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the town batteries did us considerable damage and killed two good officers. Yet this did not prevent the British from accomplishing their object. They maintained so crushing a fire on the Malakoff that the Russian artillerymen were soon obliged to quit their pieces, and only fire a gun now and then. At six in the evening a magazine blew up in a work between the Redan and the Malakoff. This battery was ruined. All night the mortars of the Allies fired heavily into the Malakoff and Redan, to hinder the enemy from repairing damages; and all night the French worked lustily at their trenches, doing more in twenty-four hours than they had done in a fortnight. The bombardment continued on the 18th. On the night of that day signal was made that masses of Russians were in the Redan. Thereupon the mortars were directed upon this work, and the heavy shells must have destroyed many men. There was a considerable exchange of musketry fire between the advanced trenches and the place, but the enemy did not venture out. The French on the left, who had been almost silent, now found that, in order to complete their approaches to a certain point, they also must open a general fire. This they did on the evening of the 20th, taking the enemy somewhat by surprise. While under cover of this fire they pushed forward their sap.
From this time to the end of the month there were constant alarms on the side of the Tchernaya. The French had been very active in the valley of Baidar immediately after the battle of the 16th. General d'Allonville had caused his infantry to penetrate the passes leading to the Tchernaya from the north, and establish posts of observation on the hills. At the same time the Sardinians strengthened their formidable works on Mount Hasfort, and the French constructed three batteries for guns intended to sweep the ground about the Stone Bridge. On the right they mounted twelve pieces of heavy artillery, naming the work the Raglan Battery. On the other flank they placed the same number of guns in a battery named after La Boussinière, a gallant artillery officer, distinguished at the Alma, and killed before Sebastopol. These guns looked obliquely up the road to the Mackenzie Heights. Then farther to the rear, and on the right of the road to Balaclava, they constructed a work for twelve pieces,
whose fire would sweep the whole road as far as the bridge, and named it Battery Bizot. Behind these works they re-made the old Turkish redoubts of October, 1854. Thus the Allies covered Balaclava with a triple line, the third being the now famous line of Balaclava, constituting a position as strong as any in the world.
Although it seemed improbable that the Russians would repeat the enterprise of the 16th of August, yet the information that reached headquarters, the partial disappearance of the Russians from the North Camp, the incessant flashing of signal lights from the eastern mountains to Inkermann, and from Inkermann to Sebastopol, induced the Allies to keep on the alert. General Simpson reconnoitred the whole position on the Tchernaya. The troops were under arms, both on the plateau and on the Tchernaya, long before daylight for several days, dispersing only when the sun rose. The men-of-war in the harbour of Balaclava were in readiness to take up positions whence they could do the most damage to the enemy. The splendid cavalry of the Allies turned out every day, and showed its thousands of sabres and lances in the plains of Balaclava; a spectacle gratifying to the military eye, and not encouraging to the enemy. The Highland Division took post above Kamara. The field artillery of the Allies was in constant readiness. From the hills that enfold the Baidar valley to the heights of Inkermann all was vigilance. Prince Gortschakoff, who had his army on the plateau of Mackenzie, and in the little valleys leading down towards the outposts and main position of the Allies, probably looked upon this scene, enacted daily; if he did so, what he saw must have extinguished any notion of breaking into the allied lines at any point. There was no weak place in the chain.
Nevertheless, the siege works made steady progress towards the Malakoff. There the assailants and defenders were within a few yards of each other. The Russians had a series of rifle-pits on the slope under the Malakoff Redoubt itself. The French works had approached so near that it became necessary to seize these pits, and incorporate them with the main body of the approaches. Accordingly, on the 23rd of August, a body of Zouaves worked all
day in opening a trench leading towards the pits; and in the evening the light infantry of a line regiment went in and carried them. But the Russians, determined not to lose their shelter without a struggle, dashed out of the Malakoff, and expelled the Frenchmen. The Russians, however, did not long enjoy their triumph, for the expelled troops, being supported by their comrades, returned to the assault, reconquered and held the work. The next day the enemy kept up a heavy fire on the Mamelon, in spite of the support that our batteries afforded to the French. But the onward march of the latter could not be arrested. On the evening of the 24th they seized the whole line of Russian works on the glacis. Again the enemy violently essayed to prevent the French from making good their hold. Before the morning the whole line was complete, and the French works were within thirty-four yards of the salient of the Malakoff. The efforts of the enemy were directed chiefly against the Mamelon and the approaches therefrom, the quarter, as they well knew, where their greatest peril lay. On the night of the 28th they made a lucky shot. One of their shells rolled into a magazine in the left or southern face of the Mamelon Redoubt. There were at the time 15,000 pounds of powder in the magazine. This exploded with an awful roar, awakening the whole camp, and killing or wounding 150 Frenchmen. This vast explosion of powder did not seriously damage the Mamelon; but it delayed the final assault, because the store of powder, thus expended, had to be replaced.
