.S. LNG Break Russia’s Gas Grip on Europe?” Oil Price, February 23, 2014; Michael Ranter et al, “Europe’s Energy Security: Options and

Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification,” Congressional Research Service, August 2013, 1-3.

47

JACQUES

decreasing energy demand through efficiency measures.4 I will argue that in this time frame American LNG is not a viable answer for European security due to two roadblocks.

First, a lack of import and export infrastructure on both continents;5 and second, a higher offloading price6 in Asia that make countries like Japan, Korea, and China more lucrative markets for American LNG exports than Europe.7 While it is possible to overcome many of these challenges in the long-term, and while American LNG export to the EU is feasible, this paper concludes that Europe is already on a path to achieving energy security via the renewable energy and efficiency commitments made in the 2030 Framework for Climate Change and Energy Policies and the contracts individual states are making to import natural gas from closer suppliers.8

SETTING THE STAGE

EUROPE’S RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN GAS

Since the breakup of USSR and the integration of the former Soviet states into

Europe, the region has become increasingly dependent on natural gas supplied from Russia’s state-owned Gazprom, which accounts for 32% of all EU natural gas imports.9 Regional variations are vast amongst member states; however, the states of Western Europe are largely independent of Russian gas. In stark contrast, three regions within Europe have a high dependency on Russian natural gas: the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland) rely solely on Russian gas to meet their demands, while countries in Central Europe (Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) and Southeastern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece) import a significant majority of their natural gas from Russia.10

4

European Commission, “2030 framework for climate and energy policies,” October 23, 2014.

5

Jason Bordoff and Trevor Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue?: The Impact of US LNG Exports on European Security and Russian Foreign Policy,” Centre on Global

Energy Policy, September, 2014, 25-30.

6

Offloading price is the price that LNG importers pay for the resource once it is shipped to their country. It is expressed as $US / mmbtu.

7

Kenneth Medlock, “Natural Gas Price in Asia: What to Expect and What it Means,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, February, 2014.

Other roadblocks exist and have been explored in the literature, particularly contractual obligations that lock-in both Gazprom and states to their contracts out of

fear of costly international arbitration: Dickel, Ralf et al., “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing Natural Gas Security from Geopolitics.”

The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 92, 2014, 3-9.

8

European Commission, “2030 framework for climate and energy policies,” Brussels: European Commission Press Release, October 23, 2014.

9 Ibid.

10

British Petroleum, “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013,” 2014, 28

QUESTIONING THE RHETORIC

48

Given the regional differences among European states and their dependencies

on Russian gas, those most dependent on the resource will bear the brunt of any cutoff initially, but given the depth of regional integration in Europe, any large-scale cutoff will have implications for the entire region. This occurred for a brief period from January 1 to January 6, 2006, when Gazprom stopped supply to Europe via pipelines in Ukraine that were transporting 80% of Russia’s gas exports to Europe.11 The impact of this stoppage on European countries was immediate; Hungary lost up to 40% of its gas supply; Austrian, Slovak, and Romanian supplies were down by a third; and France and Italy around 25%.12 A similar crisis unfolded in January 2009 when Gazprom ceased supply to Europe through Ukraine, once again over price disputes. This crisis lasted fourteen days and the economic consequences for Europe were even greater than during the 2006 crisis.13 The current conflict between Russia and the Ukraine has, again, resulted in Russia cutting off supplies to Ukraine. While supplies to the rest of Europe continue via Ukrainian pipelines, the European Union fears Russia may stop supplying to the rest of the region.14 Given the volatility of the situation and fears that history might repeat itself, the European Union has conducted stress-tests to see what will unfold if Russia decides to stop providing gas, a threat it has made if Ukraine attempts to siphon or store any of the natural gas running through its borders.15

THE RESULTS OF EUROPEAN STRESS TESTS

Undertaken in October 2014, these stress tests modeled what would happen

if Gazprom cut supplies of natural gas to the EU in the upcoming winter season. The findings are similar to the previous crises of 2006 and 2009, and reveal that the region still relies heavily on Russia for its natural gas.16 The study acknowledges that since the 2009 crisis, measures have been taken for the region to wean itself off dependency on Russian gas, but Ukraine remains the primary conduit for Russian natural gas to Europe.17 Separating the region into three areas, and modeling for a worst case scenario 11

Jonathan Stern, “The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006,” The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006, 3.

12

Ibid., 8.

13

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 14.

14

Ibid., 14.

15

Ibid., 16.

16

European Commission, “Gas Stress Test.”

17

European Commission, “Short Term Resilience,” 3-5.

49

JACQUES

(a six month supply cut-off, a two week winter cold spell during this disruption, and minimum coordination to alleviate pressure and direct natural gas to regions that need it most), the study found that the areas most dependent on Russian natural gas will be the most affected, but the economic downturn that ensues will spill over to many parts of Europe.18

The areas that will be affected are the Southeastern and Baltic states. Moreover,

even if these states cooperate, a scenario that the EU acknowledges may not occur due to the lack of a legal framework, the region does not have the necessary spare natural gas capacity and infrastructure to mitigate these severe supply disruptions.19 The report concludes that further coordination is needed among states in these regions, and provides a sobering analysis of the current extent to which the region depends on Russia as an energy supplier. It has prompted questions about energy security in the future, with many looking to the US as the answer to the current security dilemma.

THE CALL FOR AMERICAN LNG AND SHORT TERM ROADBLOCKS

The current shale gas revolution unfolding in the US has led many high-ranking

government officials in Washington to push for LNG exports to Europe. For example, US House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal;20 US Senator John Barrasso published a statement on his website;21 and US Senators John McCain and John Hoeven also expressed their opinions in the Wall Street Journal.22 These statements, along with many others, all fail to recognize the underlying roadblocks that prevent LNG shipments from America from arriving at European shores in the short term (by 2020).23 What follows is an outline of some of these complexities that indicate why US LNG is not a short-term solution to the current energy dilemma facing Europe.

18

Ibid., 26.

19

Ibid., 19.

20

John Boehner, “Counter Putin by Liberating U.S. Natural Gas,” Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/

SB10001424052702303824204579421 024172546260.

21

John Barrasso, Statement on his website, Washington, DC.

22

John McCain and John Hoeven, “Putting America’s Energy Leverage to Use,” Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2014, accessed 28 February 2015, http://www.wsj.com/

articles/john-hoeven-and-john-mccain-putting-americas-energy-leverage-to-use-1406590261.

23

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 6.

QUESTIONING THE RHETORIC

50

ROADBLOCK 1: IMPORT AND EXPORT CAPACITY IN THE EU AND UNITED STATES

To begin with, it is necessary to assess whether the US has the infrastructure

to export its natural gas, and whether Europe has the infrastructure to both receive and transport this gas throughout the continent. In other words, does the US have the infrastructural capacity in place to export, liquefy, and ship shale gas by 2020? The short answer is no.24 While the exporting capacity looks promising and the current project approvals put the country on a path to surpass Qatar in becoming the world’s leading exporter of LNG, there are significant lags between project approval, construction, and exporting.25 As of July 2014, the Department of Energy (DOE) has approved 34 of the 43 proposed terminal projects, with only one of these projects expected to begin exporting in late 2015, and the second estimated for 2019.26 Moreover, more than 50% of these approved projects are waiting for final investment decisions before construction begins, and combining this with the five-year lead-time for construction, additional projects are not expected to export until 2020, at the earliest.27

Let me turn to the second question: does Europe have the infrastructure to

import American LNG? The situation looks more promising due to the under-utilized import infrastructure, for example, the regasification ports in Europe. However, when the placement of current import facilities and the lack of pipeline infrastructure to connect these destination points are taken into consideration, the answer is no.

A significant gap exists between Europe’s LNG import capacity and the actual

amount of LNG imported into the region. From 2007 to 2013 European LNG import capacity increased from 13 billion cubic feet per day to 20 billion cubic feet per day.

In conjunction, actual imports to the continent during this period decreased from a record high of a 48% utilization rate of the potential import capacity to a 23% rate, which is roughly 4 billion cubic feet of LNG per day. The reason for this is threefold: 24

Ibid., 9-11; Dickel, “Reducing European Dependence,” 29-33; Ranter, “Europe’s Energy Security,” 27.

25

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 11.

26

Dickel, “Reducing European Dependence,” 31.

27

Ibid., 30.

51

JACQUES

the demand for gas in Europea remains stagnant as cheaper coal and subsidized renewables are used for electricity generation; the collapse of the European carbon prices has allowed for a resurgence of cheaper coal use; and higher regional prices in Asia and Latin America have pulled away LNG shipments once destined for Europe.28 In addition, even if US LNG from the planned export terminals meet this added capacity, it would go to where the current regasification terminals exist: Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.29 These offloading destinations for American LNG present significant problems because the infrastructure and regulatory framework is not in place to guarantee the resource will reach all the areas in Europe that need it most. While the states of Southeastern Europe could receive LNG, the landlocked central European states remain disconnected.30 Connecting these states to LNG import facilities would require massive investments in pipeline infrastructure and compliance amongst member states to allow for gas to pass through their borders—a difficult project given the many stakeholders involved and their interests in securing their own natural gas supplies.31 Even if these infrastructural constraints can be overcome in the short-term, which seems very unlikely, the recent regional price differences for natural gas around the world and forecasted demand projections in Asia, make the region a more valuable market for American exports.32

ROADBLOCK 2: HIGHER NATURAL GAS PRICES IN ASIA AND GROWING DEMAND

Table 1 shows gas and LNG prices for various regions around the world. The

consequences of these price differences in the short-term will be very important for determining how much US LNG makes it to global markets and where it will go. Up until August 2014, the US price was the lowest of all regional prices, trading at $4.00/ mmbtu. This is due to the shale gas revolution in the US, and the fact that this market

28

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 23.

