Issuu on Google+

2012 Edition

YEAR

27

THE UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Including: PHOTO ESSAYS CARTOONS & MORE

STILL AT THE CROSSROADS: 85%  of  Chinese  oil  imports  pass   through  the  Strait  of  Malacca,   ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĞīĞĐƟǀĞůLJĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚďLJ ƚŚĞh^EĂǀLJ͘ŽĞƐƚŚŝƐǀƵůŶĞƌĂďŝů-­‐ ŝƚLJƌŝƐŬƚƌŝŐŐĞƌŝŶŐĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌĐŽŶŇŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽƉŽǁĞƌƐ͍ BY  SAM  ROWAN

SETTLEMENTS IN THE

WEST BANK Is   Israeli   expansion   in   the   tĞƐƚĂŶŬŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂď-­‐ ůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂĨƵƚƵƌĞWĂůĞƐƟŶ-­‐ ŝĂŶƐƚĂƚĞŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ͍ BY  EMELIE  PEACOCK

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: tŚĂƚĂƌĞWƌŽǀŝŶĐŝĂůZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƟŽŶ dĞĂŵƐĂŶĚŚŽǁĐĂŶƚŚĞLJŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ hEƉĞĂĐĞŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĞīŽƌƚƐ͍   BY  QUINN  YU


T H E U B C J O U R N A L O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L A F FA I R S 2 0 1 2

The Annual Publication of the International Relations Students Association The University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C.

Cover Design: Sandy Chu Cover Photograph: Kelvin Yueng

2012 International Relations Students Association | all rights reserved. Box 197-6138 Student Union Boulevard | Vancouver, BC | Canada | V6T 1Z1


CONTENTS

UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Foreword

2

Introduction

3

Contributors

4

Settlements in the West Bank and the Two-State Solution

6

Emelie Peacock

Responses to Emelie

22

Julian Markowitz Abdurrahman Mihirig

Sierra Leone: Testing Ground of the Collier-Hoeffler Model

26

Dominika Ziemczonek

Is Justice Being Done?: An Assessment of the Viability of Hybrid Tribunals

38

Bridgette Watson

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A Model Worth Adopting in Future United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

50

Quinn Yu

Still at the Crossroads: The Strait of Malacca and Chinese Energy Security in the 21st Century

63

Sam Rowan

Kabul and Kandahar

75

Allen Sens

Strait of Malacca

79

Amir Ibrahim Abbas

The Railroad

83

Chaerean Kim

Street Anthems

85

Ludmila AndrĂŠa

From Barcelona to Florence

89

Mehran NajaďŹ

Istanbul Urbanized

93

Milena Salazar

Aerosol Activism

95

Ting Kelly

The Live or Die Paradigm Shift: Imagining an Alternative World

97

Raoul Wieland

Mortgaging Power: Economic Flows Changing International Relations

101

Ian McDonald

Canada and Climate Change: An Interview

105

Allen Sens Kathryn Harrison

Staff Biographies

109

Sponsors

111


FOREWORD Dear Reader, On behalf of the International Relations Students Association, it is my privilege to welcome you to the 2012 edition of IRSA’s Journal of International Affairs. The JIA is one of the University of British Columbia’s oldest and most celebrated undergraduate journals. For twenty-seven years it has granted undergraduate students at UBC and abroad the rare opportunity to publish their work in a highly accredited faculty and peer-reviewed academic journal. The JIA has forged a reputation as one of the most important undergraduate journals at UBC, continually striving to showcase the best of UBC’s undergraduate community to universities across North America. The ambitious scope of this year’s edition marks a continuation of this tradition of excellence. I would like to officially congratulate the JIA team for their passion and their dedication to the 2012 Edition, especially the Editor-in-Chief, editorial staff and publication team. I would also like to acknowledge our sponsors, the Liu Institute and the International Relations Program, whose generous support allows our organization to continually serve the students of UBC. Enjoy! Sincerely, Felim Donnelly President, 2011-2012 International Relations Students Association

2


INTRODUCTION Dear Reader, There has never been a more important time to study international relations. In the past year, we have been forced to reckon with a series of challenges that have made the future of our discipline, and of our very planet, uncertain. From the Occupy movement to the Arab Spring, mounting popular discontent defies our most powerful institutions. At the same time, rising states like China, India, Turkey and Brazil are shifting the balance of power. Additionally, climate change and financial instability have caused untold misery, and threaten our future prosperity. These are difficult circumstances, but I believe that we are in good hands. The 2012 Journal of International Affairs demonstrates that students appreciate the gravity of this moment. After looking at countless pieces, we have selected a few of the most thought-provoking articles and evocative photographs. Our twenty-four person staff—from the editorial board and production team, to the research department and marketing assistants—would like to thank you for reading our publication, and invite you to participate in the global discussion around these important issues. The Journal would not be possible without the generous support of our campus partners. In particular, I would like to thank the International Relations Students Association and the International Relations Program for their continued support. Additionally, the AMS Sustainability Initiative helped us print this year’s Journal on environmentally friendly, carbon-offset paper. Furthermore, the AMS Clubs Benefit Fund provided us the necessary support to create our very first essay contest. Finally, I want to thank the many faculty members who were so generous with their time. In particular, the assistance of Dr. Steven Lee and Dr. Allen Sens was invaluable to our editorial board. Sincerely, Gordon Katic Editor-in-Chief 2012 UBC Journal of International Affairs

3


THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Editor-in-Chief GORDON KATIC Senior Editors MOLLIE DEYONG, CODI HAUKA ABDURRAHMAN MIHIRIG, SAM ROWAN Junior Editors MEGHAN ANDERSON, MICHAEL BARRETT KAI GREEN, TYLER KRETZSCHMAR MEHRAN NAJAFI, ISABELLE PLESSIS, BETTY ZHANG Research Coordinator MEHRAN NAJAFI Research Assistants EMILY CSISZAR , YIQUN YUAN Production Team LUDMILA ANDRÉA, SANDY CHU, TING KELLY Cartoonist INDIANA JOEL Copy Editor KAI GREEN Communications Coordinator IANA MESSETCHKOVA Faculty Liaison JORDAN FERNANDEZ Marketing MICHELLE GILLESPIE , ANNIE JU STUDENT CONTRIBUTORS Bridgette Watson, Quinn Yu, Sam Rowan, Dominika Ziemczonek Emelie Peacock, Raoul Wieland, Ian McDonald, Ludmila Andréa Mehran Najafi, Chaerean Kim, Kelvin Yeung, Milena Salazar, Amir Ibrahim Abbas 2012 International Relations Students Association | all rights reserved Box 197-6138 Student Union Boulevard | Vancouver, BC | Canada | V6T 1Z1 The UBC Journal of International Affairs is publication of the International Relations Students Association of the Alma Mater Scoiety of British Columbia. The UBC logo and the name “UBC” are official marks of the University of British Columbia and are used in accordance with UBC Public Affairs visual guidelines. All articles published in the Journal of International Affairs represent the opinions of the authors and do not reflect the policies or opinions of the University of British Columbia, the staff of the Journal of International Affairs, or the International Relations Student Association. UBC does not assume any responsibility for errors or omissions in this journal. 4


SPECIAL GUEST CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Allen Sens Department of Political Science Dr. Kathryn Harrison

Department of Political Science

Julian Ross Markowitz

Stand With Us

Abdurrahman Mihirig

Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights

FACULTY REVIEWERS Dr. Nathan Allen

Department of Political Science

Dr. Philippe Le Billon

Liu Institute for Global Issues

Dr. Yves Tiberghien

Department of Political Science

Dr. Maxwell Cameron

Department of Political Science

Dr. Hani Faris

Department of Political Science

Dr. Catherine Douglas

Department of Economics

Dr. Scott Fitzsimmons

Departm ent of Political Science

Dr. Katharina Coleman

Department of Political Science

Dr. Scott Anderson

Department of Philosophy

Dr. Gerald McIntyre

Department of Economics

Dr. Alan Jacobs

Department of Political Science

Dr. Rima Wilkes

Department of Sociology

Kate Neville (PhD candidate)

Department of Political Science

Dr. Allen Sens

Department of Political Science

Dr. Steven Lee

IR Program Chair

SPECIAL THANKS Irina Florov Department of Political Science Dr. Leonora Angeles

Women’s and Gender Studies

Dr. Laura Janara

Department of Political Science

Dr. Richard Price

Department of Political Science

Dr. Jamie Peck

Department of Geography

Dr. Raul Pacheco-Vega

Department of Political Science

Dr. Craig Riddell

Department of Economics

Will McDonald

The Ubyssey

Andrew MacIsaac

The International Relations Student Association

Andres Casallas

The International Relations Student Association

Kavita Ramdas

Freeman Spogli Institute of International Affairs, Stanford University UBC Press

Holly Keller Ron Peleg

American Program Bureau

Seth Klein

The Centre for Canadian Policy Alternatives

Justin Ritchie

Alma Mater Society, UBC

Tristan Miller Ian Roote

Alma Mater Society, UBC MET Printers 5


PEACOCK ¦ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Settlements in the West Bank and the Two-State Solution Emelie Peacock ‡Ž‹‡ ‡ƒ…‘… ‹• …‘’Ž‡–‹‰ Š‡” ϔ‹ˆ–Š ƒ† ϔ‹ƒŽ ›‡ƒ” ƒ– ǡ ™‹–Š ƒ ƒŒ‘” ‹

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ ‡Žƒ–‹‘•Ǥ ‡” ƒ…ƒ†‡‹… ‹–‡”‡•–• ƒ”‡ “—‹–‡ ˜ƒ”‹‡† ƒ† ‹…Ž—†‡ †‹’Ž‘ƒ…›ǡ ‹–‡”ƒŽ …‘ϔŽ‹…– ƒ† ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ Š—ƒ‹–ƒ”‹ƒ Žƒ™Ǥ  –Š‡ ˆ—-­‐ –—”‡ •Š‡ ’Žƒ• –‘ ™‘” ‡‹–Š‡” ™‹–Š –Š‡  ‘” ™‹–Š ƒ ‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ Š—ƒ‹-­‐ –ƒ”‹ƒ ‘”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ǡ –‘ …‘–”‹„—–‡ –‘ ‰”‡ƒ–‡” ƒ™ƒ”‡‡•• ‘ˆ ‰Ž‘„ƒŽ ‹••—‡• ƒ† –Š‡ „‡––‡”‡– ‘ˆ Š—ƒ‹–›Ǥ Š‡ ‹• ƒ †—ƒŽ …‹–‹œ‡ ‘ˆ ™‡†‡ ƒ† ƒƒ†ƒǡ ƒ† Š‡” ‹–‡”‡•–• ‘—–•‹†‡ ‘ˆ —‹˜‡”•‹–› ‹…Ž—†‡ –”ƒ˜‡Ž‹‰ ƒ† Ž‡ƒ”‹‰ Žƒ‰—ƒ‰‡•Ǥ

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ongoing since the end of the nineteenth century, has provoked cycles of hope, anger, and despair in each attempted round of peace efforts. Since the late 1980s, a two-state solution has begun to be seen as the only legitimate end goal of the peace process, culminating in the United States’ official endorsement of it in 2003.1 On the surface, this proposition seems to conform to international norms of sovereignty and the right to selfdetermination, as well as to grant Palestinians a vehicle through which they can fully express their Palestinian nationalism. Yet what this seemingly egalitarian formula masks is the ongoing, dynamic process of Israeli “settler-colonialism”2 and the effect that this process has on nascent Palestinian polity. The Israeli process of settling the West Bank, with all that it entails—military installations and other security measures, road networks, the separation wall—has in effect rendered impossible the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state. This paper will examine the West Bank settlements, looking at ideological, political, and physical factors and what these settlements mean for the ongoing peace process.

ͳԝ‡’ƒ”–‡–‘ˆ–ƒ–‡ǡ‘ƒ†ƒ’–‘‘Ž—–‹‘‘ˆ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‘ϔŽ‹…–ȋƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ‡’ƒ”–‡–‘ˆ–ƒ–‡ǡʹͲͲ͵ȌǡŠ––’ǣȀȀ ™™™Ǥƒ‡”‹…ƒǤ‰‘˜Ȁ•–Ȁ™ƒ•Šϐ‹Ž‡Ǥ‡‰Ž‹•ŠȀʹͲͲ͵Ȁ’”‹ŽȀʹͲͲ͵ͲͶ͵Ͳͳ͵Ͷͺ͵͹”‡ŽŠ…‹‡ͲǤ͵ͻ͵ͲͶ͹ͷǤŠ–ŽǤ ʹԝ‹”‰‹‹ƒ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǣ”‡ƒ–Š”‘—‰Šˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹–Š‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹Ǧ ƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‡ƒ†Ž‘…ȋ”„‘”ǣŠ‡‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‹…Š‹‰ƒ”‡••ǡʹͲͲͷȌǡͳͶͷǤ

6


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The  Peace  Process

“The Israeli process of settling the West Bank, with all that it entails...has in effect rendered impossible the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state.�

Negotiations between Israelis and Arabs of Palestine followed the beginnings of Jewish immigration to what was at the time a part of the Ottoman Empire, and continued on through the British Mandate period that lasted from 1917 to 1948. Initially there were many proposed solutions, yet the idea of partition began to be suggested by a number of commissions during the Mandate period, and more officially in the November 1947 UN Partition Plan (see Appendix A, Map 1). Israel was declared an independent state in May of 1948; shortly after, the first Arab-Israeli war broke out between Israel, and a coalition of Arab states and Palestinians. This war resulted in the 1949 Armistice lines, also known as the “Green Line,�3 temporary ceasefire lines that a number of later partition and peace efforts used as the delineating lines for a future Palestinian state (see Appendix A, Map 2). An important turning point in the conflict came with the 1967 “Six Day War,� in which Israel captured huge swathes of territory, including the entire West Bank, which had been held by Jordan since 1949.4 The West Bank was now under Israeli occupation, and Arab states shifted their focus from reclaiming Palestine to reclaiming their own lost territory by way of peace deals with Israel.5 After 1967, a strong Palestinian resistance grew, the US and the UN entered into the equation as third party negotiators and from then onward a multilateral “peace process�6 has been ongoing. The Oslo process, seen as a breakthrough for peace before it stalled in 2001,7 was the first set of direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians. Oslo called for an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in several stages and the establishment of Palestinian self-government. However, its provisions have only been partially realized.8 After Oslo, several attempts were made to implement the agreement or create new agreements, such as the Camp David negotiations in 2000. The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen several

3 Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities (Bloomingtom, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010), 16. ÍśÔ? „‹†Ǥǥͳ͚Ǥ ͡Ô? „‹†Ǥǥͳ͚Ǥ ͸Ô?—ƒÂ?†–ǥ‹Â?Š‹•„‘‘Â?‡ƒ…‡”‘…‡••ǣÂ?‡”‹…ƒÂ?‹’Ž‘Â?ƒ…›ƒÂ?†–Š‡Â”ÂƒÂ„ÇŚ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‘Â?ϔŽ‹…–‹Â?…‡͡Ϳ͟ͽǥ…”‡†‹–•–Š‡–‡”Â?Ç˛Â’Â‡ÂƒÂ…Â‡ ’”‘…‡••dz–‘–Š‡Â?‹–‡†–ƒ–‡•™Š‘„‡‰ƒÂ?—•‹Â?‰‹–‹Â?–Š‡ͳ͚͝Ͳǯ•Ǥ –Šƒ••‹Â?…‡„‡…‘Â?‡–Š‡’”‡†‘Â?‹Â?ƒÂ?––‡”Â?—•‡†–‘†‡•…”‹„‡ Â?‡‰‘–‹ƒ–‹‘Â?•„‡–™‡‡Â? •”ƒ‡ŽƒÂ?†ƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‹ƒÂ?•Ǥ ÍšÔ? ‘—•‡‘ˆ‘”†•ǥ—”‘’‡ƒÂ?Â?‹‘Â?‘Â?Â?‹––‡‡ǤŠ‡ƒÂ?†–Š‡‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡”‘…‡••ǣ‘Ž—Â?‡͡ǣ‡’‘”–Č‹‘Â?†‘Â?ÇĄÇŁŠ‡ –ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒ”›ˆĎ?‹…‡ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍšČŒÇĄͳͳǤ ÍşÔ?Dz ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‹†‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡ƒŽÂ?•ǥdzથ‹††Ž‡ÂƒÂ•Â–ÇĄ  Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ„„…Ǥ…‘Ǥ—Â?Č€Â?‡™•Ȁ™‘”Ž†njÂ?Â‹Â†Â†ÂŽÂ‡ÇŚÂ‡ÂƒÂ•Â–ÇŚÍłÍłÍłÍ˛ÍľÍšÍśÍˇÇ¤

Íš


PEACOCK ¦ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

multilateral peace proposals from Arab states and from a new grouping of international actors labeled the “Quartet,” which includes the United States, Russia, the EU, and the UN.9 In September of 2011, Palestinians launched a diplomatic campaign at the UN to achieve recognition as a UN member state, an issue which is still in debate at the UN Security Council. From the outset, the peace process has been highly problematic, as it defers final status issues, including borders, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and the status of Jerusalem to negotiations in the future. Even more problematic is the glaring disconnect between realities in the West Bank, and diplomacy in the international arena. Although each round of agreements has produced elaborate maps of the future Palestinian and Israeli states, what these maps do not reflect and what the entire peace process fails to acknowledge are the factors that make a viable and sovereign Palestinian state impossible. The most detrimental of these realities on the ground is the Israeli settlement enterprise, which is illegal under international law10 and is the key impediment to a two-state solution.  

The  Facts  on  the  Ground Š‡……—’ƒ–‹‘ Israel has occupied the West Bank (the largest occupied territory) since 1967, following the Six Day War. The occupation has been in constant flux between clamping down heavily, engaging in combat during the Palestinian uprisings, or intifadas, and allowing some normal day–to–day life to take place in times of relative calm.11 Although the Oslo peace negotiations officially ended by granting Palestinian autonomy in sections of the West Bank12 (see Areas A and B in Appendix A, Map 3), Israel remains in complete control of the borders of all Palestinian autonomous areas, all of Area C (see Appendix A, Map 3), as well as its airspace and water resources.13 Physical control over the West Bank is enacted through law and force by a complex set of actors including the Israeli state, military, and settlers. The settlement regime is a crucial element in the continued occupation, and it is inextricably linked to the Jewish faith, political Zionism, and the Israeli state.

ͻԝDz ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‹†‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡ƒŽ•ǡdz‡™•‹††Ž‡ƒ•–Ǥ ͳͲԝŠ‡–”ƒ•ˆ‡”‘ˆƒ‘……—’›‹‰’‘™‡”ǯ•…‹˜‹Ž‹ƒ’‘’—Žƒ–‹‘–‘ƒ‘……—’‹‡†–‡””‹–‘”›‹•‹ŽŽ‡‰ƒŽ—†‡””–‹…Ž‡Ͷͻ‘ˆ–Š‡ ‡‡˜ƒ ‘˜‡–‹‘”‡Žƒ–‹‰–‘–Š‡”‘–‡…–‹‘‘ˆ‹˜‹Ž‹ƒ‡”•‘•‹‹‡‘ˆ™ƒ”ȋƒŽ•‘‘™ƒ•–Š‡ ‘—”–Š ‡‡˜ƒ‘˜‡–‹‘ȌǤ •”ƒ‡Ž Šƒ•”ƒ–‹ϐ‹‡†–Š‡‘˜‡–‹‘Ǥ ‘”‘”‡‹ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘•‡‡Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‹…”…Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‹ŠŽǤ•ˆȀǤ ͳͳԝ……—’ƒ–‹‘ͷͶͷǡ†‹”‡…–‡†„›„†ƒŽŽƒŠ‡‹•Šǡ—ˆ›ƒ‡‹•ŠȋʹͲͲ͸Ǣǣ”‹’Ž‡›‡ ‹Ž•”‘†—…–‹‘ǡʹͲͲʹǤȌǡǤ ͳʹԝƒˆƒ‡Ž‡—˜‡›ǡDz —†ƒ‡–ƒŽ‹•–‘Ž‘‹ƒŽ‹•ǣŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‘ϐŽ‹…–ǡdz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š›ʹʹȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍǣ ͵͸ͲǤ ͳ͵ԝ Šƒœ‹ǦƒŽ‹† ƒŽƒŠǡDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDz…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘dzƒ†–Š‡‡‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘–‘–Š‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ ‘ϐŽ‹…–ǡdzŠ‹”†‘”Ž†—ƒ”–‡”Ž›ʹ͸ǡ‘ǤͺȋʹͲͲͷȌǣͳ͸͹Ǥ

ͺ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political  Zionism  and  Settlement  in  the  Land  of  Israel The Israeli West Bank settlements have a long and complicated history.14 The first settlements were established in September 1967, and have multiplied and expanded under every subsequent Israeli government regardless of political creed.15 Political Zionism, the philosophy upon which the Israeli state was founded, in large part defines the West Bank settlement agenda, and provides it with ideological backing. Zionism, according to Tilley, is premised on three main ideas: ethnic sanctuary, geographic security, and national expression.16 First, the Jewish state serves as a sanctuary for a beleaguered ethnoreligious group, a sanctuary that is imperative after the horrors of the Holocaust.17 Second, the Israeli state and settlement regime are seen as a means to ensure geographic security in a monolithic hostile Arab neighbourhood. This idea of the threat of encirclement and the need to ensure security through control over territory has been present in Israeli discourse from the founding of the state with Ben Gurion’s activism. Third, and perhaps most important, is the idea that Jewish nationality can only be fully expressed through statehood, specifically by creating a Jewish state in Palestine. Palestine has become the “historical homeland” in Jewish nationalist discourse, bolstered by a “…seemingly complete—or at least self-contained—body of scientific, linguistic, literary, historical, and biblical authorities [that were] invented to foster impressions of Jewish belonging and natural rights in a Jewish homeland reproduced from biblical legend.”18 In Zionist ideology, the conception of Israel encompasses all of Mandate Palestine, including biblical Judea and Samaria (now the West Bank).19 The concept of settlement in the West Bank therefore becomes a spiritual return, and reclamation of divinely granted land.20 The conflagration of Jewish nationalism and Zionism from the founding of Israel to the present has led to a long-held yet not monolithic view that all of Mandate Palestine is “natural” Jewish space, and that maximizing Israeli control over this space is necessary to sustain the Jewish state.21 The Zionist conception of the greater Land of Israel becomes problematic when combined with the ethnoreligious basis of the Israeli state. Israel was founded as a Jewish state,22 and can only survive as such if Jewish people are the demographic majority. The Basic Laws upon which Israel was founded reflect this founding notion, as the Law of Citizenship and

ͳͶԝ  For  a  detailed  account,  see  Idith  Zertal  and  Akiva  Eldar,  Lords  of  the  Land,  (Philadelphia:  Nation  Books,  2007). ͳͷԝǯ•‡Ž‡Ǥ› ‘‘ƒ†›”‘‘ǣ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡––Ž‡‡–‘Ž‹…›‹–Š‡‡•–ƒǤȋ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡ǡ •”ƒ‡Žǣǯ•‡Ž‡ǡ —Ž›ͳͲǡʹͲͳͲȌǡ ͳͷǤ ͳ͸ԝ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳͻͷǤ ͳ͹ԝ „‹†Ǥǡͳ͸ͲǤ ͳͺԝ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳ͹ʹǤ ͳͻԝ ƒŽƒŠǡDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDz…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘dzƒ†–Š‡‡‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘dzǡͳ͵ͶͶǤ ʹͲԝ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳ͹͸Ǥ ʹͳԝ ƒŽƒŠǡDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDz…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘dzƒ†–Š‡‡‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘dzǡͳ͵ͶͶǤ ʹʹԝ  ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳ͸ͻǤ

ͻ


PEACOCK ¦ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

the Status Law give the right to nationality and associated benefits—the right to land held solely in trust for Jewish people, separate state institutions, and so on—to Jews alone.23 If the West Bank were to be officially annexed by Israel, it would no longer demographically be a Jewish state. Israel is, in fact, the sovereign over the West Bank in all but name, which Tilley argues is a strategic choice that allows Israel to remain a Jewish state while holding on to a territory that is perceived by many Israelis as given by God to the Jewish people.24

Š‡‡––Ž‡‡–‡‰‹‡ǡ–ƒ–‡”‘Œ‡…– A common myth is that the hard line Zionist and ultra-religious settlers hold the Israeli government hostage, and define the settlement agenda.25 As most settlers are secular and are drawn to settlements because of government incentives, this myth of hardliners dominating the settlement agenda serves to mask the commanding role played by the Israeli state.26 In reality, it is key “Jewish national-institutions,” steeped in the political Zionist vision of settling all of the Land of Israel, that carry out a continuously evolving settlement “master plan” in the West Bank.27 The two most important of these national-institutions are the Jewish Agency, which once functioned as the government of the nascent Israeli state, and the World Zionist Organization (WZO), which embodied the embryonic idea of the Jewish state and bore it to fruition. The two organizations are largely integrated, yet they operate in different geographical spaces in order to circumvent the illegality of settlement activity in the occupied territories; the Jewish Agency operates within the Green Line and the WZO in the occupied territories.28 These organizations are deeply embedded within the Israeli state, to the extent that their agendas are sheltered from the workings of the democratic system.29 They do work with key government ministries that are subject to changes in government, yet no administration has dared to radically alter the settlement agenda.

ʹ͵ԝ ƒ”‹•ǡDz ‡‡”ƒŽ‘–‘—”•‘ˆ–Š‡”‘’‘•‡†”ƒ„ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡––Ž‡‡–Ǥdz ʹͶԝ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳ͹͸Ǥ ʹͷԝ „‹†Ǥǡ͵ͶǤ ʹ͸ԝ „‹†Ǥǡ͵ͶǤ ʹ͹ԝ „‹†Ǥǡ͵ͶǤ ʹͺԝ „‹†ǤǡͶ͹Ǥ ʹͻԝ „‹†ǤǡͶ͸Ǥ

ͳͲ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The exact amount of incentives channeled through the Israeli government to the settlements is unknown. The independent organization B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, says that the lack of data may be intentional in order to conceal this reality from Israeli voters, as government investment in settlements is assumed to be enormous. The Israeli government has classified the entire West Bank a National Priority Area, a designation that grants the settlements therein more benefits and incentives than areas not classed as such.30 Benefits and incentives are given to settlers “in the fields of housing, education, industry, agriculture, and tourism, and also supplementary support [is] given to Israeli local authorities and economic projects in the West Bank.�31 The Ministry of Housing and Construction pays up to 50 percent of settlement housing development costs, and is directly involved in the majority of settlement construction, together with the Israeli Land Administration. The land administration is a Jewish national-institution that directs land for another such institution, the Jewish National Fund, which is in turn overseen by the Jewish Agency.32 The importance of retaining a demographic majority is played out in Israeli settlement policy, with ultra-Orthodox populations (who have a very high comparative population growth rate of 6 percent) channeled towards West Bank settlements.33 Other ministries operating in the settlements include the Ministry of Education, the Industry and Trade Ministry, and the Ministry of Agriculture, which provide a host of governmental services, the most important being teachers’ salaries.34 In many cases, government funding per capita is considerably higher in West Bank settlements than in similar areas within the Green Line.35

Š›•‹…ƒŽƒ�†‡‰ƒŽ �ˆ”ƒ•–”—…–—”‡‘Ž•–‡”‹�‰–Š‡‡––Ž‡�‡�–‡‰‹�‡ In addition to immense government funding, settlements are guarded by an equally immense security and transportation infrastructure, as well as a dualistic system of law that assures settlement expansion and discriminates against Palestinians. Israel polices Palestinian movement through a combination of checkpoints, physical obstructions, and a network of restricted roads. This settler road network strategically links settlements to Israel proper, 312 kilometres of which are off limits to Palestinians (see Appendix B, map 2).36 In addition, a separation wall is being constructed that is extremely obtrusive and damaging to the Palestinian societal fabric (map 2, Appendix B). The wall, ruled in contravention of international law by the

;ͲÔ?ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ› ‘‘Â?ƒÂ?†›”‘‘Â?ÇĄ;͝Ǥ ;ͳÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ;͚Ǥ ;ʹÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ͜ͲǤ ;;Ô?Ž—ˆ‡Â?Â?ǤDz ”‘Â?‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ–‘‘…‹ƒŽ‰‡Â?Â†ÂƒÂ•ÇŁ‹ˆˆ‡”‡Â?–‘‘Â?ƒ––Š‡‡––Ž‡Â?‡Â?–•dz–”ƒ–‡‰‹…••‡••Â?‡Â?–ͳͳǥÂ?‘ǤʹČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇŁ ͚͡Ǥ ;͜Ô?  –•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ› ‘‘Â?ƒÂ?†›”‘‘Â?ÇĄ͜ʹnj͜͡Ǥ ;͡Ô?  –•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ› ‘‘Â?ƒÂ?†›”‘‘Â?ÇĄ͜ʹnj͜͡Ǥ ;͸Ô?  ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?Ǥ ”‘—Â?†–‘ƒ ÂƒÂŽÂ–ÇŁŠ‡‡Â?‹ƒŽ‘ˆƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‹ƒÂ?•ǯ ”‡‡†‘Â?‘ˆ‘˜‡Â?‡Â?–‹Â?–Š‡‡•–ƒÂ?Â?Č‹ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡Â?ÇĄ Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŁ ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ—‰—•–ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍšČŒÇĄʹǤ

11


PEACOCK ÂŚ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

‘�•‡“—‡�…‡•ˆ‘”ƒˆ—–—”‡ƒŽ‡•–‹�‹ƒ�–ƒ–‡ International Court of Justice,37 alters the geography of a future Palestinian state by enclosing on the Israeli side of the wall settlements, and other areas that were originally on the Palestinian side of the Green Line. Although unfinished, it is already being treated as a de-facto border by Israel and the international community,38  and is, apart from the settlements themselves, the key physical impediment to the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Superimposed on this permanent physical infrastructure is a security infrastructure enforced by the Israeli Defence Forces that includes “This infrastructure severely physical obstructions to Palestinian movement, circa limits Palestinians’ freedom 180 fixed and “flying� (temporary) checkpoints,39 of movement. According to heavily fortified settlements continuously expanded B’Tselem, this is the corner(often onto private Palestinian lands), and designated stone of Israeli infringement as closed military areas.40 This infrastructure on Palestinian human rights severely limits Palestinians’ freedom of movement. in the Occupied Territories According to B’Tselem, this is the cornerstone of as it impedes the “rights to Israeli infringement on Palestinian human rights in work, health, education, and the Occupied Territories as it impedes the “rights to family life. work, health, education, and family life.�41 Through this infrastructure, the West Bank is also physically severed into multiple non-contiguous physical spaces, preventing the formation of a viable Palestinian state. The dualistic system of laws in place in the West Bank subjects the Palestinian population to military rule while settlers live under Israeli law, yet are often able to act with complete impunity in the area of settlement and land seizure. The Israeli state itself seizes land for settlements by declaring it state land or necessary for military or public needs. In addition to this, much land is expropriated for settlements in contravention of Israeli, and pre-Israeli law (Ottoman Land Law and British Mandate Law).42 The most common practice is to seize land illegally, build settlements upon it, and ex post facto legalize these years later. Illegal building is financed by the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and declared legal by the World Zionist Organization.43 Land and building violations are very rarely punished, and settlers can therefore act with near complete

;͚Ô? Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‘—”–‘ˆ —•–‹…‡ǥDz‡‰ƒŽ‘Â?•‡“—‡Â?…‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‘Â?•–”—…–‹‘Â?‘ˆƒƒŽŽ‹Â?–Š‡……—’‹‡†ƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‹ƒÂ?‡””‹–‘”› Č‹‡“—‡•–ˆ‘”†˜‹•‘”›’‹Â?‹‘Â?ČŒÇĄÇłČ‹Š‡ ÂƒÂ‰Â—Â‡ÇŁ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‘—”–‘ˆ —•–‹…‡ǥ —Ž›͝ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍśČŒÇ¤ ;ͺÔ?‡Â?Â?ÇĄDz ”‘Â?‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ–‘‘…‹ƒŽ‰‡Â?Â†ÂƒÂ•ÇłÇĄ͡͸Ǥ ;͝Ô?ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ ”‘—Â?†–‘ƒ ÂƒÂŽÂ–ÇĄÍł. ͜ͲÔ?ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ› ‘‘Â?ƒÂ?†›”‘‘Â?ÇĄ;ͲǤ ͜ͳÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ͜͡Ǥ ͜ʹÔ? „‹†Ǥǥʹͳnj;͸Ǥ ͜;Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ;ͳǤ

ͳʹ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

impunity. Although B’Tselem estimates that private Palestinian land makes up 21 percent of West Bank settlements44 (the vast majority of it illegally expropriated), the system of laws enforced by the military often displays complete disregard for Palestinian land rights, and the right of due process in regards to land disputes.