For the remainder of the month the trying labour of getting close to the Malakoff and Little Redan went on in the usual way. But the crisis of the long siege had now come. Neither side could bear much longer the horrible losses inflicted by this deadly strife. The Russians might endure, hoping against hope, to hold out until the winter once more became their keen ally; but the French and British felt that they must risk an assault or raise the siege.
When Prince Gortschakoff saw that the French had opened their seventh parallel within a few yards of the Malakoff, he must have felt certain that an assault would soon be attempted. He was quite as well aware as the allied generals that the Malakoff was the key of
the place. General Todleben had, from the first, shown a just appreciation of the ground, and upon those two salient and commanding points, the Flagstaff and the Malakoff, he had exhausted the resources of his art. Once firmly established in one of these, he knew that the Allies must win the city. He knew also that if the Flagstaff only were taken, he could defend the place long enough to secure a retreat; but that if the Malakoff fell before a raftbridge could be constructed, the Russians must surrender or die fighting, for the Malakoff Hill commanded the harbour. Here one cannot but admire the foresight of a general, who, while he defended his lines to the last, took early and ample precautions to secure a retreat. The great raft-bridge over that arm of the sea we call the Harbour, which is half a mile wide, was begun in July, and finished by the end of August. This stupendous work was designed and executed, no doubt, partly with the object of enabling the Russian general to pour troops rapidly into Sebastopol, but mainly to enable him to avoid capture in the last extremity. Nor was this the only work undertaken with the view of preparing against a calamity. The genius of Todleben had designed an inner line of works in rear and to the east of the Malakoff; and this must have been done only to gain time for the evacuation of the place in the event of the capture of that work.
THE FRENCH IN THE MALAKOFF. (Seep. 124.)
The Russians were quite right in assuming that an assault would be hazarded at no distant day. It was the uppermost thought in the minds of the allied generals. The approach of winter, the expenditure of men and ammunition, the vast extent of the works, the proximity of the trenches to the place, and the impossibility of pushing them farther in certain quarters, dictated imperiously a resolution to storm. General Pélissier and General Simpson, therefore, directed the principal officers of artillery and engineers to meet and report on the propriety of making an assault, and on the best means of carrying it out. They met on the 3rd of September, and drew up a memorandum. In the attack on the town, that is the French left attack, from the Flagstaff to the Quarantine, they said, the works of approach had remained for a long time stationary, and they declared that these works could not be pushed farther without causing great loss. The British had made some progress before the Redan—their works had stopped short at 200 yards from the salient angle. Here again these officers were of opinion that the approaches could not
be advanced, because serious impediments interposed; in other words, because the ground was rocky and enfiladed by several Russian batteries on both sides of the South Harbour. In front of the Malakoff, the report went on to state, the French artillery had attained a marked superiority over that of the place, and under its protection—and, as we may add, the protection of the British batteries—the approaches had arrived within five-and-twenty yards of the enemy's lines. The French were also within thirty yards of the Little Redan. Here it was impossible to work nearer, because the ground was living rock. Therefore, for these reasons, the officers decided unanimously that the moment had arrived for assaulting the place. How should this be done?
