2013 EDITION THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2013 EDITION VOL . 28
THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP Buckley-Pearson on the relationship between executive constraints, aid and development
ARCTIC UNDER SIEGE Franks, Rounding, and Wildcat on Inuit and Sami struggles in the Arctic
JIA
THE UBC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2013
The Annual Publication of the International Relations Student Association The University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C.
Cover Design: Sandy Chu Cover Photograph: Sam Rowan
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Editor-in-Chief
Sam Rowan Senior Editors
Michael Barrett, Mollie Deyong, Kelsey Franks, Isabelle Plessis Junior Editors
Sammy Barker, Nikki Blu, Fatima Hewaidi, Julie Jenkins Natalya Kautz, Sabina Kravcakova, Fatemeh Mayanloo, Betty Zhang Head of Production
Sandy Chu Layout and Design
Anita Hung Cartoonist
Indiana Joel Marketing and Distribution
Annie Ju, Stephanie Xu Faculty Liaison
Emma Lange Contributors
Kate Beck, Mieka Buckley-Pearson, Colin Chia, Kelsey Franks, Ivo Martinich, Allison Rounding, Matt Wildcat
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
IV
Faculty Reviewers
Dr. Nathan Allen
Department of Political Science
Dr. Michael Byers
Department of Political Science
Dr. Arjun Chowdhury
Department of Political Science
Dr. Vinay Kamat Dr. Ashok Kotwal Dr. Steven Lee
Department of Anthropology Department of Economics Department of History
Dr. Richard Price
Department of Political Science
Dr. Allen Sens
Department of Political Science
Special Thanks
Irina Florov
Department of Political Science
Dr. Laura Janara
Department of Political Science
Dr. Richard Johnston
Department of Political Science
Justin Ritchie Dr. Jessica Wang
Alma Mater Society Department of History
2013 UBC International Relations Students Association | all rights reserved. 313 – 6476 NW Marine Drive | Vancouver, BC | Canada | V6T 1Z2 The UBC Journal of International Affairs is publication of the International Relations Students Association of the Alma Mater Society of British Columbia. The UBC logo and the name “UBC” are official marks of the University of British Columbia and are used in accordance with UBC Public Affairs visual guidelines. All articles published in the Journal of International Affairs represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the policies or opinions of the University of British Columbia, the staff of the Journal of International Affairs, or the International Relations Student Association. The University of British Columbia does not assume any responsibility for errors or omissions in this journal.
V
CONTENTS
III
Contributors
VI
Foreword
VII
Introduction
1
Mieka Buckley-Pearson A Healthy Relationship
29
Kate Beck Living in a Computer Graveyard
43
Ivo Martinich Long-Term Stalemate
55
Colin Chia Good Hedges, Good Neighbours?
66
Kelsey Franks )NDIGENOUSÒ)N¹UENCEÒINÒ!RCTICÒ0OLICY
76
Allison Rounding 2ECOGNIZINGÒTHEÒ2IGHTSÒOFÒTHEÒ3AMI
88
Matt Wildcat #OMMENTARY Ò6OICESÒINÒTHEÒ!RCTICÒ
93
Biographies
96
Sponsors
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
VI
FOREWORD Dear Reader, On behalf of the UBC International Relations Students Association, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the 2013 edition of IRSA s UBC Journal of International Affairs. The JIA is one of UBC s oldest and most celebrated undergraduate journals. For 28 years now, it has granted undergraduate students at UBC and abroad the rare opportunity to publish their work in a highly accredited faculty- and peer-reviewed academic journal. The JIA has developed a reputation as one of the most important undergraduate journals at UBC, continually striving to showcase the best of UBC›s undergraduate community to universities across North America. The ambitious scope of this year›s edition marks a continuation of this tradition of excellence. It showcases talented authors in U21, a network of 21 international research-based universities devoted to advancing global perspectives and international communication. I would like to cordially congratulate the JIA team for their time, dedication and passion to the 2013 edition, especially the Editor-in-Chief, editorial staff, and publication team. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support from our sponsors, the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the UBC International Relations Program, whom have always extended an open-door policy to IRSA staff. Without further ado ‒ please, enjoy. Sincerely, Karlson Leung President, 2012/2013 UBC International Relations Students Association
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
VII
INTRODUCTION Dear Reader, Welcome to the 2013 edition of the UBC Journal of International Affairs. We are proud to present six of the most thoughtful and compelling papers written by UBC undergraduate students this year. Thankfully, the pace of global politics has slowed of late. While financial instability and protest movements have kept our hearts racing over the past few years, we have recently had more time to carefully reflect on the underlying processes shaping the future of global politics. The 2013 Journal of International Affairs indicates how UBC undergraduates have reckoned with these changes. The papers in this volume draw our attention to the complexity of contemporary global politics, and their juxtaposition demonstrates the value of diverse methods and perspectives. Mieka Buckley-Pearson s contribution to this volume highlights the desirability of drawing conclusions only after observing broad trends across many cases, while Kate Beck emphasizes that we cannot lose sight of the uniqueness of each individual case. Ivo Martinich delves into the new face of armed conflict, yet as Colin Chia makes clear, traditional security concerns have not fully receded. Finally, Kelsey Franks and Allison Rounding remind us of the importance of inclusivity. It is imperative to bring all stakeholders into the formation of national policy, but we must not gloss over the agency of marginalized groups, who have often repurposed existing mechanisms in novel ways to press their claims. Publishing the Journal would not be possible without the hard work of many people. I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to the outstanding editors, faculty liaisons, designers, and distribution staff who have all worked enthusiastically to bring this publication to fruition. Generous funding from AMS Sustainability has allowed us to print using environmentally friendly materials for the second year in a row. Additionally, we could have not have asked for more steady and supportive partners over the past 28 years than the UBC International Relations Students Association and the UBC International Relations program. Program Chair Dr. Jessica Wang and several faculty members have made themselves available to review individual papers, and we have a stronger publication because of their guidance. Sincerely, Sam Rowan Editor-in-Chief 2013 UBC Journal of International Affairs
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
1
A Healthy Relationship A  Q UANTITATIVE  A NALYSIS  O F  T HE  R ELATIONSHIP  B ETWEEN  E XECUTIVE  ǥ ǧ Mieka  Buckley-Ââ€?Pearson*
““The  widening  gap  between  the  developed  and  developing  countries  has  become  a  central  issue  of  our  time.”�  Lester  B.  Pearson  et  al.,  Partners  in  Development,  1969.
IS  AID  A  VIABLE  TOOL  FOR  DEVELOPMENT? Since  the  time  of  The  Commission  on  International  Development  (or  the  Pearson  Commission)  in  1969,  the  development  of  a  world  “more  and  more  starkly  divided  between  the  haves  and  have-Ââ€?nots,  the  privileged  and  the  less  privileged,â€?1  has  been  one  of  the  international  community’s  greatest  concerns.   In  addressing  this  concern,  on  recommendation  from  the  Pearson  Commission,  member  states  of  the  Organisation  of  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development’s  (OECD)  Development  ••‹•–ƒÂ?…‡ ‘Â?Â?‹––‡‡ Č‹ ČŒ ƒ‰”‡‡† –‘ ”ƒ‹•‡ –Š‡‹” ƒÂ?Â?—ƒŽ …‘Â?–”‹„—–‹‘Â?• ‘ˆ ĆĽÂ…Â‹ÂƒÂŽ Development  Assistance  (ODA)  to  0.7%  of  their  national  income.2  This  was  seen  ƒ• –Š‡ Â?‘•– Â‡ĆĄÂ‡Â…Â–Â‹Â˜Â‡ Â?‡–Š‘† –‘ ˆƒ…‹Ž‹–ƒ–‡ ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ †‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?–ǥ ƒÂ?† ‹Â? ’ƒ”–‹…—Žƒ” –‘ improve  the  socio-Ââ€?economic  welfare  of  the  “have-Ââ€?nots.â€?  Since  1973,  a  minimum  of  USD  40.05  billion  has  been  transferred  annually  from  the  DAC  to  countries  requiring  development  assistance,  reaching  an  historic  high  of  USD  127.52  billion  in  2010.3  A  large  proportion  of  ODA  has  been  and  continues   *                        This  article  is  adapted  from  Mieka  Buckley-Ââ€?Pearson’s  undergraduate  honours  thesis.  Mieka  Buckley-Ââ€?Pearson,  “A  Healthy                           Relationship:  A  Quantitative  Analysis  of  the  Relationship  Between  Executive  Constraints,  Aid  and  Health  Outcomes  in                           Sub-Ââ€?Saharan  Africaâ€?  (BA  Hons  thesis,  University  of  British  Columbia,  2012).
1 Â
 Lester  B.  Pearson,  Partners  in  Development:  Report  on  the  Commission  on  International  Development  (New  York:  Praeger  Publishers,  1969),
                          7-Ââ€?8.
2 Â
 OECD,  “The  0.7%  ODA/GNI  target  –  a  history,â€?  http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3746,en_2649_34447_45539475_1_1_1_1,00.html.  Â
3 Â
 OECD  Stat  Extracts,  “Net  ODA  disbursements,  Total  DAC  countries,�  http://webnet.oecd.org/dcdgraphs/ODAhistory/.
2
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
Ǧ ǡ ǦƤ the 2010 total (USD 26.5 billion).4 These countries are generally perceived to be the least developed, or the most in need, of the international community. As many ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǧ ridden, most diseased and most corrupt states in the world, foreign governments, international institutions and non-‐governmental actors continue to seek ways to assist in their development and the development of their citizens. Substantial ƪ Ǧ ͥͣ͜͝ Ǥ hundreds of billions of dollars later, many of these countries are still struggling to ǡ Ƥ of the “central [issues] of our time.” Ultimately there is little consensus as to why underdevelopment persists in Africa, and whether foreign aid should be considered a viable tool for Ǥ ơ Botswana and Nigeria, both resource-‐rich and colonized by the British, yet the former far surpassing the latter in political, social and economic development? Perhaps part of the answer, only somewhat addressed in the popular debate, is political institutions. The relationship between political institutions and the socio-‐economic development of states is not a new topic of study for political ǡ Ǥ ơ on this relationship, particularly in developing countries, has only recently become popular amongst political scientists and economists alike. This paper seeks to add to the existing academic literature through a quantitative analysis of the relationship between aid, executive constraints and health outcomes in Sub-‐Saharan Africa. The analysis comprised a time series cross-‐ Ǧ Ƥ Ǧ ǡ ͥ͢͜͝Ǧͥ͜͜͞Ǥ To account for temporal dependencies in the data, the tests were also performed across four historical sub-‐periods that vary in length: post-‐colonial, Cold War, Ǧ ǡ Ǥ Ƥ Ǧ ȋͥͥ͜͝Ǧͤ͜͜͞Ȍ ȋ Ȍ Ƥ ǡ 4
ǡ Dz͜͡ ƥ ǡdz ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ͠͝Ȁ͜ǡͣ͟͢͠ǡ ̼̼̼̼̼̼̼ͥͣͥ͢͟͢͢͞͠͠͠͠͠͝͡͞͡͝͝͝͝ǡ͜͜Ǥ Ǥ
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
3
ͥͥ͜͝Ǥ Ƥ ǡ ơ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ ơ Ǥ ơ ȋ ơ Ȍǡ Ƥ Ƥ Ǥ support Todd Moss et al.’s theory of the aid-‐institutions paradox5: countries with ơ ǡ with weak political institutions (and a lack of overall development) that are the most in need of aid. Although further investigation is required, this paper establishes that executive constraints and political institutions in general are important variables to ơ Ǥ ǡ one piece of an increasingly complex aid-‐development puzzle. The following two sections will review some of the recent literature on these Ƥ Ǥ
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT In the past decade, the academic literature has focused on the impact of particular political institutions (as opposed to regimes types) on economic growth and development, especially in studies of the developing world. Stephen Knack et al. assert, “it is naïve to suppose that [either democracies or autocracies] will regularly have better economic performance than the other,”6 but perhaps it is the variance in institutions, both between and among regime types, that explains economic and social development. Economic performance depends at least partly on the “incentives and constraints”7 faced by those making political decisions, namely the executive. As Jennifer Gandhi argues, these institutions vary across regime type, “incentives, constraints, and institutions structure the behaviour of political actors ͡
Ƥ Ƥ Ǥ Dz Ǧ ǫ
State Building in Sub-‐Saharan Africa,” in Reinventing Foreign Aid, edited by William Easterly, 255-‐282 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008).
6
Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson, “Property and Contract Rights in Democracies,” in Democracy,
Governance and Growth, edited by Stephen Knack (Maryland: The University of Michigan Press, 2003): 136-‐180, 136.
7
Clague et al., 136.
4
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
within  authoritarian  regimes  as  much  as  they  do  for  their  democratic  counterparts.â€?8  Variances  in  incentives,  constraints  and  institutions  determine  the  degree  of  discretion  policymakers  have  to  take  either  “benevolent  measures  ‌  or  malevolent  actions,â€?  9  both  for  their  country’s  economic  growth  and  the  well-Ââ€?being  of  its  citizens.  The  literature  on  development  in  Africa  points  to  a  variety  of  institutional  •–”—…–—”‡• –Šƒ– Â?ƒ› ÂƒĆĄÂ‡Â…Â– ‡…‘Â?‘Â?‹… ‰”‘™–Š ƒÂ?† ™‡ŽŽnj„‡‹Â?‰Ǥ Â? Â’ÂƒÂ”Â–Â‹Â…Â—ÂŽÂƒÂ”ÇĄ –Š‡ literature  demonstrates  the  importance  of  executive  incentives  and  constraints,  including:  coalition  size  and  level  of  political  contestation,  degree  of  state  legitimacy,  degree  of  decentralization,  degree  of  public  scrutiny  of  the  executive  and  the  institutional  separation  of  powers.10  Durham  asserts,  “the  key  causal  institutional  characteristic  of  regimes  [in  creating  growth]  is  the  degree  of  policymaker  discretion  or  freedom  of  action.â€?11  Durham’s  assertion  is  representative  of  a  near  intellectual  consensus  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  restraints  on  executive  discretion  and  economic  growth.12  Whether  a  lack  of  restraints  is  attributable  to  state  legitimacy,13  coalition  size,14  or  institutional  separation  of  powers,15  it  increases  incentives  for  the  executive  to  use  state  resources  for  personal  enrichment  and  the  maintenance  of  power.16  This  phenomenon  is  often  called  “neopatrimonialism,â€?  particularly  with  regard  to  African  states.  Neopatrimonialism  is  when  “decisions  8 Â
 Jennifer  Gandhi,  “Dictatorial  Institutions  and  Their  Impact  on  Economic  Growth,â€?  in  European  Journal  of  Sociology  49  (2008):  3-Ââ€?30,  25.
9 Â
 J.  Benson  Durham,  “Economic  Growth  and  Political  Regimes,�  Journal  of  Economic  Growth  4,  (1999):  81–111,  81.
10 Â
 Durham,  “Economic  Growth  and  Political  Regimes;�  Pierre  Englebert,  State  Legitimacy  and  Development  in  Africa  (Boulder,  Colorado:  Lynne
                          Rienner  Publishers,  2000);  Aidan  Cox  and  John  Healey,  European  Development  Cooperation  and  the  Poor  (New  York:  St  Martin’s  Press,  2000);                           Bruce  Bueno  de  Mesquita  et  al.,  “Political  Institutions,  Policy  Choice  and  the  Survival  of  Leaders,â€?  British  Journal  of  Political  Science  32,  no.                           4  (2002):  pp.  559-Ââ€?590;  Rod  Alence,  “Political  Institutions  and  Developmental  Governance  in  Sub-Ââ€?Saharan  Africa,â€?  The  Journal  of  Modern ˆ”‹…ƒÂ? –—†‹‡• Í ÍžÇĄ Â?‘Ǥ ͞ǥ Č‹ÍžÍœÍœÍ ČŒÇŁ Í?͢Í&#x;ÇŚÍ?ͤͣǢ †™ƒ”† Ǥ ÂŽÂƒÂ‡Â•Â‡Â”ÇĄ ƒˆƒ‡Ž ƒ Â‘Â”Â–ÂƒÇĄ Ž‘”‡Â?…‹‘ Â‘Â’Â‡ÂœÇŚ ‡nj ‹Ž‹ƒÂ?‡•ǥ Â?†”‡‹ ŠŽ‡Ƥ‡”ǥ Dz ‘ Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?•                           Cause  Growth?,â€?  Journal  of  Economic  Growth  9,  no.  3,  (2009):  271-Ââ€?303;  John  Mukum  Mbaku,  Institutions  and  Development  in  Africa  (Trenton,                           New  Jersey:  Africa  World  Press,  2004);  A.  Cooper  Drury  et  al.,  “Corruption,  Democracy  and  Economic  Growth,â€?  International  Political  Science ‡˜‹‡™ ͣ͞ǥ Â?‘Ǥ ͞ǥ Č‹ÍžÍœÍœÍ˘ČŒÇŁ Í?ÍžÍ?ÇŚÍ?Í&#x;͢Ǣ Žƒ•–ƒ‹” Â?‹–Šǥ Dz ‡”Â?‹…‹‘—• ‹†Ǎǣ ‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ …‘Â?‘Â?› ‘ˆ ‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?• ƒÂ?† –Š‡ ƥ‡…– ‘ˆ ‘”‡‹‰Â? ‹†ǥdz                           Unpublished  manuscript,  16  May  2006,  1-Ââ€?39;  B.C.  Smith,  Good  Governance  and  Development  (New  York:  Palgrave  MacMillan,  2007);  Gandhi,                                “Dictatorial  Institutions  and  Their  Impact  on  Economic  Growth;â€?  Joseph  Wright,  “Do  Authoritarian  Institutions  Constrain?:  How  legislatures ÂƒĆĄÂ‡Â…Â– ‡…‘Â?‘Â?‹… ‰”‘™–Š ƒÂ?† ‹Â?˜‡•–Â?‡Â?–ǥdz Â?‡”‹…ƒÂ? ‘—”Â?ƒŽ ‘ˆ ‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ …‹‡Â?…‡ ͥ͞ǥ Â?‘Ǥ Íž Č‹ÍžÍœÍœÍ¤ČŒÇŁ Í&#x;͞͞njÍ&#x;Í Í&#x;Ǥ
11 Â
 Durham,  “Economic  Growth  and  Political  Regimes,�  81,  emphasis  in  original.
12 Â
 Glaeser  et  al.,  “Do  Institutions  Cause  Growth?,�  272.
13 Â
 Pierre  Englebert,  State  Legitimacy  and  Development  in  Africa.
14 Â
 Bueno  de  Mesquita  et  al.,  “Political  Institutions,  Policy  Choice  and  the  Survival  of  Leaders;�  Smith,  “Pernicious  Aid?.�
15 Â
 Wright,  “Do  Authoritarian  Institutions  Constrain?;â€?  Alence,  “Political  Institutions  and  Development  Governance  in  Sub-Ââ€?Saharan  Africa.â€?