‘Â?•‡“—‡Â?…‡•ˆ‘”ƒˆ—–—”‡ƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‹ƒÂ?–ƒ–‡ The immense government and military investment in the settlement regime grants the West Bank settlements an enormous physical, economic and political footprint. Although this is not explicitly stated by the Israeli government for obvious reasons, the settlement regime seems to be strategically focused on preventing a Palestinian state from forming, instead ensuring a permanent Israeli annexation of the West Bank. The settlements are built in strategic blocs45 around the best natural resources, are heavily invested in, and many are now being unilaterally annexed to Israel proper by the separation wall. The remaining areas of the West Bank are being split into thirteen non-contiguous enclaves able to reach each other through one to two “access pointsâ€? in which 240,000 Palestinians are meant to live.46 Dangerous parallels are even being drawn between these non-contiguous Palestinian spaces and past settler-colonial experiments, including South Africa’s Bantustans,47 and Native American reservations,48 an indication of the severity of the situation on the ground. This physical reality has in effect rendered the two-state model an “impossible solution,â€? in the words of Gavron.49 The future Palestinian state would be the opposite of the Quartet’s 2003 vision of an â€œâ€Śindependent, democratic and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel‌â€?50 The state would not be independent, as it would not be in control of its borders and airspace, nor would it be allowed to have a military force. The possibility of forging democracy in a context where the state is a non-contiguous entity and derives its power from an occupying force would be slim, and would be more likely to strengthen extremist elements while weakening and discrediting mainstream political parties.51 To an

͜͜Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ;͡Ǥ ͜͡Ô?‡Â?Â?ÇĄDz ”‘Â?‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ–‘‘…‹ƒŽ‰‡Â?Â†ÂƒÂ•ÇłÇĄ͜͝Ǥ ͜͸Ô?ÇŻ•‡Ž‡Â?ÇĄ ”‘—Â?†–‘ƒ ÂƒÂŽÂ–ÇĄ;Ǥ ͚͜Ô?‹”‰‹Â?‹ƒ‹ŽŽ‡›…‘Â?’ƒ”‡•–Š‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‘……—’ƒ–‹‘Â?–‘‘—–Šˆ”‹…ƒÂ?ƒ’ƒ”–Š‡‹†’‘Ž‹…›‹Â?ƒÂ?‹„‹ƒ‹Â?Š‡”ƒ”–‹…Ž‡Dz ĥƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‡ ƒ••‡†–Š‡‹’’‹Â?‰‘‹Â?–ǣ‘˜‡”‡‹‰Â?–›ƒÂ?†‡––Ž‡”‘Ž‘Â?‹ƒŽ‹•Â?‹Â?‘—–Šˆ”‹…ƒƒÂ?† Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŚƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‡dzǤ ͜ͺÔ? ÂŠÂƒÂœÂ‹ÇŚƒŽ‹† ƒŽƒŠĎ?‹Â?†••–”‘Â?‰•‹Â?‹Žƒ”‹–‹‡•„‡–™‡‡Â?–Š‡‹†‡‘Ž‘‰›†”‹˜‹Â?‰ •”ƒ‡Ž‹•‡––Ž‡Â?‡Â?–’‘Ž‹…›ƒÂ?†–Š‡•–”ƒ–‡‰›‘ˆ ‡Â?…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘Â?’”ƒ…–‹…‡††—”‹Â?‰–Š‡…‘Ž‘Â?‹œƒ–‹‘Â?‘ˆ‘”–ŠÂ?‡”‹…ƒ‹Â?Š‹•ƒ”–‹…Ž‡DzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDzÂ?…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘Â?ÇłƒÂ?†–Š‡ ‡Â?‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?dzǤ ͜͝Ô?ƒÂ?‹‡Ž ƒ˜”‘Â?ÇĄŠ‡–Š‡”‹†‡‘ˆÂ‡Â•Â’ÂƒÂ‹Â”ÇŁ થƒÂ?†”ƒ„•‹Â?–Š‡”‘Â?‹•‡†ƒÂ?†ǤČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁ‘™Â?ƒÂ?ĆŹ‹––Ž‡Ď?‹‡Ž† —„Ž‹•Š‡”•ǥ Â?…ǤǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍśČŒÇĄʹʹ͚Ǥ ͡ͲÔ?‡’ƒ”–Â?‡Â?–‘ˆÂ–ÂƒÂ–Â‡ÇĄDz‘ƒ†Â?ƒ’–‘‘Ž—–‹‘Â?‘ˆ Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÂ‹ÇŚƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‹ƒÂ?‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–dzǥʹǤ ͡ͳÔ?‡—˜‡Â?›ǥDz —Â?†ƒÂ?‡Â?–ƒŽ‹•–‘Ž‘Â?‹ƒŽ‹•Â?dzǥ;͸͚Ǥ

ͳ;


PEACOCK ÂŚ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

extent this is already occurring, as the Palestinian political field is experiencing fragmentation, and a rise of extremism. Lastly, the physically non-contiguous nature of the state and its slow, painful suffocation by the security wall, and the dynamic expansion of settlements will prevent it from becoming a viable entity. In the words of Falah, “Palestinians are invited at best to a kind of ‘mock’ sovereignty over an archipelago of truncated spaces‌â€?52

Ways  Forward The  Peace  Process   Despite having relatively shallow roots, the two-state solution has come to be seen by the international community and the negotiating parties as the “only game in town.�53 The international community is locked into a call for withdrawal of Israeli settlements 54, Israel sees a two-state solution as the only way to save the “Jewish state,� and the Palestinian Authority’s funding and legitimacy largely rests on securing a Palestinian state through the peace process.55 Yet despite goodwill by many of the parties, several key factors prevent the establishment of a viable Palestinian state, and most importantly the continued “There is a glaring disconexpansion of the settlement regime. There is a glaring disconnect between the physical nect between the physical reality in the occupied territories, and the high-level reality and the high-level international diplomacy of the peace process. Nowhere is this exemplified more clearly than in Israel’s creation international diplomacy of facts on the ground in the West Bank. Settlement of the peace process.� building and expansion has, in fact, continued unabated throughout the peace process. Throughout the Oslo process, the most serious attempt at peace, the settler population doubled from 200,000 to 400,000.56 Oslo also dictated a phased Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank; in practice, this entailed granting Palestinian control over 227 “non-contiguous islands,� only one quarter of which (“Area A�) were under full internal control by the Palestinians (Appendix A, map 3).57 This was the beginning of the fragmentation of the future Palestinian state, a process that continued under the Camp David and the Roadmap peace attempts. Camp David proposed to divide the West Bank into four enclaves (see Appendix A, map 4).58 The 2003 Roadmap did not specify the borders of a

͡ʹÔ?  Falah,  “The  Geopolitics  of  “Enclavisationâ€?  and  the  Demise  of  a  Two-­State  Solution,â€?  1351,  1367.   ͡;Ô? ƒ”›—••Â?ƒÂ?ÇĄDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡Â?‰‡–‘–Š‡™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄÇł‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡’‘”–ʹ;ͳČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍśČŒÇĄͺǤ ͜͡Ô?‹ŽŽ‡›ǥDz ĥƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‡ƒ••‡†–Š‡‹’’‹Â?‰‘‹Â?–ǥdz;Ǥ ͡͡Ô?—••Â?ƒÂ?ÇĄDz •–Š‡™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?Â‡ÂƒÂ†ÇŤÇĄÇł;ͺǤ ͡͸Ô?  ……—’ƒ–‹‘Â?͜͡͡ǥÇĄ†‹”‡…–‡†„›„†ƒŽŽƒŠÂ?‡‹•ŠƒÂ?†—ˆ›ƒÂ?Â?‡‹•ŠȋʹͲͲ;Ǣ‡Â?‹…‡ǥÇŁ”‹’Ž‡›‡ ‹ŽÂ?•”‘†—…–‹‘Â?ÇĄÍ´Í˛Í˛Í¸ČŒÇ¤ ͚͡Ô?ƒ”™ƒÂ?‹•Šƒ”ƒǤƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‡Ȁ Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŁ‡ƒ…‡‘”’ƒ”–Š‡‹†ǤČ‹‘Â?†‘Â?ƒÂ?†‡™‘”Â?ÇŁ‡†‘‘Â?•ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛Í´ČŒÇĄͳ;͸Ǥ ͡ͺÔ? ÂƒÂŽÂƒÂŠÇĄDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDzÂ?…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘Â?ÇłƒÂ?†–Š‡‡Â?‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?dzǥͳ;͸ʹǤ

ͳ͜


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

future Palestinian state, and a 2004 “letter of understanding� from George W. Bush to Ariel Sharon endorsed the annexation of Israeli settlements in light of “new realities on the ground�— in other words, new and expanded settlements.59 Despite some feeble calls for settlement freezes, the US has de facto legitimized Israel’s establishment and annexation of settlements. The United States has thus played the part of dishonest broker60 since its inception as the third party to Arab-Israeli peace talks. The US political system is biased toward Israel to such a degree that its foreign policy has become virtually fused with Israel’s regional policy.61 Settlements are not only implicitly condoned by the US, but are in part financed by US aid to Israel.62 Without international pressure or punitive measures aimed at stopping settlement expansion, Israeli politicians are loath to move on the settlement issue, given its effect on Israel’s precarious internal politics. Comprehensive settlement withdrawal has never been seriously attempted by any Israeli administration. The “spectacle of ‘disengagement’� from Gaza, a territory whose borders and airspace are still completely controlled by Israel, served to delegitimize any future settlement evacuation in the eyes of Israeli politicians, and, to a certain extent, world opinion.63 Abandoning settlement carries religious, indeed biblical, connotations, and a minority of settlers are militantly opposed to any evacuation. Although this group forms a very small minority, given its militant stance and past hostile acts it could serve to splinter the “uneasy pact� of “secular, liberal, conservative, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox currents� upon which the Jewish state is built.64 This could result in civil war within Israel,65 and a worldwide breakdown of “Jewish-Zionist unity.�66 Given the possibly grave implications for the Jewish political system and society, as well as the ingrained nature of the settlement enterprise with the state, no Israeli government will likely attempt a settlement withdrawal without significant external pressure. The continued proliferation of settlements and the vagueness of a future Palestinian state has thus prompted many critics to decry the peace process as an elaborate ruse granting Israel the internal security to consolidate its hold on the occupied territories. Given its failure thus far, the question is then whether the peace process can still be the vehicle for a lasting

͡͝Ô?‹ŽŽ‡›ǥŠ‡Â?‡nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄʹͲͺǤ ͸ͲÔ?”‡†‹–ˆ‘”Â?›ƒ†‘’–‹‘Â?‘ˆ–Š‹•’Š”ƒ•‡‰‘‡•–‘ƒ•‡‡” Ǥ”—”‹ƒÂ?†Š‹•ʹͲͲ;„‘‘Â?‹•Š‘Â?‡•–”‘Â?‡”ǣŠ‡‘Ž‡‘ˆ–Š‡Â?‹–‡† –ƒ–‡•‹Â?ƒŽ‡•–‹Â?‡ƒÂ?† •”ƒ‡ŽǤ ͸ͳÔ?‡‡‹ŽŽ‡›Š‡Â?‡nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄ…Šƒ’–‡”͡Dzƒ…Â?‹Â?‰ƒŽŽ‘Â?˜‹…–‹‘Â?Çłˆ‘”ƒ…‘Â?’”‡Š‡Â?•‹˜‡ƒÂ?ƒŽ›•‹•‘ˆ–Š‡‡Â?–”‡Â?…ŠÂ?‡Â?–‘ˆ ’”‘nj •”ƒ‡Ž‹„‹ƒ•‹Â?–Š‡’‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ•›•–‡Â?Ǥ ͸ʹÔ?‘Â?› —†–ǥDz Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŁŠ‡Ž–‡”Â?ÂƒÂ–Â‹Â˜Â‡ÇĄÇłČ‹Š‡‡™‘”Â?‡˜‹‡™‘ˆ‘‘Â?•ǥ…–‘„‡”ʹ;ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍľČŒŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤÂ?›„‘‘Â?•Ǥ…‘Â?Č€ ÂƒÂ”Â–Â‹Â…ÂŽÂ‡Â•Č€ÂƒÂ”Â…ÂŠÂ‹Â˜Â‡Â•Č€Í´Í˛Í˛ÍľČ€Â‘Â…Â–Č€Í´ÍľČ€Â‹Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŚÂ–ÂŠÂ‡ÇŚÂƒÂŽÂ–Â‡Â”Â?ÂƒÂ–Â‹Â˜Â‡Č€Ç¤ ͸;Ô? ÂƒÂŽÂƒÂŠÇĄDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDzÂ?…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘Â?ÇłƒÂ?†–Š‡‡Â?‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?dzǥͳ;͚ʹǤ ͸͜Ô?‹ŽŽ‡›ǥŠ‡Â?‡nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄ61. ͸͡Ô?—••Â?ƒÂ?ÇĄDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡Â?‰‡–‘–Š‡™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄÇłͳʹǤ ͸͸Ô?‹ŽŽ‡›ǥŠ‡Â?‡nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄ͡͸Ǥ

ͳ͡


PEACOCK ÂŚ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

peace. It is here that the most problematic political dynamics come into play. Difficult concessions have to be made on both sides; the Palestinian political field must be consolidated in order to enable it to adhere to the vital promise of security for Israel, yet just as urgently Israel must engage in a withdrawal of settlements. In order to salvage this inherently biased peace process in any meaningful way, the dishonest broker would need to be removed from the equation. This may be impossible, given the immense strategic importance Israel plays in US domestic and foreign policy.67 However, with US foreign policy suffering from a legitimacy deficit worldwide and a waning US global influence,68 possibilities may emerge for other actors to resuscitate the peace process. The EU is showing promising signs of wanting to dynamize the peace process by dealing immediately with final status issues, exerting economic pressure on both parties, and discussing the possibility of deploying a peacekeeping force.69 Yet whether the EU can take the place of the US and be a truly balanced broker, given its guilty history of anti-Semitism, is highly uncertain.

Š‹��‹�‰—–•‹†‡–Š‡ƒ’ A marginal but growing chorus of voices within academia that includes Virginia Tilley, Daniel Gavron, Gary Sussman, and the late Edward Said and Tony Judt has begun to voice the revolutionary idea of a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The idea has been confined to the margins due to its portrayal as inherently dangerous and even “autogenocidal� by some Zionists, as they fear it would entail the end of a Jewish state, and possibly the destruction of the Jewish people by a monolithic and hostile Arab world.70 Yet the one-state solution can even be found in pre-Holocaust Zionist, and Jewish thought. Prominent Jewish thinkers, and members of the Yishuv, the early twentieth century immigration to Palestine that formed the State of Israel, saw the democratic one-state solution as preferable to separation for similar reasons as those who call for it today.71 Its proponents see the one-state solution as a fair, equal, and peaceful alternative to an ethnoreligious state that must continuously seek demographic majority by violent and unsustainable means such as direct and indirect ethnic cleansing, or confining populations within enclaves or reservations. According to Judt, the ethnoreligious state is an “anachronism� which has been delegitimized in similar experiments throughout the twentieth century.72 This continuous need to retain a Jewish majority has taken its toll on Israel’s democracy. As Israeli Labor politician Avraham Burg laments, “After two thousand years of struggle for survival, the reality of Israel is

͸͚Ô? ƒÂ?‹ ÂƒÂ”Â‹Â•ÇĄDz ‡Â?‡”ƒŽ‘Â?–‘—”•‘ˆ–Š‡”‘’‘•‡†”ƒ„ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡––Ž‡Â?‡Â?–dzǤ ͸ͺÔ? ‘”ƒÂ?‹Â?–‡”‡•–‹Â?‰†‹•…—••‹‘Â?‘Â?–Š‹•ǥ•‡‡ ƒ”‡‡†ƒÂ?ƒ”‹ƒŠ‡‘•–njÂ?‡”‹…ƒÂ?‘”Ž†ǥČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁǤǤ‘”–‘Â?ĆŹ‘Â?’ƒÂ?› Â?…Ǥǥ Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇ¤ ͸͝Ô?   ‘—•‡‘ˆ‘”†•ǥ—”‘’‡ƒÂ?Â?‹‘Â?‘Â?Â?‹––‡‡ǤŠ‡ƒÂ?†–Š‡‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡”‘…‡••ǥ͡͸nj͚͡. ͚ͲÔ?‹ŽŽ‡›ǥŠ‡Â?‡nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?ÇĄͳͺ͸Ǥ ͚ͳÔ?—••Â?ƒÂ?ÇĄDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡Â?‰‡–‘–Š‡™‘nj–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Â?dzǥͳͲǤ ͚ʹÔ? —†–ǥDz Â•Â”ÂƒÂ‡ÂŽÇŁŠ‡Ž–‡”Â?ÂƒÂ–Â‹Â˜Â‡ÇłÇ¤

16


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

a colonial state, run by a corrupt clique which scorns and mocks law and civic morality.”73 Tilley paints a similarly bleak picture of Israel’s future under the formula of the current peace process: “The two-state solution now seems to promise Israel only the most dismal future-permanent war, ongoing terrorism, and a domestic political culture in increasingly dominated by militarism and neo-Zionist theocratic (or at least ethnocratic) chauvinism.”74 Several enormous hurdles exist to the realization of one-state. Proponents must allay the fears of Israeli people that their right to a Jewish national home will be dashed; they must further redirect international consensus away from the two-state solution and Palestinian hopes away for a sovereign state of their own. Given these immense hurdles, the one-state solution may not be preferable to the two-state model, yet it may ultimately prove more possible to

“This continuous need to retain a Jewish majority has taken its toll on Israel’s democracy.” achieve. As Sussman claims, the one-state solution is already in the process of happening, and the continued failure of international negotiations and settlement growth will only promote further disillusionment among Israelis and Palestinians about the two-state formula.75

An  Inconclusive  Conclusion The merits of one– and two–state formulas can be debated ad nauseum, as can anything to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet the importance of debating these formulas cannot be underestimated, as there is an urgent need to look beyond the decaying US-led peace process for solutions that can ameliorate conditions in the occupied West Bank. In an unforgiving and propagandistic atmosphere, it is difficult to voice innovative solutions, and easy to offend strongly held central beliefs. Yet not broaching the difficult topics of Jewish ethnoreligious statehood, terrorism, settlements, and human rights in conjunction with any future peace process will allow bias and propaganda to conceal and distort the facts on the ground. The possibility of a peaceful future lies primarily with the Israeli and Palestinian people, the majority of whom are willing to contemplate many different options in order to achieve such a future.76 They indeed “suffer from an incurable malady[,] hope”77—as do all humans, even in the most dire circumstances.

͹͵ԝ—”‰ǡ“—‘–‡†‹ —†–ǡDz •”ƒ‡ŽǣŠ‡Ž–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡dzǤ ͹Ͷԝ  ‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡͳͺ͸Ǥ ͹ͷԝ—••ƒǡDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‡–‘–Š‡™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘dzǡͳͶǤ ͹͸ԝ‡‡‹ŽŽ‡›ǡŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǡ͵͵ʹȋ •”ƒ‡Ž‹’—„Ž‹…‘’‹‹‘Ȍƒ†’’‡†‹šȋƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ’—„Ž‹…‘’‹‹‘ȌǤ ͹͹ԝˆǤƒŠ‘—†ƒ”™‹•ŠǤ

ͳ͹


PEACOCK ¦ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Appendix  A Maps of: 1. 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine 2. 1949 Armistice Line or “Green Line” 3. Oslo proposal for a Two-State Solution 4. Camp David proposal for a Two-State Solution

Source: Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain & Caplan, Neil. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities. Bloomingtom (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010).

ͳͺ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Source: Eisenberg, Laura Zittrain & Caplan, Neil. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities. Bloomingtom (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010).

Final status map presented by Israel at Taba, January 2001. Source: The Foundation for Middle East Peace

统突


PEACOCK ¦ SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Appendix  B 1. Map of West Bank Settlements 2. Map of Separation Wall and Settler Road Network Source: B’Tselem (The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Relations)

http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/wbgs_campdavid.html

ʹͲ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Bibliography ‡™•‹††Ž‡ƒ•–ǤDz ‹•–‘”›‘ˆ‹†‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡ƒŽ•Ǥdzǡ—‰—•–ʹ͹ǡʹͲͳͲǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ„„…Ǥ…‘Ǥ—Ȁ‡™•Ȁ™‘”Ž†  ‹††Ž‡Ǧ‡ƒ•–ǦͳͳͳͲ͵͹ͶͷǤ ‡ǡŽ—ˆǤDz ”‘‡””‹–‘”‹ƒŽ–‘‘…‹ƒŽ‰‡†ƒ•ǣ‹ˆˆ‡”‡–‘‘ƒ––Š‡‡––Ž‡‡–•dz–”ƒ–‡‰‹…••‡••‡–ͳͳǡ‘Ǥʹ  ȋʹͲͲͺȌǣͶ͹Ǧ͸ͲǤ ‹•Šƒ”ƒǡƒ”™ƒǤƒŽ‡•–‹‡Ȁ •”ƒ‡Žǣ‡ƒ…‡‘”’ƒ”–Š‡‹†Ǥ‘†‘ƒ†‡™‘”ǣ‡†‘‘•ǡʹͲͲʹǤ ǯ•‡Ž‡Ǥ ”‘—†–‘ƒ ƒŽ–ǣŠ‡‡‹ƒŽ‘ˆƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ•ǯ ”‡‡†‘‘ˆ‘˜‡‡–‹–Š‡‡•–ƒǤ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡ǡ •”ƒ‡Žǣ  ǯ•‡Ž‡ǡ—‰—•–ǡʹͲͲ͹Ǥ ǦǦǦǤ› ‘‘ƒ†„›”‘‘ǣ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡––Ž‡‡–‘Ž‹…›‹–Š‡‡•–ƒǤ ‡”—•ƒŽ‡ǡ •”ƒ‡Žǣǯ•‡Ž‡ǡ —Ž›ͳͲǡʹͲͳͲǤ ‹•‡„‡”‰ǡƒ—”ƒ‹––”ƒ‹Ƭƒ’Žƒǡ‡‹ŽǤ‡‰‘–‹ƒ–‹‰”ƒ„Ǧ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡ƒ…‡ǣƒ––‡”•ǡ”‘„Ž‡•ǡ‘••‹„‹Ž‹–‹‡•ǤŽ‘‘‹‰–‘ǡ 

†‹ƒƒǣ †‹ƒƒ‹˜‡”•‹–›”‡••ǡʹͲͳͲǤ ƒŽƒŠǡ Šƒœ‹ǦƒŽ‹†ǤDzŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆDz…Žƒ˜‹•ƒ–‹‘dzƒ†–Š‡‡‹•‡‘ˆƒ™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘–‘–Š‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ  ‘ϐŽ‹…–ǤdzŠ‹”†‘”Ž†—ƒ”–‡”Ž›ʹ͸ǡ‘ǤͺȋʹͲͲͷȌǣͳ͵ͶͳǦͳ͵͹ʹǤ ƒ”‹•ǡ ƒ‹ǤDz ‡‡”ƒŽ‘–‘—”•‘ˆ–Š‡”‘’‘•‡†”ƒ„ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‡––Ž‡‡–Ǥdz”‡•‡–ƒ–‹‘‹‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‹‡…‡Ͷʹͳ‡‹ƒ”ǡ  ‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ”‹–‹•Š‘Ž—„‹ƒǡƒ…‘—˜‡”ǡǡƒ”…ŠʹʹǡʹͲͳͳǤ

ƒ˜”‘ǡƒ‹‡ŽǤŠ‡–Š‡”‹†‡‘ˆ‡•’ƒ‹”ǣ ‡™•ƒ†”ƒ„•‹–Š‡”‘‹•‡†ƒ†Ǥ‡™‘”ǣ‘™ƒƬ‹––Ž‡ϐ‹‡Ž†  —„Ž‹•Š‡”•ǡ …ǤǡʹͲͲͶǤ ‘—•‡‘ˆ‘”†•ǡ—”‘’‡ƒ‹‘‘‹––‡‡ǤŠ‡ƒ†–Š‡‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡ƒ…‡”‘…‡••ǣ‘Ž—‡ͳǣ‡’‘”–Ǥ‘†‘ǡǣ  Š‡–ƒ–‹‘ƒ”›ˆϐ‹…‡ǡʹͲͲ͹Ǥ

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘—”–‘ˆ —•–‹…‡ǤDz‡‰ƒŽ‘•‡“—‡…‡•‘ˆ–Š‡‘•–”—…–‹‘‘ˆƒƒŽŽ‹–Š‡……—’‹‡†ƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‡””‹–‘”›  ȋ‡“—‡•–ˆ‘”†˜‹•‘”›’‹‹‘ȌǤdzȋŠ‡ ƒ‰—‡ǣ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘—”–‘ˆ —•–‹…‡Ȍ —Ž›ͻǡʹͲͲͶǤ —†–ǡ‘›ǤDz •”ƒ‡ŽǣŠ‡Ž–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡ǤdzŠ‡‡™‘”‡˜‹‡™‘ˆ‘‘•ǡ…–‘„‡”ʹ͵ǡʹͲͲ͵ǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ›„‘‘•Ǥ…‘  ƒ”–‹…Ž‡•Ȁƒ”…Š‹˜‡•ȀʹͲͲ͵Ȁ‘…–Ȁʹ͵Ȁ‹•”ƒ‡ŽǦ–Š‡ǦƒŽ–‡”ƒ–‹˜‡Ǥ ƒ’’‹ǡŠƒŽ‘ǤDz •”ƒ‡ŽȀƒŽ‡•–‹‡ǣ •Š‡”‡ƒƒ•‡ˆ‘”‹Ǧƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‹•ǫdz‹••‡–ȋ‹–‡”  ʹͲͲͶȌǣͳ͵Ǧͳ͹Ǥ ……—’ƒ–‹‘ͳͲͳǤ‹”‡…–‡†„›‡‹•Šǡ„†ƒŽŽƒŠƒ†—ˆ›ƒ‡‹•ŠȋʹͲͲ͵Ǣ‡‹…‡ǡǣ”‹’Ž‡›‡ ‹Ž•”‘†—…–‹‘ǡ  ʹͲͲ͸ǤȌǤ —ƒ†–ǡ‹ŽŽ‹ƒǤ‡ƒ…‡”‘…‡••ǣ‡”‹…ƒ‹’Ž‘ƒ…›ƒ†–Š‡”ƒ„Ǧ •”ƒ‡Ž‹‘ϐŽ‹…–‹…‡ͳͻ͸͹Ǥƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǡǣ  ”‘‘‹‰• •–‹–—–‡”‡••ǡʹͲͲͷǤ ‡—˜‡›ǡǤDz —†ƒ‡–ƒŽ‹•–‘Ž‘‹ƒŽ‹•ǣŠ‡ ‡‘’‘Ž‹–‹…•‘ˆ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‘ϐŽ‹…–Ǥdz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š›ʹʹȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍǣ  ͵Ͷ͹Ǧ͵ͺͲǤ ƒ‹†ǡ†™ƒ”†ǤDzŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǤdzŠ‡‡™‘”‹‡•ǡ ƒ—ƒ”›ͳͲǡͳͻͻͻǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ›–‹‡•Ǥ…‘ȀͳͻͻͻȀͲͳȀͳͲ  ƒ‰ƒœ‹‡Ȁ–Š‡Ǧ‘‡Ǧ•–ƒ–‡Ǧ•‘Ž—–‹‘ǤŠ–ŽǤ —••ƒǡ ƒ”›ǤDz •–Š‡™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘‡ƒ†ǫdz—””‡– ‹•–‘”› ƒ—ƒ”›ȋʹͲͲͶȌǣ͵͹ǦͶʹǤ 

ǦǦǦǤDzŠ‡ŠƒŽŽ‡‰‡–‘–Š‡™‘Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘Ǥdz‹††Ž‡ƒ•–‡’‘”–ʹ͵ͳȋʹͲͲͶȌǣͺǦͳͷǤ

‹ŽŽ‡›ǡ‹”‰‹‹ƒǤŠ‡‡Ǧ–ƒ–‡‘Ž—–‹‘ǣ”‡ƒ–Š”‘—‰Šˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹–Š‡ •”ƒ‡Ž‹ǦƒŽ‡•–‹‹ƒ‡ƒ†Ž‘…Ǥ”„‘”ǣ  Š‡‹˜‡”•‹–›‘ˆ‹…Š‹‰ƒ”‡••ǡʹͲͲͷǤ ǦǦǦǤDz ƒ•ƒŽ‡•–‹‡ƒ••‡†–Š‡‹’’‹‰‘‹–ǣ‘˜‡”‡‹‰–›ƒ†‡––Ž‡”‘Ž‘‹ƒŽ‹•‹‘—–Šˆ”‹…ƒƒ† •”ƒ‡ŽǦƒŽ‡•–‹‡Ǥdz  …ƒ†‡‹…•ˆ‘” —•–‹…‡ǡ ‡„”—ƒ”›ͳ͹ǡʹͲͲͻǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ—•ƒ…„‹Ǥ™‘”†’”‡••Ǥ…‘ȀʹͲͲͻȀͲʹȀͳ͹ȀŠƒ•Ǧ’ƒŽ‡•–‹‡Ǧpassedthe-tipping-point. US Department of State. “Roadmap to Solution of Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” Washington: US Department of State, 2003. http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2003/April/20030430134837relhcie0.3930475.html. Zakaria, Fareed. The Post-American World. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 2009.