29

Thierry Deschuyteneer, “LNG import potential to Europe,” Ifri Energy Roundtable Presentation in Brussels, Belgium, 2014.

30 Ibid.

31

European Commission, “Gas Stress Test,” 56.

32

Medlock, “Natural Gas Price in Asia.”

QUESTIONING THE RHETORIC

52

Table 1: Select Average Regional Gas Prices from 2010-2015.

NATURAL GAS PRICES - US DOLLARS PER MILLION BRITISH THERMAL UNITS ($ / MMBTU) REGION

Jan, 2010

Aug, 2014

Jan, 2015

Asia Spot LNG

$6.50 / mmbtu

$16.50 / mmbtu

$8.00 / mmbtu

Europe Natural Gas

$6.90 / mmbtu

$10.50 / mmbtu

$6.80 / mmbtu

US Natural Gas (Henry Hub)

$6.30 / mmbtu

$4.00 / mmbtu

$2.95 / mmbtu

Source: Ralf Dickel et al., 2014, Thomson Reuters

remains disconnected from other regional natural gas markets because of the limited export capacity of the US.33 Following the US, European prices are the next cheapest, averaging at $10.50/mmbtu largely determined by contracts between European states and Gazprom.34 Asian prices are the highest among regional markets, averaging around $16.50/mmbtu.

It should be noted that the price for Asian LNG increased during this period

because of the Fukushima disaster in Japan, which shut down the majority of its nuclear fleet for electricity generation, leading to a significant increase in LNG imports to meet the supply and demand gap that existed immediately following the natural disaster.35 Unlike the American and European regional markets, the natural gas market in Asia continues to be price-indexed to oil, and while the price of international crude oil remains high, so does the price of natural gas in the region.36 However, when oil prices collapsed by more than 50% from September 2014 to January 2015, the price of natural gas in Asia also collapsed to their current level of $8.00/mmbtu. If the low price of oil endures and the pricing structure for Asian natural gas remains stable, the number of American LNG shipments to the region will be limited. But, as Asian demand for the resource continues to outpace all other regions around the globe, it still presents the most lucrative market for American LNG companies.37

33

Ibid., 7.

34

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 20.

35

Medlock, “Natural Gas Price in Asia,” 4.

36

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 25.

37

Warner ten Kate et al., “Developing a Natural Gas Trading Hub in Asia,” International Energy Agency, 2013, 7.

53

​

JACQUES

For American LNG project developers, whose main interest is securing higher

profits and increased market share, Asia is the more economically viable market when compared to Europe. Not only is there a higher price, but there is also a growing demand for their product that secures exports in the long-term in flexible pricing contracts.38 Moreover, shipping American LNG to Europe may prove uneconomic in many cases if prices remain low and other factors are taken into consideration. For example, when two regional markets connect, prices converge, and this will shrink the current price gap between the European and US markets. The extra costs of liquefaction, shipping, and regasification that add anywhere from $2.00/mmbtu to $4.00/mmbtu to the price of LNG also presents a significant hurdle.39 Most importantly, Russia holds significant market power over the European natural gas market and has the flexibility to undercut prices to maintain market share.40

Lastly, the possibility of American LNG as a strategic tool to undermine Russia’s

grip on Europe is misplaced. The market in the United States differs fundamentally from other major natural gas and LNG exporters, because it is composed solely of private companies. Other major natural gas and LNG exporters—such as Qatar, Norway, and Russia—have state-controlled companies with market monopolies, allowing for greater influence in determining where their exports go, thus making it easier for their hydrocarbons to be used as political leverage.41 The American government has very little influence in deciding where LNG exports go, and their influence is limited to the approval process undertaken by the DOE. Indeed, a look at the current approved exporting licenses shows that the majority of planned exports will be going to Asia.

More than half of long-term contracts are signed with large Asian utility companies, such as Japan’s Osaka Gas and Korea’s Kogas.42 In comparison, only a fraction US LNG will reach Europe, and the contractual obligations of these deals ensure that the LNG supply will stay in their offloading countries: the UK and Spain.43 38

Dickel, “Reducing European Dependence,” 40.

39

Ibid., 33.

40

Ibid., 40-43.

41

Ibid., 12.

42

Bordoff and Houser, “American Gas to the Rescue,” 23.

43 Ibid.

QUESTIONING THE RHETORIC

54

LOOKING FORWARD

American LNG is not a short-term solution to Europe’s reliance on Russian

natural gas. The lack of infrastructure in place on both continents is a major roadblock, and an increasing demand coupled with the potential of a higher offloading price in Asia attracts American companies. The possibility of enough US LNG arriving to Europe to immediately undercut Russia’s influence is unrealistic, and those looking at the US to act as Europe’s saviour engage in wishful thinking. However, this does not mean that the region will be unable to wean itself further off its dependency on Russian gas.

Several events are currently unfolding that will help enhance European energy security.

The most significant of these developments, at least in the short-term, is that those states dependent on Russian gas are looking towards alternative natural gas suppliers closer to home. For example, the Baltic states are looking to Norway’s Statoil as a potential supplier. Lithuania recently completed the construction of an import terminal that will guarantee LNG to meet all of the state’s demand starting in late 2015. This terminal also has the capacity to meet 90% of Latvia and Estonia’s current demand for natural gas, but deliveries to these states will only begin when their contracts with Gazprom end in the next 19 months.44 Moreover, Finland has started similar projects with Statoil to wean itself off Russian natural gas once contracts expire.45

Some European states are looking at exploiting their own unconventional natural

gas resources, which will increase regional supply and reduce imports from Russia.46 Some uncertainty lingers on how much of the proven reserves will be exploited due to local opposition about the dangers of hydraulic fracking and the unsubstantiated legal framework to regulate drilling and environmental oversight at the EU level.47 England and Poland provide good examples of this; both countries have well-known recoverable reserves, and there have been significant efforts by their governments and industries to kick-start unconventional production. Companies, so far, have yet to gain the necessary social license to operate to have any significant impact on natural gas production.48 If 44

Keith Johnson, “Lithuania Cheers ‘Independence’,” Foreign Policy, October 27, 2014.

45 Ibid.

46

Adreas Goldthau, “The Politics of Natural Gas Development in the European Union,” James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, October 2014, 6.

47

Ibid., 6-8.

48

Ibid., 10.

55

JACQUES

these hurdles can be overcome, which is questionable, this presents another chance for states to reduce import dependency on Gazprom.

To achieve long-term energy security, Europe is looking for local solutions with

the signing of the 2030 Framework for Climate Change and Energy Policies. After lengthy negotiations, the EU settled on three targets that will help enhance energy security: a 40% decrease in carbon emissions; an increase in the proportion of renewables of all European energy supplies to 27%; and an increase in energy efficiency to 27%.49 Introducing renewable sources of energy and increasing the overall efficiency of energy use in an economy brings significant security benefits.50 While it will be dependent on where the actual energy change occurs, i.e. which states transform their energy systems for the EU to meet these targets, to fully understand how these commitments will improve Europe’s energy security, the potential benefits are well known. Increasing efficiency will reduce the overall energy use in Europe, which has the potential of reducing energy imports and reduce the risk of supply disruptions.51 Renewable sources of energy, particularly those being developed in the region, take the form of small-scale ways to produce electricity, which also brings significant security benefits. Onshore and offshore wind farms, solar, and small hydropower stations are all forms of energy that produce electricity domestically and close to where they are needed. When backed with the correct monitoring, integration, and storage technologies to deal with intermittency problems, renewable resources will reduce imports and the risk of supply disruptions.52

49

European Commission, “2030 framework.”

50

Samantha Olz et al., “Contribution of Renewables to Energy Security,” International Energy Agency, April, 2007, 7-12.

51 Ibid.

52

Ibid., 30.

TAKING OFF THE FACEMASK

56

Taking Off the Facemask

SECURITIZING THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN HAZE JUSTIN YEE

The Malaysian government had just declared a state of emergency in the

southern regions of the country. Most of the west coast had been enveloped in what looked like a thick fog; except the reality was worse. The use of a facemask was a constant necessity everywhere one went, as the alternative was to suffer the choking effects of the Haze, even whilst indoors. Such was the reality of the June 2013 Haze episode in Southeast Asia, the region’s worst case of air pollution in decades.1

For more than twenty-five years, the region of Southeast Asia has faced a

recurring environmental disaster of air pollution induced by forest and crop burning practices.2 This is largely attributed to the practice of ‘slash-and-burn’ land clearing by traditional cultivators and large corporations in the Indonesian provinces of Kalimantan and Sumatra, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia’s Borneo.3 The occurrence of severe dry spells in the middle of the year brought about by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon further exacerbate the fires, as peat swamps dry up and are set ablaze as well. Strong northbound winds then carry the smoke particles, commonly known as the Haze, and spread it throughout the country and its regional neighbours.

The effects of the Haze are felt in numerous ways, from environmental degradation to economic decline. On a global scale, the 1994 Haze is estimated to have added 171 million tons of carbon to the atmosphere.4 Studies have shown that the 1997-1998 Haze witnessed the destruction of 4 million hectares of forested land in Kalimantan alone.5 1

Raghu Betha, Sailesh N. Behera, and Rajasekhar Balasubramanian, “2013 Southeast Asian Smoke Haze: Fractionation of Particulate-Bound Elements and Associated

Health Risk,” Environmental Science and Technology 38.8, 2014, 4333.