16 Â
 Ibid.,  167.
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
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about resources are made by ‘big men’ and their cronies… who follow a logic of personal and particularist interest rather than national betterment.”17 In Sub-‐Saharan African states, a lack of strong institutional structures that constrain the freedom of the executive in policymaking has led to widespread neopatrimonialism, and development (both economic growth and material well-‐being) has become its victim.
HOW DOES AID FIT IN? Much of this literature also considers the relationship between aid, political institutions and development.18 Ƥ ǣ aid leads to deteriorations in governance; and aid has a minimal, and sometimes ǡ ơ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ both when governance is categorized broadly by regime type (democracy or dictatorship) or narrowly by particular institutions (such as restraints on executive discretion). Aid, like natural resource rents, is “unearned revenue”19 for governments. Governments can allocate unearned revenues to particular sectors or policies without public scrutiny. In the weak institutional environment that is characteristic of African states, these revenues are “either captured by the leader … or doled out as private goods to supporters rather than used to fund public goods provisions.”20 Bureaucrats are “not rewarded for focusing on their core development functions but rather on getting money from donors.”21 In this context, governments “behave in politically
17
Diane Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?,” Development Policy Review 5, no. 25 (2007): 499-‐614,
600.
18
Deborah Brautigam, “Aid Dependence and Governance,” Expert Group on Development Issues (2000:1); Englebert, State Legitimacy and
Development in Africa; Cox and Healey, European Development Cooperation and the Poor; Brautigam and Knack, “Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-‐Saharan Africa;” Alence, “Political Institutions and Development Governance in Sub-‐Saharan Africa;” Glaeser et al., “Do Institutions Cause Growth?;” Mbaku, Institutions and Development in Africa; Djankov et al., “The Curse of Aid,” World Bank, (April 2005); Smith, “Pernicious Aid?;” Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?;” Moss et al., “An Aid-‐Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-‐Saharan Africa,” Reinventing Foreign Aid, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Joseph Wright, “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 (2009): 552-‐571.
19
Smith, “Pernicious Aid?,” 2.
20
Ibid., 18.
21
Todd Moss et al., 263.
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sensible  yet  economically  damaging  ways.â€?22  This  results  in  decreased  public  goods  provision,  and  increased  isolation  of  the  executive  from  public  accountability;  or  in  other  words,  deteriorations  in  governance.  Aid  has  been  demonstrated  to  improve  governance  and  strengthen  institutional  structures  in  developing  countries,  but  almost  solely  when  these  institutional  structures  are  already  fairly  well-Ââ€?established  and  developed.23  Ironically,  aid  is  best  suited  to  improve  political  institutions  that  require  the  least,  if  any,  improvement. ‹Â?Â‹ÂŽÂƒÂ”ÂŽÂ›ÇĄ ‹– ‹• ‘ˆ–‡Â? ƒ”‰—‡† –Šƒ– –Š‡ ‡ƥ‡…– ‘ˆ ƒ‹† ‘Â? ‡…‘Â?‘Â?‹… ‰”‘™–Š ‹• dependent  on  the  existing  policy  environment,24 –Š‘—‰Š ‹– ‹• †‹Ƽ…—Ž– –‘ †‹•…‡”Â? ƒ clear  causal  relationship  between  aid  and  growth.25  Aid  has  been  demonstrated  to  Šƒ˜‡ ƒ Dz•–”‘Â?‰ ’‘•‹–‹˜‡ ‡ƥ‡…– ‘Â? ‰”‘™–Š ‹Â? Ž‘™nj‹Â?…‘Â?‡ …‘—Â?–”‹‡• ™‹–Š ‰‘‘† ’‘Ž‹…‹‡•ǥdz26  ƒÂ?† Â?‘ Â?‡ƒ•—”ƒ„Ž‡ ‡ƥ‡…– ‹Â? …‘—Â?–”‹‡• ™‹–Š ’‘‘” ‘” †‹•–‘”–‡† ’‘Ž‹…› ”‡‰‹Â?‡•Ǥ27  Again,  though  aid  has  the  potential  to  make  a  positive  contribution  to  the  development  ‡ƥ‘”–ǥ ‹–• •—……‡••‡• ƒ”‡ ”‡•–”‹…–‡† –‘ …‘—Â?–”‹‡• –Šƒ– ƒ”‡ †‘‹Â?‰ ˆƒ‹”Ž› ™‡ŽŽ –‘ „‡‰‹Â? ™‹–ŠǤ The  research  on  the  relationship  between  aid,  political  institutions  and  development  typically  focuses  on  economic  indicators  as  a  measure  of  development  ‘” ƒ‹† Â‡ĆĄÂ‡Â…Â–Â‹Â˜Â‡Â?‡••Ǥ ‡…‡Â?– Â”Â‡Â•Â‡ÂƒÂ”Â…ÂŠÇĄ Ž‹Â?‡ –Š‡ ™‘”Â? ‘ˆ ƒ…ƒ†‡Â?‹…• •—…Š ĥ Ԡ Ž‡Â?…‡ and  Alastair  Smith,  includes  both  economic  indicators  and  public  goods  provision  as  measures  of  development.  Public  goods  –  such  as  schools,  healthcare,  roads,  clean  drinking  water  and  adequate  sanitation  –  are  fundamental  to  the  overall  development  of  a  country.  It  is  important  to  examine  indicators  of  social  development  (such  as  the  ’”‘˜‹•‹‘Â? ‘ˆ …‡”–ƒ‹Â? ’—„Ž‹… Â‰Â‘Â‘Â†Â•ČŒÇĄ ™Š‡Â? †‹•…—••‹Â?‰ ƒ‹† Â‡ĆĄÂ‡Â…Â–Â‹Â˜Â‡Â?॥ ˆ‘” –™‘ ”‡ƒ•‘Â?•ǣ social  development  has  become  one  of  the  principal  objectives  of  ODA;28  and  social  •‡…–‘” ƒ‹† ‹• ‘ˆ–‡Â? …‘Â?•‹†‡”‡† –‘ „‡ –Š‡ Â?‘•– Â‡ĆĄÂ‡Â…Â–Â‹Â˜Â‡Ç¤29  22 Â
 Alence,  “Political  Institutions  and  Developmental  Governance  in  Sub-Ââ€?Saharan  Africa,â€?  167.
23 Â
 Mbaku,  Institutions  and  Development  in  Africa,  200. Â
24 Â
 Craig  Burnside  and  David  Dollar,  “Aid,  growth,  the  incentive  regime  and  poverty  reduction,�  in  The  World  Bank:  Structure  and  Policies,  edited
                          by  Christopher  L.  Gilbert  and  David  Vines  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000):  210-Ââ€?227,  224.
25 Â
 Roger  Riddell,  Does  Foreign  Aid  Really  Work?  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2007),  223.
26 Â
 Cox  and  Healey,  European  Development  Cooperation  and  the  Poor,  45.
27 Â
 Burnside  and  Dollar,  “Aid,  growth,  the  incentive  regime  and  poverty  reduction,�  210.
28 Â
—–Š ‡˜‹Â?‡ ƒÂ?† –‡˜‡Â? ÂƒÂ†Â‡ÂŽÂ‡Â–ÇĄ Dz ƒÂ? ‡ —‹Ž† ‡––‡” Â‘Â—Â•Â‡Â–Â”ÂƒÂ’ÇŤ Š”‡‡ ‡™ Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?• ‡•‹‰Â?‡† –‘ Â?’”‘˜‡ ܠ ĆĄÂ‡Â…Â–Â‹Â˜Â‡Â?‡••ǥdz ‹Â?
                          Reinventing  Foreign  Aid,  edited  by  William  Easterly  (Cambridge:  MIT  Press,  2008):  431-Ââ€?460,  432.
29 Â
 William  Easterly,  The  White  Man’s  Burden  (London:  Penguin,  2006);  Riddell,  Does  Foreign  Aid  Really  Work?;  Smith,  “Pernicious  Aid?.�
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
7
Though “economic growth and wealth creation are essential to development ǥ ƥ Ǥdz30 It is not only economic growth, but also growth in human capital that is essential to development.31 Most aid programs provide support for health, education, environment, and infrastructure initiatives as well as capacity and skill-‐building in a variety of sectors, including government. The share of the social sector in total allocable ODA to low-‐ income countries has increased from 29 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 2004.32 Figure 1 demonstrates the trends in ODA to Africa by sector, from 1990-‐2010.33 In 2010, 42 percent of all the ODA donated to Africa by the DAC of the OECD was transferred to the social sector, compared to only 18 percent transferred to the economic sector.34 Of the various programs and initiatives of all forms of foreign aid, social sector aid, and in particular health and education initiatives, are often considered Ǥ ǡ ơ recently become a focus of statistical analyses, and aid has been demonstrated to ơ ǡ Ǥ35 To my knowledge, there are no studies that also consider the interaction of executive ƪ Ǥ focused on the relationship between aid, political institutions and economic growth ơ Ǥ social sector in development initiatives, but that measuring social outcomes can be ƥ ǡ savings and investment. Data on poverty, health and other development indicators tend to be noisy and inconsistent.36 However, to fully understand the relationship ơ ǡ 30
Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 173.
31
Anthony Bebbington and Willy McCourt, “Introduction: A Framework for Understanding Development Success,” in Development Success:
Statecraft in the South, edited by Anthony Bebbington and Willy McCourt (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007): 1-‐29, 4.
32
ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ Dz ǣ ƥ
Development Assistance Flows,” February 2007, 9.
33
Note: Figures and tables are found after the text.
34
OECD, “Development Aid at a Glance: Statistics by Region 2. Africa,” 2012 edition, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf.
35
See Mishra and Newhouse, “Health Aid and Infant Mortality.”
36
Riddell, Does Foreign Aid Really Work?, 167.
8
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
development indicators in addition to economics. Furthermore, as the relationship between aid and political institutions is inherently dynamic, it is important to Ƥ Ǥ In summary, recent studies on the relationship between political institutions ơ Ƥ ơ development when the recipient state has strong political institutions. Governments ơ ǡ states that are often in the most need of aid. However, most studies focus on economic ȋ Ȍ ơ this is an incomplete measure. Other development statistics, such as social and infrastructure indicators, must be included for a holistic analysis. The use of social development indicators, and health outcomes in particular, in statistical analyses of ơ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ơ Ǥ ơ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ơ study. A NEW STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND AID EFFECTIVENESS
Research Design This paper seeks to add to the existing literature through a statistical analysis of the relationship between aid, executive constraints and health outcomes in Sub-‐ Saharan Africa. If the theories of Alence, Smith and others are correct, we would expect regimes with relatively weak institutions to experience a negative relationship with not only economic growth, but also public goods provision and other social development outcomes (such as health and education).
ơ ǡ including economic, wealth distribution and poverty reduction, infrastructure, education and health, among others. Unfortunately the data available for most of these indicators (such as wealth distribution and literacy rates) are noisy and utterly inconsistent. These indicators may have only recently been measured and recorded
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
9
for the region, have not been consistently recorded by a reliable source, or are simply ƥ ȋ ȌǤ exception. I have used two health outcomes (life expectancy and child mortality) as a ơ development. Political institutions have been measured as coalition size, degree of democratic contestation, and degree of restraints on the executive, among many others. Of all the indicators available for political institutions, the measure of executive constraints has the most explanatory power concerning whether aid is distributed ơ Ǥ ǡ of the executive are determinants of good governance.37 This is particularly true concerning the distribution of unearned revenues such as aid. In theory, the greater ǡ ƥ ǡ ơ Ǥ This analysis of the relevant literature has led me to the following research question: What is the relationship between executive constraints, aid and health outcomes in Sub-‐Saharan Africa? My hypothesis is that this relationship will be ǣ ǡ ơ ȋ ȌǤ ơ executive constraints and aid on health outcomes that is the focus of this study, ơ Ǥ hypothesis I performed a time series cross-‐sectional analysis of these indicators in Sub-‐Saharan African countries from 1960-‐2009.
Data This analysis will focus on the political institutions of independent Sub-‐ Saharan African states and the degree to which executive constraints either constrain ơ Ǥ ǡ ƥ Ǥ ǡ the following countries are excluded because of a lack of available data: Seychelles, 37
Alence, “Political Institutions and Developmental Governance in Sub-‐Saharan Africa,” 163.
10
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
Sao Tome and Principe and South Sudan. This leaves 46 countries to be included in the analysis, some of which have data for the entire period (1960-‐2009), and Ƥ (such as Namibia), or missing data (such as Somalia). The dataset comprised 2 078 observations. The data from 1960-‐2009 includes indicators for executive constraints, ƪ ȋ Ȍǡ ȋ ȌǤ ͥͥ͜͝ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ͥͥ͜͝Ǧͤ͜͜͞ǡ ƪ health sector ODA.
1. Executive constraints Ƥ ǡ ǡ obtained from the Polity IV project. The Polity IV project codes the “authority characteristics of states in the world system”38 for statistical analysis, classifying states as either democratic, anocratic, or autocratic. The component variable most relevant to this analysis is Executive Constraints (Decision Rules), labelled XCONST in the Polity IV database. This variable measures “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-‐making powers of chief executives.”39 Operationally, these limitations on executive authority are imposed by accountability groups, such as legislatures, “the ruling party in a one-‐party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-‐prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary.”40 Governments are given a score of 1 to 7, which I recoded as 0 to 6, where 0 is Unlimited Authority (for example, “the legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive”41) and 6 is Executive Parity or Subordination (for example, “a legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation”42). There are several missing values assigned to polities that are experiencing a political transition in some form. Figure 38
Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers and Monty G. Marshall, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-‐2010 – Data
Users’ Manual,” Center for Systemic Peace (12 November, 2010), 1.
39
Ibid., 24.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
11
2  summarizes  the  variable  Executive  Constraints,  demonstrating  the  trend  over  the Â Ć¤ÂˆÂ–Â›ÇŚÂ›Â‡ÂƒÂ” ’‡”‹‘†Ǥ – ‹• ”‡’”‡•‡Â?–ƒ–‹˜‡ ‘ˆ –Š‡ ‰‡Â?‡”ƒŽ ’‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ –”‡Â?† ‘ˆ –Š‡ …‘Â?–‹Â?‡Â?–ǥ from  the  post-Ââ€?colonial  period  (1960-Ââ€?1980)  and  subsequent  rise  in  authoritarianism,  to  the  resurgence  and  growth  of  democracy  from  1990  onwards. Â
2.  ‹† ƪ‘™• ‘” –Š‡ ’—”’‘•‡• ‘ˆ –Š‹• ƒÂ?ÂƒÂŽÂ›Â•Â‹Â•ÇĄ –Š‡ †‡ƤÂ?‹–‹‘Â? ‘ˆ –Š‡ •‡…‘Â?† ‹Â?†‡’‡Â?†‡Â?– Â˜ÂƒÂ”Â‹ÂƒÂ„ÂŽÂ‡ÇĄ ƒ‹† ƪ‘™•ǥ ‹• Ž‹Â?‹–‡† –‘ –”ƒÂ?•ˆ‡””‡† ˆ”‘Â? Â?‡Â?„‡”• ‘ˆ –Š‡ ǯ• –‘ †‡˜‡Ž‘’‹Â?‰ …‘—Â?–”‹‡• ƒÂ?† Â?—Ž–‹Žƒ–‡”ƒŽ ‹Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?•Ǥ Š‡ †‡ƤÂ?‡• ÂƒÂ•ÇŁ DzǼ –Š‘•‡ ƪ‘™• –‘ …‘—Â?–”‹‡• ƒÂ?† –‡””‹–‘”‹‡• ‘Â? –Š‡ ‹•– ‘ˆ ‡…‹’‹‡Â?–• ƒÂ?† –‘ Â?—Ž–‹Žƒ–‡”ƒŽ †‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?– ‹Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?• ™Š‹…Š ƒ”‡ ÇĽ ’”‘˜‹†‡† „› Â‘ĆĽÂ…Â‹ÂƒÂŽ agencies,  including  state  and  local  governments,  or  by  their  executive  agencies;  and  each  transaction  of  which  ‌  is  administered  with  the  promotion  of  the  economic  development  and  welfare  of  developing  countries  as  its  main  objective  ‌  and  is  concessional  in  character.â€?  43 Â
Š‹• †‡ƤÂ?‹–‹‘Â? ‘ˆ †‘‡• Â?‘– ‹Â?…Ž—†‡ Š—Â?ƒÂ?‹–ƒ”‹ƒÂ? ‘” ‡Â?‡”‰‡Â?…› ÂƒÂ‹Â†ÇĄ Â?‹Ž‹–ƒ”› ÂƒÂ‹Â†ÇĄ ’‡ƒ…‡Â?‡‡’‹Â?‰ ‘” ƒÂ?–‹nj–‡””‘”‹•Â? ‡ƥ‘”–•Ǥ – ƒŽ•‘ †‘‡• Â?‘– ‹Â?…Ž—†‡ ƒ‹† †‘Â?ƒ–‡† by  individuals,  NGOs,  or  charities.  It  does  include  aid  donated  by  international  ‹Â?•–‹–—–‹‘Â?• ȋ•—…Š ĥ –Š‡ ‘”Ž† ƒÂ?Â? ƒÂ?† –Š‡ ČŒÇĄ Â‘ĆĽÂ…Â‹ÂƒÂŽ ƒ‰‡Â?…‹‡• ȋ•—…Š ĥ Â?‹–‡† Nations  agencies),  and  states.  ODA  is  measured  as  Net  ODA  received  per  capita  (current  US$),  obtained  from  the  World  Bank. ‹‰—”‡ Í&#x; •—Â?Â?ƒ”‹œ‡• –Š‡ Â˜ÂƒÂ”Â‹ÂƒÂ„ÂŽÂ‡ÇĄ †‡Â?‘Â?•–”ƒ–‹Â?‰ –Š‡ –”‡Â?† ‹Â? ƒ‹† ƪ‘™• –‘ —„nj ƒŠƒ”ƒÂ? ˆ”‹…ƒ ‘˜‡” –Š‡ Ć¤ÂˆÂ–Â›ÇŚÂ›Â‡ÂƒÂ” ’‡”‹‘†Ǥ —”‹Â?‰ –Š‹• ’‡”‹‘† –Š‡ ƒ‹† ƒ‰‡Â?†ƒ (as  determined  by  international  institutions  such  as  the  World  Bank  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  United  Nations,  individual  powerful  states,  ƒÂ?† –‘ ƒ …‡”–ƒ‹Â? ‡š–‡Â?– –Š‡ ‹Â?ƪ—‡Â?…‡ ‘ˆ • ƒÂ?† ‘–Š‡” …‹˜‹Ž •‘…‹‡–› ÂƒÂ…Â–Â‘Â”Â•ČŒ ™‡Â?– through  several  transformations:  the  1960s  was  the  decade  of  industrialization  (such  as  infrastructure  projects);  the  1970s  marked  a  shift  of  focus  to  poverty,  redirecting  aid  towards  agricultural  projects  and  social  services;  the  1980s  saw  the  emergence  43 Â
 OECD,  “Is  it  ODA?�  Factsheet  –  November  2008,  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf,  emphasis  in  original.