ʹͳ


MARKOWITZ ¦ PARTNERS FOR PEACE

Response:

Settlements in the West Bank and the Two-State Solution Partners for Peace: Hope for Israel and Palestine Julian Ross Markowitz Editor’s Note: We asked two UBC students - Julian Markowitz and Abdurrahman Mihirig - who have been advocates for each side of this issue to respond to Ms. Peacock’s article. Abdu, who is the Vice President of Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights at UBC, is also a senior editor of the journal.

Ms. Peacock’s essay prophesies a grim future for Jews and Palestinians. She suggests that the hope for sovereignty, safety, and national self-determination are terminally jeopardized by Israel’s actions. By placing the blame squarely on the Jewish state, Peacock ignores an important concept: peace takes two. The real impediment is the Palestinian leaders’ refusal to accept living side-by-side with Israel, and to renounce terrorism. Peacock incorrectly identifies the settlements as the principal obstacle to peace (they are not – terrorism is), naively advances an argument for a one state solution, mischaracterizes Jews as foreign settlers (there has been a continual Jewish presence in the area for three thousand years), and radically understates the opportunity for the creation of a viable Palestinian state through good faith negotiation. Israel has shown great willingness to make painful concessions for peace. In contrast, Hamas clearly states in their founding charter that any compromise with Israel is an affront to Islam. 24 hours after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Arab armies invaded vowing to destroy the nascent state, and capture the entire area. This ideology has not changed. It is a grave mistake to identify the settlements as the central issue preventing a peaceful resolution. In 2006, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in a good faith concession. Immediately following the withdrawal, terrorist groups including Hamas launched thousands of rockets against Israeli towns from Gaza. These terrorist assaults continue to this day. Indeed, much of what Peacock falsely identifies as the trappings of settlement are, in reality, responses to terrorism. Suicide bombers are stopped at security checkpoints, thus providing security for Jews and Palestinians; secure road systems are a direct response to terrorist attacks on Israeli motorists.

22


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The security fence, which Peacock refers to as “the key physical impediment to the creation of a viable Palestinian “The grossly state,” is a barrier that keeps terrorists out of Israel. Here Peacock’s fallacy of causation is clear: she identifies the security disproportionate fence as a barrier to peace, not the terrorism that necessitated emphasis placed its construction. She portrays a fence, the most quintessentially on settlement is a defensive measure, as an act of offence. Incidentally, the fence deliberate attempt has drastically reduced suicide bombings; yet, bombings are to conceal the true still regularly attempted in areas beyond the safety it provides. Israel’s security apparatus is, to be sure, a lugubrious obstacles to peace” necessity. It is inconvenient for Israelis and Palestinians, burdensome for security personnel, and costly for the government to maintain. Nevertheless, it is the bulwark against terrorist aggression that ensures the safety of all the region’s residents. The grossly disproportionate emphasis placed on settlement is a deliberate attempt to conceal the true obstacles to peace. Indeed, the built-up areas of Israeli settlements cover approximately 1.7 percent of the West Bank, and are close to the major Israeli cities. Today, 98% of the Palestinians live under the control of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, or the Hamas government in Gaza. Clearly, the miniscule Israeli presence in the disputed areas (settlement) is not the impediment to Palestinian statehood. Moreover, the so called ‘settlements’ are, in fact, thriving communities with opportunity for Jews and Palestinians alike. Every time Israel stops construction as a step toward negotiation, the Palestinian contractors and laborers in those areas suffer from lack of work Only with the Palestinian leaders’ acceptance of the state of Israel, only with their renunciation of violence and terrorism, and only with their commitment to serious negotiation can there be hope for peace.

Julian    is  the  StandWithUs  Emerson  Fellow  for  Vancouver,  BC.  He  was  the  Vice  President  of   the  University  of  British  Columbia’s  Israel  Advocacy  Club  from  2009  to  2010.  Since  2009,  he   has  been  the  Spiritual  Chairman  of  the  Alpha  Epsilon  Pi  Fraternity’s  Beta  Chi  Chapter.  

23


MIHIRIG ¦ A SUFFOCATING APARTHEID STRUCTURE

A Response To:

Settlements in the West Bank and the Two-State Solution A Suffocating Apartheid Structure Abdurrahman Mihirig In her essay on the Palestinian-Israeli impasse, Peacock argues that the primary impediment to the two-state solution is illegal settlement expansion. Using various maps of the West Bank, she explains the ‘facts on the ground’ and demonstrates how the illegal Israeli settlements, and the separation barrier (euphemism for the Apartheid Wall) have exacerbated the suffering of the Palestinian people. This is crucial to the understanding of the conflict. Israeli dogmatists will point to the safeguarding of Israelis from terrorism, and from the intolerant ideologies of Hamas. This might make sense, if one ignores two key facts. First, the occupation began in 1967, and Hamas was founded in 1987, with indirect support from Israel to destabilize the PLO. Second, this reasoning would hold if the wall were in fact built around the perimeter of the West Bank; however, this is not so. The wall criss-crosses through the West Bank, separates Palestinians from other Palestinians, and Palestinians from their own farmland. It is built to protect the illegal settlement infrastructure, and allows Israel to annex more land, and not, as they claim, to protect Israeli citizens from “terrorism”. Israel is not merely unthreatened by “Israel is not merely the Palestinians; Israel is also unthreatened by its neighbours, whom unthreatened by the Israel periodically invades, and pulverizes. The victim card cannot be Palestines; Israel is accepted; Israel is now on the brink of launching a full-scale aerial also unthreatened by assault on Iran, a powerful nation of 75 million, 2,000km away. To have that kind of military capacity, and still claim to be victimized by its neighbours, whom a population under occupation is an awfully hard sell. Israel periodically Peacock details the history behind the settlements, and how invades, and pulverthey have been expanding since 1967 irrespective of the ideological izes.” framework of the ruling party in Israel. She also clearly illustrates that the myth that ultra-orthodox extremists are the primary cause of settlements expansion is untrue and that they are nothing but the product of a careful and well-thought government planning. Keeping that in mind, what can be said of Israeli “goodwill” in negotiations? Yet Peacock does not address a crucial issue. For Israel to be a Jewish state, it has to maintain

24


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

the settlement structures in the West Bank, continue the ghettoization of the Palestinians, and impose a suffocating apartheid structure. If Israel removes the illegal settlements (established after appropriating thousands of acres of Palestinian land), dismantles the separation barrier, and allows the diaspora Palestinians to return, then Israel will face what it terms “the demographic bomb” – a term which categorizes Palestinians (and their children) as an existential threat. During the Oslo peace process the settler population doubled from 200,000 to 400,000. Can it be said that the Israelis were genuinely interested in the two-state solution? Which brings us to a more central question: is it more meaningful to discuss the settlements as the biggest impediment to the two-state solution, or rather as the most effective tool by a militarily and economically superior state to prevent the creation of a viable Palestinian state? But history does not have many examples of the powerful conceding to the powerless. For the peace process, serious steps must be taken by the UN Security Council. If not, punitive measures for the state support and construction of illegal settlements, then at the very least, monetary support for Israel should be withheld until serious steps are taken. As it stands, without any real pressure from the world community, and certainly not from the United States, Israel is not going to take serious steps to dismantle the settlements, and move towards the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Is such international pressure on a state-level possible? Now with the Arab Spring, we might expect that kind of pressure in the region. In the meantime, Palestinian civil society decided to take its fate into its own hands. For these reasons, they conferred in 2005, and called upon the international community to boycott, and divest from the State of Israel. Globally, this movement is known as BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions). It is initiated by the people of Palestine, and answered by peoples around the world. It is the only non-violent tool in their arsenal, and it is the only option independent of their dubious political leadership.

Abdurrahman is nearing the completion of a dual degree in electrical engineering and history. In his years at UBC, he has worked with several different activist groups such as the Resource Group Allocation Committee, Colour Connected, Social Justice Centre, and SPHR. He has a modest beard and hopes that it can help him in pursuing graduate studies in the near future.

25


ZIEMCZONEK ¦ SIERRA LEONE

Sierra Leone Testing Ground for the Collier-Hoeffler Model Dominika Ziemczonek Dominika  Ziemczonek  will  be  graduating  in  2012  with  a  double  major  in  Interna-­‐ tional  Relations  and  Political  Science  from  the  University  of  British  Colombia.  She   •–—†‹‡• ‹–‡”•–ƒ–‡ ƒ† ‹–”ƒ•–ƒ–‡ …‘ϔŽ‹…–ǡ ’‡ƒ…‡„—‹Ž†‹‰ ƒ† ”‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘ǡ ƒ† international  organizations.    She  is  also  interested  in  the  normative  effects  of  gen-­‐ †‡”‹…‘ϔŽ‹…–•‹–—ƒ–‹‘•Ǥ‘‹‹ƒ‹‡…œ‘‡’Žƒ•–‘’—”•—‡ƒƒ•–‡”•†‡‰”‡‡‹

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡Žƒ–‹‘•™‹–Šƒˆ‘…—•‘‹–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ•‡…—”‹–›ƒ†…‘ϔŽ‹…–•–—†‹‡•Ǥ

Introduction Intrastate war has been a feature of society since the birth of the modern state. Whereas interstate wars seemed to define the bulk of conflicts in the last five centuries, the end of the twentieth century has seen a noticeable movement towards an increasing outbreak of intrastate conflicts.1 Given this trend, many models and theories have been put forward in an effort to better understand these conflicts and their origins. The greed and grievance dichotomy, as expressed by the Collier-Hoeffler model, introduces two possible streams of motivation for civil war. Although neither has been unanimously adopted by war experts or scholars, the greed argument holds a great deal of credence in explaining many of the drawn-out civil wars that have exploded in the last fifty years. Despite this model, many economically motivated civil conflicts are still being erroneously defined in terms of political, ethnic, and other grievances and hostilities, even when these factors appear to provide only geopolitical context at best.2 The Collier-Hoeffler model supports rational decision-making and economic incentives as the predominant motivating factors for contemporary intrastate conflict. As demonstrated by the civil war in Sierra Leone, greed and feasibility play central roles in the emergence and perpetuation of conflict, leaving grievance factors as background dynamics in the mobilization of the population and popular framing of the conflict. The greed and grievance argument was introduced in 2000 by Collier and Hoeffler under

ͳԝƒ—Ž‘ŽŽ‹‡”ƒ†‡ ‘‡ˆϐŽ‡”ǡDz ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡‹‹˜‹Žƒ”ǡdzšˆ‘”†…‘‘‹…ƒ’‡”•ͷ͸ǡ‘ǤͶȋʹͲͲͶȌǣͷ͸͵Ǥ ʹԝ‹…Šƒ”†•ǡƒ—ŽǡDz‘ ‹‰Š–‘”–‘ ƒ”ǫ‰”ƒ”‹ƒ‹‡•‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‘‹˜‡”‘ϐŽ‹…–•ǡdzAfrican  Affairs  ͳͲͶǡ‘ǤͶͳ͹ȋʹͲͲͷȌǣ ͷ͹͵Ǥ

26


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

the World Bank working group. The paper sought to identify and explain the root causes of rebellions and intrastate conflicts through a different lens than what had previously been explored. Though most intrastate conflicts continue to be explained and justified in terms of social, political, ethnic, or religious grievances, Collier and Hoeffler claim that grievances themselves are poor explanations for the majority of intrastate wars.3 Rather, they argue that civil wars are often fought for economic reasons that may in turn exacerbate or justify pre-existing grievances.4 While intrastate wars are often framed as complex wars of territory, economic strength and spheres of influence, civil wars—especially those in the developing world and in sub-Saharan Africa—are commonly dismissed as being motivated by ethnic or long-standing rivalries, stratifying the two expressions of war as polar opposites.5 In spite of this traditional framework, some scholars suggest that just as states fight to gain access to resources, intrastate wars do not only employ resources “as a means to armed conflict, but are becoming a fundamental purpose of engaging in this conflict.�6 The first iteration of the greed and grievance argument received mixed reactions. Since that time, the greed and grievance argument has been refined and adjusted. The most recent version creates a much tighter and narrower argument, even outlining the specific conditions under which a civil war is likely to be conducted. Low per capita income is correlated with the increased likelihood of civil war breaking out, suggesting that poorer, less-developed countries are more likely to experience civil wars.7 The model also demonstrates a positive relationship between the availability and export of primary commodities, and a country’s risk of intrastate conflict.8 This relationship is clear: rebels seek to exploit important, export-based resources in order to level the economic playing field, and generate personal wealth. Furthermore, an abundance of wealth-generating resources available in the country provides an easy avenue for these same resources to be diverted to finance both the government and insurgent factions. Though Sierra Leone is a country rich in many natural resources, this analysis will only take into account finances and studies relating to diamond extraction and export. Many of Sierra Leone’s other export commodities experienced similar trends during the civil war, though many to a

ÍľÔ?ƒ—Ž‘ŽŽ‹‡”ƒÂ?†Â?Â?‡ ‘‡ˆĎ?Ž‡”ǥDz ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡‹Â?‹˜‹ŽÂƒÂ”ÇĄÇłPolicy  Research ‘”Â?‹Â?‰ƒ’‡”Č‹ƒ•Š‹Â?‰–‘Â?ÇŁŠ‡‘”Ž†ƒÂ?Â?‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?–‡•‡ƒ”…Š ”‘—’ǥ Í´Í˛Í˛Í˛ČŒÇŁʹǤ ÍśÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͡Ô?ƒ–•‡”†ƒŽƒÂ?†ƒ˜‹†ƒŽ‘Â?‡ǥ‡†•ǤǥGreed  and  Grievance:  Economic  Agenda  in  Civil  WarsČ‹Â–Â–ÂƒÂ™ÂƒÇŁ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‡ƒ…‡ …ƒ†‡Â?› Â?…ǤǥÍ´Í˛Í˛Í˛ČŒÇŁʹʹǤ ͸Ô?Š‹Ž‹’’‡‡‹ŽŽ‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆÂƒÂ”ÇŁƒ–—”ƒŽ‡•‘—”…‡•ƒÂ?†”Â?‡† ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š›ʹͲǥ‘Ǥ͡Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍłČŒÇŁ͡͸ʹǤ ÍšÔ?‘ŽŽ‹‡”ƒÂ?† ‘‡ˆĎ?Ž‡”ǥDz‡›‘Â?† ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡ǥdzšˆ‘”†…‘Â?‘Â?‹…ƒ’‡”•͸ͳǥÂ?‘ǤͳČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇŁͳͲǤ ÍşÔ?‘ŽŽ‹‡”ƒÂ?† ‘‡ˆĎ?Ž‡”ǥDz‡›‘Â?† ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡ǥdzͳͳǤ

Í´Íš


ZIEMCZONEK ÂŚ SIERRA LEONE

lesser extent than diamonds.9

Sierra  Leone:  Backdrop  for  Rebellion Sierra Leone is a small country on the West African coast. Diamonds were first discovered in Sierra Leone in the 1930s, when the country was still under the protection and administrative control of Britain.10 At first, local peoples were prevented from taking part in the extraction and trade of the valuable stones.11 The British government soon realized its inability to restrict diamond mining on its own, and utilized local chiefdom power structures to maintain some order and prevent illicit trade networks from emerging.12 Individuals and small communities could apply for mining permits after registering with the British colonial authority, and receiving permission of the local chief.13 Many of the chiefs began to use their authority to extract fees and profit shares from miners, especially from those not part of the local community. The opportunism of the local chiefs escalated, and local miners with the protection of local authority figures executed clandestine extraction, and smuggling operations.14 Chiefs justified their management of mining operations by claiming that diamonds belonged to the people, and therefore should remain in the hands of chiefs on behalf of the people. Throughout the decolonization process and smaller resource conflicts, this justification was accepted by most, including the British, and soon chiefs were widely seen as the only legitimate authorities over these resources.15 In 1968, Siaka Stevens, the leader of the ruling party the

ÍťÔ?‡‹ŽŽ‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆÂƒÂ”ÇŁƒ–—”ƒŽ‡•‘—”…‡•ƒÂ?†”Â?‡†‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdz͚͡;Ǥ ͳͲÔ?‹ŽŽ‹ƒÂ?‡Â?‘ǥDz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ‡–™‘”Â?•‹Â?ƒ ƒ‹Ž‹Â?‰Â–ÂƒÂ–Â‡ÇŁŠ‡‘‘–•ƒÂ?† —–—”‡‹‘Ž‡Â?– ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzInternational  Politics  and  Society  ʹČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍľČŒÇ¤ ͳͳÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͳʹÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͳ;Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͳ͜Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͳ͡Ô? „‹†Ǥ

28


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

All People’s Congress (APC), took mining out of the hands of local community leaders, and consolidated the industry under the portfolio of the Ministry of Mines.16 Though this change upset local communities that had become somewhat reliant on mining, large-scale conflict was avoided. The movement of mining permits to a formal ministry was initially intended to curtail corruption surrounding preferential mining permits and illicit extraction, but this change simply switched the beneficiaries of corruption from local chiefs to supporters and loyalists of the APC.17 Under the watch of the Ministry of Mines, diamond revenue was funneled out of state welfare programs, and into the hands of wealthy politicians. In 1985, Stevens appointed Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh to be his successor as leader of the APC, which was still the ruling party of Sierra Leone.18 Momoh continued distributing mining rights and privileges based on favouritism, but perhaps more devastating was his series of unviable, and ludicrous economic policies that left the country in ruin. Though it was wealthy in diamonds, the corruption among government executives saw Sierra Leone’s most precious resources financing the whims of favoured ministers and businessmen. Momoh’s destructive economic policies and rampant corruption led to complete financial ruin in Sierra Leone that would instigate rebellion. With dwindling government revenues, teachers and other civil servants could not be paid, and the education system collapsed. As a result, without employment or schooling, 80 percent of children and youth roamed the streets, leaving them prey to rebel movements, and smuggling operations.19 By 1990, despite being rich in raw minerals, Sierra Leone was recognized as one of the poorest countries with the second-lowest living standards in the world.20 By the early 1990s, Sierra Leone fit all of Collier’s main criteria for civil unrest. Indeed, with an extremely vulnerable population and an abundance of easily exported raw resources, Sierra Leone was on the brink of a devastating civil war.

The  Revolutionary  United  Front   First assembling in neighbouring Liberia in 1990 with aspirations to overthrow Momoh’s government and establish a more economically successful and equitable state, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was the central rebel force that began the civil war that

ͳ͸Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͳ͚Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͳͺÔ? ‘ŠÂ?Ǥ ‹”•…ŠǥSierra  Leone:  Diamonds  and  the  Struggle  for  Democracy  ȋ‘—Ž†‡”ǥÂ‘ÂŽÂ‘Â”ÂƒÂ†Â‘ÇŁ›Â?Â?‡‹‡Â?Â?‡”—„Ž‹•Š‡”•–†Ǥǥ Í´Í˛Í˛ÍłČŒÇŁ;ͲǤ ͳ͝Ô? „‹†Ǥ ʹͲÔ? ‘ŠÂ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?††™ƒ”†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzJournal  of  Public  Economics͝;ǥÂ?‘Ǥ ͳͳnjͳʹČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇŁͳͳ͜ͺǤ

Í´Íť


ZIEMCZONEK ÂŚ SIERRA LEONE

plagued Sierra Leone for just over a decade.21 They sought the support of Charles Taylor, who successfully led a political rebellion in Liberia eventually leading to his presidency. The small contingent of RUF forces moved back into Sierra Leone in 1991, and started recruiting in earnest for their cause. The RUF took full advantage of the collapse of Sierra Leonean education, and recruited many young men who could not find employment or afford schooling.22 Some scholars emphasize that many RUF recruits were agrarian farmer or students, unhappy with the lack of justice and land rights for rural populations.23 There was also a large amount of abduction, and forced recruitment into the RUF.24 These young men and boys were then indoctrinated into the RUF using ideological brainwashing, substitution of the family unit, coercion, violence, rape, and forced dependence on By the early 1990s, Sidrugs and alcohol.25 erra Leone fit all of ColThe RUF began attacking the Sierra Leone Army lier’s main criteria for (the state military) throughout the country, in cities, townships and villages in guerilla-style warfare. Though civil unrest. Indeed, with decisive battles could have taken place in the major cities an extremely vulnerable or townships, it is not clear that the RUF exhausted their population and an abuncapacity to achieve victory through large battles. Rebel dance of easily exported commanders did not seek direct confrontation with the raw resources, Sierra LeSLA. Instead, many top-tier commanders were looking to bolster both the RUF finances as well as their personal one was on the brink of wealth through the mining and sale of diamonds; this a devastating civil war.� tactic was likely also used to avoid large losses of RUF-held territory in the event of a defeat. Thus, a careful avoidance of a full-blown battle with the SLA protected their ability to extract diamonds during the conflict.26 The nature of the diamond deposits in Sierra Leone made them very easy for the RUF to acquire. Diamonds are an “easily mined and highly valuable commodity� that does not require

“

Í´ÍłÔ? „‹†Ǥ Í´Í´Ô? ‹”•…ŠǥSierra  Leone:  Diamonds  and  the  Struggle  for  DemocracyÇĄ;ͲǤ Í´ÍľÔ?ƒ—ŽÂ‹Â…ÂŠÂƒÂ”Â†Â•ÇĄDz‘ ‹‰Š–‘”–‘ ƒ”Â?ÇŤ‰”ƒ”‹ƒÂ?‹Â?‡Â?•‹‘Â?•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒÂ?‘‹˜‡”‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdzAfrican  Affairs  ͳͲ͜ǥÂ?‘Ǥ͜ͳ͚Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍˇČŒÇŁ ͚͡͡Ǥ Í´ÍśÔ?ƒ—ŽÂ‹Â…ÂŠÂƒÂ”Â†Â•ÇĄDz‹Ž‹–ƒ‘Â?•…”‹’–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǣ‡…”—‹–Â?‡Â?–‘ˆ‘—Â?‰ ‹‰Š–‡”•‹Â?Â?ˆ”‹…ƒÂ?ÂƒÂ”ÇĄÇłŠ‡‘Â?’ƒ”ƒ–‹˜‡–—†› ‘ˆ‘Â?•…”‹’–‹‘Â?‹Â?–Š‡”Â?‡† ‘”…‡•ʹͲČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛Í´ČŒÇŁʹ͸;Ǥ ʹ͡Ô?—•—ˆƒÂ?Â‰Â—Â”ÂƒÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽƒÂ?†—Ž–—”ƒŽ›Â?ƒÂ?‹…•‘ˆ–Š‡‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ÂƒÂ”ÇĄÇł Between  Democracy  and  Terror:  The  Sierra  Leone  Civil  WarČ‹ƒÂ?ÂƒÂ”ÇŁ ÇĄÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍśČŒÇĄ;ͲǤ ʹ͸Ô?‡Â?ƒ‘Â?Â–ÂƒÂ‰Â—Â‡ÇĄDzŠ‡—•‹Â?॥‘ˆƒ”ƒÂ?†–Š‡”‘•’‡…–ˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzThe  Brown  Journal  of  World  Affairs͝ǥÂ?‘Ǥͳ Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛Í´ČŒÇŁʹʹ͝Ǥ

;Ͳ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

extensive capital.27 At the beginning and height of conflict, this labour was forcibly recruited by the RUF from villages around the country. Unlike the majority of RUF-recruited soldiers, these labourers were mainly mature adult males, though women were occasionally recruited as well. The miners were not indoctrinated or initiated as the soldiers were.28 They were treated as expendable slaves, useful only for the purpose of accumulating wealth for the RUF.29 Some of these labourers were even used for target practice during training of new RUF recruits with the intention of desensitizing the soldiers to killing.30 The RUF’s motivation during the civil war was to establish a new government and restore economic prosperity and equality to Sierra Leone. Though this was the official cause used to motivate the soldiers and rally support, it was used more as a rhetorical tool than a true battle philosophy. Amongst individual soldiers, there was a strong belief in the political aims of the war, though it is unclear whether those goals were shared by the commanders and generals that promulgated them.31 Many rebel leaders were largely motivated by profiting from the war through the extraction of diamonds. Though some of this wealth trickled down to the citizens of Sierra Leone living around the mining areas, large portions of the revenue from diamond trading went to personal accounts at the expense of the very citizens they had sworn to liberate.32 The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was also heavily motivated by the wealth and value of the diamond trade. Though the government’s aims were to defeat the RUF and regain control of the diamond mines, many higher-ranking military personnel were looking to make a profit from illicit diamond trading.33 While fighting for the government, the SLA soldiers were actively depleting and undermining the very resources the government was attempting to preserve and recapture. Completely separate from both the RUF and SLA, the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) were community groups formed across local chiefdom lines. Unlike both the RUF and SLA, they did not have their own ultimate dogma or goal; rather, they existed only to oppose the corruption and brutality of both armies.34 Though they were effective at first, they too became caught up in the greed trap. Towards the end of the war, the CDF became ineffective, and many of its

Í´ÍšÔ?Š‹ŽŽ‹’‡‡‹ŽŽ‹‘Â?ÇĄDz‹ƒÂ?‘Â?†ÂƒÂ”•Ǎ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–‹ƒÂ?‘Â?†•ƒÂ?† ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š‹‡•‘ˆ‡•‘—”…‡ÂƒÂ”•ǥdzAnnals  of  the  Association  of   ‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š‡”•͝ͺǥÂ?‘ǤʹČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇŁ;͸ͲǤ Í´ÍşÔ?‡Â?ƒ‘Â?Â–ÂƒÂ‰Â—Â‡ÇĄDzŠ‡—•‹Â?॥‘ˆƒ”ƒÂ?†–Š‡”‘•’‡…–ˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzʹ;ʹǤ Í´ÍťÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͡ͲǤ ;ͲÔ?ƒÂ?Â‰Â—Â”ÂƒÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽƒÂ?†—Ž–—”ƒŽ›Â?ƒÂ?‹…•‘ˆ–Š‡‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ÂƒÂ”ÇĄÇł;ͲǤ ;ͳÔ?Â‹Â…ÂŠÂƒÂ”Â†Â•ÇĄDz‘ ‹‰Š–‘”–‘ ƒ”Â?ÇŤ‰”ƒ”‹ƒÂ?‹Â?‡Â?•‹‘Â?•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒÂ?‘‹˜‡”‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdz͚͡͸Ǥ ;ʹÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͡ͲǤ ;;Ô?‘Â?Â–ÂƒÂ‰Â—Â‡ÇĄ‡Â?ƒǤDzŠ‡—•‹Â?॥‘ˆƒ”ƒÂ?†–Š‡”‘•’‡…–ˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzʹ;ʹǤ ;͜Ô?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͡ͲǤ