2

David Jones, “ASEAN and Transboundary Haze Pollution in Southeast Asia,” Asia Europe Journal 4.3, 2006, 432.

3

Euston Quah and Douglas Johnston, “Forest Fires and Environmental Haze in Southeast Asia: Using the ‘Stakeholder’ Approach to Assign Costs and

Responsibilities,” Journal of Environmental Management 63, 2001, 182.

4

Janet Nichol, “Bioclimatic Impacts of the 1994 Smoke Haze Event in Southeast Asia,” Atmospheric Environment 31.8, 1997, 1213.

5

James Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia: Challenging the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement,” Pacific Affairs 72.3, 1999, 332.

57

YEE

Midday visibility in affected regions was reduced to a few meters, restricting all forms of outdoor activity. In fact, a lack of visibility due to the Haze in 1997 was cited as the main cause for the crash of an Indonesian airliner, killing all 234 passengers and crew members onboard.6 The economic loss to Singapore alone due to the 1997 Haze was an estimated USD 163.5 to 286.2 million, with the tourism sector taking the largest hit.7 Perhaps the most detrimental outcome of the Haze is its effect on human health. In his research into the effects of the 1997 Haze on Brunei, Odihi found a significant increase in reported cases of asthma attacks, headaches, conjunctivitis, skin rashes, and other pollutant-related health problems during the event.8

In an attempt to solve this transnational crisis, members of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP) in November 2002.9 According to the Agreement, its objectives are “to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution … through concerted efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation.”10 However, Indonesia, as the main source of the annual Haze, resisted ratification of the ATHP domestically for more than a decade despite the ratification by all nine other ASEAN members. It was only recently, on 16 September 2014, amidst strong regional pressure, that the bill was passed by Indonesia’s Parliament. Its impact on future Haze events, however, remains to be seen. The Haze has thus been cited as the region’s “greatest internal challenge since … Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979.”11 As presented, this annual natural destruction results in huge costs to the global environment, regional stability, and individual health.

The question that needs to be addressed then is why the Haze has persisted

and even grown in intensity over the decades. This article seeks to answer that question by arguing that the continued occurrence of annual Haze events is due to Indonesia’s 6

Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia,” 333.

7

Quah and Johnston, “Forest Fires,” 181-182.

8

John Onu Odihi, “Haze in Southeast Asia: Needed Local Actions for a Regional Problem,” Pure and Applied Geophysics 160, 2003, 213.

9

ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,” 2002.

10

Ibid., 4.

11

Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia,” 348.

TAKING OFF THE FACEMASK

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non-compliance, Indonesia’s fragmented bureaucracy, and the lack of resource contribution towards a long-term solution. In response to these factors, securitization theory provides a useful tool for policymakers to reframe the Haze as a security issue.

Positioning air pollution within the realm of security is necessary, as “a full account of the complexity and centrality of environmental issues in the twenty-first century cannot distance itself from the security considerations it necessarily invokes.”12

This article therefore employs the Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory

as well as Rita Floyd’s extension of the theory’s normative application to analyze a regional securitization of the Haze.13 A securitization framework anticipates greater regional and international pressure on Indonesia, improved enforcement by Indonesian federal agencies, and increased commitment of resources to a long-term solution. To do so, Section 1 of this paper addresses the factors that cause the repetition of Haze events. Section 2 then provides an overview of securitization theory and how the Haze could be viewed through such a lens. Section 3 demonstrates how securitization can fundamentally impact the causal factors and bring about the above-stated results.

CAUSES FOR CONTINUITY

ASEAN’S FAILURE TO PROCURE INDONESIA’S COMPLIANCE

ASEAN’s performance on the Haze has demonstrated a systemic failure in the

organization’s response to cross-boundary threats. Its main tool to combat the Haze, the ATHP, was born out of negotiations from the Regional Haze Action Plan and was signed by all ten members in November 2002.14 Once ratified, the legally binding international treaty was expected to assist members in preventing, monitoring, and ultimately mitigating transboundary Haze pollution.15 Its key provisions include the creation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (henceforth known as the ASEAN Centre), the issuing of Joint Emergency Response 12

Hugh Dyer, “Environmental Security and International Relations: The Case for Enclosure,” Review of International Studies 27.3, 2001, 446.

13

See Rita Floyd, “Can Securitization Theory be used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory,” Security Dialogue 42. 4-5, 2011, 427-439; and

O. Wæver, ‘Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New Schools in Security Theory and the Origins between Core and Periphery,’ presented at the International Studies

Association Conference, Montreal, March 2004, cited in Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” Journal of International Relations and

Development 9, 2006, 53-61.

14

ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Agreement.”

15 Ibid.

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protocols to allow members to participate in fire-fighting efforts, and provisions for technical cooperation and scientific research.16

An examination of the ATHP shows that ASEAN’s response to the Haze

has been based on the “ASEAN Way” approach to regionalism. The ASEAN Way, as defined by Nguitragool, is “a set of regional norms and a code of diplomatic conduct characterized by the principles of non-interference, consultation, consensus, quiet diplomacy, symbolism, and organizational minimalism.”17 This approach has allowed states to act in their national interest, as opposed to collective regional interests, due to the absence of strong diplomatic tools available to elicit cooperation.18 As a result, instead of applying significant pressure on Indonesia to take firm measures against corporations and individuals involved in the forest fires, member states were instead more concerned about “the maintenance of the status quo, where well-connected elites could continue to clear land using fire.”19 In other words, the adherence to norms of non-interference and consensus-seeking restricted affected member states from addressing issues of patronage politics and regional enforcement of the ATHP. Instead, the treaty was designed to be “vague and lacking in various hard-law instruments such as strong dispute-resolution and enforcement mechanisms” so as to allow states to ignore unfavorable provisions.20 Indonesia was therefore able to delay ratification of the treaty until recently since there was insufficient pressure for it to do so. A consequence of Indonesia’s non-ratification was the nulling of the Emergency Response provision which would allow neighbouring states to “activate fire-fighting services and move in, without having to write into the receiving government to get diplomatic clearance.”21 In addition, the ASEAN Centre along with its dedicated secretariat could not be established, forcing the ASEAN Secretariat to perform monitoring roles instead.22 These setbacks show the failure of the ATHP and ASEAN in mitigating the Haze.

16 Ibid.

17

Paruedee Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty” Asian Survey 51.2, 2011, 357.

18

Helena Varkkey, “Regional Cooperation, Patronage and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,” International Environmental Agreements 14, 2014,

66.

19 Ibid.

20

Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 357.

21

Varkkey, “Regional Cooperation,” 76.

22

Ibid., 77.

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INDONESIA’S FRAGMENTED BUREAUCRACY

Aside from weak external pressure, Indonesia’s domestic politics serve as an

impediment to any effective solution to the Haze. In reality, what Indonesia lacks are not legal instruments against the slash-and-burn practices or strong environmental and land-use statutes; rather, “the problem lies in their application and enforcement.”23 This is caused in large part by the fragmented nature of bureaucratic agencies in the country. Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment (MoE) holds the mandate to negotiate international environmental treaties and as such was the main actor in the ATHP negotiations. However, at the domestic level, MoE officials “barely wield decisionmaking authority over land and forest policy … nor do they have the power to enforce domestic laws on land and forest fires.”24 Instead, the power to enforce laws on the prevention of forest and plantation fires lies within the prerogatives of the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Agriculture.25 These ministries are in turn beholden to “powerful private interests that feel threatened by environmental protection policies.”26

To further complicate enforcement measures, there exists a divide of powers

and motivations between federal agencies and local councils. Legacies of the postSuharto regime, the Regional Autonomy (1999) and Fiscal Decentralization (1999) Acts empowered local administrations to issue permits for forest resource exploration.27 This has resulted in the prevalence of “government-sponsored and/or protected projects and schemes” that are often the very culprits of “large-scale fire and land clearing activities,”28 leading to fears among local authorities that the presence of foreign firefighters and monitors will expose their illegal practices.29 In response, agricultural interest groups with close personal relationships to lawmakers lobbied to prevent the ratification of the ATHP and similar laws.30 An effective solution to the Haze would therefore have to address the fragmented nature of Indonesia’s bureaucracy.

23

Quah and Johnston, “Forest Fires,” 184.

24

Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 372.

25

Ibid., 373.

26

Quah and Johnston, “Forest Fires,” 186.

27

Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 373.

28

Quah and Johnston, “Forest Fires,” 186.

29

Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 375.

30

Varkkey, “Regional Cooperation,” 74.

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LACK OF RESOURCES

While the region struggles to implement short-term measures to mitigate the

Haze, whether through the sharing of firefighting resources or satellite data to monitor fires, there is simultaneously a lack of priority towards a long-term solution for the problem. Enhanced firefighting and monitoring skills would certainly help prevent the spread of plantation and forest fires, but they have little impact on the systemic problem of individuals and corporations burning biomass.31 Instead, what is needed is a channeling of resources towards long-term programs that target the root causes of the Haze, namely a society apathetic to the costs of pollution and without alternatives. For example, in Nichol’s study of the bioclimatic impacts of the 1994 Haze, she found that Indonesian agriculturalists saw peat as “an impediment to development and its ultimate destruction to expose the underlying more fertile clay [as] desirable.”32 However, peat forests serve as “true carbon sinks,” with their destruction resulting in the release of millions of tons of carbon into the atmosphere.33 Financial and scientific resources therefore need to be put towards the creation of nationwide education programs that equip locals with the knowledge of the detrimental effects of slash-and-burn practices.