12
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
ǡ ơ debt of burdened developing countries that included neoliberal reforms to economic institutions; the 1990s was the era of good governance and democratic reform; and the 2000s was the era of the Millennium Development Goals.44 With each era came ƪ ȋ ǡ ǡ others) and dollars. As of 1990, the OECD made public a database of sector-‐level ODA, including sectors such as Agriculture, Mineral Resources and Mining, Water Supply and Sanitation, Education, and Health.45 The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), an independent global research centre at the University of Washington, collects and analyses data on Development Assistance for Health (DAH) from a variety of sources, including the OECD. 46 I have derived a second indicator for aid ƪ ǡ Net Health ODA received per capita (constant 2008 US$), from the IHME (compiled from original OECD data) for the 1990-‐2008 period. ǡ ơ 1990s. Figure 4 summarizes the variable, demonstrating the trend in health sector aid ƪ Ǧ ͥͥ͜͝Ǧͤ͜͜͞Ǥ
3. ơ Ƥ ơ ǣ Dz reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity … health, and other measures of human welfare.”47 As discussed above, due to the availability of data, ơ ǣ life expectancy (years) and child mortality (under 5 deaths per 1 000 live births). This data was also obtained from the World Bank. Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the general Ƥ Ǧ Ǥ expected, health indicators for the region improve overall during the period. The trends in the data described above demonstrate that both aid and 44
ǡ ǣ ǡ ȋ ǣ ơ ǡ ͜͜͞͡Ȍǡ ͝͠͞ǡ ͣ͟͝Ǧͣͣ͟Ǣ ǡ
Dead Aid (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2009), 10-‐28.
45
OECD, “Stat Extracts.”
46
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, “Global Health Data Exchange,” http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/ghdx.
47
ǡ Dz ǣ ơ ǡdz ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ǧ ơ Ǥ
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
13
ƪ ǡ of history. Unlike life expectancy and child mortality, they do not follow a relatively homogenous pattern. In general, studies of this nature have not accounted for these temporal dependencies in the independent variables. As the overall period may conceal the heterogeneity of the data, I performed the analysis both for the overall period and within the following historical periods: the post-‐colonial era (1960-‐1975), the Cold War era (1976-‐1989), the post-‐Cold War era (1990-‐1999), and the millennium ȋ͜͜͜͞Ǧͥ͜͜͞ȌǤ Ƥ ǡ ǡ in executive constraints and foreign aid. These trends are juxtaposed in Figure 7; the reference lines delineate the four historical eras for clarity. A brief explanation of the trends in each period is outlined below: Ȉ Ǧ ȋͩͦ͡͠Ǧͩͧͥ͡Ȍ. During this period, 43 of the 46 countries considered in this dataset gained independence or had done so previously. Ƥ ǡ Dz progress” as the “march of African nationalism seemed invincible.” 48 However, these nations with little experience of representative democracy overwhelmingly embraced the “traditions of autocratic governance, paternalism and dirigisme [that] were embedded in the [colonial] institutions the new leaders inherited.”49 Decolonization was followed by a steep decline in executive constraints (from a score of 2.3 to 1.4) and Ƥ ȋ ͊͝Ǥ͞ ͊͞͝Ǥ͡ȌǤ This is also the era of the aid agenda focusing on industrialization, as well as some poverty reduction strategies. Aid was used by various actors to ƪ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ Ȉ ȋͩͧͦ͡Ǧͩͨͩ͡Ȍ. These newly independent states were the site of proxy wars, political interventions by foreign powers, and economic battles during the Cold War.50 ƪ era remained strong (colonial institutions and ties, as well as Cold War 48
Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 141.
49
Ibid., 154.
50
Ibid., 148.
14
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
interests), while the aid agenda shifted to focus on free-‐market solutions to better the desolate economic state of the region. During the latter part of the Cold War, the region experienced a moderate decline and relative stagnation in executive constraints (from a score of 1.4 to 1.1), as well as a steep increase in ODA across the region (from $22 per capita to $62.7). Ȉ Ǧ ȋͩͩ͡͠Ǧͩͩͩ͡ȌǤ ơ Dz historical opportunity to impose its political and economic values across the globe with Africa as a prime target.”51 Democratization became a precondition for countries to receive foreign aid and loans from both international institutions and some states. Simultaneously, domestic factors such as popular movements and a growing middle class popularized democratic reforms across the continent.52 This era is marked by a steep increase in executive constraints (from a score of 1.9 to 3.3). However, aid ƪ donors began to experience fatigue with the overall lack of progress in the region. Over the course of this period, ODA declined to nearly half its initial amount, from $75.5 per capita in 1990 to $39 per capita in 1999. Ȉ ȋ͢͠͠͠Ǧͩ͢͠͠Ȍ. After a steep decline in the post-‐Cold War era, the adoption of the MDGs in 2000 revitalized donors and ODA redoubled from $33.6 per capita in 2000 to $76.3 per capita in 2009. The wave of democratization in Sub-‐Saharan Africa from the previous era continued, ǡ ơ region: executive constraints increased from a score of 3.2 in 2000 to 3.5 in 2009.
RESULTS As this analysis is both a time-‐series and cross-‐section, I have used the Prais-‐ 51
Apollos O. Nwauwa, “Concepts of Democracy and Democratization in Africa Revisited” (paper presented at the Fourth Annual Kent State
University Symposium on Democracy, April 28-‐29, 2004).
52
Claude Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 1 (2001): 32-‐44, 33
.
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
15
Winsten regression with correlated panel-‐corrected standard errors to account for autocorrelation. Furthermore, I have performed the regression in several time periods to account for possible confounds. The regression measures the respective ơ ȋ capita) and Executive Constraints on both child mortality and life expectancy. The ơ ǡ which measures the extent to which the latter either expands or constrains the ơ ȋ ȝ ODA*Constraints). The estimation model is outlined by the following regression equation: Health Outcome = ß0 + ß1*ODA + ß2*Constraints + ß3ODA*Constraints Each independent variable (Net ODA received per capita, Net Health ODA Ȍ ơ ȋ ODA*Constraints and Net Health ODA*Constraints) is expected to have a positive ơ ȋ ǡ Ȍǣ ß1>0
ß2>0
ß3>0. Similarly,
ơ ơ ȋ ǡ ͡ ͝ ͜͜͜Ȍǣ ß1<0 ß2<0 ß3<0. Table 153 ơ ǡ ȝ Ƥ Ǧ (1960-‐2009), where the constant rate of child mortality is 175 (under 5 deaths per ͝ ͜͜͜Ȍ ͝ ͥ͟͟ Ǥ ƥ received per capita and child mortality is -‐0.036: as net ODA increases by $1, the rate of child mortality decreases by 0.036. An increase of $100 of foreign aid per capita will save the lives of 3.6 children per 1 ͜͜͜ǡ Ǥ Ƥ ȋ Ϗȁ ȁϋ͜Ǥ͜͜͠Ȍǡ ǡ ǡ Ƥ ơ Ǧ Ǥ Ƥ 53
Tables are found at the end of the text.
16
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
(Executive Constraints and Net ODA*Constraints). This result suggests that executive ơ ǡ Ǥ ͞ ơ ǡ ODA received per capita, Executive Constraints, Net ODA*Constraints and Net Health ODA*Constraints on child mortality in the sub-‐period (1990-‐2008). It is in this period that the interaction of ODA (both net and health) and executive constraints has a Ƥ ơ Ǥ ƥ ȝ and child mortality is -‐0.006, with a constant of 137 (under 5 deaths, per 1,000) and a total 868 observations. As Executive Constraints increases at a rate of 1 (on a scale of 0 to 6 where 0 indicates unlimited executive authority and 6 indicates executive Ȍǡ ơ ͜Ǥ͜͜͢Ǥ ǡ ơ ǡ Ƥ ȋ Ϗȁ ȁϋ͜Ǥ͢͝͝ȌǤ ǡ ơ diminishes and eventually becomes negative. An increase from 0 to 6 in Executive ƥ ͜Ǥ͜͟͢ ȋ͜Ǥ͜͜͢ȝ͢Ȍǡ ͜Ǥ͜͝͠ Ǧ͜Ǥ͜͞͞ǡ ơ child mortality. The interaction of Net Health ODA received per capita and Executive ȋ ȝ Ȍ ơ ODA. Without constraints, Net Health ODA received per capita has a negative ơ ǣ ͊͝ decrease in child mortality of 0.613; or, for every increase of $10 per capita in foreign ǡ ͢Ǥ͟͝ Ǥ ƥ with the introduction of constraints. An increase of 1 (on a scale of 0 to 6) in Executive ơ ͜Ǥͣͣ͜Ǥ ͝ in Executive Constraints, for every increase of $1 of Net Health ODA received per capita, the rate of child mortality decreases by 0.536. With a score of 6 in Executive Constraints (an increase in 6 on the scale), for every increase of $1 of Net Health ODA received per capita, the rate of child mortality decreases by 0.151. Executive Ƥ ơ Ǥ Ƥ
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
17
aid, it is also restrained by executive constraints. This is a curious and unexpected result requiring further research. The relationships of the independent variables and the second health outcome, life expectancy, are similar to child mortality in both periods. Table 3 ơ ǡ ȝ ȋ Ȍ Ƥ Ǧ ȋͥ͢͜͝Ǧͥ͜͜͞Ȍǡ where the constant is 48.8 in a total 2 039 observations. As was the case with child ǡ Ƥ ǡ ƥ which is 0.003. For every increase of $1 in foreign aid, life expectancy increases by 0.003. Or, an increase in $100 of ODA per capita will add three years of longevity. ǡ Ƥ ǡ ơ Ƥ Ǥ ͠ ơ ǡ ODA received per capita, Executive Constraints, Net ODA*Constraints and Net Health ODA*Constraints on life expectancy in the latter period (1990-‐2008). Once again, the interaction of net ODA and executive constraints (Net ODA*Constraints) Ƥ ǡ ƥ ͜Ǥͤ͜͜͜Ǥ Ƥ ǣ ͊͜͝ ͜Ǥ͢ ǡ ȝ Ƥ ȋ Ϗȁ ȁϋ͜Ǥͤ͝͠ȌǤ ǡ ơ ǡ paribus, at increasing life expectancy. ǡ ơ ȋ ȝ Ȍ Ƥ ȋ ơ ơ Ȍ Ǧ ȋͥͥ͜͝Ǧͤ͜͜͞ȌǤ Ƥ Ǧ method assumes homogeneity in the data. The trends in aid and executive constraints are both heterogeneous and temporally dependent, as described under “Data.” To account for these temporal dependencies, I have divided the data into four historical periods: the post-‐colonial era (1960-‐1975), the Cold War era (1976-‐1989), the post-‐ ȋͥͥ͜͝Ǧͥͥͥ͝Ȍǡ ȋ͜͜͜͞Ǧͥ͜͜͞ȌǤ Ƥ ȋ Dz Ȃ ͟Ǥ ơ dzȌǡ
18
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
Figure 7. ơ ͡ ȋ Ȍ and 6 (life expectancy). In Table 5, Net ODA*Constraints is demonstrated to have Ƥ except for the most recent millennium era (2000-‐2009). From era to era, executive ơ ǡ ƥ Ǧ͜Ǥͥ͟͝͠ Ǧ ǡ ƥ Ǧ͜Ǥͥ͜͜͠ the post-‐Cold War era. In the post-‐colonial era, as Executive Constraints increases at ͝ǡ ơ ͜Ǥͥ͟͝͠Ǥ ƥ ȋǦ͜Ǥͥ͝͝Ȍ Ƥ ǡ ͜ ͝ ơ ǣ ͊͜͝ capita per year would reduce child mortality by 2.6 (-‐0.119 – 0.1439). In the post-‐Cold ǡ ƥ ȋ͜Ǥ͜͟͡Ȍ ơ ȋ Ƥ ȌǤ ơ ǡ Ǥ would require an increase from 0 to 4 in Executive Constraints for aid to have a negative relationship with child mortality (-‐0.0094*4 = -‐0.0376). With such an increase, $10 of aid per capita per year would reduce child mortality by 0.37. In Table 6, Net ODA*Constraints is demonstrated to have a positive and Ƥ ǡ most recent millennium era (2000-‐2009). The overall trend in the data is similar ǣ ơ ǡ ǡ ƥ ͜Ǥͣ͜͝͡ Ǧ ǡ ƥ ͜Ǥ͜͜͝ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ͜ ͝ǡ ơ ǡ ͜Ǥ͜͝͞ ȋ Ϗȁ ȁϋ͜Ǥ͜͞͡Ȍ ͜Ǥͣͣ͜͞Ǥ executive constraints, $10 of aid would add one-‐tenth of a year to life expectancy. With executive constraints, $10 of aid adds more than one quarter of a year. ơ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ơ Ƥ child mortality (-‐0.0094) and increasing life expectancy (0.0016). In the year 1995,
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
19
ơ ȋ ͢ Ȍ ƥ Ǧ͜Ǥ͜͢͡͠ ȋǦ͜Ǥͥ͜͜͠ȝ͢ȌǤ ͊͝ Ǧ͜Ǥ͜͟͢ ȋƤ Table 1) when there are no constraints, $1 of aid would have reduced child mortality at a rate of -‐0.0924 in South Africa, where the constant rate of child mortality is 61 deaths per 1 000. South Africa received $10 of aid per capita in 1995, reducing the rate of child mortality by nearly one death per 1 000, from 61 to 60 (in addition to other factors that reduced child mortality). In comparison, aid transferred to Sierra Leone (with a score of 0 in executive constraints) was not expanded by executive constraints. In the same scenario, $1 of aid reduces child mortality at a rate of -‐0.036, where the constant rate of child mortality is 271 deaths per 1 000. Sierra Leone received $53 of aid per capita in 1995, reducing the rate of child mortality by 1.9 deaths per 1 000, from 271 to nearly 269 (again, in addition to other factors that reduced child mortality). If South Africa had received $53 in aid per capita, its rate of child mortality would have been reduced by 4.77 deaths per 1 000 due to strong executive constraints. The impact of 1 aid dollar in South Africa was greater than in Sierra Leone due to executive constraints. Ƥ ơ increasing life expectancy in states with strong executive constraints, or a good Ǥ Ƥ ơ ǡ paper. However, countries with good policies are rarely those in need of foreign aid. The comparison of South Africa and Sierra Leone demonstrates the irony in the aid-‐institutions paradox: countries most in need of aid, such as Sierra Leone, ơ designated purposes, such as improving the health of citizens; while countries with ǡ ǡ ơ but are less in need. The international community is inclined to donate to those who are perceived to be in need: of the top ten recipients of foreign aid in Sub-‐Saharan Africa in 2010, 60% had a score lower than 3 in executive constraints (see Figure 8 for list).
20
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
CONCLUSION: AID, EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS & HEALTH OUTCOMES This paper takes a time-‐series cross-‐section approach to estimate the ability ơ Ǧ Ǥ Ƥ ơ ǡ it is an average of the data across a heterogeneous set of countries. In an attempt to account for heterogeneity, and particularly temporal dependencies in the data, I divided the analysis across one health aid comparison period (1990-‐2008) and four historical sub-‐periods. I also considered other potential confounds (climate and Ȍǡ Ƥ Ǥ Ƥ Ƥ ǣ ͝Ȍ Ƥ ơ ǡ ͞Ȍ ơ Ǥ
ȋͥ͢͜͝Ǧͥ͜͜͞Ȍǡ ơ child mortality and increasing life expectancy. However, this relationship becomes Ƥ Ǥ Ƥ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ ơ ȋͥͣ͢͝Ǧͥͤͥ͝ȌǤ ǡ Ƥ ơ life expectancy only in the post-‐colonial era (1960-‐1975). Ultimately, net ODA has ơ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ơ increasing life expectancy in the 1990-‐2008 sub-‐period. Perhaps as health aid is directed towards particular initiatives, it “may be less fungible than overall aid,”54 and thus less susceptible to neopatrimonialism. However, the relationship between ơ Ƥ Ǥ further investigation. Furthermore, Ƥ ǡ ơ Ǥ ơ ȋ ơ Ȍ Ƥ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ ȋ 54
Mishra and Newhouse, “Health Aid and Infant Mortality,” 27.
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
21
expectancy in 1990-‐2008, and net ODA and child mortality in the millennium era ͜͜͜͞Ǧͥ͜͜͞ȌǤ ơ in reducing child mortality in the 1990-‐2008 sub-‐period, they generally expand the ơ Ǥ Ƥ ǣ ǡ ơ ȋ ȌǤ ǡ ƥ ǣ ơ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ ȋ Ƥ ȌǤ Ƥ (health outcomes improve at a greater rate in the earlier periods than in the later periods). ơ Ƥ ǡ not account for all potential confounds. It does not account for the cross-‐sectional ơ Ǥ Ƥ constraints and aid amongst countries in a given year or period, the results of this Ƥ ƪ Ƥ ơ ȋ ͥͤ͜͝Ǧ͜͜͜͞ Ƥ ȌǤ ǦƤ ơ Ǧ as well as temporal variation. This paper should be considered, along with the new but growing literature Ǧ ơ ǡ analysis at the country level. The relationship between political institutions and aid ơ ǣ Ǧ Ǧ ơ ǫ ǡ ǡ Ƥ ơ Ǥ This variable should be considered in case studies and micro-‐level analyses on aid ơ Ǥ ǡ ǡ particular one that addresses the cross-‐sectional variance in the data. Furthermore, as each recipient country has a unique experience with aid, studies of this nature Ǧ Ƥ ơ ǡ potentially inform the aid policies of donor countries, international institutions, or non-‐state actors of the international community.