;ͳ


ZIEMCZONEK ÂŚ SIERRA LEONE

members began perpetrating crimes against other civilians and engaging in diamond smuggling for personal gain.35 Though the RUF seemed to be the outliers in the civil war, they collaborated with many other groups and factions to secure their position, and prolong the war. The direct enemy of the RUF was the SLA, but the spoils of the war in the resource-rich country considerably softened their initial contention.36 Members of the RUF and SLA would coordinate to smuggle diamonds out of the country and divide the revenue, contributing to personal wealth-accumulation as well as to the stockpiling of military supplies.37 They maintained a steady level of intensity, and combat did not escalate or peak as is common with many other conflicts. By avoiding each other and minimizing casualties, both sides could prolong the war, and extract more wealth from mining.38 Perhaps most interestingly, the RUF was notorious for colluding with smugglers and politicians in Liberia. Though Liberian strongmen were supporters of the RUF before they returned to Sierra Leone, they continued to utilize their relationship to increase the revenue gained from the diamond trade, and bypass Sierra Leone’s restrictions on diamond outflows during the war.39

Š‡‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ƒÂ?‘Â?–‡š–ƒÂ?†‘ŽŽ‹‡”nj ‘‡ˆĎ?Ž‡”‘†‡Ž One of the central preconditions Collier and Hoeffler identify is the poverty of a given country. There have been questions as to why poverty is only defined as per capita income in the model.40 In Sierra Leone, per capita income was a fairly accurate measure of poverty, as economic mismanagement had led to high unemployment throughout the country, and a broken bureaucratic system that failed to provide any safety nets.41 The Human Development Index (HDI) may provide a stronger measurement of the circumstances facing the citizens in the country. The importance of overall development may be reflected by the failing educational system in Sierra Leone prior to the outbreak of the war. Education was not examined in a poverty measure, though the impacts of high numbers of out-of-school young men on the development of the rebel movement was shown to be critical. Using the HDI or other more comprehensive welfare measures extends the applicability and accuracy of Collier-Hoeffler model. Though most of the conflicts used to explain this model focus on poverty and wealth accumulation, rational actors may start a war for a different benefit

;͡Ô? „‹†ǥǤͳͳ͡ͳǤ ;͸Ô? „‹†Ǥǥͳͳ͜ͺǤ ;͚Ô?‘Â?Â–ÂƒÂ‰Â—Â‡ÇĄ‡Â?ƒǤDzŠ‡—•‹Â?॥‘ˆƒ”ƒÂ?†–Š‡”‘•’‡…–ˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzʹ;;Ǥ ;ͺÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͜͝Ǥ ;͝Ô?‡‹ŽŽ‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆÂƒÂ”ÇŁƒ–—”ƒŽ‡•‘—”…‡•ƒÂ?†”Â?‡†‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdz͚͡͡Ǥ ͜ͲÔ?ǤƒÂ?•‘‘„—”•Š‡†ƒÂ?†‘ŠƒÂ?Â?Ġ—ŽˆƒÂ?ƒ†Œ‘‡††‹Â?ÇĄDz‡ƒ’’”ƒ‹•‹Â?‰–Š‡ ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡š’ŽƒÂ?ƒ–‹‘Â?•ˆ‘”‹‘Ž‡Â?–

Â?–‡”Â?ƒŽ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–ǥdz ‡•‡ƒ”…Š‘”Â?‹Â?‰ÂƒÂ’‡”ǥ  Â?‘ǤÍ´Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍšČŒÇŁͺǤ ͜ͳÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͜͸Ǥ

;ʹ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

provided it surpasses cost-benefit analysis.42 In their paper, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner state that the presence of a valuable raw resource increases the likelihood of civil war, as did diamonds in the case of Sierra Leone. In this context, however, it could be argued that the circumstances that made diamonds so crucial to the execution and extension of the civil war were a unique set of characteristics that cannot easily be replicated. First, the accessibility of alluvial diamonds is absolutely crucial in explaining the ease with which armies, as well as civilians, took advantage of the country’s destabilization to earn a profit. Alluvial diamonds are diamonds that are loosely concentrated as opposed to cemented together into a permanent feature. If the diamonds were inside primary deposits of other minerals, the rebels would not have been able to extract them to finance the war. Primary deposits require investments of very expensive capital, as well as skilled labour to operate the equipment for extraction.43 In Sierra Leone, however, alluvial deposits made diamond extraction as simple as sifting diamonds apart from dirt and minerals from shallow riverbeds, tasks that required only large amounts of unskilled labour. Sierra Leone is also unique in its relationship and proximity to its neighbour, Liberia. During the war, diamonds coming out of Sierra Leone were illegally obtained, and therefore should not have been available for purchase on general world markets.44 Transporting the diamonds across the Sierra Leone-Liberian border allowed the diamonds to be sold under the Liberian name as legal diamonds. Without this crucial link, neither the SLA nor RUF would have been able to finance the bloody conflict. In addition to the collusion of the Liberian government, private corporations played a large role in helping the RUF gain access to markets on which to sell their diamonds.45 “Private companies‌may well benefit from increased destabilization, finding new opportunities for short-term profit and longer-term gain, picking up the pieces abandoned by earlier invested who have fled.â€?46 When the quantity of diamonds from Liberia spiked during the war, none of the corporations that had contracts with Liberia evaluated the flow or composition of diamonds to determine whether or not they might have come from Sierra Leone.47 De Beers is especially notorious for blindly accepting diamonds, and Smilie argues that this makes them complicit in the atrocities committed. If corporations that profit by warring armies are to be included as players in civil wars, the greed justification becomes

͜ʹÔ?‘ŽŽ‹‡”‡–ÂƒÂŽÇĄDz‡›‘Â?† ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡ǥdz͚Ǥ ͜;Ô?—”•Š‡†ƒÂ?†ƒ†Œ‘‡††‹Â?ÇĄDz‡ƒ’’”ƒ‹•‹Â?‰–Š‡ ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡š’ŽƒÂ?ƒ–‹‘Â?•ˆ‘”‹‘Ž‡Â?– Â?–‡”Â?ƒŽ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–ǥdzͳͳǤ ͜͜Ô?‡‹ŽŽ‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆÂƒÂ”ÇŁƒ–—”ƒŽ‡•‘—”…‡•ƒÂ?†”Â?‡†‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–•ǥdz͡ͺͲǤ ͜͡Ô?‹ŽŽ‹ƒÂ?‡Â?‘ǥDz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ‡–™‘”Â?•‹Â?ƒ ƒ‹Ž‹Â?‰Â–ÂƒÂ–Â‡ÇŁŠ‡‘‘–•ƒÂ?† —–—”‡‹‘Ž‡Â?–‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡Ǥdz ͜͸Ô? ƒÂ?Â?‹Ž‹‡‡–ÂƒÂŽÇĄŠ‡ ‡ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡ÂƒÂ––‡”ǣ‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥ‹ƒÂ?‘Â?†•ƒÂ?† —Â?ƒÂ?‡…—”‹–›Č‹ƒ”–Â?‡”•Š‹’ˆ”‹…ƒƒÂ?ÂƒÂ†ÂƒÇŁÍ´Í˛Í˛Í˛ČŒÇĄ ͳʹǤ ͚͜Ô? „‹†ǤǥͳͳǤ

;;


ZIEMCZONEK ÂŚ SIERRA LEONE

relevant again.48 For all actors entering the conflict, accumulation of wealth appears to be the primary goal, inciting at once fierce competition, and unlikely cooperation.

Importance  of  Feasibility The newest form of the Collier-Hoeffler model not only redefines its parameters of war and the two main variables, but it introduces the importance of feasibility in understanding and further explaining civil wars. This feasibility hypothesis asserts that, “when rebellion is materially feasible it will occur.�49 The hypothesis also stipulates that the conditions that make the conflict feasible must also contribute to the motivating factors behind the conflict itself.50 Feasibility usually requires three factors: adequate financial resources, military deterrence, and a sufficient number of potential recruits. In the case of Sierra Leone, there were many different components feeding into the larger conflict without which the war would not have taken place, or would have been crushed immediately. The financial feasibility of the war in Sierra Leone was critical, as access to diamonds by all major players during the conflict was essential in not only beginning the war, but in allowing it to continue for over a decade.51 Military deterrence, though present, was more difficult to recognize during the war because it was indirect and complex. First, the lack of revenue needed to adequately pay the soldiers created issues of loyalty among the SLA troops. As discussed, many SLA soldiers also worked for the RUF in order to cover costs and accumulate wealth, which decreased trust and effectiveness within the military.52 Furthermore, the cooperation between the RUF and SLA to exploit diamond reserves also served to deter the SLA from decisive battles against the RUF, because both factions wanted to prolong the war to maximize monetary gains.53 Finally, because of the collapse of the public education system, recruitment for the RUF was considerably easier than it otherwise might have been. The economic mismanagement during Momoh’s term also caused rampant unemployment throughout the country.54 Without alternative

“The newest form of

the Collier-Hoeffler model not only redefines its parameters of war and the two main variables, but it introduces the importance of feasibility in understanding and further explaining civil wars.�

͜ͺÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͜͝Ô?‘ŽŽ‹‡”ƒÂ?† ‘‡ˆĎ?Ž‡”ǥDz‡›‘Â?† ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡ǥdz͡Ǥ ͡ͲÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͡ͳÔ?—”•Š‡†ƒÂ?†ƒ†Œ‘‡††‹Â?ÇĄDz‡ƒ’’”ƒ‹•‹Â?‰–Š‡ ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡š’ŽƒÂ?ƒ–‹‘Â?•ˆ‘”‹‘Ž‡Â?– Â?–‡”Â?ƒŽ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–ǥdzͳʹǤ ͡ʹÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͜͡Ǥ ͡;Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͜͡Ô? ‹”•…ŠǥSierra  Leone:  Diamonds  and  the  Struggle  for  DemocracyÇĄ;ͲǤ

;͜


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

opportunities, joining the RUF was a rational and beneficial decision for many recruits.55 These conditions made a civil war feasible, but they became even more critical in prolonging the conflict. With control over diamonds and mining sites, the RUF was able to re-supply itself with arms while working cooperatively with the SLA. The worsening economic conditions of Sierra Leone after it was plunged into war continued to decrease the cost of participation relative to potential gains.

Uncovering  the  Grievance  Argument  in  Sierra  Leone Despite the support of the feasibility and greed hypotheses in explaining the causes of the civil war, some researchers do not acknowledge resource and wealth accumulation as central factors in the conflict.56 Some scholars argue that political tensions and other grievancebased causes played a far greater role than the exploitation of natural resources in sparking the civil war.57 Major grievance-based conditions for emerging conflicts were virtually non-existent in the last ten years leading up to the outbreak of the war. Perhaps most importantly, there were no discernable ethnic or religious rivalries in the country. The country is both ethnically and religiously diverse, housing four major ethnic groups and several smaller tribes, as well as a Muslim majority with large minorities of Christian and traditional animist believers. Despite these differences, the country has not seen tensions or hostility arising from these ethnic or religious identities. Both the RUF and SLA recruited soldiers, and targeted victims indiscriminately from all ethnic and religious backgrounds.58 Some scholars, such as Ballentine and Sherman, accuse the Collier-Hoeffler model of oversimplifying the root causes of civil conflicts to make conflicts fit more easily into a scientific analytic model.59 Though this is a valid concern, the model does not exclude other social phenomena from playing a part in a civil war. Instead, the model emphasizes the increased importance of economic incentives in initiating or prolonging a conflict under a very specific set of circumstances; the model does not attempt to explain all or even most civil conflicts in this way. The political tensions in Sierra Leone did play a role in mobilizing the country for war, but not for the exclusive purpose of political reorganization. The political regime in Sierra Leone was corrupt and ineffective since the 1960s, but civil unrest was at a minimum.60 The outbreak of the civil war coincided with a decrease in the government’s effectiveness, but more

͡͡Ô?—”•Š‡†ƒÂ?†ƒ†Œ‘‡††‹Â?ÇĄDz‡ƒ’’”ƒ‹•‹Â?‰–Š‡ ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡š’ŽƒÂ?ƒ–‹‘Â?•ˆ‘”‹‘Ž‡Â?– Â?–‡”Â?ƒŽ‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–ǥdz͡Ǥ ͡͸Ô?—„‡Â?‘Â?‹Â?‰ǥDz ”‡‡†‘” ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡‹Â?‡•–ÂˆÂ”Â‹Â…ÂƒÇŻÂ• ‘”‡•–ÂƒÂ”Â•ÇŤÇłš–”‡Â?‡‘Â?ϔŽ‹…–•ƒÂ?†”‘’‹…ƒŽ ‘”‡•–•͡Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍšČŒÇŁ;ͺǤ ͚͡Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ;͚Ǥ ͡ͺÔ?‡ŽŽ‘™•ƒÂ?†‹‰—‡ŽǥDzƒ”ƒÂ?†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘Â?‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdzͳͳ͚͜Ǥ ͡͝Ô?ƒ”‡Â?ƒŽŽ‡Â?–‹Â?‡ƒÂ?† ƒÂ?‡Š‡”Â?ƒÂ?‹Â?ƒ–•Â‡Â”Â†ÂƒÂŽÇĄDz‡›‘Â?† ”‡‡†ƒÂ?† ”‹‡˜ƒÂ?…‡Č‚Â?†‘–‘‘‘‘Â?ÇĽÇĄÇłReview  of   International  Studies  ;ͳČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍˇČŒÇŁ͸ͺ͝Ǥ ͸ͲÔ? „‹†Ǥ

;͡


ZIEMCZONEK ÂŚ SIERRA LEONE

importantly, the war was a response to the country’s rapid decline into poverty, and the cessation of necessary state programs.61 Long-standing social grievances on the part of the orchestrators of the conflict are not enough to explain the drawn-out guerilla tactics that characterized the war. If the goal of the RUF had in fact been to oust the current government, it is likely they would have adopted a rapid shock-tactic response instead of the slow movement throughout the country that allowed the SLA to mobilize and prepare. Many of the young rebel soldiers did fight under the auspices of securing a better government in hopes of restoring the country to its former prosperity. However, these goals were not necessarily shared by the rebel leaders.62 For many other soldiers, no overarching goal or ideal was recognized as a motivating factor; at most, the young soldiers were fighting for the comrades that had become their new family unit, and at the least, they were fighting to avoid harsh repercussions.63 The Collier-Hoeffler model, in conjunction with the feasibility hypothesis, strongly supports the argument that the civil war in Sierra Leone was waged primarily over economic gain through resource extraction rather than over political grievances and injustice. Though the murky political climate of Sierra Leone leading up to the war cannot be discounted, it is by no means the most important factor in sparking and fueling the conflict. If the political situation of the country were to be isolated from the resource conflicts, it is unlikely the war would have broken out. The leaders of the RUF in Liberia would likely not have taken the risk of defeat in a war against the government if there were no tangible gains they could exploit through the course of the war. The access to raw resources and the criminality of illicit resource extraction have fueled conflicts in many countries across the world irrespective of political grievances. Though the Collier-Hoeffler model continues to be contested and re-written, the basic principle of greed-driven conflicts has a dominant role to play in the civil wars of poor, exportintensive, resource-rich countries. Taken in conjunction with the feasibility hypothesis, these models provide a solid framework through which to examine civil wars, stripped of the grievance framing that is often added to the narrative by both leaders and observers alike. Though civil wars should not only be evaluated in terms of economic gains and wealth accumulation, neither should these conflicts be accepted solely on the basis of ethnic rivalries and political grievances. The variation of circumstances in civil wars necessitates that both greed and grievance arguments be applied to conflicts to emerge with a balanced, and legitimate final analysis. In doing so, the greed and feasibility arguments should begin to take hold as effective models for intrastate wars, as demonstrated by the case of Sierra Leone.

͸ͳÔ?‹ŽŽ‹ƒÂ?‡Â?‘ǥDz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ‡–™‘”Â?•‹Â?ƒ ƒ‹Ž‹Â?‰Â–ÂƒÂ–Â‡ÇŁŠ‡‘‘–•ƒÂ?† —–—”‡‹‘Ž‡Â?–‘Â?Ď?Ž‹…–‹Â?‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡Ǥdz ͸ʹÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͸;Ô?—•—ˆƒÂ?Â‰Â—Â”ÂƒÇĄDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽƒÂ?†—Ž–—”ƒŽ›Â?ƒÂ?‹…•‘ˆ–Š‡‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ÂƒÂ”ÇĄÇł;ͲǤ

;͸


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Bibliography ƒŽŽ‡–‹‡ǡƒ”‡ƒ† ƒ‡Š‡”ƒ‹ƒ–•‡”†ƒŽǤDz‡›‘† ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡Ȃ†‘–‘‘ ‘‘ǥdzReview  of  International  Studies  ͵ͳȋʹͲͲͷȌǣ͸ͺͻǤ ƒ‰—”ƒǡ—•—ˆǤDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽƒ†—Ž–—”ƒŽ›ƒ‹…•‘ˆ–Š‡‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ƒ”ǤdzBetween  Democracy   and  Terror:  The  Sierra  Leone  Civil  WarǤƒƒ”ǣ ǡʹͲͲͶǤ ‡ŽŽ‘™•ǡ ‘Šƒ††™ƒ”†‹‰—‡ŽǤDzƒ”ƒ†‘…ƒŽ‘ŽŽ‡…–‹˜‡…–‹‘‹‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǤdzJournal  of   Public  Economics  ͻ͵ǡ‘ǤͳͳǦͳʹȋʹͲͲͻȌǣͳͳͶͶǦͳͳͷ͹Ǥ ‡”†ƒŽǡƒ–•ƒ†ƒ˜‹†‡‡ǤDz‹‘Ž‡…‡ƒ†…‘‘‹…‰‡†ƒ•‹‹˜‹Žƒ”•ǣ‘‡‘Ž‹…›

’Ž‹…ƒ–‹‘•ǡdz‹ŽŽ‡‹— ‘—”ƒŽ‘ˆ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ–—†‹‡•ʹ͸ǡ‘Ǥ͵ȋͳͻͻ͹ȌǤ ‡”†ƒŽǡƒ–•ƒ†ƒ˜‹†ƒŽ‘‡ǡ‡†•ǤGreed  and  Grievance:  Economic  Agenda  in  Civil  WarsǤ––ƒ™ƒǣ

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡ƒ…‡…ƒ†‡› …ǤǡʹͲͲͲǤ ‘ŽŽ‹‡”ǡƒ—Žƒ†‡ ‘‡ˆϐŽ‡”ǤDz ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡‹‹˜‹Žƒ”ǡdz‘Ž‹…›‡•‡ƒ”…Š‘”‹‰ƒ’‡”Ǥ ƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣŠ‡‘”Ž†ƒ‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–‡•‡ƒ”…Š ”‘—’ǡʹͲͲͲǤ ‘ŽŽ‹‡”ǡƒ—Žƒ†‡ ‘‡ˆϐŽ‡”ǤDz ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡‹‹˜‹Žƒ”Ǥdzšˆ‘”†…‘‘‹…ƒ’‡”•ͷ͸ǡ‘ǤͶ ȋʹͲͲͶȌǤ ‘ŽŽ‹‡”ǡƒ—Ž‡–ƒŽǤDz‡›‘† ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡Ǥdzšˆ‘”†…‘‘‹…ƒ’‡”•͸ͳǡ‘ǤͳȋʹͲͲͻȌǤ ‹”•…Šǡ ‘ŠǤSierra  Leone:  Diamonds  and  the  Struggle  for  DemocracyǤ‘—Ž†‡”ǣ›‡‹‡‡” —„Ž‹•Š‡”•–†ǤǡʹͲͲͳǤ ‘‹‰ǡ—„‡ǤDz ”‡‡†‘” ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡‹‡•–ˆ”‹…ƒǯ• ‘”‡•–ƒ”•ǫdzš–”‡‡‘ϔŽ‹…–•ƒ†”‘’‹…ƒŽ ‘”‡•–Ǥ‘”†”‡…Š–ǣ’”‹‰‡”ǡʹͲͲ͹Ǥ ‡‹ŽŽ‘ǡŠ‹Ž‹’’‡ǤDz‹ƒ‘†ƒ”•ǫ‘ϐŽ‹…–‹ƒ‘†•ƒ† ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š‹‡•‘ˆ‡•‘—”…‡ƒ”•ǤdzAnnals   ‘ˆ–Š‡••‘…‹ƒ–‹‘‘ˆ‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ ‡‘‰”ƒ’Š‡”•ͻͺǡ‘ǤʹȋʹͲͲͺȌǣ͵ͶͷǦ͵͹ʹǤ ‡‹ŽŽ‘ǡŠ‹Ž‹’’‡ǤDzŠ‡‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ…‘Ž‘‰›‘ˆƒ”ǣƒ–—”ƒŽ‡•‘—”…‡•ƒ†”‡†‘ϐŽ‹…–•ǤdzPolitical  

‡‘‰”ƒ’Š›ʹͲǡ‘ǤͷȋʹͲͲͳȌǣͷ͸ͳǦͷͺͶǤ ‘–ƒ‰—‡ǡ‡ƒǤDzŠ‡—•‹‡••‘ˆƒ”ƒ†–Š‡”‘•’‡…–ˆ‘”‡ƒ…‡‹‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǡdzThe  Brown   Journal  of  World  Affairs  ͻǡ‘ǤͳȋʹͲͲʹȌǣʹʹͻǦʹ͵͹Ǥ —”•Š‡†ǡǤƒ•‘‘„ƒ†‘Šƒƒ†—Žˆƒƒ†Œ‘‡††‹ǤDz‡ƒ’’”ƒ‹•‹‰–Š‡ ”‡‡†ƒ† ”‹‡˜ƒ…‡ š’Žƒƒ–‹‘•ˆ‘”‹‘Ž‡– –‡”ƒŽ‘ϐŽ‹…–ǡdz ‡•‡ƒ”…Š‘”‹‰ƒ’‡”‘Ǥʹ ȋʹͲͲ͹ȌǤ ‡‘ǡ‹ŽŽ‹ƒǤDz‘Ž‹–‹…ƒŽ‡–™‘”•‹ƒ ƒ‹Ž‹‰–ƒ–‡ǣŠ‡‘‘–•ƒ† —–—”‡‹‘Ž‡–‘ϐŽ‹…–‹‹‡””ƒ ‡‘‡ǡdzInternational  Politics  and  Society  ʹȋʹͲͲ͵ȌǤ ‹…Šƒ”†•ǡƒ—ŽǤDz‹Ž‹–‹ƒ‘•…��‹’–‹‘‹‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǣ‡…”—‹–‡–‘ˆ‘—‰ ‹‰Š–‡”•‹ˆ”‹…ƒ ƒ”ǡdzŠ‡‘’ƒ”ƒ–‹˜‡–—†›‘ˆ‘•…”‹’–‹‘‹–Š‡”‡† ‘”…‡•ǡʹͲȋʹͲͲʹȌǣʹͷͷǦʹ͹͸Ǥ ‹…Šƒ”†•ǡƒ—ŽǤDz‘ ‹‰Š–‘”–‘ ƒ”ǫ‰”ƒ”‹ƒ‹‡•‹‘•‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ‘‹˜‡”‘ϐŽ‹…–•ǡdzAfrican   Affairs  ͳͲͶǡ‘ǤͶͳ͹ȋʹͲͲͷȌǣͷ͹ͳǦͷͻͲǤ ‹Ž‹‡ǡ ƒ‡–ƒŽǤŠ‡ ‡ƒ”–‘ˆ–Š‡ƒ––‡”ǣ‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǡ‹ƒ‘†•and  Human  SecurityǤƒ”–‡”•Š‹’ ˆ”‹…ƒƒƒ†ƒȋʹͲͲͲȌǤ

͵͹


WATSON ¦ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

Is Justice Being Done?: An Assessment of the Viability of Hybrid Tribunals Bridgette Watson Bridgette   is   a   fourth   year   International   Relations   student   at   UBC   focusing   on   In-­‐ ternational   Diplomacy,   Security,   and   Peace   Studies.   Her   areas   of   research   interest   include:   international   justice,   international   organizations   and   global   indigenous   politics.   She   plans   to   pursue   these   interests   both   academically   and   professionally.

“Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives…Our experience in the past decade has demonstrated clearly that the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice.” -Kofi Annan, 2004.

Introduction    

The use of hybrid tribunals to conduct hearings in countries where mass atrocities have been committed is a recent emergence in world justice systems. These courts are considered hybrid because they integrate international and domestic laws in their decisions and international and domestic staff in their chambers. Academics, non-governmental organizations, and the media are often critical in their discourse concerning hybrid tribunals. Their criticism stems from the concern that resource restraints and a perceived lack of legitimacy have compromised the purpose of hybrid courts: to provide justice for post–conflict countries. This paper will explore the hybrid tribunals that have been established in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia and provide examples of both the merits and detriments affiliated with the construction, proceedings, and outcomes of these courts. The intent of this exploration will be to analyze the complexities of these case studies in an attempt  to  offer  an  answer  to  the  following   question:   Have the problems affiliated with hybrid tribunals outweighed the benefits and should they remain a viable alternative to international tribunals in the future? This primary research question leads to an important sub–question: What criteria should be used to calculate the benefits of these three unique tribunals? As mentioned, insufficient resourcing is among the dominant critiques of hybrid tribunals. This paper will first examine each

38


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

tribunal to determine how resource and funding circumstances impacted their proceedings. Then it will address to what extent these hybrid courts have been perceived by both local populations and the international community as being legitimate forums for justice. In the third section, the hybrid model will be assessed to see if it has contributed positively to the rebuilding of local judiciaries and if it has helped “foster international human rights norms� in post–conflict countries.1

The  Cost  of  Justice:  A  Resource  Assessment  of  Hybrid  Tribunals   East  Timor:  The  Special  Panels  for  Serious  Crimes After twenty-five years of oppressive Indonesian rule, East Timor indicated its desire for independence in a state referendum in 1999. Before, during, and immediately following the summer referendum, violence erupted as pro–integration militias terrorized the country. The United Nations deployed troops in October, but by this time the militia had displaced nearly three-quarters of the population and murdered several thousand.2 East Timor then faced the enormous task of establishing itself after decades of uncertainty. By October, the UN had drafted Resolution 1272 and created the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to aid the country in its transition to independence. The UNTAET then drafted Regulation 2000/11, which organized a plan for the East Timor judicial system and gave “exclusive jurisdiction� to the District Court in Dili to try crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. The Dili Court would also hear cases of murder, sexual abuses or torture if these crimes were committed during the referendum violence.3 These court panels were constructed using an experimental hybrid model that included both East Timorese and international judges. So was created the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor. Criticism of the special panels included concerns that they were “seriously hampered from the start by a lack of resources and appropriate staffing.�4 Reports by NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have stressed that inadequate funding by the United Nations perpetuated problems while the courts were in session between 2000 and 2006. For example, in 2001, the UN provided the Special Panels with 3.8 million euros, in comparison to the 63.5 million euros it gave to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

ÍłÔ?ƒ—”ƒ‹…Â?‹Â?•‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡”‘Â?‹•‡‘ˆ ›„”‹†‘—”–•ǥdzŠ‡Â?‡”‹…ƒÂ? ‘—”Â?ƒŽ‘ˆ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽĪ͚͝ǥ‘ǤÍ´Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍľČŒÇŁʹ͝͸Ǥ Í´Ô?  ‹Â?‘Â?Š‹Ž’‘––ǥDzƒ•–‹Â?‘”ǯ•‘—„Ž‡Â‹ÂˆÂ‡ÇŁÂ?‡ŽŽ•Ž‹Â?‡‡•–’ŠƒŽ‹ƒÂ?’‹”‹–ǥdzThird  World  Quarterly  ʹ͚ǥ‘ǤÍłČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛Í˛ČŒÇŁͳ͜͜Ǥ ÍľÔ?  United  Nations.  Regulation  2000/11:  4. ÍśÔ?  Human  Rights  Watch.  Justice  Denied  for  East  Timor.  Section  IIǤ„ǤÂŠÂ–Â–Â’ÇŁČ€Č€Â™Â™Â™Ç¤ÂŠÂ”Â™Ç¤Â‘Â”Â‰Č€ÂŽÂ‡Â‰ÂƒÂ…Â›Č€Â„ÂƒÂ…Â?‰”‘—Â?Â†Â‡Â”Č€ÂƒÂ•Â‹ÂƒČ€Â–Â‹Â?‘”Ȁ ‡–‹Â?‘”ͳʹͲʹ„‰ǤŠ–Â?