It was assumed, and justly, that if the Malakoff could be captured and held, the fall of the Karabelnaia suburb, that is, the whole space east of the South Ravine, would be inevitable. Therefore the main attack was to be directed against the Malakoff, and in order that it might be successful, while a powerful column rushed into the work itself, two other columns assailed simultaneously the Little Redan, and the long rampart or curtain connecting it with the Malakoff. But as the Allies were fighting, not against a mere garrison of limited number, but against a numerous army, and as the enemy, knowing the importance of the position, would do his uttermost to keep, or, if he lost, to regain it, so it was held to be necessary that other attacks should be simultaneously made upon the place, in order to prevent the Russians from concentrating their forces at the vital point. It was with this object that the officers of the Engineers recommended an assault by the British on the Redan, and by the French on the west or town front. These, it should ever be borne in mind, were to be subordinate assaults. It was held essential to success that the assault should be preceded by a heavy bombardment for three days. Such was the scheme devised by the principal officers of artillery and engineers of both armies on the 3rd of September. The day chosen was the 8th of September, the hour, noon exactly.
The sixth and last bombardment began at daybreak on the 5th of September. Nearly the whole of the 800 pieces of ordnance in
battery opened on the place. The sun shone brightly; a light air from the south-east blew over Sebastopol. One moment the old familiar scene was visible—the still majestic town, the serene waters of the harbour, the dark and rugged outline of the defences, the Black Sea, and the allied fleet. The next moment the rolling clouds of smoke, boiling up and extending on all sides, hid everything from view. It was the policy of the Allies to fill the mind of the enemy with doubt as to their projects, and thus force him to keep at a strained attention on all sides. Therefore it was from the 350 guns and mortars in the fifty-two batteries directed against the western face of the ramparts of Sebastopol that the most furious volleys issued. Even the official report of the British engineers calls it a "terrific cannonade." The fire from our batteries, and that of the French right, was what is called steady and careful. It was incessant but not hurried. This was calculated to make the enemy believe that the assault would be on the town front and not on the suburb, and, therefore, to keep more men in readiness in that quarter. Nevertheless, the mere weight of metal directed upon the Malakoff entirely silenced that work from the first. Upwards of 200 guns and mortars were levelled and trained to bear upon its outward faces, its embrasures, and its interior. The 7th passed like the 5th and 6th, opening with a volley along the whole four miles of batteries, then, of set purpose, dying away, and suddenly bursting forth again. The wind had changed. The smoke and dust were driven back from Sebastopol by a northern blast, and men strained their eyes in vain to catch a glimpse of the place. Yet patient watchers peering through the rifts in the sombre cloud saw enough to convince them that the enemy was suffering almost beyond endurance. At night fires were visible in several places; about eleven o'clock a magazine blew up; and at the same time a huge two-decker was burning solemnly in the Harbour. Up to this time the enemy had lost 4,000 men, exclusive of gunners, who, says Prince Gortschakoff, perished in great numbers, shot down at their guns. Hitherto the allied generals had kept secret the hour of the assault. At noon they held a fresh council, and took their last resolutions.
Now the secret was divulged. Precisely at noon of the following day the stormers were to make their rush. In order to secure uniformity of movement the staff officers met at headquarters, and set their watches in concert. Next morning General Bosquet, who had the immediate command on the Malakoff side, went into the sixth parallel; and between eleven and twelve General Pélissier took post in the Mamelon. General Codrington and General Markham were in the front of our Redan attack; and a little before noon General Simpson went to a spot selected for him by the engineers in the first parallel. With him went Sir Harry Jones.
We have already described the plan of attack; we have now to set forth the means of executing it. To ensure success in the attack on the Malakoff works, General Pélissier employed 25,000 men. There were not only the whole of the corps of Bosquet, but Mellinet's Brigade of the Imperial Guard, and Marolles' Brigade of the Reserve. MacMahon, with 5,000 men, was to storm the Malakoff Redoubt, and in support were Wimpfen's Brigade, 3,000 strong, and two battalions of the Zouaves of the Guard; thus giving 10,000 men to take and hold the Malakoff itself. General La Motterouge was entrusted with 4,300 men to storm the curtain between the Malakoff and Little Redan; and General Dulac had 4,600 wherewith to carry the Little Redan itself, and 3,000 under Marolles wherewith to make good his grip of this work, and thence carry the unfinished interior lines of defence. There was no special support allotted to La Motterouge, but General Bosquet had upwards of 3,000 men as a general reserve. In addition, two batteries of artillery were held in readiness to drive through the trenches and over the open, and take part in the combat in case they were required. On the western front General de Salles commanded. He had 18,500 men available, including Cialdini's 1,200 Italians. Levaillant, with 4,300 men, was to make two attacks on the Central Bastion, and D'Autemarre, with 5,280 men, was to furnish a support. In case of success, and when one of the storming columns had turned the Flagstaff Bastion on its proper right, D'Autemarre's division, Cialdini at its head, was to turn the proper left of the Flagstaff. The remaining troops were in
reserve. Thus Pélissier had set apart 43,000 men for the assaulting and supporting columns.