22
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
23
24
BUCKLEY-PEARSON
A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
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26
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A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP
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8%& -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $Ì&#x2020;DLUV > @
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
29
Living in a Computer Graveyard AN A NTHROPOLOGICAL A NALYSIS O F T HE COMMUNITY A ND ECONOMY O F AGBOGBLOSHIE, ACCRA, G HANA Kate Beck
Agbogbloshie is an area on the outskirts of Ghana’s capital city Accra. Since the mid-‐1990s, its economy has rapidly transformed from an agricultural marketplace into one of the world’s largest “e-‐waste” dumping sites, specializing in the collection, recycling, marketing and disposal of scrap precious metals and used hard drives. This informal scrap-‐dealing economy is fueled by industrialized countries shipping used electronics to Ghana to be recycled, disposed of, or as “donations” intended to bridge the technological divide.1 International media, environmental groups, and NGOs have depicted Agbogbloshie as a slum causing severe, irreversible harm to the environment and the health of the local population, while Western governments have focused on the potential security threats of shipping unformatted used hard ơ Ǥ ǡ for the reduction or complete discontinuation of e-‐waste exports to Ghana. My aim in this paper is two-‐fold. First, I will situate the informal micro-‐level economy in Agbobloshie within a macro-‐level context by focusing on the colonial ǡ ǡ ƪ markets and the international community. At the micro-‐level, I will draw on the extensive research of Martin Oteng-‐Ababio to examine the site’s role as an informal economy as well as a cultural base where people live, work, and interact with each Ǥ Ǧ ơ ǯ ǡ ơ of employment and industry-‐related health and safety risks. At a macro-‐level these risks are shown to be exacerbated by poor domestic regulations and an economic disincentive to enforce the existing UN Basel Convention among importing and 1
In reality, most donated computers are usable for an average of three years before breaking and becoming e-‐waste themselves, while over 40%
of donated computers are nonfunctional upon arrival.
30
BECK
exporting nations alike. Once these tensions are established, I aim to show how a synthesis of micro-‐level and macro-‐level considerations supports a third policy option that neither halts the global e-‐waste trade nor upholds the laissez-‐ faire status quo. If regional, domestic, and international bodies work together to formalize and thus legitimize the global e-‐waste trade through regulatory policy, the industry might reach its true potential, as a promise of economic development and secure livelihoods in Agbogbloshie and all of Ghana.
Ƥ ǡ economic factors that have led to the emergence of the Agbogbloshie e-‐waste recycling industry and informal settlement. In the second section, I discuss the development of Agbogbloshie’s informal e-‐waste economy in the context of the ǡ ơ ǯ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ to reveal tensions between the promises and threats of the industry, including the contradictions between local and outsider perceptions of its value as an informal community, as well as its role in the international sphere. Ultimately, I argue the Ǧ Ƥ considered at both a domestic and international policy level. Rather than condemn Agbobloshie outright, the international community should recognize the site’s role as a local, community and cultural base, as well as its potential to contribute positively to economic development in Ghana. The international community should also encourage the Ghanaian government to integrate the e-‐waste trade Ƥ Ƥ worker safety standards can be enforced.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE E-WASTE RECYCLING INDUSTRY IN AGBOGBLOSHIE
Globalization and foreign intervention are not new in Ghana. The region where Ghana is located today was declared the Gold Coast by British colonizers in 1844. By 1900, Britain had begun to develop a lucrative economy in the Gold Coast, focused mainly on the export of cocoa and gold. This resource-‐
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
31
based  economy  enabled  Britain  to  establish  colonial  institutions  and  cities  in  the  colonyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  resource-Ââ&#x20AC;?rich  southern  region.  Northern  Ghana,  which  is  in  the  Savanna  Belt  and  relatively  resource-Ââ&#x20AC;?poor,  received  no  socio-Ââ&#x20AC;?economic  assistance  from  the  British,  while  Southern  Ghana  became  Britainâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  â&#x20AC;&#x153;model  colony.â&#x20AC;?2  In  this  period,  the  British  established  Accra  as  the  capital  city  of  the  colony,  and  located  most  of  the  socio-Ââ&#x20AC;?economic  structures  and  government  institutions  there.  Today,  Accra  Greater  Metropolitan  Area  has  a  population  of  four  million  and  remains  the  nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  economic  and  political  hub.
Â? Í?ÍĽÍĄÍŁ Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x192; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; ƤÂ&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2030;Â&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Ǣ however,  many  of  the  legacies  of  British  colonialism  held  fast.  The  countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  economy  continued  to  rely  solely  on  the  export  of  raw  materials  and  the  import  of  Â?Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2014;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2030;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â?Ǥ Â&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x201D;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x160;ÇĄ Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x192;ÇŻÂ&#x2022; ƤÂ&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;ÇĄ focused  on  increasing  internal  industrial  production,  reducing  reliance  on  foreign  economies,  and  developing  social  programs  and  infrastructure  in  northern  Ghana.3  These  economic  and  social  development  initiatives  greatly  increased  the  national  debt,  however,  causing  the  economy  to  decline  into  recession.  Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  economic  downturn  during  the  1960s  featured  a  45  percent  decrease  in  minimum  wage,  a  46  Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2030;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2039;Â?ĆŞÂ&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; ÍĄÍ&#x153;ÇŚÍ?Í?ÍŁ Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; annually4.   Economic  prosperity  and  living  standards  in  Ghana  fell  dramatically  during  the  same  period,  particularly  among  the  countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  poor,  rural  population. This  historical  background  of  colonial  dependency  and  post-Ââ&#x20AC;?colonial  economic  mismanagement  has  inhibited  the  emergence  of  viable  economic  infrastructure  in  Ghana.  As  a  result,  Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  economy  has  relied  heavily  on  high  levels  of  consumption  from  developed  countries  ever  since  British  colonization,  and  this  trend  has  carried  through  to  its  export-Ââ&#x20AC;?centered  role  in  the  international  economy  today.  Ghana  once  provided  resources  for  developed  nations  and  today  it  manages  the  waste  they  produce.  Throughout  its  history  and  into  the  present,  Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  economy  has  centered  2 Â
 Kwadwo  Konadu-Ââ&#x20AC;?Agyemang,  â&#x20AC;&#x153;The  Best  of  Times  and  the  Worst  of  Times:  Structural  adjustment  programs  and  uneven  development  in  Africa,       Â
                          the  case  of  Ghana,â&#x20AC;?  Professional  Geographer  52  (2000):  469-Ââ&#x20AC;?483,  475.
3 Â
 Ibid.,  475.
4 Â
 â&#x20AC;&#x153;Ghana  â&#x20AC;&#x201C;  The  Economy,  Historical  Background,â&#x20AC;?  United  States  Library  of  Congress  Country  Studies,  http://countrystudies.us/ghana/63.html.
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BECK
on supporting the economic growth of wealthy states in the global economic “core” at the expense of its own development. Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) introduced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to address Ghana’s economic crisis in 1983 weakened the Ghanaian economy and social safety net even further. While there ǡ ƪ ǡ ơ were overwhelmingly negative. Ghana’s debt increased by nearly US$4.5 billion within 10 years, and the ensuing currency crash priced most businesses and individuals out of the market for needed imports, from medication to machinery, and other important supplies.5 The consequences of the SAPs were felt most acutely in Ghana’s northern provinces, the region with the highest levels of poverty, lowest accessibility to healthcare, and highest unemployment rates.6 Cuts to agriculture subsidies and government-‐funded social
Ghana ’s historical colonial dependency and post-colonial economic mismanagement has inhibited the emergence of viable economic infrastructure.
programs in northern Ghana caused rapid north-‐south migration in search of new livelihoods. Together, these conditions fostered the development of a large and lucrative informal urban economy in Accra. The Ghana E-‐Waste Assessment written under the auspices of the United Nations’s Basel Convention lists “migration from northern Ghana as a result of few income opportunities” as one of the four main factors of population growth in Agbogbloshie.7. Northern migrants have not only moved to Agbogbloshie because of its relatively inexpensive informal living accommodations, but have also begun participating in the e-‐waste economy in Agbogbloshie as a means 5
Konadu-‐Agyemang, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times,” 475.
6
Ibid., 475-‐477.
7
Ǧ Ǥǡ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ ȋ ͜͞͝͝Ȍǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ ȀƤ Ȁ
Amoyaw-‐ Osei_2011_GreenAd-‐Empa.pdf., 3.
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
33
of surviving in the urban environment.8 Today, 56 percent of the population works in “survival” industries, informal work that provides only the basic necessities for a person’s survival. This is believed to be largely due to the policies prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF almost 30 years ago.9 While the SAPs created favourable conditions for the development and growth of the informal e-‐waste economy in Agbobloshie, direct American, European and UN policies precipitated and then perpetuated it. In the 1980s, ǡ ơ Ƥ Ƥ import programs.10 By 1989, the majority of UN member states adopted the Basel Convention, which restricted and regulated the trans-‐boundary trade of hazardous waste. This convention has been expanded in recent years to include e-‐waste.11 The Basel Convention has however failed to adequately address the global e-‐waste trade. Many African countries, including Ghana, have resumed their peripheral roles as Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ƥ or development.12 Domestic Ghanaian policy has further encouraged the industry by leaving it unregulated. Currently, the Ghanaian government has not attempted to tax or restrict e-‐waste imports.13 The free and unrestricted importation of computers is a government initiative aiming to “decrease the technological divide” and increase the availability of computers to the Ghanaian population.14 Out of the estimated 280 000 tons of used technology delivered to Ghana annually, approximately 60 percent is repaired and sold in second-‐hand markets and 40 percent enters the recycling industry through informal collectors.15 Those devices that are repaired and sold have 8
Richard Grant and Martin Oteng-‐Ababio, “Mapping the Invisible and Real ‘African’ Economy: Urban E-‐waste Circuitry,” Urban Geography
33, no. 1 (2012): 1-‐21, 16
9
Martin Oteng-‐Ababio, “When Necessity Begets Ingenuity: E-‐Waste Scavenging as a Livelihood Strategy in Accra, Ghana,” African Studies
Quarterly 13, no. 1 (2012): 1-‐21, 2.
10
Dharam Vir, Education and Polity in Nepal: An Asian experiment (Northern Book Centre, 1988), 23.
11
“Overview of Basel Convention,” UN Basel Convention, http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx.
12
Ibid.
13
Amoyaw-‐Osei et al., Ghana E-‐waste Country Assessment, 2.
14
Ibid., 2.
15
Ibid., 1.
34
BECK
very short lifespans, with most ending up in the e-‐waste circuit within three years. This policy does, however, serve to justify non-‐interference by the Ghanaian government, meaning they are not obligated to tax or regulate shipments and dumping of e-‐waste by more developed nations. It can be concluded that this policy has not increased the ǡ Ǣ ǡ perpetuated the country’s historic peripheral role in the international economy, and initiated the rapid growth of the e-‐waste economy in Accra’s largest slum.
THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF AGBOGBLOSHIE ’S INFORMAL ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY Strict regulations on the disposal of hazardous waste have lead North American and European countries to look beyond their borders to dispose of or “donate” used computers and technology. The EU Waste Electric Equipment ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ by technological producers.16. In the US it costs approximately $500 to recycle one ton Ǧ ǡ ͊͜͠ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ Because the US has implemented laws that ban the disposal of e-‐waste in domestic Ƥ ǡ Ǧ is free and unregulated.17 The Basel Convention states that this is a form of NIMBY-‐ ism (“Not in my backyard”), meaning core states choose to ship waste to peripheral states with fewer environmentally-‐ and socially-‐conscious restrictions on disposal.18 Because of Ghana’s unregulated import regime for used electronics, the peripheral country imports hundreds of thousands of tons of e-‐waste annually. Although the Ghanaian government signed on to the Basel Convention in 2005, it has not been fully incorporated into legislation. Government has in fact moved in the opposite direction by increasing the imported electronics through the One Laptop per Child and the One Laptop per Household projects established in 2009.19 16
Marin Oteng-‐Ababio, “E-‐waste: an emerging challenge to Solid Waste Management in Ghana,” International Development Planning Review 32,
no. 2 (2010): 191-‐206, 191.
17
Ibid., 196.
18
“Overview of the Basel Convention.”
19
Ǧ Ǥǡ Ǧ ǡ ͞Ǣ Ǧ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢Ǥ
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
35
As a result, Agbogbloshie has established as an informal local economy that provides livelihoods for thousands of Accra’s most impoverished people. The e-‐waste industry in Agbogbloshie is a key sector of Accra’s economy. It generates $105 -‐ $268 million annually, directly employs 4 500 -‐ 6 000 people, and indirectly supports the livelihoods of 300 000 people nationwide.20 The site has also acquired a worldwide reputation for having a high degree of local expertise in extracting, recycling, and installing e-‐waste scraps. For this reason, I have chosen to examine Agbogbloshie not as a dump, but as a recycling site in the international commodity chain, which has the potential to become a location for innovative and sustainable e-‐waste management. This perspective builds on to the analysis of researcher Martin Oteng-‐Ababio, who has written numerous papers about Agbogbloshie that are referenced throughout my analysis. Previously in Accra, waste collecting was a stigmatized occupation. Waste collectors were called Kaya Bola, which is derogatory slang implying low rank in society.21 Today, the waste-‐collection industry is no longer limited to the marginalized Ǣ ǡ ends meet.22 The economy is composed of young, male full-‐time collectors and scrap dealers, and a small number of schoolchildren who collect part-‐time to provide an additional income for their families. While some women work directly in the e-‐waste industry, most participate by providing complementary goods and services for sale, such as tools, food, and water.23 Agbogbloshie workers are organized in a hierarchy of scrap collectors, refurbishers, middlemen, and scrap dealers. A scrap collector’s role is to sort through e-‐waste, dismantling pieces by hand or with rudimentary tools, in search of recyclable parts or precious metals. Scrap collectors are considered the lowest in the economic hierarchy, but are able to gain higher earnings and stronger bargaining positions ǡ Ƥ
20
Ibid., 6-‐7.
21
Grant and Oteng-‐Ababio, “Mapping the Invisible and Real ‘African’ Economy,” 4.
22
Oteng-‐Ababio, “When Necessity Begets Ingenuity,” 3.
23
Ibid., 7.
36
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parts.24 The middlemen buy recyclables from collectors, and then sell them to local or foreign scrap dealers. These individuals have well-‐formed connections in scrap collecting and scrap-‐dealing circles, allowing them to buy high-‐quality, low-‐priced Ƥ Ǥ25 Many scrap dealers reprimand middlemen for exploiting both the collectors and the dealers. The scrap dealers, however, are at the top of the hierarchy and earn Ƥ ȋ ͊͜͡ ȌǤ Ƥ ǡ exporters. Dealers can also become more competitive by specializing in certain types ǡ ǦƤ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ƪ ǡ ƥ Ǥ26 Agbogbloshie’s e-‐waste recycling industry is built on the key principles of an informal economy. These include a lack of government regulations or monitoring, Ƥ work.27 As the e-‐waste industry in Agbogbloshie has grown, the recycling community has established formal organizations to protect the industry’s vulnerable workers. The Ghana Scrap Dealers Youth Association is one example. Membership provides ƪ ǡ Ƥ Ƥ Ǥ28 The association has 2 000 members, although many scrap dealers are not members. Other associations, including a Repairers’ Association (GESTA) have also been established to formally organize and ơ Ǥ Research on Agbogbloshie’s recycling economy by NGOs, the UN, Ghanaian government organizations and universities has also become more prevalent in recent Ǥ Ƥ ǡ Ƥ ǡ Ƥ ǡ ǡ 24
Grant and Oteng-‐Ababio, “Mapping the Invisible and Real ‘African’ Economy,” 15.
25
Ibid., 15.
26
Ibid., 13.
27
“Informal economy,” International Labour Organization, http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/employment-‐promotion/informal-‐economy/lang-‐
en/index.htm.
28
Grant and Oteng-‐Ababio, “Mapping the Invisible and Real ‘African’ Economy,” 15.
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
37
Ƥ Ǥ Ƥ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ the informality of the occupation. The scrap dealers, middlemen and collectors interviewed were only able to verbally estimate their daily and total earnings, and the Ƥ Ƥ estimated due to the lack of government monitoring.
MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE AGBOGBLOSHIE NEIGHBOURHOOD AND ITS INHABITANTS The informal economy’s workers have also become inextricably tied to national and international formal economies. E-‐waste is delivered to Accra’s international airport or seaport, marking Agbogbloshie as the end-‐of-‐cycle waste-‐ management center in the international computer and electronics industry.29 29
Ibid., 2.
38
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Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2020;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2021;Â? Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x203A;Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;ƤÂ?Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x192;ÇĄ Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2021;Â&#x161;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;ƤÂ?Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x203A;Â&#x192; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Ǥ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x203A;Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â? Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;ÇŚÂ&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; chains  of  the  formal  economy  through  downstream  processors,  industries  that  use  these  recycled  parts  in  production.30  Because  the  Agbogbloshie  economy  is  relatively  new  and  rudimentary,  many  of  the  intensive  recycling  operations  must  be  performed  in  more  developed  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  sites  in  China  or  India.  Wiring  boards  are  transported  to  informal  recycling  sites  in  either  of  these  two  countries,  while  cathode  ray  tubes  and  hazardous  waste  (including  batteries  and  backlights)  must  be  sent  to  specialized  recycling  facilities,  which  are  part  of  the  formal  economy.31  This  intricate  international  trade  network  ties  Agblogboshie  to  the  formal  global  economy,  complicating  its  informal  and  unregulated  local  status  and  implicating  the  international  community.
While  Agbogbloshieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  industry  has  rapidly  developed  into  a  lucrative  sector  that  connects  Accraâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  informal  economy  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  the  region  cannot  be  understood  simply  as  the  end  of  the  line  in  the  global  commodity  chain.  Agbogbloshie  must  also  be  recognized  as  a  neighbourhood,  which  has  developed  within  in  the  context  of  the  international  economy  and  provides  informal  settlements,  facilities,  and  rudimentary  resources  for  more  than  40  000  of  the  worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  most  impoverished  people.32 Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â?Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x192;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  economy  both  positively  and  negatively:  by  earning  a  livelihood  from  it,  by  the  more  general  wealth  it  has  brought  to  the  community,  and  by  the  pollution  produced  by  the  recycling  operations.  For  Accraâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  poor,  uneducated,  and  unemployed,  Agbogbloshie  has  become  a  living  community,  and  the  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  economy  has  become  its  means  of  survival.  The  Â&#x2021;ÇŚÂ&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x203A; Â&#x2018;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â?Â&#x2039;ƤÂ&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x203A;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2030;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;ÇŻÂ&#x2022; destitute  population,  providing  incomes  that  are  higher  than  Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  formal  minimum  wage.  Workers  who  were  previously  unemployed  or  forced  to  migrate  30 Â
 Samuel  Agyei-Ââ&#x20AC;?Mensah  and  Martin  Oteng-Ââ&#x20AC;?Ababio,  â&#x20AC;&#x153;Perceptions  of  Health  and  Environmental  Impacts  of  E-Ââ&#x20AC;?Waste  Management  in  Ghana,â&#x20AC;? Â
                          International  Journal  of  Environmental  Health  Research  22,  no.  6  (2012):  500-Ââ&#x20AC;?517,  504.
31 Â
 Amoyaw-Ââ&#x20AC;?Osei  et  al.,  Ghana  E-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  Country  Assessment,  79.
32 Â
Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x160;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?ÇĄ Dz Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â? Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;ÇŁ Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;ÇŚÂ&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ĆĽÂ&#x2026;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2030;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2030;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;ÇĄÇł Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022;
                          1,  no.  1  (2012):  11-Ââ&#x20AC;?17.