But education alone will not suffice. The continuity of the Haze can be attributed

to the fact that locals and plantation owners know no viable alternative to their traditional methods. One alternative is ‘grinding and mulching,’ which though “more time-consuming and costly … is still affordable to them.”34 For these alternatives to be embraced, the right machinery and training have to be provided, creating large costs for the Indonesian government. The current contribution of resources for mitigating the Haze, however, is funneled into the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund, created by the ATHP to fund its short-term provisions rather than to achieve long-term goals.35 Even to such ends, the Fund has failed to draw sufficient finances due to ASEAN’s “principle of sovereign equality, and the practice of contributing equal 31

Odihi, “Haze in Southeast Asia,” 218.

32

Nichol, “Bioclimatic Impacts,” 1216.

33 Ibid.

34

Quah and Johnston, “ASEAN Agreement,” 15.

35

ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Agreement,” 15.

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amounts to the regional fund.”36 As not all states are affected equally by the Haze, the principle of equal contribution prevents wealthier states like Singapore and Malaysia from making large donations. It is therefore clear that ASEAN and Indonesia at present do not have the financial supply they need to implement long-term education and alternate training programs, setting the region on a course of repetitive environmental disaster.

SECURITIZING THE HAZE

The Copenhagen School’s Securitization Theory is built on the premise that

“security is a social and intersubjective construction.”37 Pioneered by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, the School identifies five general categories of security: military, economic, societal, political, and environmental.38 These broad categories demonstrate the School’s recognition of the necessity to analyze non-traditional security issues, such as the environment and society, under its theoretical framework. It is also for this reason that the School is widely employed in discussions about the securitization of climate change and the environment, and likewise adopted in this article.39 The primary argument of the School’s securitization theory is that “security is a [illocutionary] speech act, that solely by uttering ‘security’ something is being done.”40 According to Wæver, this is known as the ‘securitizing move’, where “it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one.”41 The main purpose of the speech act is to move referent objects of security (issues under the five categories above) “out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making.”42 This article’s analysis of the securitization of the Haze would therefore anticipate a shift away from usual practices that perpetuate the issue towards new solutions.

36

Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 369.

37

Rita Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” Journal of International Relations and Development 9, 2006, 54.

38

Mely Caballero-Anthony and Ralf Emmers, “The Dynamics of Securitization in Asia,” In Studying Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues and Trends, by M.

Caballero-Anthony and A. Acharya ed. R. Emmers (Singapore: Marshall-Cavendish Academic, 2006), 3.

39

See Shirley V. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of

Global Climte Change Policy?” Review of European Community & International Environmentl Law 21.3, 2012, 220-230.

40

Taureck, “Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies,” 54.

41

Wæver, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen.”

42 Ibid.

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It is however argued that the speech act alone is insufficient in a normative

application of securitization theory.43 Since the Copenhagen School’s framework is an analytical tool, a normative application requires justification of its use. The movement of issues away from regular democratic rules by governments is prone to abuse and calls for a moral standard to measure the legitimacy of implementation. As such, Rita Floyd’s conception of just securitization theory, built upon the Copenhagen School’s model, provides a criterion for the ‘moral rightness’ of normative securitization.44 Her three criteria are: “(1) that there is an objective existential threat; (2) that the referent object of security is morally legitimate; and (3) that the security response is appropriate to the threat in question.”45 The securitization of the Haze satisfies the criteria, as continued air pollution would threaten public health as well as regional peace. Floyd describes the moral legitimacy of a referent object as being “conducive to human well-being,” a condition that breathable air clearly satisfies.46 She also argues that “the degree of response must be measured to the threat in question,” meaning that securitizing the Haze does not justify a military attack, but rather actions that target the causes for its continuity.47 Floyd’s just securitization theory takes the Copenhagen model a step further by concluding that securitization is only complete when “the speech act is followed up by a change in relevant behavior by a relevant agent … that is justified by this agent with reference to the declared threat.”48 In essence, she argues that securitization is the sum of a securitizing move and a securitizing practice.

In the context of Southeast Asia, a normative application of securitization

would involve the participation of all ASEAN members as securitizing actors. Though securitization of the Haze may begin with the leadership of one or more states, its success would require the cooperation of all states due to the transboundary nature of the issue. Based on Floyd’s model, the securitization of the Haze can be concluded to be a success when the securitizing move is followed by a change in behavior (securitizing 43

See Rita Floyd, Security and the Environment: Securitization Theory and US Environmental Security Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

44

Rita Floyd, “Can Securitization Theory be used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory,” Security Dialogue 42.4-5, 2011, 427-439.

45

Ibid, 427.

46

Ibid, 431.

47

Ibid, 433.

48

Ibid, 428-429.

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practice), resulting in positive impacts on the causes of the Haze. To such ends, securitization is initiated with a change in rhetoric about the Haze. Instead of using vague and cautious terms, such as having “possible adverse effects” when referring to it in the ATHP, leaders in ASEAN need to firmly label the Haze as a threat to public and regional security.49 Such a shift is not impossible as the popular use of the term ‘Haze’ itself represents a shift in rhetoric from 1998 when Malaysian authorities refused to recognize it as anything more than “low-cloud, dew and smoke” for fear of tarnishing the country’s reputation.50 The severity of the annual occurrence would also provide leaders with a public frustrated with past measures and receptive towards securitization. The speech act would then involve press statements and media reports framing the Haze as an issue requiring urgent attention, allowing leaders to take extraordinary measures.

With that, the ‘securitizing move’ evolves into the ‘securitizing practice,’ fundamentally affecting the causes for continuity.

IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION

GREATER REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

It was highlighted above that the Haze is perpetuated by a weakness of the

ATHP and the inadequacy of the ASEAN Way in dealing with such a transboundary issue. By framing the Haze as a matter of regional security, ASEAN policy makers are able to take it out of the usual method of quiet diplomacy and exert more pressure on Indonesia to comply. This would likely begin with one member taking a leadership role by making a securitizing move, calling for the recognition of the Haze threat.

Such a step is akin to that taken by British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, who in 2006 promoted “the association of climate change with international security in global policy discourse.”51 Her leadership ultimately led to the chairing of the first UN Security Council (UNSC) debate on climate change in 2007 by the United Kingdom.52 For ASEAN, it is expected that an affluent affected state such as Malaysia or Singapore would likely play such a role. While the effects of the Haze are not directly felt by all 49

ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Agreement,” 1.

50

Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia,” 347.

51

Shirley V. Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close have We Come and would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global

Climte Change Policy?” Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 21.3, 2012, 221.

52

Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 221.

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ASEAN members, continued regional tension between Indonesia and the affected states would pose an existential threat to the other members whose economies are intimately linked to regional stability.53 It is thus expected that all other ASEAN members would follow suit in the securitization process.

Securitization of the Haze under the leadership of the affected states of

Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore would also compel a change in behavior by forcing governments to accept the weaknesses of the ASEAN Way and act outside of it. This could be achieved if the affected states appeal to the body with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” that is, the UNSC.54 In her analysis of a full securitization of climate change, Scott argues that securitization would move an issue “outside of the normal multilateral treaty framework” and into the purview of the UNSC.55 To Indonesia, such a move would demonstrate the sincerity of its neighbors in securitizing the Haze as well as bring about strong international scrutiny. In the end, these measures would encourage ASEAN to break away from its past preoccupation with non-intervention to ensure that the ATHP and other new measures are strictly applied by Indonesia.

IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT BY INDONESIA’S FEDERAL AGENCIES

The process of securitization has to be embraced by Indonesia for meaningful

change to take place. For Indonesia, the referent object is unfortunately not the health of its population, as time has demonstrated that it poses no such motivation. Instead, the referent object is its diplomatic relationship with its neighbors being threatened by the firm stance that they have adopted in securitizing the Haze. This forces the federal government to securitize the Haze as well, followed by the initiation of an emergency response. According to the Indonesian Law on the State of Emergency (no.6/1946), “a state of … emergency confers certain legislative powers on the military authorities and suspends certain normal legislative procedures.”56 The declaration of a state of 53

See The ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN Economic Blueprint (Jakarta: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2008).

54

Scott, “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics,” 223.

55

Ibid, 222-223.

56

S. Pompe (ed.), Indonesian Law 1949-1989: A Bibliography of Foreign-Language Materials With Brief Commentaries on the Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers, 1992), 83.

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emergency during the heights of a Haze event would allow the federal government to sidestep the fragmented bureaucracy that is a stumbling block to Haze mitigation without having to pass new legislation to restructure it.

Securitization would streamline the enforcement of domestic laws against

slash-and-burn practices under one body, which in a state of emergency would be the military, thus eliminating the political divide between the MoE, the Ministry of Forestry, and the Ministry of Agriculture. These agencies would instead focus on other aspects of Haze mitigation such as training and education. In addition, the deployment of large numbers of security personnel across the country would provide firefighters with the boost in manpower needed to curb the spread of flames. Such a heavy-handed response towards the Haze also serves as a deterrent against corrupt local administrators and corporations who clear forests illegally. It is necessary to note though that the challenges in Indonesian governance are more complex than just a fragmentation of bureaucracy.

Securitization’s ability to mitigate deeply entrenched issues related to the Haze such as corruption and political patronage is limited, and thus wide reforms in government are equally crucial. Nonetheless, securitization can serve as a deterrent in the short-run, while long-term solutions are also needed to prevent the return of forest fires when a state of emergency is suspended.