The British arrangements were not on this colossal scale. Two divisions, the Light and Second, were directed to furnish both stormers and supports. Each division supplied a covering party, a ladder party, a storming party divided into two sections, and a working party. The whole amounted to 1,600 men. The covering parties, riflemen intended to spread out and keep down the fire of the unsubdued Russian guns, were under Captain Fyers and Captain Lewes. The ladder parties, intended to be stormers as soon as they had placed their ladders, were under Major Welsford. The storming parties were under Lieutenant-Colonel Handcock, Captain Grove, Brigadier Shirley, and Colonel Windham. The supports consisted of 750 men of each division, and the remainder of both were held in reserve. Thus General Simpson had resolved to try and take the Redan by dribbling into it about 3,100 men; and the whole force he kept in hand in case of emergencies was about 4,000 more. At the same time the Highland Division was posted next to the French attack, while the Third and Fourth were held back in the rear of the right attack, and the First was under arms in camp.
The Russians had no fewer than 75,000 men in Sebastopol. There were sixteen battalions in the works on the proper left of the Malakoff, and twelve battalions in reserve on this side. In the Malakoff were four battalions and some companies, and four battalions in the Gervais Battery on its proper right. There were besides sixteen battalions in reserve. They had been called up from the town by General Chruleff, when his suspicions were aroused by the information that the French trenches seemed to be full of troops. Thus there were about 22,000 men under arms for the defence of the Malakoff system of works. In the Redan and to the right and left of it were nine battalions and sixteen in reserve. The battalions in the front line were chiefly our old foes of the Alma and Inkermann. Their numbers were about 13,000. In addition to these troops there were no fewer than 10,000 in reserve for general purposes. The total number for the defence of the line from the Barrack Battery to
the Harbour was therefore 45,000 men; or 2,000 more than were set apart by the French alone for all their attacks, and 10,000 more than the combined numbers of the English and French on the eastern side. In the town the Russians had 20,000 men, 2,000 more than the number at the disposal of General de Salles. The front line of works from the Quarantine to the Flagstaff was strongly manned; and besides the special reserves of the different bastions, there was a general reserve nearly 10,000 strong. Such a vast force, fighting behind the strongest entrenchments ever raised, was certain to be hard to conquer; and although it was divided into huge fragments, and one half was separated from the other by an arm of the sea— the South Harbour—we have shown that in mere numbers alone the Russians were in every point superior to their assailants. This should be remembered in view of what followed.
At mid-day the officers gave the signal. The clarions sounded, the drums beat, the men cried "Vivel'Empereur!" and dashing over the trenches, went headlong towards the Malakoff, the curtain, and the Little Redan. At the first rush all these places were surprised and overrun; but the attack on the great redoubt was the only one destined to be permanently successful.
The Malakoff Redoubt was a mighty keep, 380 yards long, and 160 wide; the ditch was upwards of six yards deep and seven wide, and its slope next to the work was very steep. In the interior were, first, the ground floor of the old stone tower, and then a multitude of traverses, huge ramparts of earth and timber designed to minimise the effect of shell fire. It was a closed work, that is, fortified on all sides, with one narrow opening in the rear, so that when once the assailants mastered the interior and closed the gorge the vast ramparts were defences for and not against them. This brief description will enable the reader to form some notion of the difficulties in the way of the stormers, and of the advantages which told in their favour when they had subdued the garrison. The Little Redan was also a closed work, but the long curtain connecting it with the Malakoff was exposed to the fire of the Russian second line, thrown up about 300 yards in the rear. The Great Redan was an
open work, like a very straddling V, and its flanks were well supplied with traverses. The old trace of the entrenchment, as it existed in 1854, formed a sort of low retrenchment at the open end, in no sense formidable except as affording cover behind which infantry could rally. Here, it will be observed, the disadvantages were on the side of the assailants. Although the defenders might not be able to keep their foes out, in all probability they could prevent them from remaining in, unless they entered in overwhelming numbers, and succeeded in closing the rear against the attacks of the expelled enemy. In order to make the separate scenes of the 8th of September clear, it will be necessary to treat them separately, trusting the reader to remember that several actions were fought simultaneously.