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
39
from the failing agricultural industries in Ghana’s north now have the opportunity Ƥ ȋ $380-‐460 per month, civil servants earn $93 per month).33 Children, who work part time as scrap collectors, can potentially provide an additional $20 per month to their family’s income, equivalent to two weeks rent in Agbogbloshie.34
American and European laws banning e-waste DISPOSALÒINÒLANDµLLSÒ has resulted in it being shipped to developing countries where importation is free and unregulated.
Although Ghana’s position in the international commodity chain has allowed the e-‐waste industry to generate relatively good incomes for some individuals, work and life in Agbogbloshie remains precarious for most. Interviews with e-‐waste workers reveal “the economic hardship and livelihood fragility of this industry.”35. While earnings from scrap dealing have the potential to be very high, Ƥ ƪ Ƥ for all actors in the sector due to the lack of ǡ ƪ
international economy, and increased local competition. The informality of the economy means there is little job security, which increases the precariousness of Ǧ Ǥ ͤ͜͜͞ ǡ ǡ Ƥ ơ Ǧ Ǥ decreased, waste produced from the replacement of electronics has decreased as well. The demand and prices for recycled precious metals and other computer parts have also fallen.36 Ƥ incomes and job security of the members of the Agbogbloshie community. This peripheral industry within the international economy has developed within the most peripheral area of Accra. Lack of government funding and oversight 33
Ibid., 9.
34
Ibid., 12.
35
Grant and Otang-‐Ababio. “Mapping the Invisible and Real ‘African’ Economy,” 9.
36
Meng Xing, “An Investigation of the Situation of E-‐Waste Recycling,” Urban Media Networks (2009), 6.
40
BECK
in Agbogbloshie means poorly built high-‐density housing and unhygienic sewage systems and water sources continue to be the norm. These poor living conditions have resulted in increased rates of illnesses, such as malaria and gastro-‐intestinal diseases, in the Agbogbloshie community.37 Although the e-‐waste economy has been able to provide Agbogbloshie’s population with improved economic means to establish livelihoods, prosperity has not translated into the development of improved community infrastructure. Living and working conditions in Agbogbloshie therefore remain precarious, perpetuating the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment despite opportunities for promising individual earnings. International and local contradictions are pronounced in the analysis of health risks in the community. International media, NGOs, and the UN Basel Convention have made the health risks associated with e-‐waste recycling a major policy concern. According to Greenpeace, health risks include “acute damage to the lungs from inhalation of fumes of heavy metals, […] mental retardation in case of lead exposure, […] damage to blood cells, the kidney, and predispositions to cancers.”38Ǥ ǯ Ƥ the international community purports. All respondents in a survey by Samuel Agyei-‐ Mensah and Martin Oteng-‐Ababio believed that working in the e-‐waste industry did have health impacts, but the biggest health impacts were “accident induced” injuries (burning, cuts, scrapes, etc).39 Within the Agbogbloshie community, youth scrap collectors were much less likely to recognize the potential hazards of working and living in Agbogbloshie. Men in the e-‐waste industry perceived health risks as being Ƥ ǯ ǡ women’s traditional roles in Ghanaian society as caregivers and environmental and health stewards.40 For most survey respondents, the income assurance of employment in the e-‐waste industry outweighed associated environmental and health hazards. Lastly, the majority of respondents believed that, despite the potential health risks of the e-‐waste 37
Ahlvin, “The Burden of the Kayayei,” 12.
38
Amoyaw-‐Osei et al., Ghana E-‐waste Country Assessment.
39
Agyei-‐Mensah and Oteng-‐Ababio, “Perceptions of Health and Environmental Impacts,” 513.
40
Ibid.
LIVING IN A COMPUTER GRAVEYARD
41
industry, Agbogbloshie provided them and their families with a “decent livelihood” and was comparatively better than the alternatives.41 Moreover, respondents with the highest incomes, who had created the best livelihoods from the e-‐waste industry, were less likely to believe there were health risks connected with their work. This overwhelming local support for the industry calls into question the univocal condemnation from international NGOs and governance bodies. Furthermore, the Ƥ Ǧ these groups to enact concrete policy changes halting the industry outright. Because of the importance of e-‐waste recycling in both international and domestic formal economies, international actors and the Ghanaian government lack incentive to take action and properly address the serious health risks to the community. Similar individualized economic rewards in Agbogbloshie create a disincentive for the community to address health and safety concerns themselves.
CONCLUSION Throughout this essay, I have discussed how the e-‐waste industry’s economic activities have shaped the lives of the people in Agbogbloshie’s impoverished Ǥ Ƥ of Agbogbloshie and the e-‐waste economy, and I have focused on Agbogbloshie as an economic center and a community. Today, the people of Agbogbloshie are faced Ǧ Ǣ however, they are also faced with the high risks associated with living and working in this community, and the precariousness of e-‐waste collecting and dealing as a livelihood. Agbogbloshie is currently transitioning from a stigmatized slum into an economic urban center, yet the future of the community and its people largely depends on the action of the Ghanaian government, business interests and the international community. I see three possible outcomes moving forward, two of which maintain ǡ ơ degrees economic and social stability to Agbogbloshie residents. Ƥ 41
Ibid., 514.
42
BECK
is  the  complete  halt  of  global  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  imports  to  Ghana,  driven  by  the  international  communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  health  and  environmental  concerns  and  enacted  through  domestic  legislation  upholding  the  Basel  Convention  tenets.  This  possibility  threatens  Agbogbloshieâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  economy  and  the  many  livelihoods  it  supports.  A  second  Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2018;ĆĄÂ&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021; business  interests  if  the  industry  remains  unregulated.  If  the  international  community  is  unable  to  put  a  stop  to  e-Ââ&#x20AC;?waste  imports,  the  economy  could  become  lucrative  enough  to Â
Agbogbloshie  cannot  be  understood  simply  as  the  end  of  the  line  in  the  global  commodity  chain.  It  must  also  be  recognized  as  a  neighbourhood.
attract  large  corporations.  These  corporations  Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2030;Â&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;ƤÂ&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; exploiting  the  communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s  poor  labour  force,  which  could  drastically  change  the  current  organization  of  the  economy  and  decrease  earnings  and  working  conditions  Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Ǥ ƤÂ?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â? government  begin  to  monitor  and  regulate  the  development  of  Agbogbloshie  as  a  neighbourhood  and  economy,  while  working  with  the  community  to  develop  and  respect  workersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;  associations  and  co-Ââ&#x20AC;?operatives.  This  government  action  has  the  potential  to  improve  the  health  and  environmental  standards  in  Agbogbloshie,  and  Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2014;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;ÇĄ Â&#x2122;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2021;ƤÂ&#x2013;Â&#x2022; within  the  Agbogbloshie  community. Â
8%& -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $Ě&#x2020;DLUV > @
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
43
Ǧ THE L ORD’S R ESISTANCE A RMY & T HE U GANDAN G OVERNMENT: ǧ ǧ ǫ Ivo Martinich
ƪ ǡ Ǥ ͥͤ͢͝ǡ ǡ ǯ ȋ Ȍǡ Ǥ ƪ ƪ ǡ ͟͜ ͜͜͜ Ǥ͝ Ƥ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ƪ ǣ Ƥ ǡ ȋ Ȍ Ǣ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ƪ ƪ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ƪ ǯ Ǥ Ǥ
THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT: ORIGINS, GOALS AND RESOURCES ͥͤ͢͝ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ ǯ Ǥ ǯ ͝
ǡ Dz ǣ Ǯ ǯ ǯ ǡdz ͥǡ Ǥ ͠ ȋͣ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͟͟͠Ǧͤ͟͡ǡ
44
MARTINICH
ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͞ ǯ Dz ȑ Ȓ ǡ ȑ Ȓ Ǥdz͟ ơ ƪ Ǥ Ǧ ǯ ǯ Ǥ ͥͥ͝͝ǡ ͤ͜ ͜͜͜ ǡ ͜͞ ͜͜͜ ͥͤ͢͝Ǥ ǡ ͊ ͥ͢Ǥ͞ ͥͤͤ͝ ͊ ͣ͟͞ ͣ͜͜͞Ǥ͠ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥdz͡ ǡ ǡ Ƥ Dz Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǥdz͢ ǯ ȋ ȌǤ ǡ ǡ Dz Ƥ ǡ ȑǤǤǤȒ Ǥdzͣ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ǥͤ ͞͡ ͜͜͜ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥ
͞
ǡ Dz ǯ ǯ ƪ ǡdz ƪ ͟͜ǡ Ǥ ͝
ȋͣ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͣ͟͟Ǧ͟͡͞ǡ ͤ͟͟Ǥ
͟ ͠ ͡ ͢ ͣ
ǡ ǯ ǣ ȋ ǡ Ǥǣ ǡ ͜͜͞͝Ȍǡ ͝Ǥ Ǥǡ ͝͠͝Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ǣ ͤ͝ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͜͢͞Ȍǣ ͣ͟͝Ǧ͝͠͠ǡ ͜͝͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͟͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǯ ǣ ǫǡdz
ͣǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋͣ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͟͢͝Ǧͤͥ͟ǡ ͟͢͞Ǥ
ͤ
ǡ Ǥǡ ǯ ǣ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͞͝Ȍǡ ͤ͟Ǥ
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
45
͝͞ ͜͜͜ Ƥ Ǥ ͥ ǯ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dz Ƥ ǡ Ǥdz͜͝ Ƥ ǡ ƪ Ǥ
For groups with existential motivations, continuing the CON¹ICTÒISÒNECESSARYÒ because an end to CON¹ICTÒISÒALSOÒTHEÒ end of the group
ǡ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ǯ Dz ǡdz Ǥ ǡ ͜͜͞͡ ȋ Ȍ ǡ Ǥ͝͝ ǡ Ƥ
ǡ Ǥ͝͞ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Dz Ȃ Ǥdz͟͝ ͥ ͜͝ ͝͝ ͝͞ ͟͝
ǡ Dz ǯ ǡdz ͟͢͞Ǥ Ǥǡ ͟͠͝Ǥ Ǥ Ǥǡ ͣ͟͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͟͡Ǥ
46
MARTINICH
Ƥ Ǥ ͡ ͜͜͜ ͜͜͜͞ǡ ͜͜͡ ͝ ͜͜͜Ǥ͝͠ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ͝͡ ǡ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡ Ƥ Ǥdz͢͝ ǡ Ǥ
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE GoU AND THE LRA: FAILED WAR, FAILED PEACE Ƥ ͥͤ͢͝ǡ Ǥ ǡ ͥͥͣ͝ǡ Ǧ Ǥͣ͝ ͜͜͞͞ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ͜͝ ͜͜͜ Ǥͤ͝ ǡ ƥ Ǥͥ͝ ͜͞͝͞ ơ Ǥ ͝͠ ͝͡ ͢͝ ͣ͝ ͤ͝ ͥ͝
Ǥǡ ͟͟͠Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǯ ǡdz ͤ͝ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋͤ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͠͡Ǧ͡͞ǡ ͣ͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͟͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͥ͟͟Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ ͝͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͠͡Ǥ
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
47
ƥ ͜͞͝͞ ǡ ǡ ͡ ͜͜͜ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͜͞ ơ ƪ Ǥ Ƥ ƪ ͥͥ͝͠ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ͞͝ ǡ ͥͥͥ͝ǡ ǡ Dz ͢͞ ǡ ͥͤ͢͝ Ǥdz͞͞ ͜͜͞͠ǡ ǦƤ Ǥ͟͞ ǡ ǦƤ ǯ Ǥ ͜͜͢͞ Ǥ ơ ͤ͜͜͞ Ǥ͞͠ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ͜͜͞͡ Ǥ ͞ ͜͜͞ ͟ ͜͜͞ ͤ͜͜ Ǥ͞͡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͢͞ Ǥ ǡ Dz ͜͞
Dz ǡdz ǡ ͥ͝ ͜͞͝͞Ǥ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ
Ȁ͜͞͝͞Ȁͥ͜Ȁͥͥͣͤͤͣ͜͞͝͞͝͝͠͡͡͠͝͡͝Ǥ Ǥ
͞͝ ͞͞ ͟͞ ͞͠ ͞͡ ͢͞
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͥ͟͝Ǥ Dz ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ǧ Ȁͥ͞͠Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǫ ǡdz ͜͝ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋͤ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͡͡Ǧͣ͝ǡ ͡͡Ǥ ǡ DzǮ ǯǣ ǡ ƪ ǡdz ͥͤǡ Ǥ ͜͠͞ ȋͥ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͥ͟͝Ǧ͟͟͝ǡ ͟͢͞Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͡Ǥ Ǥǡ Dz ͤ ͜͜͞͡ ͣ͞ ͜͜͞͡ǡdz
ȋ͜͜͞͡Ȍ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ ͥͣͤ͝͡Ǥ Ǥ
48
MARTINICH
Ǥdzͣ͞ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǯ ͜͜͞͡Ǥͤ͞ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ƪ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ
THE CURRENT STALEMATE: RULING OUT ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES
ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ ͝ ͜͜͜ ǡ ͣ͞ ͤ͞
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͟͜Ǥ Ǥ
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
49
ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥͥ͞ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ơ ǡ ǡ ƥ Ǥ ǡ Dz Ƥ ȑǤǤǤ Ȓ ǡ ơ ǡ ȑ ȒǤdz͟͜ ǡ ǯ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dz ƪ ǡ Ǥdz͟͝ ǡ ǯ ơ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ȅ Ǥ͟͞ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ Ǥdz͟͟ ͥ͞ ͟͜ ͟͝ ͟͞
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͠Ǥ
͟͟
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͠Ǥ
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͠͡Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͤ͟͝Ǥ
50
MARTINICH
Dz dz ǡ Ǥ͟͠ ͊͜͠ Ǥ͟͡ ͜͜͞͞ǡ ǡ ͠th ͞ ͜͜͠ Ƥ ͣ ͜͜͞Ǥ͟͢ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǣ ǡ
A central element of a new approach should be a clear and effective path to demobilization and reintegration for former combatants.