INCREASED COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES

With greater external pressure, and a state of emergency, securitization

would set Indonesia and its neighbours on track to stop the Haze. However, a greater commitment of resources towards a long-term solution based on education and training is still essential. It is clear that Indonesia cannot be expected to bear the cost of these programs on its own. Following a securitizing move, other ASEAN states keen to execute a securitizing practice would allocate greater portions of their budgets to the goal of Haze mitigation. Collective securitization would force ASEAN to move beyond the ‘normal’ practice of equal contribution to permit important stakeholders like Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei to make larger contributions to the Haze Fund.57 57

In 2006, Singapore and Malaysia only pledged USD 50,000 to the Fund due to restrictions on unequal contributions. Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” 371.

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Parallel to the increase in funding, a new plan to end the annual Haze in

Southeast Asia should be developed. Resources can be channeled towards educating locals about the detrimental effects of slash-and-burn practices as well as providing them with alternatives. Odihi argues that governments in the region should ensure an equitable distribution of resources to reduce overexploitation of natural resources by poor communities.58 He also advocates for the popularization of environmental education through mass media.59 With better education and the provision of agricultural support, poor farmers are motivated to abandon their harmful practices. Such measures should also be extended towards large logging and plantation companies. Often, subcontractors with little interest in fire prevention are employed to clear land owned by larger corporations.60 Resources can be used to provide employees with firefighting training, and alternate methods of land clearing can be subsidized by the government to encourage adoption. In the end, securitization can result in a multifaceted impact on the causes of the Haze, bringing about change at the regional, national, and individual level.

CONCLUSION

“Climate change is a far greater threat to the world’s stability than international

terrorism,” claimed Britain’s chief scientist Sir David King in 2004.61 Indeed, the historical trend has demonstrated that ASEAN’s failure to resolve the Haze, the fragmented nature of Indonesian bureaucracy, and a lack of resources have allowed the Haze to continue its destructive effects on Southeast Asia’s population. It is therefore necessary, as I have argued, that policy makers adopt a framework of securitization to resolve the issue. The Copenhagen School and Floyd’s just securitization theory provide a normative application of securitization that can bring the Haze out of the normal and so far ineffective practice of regional politics. Instead, securitization would result in stronger external pressure on Indonesia to comply, Indonesia’s improved enforcement capacity, and a greater commitment of resources towards a final solution for the Haze.

58

Odihi, “Haze in Southeast Asia,” 218.

59 Ibid.

60

Cotton, “The “Haze” over Southeast Asia,” 335.

61

Oli Brown, Anne Hammill, and Robert McLeman, “Climate Change as the ‘New’ Security Threat: Implications for Africa,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of

International Affairs) 83.6, 2007, 1142.

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It is hoped that such a securitized view of the Haze would one day lead to a world that does not necessitate the constant use of facemasks.

GRADUATE COMMENTARY

70

Graduate Commentary

RESPONSE TO YEE’S “TAKING OFF THE FACEMASK” TIANJIAO JIANG

The haze pollution problem in Southeast Asia has lasted for more than twenty

years with few signs of improvement going forward. Most haze originates from peat burning and forest fires in Indonesia, two processes associated with the land clearing activities required for commercial oil palm plantations. These processes produce large carbon emissions and have led to considerable environmental and socioeconomic consequences in both Indonesia and neighboring countries.1 Justin Yee’s article in this issue, “Taking off the Facemask: Securitizing the Southeast Asian Haze,” focuses on the issue of transboundary haze. Yee’s study attempts to describe what factors might cause the repetition of haze events, how the haze problem can be viewed through a new theoretical framework, and how it may be solved through the process of securitization.

In the first section of the paper, Yee argues that ASEAN’s low efficacy, Indonesia’s

fragmented bureaucracy, and a lack of resources have all contributed to the persistence of the haze pollution crisis. The ASEAN way, that is, “the adherence to norms of noninterference and consensus-seeking” has undermined the enforcement mechanisms underpinning the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP). More specifically, this model has failed to produce Indonesian compliance in mitigating the haze issue. Yee remarks that “aside from weak external pressure, Indonesia’s domestic politics serve as an impediment to any effective solution.” The relevant bureaucratic agencies “are beholden to powerful private interests” and “there exists a divide of powers and motivation between federal agencies and local councils.” Finally, there have been few resources devoted to long-term solutions such as educating local people to find alternatives to peat burning and other land clearing activities. While the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund was created to provide financial support 1

Helena Varkkey, “Patronage Politics, Plantation Fires and Transboundary Haze,” Environmental Hazards, 12.3-4, 2013, 200-217.

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for addressing these concenrs, the “principle of equal contribution prevents wealthier states like Singapore and Malaysia from making large donations.”

In the second section, Yee reviews two securitization frameworks in search of

potential solutions: the Copenhagen School and Rita Floyd’s securitization theory.

Yee suggests that policymakers adopt the framework of securitization so as to “bring the haze issue out of the normal and so far ineffective practice of regional politics.”

As politicians in ASEAN countries recast the haze crisis as “a threat to public and regional security,” more extraordinary measures may be implemented to address the problem. Yee applies this securitization framework to the three causes of repetitive haze pollution outlined earlier, concluding that “securitization would result in stronger external pressure on Indonesia to comply, Indonesia’s improved enforcement capacity, and a greater commitment of resources towards a final solution for the haze.”

Yee’s analysis does an excellent job of explaining the primary factors responsible

for the haze pollution crisis. He considers external and internal as well as short-term and long-term factors. A multi-level analysis coupled with rich materials makes Yee’s argument both comprehensive and persuasive. Additionally, by applying a securitization framework to address the haze issue, Yee offers an innovative contribution to both academic research and existing political practice. Much of the academic literature discussing transboundary haze in Southeast Asia emphasize patronage networks and employ constructivist, neo-liberal and regionalist approaches.2 Few studies consider the relationship between securitization and the haze issue. Like the broader issue of global climate change, transboundary haze is a problem that can no longer be relegated to the purview of low politics. Labeling haze pollution as a security issue might serve as a step toward improved regional cooperation and stronger domestic law enforcement.

2

See Lorraine Elliott, “ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation: Norms, Interests and Identity,” The Pacific Review 16.1, 2003, 29-52.

Euston Quah, “Transboundary Pollution in Southeast Asia: The Indonesian Fires,” World Development 30.3, 2002, 429-441.

Helena Varkkey, “Patronage Politics, Plantation Fires and Transboundary Haze,” Environmental Hazards 12.3-4, 2013, 200-217.

Luca Tacconi, Frank Jotzo, R. Quentin Grafton, “Local Causes, Regional Co-operation and Global Financing for Environmental Problems: The Case of Southeast

Asian Haze Pollution,” International Environmental Agreements 8, 2008, 1-16.

Paruedee Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” Asian Survey 51.2, 2011, 356-378.

GRADUATE COMMENTARY

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Yee’s analysis does, however, leave three major concerns open to further inquiry.

First, Yee’s optimistic view that the ASEAN way can be changed is questionable. Both the 1967 ASEAN Declaration and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation demonstrate clear commitment to non-interference, “conflicts are managed by honoring sovereignty … of ASEAN countries’ and the institutionalized ‘consensual decision-making … overrules any attempt at majority decision-making.”3 Furthermore, the ASEAN way is a developmentalist approach which “aims at downplaying, by means of disallowing public debate, the divisive issues for the sake of harmony.”4 As Lorraine Elliott explains, “environmental cooperation has reflected the Association’s (ASEAN) preference for weak or soft regionalism, cautioning against authoritative environmental agreements, effective institutional structures or anything that might seem too much like interference in the internal affairs of member states.”5 Since Yee recognizes that ASEAN’s ineffective response to environmental degradation is a “systemic failure,” in what ways might the securitization framework overturn the deeply-embedded norms and regulations of the organization? If securitizing the haze could allow Singapore and Malaysia to exert more pressure on Indonesia, would it be morally or politically acceptable for wealthier member states to coerce poorer members into compliance with any other securitized issues? Again, it is worth noting that “these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors … their ability to create such structures (effective regional institutions) is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy.”6

Furthermore, domestic rifts frustrate efforts at cooperative security

arrangements. According to Nguitragool, “the recurrence of the haze, Indonesia’s inability to cope with the problem as well as regional and international pressures have forced Jakarta to be more cooperative.” Moreover, “domestic factors have posed a different set of challenges and have constrained policy making at both the first and

3

Timo Kivimaki, “East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, 2011, 57-85.

4

Shaun Narine, Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Boulder, CO (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 31.

Timo Kivimaki, “East Asian Relative Peace and the ASEAN Way,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, 2011, 57-85.

5

Lorraine Elliott, “ASEAN and Environmental Cooperation: Norms, Interests and Identity,” The Pacific Review 16. 1, 2003, 29-52.

6

Shaun Narine, “State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific,” The Pacific Review 17.3, 2004, 423-450.

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second levels of negotiation.”7 Trends toward both increased democratization and radical nationalism have created tensions between federal agencies and local councils, adversely affecting negotiations over resource development and environmental protection with other states. Yee maintains that fragmented bureaucracies and domestic law enforcement would be improved through the proposed securitization framework, but these improvements remain improbable because the “persistence of transboundary haze lies in the persistence of patronage networks in this sector.”8 Rampant patronage politics have made it easy for well-connected oil palm plantation companies to “take advantage of these linkages to ensure that they can act with impunity.”9 The rapid process of democratization and decentralization in Indonesia has “further encouraged this practice at the regional level.”10 Since Malaysian and Singaporean investors are familiar with patronage practices at home, they have been able to control “more than two-thirds of the Indonesian oil palm plantation sector.”11 Politically influential elites from Jakarta, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur reap enormous economic benefits from these holdings, making it rather difficult to see these three countries cooperating to mitigate the haze problem in the near future.