39


WATSON ÂŚ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

(ICTY) the same year.5 The Special Panels were faced with the monumental task of conducting a human rights trial in a country where virtually no judicial infrastructure or personnel remained. In the Harvard Law Review, Suzanne Katzenstein explained that during the referendum violence “most court buildings had been torched and looted and all court equipment, furniture, registers, records, archives and indispensable to legal practice law books, case files, and other legal resources dislocated or burned.�6 Human Rights Watch reported that access to computers, Internet, and office space was limited and that without enough law clerks and administrative assistants the trials were often delayed so that judges and lawyers could process paperwork.7 Trials were also delayed because translating services and recording equipment were difficult to locate and the first thirteen trials were permitted to proceed without any audio recordings.8 Additionally, any local judicial staff suspected of being sympathetic to the Indonesian regime had fled East Timor; at the time the court was conceived, only sixty East Timorese citizens possessed law degrees.9 Given that the hybrid court in East Timor was challenged from the beginning with inadequate resources it should be commended for the work it did achieve. A newly independent state, with no established judicial system, managed to conduct fifty-five trials and convict eightyfour persons in trials that were perceived as adhering to international standards.10 However, investigations were still being conducted when the UN withdrew much of their infrastructure in May 2005 and the Special Panels were forced to “suspend operations indefinitely.�11 This occurred despite a UN Commission of Experts report produced the same year that indicated “there are still further international crimes which may be prosecuted in East Timor.�12

Sierra  Leone:  The  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Liberia invaded Sierra Leone in 1991 and devastated the country. The RUF was financed largely by Charles Taylor, the warlord who would become head of state in Liberia. The RUF “war of terror� included atrocities such as child soldier

͡Ô?—’‡”–Â?‹Ž„‡…Â?ǤDz —Â?†‹Â?‰ —•–‹…‡ǣŠ‡”‹…‡‘ˆƒ””‹Â?‡•Â”Â‹ÂƒÂŽÂ•ÇĄÇł —Â?ƒÂ?‡…—”‹–› ƒ–‡™ƒ›’Ǥ͸ǥŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ Š—Â?ƒÂ?•‡…—”‹–›‰ƒ–‡™ƒ›Ǥ…‘Â?Ȁ†‘…—Â?‡Â?–•Ȁ Ě´Ě´ÂˆÂ—Â?†‹Â?‰Œ—•–‹…‡–Š‡’”‹…‡‘ˆ™ƒ”…”‹Â?‡•–”‹ƒŽ•Ǥ’†ˆǤ ͸Ô?—œƒÂ?Â?‡ƒ–œ‡Â?•–‡‹Â?ÇĄ“Hybrid  Tribunals:  Searching  for  Justice  in  East  Timor,â€?Harvard  Human  Rights  JournalČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍľČŒÇŁʹ͡ͲǤ ÍšÔ? —Â?ƒÂ?‹‰Š–•ƒ–…ŠǤ —•–‹…‡‡Â?‹‡†ˆ‘”ƒ•–‹Â?‘”Ǥ‡…–‹‘Â?ÂƒÍľÇ¤ ÍşÔ?ƒ˜‹†‘Š‡Â?ÇĄDz‡‡Â?‹Â?‰ —•–‹…‡Â?–Š‡ÂŠÂ‡ÂƒÂ’ÇŁ •–Š‡ƒ•–‹Â?‘””‹„—Â?ƒŽ‡ƒŽŽ›‘†‡Žˆ‘”–Š‡ —–—”‡Ǎdz•‹ƒƒ…‹Ď?‹… ••—‡•͸ͳ Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛Í´ČŒÇŁ͚Ǥ ÍťÔ?ƒ–œ‡Â?•–‡‹Â?ÇĄ ›„”‹†”‹„—Â?ÂƒÂŽÂ•ÇĄʹ͜͡Ǥ ͳͲÔ?”‹ƒŽDz’‡…‹ƒŽƒÂ?‡Ž•ˆ‘”‡”‹‘—•”‹Â?‡•‹Â?‘”nj‡•–‡ǣ’’”ƒ‹•ƒŽ•ƒÂ?† —–—”‡”‘•’‡…–•Ǥdz ÂŠÂ–Â–Â’ÇŁČ€Č€Â™Â™Â™Ç¤Â–Â”Â‹ÂƒÂŽÇŚÂ…ÂŠÇ¤Â‘Â”Â‰Č€Â‡Â?Ȁ”‡•‘—”…‡•Ȁ–”‹„—Â?ÂƒÂŽÂ•Č€ÂŠÂ›Â„Â”Â‹Â†ÇŚÂ–Â”Â‹Â„Â—Â?ÂƒÂŽÂ•Č€Â•Â’Â‡Â…Â‹ÂƒÂŽÇŚÂ’ÂƒÂ?Â‡ÂŽÂ•ÇŚÂˆÂ‘Â”ÇŚÂ•Â‡Â”Â‹Â‘Â—Â•ÇŚÂ…Â”Â‹Â?‡•nj–‹Â?‘”njŽ‡•–‡ǤŠ–Â?ÂŽ ͳͳÔ? Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽƒ”••‘…‹ƒ–‹‘Â?ǤDz’‡…‹ƒŽƒÂ?‡Žˆ‘”‡”‹‘—•”‹Â?‡•Č‹ƒ•–‹Â?Â‘Â”ČŒÇ¤ÂŠÂ–Â–Â’ÇŁČ€Č€Â™Â™Â™Ç¤Â‹Â„ÂƒÂ?‡–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‘Â?Â?‹––‡‡•ȀĚ´ ƒ•–‹Â?‘”Ǥƒ•’š ͳʹÔ? „‹†Ǥ

͜Ͳ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

recruitment, kidnapping, rape, sexual slavery, and the deliberate amputation of over 4,000 civilians.13 By the time the conflict concluded it was estimated that 60,000 people had been murdered, 2 million people had been displaced and 20,000 people had been abducted.14 In 2000, the UN Security Council Resolution 1315 granted the request of the Sierra Leone government to establish a hybrid tribunal to bring to justice those who had orchestrated the violence. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created with the mandate “to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean “A newly independent law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone� during state, with no estabthe RUF terror war.15 Resolution 1315 recommended lished judicial system, that the special court have subject–matter jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other managed to conduct serious violations of international humanitarian law. fifty-five trials and conThe court was hybrid in nature because it was comprised vict eighty-four persons of both international and local lawyers and judges, and in trials that were peralso because it incorporated international and Sierra ceived as adhering to inLeonean laws. However, unlike the East Timor Special Panels, it also had an experimental method of funding. ternational standards.� The UN Security Council was unwilling to financially support the special court and it was to be financed entirely by voluntary donations from other countries.16 This method of financing proved problematic for the Special Court, just as then–UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had warned. Annan attempted to negotiate with the Security Council for funding, but it proved impossible. He resolved that the Special Court could commence if funding was secured that could enable the court to proceed for three years. Annan estimated this cost to be 114.6 million US dollars, an amount the Security Council deemed too expensive. A revised budget of $57 million was agreed upon.17 Voluntary contributions eventually amounted to just over half of this amount, yet Annan gave approval for the Special Court project to commence. Given that the Court was designed to try fewer criminals then the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the amount of funding paled in

ͳ;Ô?‡–ŠǤ‘—‰Š‡”–›ǥDz‹‰Š–nj‹œ‹Â?‰ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ”‹Â?‹Â?ƒŽ —•–‹…‡ǣŠ‡ ›„”‹†š’‡”‹Â?‡Â?–––Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ ‡‘Â?‡ǥdz Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽˆˆƒ‹”•ͺͲǥ‘ǤÍ´Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍśČŒÇŁ;ͳ͡nj;ͳ͸Ǥ ͳ͜Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ;ͳ͡Ǥ ͳ͡Ô?Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥDzŠƒ–‹•–Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǍdzŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ•…nj•ŽǤ‘”‰ȀǤ ͳ͸Ô?‡…—”‹–›‘—Â?…‹Ž‡––‡”†ƒ–‡†ʹ͸ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲ͜ˆ”‘Â?–Š‡‡…”‡–ƒ”› ‡Â?‡”ƒŽƒ††”‡••‡†–‘–Š‡”‡•‹†‡Â?–‘ˆ–Š‡ ‡…—”‹–›‘—Â?…‹ŽǤƒ••‹Â?Ǥ ͳ͚Ô?‘—‰Š‡”–›ǥDz‹‰Š–nj‹œ‹Â?‰ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ”‹Â?‹Â?ƒŽ —•–‹…‡ǥdz;ʹͲǤ

͜ͳ


WATSON ÂŚ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

comparison. While the Special Court was expected to function for three years on $21 million, the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTR had annual budgets in 2001 of $108.5 million and $94 million respectively.18 Amnesty International claims the decision to fund the Special Court through voluntary donations undermined its full potential because it was “in a continued state of financial crisis due to lack of consistent contributions.�19 Human Rights Watch has indicated key areas of the Court that were underfunded, namely the defence unit, the witness and victim support unit, the chambers, and the outreach section.�20 Trials were routinely delayed while additional donations were sought and the international press speculated that Charles Taylor would not be tried due to budgetary restraints.21 The Special Court was challenged from its conception, but it successfully brought to justice men who orchestrated the war of terror in Sierra Leone. Trials may have been conducted on a shoestring budget and repeatedly stalled because resources were scarce, but in the end all those indicted were tried and convicted. Exceptions include those who died before they could be tried, and Charles Taylor, whose trial was moved to the International Criminal Court. It can be suggested that more investigations and indictments could have occurred if financial resources were greater. However, the Special Court should be commended for the work it did complete and not condemned for what it was financially incapable of achieving.

Extraordinary  Chambers  in  the  Courts  of  Cambodia Between 1974 and 1979, Cambodians were brutalized by the regime of Pol Pot and his

ͳͺÔ?  Ibid. ͳ͝Ô?Â?Â?‡•–› Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ÂƒÂŽÇĄDz‘Â?’Ž‡–‹Â?‰–Š‡™‘”Â?ˆ‘”–Š‡ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ”‹Â?‹Â?ƒŽ”‹„—Â?ƒŽ•ˆ‘”–Š‡ ‘”Â?‡”—‰‘•Žƒ˜‹ƒƒÂ?† ™ƒÂ?Â†ÂƒÇĄÇł;Ǥ ʹͲÔ? —Â?ƒÂ?‹‰Š–•ƒ–…ŠǤDz”‹Â?‰‹Â?‰ —•–‹…‡ǣŠ‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡Ǥdz‡…–‹‘Â?ʹǤ Í´ÍłÔ?ƒÂ?‹…‡ǥDz‹˜‹Žƒ””‹Â?‡•”‹„—Â?ƒŽÂ?†‡”Š”‡ƒ–ĥ‘Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?•”›Â’ÇĄÇłŠ‡ —ƒ”†‹ƒÂ?ÇĄʹ͡ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲ͝ǥƒ……‡••‡†ƒ– ÂŠÂ–Â–Â’ÇŁČ€Č€Â™Â™Â™Ç¤Â‰Â—ÂƒÂ”Â†Â‹ÂƒÂ?Ǥ…‘Ǥ—Â?Č€Â™Â‘Â”ÂŽÂ†Č€Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČ€ÂˆÂ‡Â„Č€Í´ÍˇČ€Â…Â‹Â˜Â‹ÂŽÇŚÂ™ÂƒÂ”ÇŚÂ…Â”Â‹Â?‡•nj–”‹„—Â?ƒŽǤ

͜ʹ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Khmer Rouge army. Determined to regress Cambodia back to a peasant society, the Khmer Rouge are suspected of killing an estimated 3,314,768 people either by direct execution or forced starvation.22 Urban professionals were displaced from their homes and taken to “the killing fields� where they were forced into agricultural slave labour. Those who refused were imprisoned and subjected to torture. After four years of atrocities, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded and stopped the Pol Pot government. In 1986 the new Cambodian regime requested the UN’s help with a Khmer Rouge tribunal, but how the courts would be modelled was not agreed upon for several years. Finally, in 2003, the people of Cambodia welcomed the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to provide justice for the victims of the Pol Pot regime. The court was hybrid and comprised of local and international staff operating under both Cambodian and international laws and the ECCC continues to have the power to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Like the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the ECCC is dependent upon voluntary contributions from benevolent states and has faced warranted criticism for its lack of adequate financing. Human Rights Watch has praised the ECCC for the manner in which it conducted its first trials that sentenced four Khmer Rouge leaders. However, the NGO has also noted that “large numbers of other alleged perpetrators... continue to live freely.�23 An additional four suspects are currently on trial, yet postponement due to inadequate funding is always a concern. A plea to donor states for funding in May 2010 revealed that of the estimated $46.8 million US dollars required for the 2011 year, only $1.1 million dollars had been collected.24 Financial pressures have raised other criticisms about the effectiveness of the ECCC. For example, Amnesty International has said that there is insufficient financial support for witness protection programs. Human Rights Watch has questioned “how the ECCC can protect the witnesses who participate ... when the ECCC’s witness unit is barely functioning?�25 New Internationalist magazine has also reported that an estimated 1,800 witnesses are determined to present their stories in court, yet a lack of funds could prevent these people from either being able to testify, or being provided with witness protection after they do so.26 The reality is that inadequate funding could alter the perception the Cambodian people have about the

Í´Í´Ô?”ƒ‹‰–…Š‡•‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡—Â?„‡”ǯnj—ƒÂ?–‹ˆ›‹Â?‰”‹Â?‡•‰ƒ‹Â?•– —Â?ƒÂ?‹–›‹Â?ƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒÇĄÇł Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤÂ?‡Â?‘Â?‰ǤÂ?Â‡Â–Č€Â…ÂƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒČ€Â–Â‘ÂŽÂŽÇ¤ÂŠÂ–Â?Ǥ Í´ÍľÔ?ƒ”ƒ‘ŽÂ?ǤŠ‡‹ŽŽ‹Â?‰ ‹‡Ž†Â”Â‹ÂƒÂŽÂ•ÇĄČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁ —Â?ƒÂ?‹‰Š–•ÂƒÂ–Â…ÂŠÇĄÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇĄƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ”™Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‡Â?Č€ Â?‡™•ȀʹͲͲͺȀͲ;ȀͲʹȀÂ?‹ŽŽ‹Â?‰njĎ?Â‹Â‡ÂŽÂ†ÇŚÂ–Â”Â‹ÂƒÂŽÂ•Ç¤ Í´ÍśÔ?થ‡Â?–”‡ǥDz‘Â?‘”•”‰‡†–‘‘Â?–”‹„—–‡–‘ƒ…Â?‡† ‡Â?‘…‹†‡‘—”–‹Â?ƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒÇ¤Çł ʹ͡Ô?‘ŽÂ?ÇĄ‹ŽŽ‹Â?‰ ‹‡Ž†•Ǥ ʹ͸Ô?‘Â? ÂƒÂ™Â–ÂŠÂ”Â‘Â’ÇĄDz ƒ…‹Â?‰ ‹•–‘”›‹Â?ƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒÇĄÇł‡™ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽƒ‰ƒœ‹Â?‡͜ʹͲǤČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇĄ ƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤÂ?‡™‹Â?–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ…‘Ž—Â?Â?Â•Č€Â‡Â•Â•ÂƒÂ›Â•Č€Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČ€Í˛ÍľČ€Í˛ÍłČ€ÂˆÂƒÂ…Â‹Â?Â‰ÇŚÂŠÂ‹Â•Â–Â‘Â”Â›ÇŚÂ…ÂƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒČ€Ç¤

͜;


WATSON ÂŚ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

legitimacy of the ECCC.

The  Issue  of  Legitimacy:  Local  and  International  Perceptions One of the greatest challenges of hybrid trials is ensuring that both local populations and international audiences perceive them as legitimate. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer served as deputy principal and principal legal advisor to the UNAET in East Timor and claimed it was essential to recruit “After decades of awaiting justice, among the locals to legitimize the trials in the eyes Cambodians have positive percepof the East Timorese public. The country had been tions of the Court. In 2008, the subjected to the judicial system of Indonesia for over International Republican Institwo decades and the decision to appoint native East tute conducted a poll that showed Timorese judges and lawyers was “an unprecedented� 27 80 percent of Cambodians supand highly symbolic move. Strohmeyer wrote in his reflections on the special panels that hiring within the ported the tribunal. The ECCC is country empowered local experts. Furthermore, he also the first hybrid tribunal that noted the public took pride in having a judicial system allowed victims to participate in that did not “inhibit the professional participation of proceedings as civil parties alongthe East Timorese.�28 It has also been indicated that the side lawyers... this has helped to international community recognized the legitimacy of galvanise Cambodian interest the special panels for East Timor. In 2005, a report and ownership over the process submitted by a commission of experts to the Security that would have been impossible Council acknowledged that “the serious crimes if it had been held in The Hague.� process in Timor-Leste ensured a notable degree of accountability for those responsible for the crimes committed in 1999.�29 In contrast to East Timor, the international community was more suspicious of the legitimacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. It was known that the RUF still exercised influence in Sierra Leone and it was feared that local judges would be too intimidated to sentence certain perpetrators. However, the hybrid model meant international judges were also on staff to ensure that intimidation did not factor into verdicts. The hybrid model helped appease international concerns that corruption and intimidation would impede the legitimacy of a Human Rights

Í´ÍšÔ? ƒÂ?•Œ‘”‰–”‘ŠÂ?‡›‡”ǥDz‘ŽŽƒ’•‡ƒÂ?†‡…‘Â?•–”—…–‹‘Â?‘ˆƒ —†‹…‹ƒŽ›•–‡Â?ÇŁ–Š‡Â?‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘Â?•‹••‹‘Â?•‹Â?‘•‘˜‘ƒÂ?†ƒ•– ‹Â?‘”ǥdzŠ‡Â?‡”‹…ƒÂ? ‘—”Â?ƒŽ‘ˆ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽĪ͚͜ǥÂ?‘Ǥ͸;ǤČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍłČŒÇŁ͜͡Ǥ Í´ÍşÔ?  Ibid. Í´ÍťÔ?”‹ƒŽÇŁDz’‡…‹ƒŽƒÂ?‡Ž•ˆ‘”‡”‹‘—•”‹Â?‡•‹Â?‘”nj‡•–‡ǣ’’”ƒ‹•ƒŽ•ƒÂ?† —–—”‡”‘•’‡…–•Ǥdz

͜͜


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Tribunal held in Sierra Leone. The architects of the Special Court were conscious of the importance of local legitimacy. During its operation, Sierra Leoneans comprised approximately 32 percent of the court staff.30 Workshops and consultations were held to inform the local public of events in the courtrooms and to spread confidence about the procedures. However, when Charles Taylor was relocated to The Hague in 2006, Sierra Leone locals questioned the legitimacy of the Court. As Valnora Edwin, a civil society activist in Freetown, said, “A deep dissatisfaction with the Court developed because of this.�31 Although transferring Taylor out of Sierra Leone did alter public perceptions of legitimacy, it also indicates local confidence in the Special Court. The people believed that the Court was legitimate enough to be responsible for trying their country’s number one criminal. Like Sierra Leone, the international community was sceptical about the Cambodian tribunals because of previous corruption in the country’s domestic court system. This posed a concern for the international community because unlike in East Timor and Sierra Leone, Cambodian judges in the ECCC have the final say in the tribunal’s court of appeals. However, to date, those who have appeared before the court have all been sentenced with terms that multiple human rights organizations have praised as impartial and just. While some perpetrators still remain at large, the proceedings of the ECCC have proven that if a suspect is brought to trial they will be treated in a manner consistent with international standards. Cambodian locals also appear to consider the ECCC a legitimate tribunal. After decades of awaiting justice, Cambodians have positive perceptions of the Court. In 2008, the International Republican Institute conducted a poll that showed 80 percent of Cambodians supported the tribunal.32 The ECCC is also the first hybrid tribunal that allowed “victims to participate in proceedings as civil parties alongside lawyers... this has helped to galvanise Cambodian interest and ownership over the process that would have been impossible if it had been held in The Hague.�33 The number of Cambodians who have voiced an interest in participating as witnesses, and the fact that courtrooms have been packed with local audiences, also indicate that Cambodians have faith in the ECCC.

  The  Lasting  Impression:  Impact  on  Local  Judiciaries  and  Transmission  of  Norms It can be suggested that the hybrid court model “helps promote local capacity–building,

;ͲÔ?‘—‰Š‡”–›ǥDz‹‰Š–nj‹œ‹Â?‰ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ”‹Â?‹Â?ƒŽ —•–‹…‡ǥdz;ʹ͡Ǥ ;ͳÔ?—Ž—Â?•ŠƒÂ?ƒ Â—Â’Â–ÂƒÇĄDzŠ‡‘–‘’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥdz‡™ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‹•–͜ʹ͚Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇ¤……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ ™™™ǤÂ?‡™‹Â?–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ…‘Ž—Â?Â?Â•Č€Â‡Â•Â•ÂƒÂ›Â•Č€Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČ€ÍłÍłČ€Í˛ÍłČ€Â•Â’Â‡Â…Â‹ÂƒÂŽÇŚÂ…Â‘Â—Â”Â–ÇŚÂ•Â‹Â‡Â”Â”ÂƒÇŚÂŽÂ‡Â‘Â?‡ȀǤ ;ʹÔ? „‹†Ǥ ;;Ô?‘Â? ƒ™–Š”‘’ǤDzƒÂ?„‘†‹ƒƒÂ?–•‹–•ƒ›‹Â?‘—”–ǥdzŠ‡ —ƒ”†‹ƒÂ?ÇĄʹͲ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲ͝ǥƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–ÂŠÂ–Â–Â’ÇŁČ€Č€Â™Â™Â™Ç¤Â‰Â—ÂƒÂ”Â†Â‹ÂƒÂ?Ǥ …‘Ǥ—Â?Ȁ…‘Â?Â?‡Â?Â–Â‹Â•ÂˆÂ”Â‡Â‡Č€Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČ€ÂˆÂ‡Â„Č€Í´Í˛Č€Â…ÂƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒÇŚÂ?ŠÂ?‡”nj”‘—‰‡Ǎ Îą Ǥ

͜͡


WATSON ÂŚ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

which is often an urgent priority in post–conflict situations.�34 For example, before the Special Panels were established in East Timor, the country lacked judicial infrastructure, a penal code, equipment, and personnel. When the Special Panels were created, the UNTAET facilitated training sessions on international law for the East Timorese judges and lawyers. Additionally, international professionals acted as mentors for local professionals and assisted them with courtroom procedures. Training and experience from the Special Panels undoubtedly benefited the domestic judicial system when personnel working on the tribunals returned to the local courts. In Sierra Leone, the Special Court has been described as leaving a legacy on the local judicial system. Despite struggling financially throughout its duration, the project managed to organize international law and juvenile justice workshops for local professionals.35 The Special Court also provided internships for Sierra Leonean students and training sessions on archival management and court translating. Furthermore, it provided training programs for the Sierra Leonean police force and then cooperated with the police to create a permanent national witness protection program.36 Whether the Cambodian tribunals will leave a positive legacy remains to be seen. However, the ECCC has contributed to an increased international scrutiny of the Cambodian judicial system and improvements have been noted. In the past, local authorities have been accused of failing to cooperate with court investigations, but The Guardian has reported that the ECCC has received “good co-operation from the authorities and unrestricted access to all person, records and places.�37 The ECCC has also established witness support services, a concept that will hopefully be introduced into the local judicial system as well. The UN has contributed to these services by providing the Cambodian support staff with training that can later be applied locally.38 NGOs in Cambodia and international human rights organizations remain “hopeful that the Tribunal can set new standards for judges and the rights of the defence in domestic courts and provide a new foundation for a fairer and more competent legal system.�39 The legacy of hybrid tribunals can be more than just rebuilding or improving local judicial systems. By working with international personnel and within a framework of international laws, hybrid courts also have the potential to transmit international human rights norms into penal systems and social discourse in post conflict countries. As reporter Sulakshana Gupta articulated in an article concerning Sierra Leone, “Transitional justice in a post–conflict country goes beyond

;͜Ô?ƒ—”ƒǤ‹…Â?‹Â?•‘Â?ÇĄDzŠ‡”‘Â?‹•‡‘ˆ ›„”‹†‘—”–•ǥdzŠ‡Â?‡”‹…ƒÂ? ‘—”Â?ƒŽ‘ˆ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽÂƒÂ™ÇĄ͚͝ǥÂ?‘ǤÍ´Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍľČŒÇŁ;Ͳ;Ǥ ;͡Ô?’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǥDz‡˜‡Â?–ŠÂ?Â?—ƒŽ‡’‘”–‘ˆ–Š‡”‡•‹†‡Â?–‘ˆ–Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–‘ˆ‹‡””ƒ‡‘Â?‡ǤdzŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ •…nj•ŽǤ‘”‰Ȁ‹Â?Â?Ž‹…Â?Ç¤ÂƒÂ•Â’ÂšÇŤĎ?‹Ž‡–‹…Â?‡–ι;;”›‘•ÂŒ Î¨ÍľÂ†ĆŹÂ–ÂƒÂ„Â‹Â†ÎąÍłÍšÍ¸ÇŁ͡Ǥ ;͸Ô?Ibid.,  47. ;͚Ô?‘Â? ÂƒÂ™Â–ÂŠÂ”Â‘Â’ÇĄDz ƒ…‹Â?‰ ‹•–‘”›‹Â?ƒÂ?Â„Â‘Â†Â‹ÂƒÇ¤Çł ;ͺÔ? „‹†Ǥ ;͝Ô? „‹†Ǥ

͜͸


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

prolonged prison sentences. It’s about transforming society.”40 The Special Court for Sierra Leone has proven that this is possible. It can be suggested that the court’s endorsement of humanitarian law inspired local d mestic gender and child protection legislation in 2007.41 Therefore, Sierra Leone’s special courts indicate that hybrid tribunals can help international human rights norms to penetrate into local penal systems. The court can also be considered groundbreaking for establishing international legal precedents that recognize the recruitment of child soldiers and sexual slavery as crimes.42 These precedents prove the potential of hybrid courts to foster international human rights norms in post–conflict countries. In her article “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” Laura Dickenson claims that the hybrid model is the only justice forum that “can lead to the cross–fertilization of norms.”43 She raises the argument that if purely local tribunals are conducted, lawyers may not be educated on international laws and could fail to recognize the severity of crimes such as genocide or crimes against humanity. This poses the risk that lawyers “may seek to apply ordinary criminal law” such as murder instead of following international legal precedents.44 If an international tribunal is held then post conflict countries may not benefit from the transmission of human rights norms that can accompany a hybrid tribunal. Hybrid tribunals provide training for local lawyers and judges in international human rights law that can benefit local judicial systems. Furthermore, when citizens follow coverage of a hybrid tribunal in their local media, or actually witness how the court operates in person, this contributes to a heightened awareness of human rights norms.

Concluding  Commentary The circumstances in each country where hybrid courts have been constructed are complex and varied. In East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia, the courts should be commended for their innovation despite the overwhelming hardships they faced. All three tribunals indicted war criminals in line with international law and to some extent enabled international human rights standards to be transmitted into the social fabric of their respective states. If hybrid tribunals are to remain a viable alternative in the future, then the mistakes made in previous trials must be learned from and avoided. If adequately funded and carefully constructed, the hybrid model can be considered a legitimate forum for justice in post–conflict countries. It may not be a perfect model, but perhaps “incomplete justice is better than no justice at all.”45

ͶͲԝ —’–ƒǡDzŠ‡‘–‘’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–Ǥdz Ͷͳԝ „‹†Ǥ Ͷʹԝ „‹†Ǥ Ͷ͵ԝ‹…‹•‘ǡDzŠ‡”‘‹•‡‘ˆ ›„”‹†‘—”–•ǡdz͵ͲͶǤ ͶͶԝ „‹†Ǥǡ͵ͲͷǤ Ͷͷԝ ƒ™–Š”‘’ǡDzƒ„‘†‹ƒƒ–•‹–•ƒ›‹‘—”–Ǥdz

Ͷ͹


WATSON ¦ IS JUSTICE BEING DONE?