The leading troops of MacMahon's division were the 1st Zouaves and the 7th of the Line. The Zouaves darted out on the right, and the Linesmen on the left. The heads of the columns reached the deep ditch together, leapt into it without waiting for ladders, swarmed up the opposing bank, and climbing, some over the parapet, some through the embrasures, jumped into the midst of the astonished Russians. In a short space half the force of the two regiments was in the work; but the engineers had thrown a ladder bridge so swiftly over the ditch that the rear companies of the 7th were able to cross it. At the same time four companies of Chasseurs had crossed the ditch, and entering the work at its point of junction with the Gervais Battery, drove its defenders out at the point of the bayonet, and made good their hold upon the battery. The Zouaves and the Linesmen in the Malakoff had attacked with such impetuosity and in such numbers that the Russians were obliged to fight in disorder, about the base of the old White Tower. But Frenchmen rushed in on all sides. There was a brief and bloody combat. Assailed in front, turned on both flanks, unable to retreat, above a hundred Russians ran into the lower storey of the old tower, and began to fire through the loopholes. By this time the Zouaves and the 7th had driven the enemy completely out of the space round the tower. Quickly rallying, the Russians collected behind the first huge line of traverses, and, in
spite of the efforts of the French, held for awhile their ground. Foot by foot the French had gained upon them. They dashed at the openings, they wound in and out around the flanks, they crept along the parapets, and just as Vinoy's brigade was entering the work in support of Decaen, the latter's men had succeeded in forcing the enemy to seek shelter behind the second great line crossing the Malakoff at its widest part. Here the Russians rallied stronger than ever. They were plainly gathering for a rush. Hundreds had fallen on both sides, but the fury of the combat did not abate. The great French flag floated in the smoke and dust over the tower, but the Malakoff was yet to win. Until the gorge was gained and closed nothing was gained. So thought MacMahon. Vinoy was bursting in to his aid, but he determined to be secure, so he sent one of his staff for part of the Imperial Guard and Wimpfen's reserve. Before these could arrive, Vinoy, a prompt and gallant soldier, had led his men into the work and made use of them with striking skill. He had thrown the bulk of his force on the right of the assailants. With the 20th he supported the right of the Zouaves, and with the 27th, by a most soldier-like movement, he turned the Russian left. Paralysed by this rapid manœuvre, executed with unfaltering impetuosity, as soon as he saw the 27th in the rear of his left, and rapidly approaching the gorge, the enemy quitted his hold of the great line of traverses, and made for the sole exit from the redoubt. The French burst through like a flood. The more daring of the enemy turned several times, and spent their strength in brave but useless charges. Though they were swept along by the torrent of foes which streamed upon them, they made a brilliant resistance; and it was only when they felt that the 27th of the Line, so skilfully led, so relentlessly bent on gaining the gorge, would soon reach it, that they rushed out of the work. MacMahon and Vinoy swooped upon their prize, closed the gorge, and forbade all return.
THE STRUGGLE IN THE REDAN. (Seep. 126.)