While it is possible to dismantle these patronage networks as long as “there

are firm reforms within the Indonesian government,”12 Yee has failed to explain the relationship between securitizing the haze and these reforms. When the haze problem is brought out of the realm of normal politics and regarded as an emergent security issue, how will it promote domestic reforms? Perhaps the media, civil society and other interest groups will play important roles, but how they will do so is not clear from Yee’s analysis. Upon securitizing the haze issue (securitizing move), what changes in Indonesia’s long-term behaviour (securitizing practice), if any, should we expect to observe? Institutionalization, identity-shaping and other factors will be crucial, but the mechanisms connecting the securitizing move and the securitizing practice are elided 7

Paruedee Nguitragool, “Negotiating the Haze Treaty,” Asian Survey 51.2, 2011, pp.356-378.

8

Helena Varkkey, “Patronage Politics, Plantation Fires and Transboundary Haze,” Environmental Hazards 12. 3-4, 2013, 200-217.

9 Ibid.

10

Helena Varkkey, “Oil Palm Plantations and Transboundary Haze: Patronage Networks and Land Licensing in Indonesia’s Peatlands,” Wetlands 33, 2013, 679-690.

11

Helena Varkkey, “Patronage Politics as a Driver of Economic Regionalisation: The Indonesian Oil Palm Sector and Transboundary Haze,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53.3,

2012, 314-329.

12

Helena Varkkey, “Patronage Politics, Plantation Fires and Transboundary Haze,” Environmental Hazards 12.3-4, 2013, 200-217.

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in Yee’s discussion. Future research will have to determine how securitizing the haze can effectively answer these questions.

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Perceptions Trump Institutions

DIVERSE POLICY RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS NICOLAS THOMSON

Since the financial crisis of 2008, the regulation of big banks has become an

urgent and salient topic across the globe as governments consider what can be done to prevent such an economic disaster from reoccurring. This paper explores legislation surrounding banking regulation in both the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), with a focus on the separation of commercial and investment banking. The US has attempted to dismantle ‘universal banks’ (those with both commercial and investment divisions1) by barring commercial banks from pursuing investment activity, while the UK has decided to require banks to increase their capital holdings while allowing them to remain universal.2 Why have two western capitalist democracies taken such different approaches to a common problem? Some theorists, such as Immergut, have argued that institutional veto points (opportunities to veto or block legislation) play a significant role in the formation of policy.3 While this assertion applies in many policy areas, the differences in veto points between the American and British regimes do not account for their distinct policy responses towards universal banks. Rather, this essay will argue that the central factor behind the policy difference is diverse perceptions of the crisis, as the blame for the 2008 crisis had different targets in America and Britain. Where the US looked to reform a banking system that had caused the crisis, the UK looked to patch up a banking system that was caught up in the banking crisis.

When universal banks have liquidity issues4 in their investment divisions

they can address those issues with capital from depositors’ assets on the commercial side, shifting undue risk onto depositors and thus creating a highly public issue to 1

“Universal Banking,” accessed March 8, 2015, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/universalbanking.asp.

2

Shearman and Sterling LLP, “Vickers Recommendations on Bank Ring-fencing Made Law in the UK,” client report, 19 December 2013.

3

Ellen Immergut, “The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-making in France, Switzerland, and Sweden” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism

in Comparative Analysis, ed. Sven Steinmo et al. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 57-89.

4

Liquidity refers to how easily an asset can be bought or sold.

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which governments become attuned. Economic prosperity has become a large part of democratic legitimacy in western capitalist democracies, leading to greater emphasis being placed on the ability of governments to increase the wealth of their nations and the living standards of their citizens.5 The 2008 financial crisis had significant adverse affects on a preponderance of both American and British citizens, necessitating government intervention, yet the respective governments chose disparate policies in response. The American approach attempts to protect its citizens by keeping their capital separate from businesses, while the British approach seeks to protect its people by ensuring that more of their capital is retained by the bank in case of future credit squeezes. Given that these policies will have diverse effects on each country’s banking sector, it is important to understand the causal factors behind each government’s respective decision. This paper will first explain how veto points work and why they were not factors in banking legislation after the crisis, and then proceed to argue that diverse perceptions regarding the cause of the crisis led to different policies in the US and UK.

VETO POINTS

Veto points are areas of opportunity for political actors to block legislation from

being passed. These veto points can arise from the institutional design of the nation (de jure rules), or can occur as a function of party discipline levels and electoral results (de facto rules), with both de jure and de facto rules working together to establish the ‘rules of the game.’6 Each veto point creates an opportunity to block legislation, thus an increase in the number of these points allows more opportunity for actors with dissenting views to block legislation they, or their constituents, disagree with. While arguments about veto points have proven effective in exploring other areas of policy making, they do not adequately explain the differences between the US and the UK banking regulation policies. Banking interests in America were unable to take advantage of their greater veto opportunities, and the British government did not take advantage of their lack of veto points to impose severe reforms on the banking sector.

5

Fritz Scharpf, “Monetary Union, Fiscal Crisis and the Preemption of Democracy,” MPIfG Discussion Paper 11.1, 2011, accessed 4 November 2014,

http://www.mpifg.de/pu/dp_abstracts/dp11-11.asp, 40.

6

Immergut, “The Rules of the Game,” 57-89.

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America has more veto points in part due to the weak party system that permits

representatives to vote freely on legislation as they see fit, largely a product of US primary elections that allow candidates to run for office without their party leader’s explicit support. Conversely, the strong party system in Britain forces legislators to follow party lines. This is because Britain’s multiparty parliamentary system places a high emphasis on party affiliation, and given that the party must offer membership to members of parliament (MPs) the legislators have a strong incentive to vote in line with their party. America’s two-party presidential system can also place importance on party affiliation, but crucially the American system uses primary elections to determine who will represent the respective parties in each riding. A candidate does not need to be nominated by his or her party to run, rather they simply need their constituents to vote for them over their opponents. This can remove the incentive for legislators to follow party lines, as they can freely vote against their party’s official stance and still be re-elected by their constituents as a representative. Consequently, organizations (such as banks) can lobby the members of the American Congress to vote against and block unfavorable legislation, creating a veto opportunity, while British legislators stay true to party lines because of the incentives to remain a part of their political party.

The veto opportunity offered through America’s relatively weak party discipline

is further strengthened by the existence of a bicameral legislature. Congress is split into two equal chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives, both of which must assent to a bill before its passage into law.7 While the British legislature has de jure bicameralism, in practice the House of Commons possesses much more power than the House of Lords, resulting in a de facto unicameral system.8 This makes laws more difficult to pass in America, as two separate chambers, which are not necessarily controlled by the same party, must both agree on a bill for it to be passed into law.

Logically, then, it becomes easier for small interests to influence policy as they have more access points to block legislation; combined with American legislators who are more receptive to outside influences than their British counterparts, it is evident that 7

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, “One Chamber or Two? Deciding Between a Unicameral and Bicameral Legislature,” accessed 19 February

2015, https://www.ndi.org/files/029_ww_onechamber.pdf.

8

Ibid.

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ample opportunity exists for lobby efforts to be successful in America. This suggests that banking interests had more opportunity to veto legislation in the Unites States; through a combination of weak party discipline and a bicameral system, American legislators are both easier to access, and more receptive to lobbying efforts.

While the number of legislative veto points in America is higher than in Britain,9

and the American legislature is better suited for lobby efforts, the policies enacted in the respective countries seem to contradict this logic. The UK, regarded as having very few veto points, responded to the crisis by raising minimum capital requirements in an effort to reduce leverage and by proposing ‘ring-fencing regulation.’10 These restrictions are not very difficult for big banks to comply with as the law can be easily accommodated through the creation of subsidiaries,11 allowing British banks to maintain the status quo outside of the need to raise capital. The US responded in a more stringent manner, enacting the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that sought to separate commercial and investment banking via the Volcker Rule within the Act.12 Given the illiquidity of many proprietary assets13 and the lengthy term agreements of certain securities, it will be incredibly difficult for American banks to comply with the new rules without significantly affecting their businesses. One would expect the UK to have been harsher on the banking sector, given the adverse effects on the public and the limited ability of the banks to block unwanted legislation; conversely, the expected outcome in the US would have been comparatively lenient given the ability of the banks to block legislation. However, it is evident that the British government did not take advantage of the lack of veto points, nor did the American banks take advantage of their veto opportunities. This illustrates that veto points were not a determining factor in banking regulation after the crisis.

9

George Tsebelis, “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British Journal of Political Science

25.3, 1995, 289-325.

10

An attempt to ‘fence’ off the commercial side of bank to separate them from conflicts of interest on the investment side. See Andrews & Oxenford, “U.K. bank ring-

fencing – what goes where?,” Deloitte Blog, 23 July 2014, http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financialservices/2014/07/uk-bank-ring-fencing.html.

The National Archives, “Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013,” 2013, accessed 5 November 2014.

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/33/contents/enacted.

11

Andrews & Oxenford, “U.K. bank ring-fencing – what goes where?,” Deloitte Blog.

12

United States Congress, “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,”

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/html/PLAW-111publ203.htm.

13

Proprietary assets are assets off which banks attempt to directly make money, as opposed to through commissions.