Bibliography ‡•–› –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽǤDz‘’Ž‡–‹‰–Š‡‘”ˆ‘”–Š‡ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‹‹ƒŽ”‹„—ƒŽ•ˆ‘”–Š‡ ‘”‡” —‰‘•Žƒ˜‹ƒƒ†™ƒ†ƒǡdzȋ‘†‘ǣ‡•–› –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽǡʹͲͲʹȌǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥƒ‡•–›Ǥ ‘”‰Ȁ‡ȀŽ‹„”ƒ”›Ȁƒ••‡–Ȁ ͲͳȀͲͲͷȀʹͲͳͲȀ‡Ȁͷ͸†ͻʹͷͷ͸Ǧ͸͹‡ͶǦͶ…ˆͶǦͻ͵…͹ǦͲͺ͹ͲͻͲͷͷͷ„ͷͺȀ ”‡‰ͲͳͲͲͷʹͲͳͲ‡Ǥ’†ˆǤ ‘Š‡ƒ˜‹†ǤDz‡‡‹‰ —•–‹…‡‘–Š‡Š‡ƒ’ǣ •–Š‡ƒ•–‹‘””‹„—ƒŽ‡ƒŽŽ›ƒ‘†‡Žˆ‘”–Š‡ —–—”‡ǡdz •‹ƒƒ…‹ϔ‹… ••—‡•͸ͳǡ‘ȋʹͲͲʹȌǣͳǦͺǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‡ƒ•–™‡•–…‡–‡”Ǥ‘”‰Ȁϐ‹Ž‡ƒ†‹Ȁ•–‘”‡†Ȁ’†ˆ•Ȁ ƒ’‹Ͳ͸ͳǤ’†ˆǤ ‘Žǡƒ”ƒǤThe  Killing  Field  Trialsȋ‡™‘”ǣ —ƒ‹‰Š–•ƒ–…ŠǡʹͲͲͺȌǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ”™Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‡Ȁ ‡™•ȀʹͲͲͺȀͲ͵ȀͲʹȀ‹ŽŽ‹‰Ǧϐ‹‡Ž†Ǧ–”‹ƒŽ•Ǥ ‹…‹•‘ǡƒ—”ƒǤDzŠ‡”‘‹•‡‘ˆ ›„”‹†‘—”–•ǡdzThe  American  Journal  of  International  Lawǡͻ͹ǡ‘Ǥ ʹȋʹͲͲ͵ȌǣʹͻͷǦ͵ͳͲǤ ‘—‰Š‡”–›ǡ‡–ŠǤDz‹‰Š–Ǧ‹œ‹‰ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ”‹‹ƒŽ —•–‹…‡ǣŠ‡ ›„”‹†š’‡”‹‡–ƒ––Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǡdzInternational  Affairs  ͺͲȋʹͲͲͶȌǣ͵ͳͳǦ͵ʹͺǤ –…Š‡•‘ǡ”ƒ‹‰ǤDzŠ‡—„‡”ǣ—ƒ–‹ˆ›‹‰”‹‡•‰ƒ‹•– —ƒ‹–›‹ƒ„‘†‹ƒǡdzƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ ™™™Ǥ‡‘‰Ǥ‡–Ȁ…ƒ„‘†‹ƒȀ–‘ŽŽǤŠ–Ǥ ƒ™–Š”‘’ǡ‘ǤDzƒ„‘†‹ƒƒ–•‹–•ƒ›‹‘—”–ǡdzThe  Guardian,  ʹͲ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲͻǡƒ……‡••‡† ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‰—ƒ”†‹ƒǤ…‘Ǥ—Ȁ…‘‡–‹•ˆ”‡‡ȀʹͲͲͻȀˆ‡„ȀʹͲȀ…ƒ„‘†‹ƒǦŠ‡”Ǧ ”‘—‰‡ǫ α Ǥ ƒ™–Š”‘’ǡ‘ǡDz ƒ…‹‰ ‹•–‘”›‹ƒ„‘†‹ƒǡdzNew  International  Magazine  ͶʹͲȋʹͲͲͻȌǡƒ……‡••‡†ƒ– Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‡™‹–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ…‘Ž—•Ȁ‡••ƒ›•ȀʹͲͲͻȀͲ͵ȀͲͳȀˆƒ…‹‰ǦŠ‹•–‘”›Ǧ…ƒ„‘†‹ƒȀǤ

—’–ƒǡ—Ž—•ŠƒƒǤDzŠ‡‘–‘’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǡdz New  Internationalist  Ͷʹ͹ȋʹͲͲͻȌǡƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‡™‹–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ…‘Ž—•Ȁ‡••ƒ›•ȀʹͲͲͻȀͳͳȀͲͳȀ •’‡…‹ƒŽǦ…‘—”–Ǧ•‹‡””ƒǦŽ‡‘‡ȀǤ —ƒ‹‰Š–•ƒ–…ŠǡDz”‹‰‹‰ —•–‹…‡ǣ–Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ‘—”–ˆ‘”‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡ǡdzȋ‡™‘”ǣ —ƒ‹‰Š–• ƒ–…ŠǡʹͲͲͶȌǡŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ”™Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‡Ȁ‘†‡Ȁͳͳͻͺ͵Ȁ•‡…–‹‘ȀͷǤ —ƒ‹‰Š–•ƒ–…ŠǡDz —•–‹…‡‡‹‡†ˆ‘”ƒ•–‹‘”ǡdzƒ……‡••‡†ʹͷƒ”…ŠʹͲͳͳŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ”™Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ Ž‡‰ƒ…›Ȁ„ƒ…‰”‘—†‡”Ȁƒ•‹ƒȀ–‹‘”Ȁ‡–‹‘”ͳʹͲʹ„‰ǤŠ–Ǥ

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽƒ”••‘…‹ƒ–‹‘ǤDz’‡…‹ƒŽƒ‡Žˆ‘”‡”‹‘—•”‹‡•ȋƒ•–‹‘”ȌǡdzInternational  Bar   Associationǡƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‹„ƒ‡–Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‘‹––‡‡•Ȁ̴ƒ•–‹‘”Ǥƒ•’šǤ

Ͷͺ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ƒ–œ‡–‡‹ǡ—œƒ‡ǤDz ›„”‹†”‹„—ƒŽ•ǣ‡ƒ”…Š‹‰ˆ‘” —•–‹…‡‹ƒ•–‹‘”ǡdzHarvard  Human  Rights   Journalǡͳ͸ȋ’”‹‰ʹͲͲ͵ȌǣʹͶ͸Ǧʹ͹ͺǤ Š‹Ž’–ǡ‹‘ǤDzƒ•–‹‘”ǯ•‘—„Ž‡‹ˆ‡ǣ‡ŽŽ•‹‡‡•–’ŠƒŽ‹ƒ’‹”‹–ǡdzThird  World  Quarterlyʹ͹ǡ ‘Ǥ͸ȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍǣͳ͵ͷǦͳͶͻǤ ‹…‡ǡƒǤDz‹˜‹Žƒ””‹‡•”‹„—ƒŽ†‡”Š”‡ƒ–ƒ•‘ƒ–‹‘•”›’ǡdzThe  Guardian,  ʹͷ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲͻǡƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–™™™Ǥ‰—ƒ”†‹ƒǤ…‘Ǥ—Ȁ™‘”Ž†ȀʹͲͲͻȀˆ‡„ȀʹͷȀ…‹˜‹ŽǦ™ƒ”Ǧ…”‹‡•Ǧ –”‹„—ƒŽǤ ‡˜‡–Š—ƒŽ‡’‘”–‘ˆ–Š‡”‡•‹†‡–‘ˆ–Š‡’‡…‹ƒŽ…‘—”–‘ˆ‹‡””ƒ‡‘‡Ǥƒ›ʹͲͳͲǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ ™™™Ǥ•…Ǧ•ŽǤ‘”‰Ȁ‹Ž‹…Ǥƒ•’šǫϐ‹Ž‡–‹…‡–α͵͵”›‘•Œ Ψ͵†Ƭ–ƒ„‹†αͳ͹͸Ǥ ‹Ž„…ǡ—’‡”–ǤDz —†‹‰Œ—•–‹…‡ǣŠ‡”‹…‡‘ˆƒ””‹‡•”‹ƒŽ•ǡdzHuman  Security  Gateway,   ƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™ǤŠ—ƒ•‡…—”‹–›‰ƒ–‡™ƒ›Ǥ…‘Ȁ†‘…—‡–•Ȁ ̴̴ ˆ—†‹‰Œ—•–‹…‡–Š‡’”‹…‡‘ˆ™ƒ”…”‹‡•–”‹ƒŽ•Ǥ’†ˆǤ –”‘Š‡›‡”ǡ ƒ•Œ‘”‰ǤDz‘ŽŽƒ’•‡ƒ†‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‘ˆƒ —†‹…‹ƒŽ›•–‡ǣ–Š‡‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘• ‹••‹‘•‹‘•‘˜‘ƒ†ƒ•–‹‘”ǡdzThe  American  Journal  of  International  Law  Ͷ͹ǡ‘Ǥ͸͵ ȋʹͲͲͳȌǤ ”‹ƒŽǤDz’‡…‹ƒŽƒ‡Ž•ˆ‘”‡”‹‘—•”‹‡•‹‘”Ǧ‡•–‡ǣ’’”ƒ‹•ƒŽ•ƒ† —–—”‡”‘•’‡…–•ǤdzǤʹͳƒ”…Š ʹͲͳͳǡƒ……‡••‡†ƒ–Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ–”‹ƒŽǦ…ŠǤ‘”‰Ȁ‡Ȁ”‡•‘—”…‡•Ȁ–”‹„—ƒŽ•ȀŠ›„”‹†Ǧ–”‹„—ƒŽ•Ȁ •’‡…‹ƒŽǦ’ƒ‡Ž•Ǧˆ‘”Ǧ•‡”‹‘—•Ǧ…”‹‡•Ǧ–‹‘”ǦŽ‡•–‡ǤŠ–ŽǤ ‡…—”‹–›‘—…‹ŽǤ‡––‡”†ƒ–‡†ʹ͸ ‡„”—ƒ”›ʹͲͲͶǡˆ”‘–Š‡‡…”‡–ƒ”› ‡‡”ƒŽƒ††”‡••‡†–‘ –Š‡”‡•‹†‡–‘ˆ–Š‡‡…—”‹–›‘—…‹ŽǤͳͲƒ”…ŠʹͲͲͶǤƒ……‡••‡†ʹͷƒ”…ŠʹͲͳͳȐǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ †ƒ……‡••Ǧ††•›Ǥ—Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ†‘…ȀȀ ȀͲͶȀʹ͸ͷȀ͹͹Ȁ ȀͲͶʹ͸ͷ͹͹Ǥ’†ˆǫ’‡Ž‡‡–Ǥ ‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘•Ǥ‡‰—Žƒ–‹‘ʹͲͲͲȀͳͳǤȏ‘Ž‹‡ȐǤƒ”…Š͸ǡʹͲͲͲǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ—Ǥ‘”‰Ȁ‡Ȁ ’‡ƒ…‡‡‡’‹‰Ȁ‹••‹‘•Ȁ’ƒ•–Ȁ‡–‹‘”Ȁ—–ƒ‡–Ȁ‡‰ͲͲͳͳǤ’†ˆǤ

Ͷͻ


YU ÂŚ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: A model worth adopting in future United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Quinn Yu Quinn  Yu  is  a  4th  year  Political  Science  Major.  He  has  a  particular  interest  in  is-­� sues   in   international   security   as   well   as   restrictive   immigration   politics.   In   Sep-­� tember,  he  plans  to  start  his  Masters  of  Public  Policy  at  Simon  Fraser  University.   His  career  aspiration  is  to  work  with  the  Canadian  Security  Intelligence  Services.

The global enterprise of peacekeeping has undergone numerous modifications to reflect the ever-changing international environment. At its birth in the mid 20th century, its identity centered on the provision of a neutral force to stop conflict by containing hostilities, supporting ceasefires, or supervising implementations of peace agreements.1 *However, most present-day peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are multidimensional, multifaceted, multifunctional, and are

*IN  1998,  THE  JOURNAL  ALSO  LOOKED  AT  THE  CHANGING  ROLE  OF  UN  PEACEKEEPERS: ... Since the end of the cold war, peacekeeping has been transformed from eorts that focus on supervising cease-ďŹ re and discouraging the recurrence of hostilities to a concept that embodies peacemaking and peacebuilding directives, and is aimed at actively engaging in the reconstruction of a country. This points to the ways that the nature of violent conict has been modiďŹ ed, and has in turn inuenced the direction of UN Peacekeeping. -The New Generation of Peace, by Jennifer Hove, JIA 1998.

more commonly deployed into hostile environments.2 The numerous contemporary models outlining how a mission ought to be structured, mandated, and deployed reflect the evolution

ÍłÔ?”‹•–‹Â?‡–nj‹‡””‡ǥThen  and  Now:  Understanding  the  Spectrum  of  Complex  Peace  OperationsČ‹Â–Â–ÂƒÂ™ÂƒÇŁ‡ƒ”•‘Â?‡ƒ…‡Â?‡‡’‹Â?‰ ‡Â?–‡”ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇ¤ Í´Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ͝Ǥ

50


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

of the peacekeeping enterprise. Of these contemporary models, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provide a unique opportunity to integrate civilian and military components into a cohesive force on the ground.3 Although it was initially designed and utilized by American development and defence agencies, numerous countries around the world are now putting the PRT model into practice.4 In the following essay I will provide an analysis of the PRT model’s core characteristics, its advantages, and the potential for added value if implemented in future UN peacekeeping operations in place of existing peacekeeping structures. I will do this in three sections: first, I will provide a brief overview of the PRT;;  second,  I  will  discuss  a number of the PRT model’s strengths and weaknesses, while linking them to reasons why the UN should adopt the PRT model; and third, I will provide two recommendations to potentially better the PRT model within the UN framework. I conclude that despite a handful of drawbacks to UN implementation, the unique strengths of the model and its potential to remedy numerous vital downfalls of current PKOs overwhelmingly support the adoption of the PRT model for use under the UN banner.

     Brief  overview  of  PRT  history PRTs started off in Operation Enduring Freedom in early 2002 to “spread the effect of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.”5 Specifically, PRTs were designed the unique strengths of to enhance the efforts of the US Army Civil Affairs the model and its poten- Teams - Afghanistan (CAT-As) who were tasked with supporting humanitarian assistance, relief efforts tial to remedy numerous and reconstruction projects throughout the Afghan vital downfalls of current state.6 The main problem CAT-As faced was lack of friendly security forces in the outlying provinces PKOs overwhelmingly to provide them protection from pockets of hostile insurgents. Due to the unsafe environment, support the adoption of reconstruction projects and relief efforts in the field the PRT model were extremely difficult.7 Meeting this challenge was done through the development of the PRT

͵ԝ‹…Šƒ‡Žœ‹‡†œ‹…ƒ†‹…Šƒ‡Ž‡‹†ŽǡProvincial  Reconstruction  Teams  and  Military  Relations  with  International  and   Nongovernmental  Organizations  in  Afghanistanǡȋƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ‹–‡†–ƒ–‡• •–‹–—–‡‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡ǡʹͲͲͷȌǡͳͳǤ Ͷԝœ‹‡†œ‹…Ƭ‡‹†ŽǡȋʹͲͲͷȌǡͶǤ ͷԝœ‹‡†œ‹…ƒ†‡‹†ŽǡProvincial  Reconstruction  TeamsǤ ͸ԝ „‹†Ǥǡ͵Ǥ ͹ԝ „‹†Ǥ

51


YU ÂŚ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

model by the US Agency for International Development, the US Department of Defense, and the US Department of State.8 These agencies called for PRT deployment into both major cities and outlying towns throughout Afghanistan to complete tasks which CAT-As were mandated to do. Initially called “Joint Regional Teams,� they were quickly renamed “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,� to demonstrate that reconstruction was their main purpose.9 The PRT model quickly gained popularity in the field. Within two years, there were over 20 PRTs functioning in Afghanistan.10 These PRTs varied in size, scope, and mission focus, allowing each PRT to be tailored to the local security, political, and socio-economic   dynamics   in   their respective area of operation.11 Some PRTs in the field operated with as little as 60 personnel, while others used close to 375.12 Some PRTs were largely composed of military personnel, while others included more civilian experts in reconstruction and development. In short, there was no onesize-fits-all PRT model nor was there a correct or incorrect military to civilian ratio. Considering their general operating size, PRTs were seen as a ‘lighter footprint’ approach. This meant that Afghanistan PRTs were composed of fewer personnel while still providing perceivable results. This necessary characteristic was greatly valued by the Afghan state as it strongly restricted robust peace-enforcement.13

Strengths  of  the  PRT  model The UN’s 2008 Capstone Document highlights legitimacy, credibility, and promotion of local ownership as key factors that have enhanced perceived success of previous peacekeeping operations.14 The PRT model contains numerous unique characteristics that allow it to meet these UN prescribed key factors for success. One of the PRT model’s primary strengths, and also its most unique characteristic, is its integration of civilian and military personnel within a single framework. The PRT is capable of neutralizing threats while simultaneously improving the civilian situation through reconstruction projects.15 Furthermore, due to their military capacity, PRTs are capable of deploying into more

ÍşÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ͜Ǥ ÍťÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͳͲÔ?‘„‡”–ÇĄ‡”‹–‘ǥThe  U.S.  Experience  with  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  AfghanistanÇĄČ‹ƒ•Š‹Â?‰–‘Â?ÇŁÂ?‹–‡†–ƒ–‡•

Â?•–‹–—–‡‘ˆÂ‡ÂƒÂ…Â‡ÇĄÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍˇČŒÇ¤ ͳͳÔ?œ‹‡†œ‹…ƒÂ?†‡‹†ŽǥProvincial  Reconstruction  Teams,͜Ǥ ͳʹÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ͜Ǥ ͳ;Ô?•Â?ƒ”‹”‘Â?‡Â?ÇĄPRT  Models  in  Afghanistan:  Approaches  to  Civil-­â€?Military  IntegrationÇĄČ‹ ‹Â?ŽƒÂ?†ǣ”‹•‹•ƒÂ?ƒ‰‡Â?‡Â?–‡Â?–”‡ǥ Í´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇ¤ ͳ͜Ô?Â?‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘Â?•ǥUnited  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Principles  and  GuidelinesÇĄČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁ‡’ƒ”–Â?‡Â?–‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡Â?‡‡’‹Â?‰ ’‡”ƒ–‹‘Â?•ǥÍ´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇ¤ ͳ͡Ô?‡Â?–‡”ˆ‘””Â?›‡••‘Â?•‡ƒ”Â?‡†ǤDzŽƒ›„‘‘Â?ÇŁÂƒÂ…Â–Â‹Â…Â•ÇĄ‡…ŠÂ?‹“—‡•ǥƒÂ?†”‘…‡†—”‡•ǥdzCALL  Handbook  ͝ǥÂ?‘Ǥ;͜Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍšČŒÇ¤

͡ʹ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

hostile settings, thus operating in environments where NGOs and other humanitarian agencies are unwilling or incapable of working.16 Hostility leading to fatalities was a key contributing factor to NGOs pulling out of select Afghan provinces. Some claimed that had PRTs not been present in those provinces, reconstruction progress would have slowed to a trickle or stopped altogether.17 UN legitimacy can be promoted through the PRT’s integrated structure allowing for specialized personnel to be deployed into the field and providing perceivable results. The UN Capstone Document refers to legitimacy as “one of the most important assets of a UN PKO.�18 Perceived legitimacy of a UN PKO may erode over time if the presence of the UN personnel becomes a source of local resentment or if the PKO is not sufficiently responsive to the local situation.19 By adopting had PRTs not been the PRT model, the UN would be equipped to uniquely compose teams and target specific objectives throughout present in those prova state. In areas requiring governance or security sector inces, reconstruction reform, the UN could deploy a team that is comprised of more reconstruction experts; in areas requiring more progress would have counter-insurgency, the UN could deploy a team that is slowed to a trickle or more militarily capable. Regardless of an area’s condition, PRTs would allow the UN to respond specifically to each stopped altogether locality, thus improving the perceived legitimacy of the overall operation. Furthermore, a PRT’s ability to deploy into areas of increased hostility further strengthens UN legitimacy, as it intervenes in areas where NGOs may be unwilling or incapable of operating in. Rather than leaving a hostile area unattended, the integrated characteristic of a PRT allows it to establish itself in the hostile zone and commence necessary reconstruction and development efforts. Due to its integrated characteristic, a second strength is a PRT’s ability to stay flexible. Flexibility is not only reflected in a PRT’s ability to deploy into varying levels of hostility, as discussed above, but is also reflected in a PRT’s ability to quickly start projects to benefit the local community. Known as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), these initiatives are geared towards gaining the consent of the local population by catering to their needs and wishes.20 Flexibility

“

�

ͳ͸Ô?‘”–Š–ŽƒÂ?–‹…”‡ƒ–›”‰ƒÂ?‹œƒ–‹‘Â?ÇĄDz  ”‘˜‹Â?…‹ƒŽ‡…‘Â?•–”—…–‹‘Â?‡ƒÂ?Č‹ČŒ ƒÂ?†„‘‘Â?dzǥISAF  PRT  Handbook  ͜ǥ Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇ¤ ͳ͚Ô?ƒ”–‡”ƒŽÂ?ƒ•‹ƒÂ?ƒÂ?† ‡”ƒŽ†‡›‡”Ž‡ǥDz”‘˜‹Â?…‹ƒŽ‡…‘Â?•–”—…–‹‘Â?‡ƒÂ?•ǣ ‘™‘‡Â?‘™Š‡›‘”Â?ÇŤÇĄÇłStrategic   Studies  InstituteÇĄČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍťČŒÇĄ;ͲǤ ͳͺÔ?Â?‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘Â?•ǥUnited  Nations  Peacekeeping  OperationsÇĄ;͸Ǥ ͳ͝Ô? „‹†Ǥ ʹͲÔ?•Â?ƒ”‹”‘Â?‡Â?ÇĄPRT  Models  in  AfghanistanÇĄʹ͚Ǥ

53


YU ¦ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

also helps ensure that PRTs operating in areas in need of infrastructure will build the necessary schools, bridges or roads. PRTs operating in areas requiring stronger governance will focus on security sector reforms (SSR), mediation between disaffected locals, and perhaps escorts for local officials.21 The flexibility for PRTs to decide what projects and reforms to initiate and fund enhances their credibility in the eyes of the local population. The UN Capstone document defines credibility as a direct reflection of the local community’s belief in the mission’s ability to achieve its mandate.22 As a second key factor for UN PKO success, it would be logical for PKOs to attend to expectations of the local people to promote an operation’s credibility. By implementing PRTs into future PKOs, the UN would be better equipped to meet these local While theoretically QIPs expectations through QIPs. On the ground, this is are fantastic at winning reflected through the initiation of QIPs centered on ‘hearts and minds’ and agricultural lessons and construction of wells if the can bolster a UN PKO’s population is suffering from a lack of food and water. If a population is in need of roads and bridges, UN PRTs overall credibility, realiscan initiate QIPs to build the necessary infrastructure. tically, these projects may Flexibility in providing exactly what the local residents lack funding, resulting want is a critical added value for UN PKOs; however, in poorly constructed or we must be frank and remember these projects cost half–finished efforts. money, a commodity which the UN does not have a lot of due to its budget restrictions. While theoretically QIPs are fantastic at winning ‘hearts and minds’ and can bolster a UN PKO’s overall credibility, realistically, these projects may lack funding, resulting in poorly constructed or half–finished efforts. Poor quality projects ultimately undermine an operation’s overall credibility. Therefore, in order to ensure success, the UN must adequately fund its PRTs to complete all initiated projects in the field. A final strength to highlight is a PRT’s ability to facilitate local ownership and build capacity with local communities and the provincial government.23 In Afghanistan, PRTs frequently hired local workers and contractors to assist with reconstruction projects. Within these projects, PRT personnel were known to incorporate training components to better develop the workers’ skills.24 Local ownership of projects was also facilitated through funding initiatives established by lead

ʹͳԝ‘„‡”–ǡ‡”‹–‘ǡThe  U.S.  Experience  with  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teamsǡ͵ͲǤ ʹʹԝ‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘•ǡUnited  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operationsǡ͵͹Ǥ ʹ͵ԝ‹…Šƒ‡Ž …‡”›ǡDz–ƒ„‹Ž‹œƒ–‹‘ƒ†‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‹ˆ‰Šƒ‹•–ƒǣ”‡•ƒ‘†‡Ž‘”ƒ—††Ž‡ǫdzParametersǡʹͲͲ͸Ǥ ʹͶԝ „‹†ǤǡͶʹǤ

54


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

nations.25 These funds helped local citizens to jump-start their own projects. At the provincial level in Afghanistan, PRTs coordinated with indigenous Reconstruction and Development Committees to plan and implement their activities.26 These committees were composed of local officials and empowered them to initiate, discuss, and approve future projects.27 Capacity building was very evident in security sectors as PRTs assisted with training for local police.28 PRTs provided training manuals, tactical equipment, and administrative support to enhance the police capacity. In some areas of operation, PRTs have helped build police stations and prison cells, and paint police vehicles.29 These capabilities show that PRTs are extremely capable not only of developing capacity, but also of facilitating pride and ownership in local assets and projects. The UN Capstone Document considers the facilitation of local and provincial ownership as its third and final factor for past PKO success.30 By adopting the PRT model into the UN framework, the UN would have another tool to achieve this crucial factor for success. Ownership reinforces the perceived legitimacy of the operation and helps ensure the sustainability of national capacity once the PKO withdraws.31 Since PRTs are relatively small in size, they are able to build stronger and closer relationships with officials through increased interactions. This trusting relationship is crucial for PRTs to assist with capacity building. By utilizing the PRT model and developing stronger relationships with officials, the UN will not only be able to build capacity throughout the state, it will also be able to facilitate ownership of projects as displayed by the PRTs in Afghanistan. It is important to note, however, that PRTs must be cautious not to do ‘too much’ for capacity building or ownership facilitation, as it may call into question the impartiality of a PKO.32 If UN PKOs develop into economic or political factors within a region, they would lose all counts of impartiality. This may keep local institutions from functioning properly, potentially causing greater social unrest and resulting in a more disgruntled population.33 While facilitating local ownership and capacity building is not specific to PRTs, the inherent structure and composition of a PRT allows it to be the best-fit method to achieve these goals.

ʹͷԝ‘„‡”–ǡ‡”‹–‘ǡThe  U.S.  Experience  with  Provincial  Reconstruction  TeamsǡͳǤ ʹ͸ԝ „‹†Ǥ ʹ͹ԝ „‹†Ǥ ʹͺԝ…‡”‡›ǡDz–ƒ„Ž‹œƒ–‹‘ƒ†‡…‘•–”—…–‹‹ˆ‰Šƒ‹•–ƒdzǡͶʹǤ ʹͻԝ „‹†ǡͶ͵Ǥ ͵Ͳԝ‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘•ǡ  United  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operationsǡ͵ͻǤ ͵ͳԝ „‹†Ǥ ͵ʹԝ  ƒ”—• ƒ—•–‡”ǡProvincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  Afghanistanȋ ƒ”‹•…ŠǦƒ”–‡‹”…Š‡ǡ ‡‘”‰‡Ǥƒ”•ŠƒŽŽ—”‘’‡ƒ ‡–‡”ˆ‘”‡…—”‹–›–—†‹‡•ǣʹͲͲͺȌǡͶʹǤ 33ԝ „‹†ǡ  ͶʹǤ

55


YU ÂŚ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

The strengths of the PRT model would greatly benefit the UN in future PKOs. This model is proficient in achieving legitimacy, credibility, and facilitating local ownership, all factors considered necessary for past UN operation successes. Furthermore, the PRT’s uniquely integrated structure allows it to be catered and deployed according to local conditions, thus presenting it as an ideal replacement for existing UN peacekeeping structures.

Limitations  of  the  PRT  model While there are some solid benefits for UN adoption of the PRT model, there are also a few limitations of the model for use within the UN framework. A PRT’s dependence on specialized personnel and its inability to preserve humanitarian space are major weaknesses. Because the UN is restricted in terms of financing and by its dependence on member-state contributions, the PRT model may encounter difficulties during start-up and throughout its deployment. The fundamental limitation to a PRT’s capacity in the field is its dependence on its personnel. Strong versatile PRTs have full rosters with all positions filled, while weak one-dimensional PRTs are missing experts in areas of security, reconstruction, or development. Given that each position is specialized within a domain, it is difficult for PRT members to play more than one role on a team.34 According to the American Center for Army Lessons Learned, each PRT needs to have a team leader, a deputy team leader, an agriculture specialist, a bilingual bicultural advisor, civil affairs officer, economic developer, engineering officer, provincial action officer, military liaison officer, public diplomacy officer, and a rule of law coordinator.35 Numerous additional positions are considered ‘nice to have’ but are not ‘need to haves,’ including that of medical specialist, veterinary specialist, and assistants for administration and translation duties.36 While this list is arguably quite extensive, each member acts as a piece to the PRT puzzle; therefore, by simply missing one member, the PRT is incomplete. The need to fill every position in a PRT could theoretically be mitigated but is realistically exacerbated within the UN framework. Because the UN can access assets of every member-state, this supposedly provides the UN with a massive pool of personnel to fill each and every position on a PRT. Although having numerous experts on stand-by to plug into a PRT when necessary is a wonderful thought, it is equally possible that member-states will decide not to contribute anything, leaving the UN with understaffed operations and vital positions unfilled. For example, a PRT without a rule of law coordinator would be incapacitated in creating initiatives focused on law enforcement, fair civil and criminal judicial system, and humane correction systems. These are

;͜Ô?‡Â?–‡”ˆ‘””Â?›‡••‘Â?•‡ƒ”Â?‡†ǤDzŽƒ›„‘‘Â?dzǥ͸͸Ǥ ;͡Ô?  Â?‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘Â?•ǥUnited  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operations,  ͸ͺnj͸͝Ǥ ;͸Ô?  ‡Â?–‡”ˆ‘””Â?›‡••‘Â?•‡ƒ”Â?‡†ǤDzŽƒ›„‘‘Â?dzǥ͸͸Ǥ

56


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

all, arguably very important aspects for a state requiring security sector reform.37 Therefore, depending on member-state contributions, the UN could either fill all necessary positions contributing to a robust PRT, or deploy an incomplete PRT missing necessary experts, thus limiting the PRT’s potential and undermining overall UN efforts to help. A second weakness of the PRT model is its inability to preserve humanitarian space. Humanitarian space is a concept that guarantees and secures NGO access to conflict zones to provide life-saving assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles.38 NGOs and aid agencies are worried that PRTs are militarizing aid, resulting in blurred lines between soldiers and civilians in conflict zones.39 PRT projects have been accused of confusing local populations and the government over what roles each actor is responsible for. Ultimately, the delineation between military and civilian personnel becomes hazy due to observations that soldiers and civilians are working together on reconstruction and development projects. From an NGO perspective, this increases the risk to aid personnel as they may be perceived as part of a military campaign. Numerous attacks have caused casualties of aid workers due to assumptions they were operating in conjunction with the military.40 In an extreme case in 2004, Doctors

“As UN missions lean towards more intergrated approaches, the preservation of humanitarian space will become trickierâ€? Without Borders pulled out of Afghanistan after five of their aid workers were mistaken for military personnel and subsequently killed.41     Preserving  humanitarian  space  is  the  problem  with  which  the  UN  will  have  the  greatest   GLIÂżFXOW\UHPHG\LQJ2YHUWKHSDVWGHFDGHUHSRUWVKDYHVKRZQLQFUHDVLQJO\OHVVKXPDQLWDULDQ space for NGOs and aid workers operating around the world.42 As UN missions lean towards more integrated approaches, the preservation of humanitarian space will become trickier. While a more integrated mission aligns the objectives of all personnel on the ground, promoting ‘strategic coherence,’ its consequences include a lack of differentiating the military and civilian personnel.43 Although attempts at expanding humanitarian space have been met with little to

;͚Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ͸ͺǤ ;ͺÔ?  •Â?ƒ”‹”‘Â?‡Â?ÇĄPRT  Models  in  Afghanistan,  ;ͳǤ ;͝Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͜ͲÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͜ͳÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ;ʹǤ ͜ʹÔ?  —”‘’‡ƒÂ?‘Â?Â?‹••‹‘Â?‘Â? —Â?ƒÂ?‹–ƒ”‹ƒÂ?‹†ǥThe  Humanitarian  Space  Increasingly  Under  ThreatČ‹”—••‡Ž•ǣŠ‡ —”‘’‡ƒÂ?‘Â?Â?‹••‹‘Â?‘Â? —Â?ƒÂ?‹–ƒ”‹ƒÂ?‹†ǥÍ´Í˛ÍłÍ˛ČŒÇ¤ ͜;Ô?   —Â?ƒÂ?‹–ƒ”‹ƒÂ?‘Ž‹…› ”‘—’ǥThe  Search  for  Coherence:  UN  Integrated  Missions  and  Humanitarian  SpaceČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁ

57


YU ÂŚ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

no success, the Integrated Strategic Framework has been introduced to promote inter-agency communication and ensure security concerns from all allied personnel working in a country are heard. Since its inception in 2008, UN personnel, NGOs, humanitarian agencies, and other supporting actors have praised the framework for providing increased avenues to voice concerns on security of personnel.44 Though this framework will neither preserve nor expand humanitarian space, it is a step toward acknowledging the efforts of aid agencies, which are committed to ensuring humanitarian assistance is available for those in need.45

Recommendations  to  improve  the  PRT  model  for  use  by  the  UN 1. The inherent PRT model should be renamed as Provincial Teams and be divided into two sub-teams: a Provincial Stability Team and a Provincial Development Team. Provincial Stability Teams (PSTs) are teams that should be oriented militarily. These are teams that should be deployed quickly (ideally within thirty to sixty days), under a Chapter VII mandate, with their focus largely on counter-insurgency and stabilization efforts. The PST should be equipped for and adequately trained to conduct patrols, protect civilians, and establish a safe and secure environment. The civilian component of the PST should be minimal, consisting solely of military police teams and rule of law coordinators with a focus of promoting stability in the region. Military police teams should be deployed and are responsible for assessing the needs of and training the local police.46 Rule of law coordinators should be deployed to help develop civil law, criminal law, and police, judicial, and detention institutions.47 Considering a PST’s primary objective is to promote stability, its civilian component should never exceed its military component. Provincial Development Teams (PDTs) within the Provincial Teams (PTs) model should be deployed either in parallel to a PST or sequentially after one, depending on the hostility of the environment. If an environment is considerably hostile, deploying sequentially after a PST would provide two benefits. First, it would allow for preliminary stabilization efforts to take place, thus allowing the incoming PDT to interact with a less distressed local population. Second, by deploying slightly after a PST, PDTs would be able to spend more time receiving cultural and language training, allowing them to be have heightened cultural awareness and be more

˜‡”•‡ƒ•‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?– Â?•–‹–—–‡ƒÂ?†–Š‡–‹Â?•‘Â?‡Â?–‡”ǥÍ´Í˛ÍłÍłČŒÇ¤ ͜͜Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͜͡Ô? „‹†Ǥ ͜͸Ô?  ‘„‡”–Ǥ‡”‹–‘ǥThe  U.S.  Experience  with  Provincial  Reconstruction  TeamsǤ ͚͜Ô?‡Â?–‡”ˆ‘””Â?›‡••‘Â?•‡ƒ”Â?‡†ǤDzŽƒ›„‘‘Â?dzǥ͸ͺǤ

͡ͺ


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

proficient at cross-cultural communications upon arrival. Bebber argues that when operations lack adequate communication skills and awareness to indigenous cultural sensitivities, local resentment develops, thus complicating the overall operation and hindering success.48 If an environment is not hostile, then PDTs should deploy parallel to a PST in order to follow UN conventions of initiating development efforts as soon as possible. As a general guideline, PDTs should deploy within twenty-one days following the initial PST deployment. In sequential deployment circumstances, any time lag in deployment should be used by the latter team to establish and clarify key concepts such as standard operating procedures and guidelines for interactions, in order to promote functionality as a cohesive unit. Furthermore, an extended timeline guarantees PDT personnel are adequately trained and willing to deploy, two factors that can dramatically decrease the productivity of a PKO as learned from past operations.49 Finally, whenever financially and humanly possible, efforts should be made to coordinate a layover period between outgoing PST personnel and incoming PDT personnel in their respective area of operation. This layover period is designed to allow for information exchange and introductions to be made between local officials and the PDT, thus accelerating the incoming team’s ability to acclimatize to the province, develop understanding of the local and regional players, and build stronger relationships. Bebber argues that when a new team enters a country, it spends numerous months getting to know the local population, terrain, and

͜ͺÔ?  ‘„‡”– ‡„„‡”ǥDzŠ‡‘Ž‡‘ˆ”‘˜‹Â?…‹ƒŽ‡…‘Â?•–”—…–‹‘Â?‡ƒÂ?•‹Â?‘—Â?–‡”‹Â?•—”‰‡Â?…›’‡”ƒ–‹‘Â?•ǣŠ‘•–”‘˜‹Â?…‡ǥdzSmall   Wars  JournalČ‹Í´Í˛Í˛ÍşČŒÇĄͳ;Ǥ ͜͝Ô? „‹†Ǥǥͳ͸Ǥ

͡͝


YU ¦ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

geography. Therefore, this overlap period would allow for key information to be relayed from the outgoing team to the incoming team, thereby reducing the acclimatization period and promoting overall operational efficiency and efficacy.50 2. Embed PRTs within previously established formed contingents whenever logistically possible and financially beneficial. By embedding a PRT within a friendly formed contingent, the UN will be able to maximize resources on the ground and promote burden-sharing whenever possible. Money and time are needed to construct accommodating structures. Through embedment, forces on the ground can minimize finances and time required to construct an HQ, along with a multitude of associated tasks, such as establishment of communication devices or setting up a mess hall. In addition to resource maximization, numerous other mutual benefits can be facilitated. For example, if a PRT was to be embedded within a previously established infantry battalion or observer group, the PRT could benefit from access to tactical transportation equipment, pre-established telecommunication devices, and better provisions in the area of housing and food depending on the contingents support system. On the other hand, the infantry battalion or observer group could benefit from operating in less hostile areas of operation due to the embedded PRT’s (ePRT’s) capacity to initiate QIPs, winning local hearts and minds.51 Within the UN framework, a symbiotic relationship like this not only effectively uses resources through burden sharing and prevention of frivolous budget expenditures, but may also provide numerous benefits to both parties, ranging from better meals to decreased numbers of hostile unreceptive locals.

ͷͲԝ „‹†Ǥ 51 John K. Naland, Lessons From Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 6.

60


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Conclusion A PRT’s ability to integrate military components and civilian experts into a single and flexible framework provides numerous benefits. Since their inception, PRTs have been credited for improvements of security and governance in numerous areas of operation. By adopting the PRT model, future UN PKOs would be able to enjoy greater legitimacy by responding to unique local conditions, increased credibility through QIPs winning hearts and minds, and better promote local and national ownership through increased personal interactions and developing stronger relationships. Furthermore, my recommendations of the PT model and the concept of ePRTs alleviate numerous shortcomings to current PKOs. The PT model allows for rapid reaction of a military component with follow-up from development experts that are culturally tuned to the local population. The ePRT concept promotes efficiency in resource consumption and increased burden-sharing. While these recommendations require fine tuning prior to implementation within the UN framework, strong consideration should be provided for adopting the inherent PRT model for future operations. Characteristics such as its integrated component that is not only capable of self-defence, but also able to facilitate political and economic development, can benefit the UN greatly in the field. All things considered, PRTs are capable of being multidimensional, multifaceted, and multifunctional, precisely what is needed by the UN for future PKOs of a similar nature.

 

61


YU ¦ PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Bibliography ‡„„‡”ǡ‘„‡”– ǤDzŠ‡‘Ž‡‘ˆ”‘˜‹…‹ƒŽ‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‡ƒ•‹‘—–‡”‹•—”‰‡…›’‡”ƒ–‹‘•ǣ Š‘•–”‘˜‹…‡ǤdzSmall  Wars  JournalȋʹͲͲͺȌǤ ‡–‡”ˆ‘””›‡••‘•‡ƒ”‡†ǤDzŽƒ›„‘‘ǣƒ…–‹…•ǡ‡…Š‹“—‡•ǡƒ†”‘…‡†—”��•ǤdzCALL   Handbookͻǡ‘Ǥ͵ͶȋʹͲͲ͹ȌǤ œ‹‡†œ‹…ǡ‹…Šƒ‡Žƒ†‡‹†Žǡ‹…Šƒ‡ŽǤProvincial  Reconstruction  Teams  and  Military  Relations  with   International  and  Nongovernmental  Organizations  in  Afghanistan.  ƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ‹–‡†–ƒ–‡•

•–‹–—–‡‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡ǡʹͲͲͷǤ ”‘‡ǡ•ƒ”‹ǤPRT  Models  in  Afghanistan:  Approaches  to  Civil-­‐Military  Integration. ‹Žƒ†ǣ”‹•‹• ƒƒ‰‡‡–‡–”‡ǡʹͲͲͺǤ —”‘’‡ƒ‘‹••‹‘‘ —ƒ‹–ƒ”‹ƒ‹†ǤThe  Humanitarian  Space  IncreasinglyǤ”—••‡Ž•ǣŠ‡ —”‘’‡ƒ‘‹••‹‘‘ —ƒ‹–ƒ”‹ƒ‹†ǡʹͲͳͲǤ

ƒ—•–‡”ǡƒ”—•ǤProvincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  Afghanistan. ƒ”‹•…ŠǦƒ”–‡‹”…Š‡ǣ ‡‘”‰‡Ǥ ƒ”•ŠƒŽŽ—”‘’‡ƒ‡–‡”ˆ‘”‡…—”‹–›–—†‹‡•ǡʹͲͲͺǤ —ƒ‹–ƒ”‹ƒ‘Ž‹…› ”‘—’ǤThe  Search  for  Coherence:  UN  Integrated  Missions  and  Humanitarian  Space. ‡™‘”ǣ˜‡”•‡ƒ•‡˜‡Ž‘’‡– •–‹–—–‡ƒ†–Š‡–‹•‘‡–‡”ǡʹͲͳͳǤ ƒŽƒ•‹ƒǡƒ”–‡”ƒ†‡›‡”Ž‡ǡ ‡”ƒŽ†ǤDz”‘˜‹…‹ƒŽ‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‡ƒ•ǣ ‘™‘‡‘™Š‡› ‘”ǫdzStrategic  Studies  InstituteǡȋʹͲͲͻȌǤ …‡”›ǡ‹…Šƒ‡Ž ǤDz–ƒ„‹Ž‹œƒ–‹‘ƒ†‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‹ˆ‰Šƒ‹•–ƒǣ”‡•ƒ‘†‡Ž‘”ƒ—††Ž‡ǫdz ParametersǡȋʹͲͲ͸Ȍǣ͵ʹǦͶ͸Ǥ ƒŽƒ†ǡ ‘ŠǤLessons  From  Embedded  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  Iraq.ƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ‹–‡† –ƒ–‡• •–‹–—–‡‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡ǡʹͲͳͳǤ ‘”–Š–Žƒ–‹…”‡ƒ–›”‰ƒ‹œƒ–‹‘ǡDz  ”‘˜‹…‹ƒŽ‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‡ƒȋȌ ƒ†„‘‘dzǡISAF  PRT   HandbookͶǡȋʹͲͲͻȌǤ ‡”‹–‘ǡ‘„‡”–Ǥ  The  U.S.  Experience  with  Provincial  Reconstruction  Teams  in  Afghanistanǡƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ ‹–‡†–ƒ–‡• •–‹–—–‡‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡ǡʹͲͲͷǤ ‡”‹–‘ǡ‘„‡”–Ǥ”‘˜‹…‹ƒŽ‡…‘•–”—…–‹‘‡ƒ•‹ ”ƒ“ǡƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǣ‹–‡†–ƒ–‡• •–‹–—–‡‘ˆ ‡ƒ…‡ǡʹͲͲ͹Ǥ –Ǧ‹‡””‡ǡ”‹•–‹‡ǤThen  and  Now:  Understanding  the  Spectrum  of  Complex  Peace  OperationsǤ––ƒ™ƒǣ ‡ƒ”•‘‡ƒ…‡‡‡’‹‰‡–‡”ǡʹͲͲͺǤ ‹–‡†ƒ–‹‘•ǤUnited  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Principles  and  Guidelines.‡™‘”ǣ ‡’ƒ”–‡–‘ˆ‡ƒ…‡‡‡’‹‰’‡”ƒ–‹‘•ǡʹͲͲͺǤ

͸ʹ


ROWAN ÂŚ STILL at the CROSSROADS

Still at the Crossroads The Strait of Malacca and Chinese Energy Security in the 21st Century Sam Rowan Sam   Rowan   is   pursuing   a   double   major   in   Political   Science   Honours   and   Inter-­� national   Relations.   He   spent   last   year   on   exchange   at   Sciences   Po   Paris   where   he   deepened   his   appreciation   of   French   Theory.   Sam   is   also   interested   in   criti-­� cal   IR   theory,   intellectual   history,   and   the   changing   conceptualizations   of   global   politics.   After   graduation,   Sam   intends   to   pursue   further   studies   in   so-­� cial   and   political   thought.   Sam   also   likes   traveling,   baking,   and   photography.

Robert Kaplan suggests that twenty-first century political geography will be inexorably drawn to focus on the Indian Ocean, and it seems political leaders in Beijing agree. Indeed, for China, a Pacific Ocean nation, the twenty-first century’s geopolitical landscape looks set to play out at the nexus of the Indian and Pacific oceans—namely, in the Strait of Malacca. China’s extensive and expanding role in global trade links it intimately to the world’s sea lanes, none of which are as crucial for China as the Strait of Malacca (see Appendix). While China may import and export goods to locations all over the world, and use a variety of trade routes to do so, over 85 percent of Chinese oil imports pass through Malacca. This extraordinary concentration constitutes China’s most important strategic vulnerability. China’s vulnerability is intensified by its inability to project military power into the strait, but also crucially by the United States’ regional military dominance. Here lies the crux of China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma�: China depends on transit through the Strait of Malacca for its oil imports, yet this sea route remains subject to interdiction by other states.1 Since Chinese president Hu Jintao first publicly acknowledged his country’s dilemma in 2 2003, China has followed two strategies to mitigate this vulnerability. First, China has sought

Editor’s  Note:  Sam  Rowan  is  also  a  senior  editor  at  the  Journal.  However,  he  had  no  role  in  selecting  this  article.  The  author   names  of  all  submissions  were  removed,  and  only  put  back  in  after  the  editorial  board  had  made  their  selections. ÍłÔ?Š‹•‹•Â?›‘™Â?‡š’ŽƒÂ?ƒ–‹‘Â?„—–‹–Â?ƒ‹Â?–ƒ‹Â?•‡Ž‡Â?‡Â?–•ˆ”‘Â? ƒÂ?–‘”‡›ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłThe  China  Brief  6,  no.  8,   Č‹Í´Í˛Í˛Í¸ČŒÇŁ͜ǤǢƒ”…ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ”‹–‹Â?‡‡…—”‹–›ƒÂ?†–Š‡ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłAsian  Security  4  no.  2  (  2008):  143-­â€?4;  and   Š‹Ž‹’Â?†”‡™•nj’‡‡†ƒÂ?†‘ŽƒÂ?†ƒÂ?Â?”‡—–Š‡”ǥŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇĄ‹ŽƒÂ?† Ž‘„ƒŽ‘Ž‹–‹…•ǥČ‹‘Â?†‘Â?ÇŁ‘—–Ž‡†‰‡ǥÍ´Í˛ÍłÍłČŒÇĄͳ;ʹnj͜Ǥ Í´Ô?ƒ”…ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ”‹–‹Â?‡‡…—”‹–›ƒÂ?†–Š‡ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłAsian  Security  4  no.  2,  (2008):  143-­â€?4.

63


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

to diversify oil import routes away from the Strait of Malacca, and second, it has sought to develop the military “ capacities to safeguard its vital sea lane of communication (SLOC). While these two strategies may be complementary, China’s energy security will be shown to depend more on the latter than on the former, and thus, China’s ability to overcome its Malacca dilemma ultimately depends on its ability to secure this SLOC; however, this strategy is not without its own costs. ” Within the context of contemporary international relations, where the United States stands above all others in terms of global power and projection capabilities, China has committed itself to a “peaceful rise” in hopes of preempting conflict between the two countries.3 Above all else, China has sought to reassure other actors that its tremendous economic growth and modernization benefit the international system as a whole, and do not pose threats to other actors. Yet in the context of China’s Malacca dilemma, where the United States possesses potentially inordinate leverage over Beijing, any strategy China pursues to lessen its vulnerability will entail security gains for China at the expense of American power. Consequently, depending on one’s frame of reference, China’s attempts to decrease its vulnerability at Malacca may be perceived as either defensive or offensive. This paper argues that managing these perceptions will be crucial to mitigating SinoAmerican conflict over the coming decades. In many ways, China’s Malacca dilemma is not solely about its energy security. Many contemporary geopolitical trends converge in this particular problem, notably China’s tremendous economic growth, the relative decline of American global influence, the lack of a meaningful global governance architecture, and the shifting focus of international politics to the Asia-Pacific region. All of these trends have the potential to upset the international status quo, creating winners and losers. Perceived losses in power and influence, and perceived openings for geopolitical advancement, may motivate actors to behave aggressively. The different perceptions of these trends may condition conflict, and the stakes are enormous. This paper will begin by detailing China’s two main strategies for mitigating its Malacca dilemma to demonstrate how different actors with different interests may perceive strategies differently. Specifically, this entails exploring both China’s designs to diversify its import routes and China’s attempts to develop the capabilities to prevent interdiction of the strait by foreign

any strategy China pursues to lessen its vulnerability will entail security gains for China at the expense of American power

͵ԝƒ””›—œƒǡDzŠ‹ƒ‹ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘…‹‡–›ǣ •Ǯ‡ƒ…‡ˆ—Ž‹•‡ǯ‘••‹„Ž‡ǫǡdzChinese  Journal  of  International  Politics  3  no.  1,   (2010):  5.

64


ROWAN ÂŚ STILL at the CROSSROADS

navies. Finally, this paper will situate the Malacca dilemma in the broader context of US–Chinese international affairs.

Š‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•‹˜‡”•‹Ď?‹…ƒ–‹‘Â?‘ˆ‹Ž Â?’‘”–‘—–‡•   China’s attempts to develop new import routes that bypass the Strait of Malacca can be considered as broadly consistent with its stated “peaceful riseâ€? policy in that they do not overtly seek to upset the international status quo. To this end, China has sought to bypass the Strait of Malacca in two major ways: overland pipelines through Pakistan and Myanmar, and an isthmian canal through Thailand. Analysts maintain that for China to meet its growing oil demands, it will increasingly need to rely on imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa; however, the maritime transit routes to China from these regions will increase China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca.4 For shipments from these two regions, the Chinese government has discussed circumventing the strait by constructing long distance pipelines from Middle Eastern countries to China. The most ambitious of these projects would link Gwadar, Pakistan with Kashgar in Xinjiang province in western China through a 1,800 kilometre assemblage of pipeline, road, and rail linkages.5 This is the shortest possible route from Middle Eastern oil fields to Chinese territory; however, geographically, this would entail cutting through the Kunlun Mountains, regarded as some of the world’s most complicated terrain.6 It is widely thought that an undertaking of this scale and complexity lies outside Chinese technological expertise.7 Furthermore, it is not necessarily clear whether such a pipeline would significantly ameliorate China’s energy concerns. A Gwadar-Kashgar pipeline would traverse Pakistan’s politically unstable Balochistan province, as well as contested territory between India and Pakistan. Ultimately, such a pipeline may create as many concerns for the Chinese leadership as Malacca does now.

China’s second major pipeline would connect Kunming in southern China with Indian Ocean sea lanes via Burmese ports near Sittwe in the northern Bay of Bengal.8 Indeed, this project is already under construction and should finish this year. Nonetheless, like the proposed GwadarKashgar route, this project faces concerns over political stability. Ethnic tensions, domestic political animosity, and repressive government crackdowns contribute to political instability in Myanmar

ÍśÔ?‡’ƒ”–Â?‡Â?–‘ˆ‡ˆ‡Â?•‡ǥDzÂ?Â?—ƒŽ‡’‘”––‘‘Â?‰”‡••ǣ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›ƒÂ?†‡…—”‹–›‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?–• Â?˜‘Ž˜‹Â?‰–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆ Š‹Â?ƒʹͲͳͲǥdzČ‹Í´Í˛ÍłÍ˛ČŒÇŁ;ͲǤ ͡Ô?–‘”‡›ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇł͡Ǥ ͸Ô?ǤǤ ƒ—–ƒÂ?ÇĄDzƒ’’‹Â?‰Š‹Â?‡•‡‹ŽƒÂ?† ĥ‹’‡Ž‹Â?‡•ƒÂ?†‡ƒ‘—–‡•ǥdzStrategic  Analysis,  (2011):  601. ÍšÔ? „‹†Ǥ ÍşÔ?ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ”‹–‹Â?‡‡…—”‹–›ƒÂ?†–Š‡ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłÍłÍˇÍ´Ç¤

65


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

and raise concerns over the safety of the pipeline.9 China’s second major strategy for diverting oil routes away from the Strait of Malacca entails the construction of a Chinese-financed canal across the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand. The Thai government has not offered strong support for this project for a number of reasons. Primarily, Bangkok fears such a project might symbolically as well as physically cut the country in two. With a predominantly Muslim population in southern Thailand and a Buddhist majority in the north, an isthmian canal could exacerbate religious tensions.10 This had led the Thai government to shelve its canal projects.11 Thus, the Kra canal project is more symbolic of the way Chinese policy makers are attempting to diversify their oil import routes, rather than a concrete example of their doing so. In light of the limitations of its pipeline and canal proposals, Beijing has been forced to realize that it cannot diversify its import routes sufficiently or quickly enough to guarantee continued access to Middle Eastern and African oil imports. The nature of Beijing’s current proposals demonstrate broad consistency with its stated peaceful rise policy in that they entail working constructively with friendly neighbours Pakistan and Myanmar, and not exerting overt pressure on reluctant ones, such as Thailand. Nonetheless, China’s attempts to redirect

ÍťÔ? „‹†Ǥ ͳͲÔ?ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ”‹–‹Â?‡‡…—”‹–›ƒÂ?†–Š‡ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłͳ͡ͳǤ ͳͳÔ? ƒ—–ƒÂ?ÇĄDzƒ’’‹Â?‰Š‹Â?‡•‡‹ŽƒÂ?† ĥ‹’‡Ž‹Â?‡•ƒÂ?†‡ƒ‘—–‡•ǥdz͡͝͝Ǥ

66


ROWAN ÂŚ STILL at the CROSSROADS

its oil imports away from the strait have not significantly impacted its overall energy situation. Consequently, other strategies have been pursued.

Š‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•––‡Â?’–•–‘‡…—”‡‹–•‡ƒƒÂ?‡•‘ˆ‘Â?Â?—Â?‹…ƒ–‹‘Â? Beyond China’s vulnerability at a specific maritime chokepoint, the Malacca dilemma draws attention to the more general vulnerability of China’s SLOCs. The Malacca dilemma highlights that much of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean lie outside the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) operational theatre,12 and further, that the US has powerful military alliances with several regional actors, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.13 These alliances, combined with its technical superiority, make the US Navy the dominant force in the region.14 In order to lessen its vulnerability at Malacca, the Chinese leadership has sought to augment power projection capabilities. Chinese political leaders have been explicitly aware of American regional dominance since as early as 2003, when Chinese president Hu Jintao publicly warned that “certain powers [i.e., the United States] have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the Strait.â€?15 Since then, according to the 2011 Chinese White Paper on National Defense, these same “certain powersâ€? have increased their “strategic investmentâ€? in the Asia-Pacific region.16 Later in the same paper, Beijing singled out the United States by name, drawing attention to American actions designed to “further [consolidate] its military alliances, [adjust] its military deployment and [enhance] its military capabilitiesâ€? in the region.17 This quotation draws attention to the

ͳʹÔ?ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥͳ͚͜Ǥ ͳ;Ô? ‹ŽŽƒ”›‘†ŠƒÂ?Ž‹Â?–‘Â?ÇĄDzÂ?Â‡Â”Â‹Â…ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ…‹Ď?‹…‡Â?–—”›ǥdzForeign  Policy  90  no.  6,  (2011). ͳ͜Ô?Š‹Ž‹’Â?†”‡™•ǥ’‡‡†ƒÂ?†‘ŽƒÂ?†ƒÂ?Â?”‡—–Š‡”ǥŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇĄ‹ŽƒÂ?† Ž‘„ƒŽ‘Ž‹–‹…•ǥČ‹‘Â?†‘Â?ÇŁ‘—–Ž‡†‰‡ǥÍ´Í˛ÍłÍłČŒÇĄͳ͜ͲǤ ͳ͡Ô?ƒÂ?–‡‹‰Â?‡ǥDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ”‹–‹Â?‡‡…—”‹–›ƒÂ?†–Š‡ÇŽƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡Â?Â?ÂƒÇĄÇŻÇłͳ͜;nj͜Ǥ ͳ͸Ô? Â?ˆ‘”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ˆĎ?‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡–ƒ–‡‘—Â?…‹Ž‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹Â?ƒDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‡ˆ‡Â?•‡‹Â?ʹͲͳͲǥdzʹͲͳͳǣͳǤ ͳ͚Ô? „‹†Ǥ

67


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Chinese leadership’s overall strategic mindset that fears not only interdiction of the Strait of Malacca by the US Navy, but more general American “strategic maneuvers and containment� designed to encircle the People’s Republic with hostile alliances.18 Responding to its perceived encirclement—a perception no doubt heightened by the Obama Administration’s recent decision to permanently station American Marines at Darwin, Australia19—the PLAN has been developing the military capabilities to secure its SLOCs. A clear example of the Chinese strategic mindset can be seen in PLAN Commander Wu Shengli’s 2004 call for a “powerful navy to protect fishing, resource development and strategic passageways for energy.�20 Wu’s “strategic passageways for energy� must necessarily focus overwhelmingly on securing trade through the Strait of Malacca. The United States Department of Defense (DoD) confirmed that Chinese political leaders have heard Wu’s call. In their annual reports to Congress on military and security developments in China, the DoD highlights China’s steady reallocation of resources to its South Sea Fleet stationed at Hainan Island.21 Not only is the PLAN allocating more resources to its South China Fleet, Chinese military planning is expanding its naval forces. The DoD notes that Chinese military expenditure has grown at an average of over 12 percent annually since 2000. In naval terms, this has meant the expansion of PLAN forces to include “75 principal surface combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55 amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants.�22 While China’s fleet size may pale in comparison to the Americans’, the PLAN is quickly becoming a powerful ocean-going force.23 To the extent that the United States and China continue to securitize their relationship by reciprocally increasing troop levels and military spending, the possibility that underlying tensions between the two will manifest into open hostility cannot be ignored. In addition to augmenting its fleet size, Beijing is developing a network of naval bases in the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, China’s so-called “string of pearls� strategy. “Pearls� in China’s necklace include deep-water ports in Pakistan at Gwadar, in Sri Lanka at Hambantota, in Bangladesh at Chittagong, and in Burma near Sittwe.24 These are located at close proximity to major maritime choke points at the Mandab, Hormuz, and Malacca straits. Over the long-term, these bases will allow the PLAN to maintain a forward presence along its strategic SLOCs.25 The

ͳͺÔ? Â?ˆ‘”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ˆĎ?‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡–ƒ–‡‘—Â?…‹Ž‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹Â?ƒDzŠ‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽ‡ˆ‡Â?•‡‹Â?ʹͲͲͺǥdzʹͲͲ͝ǣͳǤ ͳ͝Ô?‡™‘”Â?‹Â?‡•ǥDz›‡‹Â?‰Š‹Â?ÂƒÇĄš’ƒÂ?†•‹Ž‹–ƒ”›‹‡•–‘Â—Â•Â–Â”ÂƒÂŽÂ‹ÂƒÇĄÇłͳ͸‘˜‡Â?„‡”ʹͲͳͳǤ ʹͲÔ?‡’ƒ”–Â?‡Â?–‘ˆ‡ˆ‡Â?•‡DzÂ?Â?—ƒŽ‡’‘”––‘‘Â?‰”‡••ǣ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›ƒÂ?†‡…—”‹–›‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?–• Â?˜‘Ž˜‹Â?‰–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹… ‘ˆŠ‹Â?ƒʹͲͳͳǥdz;͝Ǥ Í´ÍłÔ? „‹†Ǥǥ͜ͲǤ Í´Í´Ô? „‹†Ǥǥ;Ǥ Í´ÍľÔ?ƒ•Š‹Â?‰–‘Â?‹Â?‡•ǥDzŠ‹Â?ƒ—‹Ž†•Â’–”ƒ–‡‰‹…‡ƒƒÂ?‡•ǥdz ƒÂ?—ƒ”›ͳ͚ǥʹͲͲ͡Ǥ Í´ÍśÔ?‘„‡”–ƒ’ŽƒÂ?ÇĄ‘Â?•‘‘Â?ÇŁ–Š‡ Â?†‹ƒÂ?…‡ƒÂ?ƒÂ?†–Š‡ —–—”‡‘ˆÂ?‡”‹…ƒÂ?‘™‡”ǥČ‹‡™‘”Â?ÇŁƒÂ?†‘Â? ‘—•‡ǥÍ´Í˛ÍłÍ˛ČŒÇĄͳͲǤ ʹ͡Ô?•ŠŽ‡›‘™Â?•Š‡Â?†ǥDzÂ?”ƒ˜‡Ž‹Â?‰Š‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ÇŽ–”‹Â?‰‘ˆÂ‡ÂƒÂ”Ž•ǥǯdzYale  Global,  2011.