During this time the French on the extreme right had fought with great bravery but adverse fortune. The parallels of approach had been pushed up close to the Little Redan, and the heads of the columns of attack were close under the work; Dulac's leading brigade, therefore, had at the appointed hour started like the rest and had at once seized the Little Redan. Somewhat later in point of time, because the distance to be overcome was greater, General La Motterouge had sent his first brigade under Bourbaki against the curtain. Here again the French succeeded. The whole line from the Malakoff to the Little Redan was in their hands. Eager to take advantage of this burst of success, the leading brigades, as soon as the supports were well up, dashed forward. Bourbaki led his men against the second line, while St. Pol, issuing from the Little Redan, sought to turn the line at its point of intersection with the rear defences of the latter work. But the Russians were now fully alive. The batteries on the north side opened on the assailants. Three war-
steamers ran up to the mouth of the Careening Bay, and poured in broadside after broadside. Field guns were promptly brought up to the second line, and used to hurl forth showers of desolating grapeshot. The Russian reserves came up, and charging the disordered columns of the French, forced them violently back— Bourbaki, as far as, and over, the curtain; St. Pol into the Little Redan. So prompt and vigorous was this counter-stroke, so deadly was the fire of the steamers, that St. Pol could not keep his hold even of the Little Redan. He was driven out, and the French, with difficulty, ensconced themselves on their own side of the curtain and in its ditch. The attempts to recover these positions were unsuccessful. Similarly on the extreme right they failed to carry the Central Bastion.
The afternoon was wearing away. The British attack on the Great Redan, which we shall presently describe, had failed. The guns on the left face of this work were shooting down the French on the slopes of the Malakoff. General Chruleff had tried by three desperate charges to break into the gorge of the key of the place, and tear away from MacMahon his blood-stained prize. But the defence was too strong. The Russians only dashed up to the gorge and tried to pull down the gabions that closed it, or endeavoured to scramble up the ramparts, to meet death from the crushing musketry fire that blazed from the parapets. A huge column had emerged from the houses, and for a moment seemed resolved to sweep the gallant Chasseurs out of the Gervais Battery. Suddenly the massive column was rent by round shot and disordered by shell, and struck in flank by musketry. The British gunners in the Quarry Battery had caught sight of this column, and in an instant had trained and fired their pieces. Finding only five guns bore upon the enemy, they tore down the sides of the other embrasures, and brought promptly seven into action. That was the source of the torrent of shot and shell. The streams of musketry rolled from the western flank of the Malakoff, and from the Chasseurs in the Gervais Battery. The column broke up under this fire and fled to the rear. Prince Gortschakoff had arrived from the north side, and scanning the Malakoff, saw that life would
be vainly wasted in further attempts to retake it. He therefore forbade them; but he ordered his generals to resist to the last on the other points.
It is now time to narrate the attack of the British on the Redan. There were in and near the work, and specially appointed to defend it, no less than, at the lowest computation, 12,000 men, exclusive of a great reserve. Against these we were about to send not altogether, stormers and supports, more than one-fourth of the number. This handful of men were expected to take and hold an open work defended by thirty-two battalions of Russian infantry. The men did not hesitate. In a few minutes the salient was won. The Light Division column had stormed in at the apex, the Second Division column had been led to the right, and had entered the work on its proper left face, some yards from the salient. Now the crisis of the combat arrived. Driven back by the impetuous charge of the British, the Russians in the salient, and on each flank ran to the rear, and collected behind the breastwork, up to which they speedily brought field artillery. The handful of British who had got in did not, unhappily, even attempt to carry the breastwork by a rush. The British soldier is a creature of habit, and he instinctively fell into his old ways. Instead of storming on, he extended himself on parapet or traverse, and began to fire. The officers saw how fatal this would prove, and tried to get the men out from cover, and to form them for a rush. In this work Colonel Windham and others were conspicuous. But it availed nothing. During this musketry combat weak supports, in disarray, arrived from the British trenches; but the Russians had now gathered in immense force. Pauloff, who commanded here, had called up about 8,000 men. Throwing these into the fight as they came up, he sent some along the flanks, while he kept a strong line, aided by field guns, behind the breastwork, and from that point directed a converging fire into the salient. Considering his numbers, the Russian general was singularly slow in his movements. But by degrees, and by sheer weight of men, his masses pressed the British closer and closer. These, firing with all their might, soon exhausted their stock of ammunition, and were forced to use stones. Then the
supports from the trenches, on reaching the salient, imitated the example of their precursors and fired until their store was gone. Colonel Windham sent three officers to beg for troops in formation. Not one reached General Codrington. This officer was perplexed and irresolute, and at length Windham arrived himself to demand a wellformed support. It was too late, assuming that such a support could have reached the Redan and have expelled its numerous garrison. Just after Windham had quitted the work on this errand, Pauloff grew emboldened by his numbers, and pressing down upon the salient, closed with the British soldiers still holding on. A short and terrible combat ensued at close quarters. Our men were unwilling to surrender the little space they had so dearly won; but the pressure of fire and steel was irresistible. The remnant of the stormers was forced over the parapet, but not away from it. There, on our side, they still hung, and were fed from the trenches by sections of men who had survived the path of fire by which alone they could reach the enemy. But this could not last long. At length the enemy made a mighty effort, and swept every British soldier from the parapet into the ditch. Those who were able to scramble up had to run the gauntlet of a fire of grape and musketry on their return to the trenches, whither they arrived breathless, bleeding, exhausted. The Russians cheered, manned their parapets, fired into the chaos of human beings weltering in heaps in the ditch, and even brought up two field-pieces, and with grape from these pursued the fugitives. For this they paid a heavy penalty. Our batteries instantly opened a deadly fire on the Redan, crushing the field-pieces at once, and smashing the masses of infantry whose numbers choked the work. But the enemy had gained his point, and had worsted the victors of the Alma and Inkermann.