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DIVERSE PERCEPTIONS

These distinct approaches have very different ramifications for the American

and British banking sectors, and to understand why two western democracies chose particular responses to a common crisis, we must look at their contrasting perceptions regarding the root of the crisis. This section will largely draw on media reports and press releases to show that US President Obama, due to many seeing the US as the cause of the crisis, was attempting to preserve America’s image worldwide as they were seen as the offender, while UK Prime Minister Brown assured Britons that he was doing all he could to repair damage from American greed, leading to divergent policy approaches.

THE AMERICAN CASE

It is undeniable that the 2008 financial crisis began with the American sub-prime

mortgage crisis and then spread around the globe. American banks gave out sub-prime mortgages to Americans who could not afford the price of the homes;14 these mortgages were then resold by investment banks all over the world, leaving many firms (and countries) with worthless assets as homeowners began to default on payments.15 Even President Obama conceded American culpability for beginning the financial crisis at a Group of Twenty (G20) meeting shortly after the crisis began, setting the stage to begin addressing the problem.16 This led Obama to approach the American banking system as the central issue that needed solving, specifically the existence of universal banks and poor regulatory control. Accordingly, Obama backed17 Paul Volcker’s suggestion that commercial banks should be banned from proprietary trading, adding the ‘Volcker Rule’ to the Dodd-Frank Reform Act.18 Part of the allure surrounding Volcker’s idea was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. Glass-Steagall was made law after the Great Depression, and it sought to separate commercial and investment banking in a

14

Sub-prime mortgages were offered below the prime lending rate set by the US Federal Reserve, often with high rate increases after a short period of sub-prime

payments.

15

Jonathan Jarvis, “The Crisis of Credit Visualized,” accessed 4 November 2014, http://crisisofcredit.com.

16

Weisman et al., “Obama hits resistance at G-20,” Wall Street Journal, 2 April 2009, accessed 20 February 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123857874355677711.

17

David Cho and Binyamin Appelbaum, “Obama’s ‘Volcker Rule’ shifts power away from Geithner,” Washington Post, 22 January 2010, accessed 19 February 2015,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012104935.html.

18

Damian Paletta and Aaron Lucchetti, “Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2010, accessed 19 February 2015,

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.

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very similar way to the Volcker Rule.19 Having created a stable and successful banking environment for over sixty years, coupled with the almost immediate crisis that emerged after its repeal, the rationale behind Glass-Steagall offered an enticing solution to the sudden problem. Accordingly, Obama focused his efforts on banking reform that would act as a “sweeping reform of the financial regulatory system,” changing everything from the rules surrounding banks’ actions, to the agencies existing to police those rules.20 This was a strong move from the American government that definitively expressed its perception that the US banking system had been at the root of the crisis, and that deep structural reforms were necessary to avoid future crises. Unlike Britain’s comparatively soft response, America’s decisive legislation was intended to castigate a banking system that was widely regarding as having precipitated the economic meltdown.

THE BRITISH CASE

Gordon Brown, then British Prime Minister, expressed Britain’s perception of

the crisis when he announced one of the earliest bail-outs, which was meant to provide capital to stabilize the banking system without fundamentally changing it.21 Brown had “repeatedly blamed the United States of America for causing the crisis,” leading to tension between himself and Obama, but more importantly showing why Britain chose to respond with leniency towards its banks.22 This was very much in line with other European leaders, who largely considered American banks to be responsible for the crisis, spurring an ‘us-and-them’ mentality throughout Europe. Nicolas Sarkozy, then French President, suggested at a G20 summit that Europe was not to blame, and therefore another large global power was.23 In fact, the European Commission explicitly blames the American banking sector for the debt crisis gripping the European continent.24 This contributed to the view that British banks were safer than American 19

James Rickards, “Repeal of Glass-Steagall Caused the Financial Crisis,” U.S. News, 27 August 2012, accessed 20 February 2015,

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/08/27/repeal-of-glass-steagall-caused-the-financial-crisis.

20

Wall Street Journal Staff, “Obama’s Financial Reform: The Condensed Version,” Wall Street Journal, 17 January 2009, accessed 20 February 2015,

http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/06/17/obamas-financial-reform-plan-the-condensed-version.

21

Graeme Wearden, “British Government Unveils £37bn Banking Bail-out Plan,” The Guardian, 13 October 2008, accessed 5 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.

com/business/2008/oct/13/marketturmoil-creditcrunch.

22

The White House, “Joint Press Availability with President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Gordon Brown,” 1 April 2009, accessed 19 February 2015,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Press-Availability-With-President-Barack-Obama-and-Prime-Minister-Gordon-Brown/.

23

Weisman et al., “Obama hits resistance at G-20.”

24

European Commission, “Why Did the Crisis Happen?,” last modified 9 April 2014, accessed 17 November 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/explained/

the_financial_and_economic_crisis/why_did_the_crisis_happen/index_en.htm

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banks, and therefore the strict new rules in America were unnecessary for Britain. The history of British banking also influenced the approach to addressing the economic meltdown. At the beginning of the crisis there was a bank run25 on Northern Rock, which was the first run on a British bank in over 100 years.26 The UK had experienced a very calm and safe period of banking prior to this, even with an extended period of universal banks dominating the British banking sector.27 From 1960 onwards, the UK banking system has been focused around big universal banks, and the size of these banks only became an issue in 2008 due to the large bail-out costs that were required to avoid a total catastrophe.28

From the British perspective it was greedy American bankers who had caused

the crisis, and the British banks had simply got caught with too much leverage at the wrong time. This national concern led to the passage of the Financial Services Act, which raised capital requirements for banks in an effort to increase their ability to absorb market fluctuations.29 This is quite different from the American focus on dissolving universal banks, and the legislation matches the diverse perceptions regarding the cause of the crisis.

CONCLUSION

This analysis has policy implications that reach beyond the banking sector, as it

shows that institutions in strong democracies may not have the same effect on policy.

Clearly, differences in perception are important with regards to banking policy, as the interconnectedness of the global economy implies that the actions of one nation will impact others around the world, especially if their economy is relatively large. As an example, the perceptions that created the ‘us-and-them’ mentality could be a dangerous approach for European policy makers as they might fail to recognize the need for policy action within Europe. While the sub-prime mortgage crisis in America caused 25

A bank run occurs when many depositors attempt to take money out at the same time, creating a liquidity issue for the bank.

26

“UK Recession: Timeline of How the British Economy Has Been Hit,” The Telegraph, 13 January 2009, accessed 7 November 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

finance/recession/4320827/UK-Recession-Timeline-of-how-the-British-economy-has-been-hit.html

27

Casserley et al., “Should Commercial and Investment Banking Be Separated?” McKinsey & Company, accessed 7 November 2014, http://www.mckinsey.com/

App_Media/Reports/Financial_Services/Commercial_and_Investment_Banking.pdf.

28 Ibid.

29

Herbst et al., “Banking Regulation Reform: The UK Approach to Glass-Steagall Legislation: The Vicker’s Interim Report,” Norton Rose Publications, 1 May 2011.

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liquidity crises throughout Europe, it more importantly exposed European regulatory shortcomings that ought to be addressed.30 Crucially here, the different perceptions in America and Britain were strong enough to affect policy output. In comparison, the higher number of veto points in the US was not used by American banks to block legislation, and the low number of veto points in the UK did not encourage the British government to pursue harsher punishments for universal banks, indicating that veto points were not influential in these cases. If the power of perception is so influential, it is imperative to conduct further research on the effect of divergent perceptions in relation to different policy responses to similar problems.

30

“The European Debt Crisis Visualized,� Bloomberg Business, 11 February 2014, accessed 20 February 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/88f037f8-0

6ec-4861-bcf4-b38692477e44.

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UNIVERSITAS 21 SUBMISSION MAP

UNIVERSITAS 21 SUBMISSION MAP

UNIVERSITIES Australia - University of Queensland, University of New South Wales Canada - University of British Columbia China - Fudan University, University of Nottingham (China Campus) India - University of Delhi Ireland - University of Dublin

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UNIVERSITIES Singapore - National University of Singapore South Africa - University of Johannesburg Sweden - Lund University United Kingdom - University of Glasglow, University of Nottingham United States - University of Virginia

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STAFF AND AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES | JIA 2015

STAFF Editor-in-Chief KLAUDIA WEGSCHAIDER is a fourth year international student in the English Honours and Political Science Honours programmes. She wholeheartedly enjoyed working for the JIA this year, and would like to thank all those who contributed for their excellent work. She hopes that you enjoy reading this issue.

Managing Editors ISABELLA CASCIOLA is a fourth year student at UBC. She is particularly interested in Eurasian affairs and energy policy. When not following the news obsessively, she can usually be found trying to improve her Russian or on the road on some kind of overseas adventure.

AGATHE DE MARCILLAC is a fourth year Political Science Honours and International Relations student, pursuing a double degree with Sciences Po Paris, where she is majoring in Law and Political Science. She is interested in the global economy and its impact on indigenous communities. Before moving on to law school in the fall of 2015, she is getting the most out of beautiful BC and can generally be found hiking or skiing on the weekends and getting distracted by the Law Library view during the week.

Senior Editors ZAK JACQUES is a final year Political Science and International Relations student. His research interests focus on public policy, energy, climate change, and geopolitics. In the fall, he intends to pursue a master’s degree in public policy with a focus on sustainable energy.

NATALYA KAUTZ is a fourth year student, majoring in Economics and Political Science. She enjoys student publishing, and has previously been employed at the Ubyssey. In her spare time, Natalya likes hiking and eating cheese.