ǯ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ƥ Dz ǡ Ǥdzͣ͟ On the other ǡ Dz ǡdz Dz ǡdz Dz Ǥdzͤ͟ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ ͣ͜͜͞ǡ Ǥͥ͟ ǡ ǯ ͟͠ ͟͡ ͟͢ ͣ͟ ͤ͟ ͥ͟
Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ ͡͞Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͠͞Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͜͝͠Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͞Ǥ
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
51
Ǧ Ǥ ǯ Ƥ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ Ƥ Dz dz Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Dz Ǧ ƪ Ǥdz͜͠
FORWARD: LONG-TERM SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION In ǡ ǡ Ƥ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ƥ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ͠͡ ͜͜͜ ǡ ͝͡ ͜͞ Ǥ͠͝ ƥ Ƥ Ǧ ƪ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ǧ ƪ Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ͜͠ ͠͝
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͡͡Ǥ Dz ǡdz ͝͝͞ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍǣ ͠͝͝Ǧ͢͠͞ǡ ͤ͠͡Ǥ
52
MARTINICH
ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ơ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ͜͞͝͞ ǡ ǡ Ƥ ƪ Ǥ͠͞ Ǧ Ǥ Dz ǡdz ǯ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͟͠ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǯ ƪ ͤ͜͜͞Ȁͥ͜͜͞ ǡ ͤ͞Ǥ͡ ȋ ͊͜͝ Ȍ ǡ ͟͜͡ ȋ ͊ͥ͝͞ Ȍ Ǥ͠͠ ǡ Ǥ͠͡ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ơ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dz ƪ ǡ ȑ Ȓ ƪ Ǥdz͢͠ ǡ ͠͞
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ ȀƤ Ȁ
Ǥ Ǥ
͟͠ ͠͠
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͠Ǥ Dz ͤ͜͜͞Ȁͥ͜ǡdz ǡ ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ
Ƥ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ Ȁ Ǧ Ȁ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ
͠͡
ǡ Dz Ǥdz
͢͠
ǡ Dz ǣ ǫdz ͥ͟ǡ Ǥ ͞ ȋ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ
LONG-TERM STALEMATE
53
ƪ ǡ ǡ Ǥͣ͠ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ƥ Dz dz Dz ơ Ǥdzͤ͠
Where decades OFÒCON¹ICTÒHAVEÒ DESTROYEDÒTHEÒ social fabric, approaches must focus on restorative justice rather than retributive
ǡ Dz Ǧ ơ ƪ Ǥdzͥ͠ ǡ Dz dz͜͡ ƪ Ǥ ǡ
ǯ ǡ ǯ Ǥ͡͝ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ͣ͝ ǡ Dz Ǥdz͡͞ ǡ ͟͡ ͥ͟͞Ǧ͟͜͝ǡ ͢͞͠Ǥ
ͣ͠
± ơ ǡ Dz ǡ ǣ ǯ ǡdz ƪ ͢͠ǡ
Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ ͤͥǤ ͤ͠
Ǥǡ DzǮ ǯǣ Ǧ ǡdz ͟͝ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍǣ ͝͝͝Ǥ
ͥ͠
Dz ǣ ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ
ȀƤ Ȁ Ǧ Ƥ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ͜͞͝͞Ǧ Ǥ ȋ ͝͝ǡ ͜͞͝͞ȌǤ
͜͡ ͡͝
Ǥǡ ǡ ͝͝͝Ǥ
͡͞
Dz ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ ̼ ȋ ȌǤ
ǡ ǡ ͞͠͞Ǥ
ȋ ͝͝ǡ ͜͞͝͞ȌǤ
54
MARTINICH
Dz Ǥdz͟͡ ǡ Ǥ
CONCLUSIONS F ͞͡ ǡ Ǥ ƪ ǯ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ƪ ǡ Ǥ ͜͞͝͞ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ƪ Ǥ
͟͡
Ǥ
8%& -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $̆DLUV > @
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
55
Good Hedges, Good Neighbours? Ƭ ǧ Colin Chia
INTRODUCTION ǯ Ƥ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ partner is key for its economy, but this is matched by uncertainty regarding how China will use its growing power, and whether, as a close American ally, Australia will ƪ Ǥ ǡ Ǣ Ƥ ǯ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ
56
CHIA
Ǥ ǯ from hedging their bets (or “soft balancing”) on China’s peaceful rise, towards Ǥ ǡ
Ȃ ǯ Ȃǡ Ȃ Ȃ Ƥ Ǧ Ƥ ǯ Ǥ ǡ argues that the region’s changing power dynamics makes Australia’s relationship ǡ Dz dzǡ Ǥ
ASEAN ANXIETIES: THE REGIONAL CONTEXT ȋ Ȍ Ǥ1 Ǧ Ƥ ǯ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ͜͞͝͞ ƪ Ǥ ͜͞͝͞ ± Ƥ Ǥ Ǥ͞ product of Chinese lobbyists, this failure added to the growing uneasiness towards Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ 1
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡ ǡdz
͟͜ ȋͤ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͢͞͠Ǧͥ͞͞Ǥ ͞
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz
ǡ ͢͝ ͜͞͝͞Ǥ
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
57
Ǣ Ǥ3 ǯ Ǧ ǡ ͜͠ ǯ Ǥ͠ ƪ Ǥ
ǯ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǯ ǡ Ƥ Ǧ Ǧ ǯ Dz Ǥdz5 ǯ Ǥ ƪ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ȅ Ǥ͢ ǡ Ǯ ǯ Ǣ Ǥ
Ǧ Ƥ China gaining regional hegemony or primacy; the real question is whether they ǯ Ǥ ǡ
ǯ Ǥ
GARUDAS, KANGAROOS, AND COMMON INTERESTS
Ǧ ǡ ǯ ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Dz Ǧ Ƥ ǡdz ǡ ƥ 3
ǡ Dz ǫǡdz ǡ ͥ͞ ͜͜͞͝Ǥ
͠
Dz ǡdz ȋ͜͞͝͝ȌǤ
5
ǡ Dz ǣ
ǡdz ͠͡ ȋ͜͜͞͡Ȍǣ ͤ͢͠Ǧ͢͜͡Ǥ ͢
Ú ǡ Dz ǣ ȋ Ȍ ǡdz ͡͞ ȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍǣ ͣ͡͠Ǧͣͣ͢ǡ
ͣ͢͡Ǥ
58
CHIA
Dz dz Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥͣ Australia’s largest trading Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǡ Ǥ policymaking as Australia seeks to chart a course to Ǥ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǯ ǯ
Indonesia and Australia are part of the same continent in Risk, but Australia ’s policymakers can only wish for such AÒSIMPLEÒAFµNITY
ǡ ǯ Ǥ Ǥͤ Ȃ ơ ǯ ƪ Ȃ ǡ ǯ Ƥ Ǥͥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͜͝ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ ǯ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ͣ
ǯ ǣ ǡ Dz
ǣ ǡdz ͠͡ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͜͞͝Ȍǣ ͣͤǦͤ͟Ǥ ͤ
ǡ ǣ ȋ ǡ ǣ Ǥǡ ͜͞͝͞Ȍǡ ͠͡Ǥ
ͥ
ǡ Dz ǣ Ǧ Ǧ ǡdz
͟͡ ȋ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ ͝Ǧ͟͢ǡ ͠Ǥ ͜͝
Ǥ ǡ Dz ǯ Ǧ ǣ ǡdz ǣ
Ǧ ͜͝ ȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍǣ ͡Ǧ͜͞ǡ ͟͝Ǥ
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
59
ǡ ǯ Ȃ ͟͝ Ǧ Ȃ11 Ǥ ǡ Ǥ͝͞ Australian defence strategy considers the northern ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǯ ͥ͜͜͞ Dz ǡdz Ǥ13
ǡ ǯ ǡ Ǥ͝͠ security interests are one reason that longstanding defence cooperation is deepening, ȋ͜͜͢͞Ȍ Ǥ ơ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ƪ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ15
ǡ Ǥ͢͝ 11
Dz ǡdz ȋ͜͞͝͝ȌǤ
͝͞
ǡ Dz ǯ ǫǡdz
ơ ͢͜ ȋ͜͜͢͞Ȍǣ ͣ͞͠Ǧ͢͞͠ ǡ ͥ͞͠Ǧ͜͞͡Ǥ 13
ǡ Ǧ Ƥ ǣ ͜͟͜͞ ȋ ǡ ǣ
ǡ ͥ͜͜͞Ȍǡ ͠͞Ǥ ͝͠
ǡ Dz ǣ ͜͟͜͞ǡdz ͡ ȋͥ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͞͝Ǧͥ͞Ǥ
15
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ơ ǡ ǣ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͢͞Ȍǣ ͟͠Ǧͤ͟Ǥ ͢͝
ǡ ǡ ǣ ǯ ȋ ǡ ǣ
60
CHIA
ǯ ǡ Ȃ Ȃ Ǧ Ƥ ǡ Ǥͣ͝ ǡ ǯ ǣ ǡ ơ Ǥ Ƥ ͥͥͣ͝Ǧͥͥ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ǯ ǡ Ǥͤ͝ ơ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
THE OTHER RISING POWER? onesia’s regional importance is clear today, in the near future
Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ǥͥ͝ ǯ Ǧ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ ͜͞͝͞Ȍǡ ͠Ǥ ͣ͝
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ǣ ơ
͜͜͢͞Ǧ͜͜͞͝ Ǥ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ ͢͝͡Ǧͤ͝͠ǡ ͤ͢͝Ǧͥ͢͝Ǥ ͤ͝
ǡ Dz ǡdz ǡ ͜͝ ͥͥͤ͝Ǥ
ͥ͝
ǡ Dz ǯ Ƥ ǣ ǫǡdz
͟͟ ȋ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ ͣ͝͡Ǧͤ͝͞ǡ ͤ͝͡Ǧͥ͝͡Ǥ
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
61
ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ͜͞ ǡ militarily weaker, and Australian strategic policy faces challenges in adapting to this Ǥ͞͝ ǡ ǡ ƪ ͜͞Ǥ Dz dz Ǧ Ƥ ǯ ǡ Ǥ͞͞ ǯ ơ Ȃ Ȃ Ǥ
Indonesia is Australia ’s obvious partner in building a regional power core to manage !SIA 0ACIµCgSÒ changing balance of power
an arm’s length, and look for ways to do so without Ǥ ǡ ǡ ͜͞͝͝ Dz Ƥ dz Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ Dz ǡdz Ǥ͟͞
͜͞
ǡ Dz ǫǣ ǡdz
͟͞ ȋ͜͜͞͝Ȍǣ ͜͡Ǧͥ͢Ǥ ͞͝
ǡ Dz Ǯ ǯ ǯ ǡdz ơ ͢͝
ȋͣ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͞͝͡Ǧ͟͞͝Ǥ ͞͞
ǡ ǣ ǯ ȋ ǡ ǣ
ǡ ͜͞͝͝Ȍǡ ͣ͞Ǧ͟͜Ǥ ͟͞
ǡ ǡ ͤ͜Ǥ
62
CHIA
ƪ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ȃ ȋ Ȍ Ȃ Ǥ͞͠ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǯ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ greater compatibilities with its neighbours than with China, and especially with
ǡ Ǥ͞͡
TYING UP A GIANT ƪ ǡ Ǥ self-‐constraints within a regional institutional framework, and both Australia and
Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ȃ Ȃ organisation, while Australia has sought to build regional multilateralism partly Ǥ ǡ Ǣ ǯ ǯ Ǥ͢͞ Combining strengths in a power Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ƥ ǯ ͞͠
ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ͟ ȋͣ͜͜͞Ȍǣ ͥǦͥ͢Ǥ
͞͡
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣͤ͝Ǧͣͥ͝Ǥ
͢͞
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͟Ǥ
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
63
Ǥ pressures to act in a nationalist and belligerent manner, while pursuing a “peaceful Ǥdz ǡ ǡ Ȃ Ǥͣ͞ Ǧ Ƥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǯ ͜͞͝͞ Ǥͤ͞ Can China
If Beijing can get a seat at the table there seems little reason for it to KICKÒTHEÒTABLEÒOVER
multilateral institutions, which by their nature allow smaller countries to constrain larger and more powerful ones? Getting China to settle for less means the route Ǣ Ǥ Ƥ in guiding China down the route of engagement and ǡ
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
ǯ a great power, if Beijing can get a seat at the table there seems little reason for it to Ǥ ǡ Ǣ ǡ Ǥ ƪ Dz dz ǡ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ͜͜͞͝ Dz ǡ ͣ͞
ǡ Dz ǡdz ͢͝Ǧ͢͟Ǥ
ͤ͞
ǡ Dz ǣ ǫǡdz ͣ͞ ȋ͜͜͞͡Ȍǣ ͟͜͡Ǧ͟͞͞ǡ
ͣ͟͜Ǥ
64
CHIA
ǯ Ǥdzͥ͞ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ƥ ǯ ǡ ƪ Ǥ
CONCLUSION U Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ ǣ ǡ ǫ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Asian countries has been to hedge, but the increasing trend is to go further and try Ȃ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ͟͜ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǯ ǯ Ǥ ǡ the risk that miscalculation, misperception, or accidental escalation could lead to Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ countries in maintaining the broadest range of strategic options, and would help raise ǯ Ǥ ƪ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ͥ͞
ǡ Dz Ǥ Ǥ ǡdz ǡ
͟͜ ͜͜͞͝Ǥ ͟͜
ǡ ǡ Dz ǡdz ǡ ͥ
͜͞͝͞Ǥ
GOOD HEDGES, GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
65
Dz Ǥdz are each other’s strongest and most powerful neighbours, but neither country can, ǡ Ǧ Ƥ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ȃ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
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FRANKS
66
ƪ Kelsey Franks
Dz Ƥ ǡdz1 ͜͜͞͝ǡ
Dz Ǥdz͞ ǡ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ƥ ȋ Ȍ ȋ Ȍǡ and ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ƪ ǡ ǯ Ǥ
* Kelsey Franks is a also senior editor; however, she had no role in selecting this paper for publication. Submissions are read with names removed, Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ 1
ǡ Dz ǡdz ǡ ͥ͞ ͜͜͞͝ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ
Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁͥͥͤ͜͜͢͠Ǥ
͞
Dz dz ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Ƥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
INDIGENOUS INFLUENCE
67
CIRCUMVENTING BARRIERS TO INCLUSION ͜͜͞͝ Ƥ Ǥ ͤ͜͜͞ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ȋ Ȍ Dz dz øǡ Ǥ3 ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǥ ǡ ȑ Ȓ Ǥ Ǥ͠
͜͜͞͝ǡ
ơ Ǥ ǡ ƪ ǡ Ǥ ǯ Ƥ ǡ Dz ǡ ȑ Ȓ Ǥdz5 ǡ ǯ ǯ ơ
3
ǡ ǫǣ ȋ ǡ ǣ Ƭ ǡ ͜͜͞͝Ȍǡ ͝͞͡Ǥ
͠
Dz ǡdz ǡ ͥ͜͜͞ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ
Ƥ Ȁ ̼͝͞ ̼ͤ͝ Ǧ ̼ Ǥ Ǥ
5
Ǥ
68
FRANKS
Dz ơ Ǥ͢ ƪ
Ǥ ƪ Ǧ Ƥ ǡ Dz dz Dz dz Ǥ Ȃ ȋ Ȍǡ ǡ Ȃ Dz ǯ Ǥdzͣ
The declaration ’s perfectly-timed release maximized ITSÒIN¹UENCEÒONÒTHEÒ ministers, media and international community
principle of consensus decision-‐making adopted in the ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ơ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Council coincided with their ban on the import of seal Ǥ
Ȃ ǯ ǯ Ȃ ƪ ǡ ǯ Ǥͤ ƪ Ǥ Dz Ƥ ǥ ȑ Ȓ actor of consequence,”ͥ ƪ Ƥ ͢
Dz ǯ ǡdz ǡ ͟͝ ͜͜͞͝ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ͜͜͞͝Ȁ͜͟Ȁ͟͝Ȁ
Ǥ Ǥ
ͣ
Dz ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ǧ Ȁ Ǥ
ͤ
Dz ǡdz ǡ ͥ͞ ͥ͜͜͞ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ
Ȁͥ͜͜͞Ȁ͜͠Ȁͥ͞Ȁ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ ͥ
ǡ ǫǡ ͟͝͞Ǥ
INDIGENOUS INFLUENCE
69
Ǥ ơ Ǥ ơ Ȃ Ȃ Ǧ ǡ made a direct and human appeal to member states during the negotiation of the ǡ Ǥ͜͝ ƥ ͜͜͞͝ Ƥ ͢͝͞ Ǥ11
UNDRIP AND NLCA: UNFULFILLED SELF-DETERMINATION ƪ ǡ
ƪ ȋ Ȍ ȋ Ȍ Ȃ Ǧ Ǥ ƥ ͜͜͞͝ǡ ǡ Dz indigenous peoples to maintain and strengthen their own institutions, cultures and Ǥdz͝͞ Ǧ ǣ ǯ Dz ǡ Ƥ ǡ ǡ Ǥdz13 ͥͥ͟͝ Dz Ǧ Ǣdz͝͠ ǡ ǡ Ƥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ͜͝
Ǥǡ͟͝͞Ǥ
11
Ǥǡ ͝͞͠Ǥ
͝͞
Dz ǣ ǡdz ǡ
ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ƥ Ȁ Ȁ Ǥ Ǥ 13
ǡ ǣ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͥͥͤ͝ȌǤ
͝͠
ǡ ǯ ǣ
ȋ ǡ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͢͞ȌǤ
70
FRANKS
Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ͟͞ ǡ Ȃ ͤ͡τ Ǥ15 ͠͡τ ǡ ͜͠τ ͥͥ͟͝ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǯ Ƥ Dz Ǥdz͢͝ He suggests a bilingual education ǡ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ federal funding is the greatest impediment to Ǥ
The government of Canada has excluded the Inuit from critical discussion and decision-making forums
ͣǤ͡ Ǣ ǡ ͜͞ Ǧ Ǥͣ͝ ǡ Ǥ Ƥ ǯ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Dz Ǧ Ƥ Ǥdzͤ͝ 15
ǡ ǫǡ ͝͝͞Ǥ
͢͝
ǡ ǯ Ǥ
ͣ͝
Ǥ
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ǡ ǫǡ ͤ͝͝Ǥ
INDIGENOUS INFLUENCE
71
ǡ adequate funding or opportunity to address the immense challenges they face in the Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Dz ȑǥȒ Ǥ ȑ Ȓ Ƥ Ǥdzͥ͝ ơ Ǥ “as temperatures rise, weather patterns change, snow and ice conditions become ǡ Ǥdz͜͞ as contributors to emissions causing climate change, it is our shared responsibility Ǥ Ǧ Ƥ Ǧ Ǥ͞͝ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ Ǥdz͞͞ Ƥ ǡ ǡ when possible and supporting their interests in international agreements regarding Ǥ
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72
FRANKS
RECONCILING INUIT AND GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN THE ARCTIC ǡ Ǥ in the past has been limited, the potential for future collaboration between the two Ƥ Ǥ ǯ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ͟͞ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ Dz ǡdz ǡ Dz Ǥdz͞͠ ǡ Ȃ Ȃ Ƥ Dz ǡdz Ǥ strait, it would “limit Canada’s ability to control these waters, especially in terms of Ǥdz͞͡ ǯ ƥ Ȃ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Dz ǯ dz͢͞ of the sea-‐ice and Ȃ Ȃ ǯ Dz dz ǡ Dz
͟͞
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ǡ Dz ǡdz ǡ ơ ǡ ͢͞
͜͜͢͞ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ ͜͢͡͝Ǧ Ǥ ͛ Ƥ Ǥ
͢͞
ǡ ǫǡ ͥ͝͝Ǥ
INDIGENOUS INFLUENCE
73
ȑ ǯ Ȓ Ǧ Ǥdzͣ͞ ǡ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Passage claim, since it is not as if other countries are unaware of the hypocrisy ȑ ǯ Ȓ ơ Ǥͤ͞ Ȃ Dz dz Ȃͥ͞ ǡ Ƥ ǯ
Devolution would encourage development and Canada ’s internal waters claim
Ǥ Dz Ƥ ǯ Ǥdz͟͜ Ƥ ǡ
Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ȃ Ǧ Ȃ ǡ caused by greenhouse gas emissions is to place control of resources in the hands of ơ Ǥ31 ͣ͞
Ǥ
ͤ͞
Ǥǡ ͝͞͞Ǥ
ͥ͞
Dz ǣ ǡdz ơ ǡ ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ
Ȁ Ƭ ̼ Ǥ Ǥ
͟͜
Dz ǡdz ơ ǡ ǡ ǣȀ
Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ τ͜͞ ̼ Ǥ Ǥ
31
Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͞Ǥ͝ ȋͥͥͥ͝Ȍǣ ͥ͟͠Ǧ͟͡͡ǡ ǡ ͢͞ ͜͟͞͝Ǥ
74
FRANKS
Dz ǥ stewardship,”͟͞ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡdz Ƥ dz ȑ Ȓ ǡdz ǡ Dz ǯ Ǥdz33 Additionally, as economic ǡ ǡ Ǥ͟͠ Projects and Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ
ǯ Ǥ ǡ Dz dz ǯ
Ǥ35 ǡ Dz ǯ ǡdz͟͢ and align Dz dz Ǥͣ͟
͟͞
Dz Ǧ Ǥdz
33
Ǥ
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35
Ǥ
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INDIGENOUS INFLUENCE
75
CONCLUSION ǡ ǡ ǡ ƪ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥ ƪ Ǧ ǡ Ƥ ƪ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ƪ ƥ Ǥ As the legal status of the Northwest Passage becomes more salient in the ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ Ǥ
ǯ ƪ and decision-‐making regarding the Arctic region, particularly as it relates to Canada’s ǯ Ǥ
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RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
76
Allison Rounding
INTRODUCTION Indigenous peoples worldwide have been, and continue to be, subject to ǡ ǡ ơ and culture, among other injustices. Indigenous peoples have resisted this oppression at a domestic level, but they now also have the tool of international law at their disposal. The Sami1 people2 of Northern Europe are one of the many indigenous groups that have simultaneously gained power in domestic politics, and used international law to become recognized as an indigenous people with unique cultural and land rights. Creating a separate Sami state has not been a popular idea among the Sami people;3 rather, they have sought self-‐determination within a state structure through the pursuit of cultural, language, land, and water rights.4 When domestic avenues to securing these rights have been blocked, the Sami have sought political redress through legal challenges at the international level. Though 1
The term Sami will be used here for the sake of consistency, although the words Sámi and Saami can also be used. The term Lapp will not be used in this
Ǥ ƥ ͥ͢͜͝ ǡ ȋ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǡ ǣ ǡ ͣ͝͡͝Ǧͤ͜͜͞ǡdz ͝͠ǡ Ǥ ͡ ȋ͜͜͞͝Ȍǣ ͡͡͠ȌǤ
2
ǡ ǡ Dz dz ȋ ǡ
Dz ǡ ǡdz Ǥ ͡͡͝Ȍǡ ǡ ȋ ǡ Dz ǡ Ǣdz ǡ Dz Ǧ ǫǡdz ͝͝ǡ Ǥ ͠ ȋ͜͜͞͡ȌǢ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǣ ǡ ͤͤ͢͝Ǧ͜͜͢͞ǡdz ǡ ͟͟ǡ Ǥ ͝ǡ ȋͤ͜͜͞ȌǢ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǣ ǡdz ǡ ͞͡ǡ Ǥ ͞ ȋ͜͜͞͡ȌǢ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǣ ǫǡdz ǡ ͣ͞ǡ Ǥ͝ ȋ͜͜͞͝ȌȌǤ ơ ȋ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡdz ͡͠͠ȌǤ Ƣ ȋ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͟͟͡ȌǤ ǡ ǡ Ǯ ǯ Ǧ ȋ ǡ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͞͞Ȍǡ ͠͝ȌǤ when referring to indigenous groups worldwide.