LORD RAGLAN VIEWING THE STORMING OF THE REDAN AT THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.
FROM THE PAINTING BY R. CATON WOODVILLE.
By permission of Messrs. Henry Graves & Co., Ltd, Pall Mall, S.W.
[See larger version]
From his post of vantage on the Mamelon General Pélissier had witnessed our defeat; and he now sent to inquire whether General Simpson intended to renew the assault, telling him at the same time that the French were inexpugnably placed in the Malakoff. General Simpson was compelled to say that he could not renew the assault, for the trenches were full of the beaten troops; but he promised to strike at the Redan once more in the morning. The sun went down,
and in the British camp gallant men groaned in bitterness of heart over their splendid failure.
In the desperate efforts they made to recapture the Malakoff, the Russians had lost hundreds of men and several generals. At five o'clock orders for a general retreat were issued. As soon as it was dark the enemy placed bodies of riflemen and artillerymen in all the works remaining to them, and these were instructed to keep up a steady fire. Behind them were some battalions in reserve, occupying the street barricades and houses. Thus protected, the troops in the town were to march directly to the raft-bridge, and across it to the north side in regular order. Those in the suburb were to move upon the point where stood Fort Paul. Thence steamers and other craft would transport them to the great bridge. Then the reserves were to follow, and finally, at a given signal, the rear-guard were to spike the guns, fire the trains of the magazines, and beat a retreat over the bridge. All this was accomplished with great skill and celerity. The Allies were uncertain of the intentions of the enemy, and, moreover, they stood in awe of the mines supposed to exist. So all night the long and heavy columns of men, with field artillery, some of which they were obliged to throw into the sea, were passing over the bridge, which swayed to and fro under the great weight. It was a marvellous feat and forms a splendid finale to the siege; but it should be remembered that it was the retreat of an army by an unassailable line; and what is admirable in the action is the promptitude of the general's decision, and the coolness and speed with which it was executed. The town was committed to the flames and the magazines were exploded. On the 11th our guns had been brought to bear on the Russian steamers still afloat, and the enemy, to prevent us from sinking them, burnt them at night, making a second conflagration nearly as brilliant as that of the blazing town. The Russian Black Sea fleet had ceased to exist. Thus ended this now famous and unique military operation. The losses had been enormous on both sides during the last days of the siege. In four days in August the admitted loss of the enemy was 5,500 men from the brief bombardment alone. From the 22nd of
August to the 4th of September the Russians had lost upwards of 7,000 men. During the cannonade and bombardment which preceded the assault—that is, in three days—their loss was 4,000, giving a total of 16,500 men, exclusive of the artillerymen killed at their guns. On the 8th their loss, estimated by themselves, was 11,690. So that between the 16th of August and the 9th of September their force was diminished by 28,190 men killed and wounded. Included in this total, which is understated, are a few hundred "missing," but most of the missing were among the slain. The losses of the Allies, although very severe every day, were not so great. Allowing 200 a day for the last three weeks of the siege, we have a total of 4,200, and if we add to these the loss on the 8th— 7,557 for the French, and 2,610 for the British—we have a total loss of 14,367, a dear price for the prize that was won.
