Book Review of Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West

Book Review Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

By Toh Boon Kwan

Author’s Note Book review of Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Published in Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, 35, 1 (2009): 86-88.

Book Review China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia by Peter C. Perdue (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005) In a majestic treatment of China’s imperial strategy and frontier policy, Professor Peter Perdue explains the successful Qing conquest of Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet as well as its permanent incorporation into China. This was a feat that had eluded the Han, Tang and Ming dynasties.

Throughout history, the Chinese dynasties had attempted to secure their borders against the nomadic Mongolian and Turkic tribes which constantly raided the settled communities on the frontier. These attempts met with varying levels of success and outright failure led to the imposition of foreign rule under the Yuan and Qing dynasties.

Imperial strategy could be broadly classified into two strands: the first was offensive oriented; the second was defensive in nature. Under the strong and vigorous leadership of martial Emperors like Han Wudi and Yongle, offensives were mounted against the nomadic tribes. Prior to the Qing, Chinese campaigning beyond the frontier was limited to 90-100 days before military supplies run out. Taking advantage of this logistical constraint, the Mongolian tribes would swiftly withdraw deep into the steppe, trading space for time, adopting a scorched earth policy and stretching the Chinese lines of communications. The Mongolians also enjoy the advantage of being mounted on steeds that were vastly superior to Chinese horses. The latter were neither as swift nor suitable for combat as their nomadic cousins. Chinese campaigning depended heavily on a steady supply of horses but the best herds were located in the steppe beyond the frontier and they were never able to procure sufficient numbers for their military use. Thus, logistical constraints and inferior equipment limited the success of Chinese offensives.

In turn, defensive strategies were adopted. The Ming embarked on a massive construction effort to extend the Great Wall to defend themselves. They also practised a divide and rule policy against the Mongol tribes that took advantage of the internecine conflict endemic to Mongol society, buying time for the frontier defences to be constructed. Limited trade with the Mongolian tribes was also allowed to reduce the need for the Mongols to raid the settled communities to secure access to much needed necessities like cloth. But defence expenditure on the Great Wall proved ruinous to the Ming as Beijing was unable to transport sufficient grain and silver to feed and pay the frontier garrisons. As soldiers deserted, the frontiers were left undefended. Within the Ming empire, increased taxation to fund the frontier defences impoverished society and finally sparked off peasant revolts, which brought down the dynasty.

The failure of the Ming ushered in foreign rule by the Manchu under the Qing dynasty. The Qing learnt from the dynasties before it and successfully implemented an imperial strategy and frontier policy that marked the zenith of Chinese power in Central Eurasia.

What accounted for the Qing success?

First, unlike the earlier dynasties, the Qing armies mastered the intricate military logistics required to campaign in these arid lands on the periphery of Chinese civilisation. The Qing paid close attention to military supply during campaigning. Roads were built to transport grain, fodder and military supplies from the Chinese interior to the periphery. New bases were developed in the western region that served as launching pads into Central Eurasia. These bases were developed into self-sufficient military colonies and well stockpiled with military supplies and linked to the Chinese interior. These developments allowed the Qing armies to break through the 100 days logistical barrier and project military power deep into the heart of nomadic territory in the steppe.

Second, the Qing adroitly used diplomacy to their advantage. The Manchu always ensured that the Eastern Mongolian tribes were allied to them. These tribes provided horses and men in the Qing campaigns against their formidable Western Mongolian enemies, in particular, the Zunghar. The Qing also reached an accommodation with the expanding Russian Tsarist empire and between them, crushed the Zunghar empire and divided the spoils. Trade was also used to reward allied tribes and buy their loyalty to the Qing cause.

Third, the Qing ensured the integration of the newly conquered lands by moving in settlers and facilitating economic links with the rest of the empire. The roads to the frontier that transported military supplies soon became a mercantile highway. The military colonies became towns and new economic nodes in an expanded empire, further cementing Qing rule.

What insights could the SAF draw from the Chinese imperial experience?

First, strong defences require a robust economy. Without a strong economy, military spending will impoverish society. When the economy is weak, there would be greater pressures to reduce defence expenditures. But a small country could only neglect defence at its own peril. Although defence spending must be maintained, the SAF could do its part by ensuring that the defence dollar is fully stretched and maximum bang for the buck is achieved.

Second, having a strong SAF is insufficient if our diplomacy is found wanting. Our diplomatic efforts in maintaining stability in our region and promoting common interests among our neighbours helps to secure our borders and ensure a flourishing economy so crucial to the well-being of our country.

Third, our soldiers must be well equipped with modern state of the art equipment that would confer superior fighting capabilities if and when the SAF is called into action. We should also never neglect military logistics as it makes the difference between success and failure on the battlefield.

China Marches West is available at SAFTI Library. Professor Purdue’s clear prose and well argued narrative provides clear insights into Chinese imperial strategy and frontier policy. The book is meticulously produced and beautifully illustrated with maps, photographs and paintings that give the reader a window into a bygone era. It truly deserves the Levenson Prize awarded in 2007 by the Association for Asian Studies for the best book on pre-1900 Chinese history.