3
ǡ Dz Ǧ ǫǡdz ͤ͟͡Ǣ ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz
ǣ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͢͞Ȍǣ ͣ͢͞Ǥ
4
ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͡͠͝Ǥ
77
ROUNDING
international  law  has  become  less  of  an  instrument  of  colonialism  over  time,  indigenous  peoples  still  face  barriers  to  accessing  the  protection  of  international  law.  The  Sami  have  been  recognized  domestically  as  an  indigenous  people  possessing  both  the  right  to  participate  in  the  domestic  politics  of  Norway,  Sweden  Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;5  through  self-Ââ&#x20AC;?led  parliaments,  and  the  right  to  engage  in  traditional  activities  like  reindeer  herding.  Nonetheless,  though  granted,  these  rights  have  not  always  been  upheld  by  national  governments.  Consequently,  the  Sami  have  repeatedly  appealed  to  international  law  to  press  their  claims,  although  they  have  been  met  with  unclear  success.  These  results  indicate  that  the  Sami  are  in  a  situation  similar  to  many  other  indigenous  peoples:  though  the  Sami  have  had  domestic  successes  in  moving  states  to  accommodate  some  of  their  demands,͢  the  project  of  securing  the  rights  of  the  Sami  under  international  law  is  far  from  over.
INDIGENEITY,  SELF-ÂDETERMINATION,  AND  THE  HISTORY  SAMI Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;ƤÂ?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; DzÂ&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Çł Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x192; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2C6;ÇŚÂ&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;ƤÂ&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2019;Ǥ Â? Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄ Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2021;Â&#x161;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; oppression  and  subsumption  under  an  alien  state  structure  are  emphasized  as  key  aspects  of  the  term.7 Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Ǥ Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; DzÂ&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022; Â&#x201E;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; the  living  descendants  of  pre-Ââ&#x20AC;?invasion  inhabitants  of  lands  now  dominated  by  Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Ǥdzͤ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; ƤÂ&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2026;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â? Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x2122;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; 5 Â
Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039;Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;ÇĄ Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â? Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;Č&#x152;Ǥ Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Í?Í&#x153;Í&#x153; Í&#x153;Í&#x153;Í&#x153; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2013;
Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â?Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Č&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2DC;Â&#x192; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â?ÇĄ Dz Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x161;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;ÇĄÇł Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2022;ÇŁ Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â? Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2C6;ÇŚÂ&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â? Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;ÇĄ Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022;Ǥ Ǥ Â&#x2039;Â?Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2019; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Ǥ Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2030; Č&#x2039; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇŁ Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x161; Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;Í?Í?Č&#x152;ÇŁ Í&#x;Í?ÇŚÍ Í ÇĄ Í&#x;Í&#x17E;Č&#x152;Ǥ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x203A; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Č&#x2039;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Í&#x17E; Í&#x153;Í&#x153;Í&#x153; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Č&#x152; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192; Č&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021; Ǥ Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Dz Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2C6;ÇŚ Â&#x2021;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇŁ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;ÇĄÇł Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; ͢͢ǥ Â?Â&#x2018;Ǥ Í Č&#x2039;Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;Í?Í?Č&#x152;ÇŁ ͤͼÍ&#x;ÇŚÍĽÍ&#x153;ÍŁÇĄ ͤͼͥČ&#x152;ÇĄ Â&#x201E;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x203A; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2122;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇŻ Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Č&#x152;Ǥ Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2022;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x192; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020;           oppression  and  now  legally  have  a  degree  of  political  representation,  but  like  the  Sami  their  right  to  land  and  self-Ââ&#x20AC;?determination  is  often Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2030;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039; Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄ Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;Í&#x153;ÍĽČ&#x152;Ǥ
͢ Â
Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Ǥ Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192;ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x2122; Č&#x2039; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2122; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â?ÇŁ Â&#x161;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020; Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;Í&#x153;Í&#x153;Č&#x152;ÇĄ Í?ͤÍ&#x;Ǥ
7 Â
Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039; Â&#x192;ÇŻÂ?Â&#x2021;ÇŻÂ&#x152;Č&#x152; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x203A; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇŁ Â&#x2026;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2030;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Č&#x2039; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇŁ Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; Â&#x2014;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030;ÇĄ
Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;Í&#x153;ͤČ&#x152;ÇĄ Í Í&#x;Ǣ Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201D;Â&#x203A;ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Í ÍĽÇ¤
ͤ
Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192;ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x2122;ÇĄ Í&#x;Ǥ
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
78
they call Sápmi, for thousands of years prior to the establishment of the Norwegian, Ǥ
Ǧ ǡ Dz Ǥdzͥ Under ǡ
ǡ right to self-‐determination, and to “freely determine their political status and freely ǡ Ǥdz͜͝ ǡ Dz dz ǡ
The project of securing the rights of the Sami under international law is far from over.
therefore, their right to self-‐determination frequently goes unrecognized. The Sami seek self-‐determination through regaining control of their land, cultural, and economic practices damaged by colonialism. The Sami have historically been perceived as an undesirable element of society and have consequently Ǥ Similarly to other marginalized indigenous groups, the
Sami have lived under “conditions of severe disadvantage relative to others in the Ǥdz11
ǡ Sami focused on assimilation and paternalism, undermining Sami language, culture and identity.12 The Sami lost control of their land, as reindeer herding areas made way for settlers, agriculture, forestry and hydropower projects.13 Economic sanctions, ǡ who did not assimilate into an ethnic Norwegian lifestyle, including the Sami.14 ǡ ͥ
Ibid., 75.
͜͝ Ǥǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ ͝Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁ Ǥ Ǥ
11
ǡ ǡ ͟Ǥ
12 ǡ Dz ǡdz ͤ͡Ǥ 13
ǡDz ǡ ǡdz ͜͡͡Ǥ
14 Ǥ ǡ Dz ơ ǣ ǡdz Ƥ ͥ͞ǡ ͠ǡ ȋ͜͜͞͝Ȍǣ ͥ͟͠Ǧ͜͠͠ǡ ͥͥ͟Ǥ
79
ROUNDING
to  claim  that  the  Sami  did  not  properly  own  their  lands,15  and  to  depict  the  Sami  as  Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â?Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122;Â? Â&#x192;ĆĄÂ&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;ǤÍ?͢  Because  the  Sami  migrated  across  borders  throughout  the  eighteenth  century,  traditional  Sami  territories  do  not  conform  to  the  borders  of  current  Westphalian  states.  While  they  Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x192;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160; Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x161;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x203A; state  in  particular.  Initially  the  borders  of  the  Nordic  states  Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;ƤÂ?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?ĆŞÂ&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2122;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; northernmost  areas  of  Europe  meant  that  the  Sami  had  to  Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x161;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â?Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Ǥ17  In  1751,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ and  the  Sami  were  partitioned  into  states  and  assumed  citizenship.Í?ͤ Â
Nevertheless, Â
citizenship  was  subordinate  to  a  Sami  identity,  and  the  Sami  often  chose  their  citizenship  strategically  to  access  certain  reindeer  grazing  areas  divided  among  states.Í?ÍĽ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Č&#x201E; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ƤÂ&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x201E; Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;ÇĄ ƤÂ&#x2022;Â&#x160; and  otherwise  access  their  lands.  This  treaty  respected  their  history  on  the  land  and  acknowledged  the  widespread  area  of  their  traditional  lands,  while  enforcing  a  Western  sense  of  citizenship  and  land  ownership  upon  the  nomadic  Sami.Í&#x17E;Í&#x153; 15 Â
Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2039;ÇĄ Dz Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄÇł Í&#x;ͼͣǤ
Í?͢  Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â?ÇĄ Dz Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2C6;ÇŚ Â&#x2021;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇĄÇł Í Í&#x;ͼǤ 17  Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;ÇĄ Dz Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;ÇĄÇł ÍĄÍ ÍĄÇ¤ Í?ͤ   Ibid. Í?ÍĽ  Â&#x201E;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Ǥǥ ÍĄÍ Í¤Ç¤ Í&#x17E;Í&#x153;  Â&#x201E;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Ǥǥ ÍĄÍ Í˘Ç˘ Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2039;ÇĄ Dz Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄÇł Í&#x;ͼͼǤ
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
80
ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ͤ͝͡͞ǡ ǡ Ƥ ǡ Ǧ ͤͤͥ͝Ǥ21 Ǥ the course of the nineteenth century, the northernmost areas of Europe became a ǡ to vacate their lands to make way for the settlers’ farms.22 Sami activities were deemed to be less valuable than agriculture, and nomadic Sami were not treated as legitimate landowners or users compared to the settlers.23 The Sami have continued to lose access and control over much of their reindeer grazing lands. 24 ǡ ơ ǡ over what was once indigenous territory.25 ǡ ǡ assumed ownership of their land when the rights of the Sami to engage in reindeer ͤͤ͢͝Ǥ͢͞ Though Ƥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dz Ǥdz27 ǡ ͥ͜͝͞ ͥͣ͜͝ ǡ Ƥ ǡ Ǧ Ƥ Ǥͤ͞
21 ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡdz ͤ͡͠Ǥ 22 Ǥ ǡ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͥͥ͝͡Ȍǣ ͢͝͞Ǥ 23 ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡdz ͥ͡͠Ǥ 24 Ǧ ǡ Dz ǣ ǡdz ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ȋ ǣ Ƭ ǡ ͥͤ͝͞Ȍǣ ͝͝Ǧ͞͞ǡ ͝͡Ǧͣ͝Ǥ
25 ǡ Dz ơ ǡdz ͥͣ͟Ǥ ͢͞ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͣ͟͠Ǥ 27 Ǥǡ ͥ͟͠Ǥ ͤ͞ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͝Ǥ
81
ROUNDING
FIGHTING FOR RIGHTS AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL as an indigenous people with the right to practice their unique cultural, linguistic, and traditional economic activities. While these symbolic rights have been recognized by national governments, as the previous section illustrates, Sami land rights have been continuously marginalized. Norway has been the most willing to recognize Sami ǡ ͜͜͞͡ Ǥͥ͞ This is one of the few instances where the Sami have regained title over land. Norway is also the only Nordic country that has Ƥ ͥ͢͝ǡ Dz ȑ Ȓ ǡ ways of life and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, ǡ Ǥdz͟͜ This convention also asserts that the state’s legal system must adequately address land claim issues, and “measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the right Ǥdz31 ͥ͢͝ǡ Ǥ ǡ ͥͤ͝͝ Dz dz ȋ Ƥ Ȍ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ Ǥ32 The Sami possess the right to herd ǡ ǡ but they do not possess title over the land.33 ͜͞͝͝ǡ rights.34 ǡ ǡ ǡ ͥ͞ Dz ǡdz ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ǧ Ȁͣͣ͟͜͞ the-‐sami-‐of-‐northern-‐europe-‐-‐one-‐people-‐four-‐countries.
͟͜ ǡ ǡdz ͜͞͝Ǥ 31 Ǥǡ ͜͞͡Ǥ 32 Ƭ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͟Ǣ ǡ Dz ǡdz ǡ ǣ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ƭ Ǥ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͞͝͝Ȍǣ ͤ͢͝Ǧͥͣ͝ǡ ͣ͟͝Ǥ
33 ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͟͠͠Ǥ 34 Dz Ǥdz
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
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sign on in the future.35
Sami Parliaments Ƥ through the creation of Sami parliaments in all three Nordic states. The Sami people Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ Ȁ to vote in a Sami election.͟͢ ͥͣ͟͝ǡ deals predominantly with Sami cultural issues and helps allocate government funds earmarked for the Sami.37 Ƥ must “create conditions enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture ǡdz ͥͤͥ͝Ǥͤ͟ ǡ ǡ powers of the Norwegian Sami parliament are Ǥ ͥͥ͟͝
International law is now increasingly IN¹UENCEDÒANDÒ utilized by non- state actors such as the Sami
body on issues concerning the Sami.ͥ͟ Like the Norwegian Sami parliament, the Swedish Sami parliament has no veto power, can only suggest – not pass – legislation, and is economically dependent on the state as Ǥ Ǧ ǡ͜͠ as ǡ Ǥ their lack of real political authority, the parliaments have contributed to reform on 35 ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͢͠͠Ǥ ͟͢ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͟Ǥ 37 ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡdz ͡͡͞Ǥ ͤ͟ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͥ͢Ǥ ͥ͟ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡdz ͡͡͞Ǥ ͜͠ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͟͡͡Ǥ
83
ROUNDING
Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039;Ǥ Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; from  the  Sami  parliaments  often  meet  and  work  together  on  common  issues,  but  Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x203A; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022;Ǥ Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2021;ĆĄÂ&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Ǥ41 Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2021;Â&#x161;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â&#x203A; Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; borders,  they  still  do  not  allow  the  Sami  from  Sweden  to  herd  reindeer  in  Norway.42  The  Sami  have  attained  recognition  of  their  status  as  indigenous  peoples  through  domestic  politics,  but  this  approach  has  not  achieved  their  demands  for  land  rights.  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  AND  THE  SAMI The  Sami  have  secured  some  of  their  rights  through  domestic  legal  challenges  and  politics,  but  this  is  not  only  legal  avenue  open  to  them.  With  the  rise  of  international  human  rights  law,  the  Sami  people  have  gained  access  to  another  tool.  If  domestic  politics  courts  do  not  adequately  address  their  concerns,  the  Sami  are  able  go  to  organizations  such  as  the  United  Nations  and  demand  recognition  of  their  rights  as  indigenous  people.  International  law  was  certainly  not  created  with  Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Â&#x201E;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2013; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ DzÂ&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2122;ÇĄ although  once  an  instrument  of  colonialism,  has  developed  and  continues  to  develop,  Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A;ÇĄ Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇŻ Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022;Ǥdz43
Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2122; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x17D;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2039;Â?ĆŞÂ&#x2014;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2014;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â?Â&#x2018;Â?ÇŚÂ&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021; actors,44  such  as  the  Sami.  International  law  consists  of  norms  and  procedures  linked  to  international  institutions  and  organizations  â&#x20AC;&#x153;that  are  in  some  measure  controlling  Â&#x192;Â&#x2026;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2022; Â&#x152;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Ǥdz45 Â&#x2018;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2122;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160; Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x161;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â? indigenous  person,  the  â&#x20AC;&#x153;international  community  has  not  been  completely  successful  Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;Ç¤ÇłÍ Í˘ Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x2122; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â? non-Ââ&#x20AC;?binding,  and  court  cases  can  be  lengthy  processes.  The  Sami  have  challenged  41  Â&#x160;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2021;Â?ÇĄ Dz Â&#x192;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2022;ÇĄÇł Í&#x17E;Í¤Í Ç¤ 42  Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;ÇĄ Dz Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019;ÇĄ Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄÇł ÍĄÍĄÍ&#x17E;Ǥ 43  Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x203A;Â&#x192;ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â? Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x2122;ÇĄ Í Ç¤ 44   Ibid.,  5. 45   Ibid.,  4. Í Í˘  Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Dz Â?Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x2122;ÇĄÇł Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039;Í?ͼͼ͢Č&#x152;ÇĄ Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2019;ÇŁČ&#x20AC;Č&#x20AC;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2122;ǤÂ&#x2030;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2026;ǤÂ&#x2026;Â&#x192;Č&#x20AC;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Č&#x20AC;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;ǤÂ&#x2019;Â&#x160;Â&#x2019;ÇŤÂ&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Ď&#x2039;ͥ͢Ǥ Â
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
84
national  governments  using  international  legal  procedures,  but  they  have  lost  many  cases.  While  they  have  been  recognized  as  an  indigenous  people  at  domestic  and  international  levels,  this  has  not  always  translated  into  respect  for  their  land  and  cultural  rights.
Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Í?ͼ͢Í&#x153;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Í?ÍĽÍŁÍ&#x153;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2030;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â? educated  Sami  elite  organized.47 Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2030;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021; demands  in  terms  of  indigenous  rights,  the  Sami  adopted  the  discourse  of  indigenous  rights.Í Í¤ Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2122;Â&#x192;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2026;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019; Â&#x2039;Â? Â&#x192; Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?ÇŚÂ&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201E;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2020;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2021; Â&#x192; Â&#x2022;Â&#x203A;Â?Â&#x201E;Â&#x2018;Â&#x17D; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â?ÇŚ Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Ǥ Â? Í?ͼͣͤǥ Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2030;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â?Â?Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;ÇŻÂ&#x2022; Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2039;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020; Â&#x192; Â&#x160;Â&#x203A;Â&#x2020;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026; Â&#x2020;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021; Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x160; ƤÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2C6;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039;ÇĄ who  were  concerned  about  the  environmental  impact  of  the  dam  and  its  negative  Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201C;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D; ƤÂ&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D; Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Ç¤Í ÍĽ  Environmentalists  supported  the  Sami,  and  protests,  which  included  hunger  strikes  and  human  barriers  to  prevent  machinery  from  accessing  the  river,  gained  widespread  media  attention.  Nonetheless,  protestors  were  forcibly  removed  by  the  Norwegian  police  force.ÍĄÍ&#x153;
The  Sami  have  sought  redress  in  international  law  when  national  avenues  have  been  blocked.
Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x192;Â&#x17D; Â&#x192;Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2014;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x201E;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2026;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020;ÇĄ Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; sought  redress  in  international  law.  The  Sami  petitioned  Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2021;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2DC;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2018;Â? Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022; Č&#x2039; Č&#x152;ÇĄ Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2039;Â&#x201D; Â&#x160;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; ƤÂ&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2122;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x201E;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2020;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2019;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x152;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2013;Ǥ Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; ͤ Â&#x2018;Â&#x2C6; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; ÇĄ Â&#x2122;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x160; Â&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; DzÂ&#x192; Â?Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A; Â&#x2030;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2019; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2039;Â? principle,  entitled  to  claim  the  right  to  respect  for  the[ir]  Â&#x2019;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2026;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x192;Â&#x201D; Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2C6;Â&#x2021;ÇŚÂ&#x2022;Â&#x2013;Â&#x203A;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;ÇĄÇł Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2013; Â&#x201D;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â&#x2013; Â&#x2013;Â&#x160;Â&#x2021; Â&#x2020;Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2122;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2020; not  prevent  the  Sami  from  living  in  their  traditional  ways,  and  the  case  was  declared  inadmissible.51  While Â
47  Â&#x2021;Â&#x17D;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2013;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2018;Â?Â&#x2022;Â?Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Dz Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2039; Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019;ÇĄÇł ͢ͼǤ Í Í¤  Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;ÇĄ Dz Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2020;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x153;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2022;Â&#x160;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Â&#x160;Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;ÇĄÇł ÍĄÍ?Í?Ǥ Í ÍĽ  Â&#x192;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2019;Â&#x2039;ÇĄ Dz Â?Â&#x2026;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x2013;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â?Â&#x2030; Â&#x2039;ĆĄÂ&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2013; Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x192;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022;ÇĄÇł Í Í&#x153;Í&#x153;Ǥ ÍĄÍ&#x153;   Ibid . 51  Â&#x160;Â&#x2018;Â&#x201D;Â?Â&#x201E;Â&#x2021;Â&#x201D;Â&#x201D;Â&#x203A;ÇĄ Â?Â&#x2020;Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x2021;Â?Â&#x2018;Â&#x2014;Â&#x2022; Â&#x2021;Â&#x2018;Â&#x2019;Â&#x17D;Â&#x2021;Â&#x2022; Â&#x192;Â?Â&#x2020; Â&#x2014;Â?Â&#x192;Â? Â&#x2039;Â&#x2030;Â&#x160;Â&#x2013;Â&#x2022;ÇĄ Í&#x17E;ͼͤǤ
85
ROUNDING
might entitle them to some compensation, the court rejected the Sami’s cultural argument.52 Ǥ movement helped the Sami network across Nordic borders, since the dam was seen ǡ Ǥ helped mobilize the Sami movement in Norway that resulted in the creation of a ͥͤͥ͝Ǥ53 While the Sami were ultimately unsuccessful ǡ ơ Ǥ The Sami have used international law to try to regain control over their lands, Ǥ ͥͤ͝͡ǡ ǡ in Sweden, unsuccessfully brought a case before the International Covenant on Civil Ǥ ǡ right to water and land in his village, as well as the right to farm reindeer because he had worked in a profession other than reindeer farming for more than three years.54 ͣ͞ ǡ ǯ ǡ Ƥ a license. Sweden argued that the laws governing reindeer husbandry, with which ǡ Dz ǡdz Dz Ǥdz55 Like the ͤͤ͢͝ǡ traditional economic activity of the Sami, and tied Sami identity to reindeer herding Ǧ Ƥ Ȃ Ǥ
ͥͥ͝͞ǡ 52 Ibid. 53 ǡ Dz ơ ǡdz ͜͜͠Ǥ 54 Dz Ǥ ǡdz ȋ Ǥ ǡȌǡ ǣȀȀ ͝Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ȁͥͣ͝Ǧͥͤ͝͡Ǥ ǡǡ para 2.1. 55 Ibid., para 4.3.
RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF THE SAMI
86
Ǥ ¡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ quarry to be built in reindeer herding area would destroy their traditional livelihood.͢͡ ͣ͞ǡ herding, an integral part of Sami culture. The site of the stone quarry was situated on a sacred Sami religious site, and the nearest village to the quarry was the last remaining Ǥ reindeer herding was important to Sami culture, the court found that this contract ͣ͞Ǥ quarry contract being written, and the court found that the quarry did not interfere enough with reindeer herding for there to be a violation.57 ͣ͞ Ǥͤ͡ ǡ indicated that, while the Sami have the right to practice their traditional reindeer Ƥ ǡ use it for their own economic purposes.ͥ͡
CONCLUSION Issues facing the Sami regarding cultural rights and land rights are common to other Ǥ Ƥ and international level, and is “a part of the international movement among the Ǥdz͢͜ The Sami have achieved a minimal level of political independence and recognition at the domestic level, but they clearly remain within the system of Nordic states,͢͝ as their parliaments and industries Ǥ ǡ ǡ ͢͡ ǡ ǡ ͤ͢͝Ǥ 57 Ǥǡ ͤ͢͝Ǧͣ͜͝ . ͤ͡ Ǥǡ ͣ͜͝Ǧͣ͝͝Ǥ ͥ͡ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͣ͝͠Ǥ ͢͜ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͝͝Ǥ ͢͝ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͟͡͞Ǥ
87
ROUNDING
such as reindeer herding, have been tolerated, “modern [non-‐indigenous] systems of administration and governance have been introduced to control and regulate Ǥdz͢͞ Since the creation of the Lapp Codicil, Nordic states have recognized the Ǥ husbandry, yet simultaneously restrict the Sami’s opportunity to pursue reindeer farming and other traditional activities by developing and controlling Sami lands. Ǥ for their handling of indigenous issues from the United Nations Committee on the ǡ͢͟ and while these criticisms are non-‐binding, Ǥ law has evolved to include indigenous peoples, allowing people like the Sami to access ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ¡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ and the state remains in control of Sápmi. State borders have split the Sami, and the Ƥ Dz Ƥ Ǥdz͢͠ Control over ǡ Ǧ ǡ Dz Ǥdz͢͡ Ƥ ͥ͢͝ be a crucial recognition of Sami land rights,͢͢ but as long as “the real power and Ƥ Ǧ ǡdz Ǥdzͣ͢ International law has ǡ tool of resistance, but thus far international law has failed to adequately protect their cultural and land rights.
͢͞ ǡ Dz ơ ǡdz ͥͣ͟Ǥ ͢͟ ǡ Dz ǡ ǡ ǡdz ͡͡͞Ǥ ͢͠ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͤ͞͞Ǥ ͢͡ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͝͝Ǥ ͢͢ ǡ Dz ǡdz ͠͝Ǥ ͣ͢ ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡdz ͠͡͝Ǥ
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VOICES IN THE ARCTIC
88
Commentary: Voices in the Arctic Matt Wildcat*
ǡ ơ Ǥ ƪ Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ Dz ƪ ǡdz ƪ ǡ ȋ Ȍ ȋ ȌǤ ǡ1 ǯ Ǧ Ǥ Dz ǣ ǡdz Dz ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ȑ Ȓ ǡ ǡ Ǥdz ǡ Ǧ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ * ǡ ȋ Ȍ ȋ ȌǤ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ
1
ǡ Dz dzǡ ǡ ͠ ͜͟͞͝Ǥ
89
WILDCAT
ǡ ơ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ
THE ‘DOMESTIC ’ Dz Ǥdz Ǧ Dz dz ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Dz Ǥdz ǡ ǡ Ǥ͞ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ Dz ȑ Ȓ dz Ǥ Dz Ǯ ǯ ǯ Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ȑ Ȓ Ǯ ǯ Ǧ ǯǤdz ǡ Ƥ Ǥ
͝Ǥͤ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ơ ǡ ͞
ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ ǡ Ǥ
VOICES IN THE ARCTIC
90
Dz ǡdz͟ Dzȑ Ȓ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥdz͠ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ
Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǣ Ǥ Ƥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ5
ǡ Ǯ ǯ ơ Ǥ6
THE NORMATIVE WORK OF HISTORY
͟
ǡ ǡ ͟ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͜͜͞͠Ȍǡ ͥͤǤ
͠
ǡ Dz Ǧ ǡ ǯ Ƥ ǡdz ͤ͞ǡ Ǥ ͝ ȋ͜͜͞͠Ȍǣ ͢ǦͥǤ
5
Ǥ
6
ǡ Dz Ǧ ǣ ǡ ǡ ǯ dz
͞ǡ Ǥ ͞ ȋ͜͟͞͝Ȍǣ ͢͠ǦͤͣǢ ǡ Dz ǣ dz ȋ ǡ ǡ ͜͞͝͞ȌǤ Ǧ Ǯ ǯ Ǥ
91
WILDCAT
ǡ Ǥ ͜͡ ǡ Ǥ ͜͞͡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Dz ȑ Ȓ Ǥdz Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ
INCLUDING INUIT AND INDIGENOUS VOICES ǡ ơ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ơ Ǥ ơ ơ Ǥ ơ
Ǧ ǡ Ƥ
VOICES IN THE ARCTIC
92
Ǥͣ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Dz ǥ ȑ Ȓ ǯ Ǥdz ͤ Ǧ Dz ȑ Ȓ Ǥdzͥ ǯ Ƥ ǡ ǡ Ƥ Ǥ ǡ ǯ Dz Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥdz ǡ ǯ ǣ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ͜͝
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ǡ ǡ ǡ Dz ǣ dzǡ ǡ ͟͠ǡ Ǥ ͞ ȋͥ͜͜͞Ȍǣ
͜͞͡Ǧ͢͜͞Ǥ ǡ ǣ Ƥ ǡ Dz ǣ ǡ ǡdz ǣ Ǧ ǡ ͤ͞ ͜͟͞͝ǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ͢͢͞Ǣ Dz Ȃ ǡ dzǡ ȋ͜͟͞͝Ȍǡ ǣȀȀ Ǥ Ȁ Ȁ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ǧ Ȁ Ȁ Ǥ ͤ
ǡ Ǥ
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ǡ Dz ǡdz ͟͞ǡ Ǥ ͞ ȋ͜͞͝͞Ȍǣ ͞Ǧ͟ǡ ͟Ǥ
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STAFF BIOGRAPHIES ¦ JIA 2013
93
STAFF Editor-in-Chief SAM ROWAN is a fourth-year Honours Political Science with International Relations student, and is interested in the changing conceptualizations of global politics, and the production and sociology of the discipline. Sam has studied abroad at Sciences Po Paris, and will be pursuing graduate studies in the fall. Sam is also involved in running Cinema Politica UBC, and enjoys cycling and eating quinoa. Senior Editors MICHAEL BARRETT completed his undergraduate degree in December 2012, with a major in Political Science and a minor in Economics. In September, he will be attending law school. MOLLIE DEYONG will graduate this year with a BA in Political Science. Her favourite topics of study are gender and legal theory, though she wishes she had taken at least one history course during her undergrad. Mollie›s interests include food (eating, cooking, smelling), animals (special emphasis on dogs and capybaras), and reading (anything other than romance novels). In September 2013, she will be attending law school at the University of Victoria. KELSEY FRANKS is a fourth-year student, pursuing a degree in Honours Political Science with International Relations. She recently returned to UBC after spending time on exchange in England, where she furthered her knowledge of European history, politics and culture. After graduation, Kelsey plans on continuing her studies in law and global affairs, and travelling. ISABELLE PLESSIS is in the final year of her degree in Honours Political Science with International Relations and a minor in German. Though interested in all things international, she has a soft spot for International Political Economy, with a research interest in global governance, emerging economies, and European integration. She is currently writing her Honours thesis on the politicization of Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Isabelle has studied abroad in England and Germany, and will use any excuse to go travelling. When not studying, you can find Isabelle running, sleeping, or eating (and sometimes all three at once). Isabelle will begin a master›s degree in International Political Economy next year. Junior Editors SAMMY BARKER is a fourth-year Honours Political Science student with an interest in immigration politics, security studies and international diplomacy. After graduation, Sammy is off to law school where she tentatively plans to specialize in immigration law. In her spare time, she enjoys skiing, yoga and golfing. NIKKI BLU is an International Relations and Political Science student finishing her last year at UBC. She is interested in global environmental politics and conflict management. After graduation she plans on continuing her studies in water security and water resources management. During her spare time when she is not immersed in the exciting world of IR, she enjoys swimming, painting and baking. FATIMA HEWAIDI is a third-year International Relations student. In addition to serving on the editorial board, she has also been involved in the International Relations Students Association as the Head Delegate of this year’s Model NATO team and as the Director of Delegate Affairs at UBCMUN 2013. Upon graduating, she plans to move to the Middle East and prepare herself for graduate studies in International Relations with an extensive concentration on the MENA region. JULIE JENKINS is pursuing a degree in Political Science with a minor in Sociology. Her academic interests include critical, postcolonial and democratic theory, the sociology of knowledge and power, and public-interest policy and law. Active in Vancouver’s independent media community, Julie is committed to projects that create space for public pedagogy and inclusive dialogues about social, political and economic change.
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THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NATALYA KAUTZ is a second-year student, hoping to major in Economics and International Relations. She has been involved with campus publishing, previously employed as Features Editor at The Ubyssey. During her next two years at UBC, Natalya plans to travel, eat cheese, and delve into all that academia has to offer. SABINA KRAVCAKOVA, is a double degree student graduating at UBC and Sciences Po Paris this year. Sabina’s genuine passion for international relations guided her from Eastern Europe to France and then to Canada. Initially specializing in European affairs, Sabina’s studies at UBC inspired her to enlarge her academic and language focus to Asia and the process of globalization. Her next adventure is to pursue new challenges in the field of international management. Sabina’s ultimate goal is to be a veritable global citizen, therefore living in different places, exploring new cultures and learning new language is not just a hobby for Sabina, but her lifestyle and everyday reality. FATEMEH MAYANLOO is in her fourth-year of a double major in Economics and International Relations. She is particularly interested in areas of economic development relating to maternal health initiatives, access to drug development and, more recently, the interface between intellectual property, competition policy and access to medical innovations. She will be working in Latin America this upcoming summer with an NGO that focuses on agroecology and appropriate technologies. In her spare time, she enjoys nerding out over Game of Thrones, and watching Kipper and hanging out with her two-year-old brother. BETTY ZHANG is a fifth-year student majoring in International Relations with a minor in French. Having spent eight months last year working in Hong Kong, she has developed a keen interest in the Asia-Pacific region. Upon graduation, Betty hopes to pursue a career that combines her curiosity for global issues with her love for writing and travel. Layout and Design SANDY CHU is a third-year International Relations student minoring in Environment and Society. Her fascination with the discipline lies with security studies, sustainable urban development, modern warfare, and international political economy. She will be going on exchange to University College London in the upcoming term. In reality, she spends most of her time at UBC sitting in cafés looking at fonts magnified to 100pt. ANITA HUNG is a third-year student studying Political Science. Her academic interests include Middle East conflict studies, and international humanitarian law. She is a self-identified typography snob with a passion for food, photography, and travel. Anita’s ideal career would to be an international human rights lawyer by day, and a fashion editor by night. Marketing and Distribution ANNIE JU is a fourth-year Political Science and Gender Studies student. Aside from JIA, she has contributed to The Ubyssey and works at the Communications Department of Go Global. She has also lived and studied abroad in Lyon, France in her third year to indulge in her passion for traveling, the French language, and wine. Upon graduation this May, Annie will be pursuing a Master’s degree in Journalism in New York. STEPHANIE XU is currently a second-year student in science, majoring in biopsychology, and hoping to pursue a career in forensic psychiatry. Her interest with international relations stems from her many years of Model United Nations involvement where she has participated as both delegate and chair. She hopes to expand her experience with world relations by documenting her travels with her photography. Faculty Liaison EMMA LANGE is a third-year student, currently pursuing a double major in Political Science and Human Geography. She hopes to use her knowledge acquired at UBC to engage in purposeful global travels.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES ¦ JIA 2013
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AUTHORS KATE BECK is a third-year undergraduate student completing a major in International Relations and a minor in Human Geography. Her main interests are in international micro-economic development and community planning, and she hopes to complete a Master’s in Regional Planning after finishing her undergraduate degree. MIEKA BUCKLEY-PEARSON graduated from UBC in May 2012 with a degree in Honours Political Science with International Relations and a minor in African Studies. In addition to writing her thesis, in her last year she was also the Editor-in-Chief of the UBC Journal of Political Studies. She focuses her academic and career interests on the role of global civil society in the sustainable social, economic, and political development of the southeastern region of Africa. She currently lives in Ottawa and is a Project Coordinator for the United Nations Association in Canada. COLIN CHIA is graduating from UBC in 2013 with a BA in Political Science, and hopes to pursue graduate studies in politics this fall. His main academic interests are security studies, nationalism and federalism, and politics of the Asia-Pacific region. He recently completed an exchange term at the Australian National University. KELSEY FRANKS is a fourth-year student, pursuing a degree in Honours Political Science with International Relations. She recently returned to UBC after spending time on exchange in England, where she furthered her knowledge of European history, politics and culture. After graduation, Kelsey plans on continuing her studies in law and global affairs, and travelling. IVO MARTINICH is a fourth-year student in the Honours Political Science with International Relations program. His academic interests lie mostly within the field of international relations, and include transitional justice, peacekeeping operations and international organizations. Upon graduation, Ivo hopes to complete a J.D. degree and pursue a career in international law. He also enjoys travelling and reading twentieth-century French and Latin American literature. ALLISON ROUNDING is a fourth-year Honours Political Science student who is also doing a minor in Gender Studies. She is interested in social justice issues, and more specifically, issues surrounding HIV/ AIDS stigma as well as childcare and the welfare state. She plans to continue her education at a graduate level after completing her undergraduate degree in December 2013.
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SPONSORS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDENTS ASSOCIATION 8%& KDV ORQJ HQFRXUDJHG JOREDO FLWL]HQVKLS DV D NH\ SDUW RI DFDGHPLF GHYHORSPHQW )RU RYHU WZHQW\ ¿YH years, the International Relations Students Association (IRSA) has worked to develop co-curricular programs that help achieve this goal. We aim to provide students from a variety of disciplines with a forum for the discussion of international issues. IRSA membership is available to all UBC students and alumni. Our core projects include: Â&#x2021; 8%& -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $Ì&#x2020;DLUV Â&#x2021; 1LJKW RI D 7KRXVDQG 'LQQHUV Â&#x2021; 8%& 0RGHO 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV Â&#x2021; %L DQQXDO IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FRQIHUHQFH Â&#x2021; 0RGHO 1$72 DQG 81 GHOHJDWLRQV Â&#x2021; &DUHHU QLJKW Â&#x2021; 6RFLDO HYHQWV Â&#x2021; %L ZHHNO\ PHHWLQJV 7KH -,$ DQG ,56$ ZRXOG OLNH WR WKDQN WKH IROORZLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQV DQG GHSDUWPHQWV IRU WKHLU JHQHURXV support for our programs: Â&#x2021; 8%& $OPD 0DWHU 6RFLHW\ Â&#x2021; 8%& $UWV 8QGHUJUDGXDWH 6RFLHW\ Â&#x2021; 7KH /LX ,QVWLWXWH IRU *OREDO ,VVXHV Â&#x2021; 8%& ,QWHUQDWLRQDO +RXVH Â&#x2021; 8%& ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HODWLRQV 3URJUDP ZZZ EORJV XEF FD LUVD _ _ /LX ,QVWLWXWH IRU *OREDO ,VVXHV 5RRP
7KH $06 6XVWDLQDELOLW\ )XQG LV VXSSRUWHG WKURXJK D FRQWULEXWLRQ of just slightly over $2 from each UBC student. This fund of over $100,000 goes to support reducing the ecological footprint and increasing the social cohesion of the student community at UBC. Our students submit proposals that are reviewed on a regular basis through our website at http://amssustainability.ca
The UBC International Relations program is a degree granting undergraduate program in the Faculty RI $UWV :LWK DSSUR[LPDWHO\ PDMRUV WKH SURJUDP LV RQH RI WKH ODUJHVW LQ WKH )DFXOW\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO Relations is an interdisciplinary major which permits students to take courses in a variety of disciplines LQFOXGLQJ +LVWRU\ 3ROLWLFDO 6FLHQFH (FRQRPLFV WKH WKUHH FRUH GLVFLSOLQHV DV ZHOO DV *HRJUDSK\ $VLDQ 6WXGLHV DQG 6RFLRORJ\ DPRQJ RWKHUV 7KH ,5 SURJUDP LV D SURXG VSRQVRU RI WKH 8%& -RXUQDO RI ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $Ì&#x2020;DLUV