68


ROWAN ÂŚ STILL at the CROSSROADS

PLAN would thus have the ability to protect its merchant fleets at distance, ensure the security of its oil imports, and eventually be in a position to challenge American naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean.26 However, there is reason to be skeptical of this characterization and representation of China’s overseas port locations. The militarized rhetoric surrounding these ports may in fact distort their underlying commercial nature. The term “string of pearls,â€? indeed the whole conceptualization of these scattered ports being a networked system of naval bases, was coined by American security analysts at Booz Allen Hamilton. In their classified 2004 report, “Energy Futures in Asia,â€? Booz Allen Hamilton analysts emphasized the strategic military potential of these locations, and helped stoke “growing fears in the Pentagon about China’s long-term development.â€?27 However, Ashley Townshend asserts that such fears are exaggerated. He argues the PLAN is not truly involved with these ports; rather, they are exactly what they appear to be: commercial shipping facilities for rest, re-fuelling, and re-fitting.28 Further, he maintains it would be extremely difficult to harden these facilities and prepare them for military use given the complementary air defenses, mineclearing capabilities, and storage facilities required.29 Despite the possibility of varying interpretations, it is very difficult to accommodate the scale, speed, and breadth of China’s military modernization and expansion under the rubric of “peaceful rise.��€? Quite clearly, China’s programs are working to upset the balance of power in AsiaPacific and the Indian Ocean by tilting power projection capabilities in China’s favour. While in purely economic terms China’s rise can be portrayed as an instance of absolute gains among actors, in military terms, China’s security gains are relative to losses on the American side. While the Chinese leadership may cast China’s military modernization as a defensive means to promote its security, the American leadership may view China’s increased military spending as expansionary and aggressive.30 The distinction between defensive and offensive military capabilities falls apart when strategies taken to increase one’s own security come at the expense of another actor’s.

“The distinction between defensive and offensive military capabilities falls apart when strategies taken to increase one’s own security come at the expense of another actor’s. �

 

ʹ͸Ô? „‹†Ǥ Í´ÍšÔ?ƒ•Š‹Â?‰–‘Â?‹Â?‡•ǥDzŠ‹Â?ƒ—‹Ž†•Â’–”ƒ–‡‰‹…‡ƒƒÂ?‡•ǥdzʹͲͲ͡Ǥ Í´ÍşÔ?‘™Â?•Š‡Â?†ǥDzÂ?”ƒ˜‡Ž‹Â?‰Š‹Â?ÂƒÇŻÂ•ÇŽ–”‹Â?‰‘ˆÂ‡ÂƒÂ”Ž•Ǥǯdz Í´ÍťÔ? „‹†Ǥ ;ͲÔ?ƒ””›—œƒÂ?ÇĄDz‘”Ž†‹–Š‘—–—’‡”’‘™‡”•ǍǥdzInternational  Relations  25  no.  1,  (2012):  8-­â€?9.

69


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Š‡ƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡ƒ‹ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘–‡š– As the string of pearls situation typifies, inputs can be interpreted in a variety of ways when the truth remains obscured. When actors do not have full knowledge of another actor’s intentions and interests, they are forced to intuit them from the evidence gathered. Crucially, since the evidence will be perceived differently by different actors, and having recourse only to self-help under anarchy, states proceed with a mindset of self-preservation. The exact nature of China’s budding maritime ports on the Indian Ocean is uncertain, and when studied by different analysts, different conclusions will be reached. Whether or not the prevailing perspective will be to treat these ports as commercial or as military sites is impossible to foresee, but the implications of either portrayal are predictable. It is important to remember that discourses and perceptions can play to people’s fears and condition different types of responses. If these sites are perceived and discursively constructed as being forward operating bases for the PLAN, tensions between China and the United States, as well as between China and India, will mount. International organizations (IOs) can play a role in mitigating uncertainty between 31 states. IOs serve as forums for dialogue and mediation between states. They allow states

“All of these issues are likely to become ever more sensitive as China’s GDP catches and eclipses the United States’” to signal “cooperative intent,” and perform other functions designed to “add more complete information about [actors’] intentions.”32 IOs institutionalize discussion and learning between actors, helping actors to familiarize themselves with others, and develop cooperative relationships on the basis of the reduced uncertainty as to others’ intentions. Further, over longer periods of time, IOs may also have a constructive influence on actors’ identities and relationships. IOs may be sites where states develop shared identities and interests, and in doing so are “socialized into normative understandings of appropriate behaviour.”33 Nonetheless, a meaningful, mediated, and institutionalized relationship between the United States and China does not exist. The stunning failures of the international community to come to a meaningful agreement on climate change, the collapse of the Doha Round of trade talks, and the failure to effectively regulate global finance are reflective of a generalized lack of global governance. Further, in the domain of energy security, no truly inclusive IO exists that

͵ͳԝ”‹ƒƒ–Š„—ǡDz…‡”–ƒ‹ƒ„‘—–…‡”–ƒ‹–›ǡdzInternational  Studies  Quarterly  51,  no.3  (2007). ͵ʹԝ „‹†ǤͷͶͷǤ ͵͵ԝ „‹†ǡͷͶͻǤ

70


ROWAN ÂŚ STILL at the CROSSROADS

is tasked with facilitating interactions between states facing resource competition.34 As much as the international community as a whole lacks multilateral institutions equipped to manage global issues, the absence of meaningful IO mediation in the Sino-American relationship is particularly worrisome. Not only do China and the United States share a sensitivity over transit through the Strait of Malacca, but bilaterally they share tensions in currency regulation, current account balances, trade regulations, the autonomy of Taiwan, and human rights, amongst other areas. All of these issues are likely to become even more sensitive as China’s GDP catches and eclipses the United States’ by the end of the decade. On all of these issues, the United States and China share an uncertainty as to the precise interests, intentions, and commitments of the other. The possibility for tensions in one area to adversely affect the relationship in all other areas is by no means negligible. To mitigate the risks of misperception and miscalculation, the United States and China must take steps towards transparency in their relationship. Both must maintain open dealings with each other, clearly signaling their interests and intentions. Henry Kissinger has also recognized this as the signature challenge facing the SinoAmerican relationship.35 Kissinger notes that Beijing and Washington have taken steps towards forging a more cooperative relationship with the establishment of a semi-annual forum, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Nonetheless, Kissinger remains wary as to this forum’s ability to “produce a truly global economic and political order.�36 If the Chinese and American leadership fail to develop a cooperative relationship in which both actors are willing and able to communicate their intentions to the other, then understandings of the other’s intention will be developed at a purely national level. Just as with the “string of pearls,� national approaches to information processing may lead to different interpretations and perceptions on both sides, and these perceptions may condition a host of divergent policy responses. Two dominant schools of thought exist within each country regarding foreign relations with the other: in Beijing, hard-line, assertive ultra-nationalists compete domestically with purely development-focused politicians; in Washington, a realist school committed to preventing any peer competitor to the United States and a liberal school eager to engage Beijing and bring China into the international public order as a responsible stakeholder vie for dominance.37 Whichever perspective dominates in each capital will have tremendous shaping influence on the future of the US-China relationship, but the power of each perspective will be tempered if a robust dialogic and cooperative relationship develops between both capitals. Globally, the stakes are too high for either side to forego learning and engaging constructively with the other.

;͜Ô?Š‡ Â?–‡”Â?ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒŽÂ?‡”‰›‰‡Â?…›Č‹ ČŒ‹•…Ž‘•‡•–ǢÂŠÂ‘Â™Â‡Â˜Â‡Â”ÇĄÂ?‡Â?„‡”•Š‹’‹•Ž‹Â?‹–‡†–‘–Š‡”‰ƒÂ?‹œƒ–‹‘Â?ˆ‘”…‘Â?‘Â?‹… ‘‘’‡”ƒ–‹‘Â?ƒÂ?†‡˜‡Ž‘’Â?‡Â?–Č‹ČŒÂ•Â–ÂƒÂ–Â‡Â•ÇĄ–Š—•‡š…Ž—†‹Â?‰Š‹Â?ƒǤ ;͡Ô? ‡Â?”›‹••‹Â?‰‡”ǥDzŠ‡ —–—”‡‘ˆǤǤnjŠ‹Â?‡•‡‡Žƒ–‹‘Â?•ǥdzForeign  Affairs  90  no.  2,  (2012):  53-­â€?54. ;͸Ô? „‹†Ǥ ;͚Ô?ƒ””›—œƒÂ?ÇĄDz‘”Ž†‹–Š‘—–—’‡”’‘™‡”•ǍǥdzInternational  Relations  25  no.  1,  (2012):  12-­â€?13.

71


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

‘…Ž—•‹‘ This paper has sought to draw attention to the ways perceptions of security and vulnerability condition actors to respond in certain ways, which may result in adverse effects on each actor’s own security. At present, China has a major strategic vulnerability at the Strait of Malacca. To lessen its dependence on this passageway, China has sought to develop new import routes, but these have proved inadequate. Thus, China has invested in naval modernization and expansion so that it may guarantee the safe passage of its imports through the Strait of Malacca. Nonetheless, its military buildup risks upsetting the balance of power in Asia-Pacific, and provoking a backlash by the United States and other regional actors. China’s naval modernization is a relatively new development in international politics, and it is still too early to discern the other actors’ final responses. Actors must respond without full information as to China’s longterm intentions and commitment; without this, they rely on heuristics and beliefs. Accordingly, the risk of misperception and miscalculation is high. The opacity of Chinese strategic planning works to exacerbate the inherent uncertainty of international politics. International mediation may help reduce uncertainty, and promote common understandings, yet, the Sino-American relationship lacks any meaningful mediated dialogue. At present, perceptions and decisions will depend on the domestic politics of the actors involved, and the situation may thus progress in many different ways, some of which are more dangerous than others. Therefore, to reduce uncertainty and the risk of miscalculation, the Chinese and American leadership must strive to develop a more transparent relationship. Given the enormous roles both the United States and China are set to play in global politics, keeping distrust and animosity to a minimum is necessary to ensure stability.

72


ROWAN ¦ STILL at the CROSSROADS

Appendix:

‹‰—”‡ͳǣChina’s  import  transit  routes/critical  chokepoints   and  proposed/under  construction  SLOC  bypass  routes   ‘—”…‡ǣDz—ƒŽ‡’‘”––‘‘‰”‡••ǣ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›ƒ†‡…—”‹–› ‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–• ˜‘Ž˜‹‰–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒ ʹͲͳͳǡdzʹͳǤ

73


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

‹„Ž‹‘‰”ƒ’Š› †”‡™•Ǧ’‡‡†ǡŠ‹ŽŽ‹’ƒ†‘Žƒ†ƒ”‡—–Š‡”ǤChina,  Oil  and  Global  PoliticsǤ‘†‘ǣ‘—–Ž‡†‰‡ǡ 2011. —œƒǡƒ””›ǤDzŠ‹ƒ‹ –‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‘…‹‡–›ǣ •Ǯ‡ƒ…‡ˆ—Ž‹•‡ǯ‘••‹„Ž‡ǫdzChinese  Journal  of   International  Politics  3,  no.  1  (2010):    5-­‐36. —œƒǡƒ””›ǤDz‘”Ž†‹–Š‘—–—’‡”’‘™‡”•ǡdzInternational  Relations  25,  no.  1  (2011):  3-­‐25. Ž‹–‘ǡ ‹ŽŽƒ”›‘†ŠƒǤDz‡”‹…ƒǯ•ƒ…‹ϐ‹…‡–—”›ǤdzForeign  Policy  90,  no.  6  (2011)  http://www. ˆ‘”‡‹‰’‘Ž‹…›Ǥ…‘Ȁƒ”–‹…Ž‡•ȀʹͲͳͳȀͳͲȀͳͳȀƒ‡”‹…ƒ•̴’ƒ…‹ϐ‹…̴…‡–—”›Ǥ ‡’ƒ”–‡–‘ˆ‡ˆ‡•‡ǡDz—ƒŽ‡’‘”––‘‘‰”‡••ǣ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›ƒ†‡…—”‹–›‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–• ˜‘Ž˜‹‰–Š‡ ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒʹͲͳͲǤdzƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǡǣˆϐ‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡‡…”‡–ƒ”›‘ˆ‡ˆ‡•‡ǡʹͲͳͲǤ ‡’ƒ”–‡–‘ˆ‡ˆ‡•‡ǡDz—ƒŽ‡’‘”––‘‘‰”‡••ǣ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›ƒ†‡…—”‹–›‡˜‡Ž‘’‡–• ˜‘Ž˜‹‰–Š‡ ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒʹͲͳͳǤdzƒ•Š‹‰–‘ǡǣˆϐ‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡‡…”‡–ƒ”›‘ˆ‡ˆ‡•‡ǡʹͲͳͳǤ

ƒ—–ƒǡǤǤDzƒ’’‹‰Š‹‡•‡‹Žƒ† ƒ•‹’‡Ž‹‡•ƒ†‡ƒ‘—–‡•Ǥdz–”ƒ–‡‰‹…ƒŽ›•‹•͵ͷ‘ǤͶ (2011):  595-­‐612.

ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ˆϐ‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡–ƒ–‡‘—…‹Ž‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒǤDzŠ‹ƒǯ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡ˆ‡•‡ ‹ʹͲͲͺǤdz‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‡‡–”ƒŽ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ• ‘˜‡”‡–‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡʹͲͲͻǤ Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‰‘˜Ǥ…Ȁ‡‰Ž‹•ŠȀ‘ˆϐ‹…‹ƒŽȀʹͲͲͻǦͲͳȀʹͲȀ…‘–‡–̴ͳʹͳͲʹʹ͹ǤŠ–Ǥ

ˆ‘”ƒ–‹‘ˆϐ‹…‡‘ˆ–Š‡–ƒ–‡‘—…‹Ž‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒǤDzŠ‹ƒǯ•ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡ˆ‡•‡ ‹ʹͲͳͲǤdz‡‹Œ‹‰ǣŠ‡‡–”ƒŽ‡‘’Ž‡ǯ• ‘˜‡”‡–‘ˆ–Š‡‡‘’Ž‡ǯ•‡’—„Ž‹…‘ˆŠ‹ƒǡʹͲͲͻǤ Š––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ‰‘˜Ǥ…Ȁ‡‰Ž‹•ŠȀ‘ˆϐ‹…‹ƒŽȀʹͲͳͳǦͲ͵Ȁ͵ͳȀ…‘–‡–̴ͳͺ͵ͷͶͻͻǤŠ–Ǥ ƒ’Žƒǡ‘„‡”–ǤMonsoon:  the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Future  of  American  PowerǤ‡™‘”ǣƒ†‘ House,  2010. ‹••‹‰‡”ǡ ‡”›ǤDzŠ‡ —–—”‡‘ˆ–Š‡ǦŠ‹‡•‡‡Žƒ–‹‘•Š‹’ǤdzForeign  Affairs  91,  no.  2  (2012):  44-­‐55. ƒ–‡‹‰‡ǡƒ”…ǤDzŠ‹ƒǯ•ƒ”‹–‹‡‡…—”‹–›ƒ†–Š‡ǮƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡ƒǯǤdzAsian  Security  4,  no.  2  (2008):   143–161.   New  York  TimesǤDz›‡‹‰Š‹ƒǡš’ƒ†•‹Ž‹–ƒ”›‹‡•–‘—•–”ƒŽ‹ƒǤdzͳ͸‘˜‡„‡”ʹͲͳͳǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ ™™™Ǥ›–‹‡•Ǥ…‘ȀʹͲͳͳȀͳͳȀͳ͹Ȁ™‘”Ž†Ȁƒ•‹ƒȀ‘„ƒƒǦƒ†Ǧ‰‹ŽŽƒ”†Ǧ‡š’ƒ†Ǧ—•Ǧƒ—•–”ƒŽ‹ƒǦ ‹Ž‹–ƒ”›Ǧ–‹‡•ǤŠ–ŽǫŠ’Ǥ ƒ–Š„—ǡ”‹ƒǤDz…‡”–ƒ‹ƒ„‘—–…‡”–ƒ‹–›ǣ†‡”•–ƒ†‹‰–Š‡—Ž–‹’Ž‡‡ƒ‹‰•‘ˆƒ‘…‡’–‹

–‡”ƒ–‹‘ƒŽ‡Žƒ–‹‘•Š‡‘”›ǤdzInternational  Studies  Quarterly  51,  no.  3  (2007):  533-­‐557. –‘”‡›ǡ ƒǤDzŠ‹ƒǯ•ǮƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡ƒǯǤdzThe  China  Brief  6,  no.  8,  (2006). ‘™•Š‡†ǡ•ŠŽ‡›ǤDz”ƒ˜‡Ž‹‰Š‹ƒǯ•Ǯ–”‹‰‘ˆ‡ƒ”Ž•ǯǤdzYale  Global.  16  September  2011.  http:// yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/unraveling-­‐chinas-­‐string-­‐pearls.   Washington  TimesǤDzŠ‹ƒ—‹Ž†•’–”ƒ–‡‰‹…‡ƒƒ‡•Ǥdzͳ͹ ƒ—ƒ”›ʹͲͲͷǤŠ––’ǣȀȀ™™™Ǥ ™ƒ•Š‹‰–‘–‹‡•Ǥ…‘Ȁ‡™•ȀʹͲͲͷȀŒƒȀͳ͹ȀʹͲͲͷͲͳͳ͹ǦͳͳͷͷͷͲǦͳͻʹͻ”ȀǤ ‘— ‹ǤDz‡ƒŽ‹‰™‹–Š–Š‡ƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡ƒǣŠ‹ƒǯ•ˆˆ‘”–•–‘”‘–‡…–‹–•‡”‰›—’’Ž›ǤdzStrategic   Analysis  31,  no.  3  (2007):  467–489. Šƒ‰ǡŠ‘‰‹ƒ‰ǤDzŠ‹ƒǯ•‡”‰›‡…—”‹–›ǡ–Š‡ƒŽƒ……ƒ‹Ž‡ƒƒ†‡•’‘•‡•ǤdzEnergy  Policy  39,   no.  12  (2011):  7612–7615.  

74


Kabul and Kandahar photos by Dr. Allen Sens

75


View from inside Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar Province, 2007.

76


Driving in ISAF convoy, Kabul, 2007.

Canadian armoured vehicle, Camp Nathan Smith, Kandahar Province, 2007.

77


Kabul Mountains, 2007.

78


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

STRAIT OF MALACCA

photo essay by Amir Ibrahim Abbas

79

#80


ABBAS ¦ STRAIT OF MALACCA

UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

# 81

#82


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE RAILROAD Chaerean Kim

During the Dust Bowl, capitalism encouraged largescale agriculture, turning farmers into “machine men� who plowed the fields to maximize gains. Commercial agriculture, which enables mass consumption, is a driving force behind the crisis facing the natural world. The Green Revolution meant that more fields were plowed irrespective of unknown future consequences. Despite the effects on the environment, state governments encourage continuous production and consumption to increase economic growth. As long as people are driven by this system of growth, production, and consumption--maximizing gains and profit--they will extract whatever they can from the environment. Without paying careful attention to the usage of the land, and by focussing exclusively on capitalist gain, farmers can easily transform the delicate ecosystem of the plains in a land of dust.

#83

# 84


LUDMILA ANDRÉA ¦ STREET ANTHEMS

STREET ANTHEMS LUDMILA ANDRÉA

An ode to the ebb and flow of Mediterranean streets. A tribute to the many individuals who make their livelihood on the cobblestones day after day and remain strong in a time of economic uncertainty. The musicians who fill the streets with somber melodies. The displaced people whose worldly belongings fit into a single suitcase. The men and women who sit silently in street corners waiting for the hand of a stranger to drop a coin or two into a dusty, torn hat. The venders who rise with the dawn each day and fill the streets with vibrancy until sundown.

85


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

86


LUDMILA ANDRÉA ¦ STREET ANTHEMS

87


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

88


A JOURNEY FROM BARCELONA TO FLORENCE Mehran Najafi In our increasingly commercialized and globalized world, two UBC students on an exchange program to Barcelona decide to liberate themselves from their material possessions and embark on a bicycle trip along the Meditterreanean. They rediscovered the beauty of simplicity. From Barcelona to Florence: 1800 kilometres… 43 days… 2 old vintage road bicycles… 4 panniers. 4 pairs of socks… 4 pairs of underwear… 2 pairs of shoes… 2 sleeping bags… 1 tent… 1 chess board… Some pots and pans… And 2 unsatisfied global citizens.


Saying our farewells to a city that became our home for a whole year: Barcelona.

Strolling and feeling out of place through the streets of St. Tropez, France.

Living on the bare minimums. Less is more.

Enjoying the simple pleasures of life.


Taking a detour and a less traveled road towards the city of Nimes, France.


ISTANBUL URBANIZED MILENA SALAZAR

Not long after crossing a bridge from west to east, behind slow-moving cars, the change in Istanbul’s cityscape becomes apparent. They are the giant blocks rising from ancient soils to redefine a new skyline. These towers seem to exist outside Istanbul’s immediate geography. They’re the standardized towers of Tokyo, Sao Paulo and Vancouver; those that create the geography of nowhere. The city is growing fast and the cars are moving slowly. They are the symbols of the crowded city. The symptoms of the metropolis. This is a glimpse of Istanbul growing, three quarters of an hour in traffic.

93


94


STAFF BIOGRAPHIES ÂŚ JIA 2012

STAFF EDITOR IN CHIEF GORDON KATIC is a fourth year student of philosophy and political science. He has been an active presence in many facets of student life, including being the student coordinator of the Terry Project as well as a columnist for The Ubyssey. After graduating, he plans to pursue a career in journalism.

SENIOR EDITORS MOLLIE DEYONG is a fourth year political science student. Mollie wanted to be a geologist until she realized that geology involved science, and an architect until she realized that architecture involved math. She is now taking political science and intends to go to law school. CODI HAUKA is a fifth year student graduating with a major in international relations and a minor in history. Following her time as an undergraduate, she plans pursuing a career in journalism, taking over The Daily Show, and becoming an Arts One professor at UBC. ABDURRAHMAN MIHIRIG is nearing the completion of a dual degree in electrical engineering and history. In his years at UBC, he has worked with several different activist groups such as the Resource Group Allocation Committee, Colour Connected, Social Justice Centre, and SPHR. He has a modest beard and hopes that it can help him in pursuing graduate studies in the near future. SAM ROWAN is pursuing a double major in political science honours and international relations. He spent last year on exchange at Sciences Po Paris where he deepened his appreciation of French Theory. Sam is also interested in critical IR theory, intellectual history, and the changing conceptualizations of global politics. After graduation, Sam intends to pursue further studies in social and political thought. Sam also likes cycling, traveling, baking, and photography.

JUNIOR EDITORS MEGHAN ANDERSON is a fourth year student majoring in international relations Her academic interests include global environmental politics, microfinance and the role of women in international development. Outside of school she enjoys traveling and spending as much time as possible in the mountains. MICHAEL BARRETT is a fourth year student majoring in political science with a minor in economics. His academic interests include conflict studies, development, American domestic politics and international finance. Upon graduation he hopes to attend law school. TYLER KRETZSCHMAR is a fourth year student studying international relations and French. His areas of interest include environmental politics, human rights protection, and international economic development. After graduation, he plans to pursue a career in international diplomacy. MEHRAN NAJAFI is a fourth year majoring in international relations, patching up his specialization in international development. His zeal for academia comes in a fine balance between postcolonial theory, alternative approaches to Development, and modern critical film theory. He aspires to pave a path in his life that will include sustainable development, creative writing, photography, film and of course, traveling. ISABELLE PLESSIS is a fourth year honours student in political science. Her interests include European Integration, global governance, and environmental policy. Isabelle has spent time studying abroad in England and Germany, and at Queen’s University. She currently serves as an ambassador for the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and hopes to pursue graduate studies in international relations. BETTY ZHANG is a fourth year student with a major in international relations and a minor in French. She is particularly interested in international development. Upon graduation, Betty hopes to pursue a career that combines her interest in global issues with her love for writing and travel.

RESEARCH ASSISTANTS EMILY CSISZAR is a fourth year philosophy major at UBC. Her academic interests include existentialism, political and social philosophy, and ethical theory. After graduation, she aspires to pursue law. YIQUN YUAN is a third year student majoring in international relations. Her academic interests focus on Asia-Pacific international relations and Chinese politics. She hopes to pursue further studies in either international relations or law. 109


UBC JOURNAL of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

PRODUCTION COORDINATOR TING KELLY is a fourth year international relations student with a deep curiosity for agricultural development, international journalism, political philosophy, urban planning and design. Ting loves engaging with people from all around the world through travel, gastronomy and cross-cultural communication. She envisions herself working abroad as a journalist, alternative food critic and boutique hotel owner.

PRODUCTION TEAM LUDMILA ANDRÉA is a fourth year majoring in political science and minoring in critical studies in sexuality. Her interests include 20th century literature, feminist theory, international humanitarian law, and philosophy. When she graduates she plans to indulge her wanderlust and work abroad, and hopes to eventually pursue a career in journalism with a focus on international affairs and human rights. SANDY CHU is a second year student aspiring to combine her love for global issues and journalism with a double major in international relations and English honours. She’s a shutterbug, font fanatic, and freelance illustrator in her spare time. Her one true ambition is to be a thorough traveller of the world.

CARTOONIST INDIANA JOEL is a second year student majoring in Asian languages with a passion for Japanese, Korean and Hindi. She has been drawing for fun since she can remember, and currently does most of her illustration for The Ubyssey. After graduation she plans to go into language and art education and eventually become a secondary school teacher.

COPY EDITOR KAI GREEN graduated from UBC with an honours degree in Asian area studies. She was also the copy editor for The Ubyssey. As job prospects are slim for nitpicky premodern literature-lovers, Kai has opted to pursue a law career and will be starting her studies at UBC in September 2012.

COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATOR IANA MESSETCHKOVA is a fourth year international relations major and English literature minor. Born in Sofia, Bulgaria and raised in Vancouver, she has had a strong interest in international affairs from an early age. Iana hopes to graduate this May and then, after taking a year off and gaining some work experience, dreams of attending NYU to study international human rights law.

FACULTY LIAISON JORDAN FERNANDEZ is a fourth year student majoring in political science and minoring in economics. His academic interests include economic and political development whether it be at the regional, national, or international level. After graduation he hopes to pursue his masters in community and regional planning at the University of British Columbia and a career in city planning after that.

MARKETING MICHELLE GILLESPIE is a fourth year student majoring in international relations with a minor in economics. Her academic interests include social justice, international trade, climate change, women’s empowerment, and the link between development and malnutrition. She looks forward to continuing her studies at UBC next year in the Faculty of Law. ANNIE JU is a third year student majoring in political science and minoring in women’s and gender studies. She has a passion for political theory and gender politics. Aside from JIA, Annie is currently involved in the World Model United Nations and Delta Gamma Fraternity. After graduation, she hopes to pursue graduate studies in journalism.

110


SPON S O R S UBC International Students Association UBC has long encouraged global citizenship as a key part of academic development. For over twenty-five years, the International Relations Students Association (IRSA) has worked to develop co-curricular programs that help achieve this goal. We aim to provide students from a variety of disciplines with a forum for the discussion of international issues. IRSA membership is available to all UBC students and alumni. IRSA’s core projects include: tɥF6#$+PVSOBMPG*OUFSOBUJPOBM"êBJST tɥF/JHIUPGBɥPVTBOE%JOOFST tɥF6#$.PEFM6OJUFE/BUJPOT$POGFSFODF t"#J"OOVBM'PSFJHO1PMJDZ$POGFSFODF t.PEFM/"50EFMFHBUJPO t*OUFSOBUJPOBM$BSFFS/JHIU t&YUFSOBM.PEFM6OJUFE/BUJPOTEFMFHBUJPO t4PDJBMFWFOUT t8FFLMZNFFUJOHT The JIA and IRSA would like to thank the following organizations and departments for their generous support for our programs: t6#$"MNB.BUFS4PDJFUZ t6#$"SUT6OEFSHSBEVBUF4PDJFUZ tɥF$FOUSFGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FMBUJPOT tɥF-JV*OTUJUVUFGPS(MPCBM*TTVFT t6#$*OUFSOBUJPOBM)PVTF t6#$*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FMBUJPOT1SPHSBN t6#$$FOUSFGPS4UVEFOU*OWPMWFNFOU More informationXXXJSTBDB]]6#$4UVEFOU6OJPO#VJMEJOH SPPN( The AMS Sustainability Fund is supported through a contribution of just TMJHIUMZPWFSGSPNFBDI6#$TUVEFOUɥJTGVOEPGPWFS HPFTUP support reducing the ecological footprint and increasing the social cohesion of UIFTUVEFOUDPNNVOJUZBU6#$0VSTUVEFOUTTVCNJUQSPQPTBMTUIBUBSFSFWJFXFE on a regular basis through our website at http://amssustainability.ca

The UBC International Relations Program is a degree granting undergraduate program in the Faculty of Arts. 8JUIBQQSPYJNBUFMZNBKPST UIFQSPHSBNJTPOFPGUIFMBSHFTUJOUIF'BDVMUZ*OUFSOBUJPOBM3FMBUJPOTJTBO JOUFSEJTDJQMJOBSZNBKPSXIJDIQFSNJUTTUVEFOUTUPUBLFDPVSTFTJOBWBSJFUZPGEJTDJQMJOFTJODMVEJOH)JTUPSZ 1PMJUJDBM 4DJFODF &DPOPNJDT UIFUISFFDPSFEJTDJQMJOFT BTXFMMBT(FPHSBQIZ "TJBO4UVEJFT BOE4PDJPMPHZ BNPOHPUIFST ɥF*3QSPHSBNJTBQSPVETQPOTPSPGUIF6#$+PVSOBMPG*OUFSOBUJPOBM"êBJST

111



UBC Journal of International Affairs 2012