LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN
SECURITY FORCE CAPACITY BUILDING AND THE FUTURE OF THE CAF In “Unconventional Warfare,” Tony Balasevicius critiques the Department of National Defence’s concept of the Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO) which argues for agile, multi-purpose, and full-spectrum capable forces that can operate effectively while dispersed throughout the battlefield.27 He argues that the ADO concept may not be sufficiently robust to combat a sophisticated enemy with a large, well-organized military, particularly if the organization using ADO has a limited number of forces at its disposal. Based on experiences during Op ATHENA II it should be evident that the Taliban insurgents, while hardly sophisticated, were both motivated and resilient, and posed a significant challenge to Canadian forces. This challenge was amplified by the comparatively small and limited number of Canadian troops. Balasevicius introduces the concept of compound warfare, “the simultaneous use of conventional and irregular forces against an enemy.”28 Due to their local nature, indigenous troops offer significant advantages, such as superior intelligence and the ability to garner nature support and resources. Their specific use within combined warfare is referred to as unconventional warfare (UW), which “can be defined as the ability to organize, train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate forces in military and paramilitary operations.”29 In a context more specific to Canadian counterinsurgency, the COIN doctrine notes: Indigenous police forces may play a valuable role in the conduct of a COIN mission and will be a key element in a comprehensive approach… the presence of police forces, particularly if seen to be leading operations, will have a normalizing effect on the population... indigenous [military] forces should be seen, to the greatest extent possible, to be leading missions against the insurgents. This will indicate an attempt at a local solution to the insurgency and add legitimacy to the overall campaign… The training and development of indigenous forces will be a key part of security sector reform.30 27
Tony Balasevicius, “Unconventional Warfare,” Canadian Military Journal 9, no. 4 (2009), 30-40.
28
Ibid., 32.
29
Ibid.
30
Dept. of National Defence, “Counter-Insurgency Operations,” 32-33.
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