ALEX KILPATRICK is a fourth year student in the Department of Political Science. His research centres on US and Canadian policy in the Arctic. He writes comedy for the campus-based magazine The Syrup Trap.

Editors REBECCA BARCLAY is a fourth year student, pursuing a degree in International Relations. Her areas of interest are Gender Justice and the Politics of War. Ever since a two-month backpacking trip to South East Asia, Becca has been counting down the days until her graduation so she can embark on more travels around the world.

SPENCER BROWN is a third year student in the Department of Political Science. His academic interests include Internet governance, cyber-warfare, and East Asian politics. This past summer, Spencer interned at AARP International, learning how public and private institutions around the world are enhancing the quality of life for people as they age.

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JORDAN BUFFIE is a fourth year Honours English and Political Science student interested in the history of colonialism, critical legal studies, postcolonial theory and rhetorical criticism. He is active in community organizing and has been a keen observer of the politics of the Middle East for many years.

Following graduation, Jordan intends to pursue law and graduate studies in political philosophy. He is an audiophile, avid reader of genre fiction and general “outdoorsy” type. He also enjoys spending time feeling overwhelmed in the face of a tide of information.

NICOLE CHAN is a fourth year student pursuing a double major in International Relations and Economics. She likes escaping into economic history with an international slant, and her primary region of interest is East Asia (the Umbrella Revolution kept her glued to her laptop). She spends her spare time dreaming about the various places she would like to visit, and organizes conferences for outgoing exchange students to fund her plans to backpack around South East Asia and go to law school.

RUSSO CHECHELASHVILI is a third year Political Science student. She has work experience at a policy watchdog organization and is interested in learning about countries under transition. She has also done an exchange program at McGill University, which she found extremely valuable. She hopes to be involved in the field of international justice after finishing her studies.

SEBASTIAN COOPER is a third year International Relations student with a particular interest in international law and justice, inspired by a visit to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He is also passionate about Canadian politics and is keen to expand his knowledge and understanding of Aboriginal rights. Following graduation, he hopes to pursue a degree in law.

ELIZABETH GOOD is a fifth year student, currently attaining a double major in International Relations and Geography: Environment and Sustainability. She hopes to pursue an academic career, studying the Geopolitics of War and has a particular interest in Third Party State actors, intrastate conflict, and terrorism.

Elizabeth looks forward to pursuing Graduate studies in the fall of 2015.

PAUL ANDRÉ NARVESTAD is a third year standing international student from Norway majoring in International Relations. His main research interests are Arctic politics, defence policy, the European Union, statelessness and military technology. Apart from studying in the library, he enjoys the outdoors, especially cross-country skiing. He looks forward to participating in a research seminar through UBC at the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia this summer.

BOBBY SANGHA is a fourth year student pursuing a double major in History and Political Science. His academic interests include federalism, North American politics, and the Cold War. Outside of academics, he enjoys trying new outdoor activities and traveling with good company. After graduating Bobby will be attending the Allard School of Law in the hopes of obtaining a Juris Doctor.

CYRUS SIE is an umpteenth year double major International Relations and Human Geography student with a wide range of interests in trade, development, conflict, urban planning, racial politics, and gender politics. He spends his free time eating, travelling, doing sports, and hoping he will not become a career student. After graduation he plans to hide from the world of academia for a few years somewhere in East Asia.

MARTIN STILLMAN will be graduating this spring with a major in International Relations and a minor in Political Science, with particular interest in immigration, terrorism, and present conflicts in the Middle East. With the embargo getting lifted, Martin’s goal for this summer is to enjoy a month in Cuba before the rest of his fellow Americans flood its beaches.

ALLYSSA TONE is a fourth year Political Science student. She is particularly interested in global environmental politics, sustainable development, and Indigenous politics. She has filled her spare time at

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STAFF AND AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES | JIA 2015

UBC studying literature and German. Allyssa has spent her summers working for the Yukon government, and will do so temporarily after graduating; she will be applying to law school this year, and would like to pursue a career in environmental law.

AUDREY TONG is a fourth year Honours Political Science with International Relations student. Her primary areas of interest include East Asian and Pacific affairs, civil society, institutional design and social justice. Upon graduation, Audrey has plans for law school and a future in governmental affairs.

KIAH VAN DER LOOS is a fourth year student graduating with a double major in International Relations and Political Science. Her academic interests include transitional justice, non-state armed actors, and international human rights law. Next year, she plans on attending law school either in Canada or in the UK. Until then, she will be enjoying her last few months at UBC and spending all of her free time skiing in Whistler.

Head of Producation and Design ANITA HUNG is fifth year student majoring in Gender, Race, Sexuality, and Social Justice. She is a selfidentified typography snob and a freelance designer/photographer. Some of her favourite things include obsessing over text alignment, eating tacos, and playing with cats. This is her third year working on the Journal of International Affairs.

Production Team SEAN DURFEE is a fifth year International Relations student graduating in November 2015. His academic interests span across East Asian history, languages, culinary arts, terror management theory, international finance, and development economics. When time allows it, he enjoys pushing pixels around, parkour, drinking snobby coffee, and napping in the sun. He is a freelance graphic and web designer.

ADA SIN is a first year student, leaning towards a major in International Relations or Political Science.

Possessing a keen interest in typography and graphic design, she hopes to pursue these interests, and make the most out of her university experience by appreciating the world around her, meeting new people and finding new passions to pursue along the way.

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AUTHORS ZAK JACQUES is a final year Political Science and International Relations student. His research interests focus on public policy, energy, climate change, and geopolitics. In the fall, he intends to pursue a master’s degree in public policy with a focus on sustainable energy.

JULIE JENKINS is a graduate of UBC’s Political Science Honours Program and is now an MA student in Political Theory at the University of Toronto. She practices an engaged, problem-driven political theory with research interests at the intersections of democratic governance, constitutional theory, and questions of freedom, justice, and equality in multinational and settler-colonial states. Outside of her interest in theory, Julie has a closet affection for Canadian politics and public policy. Upon completing her MA, she plans to pursue a career in progressive policy analysis while contemplating the pros and cons of further academic studies.

TIANJIAO JIANG is a PhD candidate at Fudan University and former visiting scholar at George Washington University. His research focus is on East Asia and nuclear policy. He completed his undergraduate degree in International Politics at Fudan University in 2013.

JULIE SAGRAM is a third year History student at UBC minoring in International Relations, with hopes of pursuing a graduate education and career in International Humanitarian Law. With a deep interest in peace and security, she will be travelling to Jerusalem this summer to gain insight into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peace process. She believes in changing the world through writing, and will continue to research important and controversial global issues.

NICOLAS THOMSON is an fourth year undergraduate student at UBC studying Political Science and English Literature. He is looking forward to a future studying and practicing law after completing his degree. When his head is not buried in a book you can find him climbing a rock face, exploring exotic cuisines, or seeking out new challenges across the globe.

JUSTIN YEE recently graduated from the University of British Columbia with a Bachelors of Arts in International Relations. Born and raised in Malaysia, his research focuses on issues of security and development in the Southeast Asian region. His academic interest in the region is supplemented by firsthand experience as an Assistant to the Speaker of the Selangor Legislative Assembly, Malaysia. There he worked on programs to curb urban poverty, and participated in efforts to reform the state’s legislative arm.

Justin is also the former President of the Seri Malaysia Club. He believes that righteousness exalts a nation.

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STAFF AND AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES | JIA 2015

PHOTOGRAPHERS BENJAMIN DAVID CLARK is a second year student in the Computer Science and Statistics Combined Honours program at UBC. Ben has a research background in data analysis with applications to radiochemistry, but his extracurricular interests include trap music, Slavoj ŽiŞek, and photography. During the upcoming year, Ben will be pursuing more technical projects in data analytics.

CYRUS SIE is an umpteenth year double major International Relations and Human Geography student with wide range of interests in trade, development, conflict, urban planning, racial politics, and gender politics. He spends his free time eating, travelling, doing sports, and hoping he will not become a career student. After graduation he plans to hide from the world of academia for a few years somewhere in East Asia.

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SPONSORS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENT ASSOCIATION ďżź UBC has long encouraged global citizenship as a key part of academic development. For many years, the International Relations Students Association (IRSA) has worked to develop co-curricular programs that help achieve this goal. We aim to provide students from a variety of disciplines with a forum for discussing international issues. IRSA membership is available to all UBC students and alumni.

THE AMS SUSTAINABILITY FUND The AMS Sustainability Fund is supported through a contribution of just slightly over $2 from each UBC student.

This fund of over $100,000 goes to support reducing the ecological footprint and increasing the social cohesion of the student community at UBC.

UBC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM The UBC International Relations program is a degree granting undergraduate program in the Faculty of Arts. With approximately 300 majors, the program is one of the largest in the Faculty. International Relations is an interdisciplinary major which permits students to take courses in a variety of disciplines including History, Political Science, Economics (the three core disciplines), as well as Geography, Asian Studies, and Sociology, among others. The IR program is a proud sponsor of the UBC Journal of International Affairs.

AMS STUDENT INITIATIVES FUND The AMS Student Initiatives Fund supports active AMS members that spearhead philanthropic and academic projects with up to $500 per project.

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THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

OTHER SPONSORS IRSA and the JIA would like to thank the following organizations and departments for their generous support of our programs: UBC Alma Mater Society UBC Arts Undergraduate Society The Liu Institute for Global Issues UBC Global Lounge